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Analyticity/Syntheticity | Searle | V 18 Analyticity/Quine: e.g. I do not know whether the statement "Everything green is extended" is analytic. Searle: sophisticated: one can deny that >sense data is extended. SearleVsQuine: conversely: to show that the criteria for A are missing, we must already understand A. >Analyticity/Quine. V 19 Analyticity/SearleVsQuine: we understand analyticity, otherwise we could not find such good examples. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Anxiety | Eysenck | Corr II 119 Fear/Anxiety/study/reward/punishment/Arousability/Gray/Eysenck/GrayVsEysenck/McNaughton/Corr: Gray’s intellectual starting point is the biological component of Hans Eysenck’s theory of introversion–extraversion and neuroticism–stability. II 120 Eysenck saw introverts and extraverts as differing primarily in general conditionability (whether with reward or punishment as the reinforcer) resulting from arousability (…). In contrast, Gray suggested that they differ, instead, in specific conditionability (…), related to sensitivity to punishment (sometimes he said fear) but not reward. (…) for both theories, the most important consequence of introversion for psychiatry is high conditioning of fear. Both theories presumed that these introversion-/extraversion-based differences in socialization would lead to psychiatric disorder when combined with high levels of neuroticism, which acts like an amplification factor. [However,] the two theories differ in their predictions about conditioning via reward. Gray’s key modification (…) is to attribute variations in fear conditioning to differing sensitivities to punishment, whereas Eysenck attributes it to variations in general arousability (in the ascending reticular activating system, ARAS) and so, as a consequence, conditionability in general. Gray located punishment sensitivity (in the sense of susceptibility to fear; see Gray, 1970a, p. 255(1)) in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the septo-hippocampal system (SHS) (…). He connected PFC, SHS and ARAS in a feedback loop, controlled by ‘theta’ rhythm, and impaired by extraverting (anti-anxiety) drugs such as amylobarbitone. High arousal could generate punishment (with effects similar to those proposed by Eysenck). Conversely, high punishment sensitivity would generate high arousal in punishing situations (…) due to interaction of PFC + SHS with ARAS. II 123 Susceptibility to fear (although not always due to conditioning (…)) fitted well with a number of facts (p. 255)(1). We can easily see internalizing disorders (‘dysthymias’, e.g., phobia, anxiety and obsession) as excessive fear of one form or another. (…) trait-anxious people (neurotic introverts) condition better only if there is threat. At the other end of the scale, we can view externalizing disorders (e.g., psychopathy) as insufficient sensitivity to punishment. II 126 Reward/Punishment/Arousability/Sensitivity/Gray/McNaughton/Corr: According to Gray, arousability is a general concept that should apply to both reward and punishment. To explain activity in a ‘system whose chief function appears to be that of inhibiting maladaptive behaviour’ (p. 260)(1), general arousability needs explanation. For Gray, if we invert the causal order, it seems perfectly reasonable that higher susceptibility to the threats that abound in everyday life would lead to higher levels of arousal effects. For Gray, arousal, however it is produced, serves to invigorate behaviour (…), unless it is so intense it becomes punishing. This can give rise to paradoxical effects: for example, mild punishment will induce arousal and may invigorate reward-mediated reactions – so long as the punishment-inducing effects are smaller than the reward-inducing effects. II 127 Neuroticism/Anxiety: Taking an explicitly two-process learning approach, Gray first recasts the combination of neuroticism with introversion. If reward and punishment sensitivities are distinct, and we employ only two factors for our explanations, then high neuroticism/emotionality as normally measured must represent a combination of high reward and high punishment sensitivity. Gray’s initial equation of introversion with punishment sensitivity means that the neurotic introvert will be particularly sensitive to punishment. II 129 VsGray: The paper’s complexity may seem a trivial issue [but] even half a century later, readers (…) struggle with it. The biggest problem is that the theory spans multiple disciplines – with each integral to the whole. Gray’s detailed exposition also has some specific problems that we discuss here. At the theoretical level, his use of the terms ‘punishment’ and ‘fear’ were ambiguous: blurring key points when he shifted between one and the other conceptually. At the measurement level, while proposing a rotation of Eysenck’s axes, he did not tell us how to assess his proposed reward and punishment sensitivities (…). [Moreover] his paper focused on ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’ in the context of conditioning. He, therefore, did not discuss the third case of escape/withdrawal in any detail. However, it is via fight/flight that he included obsessive–compulsive disorder, with its compulsive rituals and obsessive rumination, within the dysthymic disorders. >Terminology/Gray, >Fear/Eysenck. 1. Gray, J. A. (1970a). The psychophysiological basis of introversion–extraversion. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 8, 249–266. McNaughton, Neil and Corr, John Philip: “Sensitivity to Punishment and Reward Revisiting Gray (1970)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 115-136. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
Arbitrage | Rothbard | Rothbard III 829 Arbitrage/Rothbard: Arbitrage gains tend to eliminate themselves and to bring about equilibrium. Arbitrage will restore the exchange rate between e.g., silver and gold to its purchasing power parity. >Purchasing power parity/Rothbard, >Near money/Rothbard. The fact that holders of gold increase their demand for silver in order to profit by the arbitrage action will make silver more expensive in terms of gold and, conversely, gold cheaper in terms of silver. The exchange rate is driven in the direction of e.g., 1:2. Purchasing power: Furthermore, holders of commodities are increasingly demanding gold to take advantage of the arbitrage, and this raises the purchasing power of gold. In addition, holders of silver are buying more commodities to make the arbitrage profit, and this action Iowers the purchasing power of silver. Hence the ratio of the purchasing powers moves from 1 in the direction of 1:3. The process stops when the exchange rate is again at purchasing power parity, when arbitrage gains cease. >Equilibrium/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
Art | Gadamer | I 57 Art/GadamerVsKant/Gadamer: [Kant's] preference of natural beauty over artistic beauty is only the other side of the lack of natural beauty in a certain statement. >Beauty/Kant, >Nature/Kant. Conversely, the advantage of art over natural beauty can be seen in the fact that the language of art is a demanding language that is not free and indeterminate in its atmospheric interpretation but addresses us in a meaningful and definite way. And it is the wonderful and mysterious thing about art that this particular demand is not a shackle for our mind, but rather opens up the scope of freedom in the play of our powers of cognition. KantVsVs/Gadamer: Kant certainly does justice to this when he says(1) that art must be "seen as nature", i.e. it must please, without betraying the compulsion of rules. I 121 Art/Gadamer: The thesis is (...) that the being of art cannot be determined as the object of an aesthetic consciousness, because conversely the I 122 aesthetic behaviour is more than it knows about itself. It is a part of the process of being of representation and belongs to the game as a game in its essence. >Representation/Gadamer, >Play/Gadamer, >Aesthetic Consciousness/Gadamer. 1. I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1799, S. 179ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Art | Kant | Gadamer I 52 Art/Beauty/Kant/Gadamer: Judging according to an ideal of beauty is (...), as Kant says, not merely a judgment of taste. Gadamer I 53 (...) to be pleasing as a work of art, something must be more than just tasteful and pleasing at the same time. Note: GadamerVsAdorno/GadamerVsJauß: Unfortunately, the Kantian analysis of taste judgement is still being misused for art theory, even by T. W. Adorno's Aesthetic Theory( (Schriften Band 7, S. 22ff.) or by H. R. Jauss (Ästhetische Erfahrung und literarische Hermeneutik. Frankfurt 1982, S. 29f.). When just now actual beauty seemed to exclude any fixation by concepts of purpose (>Beauty/Kant), then here, conversely, even a beautiful house, a beautiful tree, a beautiful garden, etc. is said to have no ideal, "because these purposes are not sufficiently defined and fixed by their concept, consequently the usefulness is almost as free as with vague beauty". Only of the human form, precisely because it alone is capable of a beauty fixed by a concept of purpose, is there an ideal of beauty! This doctrine, established by Winckelmann and Lessing(1), gains a kind of key position in Kant's foundation of aesthetics. For it is precisely this thesis that shows how little a formal aesthetic of taste (arabesque aesthetics) corresponds to the Kantian idea. >Beauty/Kant. Gadamer I 55 Kant/Gadamer: It is precisely with this classicist distinction between the normal idea and the ideal of beauty that Kant destroys the basis from which the aesthetic of perfection finds its incomparably unique beauty in the perfect meaningfulness of all being. Only now can "art" become an autonomous phenomenon. Its task is no longer the representation of the ideals of nature - but the self-encounter of man in nature and the human-historical world. Kant's proof that the beautiful is pleasing without concept does not prevent us from being fully interested only in the beautiful that appeals to us in a meaningful way. It is precisely the recognition of the concept-lessness ["Begrifflosigkeit"] of taste that leads beyond the aesthetics of mere taste.(2) >Art/Hegel, >Interest/Art/Kant, >Artwork/Kant, >Nature/Kant. Gadamer I 58 Def Art/Kant/Gadamer: Kant's definition of art as the "beautiful idea of a thing" takes this into account, insofar as even the ugly is beautiful in the representation by art. GadamerVsKant: Nevertheless, the true essence of art comes out badly in its contrast to the beauty of nature. If the concept of a thing were only represented beautifully, then this would again only be a matter of a "school-suitable" representation and would only fulfil the indispensable condition of all beauty. KantVsVs: Art, especially according to Kant, is more than a "beautiful representation of a thing"; it is a representation of aesthetic ideas, i.e. of something that is beyond all concept. The concept of genius wants to formulate this insight of Kant. >Genius/Kant. 1. Lessing, Entwürfe zum Laokoon Nr. 20 b; in Lessings Sämtl. Schriften ed. Lach- mann, 1886ff., Bd. 14, S. 415. 2. Kant explicitly says that "the judgement according to an ideal of beauty is not a is merely the judgement of taste".(K. d. U. S. 61). Vgl. dazu meinen Aufsatz Gadamer, Die Stellung der Poesie im Hegel'schen System der Künste( Hegel-Studien 21, (1986). |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Art | Schiller | Gadamer I 61 Art/Schiller/Gadamer: The grounding of aesthetic judgement on an a priori of subjectivity was to take on a whole new meaning when the meaning of transcendental philosophical reflection changed among Kant's successors. When the metaphysical background that justified Kant's preference for natural beauty and bound the concept of genius back to nature no longer exists, the problem of art arises in a new sense. >Subjectivity, >Aesthetics, >Aesthetic perception, >Aesthetic experience, >Aesthetic consciousness. Taste/Judgement/SchillerVsKant: The very way in which Schiller took up Kant's "Critique of Judgement" and used the full force of his moral-pedagogical temperament for the idea of an "aesthetic education" made the standpoint of art take precedence over the Kantian standpoint of taste and judgement. From the standpoint of art, the relationship between the Kantian concepts of taste and genius is now shifting from the ground up. The more comprehensive concept had to become that of genius - conversely, the phenomenon of taste had to devalue itself. >Genius/Kant, >Taste/Kant. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Artificial Consciousness | Adorno | XIII 144 Artificial Consciousness/Adorno: (Answer to a question from students): Machines can perform the steps of synthesis - reproduction (recollection) and recognition. >Synthesis, >Recognition, >Reproduction. XIII 145 Contrast to the idealistic concept of the "I think", which is attributed to subjects: in a subject, the set of his experiences is not interchangeable with that of another subject. >Subjectivity, >"I think", >Cogito. If one were to assume that this would be possible by means of communication in the long run, one would make the notion of egoism an extremely thin and abstract principle. >Self, >Subject. However, the model of cognitive personal consciousness itself is an abstraction. Since Descartes, the ideal of recognition is the causal-mechanical recognition. >Recognition/Adorno, >Epistemology/Adorno. XIII 146 Then one might say that the ideal of the scientific and epistemological subject is the machine. N.B.: then machines, which are difficult to distinguish from the subject, presuppose a logical cognitive subject as a condition, whereas, conversely, this logical cognitive subject does not presuppose the existence of such machines, as it is simply and intelligently evident from history. Cf. >Turing-Test. ((s) Adorno thus establishes a distinction based on genesis against indistinguishability based on characteristics and behaviors). |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
Artworks | Kant | Gadamer I 57 Artworks/Work of Art/Kant/Gadamer: difference to nature: With regard to the idea of an intelligible destiny of mankind, nature as beautiful nature gains a language that leads it to us.(1) Of course, the significance of art is also based on the fact that it appeals to us, that it presents man himself in his morally determined existence. But the products of art are only to appeal to us in this way - natural objects, on the other hand, are not to appeal to us in this way. It is precisely in this that the significant interest of natural beauty lies, that it is nevertheless able to make us aware of our moral destiny. >Interest/Kant. Art cannot convey to us this finding of the human being in unintentional reality. The fact that man meets himself in art is not a confirmation from another of his own self. GadamerVsKant: (...) [Kant] does not place the phenomenon of art below its appropriate standard. The advantage of natural beauty over artistic beauty is only the other side of the lack of a certain statement by natural beauty. Conversely, the advantage of art over natural beauty can be seen in the fact that the language of art is a demanding language that does not present itself freely and indefinitely to atmospheric interpretation, but addresses us in a meaningful and definite way. And it is the wonderful and mysterious thing about art that this particular claim is nevertheless not a shackle for our mind, but rather just opens up the scope of freedom in the play of our powers of cognition. KantVsVs: Kant does justice to this when he says(2) that art must be "regarded as nature", i.e. pleasing without betraying the compulsion of rules. Kant/Gadamer: We do not pay attention to the intentional correspondence of the portrayed person with known reality. We do not look at it to see who it resembles. We do not measure its sense of claim against a measure that is already well known to us, but on the contrary, this measure, which is "aesthetically extended" in an unlimited way, becomes "aesthetically extended".(3) Gadamer I 99 Artworks/Work of Art/Kant/Gadamer: If one is to take into account [the] criticism of the doctrine of unconscious productivity of the genius (>Artist/Gadamer), one is confronted anew with the problem which Kant had solved through the assignment of the transcendental function to the concept of genius. (>Genius/Kant, >Genius/Gadamer). What is a work of art, and how does it differ from a handcrafted product or even from a "concoction" (German: "Machwerk"), i.e. from something aesthetically inferior? For Kant and idealism the work of art defined itself as the work of genius. His distinction of being the perfectly successful and exemplary proved itself in that it offered pleasure and contemplation as well as an inexhaustible object of dwelling and interpretation. That the genius of creation corresponds to the genius of enjoyment can already be found in Kant's teaching of taste and genius, and even more explicitly in the teachings of K. Ph. Moritz and Goethe. >Taste/Kant, >Taste/Gadamer. 1. I.Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1799, § 42 2. Ebenda, S. 179f. 3. Ebenda. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Barcan-Formula | Stalnaker | I 150 Barcan formula/BF/Stalnaker: the Barcan formula involves the interaction of the universal quantifier with the necessity operator: (BF) " NF x ^ > N " x ^ F. Conversely: (CBF) N " F ^ x > " x ^ NF (Kripke 1963)(1): Kripke's semantics showed that semantic assumptions are also needed. He also showed a fallacy in the proofs that they supposedly deduced, in which these assumptions were missing. It is valid if wuU, Du < Dw, i.e. if the subject matter of the accessible possible world is a subset of the range of the output possible world - vice versa for the converse. Qualified converse of Barcan-Formula/Stalnaker: a qualified converse with the Barcon-Formula is made with the existence adoption: ( QCBF ) N "x ^ F> " x ^ N ex > F). Existence predicate e: Ey ^ (x = y ). I 151 Barcan-Formula/qualified converse/Stalnaker: if in possible world w it is necessary that everything satisfies F, then everything that must exist in w, must satisfy F in any accessible possible world, in which this individual exists. That is valid in our semantics but it is not a theorem because it is a variant of the invalid semantics. This is what we examine here. 1. S. A. Kripke, 1963. Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I Normal Modal Propositional Calculi. Mathematical Logic Quarterly Volume 9, Issue 5‐6 |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Bimetallism | Rothbard | Rothbard III 898 Bimetallism/Rothbard: Price control/relative prices: Whenever the State sets an arbitrary value or price on one money in terms of another, it thereby establishes an effective minimum price control on one money and a maximum price control on the other, the "prices" being in terms of each other. >Relative price/Rothbard. Bimetallism: This, for example, was the essence of bimetallism. Under bimetallism, a nation recognized gold and silver as moneys, but set an arbitrary price, or exchange ratio, between them. When this arbitrary price differed, as it was bound to do, from the free-market price (and this became ever more likely as time passed and the free-market price changed, while the government's arbitrary price remained the same), one money became overvalued and the other undervalued by the government. Thus, suppose that a country used gold and silver as moneys, and the government set the ratio between them at 16 ounces of silver : 1 ounce of gold. >Price control/Rothbard, >Gresham’s Law/Rothbard. Rothbard III 899 VsBimetallism: The market price, perhaps 16:1 at the time of the price control, then changes to 15:1. What is the result? Silver is now being arbitrarily undervalued by the government and gold arbitrarily overvalued. In other words, silver is fixed cheaper than it really is in terms of gold on the market, and gold is forced to be more expensive than it really is in terms of silver. The government has imposed a price maximum on silver and a price minimum on gold, in terms of each other. The same consequences now follow as from any effective price control. With a price maximum on silver, the gold demand for silver in exchange now exceeds the silver demand for gold (conversely, With a price minimum on gold, the silver demand for gold is less than the gold demand for silver). Problem: Gresham’s Law: Gold goes begging for silver in unsold surplus, while silver becomes scarce and disappears from circulation. Silver disappears to another country or area where it can be exchanged at the free-market price, and gold, in turn, flows into the country. World: If the bimetallism is worldwide, then silver disappears into the "black market," and offcial or open exchanges are made only with gold. VsBimetallism: No country, therefore, can maintain a bimetallic system in practice, since one money will always be undervalued or overvalued in terms of the other. The overvalued always displaces the other from circulation, the latter being scarce. >Gresham’s Law. Fiat money: Similar consequences follow from such price control as setting arbitrary exchange rates on fiat moneys and in setting new and worn coins arbitrarily equal to one another when they discernibly differ in weight. >Exchange rates/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
Cartesianism | Boer | I 6 Cartesianism/Dualism/Boer: a dualist might say that some things are localized in time, but not in space. Theorem (T1): follows from (P ^) and (D1) (T1) Everything that participates in the world exists. (D1) Definition "X participates/participation in the world": If X is an individual, then it exists localized in the space time, if X is a proposition, it exists and is true. If X is a state, it exists and persists. If X is a property or relation, then it exists and is exemplified. If X is an event, then it exists and X occurs. Non-actuality/Boer: would say that non-existent things can no longer participate in the world, as unexamplified properties. Therefore (D1) can be accepted by actualists as well as by non-actualists. The converse of (T1) is controversial: Tolerant actualismVs(T1). |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
Causality | Bigelow | I 264 Explanation/causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: because of impending circularity, we cannot explain causality by laws or counterfactual conditional or probability. >Circular reasoning, >Counterfactual conditionals, >Probability, >Laws, >Explanations, >Causal explanation. Counterfactual Conditional/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Conversely, counterfactual conditionals are analyzed in terms of causality. Just as necessary. >Necessity. Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Must be an unanalyzed basic concept. It is a structural universal. Fundamental forces play a major role. >Basic concepts, >Causation, >Universals, >Forces. Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are vectors. >Vectors. I 265 Causality/causation/explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: first we refute some common theories. Causation/Tradition/Bigelow/Pargetter: is often regarded as a kind of "necessary connection". Normally, this is expressed in such a way that either the cause is necessary for the effect or the effect is a necessary consequence of the cause. Then the cause is either a necessary or a sufficient condition or both. >Cause, >Effect. Weaker: some authors: it is only unlikely to find a cause without effect (or vice versa). (Probabilistic theories of causation, Lewis 1979(1), Tooley 1987)(2). >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. "Necessity Theories"/Bigelow/Pargetter: should explain on what kind of necessity they rely on. Cause/Effect/BigelowVsTradition/BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis that a cause does not have to be a sufficient or a necessary cause for an effect, the effect could have occurred without or by another cause, or without cause at all! One cannot always assume a high probability. A cause does not always have to increase the probability of an event. I 266 Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: that's what we learned from him. (HumeVsLewis). Causality/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: his conception of it has a theological background (from Descartes and Malebranche): Thesis: it could not be that God was bound by any restrictions. >Causality/Hume. Therefore, it could not be that God would be compelled to allow the effect to follow. It would always have to come out of God's free choice and be a miracle every time. Cf. >Causes/Nietzsche. Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: Hume's theory simply eliminates God. Hume simply asks us to imagine that the effect could not follow from the cause. Bigelow/Pargetter: he's right! It is not only logically possible, but also empirically possible. >Possibility, >Logical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility. Presentation/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: is for Hume the guide to the possibility. He thus swings from a theological to a psychological argument. Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: Causes are not sufficient conditions. They are not always necessary. >Sufficiency. I 267 Solution/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: inner expectations of regularities. Cause/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to Hume "sufficient" cannot be considered modal. That is, that "sufficient" must not be considered realistic. >Modalities, >Modal logic, >Realism. BigelowVsHume: Hume went too far in his rejection of necessity in laws. But not far enough in his rejection of the necessity approach of causality. 1. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76 2. Tooley, M. (1987). Causation. A realist's approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
Climate Data | Climatology | Edwards I 406 Climate data/climatology/Edwards: The purposes, priorities, sources, and character of climate data contrast with those of weather data. The purpose of climate data is to characterize and compare patterns and trends. This requires statistics - averages, maxima, minima, etc. - rather than individual observations. And climate scientists care more about measurement quality, station stability, and the completeness and length of station records than they care about the speed of reporting. >Weather data/metereology, >Climate data/Edwars, >Models/climatology, >Weather forecasting/Edwards. Climatologists use many of the same data sources as forecasters, but they also use many others. Certain kinds of data, such as precipitation measurements or paleoclimatic proxies, are crucial to climatology yet have little relevance to forecasting. Conversely, some kinds of data useful in forecasting play little or no role in climatology. For example, Doppler radar revolutionized Edwards I 407 daily precipitation forecasting, but the data it produces are of little interest to climatologists.(1) When examining pre-twentieth century and paleoclimatic data, climatologists also use numerous “proxy” sources, including data on non-meteorological phenomena that depend strongly on climatic conditions. These data can provide indirect information about past weather conditions. Examples include ice cores, harvest records, tree rings, and species ranges.(2) Edwards I 408 Data quality: To control data quality, climatologists may compare one data set with another for the same area, perhaps taken with different instruments (e.g. radiosonde vs. satellite). Metadata - information about station or instrument history, location, etc. - are crucial to this process. Edwards I 411 Temperature changes: In an influential article published in 1953, J. Murray Mitchell dissected the many causes of “long-period” temperature changes in station records, dividing them into two principal types. “Apparent” changes, such as changes in thermometer location or shelters, were purely artifactual, stemming from causes unrelated to the actual temperature of the atmosphere. “Real” changes represented genuine differences in atmospheric conditions. These could be either “directly” or “indirectly” climatic, for example resulting from shifts in the general circulation (direct) or variations in solar output (indirect). But not all “real” temperature changes reflected actual climatic shifts, since some were caused by essentially local conditions (such as urban heat islands, industrial smoke, and local foliage cover) that had nothing to do with the climates of the region or the globe.(3) >Homogenization/climatology, >Reanalysis/climatology, >Model bias/climatology. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Doppler radar can detect falling raindrops, hail, and snow, so it is commonly used for short-term precipitation forecasts. However, the amount of precipitation actually reaching the ground can differ from what radar detects in the atmosphere. For climatological purposes, actual ground-level precipitation is usually all that matters. 2. K. R. Briffa et al., “Tree-Ring Width and Density Data Around the Northern Hemisphere: Part 1, Local and Regional Climate Signals,” The Holocene 12, no. 6 (2002): 737; H. Grudd et al., “A 7400-Year Tree-Ring Chronology in Northern Swedish Lapland: Natural Climatic Variability Expressed on Annual to Millennial Timescales,” The Holocene 12, no. 6 (2002): 657; J. Esper et al., “Low-Frequency Signals in Long Tree-Ring Chronologies for Reconstructing Past Temperature Variability,” Science 295, no. 5563 (2002): 2250–; J. R. Petit et al., “Climate and Atmospheric History of the Past 420,000 Years from the Vostok Ice Core, Antarctica,” Nature 399 (1999): 429–; T. L. Root et al., “Fingerprints of Global Warming on Wild Animals and Plants,” Nature 421, no. 6918 (2003): 57–; T. L. Root and S. H. Schneider, “Ecology and Climate: Research Strategies and Implications,” Science 269, no. 5222 (1995): 334; I. Chuine et al., “Back to the Middle Ages? Grape Harvest Dates and Temperature Variations in France Since 1370,” Nature 432 (2004): 289–. 3. 13. J. M. Mitchell, “On the Causes of Instrumentally Observed Secular Temperature Trends,” Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 10, no. 4 (1953): 244–. |
Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013 |
Collectives | Olson | Brocker I 475 Collectives/Olson: Olson's starting question is why some groups succeed in providing public goods while others fail. >Communicative Action/Olson. Def Group/Olson: a number of actors who share a common interest.(2) Members may also have their own particular interests. A group is interested in the production of a collective good.(1) Brocker I 476 Thesis 1: The common interest in a good does not necessarily lead to joint action for the production of that good. Brocker I 479 Thesis 2: It is easier for small and/or privileged groups to provide public goods than large and/or latent groups. Problem: it can come to the exploitation of more interested members by less interested members. Brocker I 480 Groups/Olson: small groups have the advantage that the individual contributions are perceived more strongly. Free riding can be punished. Brocker I 485 Thesis: In large groups, selective incentives are needed to make the production of collective goods possible. Public goods are created as an unintended by-product of rational action. For example, lobbying can be seen as a by-product of organisations capable of mobilising a latent group through 'selective incentives'.(2) Conversely, an organisation could not offer potential members an incentive to become members if it serves no other purpose than to provide the public good: "Only an organisation that also sells private or non-collective goods or provides individual members with beneficial social or recreational facilities would have such positive incentives" (3). Solution/Olson: When organizations have selective incentives, they develop a robustness and stability that enables them to survive. 1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968)., p. 7 2. Ibid. p. 130f. 3. Ibid. p. 131 Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOlson I Mancur Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Colonialism | Kant | Höffe I 315 Colonialism/Kant/Höffe: Kant's world citizenship consists of a well-determined right of cooperation, namely a right to visit, not a right to hospitality: whether individuals, groups, companies or states, even religious communities - they are all allowed to "knock" elsewhere, but have no right to enter. In particular, they are not allowed to kill, enslave or rob the one who knocks, nor, conversely, are they allowed to subjugate, exploit or enslave the natives. Colonialism: In this context, the colonial policy of the time is strongly condemned without compromise. The "injustice" that the "acting states of our part of the world" did to foreign countries and peoples goes "to the point of horror", because "the inhabitants there reckoned them for nothing".(1) >Freedom/Kant, Cf. >Postcolonialism. 1. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 1795 |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
Competence | Dummett | II 100 Abilities/superhuman/Dummett: our image of a super being that has direct insight into counterfactual things does not provide a picture of what these abilities actually consist of. >Superhuman. I 154/155 Meaning/competence/Dummett: meaning does not have to be explained by understanding! (Speakers have no explicit theory). - But also: DummettVsWittgenstein: control is more than a practical skill. III (b) 68 Speech/control/propositional knowledge/Dummett: there is usually little difference between knowledge of P and knowledge of the truth of the sentence. >Judgments. But propositional knowledge is not sufficient for language proficiency. - Propositiponal knowledge is not sufficient for word understanding. Knowledge of a single proposition is not sufficient for understanding of words. - ((s) The word must be able to appear in several contexts.) - ((s) Converse to substitution principle). III (c) 119 Translation theory/Dummett: does not explain the command of the native language. III (c) 117f Theory of meaning/Dummett: from a theory of truth (axioms like ""earth" denotates earth") - but meaning is more than knowledge of the axioms: Knowledge of the (corresponding) propositions. - From knowledge of the truth theory follows the ability of language as a whole, not sentence by sentence. -> Holism. Knowledge of the propositions is not available in lists. >Lists, >Knowledge, >Propositional knowledge. III (c) 133 Meaning Theory: Knowledge of reference is not sufficient for language proficiency. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Copula | Quine | I 175 The general term is a predicate. It can take on the position of the adjective or the verb just as well as that of a noun. One could even regard the verb as a basic form, because it gets along without "is". ((s) But not "wisdom socratized", see >Things/Strawson, >Names/Strawson). The copula "is" can therefore simply be explained as a prefix. I 211 Copula/Quine: the combination "is a", which we have treated as a copula, can now be treated as particles to form an indefinite singular term: Composition of "is" and "a". E.g. "Agnes is a lamb" is then no longer seen as "Fa" but as "a=b", whereby "b" stands for an indefinite singular term of the form "an F". "Agnes bleats" and "Agnes is docile" retain the form "Fa" and the "is" retains here the status of a copula for the conversion of adjectives into verbs. But the "is" in "is a lamb" becomes "=". The equation "x = a" is now actually analyzed as a predication "x = a", whereby "=a" forms the verb. The "F" of "Fx". What used to mean "x = Socrates" is still called the same now in words but now the "=" or "is" copula as in "is mortal" or "is a human" merely serves to give the verb form to the general term and adapts it to the predicative position. Socrates becomes a general term that applies exactly to an object, but is general in that from now on it is grammatically permitted for the predicative position, but not for positions that are suitable for variables; "Socrates" then plays the role of "F" in "Fa" and no longer that of "a". II 204 Copula: Plural "excl" ("none are"). These are not singular (two-digit general terms which connect pairs of classes). XIII 36 Copula/is/Quine: Example: avoidance of "is": "You green in winter". Color word/Color words/Sentence construction/Word order/Predicate/Japanese/Quine: in Japanese color words are always placed at the beginning. N.B.: this means that Japanese color words coincide in form and grammatical behavior with the multitude of Japanese words that we call verbs when we translate Japanese. (see above: example "greenest"). XIII 37 Adjective/Quine: even in English they do not differ from intransitive verbs, but we use them attributively, e.g. green tree. ((s) instead of "The tree is green"). Semitic languages/Quine: allow forms like "you green in winter": i.e. the predicate stands as a verb without the help of a copula. Copula/Quine: is often used to structure sentence parts clearly. Example: telegram: "How old Gary Grant - Old Gary Grant very well - how you? The copula then serves to distinguish "how old is" from "how is old". Predicative/attributive/predicate/attribute/Quine: the adjective is predicative here, in the other case attributive. In other languages this may be distinguished by the word forms or the sentence order. Predication/Copula/Quine: the "is" of predication has a converse: the ing-form: one transforms adjectives into verbs, the other vice versa. Example "you are reading" to "you read". >Predication/Quine; cf. >Equal sign. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Correctness | Plato | Gadamer I 350 Correctness/Truth/Formalism/Sophistry/Plato/Gadamer: [Plato has] clearly seen (...) that there is no criterion that is sufficient for argumentation, by which truly philosophical use of speech can be distinguished from sophistic use. In particular, he shows in Letter 7 that the formal refutability of a thesis does not necessarily exclude its truth.(1) Cf. >Reflection/Gadamer, >Reflection/Hegel, >Sophists/Plato. Gadamer I 412 Correctness/Word/Language/Thinking/Plato/Gadamer: If one (...) sees (...) the dispute about the "correctness of names" as it is settled by "Cratylos"(2-4), then the theories under discussion there (>Word/Plato, >Names/Plato, >Language/Plato) suddenly gain an interest that goes beyond Plato and his own intention. For both theories, which the Platonic Socrates brings to failure, are not weighed in their full truth weight. A. Conventionalist theory attributes that of words to a naming, a baptism of things in a name, as it were. ((s) Cf. today's >Causal theory of names.) For this theory, the name apparently does not claim any objective knowledge - and now Socrates convicts the advocate of this sober view by allowing him or her, from the difference between the true and the false Logos, to admit the components of the Logos, the words (onomata), as true or false, and also the naming as a part of speaking to refer to the discovery of being (ousia) happening in speaking(4). Gadamer I 413 This is such an assertion that is so incompatible with the conventionalist thesis that it is easy to infer from there, conversely, that the true name and the correct naming is decisive. Socrates himself admits that the understanding of the name thus obtained leads to an etymological intoxication and to the most absurd consequences (...). B. Similarity Theory: (...) its discussion [adheres] entirely within the preconditions of "natural theory", namely to the principle of similarity, and resolves the same only by gradual restriction. For if the "correctness" of names should really be based on the correct, i.e. appropriate, naming of things, even then, as with every such measurement, there are still degrees and gradations of correctness. Now, if only that little bit of rightness still reflects the outline (typos) of the thing in itself, it may be good enough to be useful.(6) But you have to be even more far-reaching. A word can also be understood, obviously out of habit and agreement, if it contains sounds that are not at all similar to the thing - so that the whole principle of similarity is shaken and refuted by examples such as the words for numbers. There, no similarity can be allowed at all, because numbers do not belong to the visible and moving world, so that for them the principle of agreement obviously applies alone. Solution/Plato: The convention, which is presented in practical language and which alone determines the correctness of the words, may make use of the principle of similarity wherever possible, but it is not bound by it.(7) Recognition/Language/Words/Plato: This is a very moderate point of view, but it includes the fundamental premise that words have no real cognitive meaning - a result that points beyond the whole sphere of words and the question of their correctness to the recognition of the matter. Gadamer: This is obviously what Plato alone is concerned with. Gadamer I 414 The handling of the matter at issue here is the revelation of the thing meant. The word is correct when it brings the thing to the point of representation, that is, when it is a representation (mimesis). Now, it is certainly not an imitative representation in the sense of a direct depiction, so that the phonetic or visible appearance would be depicted, but it is the being (ousia), that which is appreciated by the designation to be (einai), which is to be made manifest by the word. Gadamer: But the question is whether the terms used in the conversation, the terms of mimema or deloma understood as mimema, are correct. It is certainly in the nature of mimema that something other than what it represents itself is also represented in it. Mere imitation, "to be like", therefore always contains the possibility for reflection on the distance of being between imitation and model. Neither true nor false/Cratylos: [Cratylos] is quite right when he says that as far as a word is a word, it must be "right", a correctly "lying" (here: to lie down) one. If it is not, that is, if it has no meaning, then it is a mere sounding ore(8). There is really no point in speaking of "wrong" in such a case. ((s) Cf. >Truth value gap). 1. This is the meaning of the difficult exposition of 343 c d, for which the deniers of the authenticity of the 7th letter must accept a second, nameless Plato. (Cf. my detailed presentation "Dialectic and Sophism" in the VII Platonic Letter (vol. 6 of the Ges. Werke, pp. 90-115).21. Krat. 384 d. 3. Krat. 388 c. 4. Krat. 438 d-439 b. 5. Krat. 385 b, 387 c. 6. Krat. 432 a ff. 7. Krat. 434 e. 8. Krat. 429 loc, 430 a. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Correspondence Theory | Davidson | Rorty I 328 Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: for Davidson it is a relation without ontological preferences, it can connect any words with any object. Nature prefers no mode of presentation. (VsAnthropic Principle). Rorty VI 134 Correspondence: does not add anything enlightening to the simple concept of being true. Perhaps we should rather say "mostly true" and admit that people have different views on questions of detail. Match/Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: does not add anything intelligible to the concept of "being true". Horwich I 497 DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/VsCausal Theory of Reference/DavidsonVsKripke: if, conversely, reference was fixed by a physical relation, the correspondence between the two correspondences would need an explanation - because according to causal theory it would be possible that we often refer to things that we cannot reliably report - then it would be an empirical ((s) contingent) fact that our beliefs are mostly true. >Beliefs/Davidson. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Cosmopolitanism | Kant | Höffe I 299 Cosmopolitanism/Kant/Höffe: Kant's thinking has, historically speaking, Greek, Roman and Christian roots, but in this respect it is clearly European. From them, however, he develops a philosophy that transcends all European borders and is truly capable of globalization. Averse to any Eurocentric arrogance, the philosopher cultivates a cosmopolitanism that pervades all of his thinking: the theory of knowledge, of morality and of the unity of nature and morality, the philosophy of education, of art, of history and, above all, of law, state and politics. This comprehensive cosmopolitanism is facilitated and at the same time saturated with reality by a curiosity that is directed at almost all objects, thus leading to an extraordinarily rich knowledge of the world. Höffe I 315 Cosmopolitanism/Kant/Höffe: Kant's philosophy of public law reaches its conclusion, at the same time the completion of the Definitive Article 3(1), with the newly introduced world civil law. Since it does not replace "national" civil law, but rather complements it, he does not advocate an exclusive but a complementary cosmopolitanism. World Citizenship: The Kantian World Citizenship consists of a well defined right of cooperation, namely a right to visit, not a right to be a guest: whether individuals, groups, companies or states, even religious communities - they are all allowed to "knock" elsewhere, but have no right to enter. In particular, they are not allowed to kill, enslave or rob the one who knocks, nor, conversely, are they allowed to subjugate, exploit or enslave the natives. Colonialism: In this context, the colonial policy of the time is strongly condemned without compromise. The "injustice" that the "trading states of our part of the world" did to foreign countries and peoples goes "to the point of horror", because "the inhabitants there reckoned them for nothing". >Freedom/Kant. 1. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 1795 |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
Counterfactual Conditionals | Fraassen | I 13 Counterfactual conditional/Fraassen: objectively neither true nor false. I 115f Counterfactual conditionals/Fraassen: truth conditions use similarities between possible worlds: "If A, then B" is true in possible world w iff B is true in most similar world to w in which A is also true. - Similarity: is again context-dependent E.g. "Three Barbers"/Carroll: one in three must always be there: 1) if A is ill, B must accompany him, but 2) if C is gone as well, B has to stay there. Contradiction: if A is ill, B must be there and gone. VsCarroll: 1) and 2) are not in contradiction. Material conditional: "either B or not A". Solution/Fraassen: everyday language: not material conditional. >Everyday language. Solution/Fraassen: Context Dependency: 1) is true if we only consider the illness, 2) is true if we only consider the shop - general: what situation is more like ours? -> Lewis: E. g. Bizet/Verdi, Similarity Metrics. I 118 FraassenVsCounterfactual conditionals: but they are no solution here: scientific statements are not context-dependent. Therefore science implies no counterfactual conditionals (if they, as I believe, are context-dependent. Counterfactual Conditionals/Laws of Nature/Reichenbach/E. Goodman: only laws, not general statements imply counterfactual conditionals. - Therefore they are a criterion for laws. FraassenVsGoodman, E.: conversely: if laws imply counterfactual conditionals, it is because they are context-dependent. >Context. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
de re | Wiggins | II 293 de re must/Wiggins: thesis: in order to keep (4)(x)(y)[(x = y)> N(y = x)] away from opaque contexts, we have to presume must de re: E.g. "the number of planets that is 9, must be greater than 7." If we apply this on the relation of the identity (lx)(ly)(x = y) we get necessarily [(lx)(ly)(x = y)] or the relation which has all r and all s if they are necessarily identical. Then variant of (4): (4l)(x)(y)(x = y) > (y has(Iz)[[necessary[(lr)(ls)[s = r]]],[x, z]])). That needs the contingency theory: then the definition of "is necessarily identical with" depends no longer on the possible world. >Possible worlds, >Necessity. Problem: this might not exist in English. II 309f Necessity de re/Wiggins: Problem: E.g. certainly Caesar can be essentially a person, without being essentially in that way so that each sequence with Caesar satisfies in second place: (Human(x2)) Reason: it could be that "human" would not have meant "human". --- II 310 General problem: asymmetry, de re. E.g. Kripke: Elizabeth II is necessarily (de re), the daughter of George VI. But George VI does not necessarily have to have a daughter. E.g. Chisholm: if a table T has a leg L, then T must have L de re as part. But, to say of the table, that it necessarily consists of substructure and board, is not the same as to say that substructure and board are necessarily parts of the table - and also not that the board is necessarily connected to the substructure. Wiggins: nevertheless, if anything is certain, it is this: [(lx)(ly)[xRy] = [(ly)(lx)[y converse-Rx] It would be a perverse extreme in the other direction, if one wanted to banish the corresponding biconditional from the truth theory for L. Wiggins: no matter what one thinks of this mereological essentialism, it means that when the legs exist, the rest of the table needs not to exist. >Essentialism, >Mereology, >Mereological essentialism. Solution: more specific description of the essential properties, e.g. trough points in time: (t)(table exists at t)> (leg is part of table at t)) then necessary[(ly)(lw)[(t)((y exists at t) > (w is part of y at t)))], [table, leg]. II 311 That secures the desired asymmetry. Problem: There is a problem because the existential generalization does not work for the necessity-of-origin doctrine. More general solution: distinction: wrong: [Necessary[(lx) (ly)(x consists of y], [leg, table] There are undesirable consequences for existence that would be proven through it. And [Necessary [(lx) (x consists of table], [leg] this is also wrong. And finally: [Necessary (ly)(leg consists of y], [table] What is right or false depending on whether Kripke or Chisholm is right. >Necessity, >Necessity/Kripke. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
Demand for Money | Rothbard | Rothbard II 166 Demand for money/prices/Rothbard: (…) partial ‘real’ factors - such as government expenditures abroad, a sudden scarcity of food, or ‘a sudden diminution of the confidence of foreigners, in consequence of any great national disaster’ - could influence overall prices or the status of the pound in the foreign exchange market. But (…) such influences can only be trivial and temporary. The overriding causes of such price or exchange movements - not just in some remote ‘long run’ but a all times except temporary deviations - are monetary changes in the supply of and demand for money. Changes in ‘real’ factors can only have an important impact on exchange rates and general prices by altering the composition and the height of the demand for money on the market. But since market demands for money are neither homogeneous nor uniform nor do they ever change Rothbard II 167 equiproportionately, real changes will almost always have an impact on the demand for money. Salerno: ... since real disturbances are invariably attended by ‘distribution effects’, i.e. gains and losses of income and wealth by the affected market participants, it is most improbable that initially nonmonetary disturbances would not ultimately entail relative changes in the various national demands for money...[U]nder inconvertible conditions, the relative changes in the demands for the various national currencies, their quantities remaining unchanged, would be reflected in their long-run appreciation or depreciation on the foreign exchange market.(1) >Price theory/Rothbard. Rothbard III 756 Demand for money/Rothbard: The total demand for money on the market consists of two parts: Exchange demand: the exchange demand for money (by sellers of all other goods that wish to purchase money) and Reservation demand: the reservation demand for money (the demand for money to hold by those who already hold it). Because money is a commodity that permeates the market and is continually being supplied and demanded by everyone, and because the proportion which the existing stock of money bears to new production is high, it will be convenient to analyze the supply of and the demand for money in terms of the total demand-stock analysis (…). In contrast to other commodities, everyone on the market has both an exchange demand and a reservation demand for money. A. Exchange Demand Exchange demand: The exchange demand is his pre-income demand. As a seller of labor, land, capital goods, or consumers' goods, he must supply these goods and demand money in exchange to obtain a money income. >Production factors, >Income, >Goods, >Production. Demand: Aside from speculative considerations, the seller of ready-made goods will tend, (…) to have a perfectly inelastic (vertical) supply curve, since he has no reservation uses for the good. Rothbard III 757 Supply: But the supply curve of a good for money is equivalent to a (partial) demand curve for money in terms of the good to be supplied. Exchange demand: Therefore, the (exchange) demand curves for money in terms of land, capital goods, and consumers' goods will tend to be perfectly inelastic. >Elasticity/Rothbard. Labour: Some people might work a greater number of hours because they have a greater monetary inducement to sacrifice leisure for labor. Others may decide that the increased income permits them to sacrifice some money and take some of the increased earnings in greater leisure. In both cases, the man earns more money at the higher wage rate.(…) Therefore, a man’s backward-sloping supply curve will never be “backward” enough to make him earn less money at higher wage rates. Rothbard III 758 „Buying money“/market: Thus, a man will always earn more money at a higher wage rate, less money at a Iower. But what is earning money but another name for buying money? And that is precisely what is done. People buy money by selling goods and services that they possess or can create. Demand schedule for money: We are now attempting to arrive at the demand schedule for money in relation to various alternative purchasing powers or "exchange-values" of money. Exchange value of money: A Iower exchange-value of money is equivalent to higher goods-prices in terms of money. Conversely, a higher exchange-value of money is equivalent to Iower prices of goods. Labour/wages: In the labor market, a higher exchange-value of money is translated into Iower wage rates, and a Iower exchange-value of money into higher wage rates. Labour market: Hence, on the labor market, our law may be translated into the following terms: The higher the exchange-value of money, the Iower the quantity of money demanded; the Iower the exchange-value of money, the higher the quantity of money demanded (i.e., the Iower the wage rate, the less money earned; the higher the wage rate, the more money earned). Therefore, on the labor market, the demand-for-money schedule is not vertical, but falling, when the exchange-value of money increases, as in the case of any demand curve. Exchange demand for money: Adding the vertical demand curves for money in the other exchange markets to the falling demand curve in the labor market, we arrive at a falling exchange-demand curve for money. B. Reservation Demand Reservation demand: More important, because more volatile, in the total demand for money on the market is the reservation demand to hold money. This is everyone's post-income demand. After everyone has acquired his income, he must decide, between the allocation of his money assets in three directions: a) consumption spending, b) investment spending, and c) addition to his cash balance ("net hoarding"). Furthermore, he has the additional choice of subtraction from his cash balance ("net dishoarding"). How much he decides to retain in his cash balance is uniquely determined by the marginal utility of money in his cash balance on his value scale. >Cash balance/Rothbard. Reservation demand curve for money: (…) the higher the PPM (purchasing power of money; the exchange-value of money), the lower the quantity of money demanded in the cash balance. >Purchasing power/Rothbard. As a result, the reservation demand curve for money in the cash balance falls as the exchange-value of money increases. This falling demand curve, added to the falling exchange-demand curve for money, yields the market's total demand curvefor money - also falling in the familiar fashion for every commodity. Rothbard III 762 Equilibirum/purchasing power: Suppose (…) that the PPM (purchasing power of money) is slightly higher (…). The demand for money at that point will be less than the stock. People will become unwilling to hold money at that exchange-value and will be anxious to sell it for other goods. These sales will raise the prices of goods and Iower the PPM, until the equilibrium point is reached. On the other hand, suppose that the PPM is Iower (…). In that case, more people will demand money, in exchange or in reservation, than there is money stock available. The consequent excess of demand over supply will raise the PPM again (…). >Purchasing power parity/Rothbard. Rothbard III 766 Economic law: Every supply of money is always utilized to its maximum extent, and hence no social utility can be conferred by increasing the supply of money. >Money supply/Rothbard, >Money supply/David Hume. Economists have attempted mechanically to reduce the demand for money to various sources(2) RothbardVsKeynes: There is no such mechanical determination, however. Each individual decides for himself by his own standards his whole demand for cash balances, and we can only trace various influences which different catallactic events may have had on demand. >Speculative Demand, >Clearing/Rothbard. Rothbard III 772 Demand for money/Rothbard: Is the demand for money unlimited? A popular fallacy rejects the concept of "demand for money" because it is allegedly always unlimited. This idea misconceives the very nature of demand and confuses money with wealth or income. the form of holding back the good from being sold. (…) effective demand for money is not and cannot be unlimited; it is limited by the appraised value of the goods a person can sell in exchange and by the amount of that money which the individual wants to spend on goods rather than keep in his cash balance. Purchasing power: Furthermore, it is, of course, not "money" per se that he wants and demands, but money for its purchasing power, or "real" money, money in some way expressed in terms of what it will purchase. (This purchasing power of money (…) cannot be measured.) >Time preference/Rothbard, >Price/Rothbard. Rothbard III 775 Value of cash balances: The only necessary result (…) of a change in the demand-for-money schedule is precisely a change in the same direction of the proportion of total cash balances to total money income and in the real value of cash balances. Given the stock of money, an increased scramble for cash will simply Iower money incomes until the desired increase in real cash balances has been attained. If the demand for money falls, the reverse movement occurs. The desire to reduce cash balances causes an increase in money income. Total cash remains the same, but its proportion to incomes, as well as its real value, declines.(3) 1. Joseph Salerno. 1980. ‘The Doctrinal Antecedents of the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments’ (doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University, 1980), pp. 299-300. 2. J.M. Keynes’ Treatise on Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1930) is a classic example of this type of analysis. 3. Strictly, the ceteris paribus condition will tend to be violated. An increased demand for money tends to Iower money prices and will therefore Iower money costs of gold mining. This will stimulate gold mining production until the interest return on mining is again the same as in other industries. Thus, the increased demand for money will also call forth new money to meet the demand. A decreased demand for money will raise money costs of gold mining and at least Iower the rate of new production. It will not actually decrease the total money stock unless the new production rate falls below the wear-and-tear rate. Cf. Jacques Rueff, "The Fallacies of Lord Keynes' General Theory" in Henry Hazlitt, ed., The Critics ofKeynesian Economics (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1960), pp. 238-63. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
Descartes | Heidegger | Gadamer I 274 Heidegger's proof that in the concept of spirit in Hegel and of consciousness in Descartes, the Greek ontology of substance prevails, which interprets being as being present and in the present (... ) certainly goes beyond the self-understanding of modern metaphysics, but not arbitrarily, but from an "intention" (>Seinsfrage) that actually makes this tradition understandable by revealing the ontological premises of the concept of subjectivity. Understanding/Heidegger: So it is not at all a matter of securing oneself against the tradition that raises its voice from the text, but on the contrary, to keep away what can prevent one from understanding it from the point of view of its content. It is the obscure prejudices, whose dominion makes us deaf to the thing that speaks in tradition. Kant/Heidegger: Conversely, Heidegger discovers in Kant's critique of "dogmatic" metaphysics the idea of a metaphysics of finiteness, against which his own ontological design has to prove itself. >Understanding/Heidegger. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Dialetheism | Priest | Field II 145 Dialethism/Priest/Paradoxa/Field: (Priest 1998): Thesis: the sentence of the liar as well as its negation are both assertable (and also their conjunction). The rules of the logic are weakened (> stronger/weaker; >strength of theories), so that not every assertion can be asserted by this. Most attractive variant: builds on Kleene's trivalent logic. Trivalent logic/Kleene/Priest/Field: Priest assumes here that the valid inferences are those that guarantee "correct assertion". But an assertion is only correct if it has one of the two highest truth values in the truth value table. Curry paradox: is thus excluded, since the only conditional in this language is the material conditional. Material conditional/Field: the material conditional is defined by ~ and v. It does not fully support the modus ponens in the logic of Kleene/Priest. Liar/KleeneVsPriest: (and other "deviant" sentences): have truth-value gaps. But there are no agglomerations of truth values. Deviating Sentence: E.g. Liar sentence, has no truth-value agglomerations but truth-value gaps. Liar/PriestVsKleene: (and other deviating sentences): have, conversely, truth-value agglomerations and no gaps. Problem/Kleene: here one cannot establish an equivalence between "p" and "p" is true! For to assert a truth-value gap in a sentence "A" would be to assert: "~ [true ("A") v true ("~A")]" and this should be equivalent to "~ (A v ~ A)". But one sentence of this form can never be legitimate in Kleene. Truth-value gap/logical form/Field: to assert a truth-value gap in a sentence "A" would mean to assert: "~ [true ("A") v true ("~ A")]" and this should be equivalent to "~ (A v ~ A)". Solution/Priest: if "A" is a deviating sentence, this is then a correct assertion in Priest. Also the assertion of the absence of a truth-value agglomeration in a sentence "A" would be the assertion "~ [(true ("A") u true ("A)"]" which should be equivalent to "~(a u ~A)". Kleene cannot claim this absence for deviant sentences, Priest can do this. |
Pries I G. Priest Beyond the Limits of Thought Oxford 2001 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Distributive Justice | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 223 Distributive Justice/Political philosophy/Lamont: the conceptual terrain produced by modern theories of distributive justice is multi-dimensional. One way to gain insights is to view the different theories according to the importance they afford the competing considerations of welfare (or utility) and responsibility, since the relative importance of these considerations is a constant theme in political discussion throughout the world. a) At one end of the spectrum, a utilitarian approach to the distributive problem would identify welfare as the only morally relevant consideration in the design of distributive systems, with other moral considerations, including responsibility, entering the calculation not at all, or only in so far as they increase welfare. >Utilitarianism. b) Alternatively, an approach with responsibility as the primary moral consideration would endeavour to allocate goods and services only on the basis of factors for which individuals are fully responsible. Institutions: (...) the distributive institutions under such an approach would be designed to reduce the influence of factors that are the converse of responsibility, those over which people have little or no control (...). >Institutional utilitarianism/Gaus, >Institutions, >Institutionalization. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
Each/All/Every | Strawson | I 200 "Any"/"all"/"nobody"/"nothing"/"something"/Strawson: these are all either singular nouns (A-expressions) or end with a singular relative pronoun. Like nouns in the singular they do not have the character of B-expressions (predicates), and cannot occur in such places. A-expressions/Strawson: nouns in singular B-expressions/Strawson: predicates I 201f Difference A/B/Strawson: a series of statements can contain a constant B (predicate) and variable A-elements (singular nouns). It could follow a statement that contains the same B-element but d no A. Conversely: from this finding could none of the previous findings follow - i.e. in place of the A can occur variables. - (Quine ditto). Cf. >Singular terms/Brandom, >Predicates/Brandom. >Universal Quantification, >Existential quantification, >Domain, >Individuation, >Identification, >Reference, >Someone/Geach. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
Economic Policies | Political Philosophy | Mause I 304 Economic Policy/Political Theories: Many politicians argue that money and the financial markets should be decoupled from the real economy. This thesis was widely discussed in political science in the 1980s and 1990s (including Strange 1988).(1) Vs: In recent years, the "counter-argument" that, conversely, financial markets of the real economy determine the heartbeat and thereby both systems show increasing similarities and interlocking possibilities (Overbeck and van Apeldoorn 2012)(2). >Economy, >Financial markets. 1. Susan Strange, States and markets, 2. Aufl. London/ New York 1988. 2. Henk Overbeek & Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Hrsg. Neoliberalism in Crisis. International Political Economy Series. Houndmills/ Basingstoke/ Hampshire 2012. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
Epistemology | Berkeley | I 213 Knowledge/Berkeley/VsLocke: if our knowledge is based only on feelings, it must be shown conversely, how the outside world may be the result of a production, which is based solely on our sensory perceptions. 1. Perception must be purified from all mind ingredients 2. Reality must not become a figment of imagination. >Knowledge, >Reality, >World, >Perception. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
Epistemology | Quine | XII 86/87 Epistemology/Quine: a) conceptual side: is explanation of terms by terms. b) applicability/validity: by truth. II 35 Epistemology is about the question of how we animals managed to produce this ((s) highly differentiated) science in view of the sketchy neural input. This study shows that shifts due to the representative function would not have done any less justice to this input. This does not mean rejecting ontology. We can refuse them! II 36 Truth must not be confused with evidence. Truth is intrinsic and there is nothing about it. See also >Naturalized Epistemology. V 15 Berkeley/Traditional Epistemology: Problem: how do we know that there are objects and that science is true? V 16 Quine: the introduction of the physical sense organs would have appeared to them as a circle. V 17 Epistemology/Quine: the emancipated epistemologist works as an empirical psychologist (with >stimuli instead of >sense data, but without >gestalt theory.) VsGestalt Theory: it is about the connection of stimuli with receptors, not with consciousness. V 38 Epistemology/Quine: main question: if our theory of the outside world is true, how could we ever come up with it? X 12 Inductive Logic/Quine: is indistinguishable from epistemology. X II 86 Epistemology/Quine: we can look at it here analogous to mathematics: just as mathematics should be reduced to logic or to logic + set theory, so should empirical knowledge be somehow based on sensory experience. XII 87 a) conceptual side: is there to explain the concept of the body from the sensory experience b) (validity, truth): is there to justify our knowledge of nature from the sensory experience. Epistemology/Hume: a) conceptual side: here he equated it immediately with sensory experiences. I.e. an apple is a new apple in every moment. b) Validity, truth: Hume failed here and we still have no solution. Problem: general statements as well as singular statements about the future gain nothing in certainty by being understood as if they were talking about sensory impressions. Quine: We are still facing the same problem as Hume. On the conceptual side, however, progress was made. Solution: Bentham: XII 88 Def Theory of Fiction/Context Definition/Entire Sentences/Word/holophrastic/Bentham/Quine: Bentham discovered the Def Context Definition/Bentham/Quine: (Vs normal definition): to explain a term we do not need to specify a reference object, not even a synonymous word or phrase, we just need to show how to translate all complete sentences containing the term. Epistemology/Quine: apart from context theory, epistemology was enriched by set theory. Then you do not have to equate bodies with sense data or context definitions: XII 89 Def Object/Quine: Solution: Objects as sets of sets of sensations; then there may be a category of objects that enjoy the very qualities that bodies are supposed to have. Vs: this is not as untouchable as the context definition. Because of the recourse to the problematic ontology of quantities. Epistemology/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements and statements about the future are uncertain if they are understood to be about sense data or sensory impressions) is still unsolved today. Carnap/Quine: his constructions would have made it possible to translate all sentences about the world into sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observation terms does not mean that it can be proven with logical and set-theoretical means from observation sentences. ((s) Means of expression are not evidence. (> exterior/interior, description levels, circularity). Epistemology/Quine: N.B.: to want to endow the truths about nature with the full authority of immediate experience is just as doomed to failure as the return of the truths of mathematics to the potential insight of elementary logic. >Epistemology/Carnap. XII 91 Epistemology/Psychology/Quine: if sensory stimuli are the only thing, why not just turn to psychology? TraditionVsPsychology/Quine: this used to appear circular. No Circle/QuineVsVs: Solution: we just have to refrain from deducting science from observations. If we only want to understand the connection between observation and science, we need all the information we can get. Also those from science, which is investigating exactly this connection. See > Rational reconstruction. XII 98 Epistemology/Quine: still exists within psychology and thus within empirical sciences. It studies the human subject. Aim: to find out how observation is related to theory and to what extent theory goes beyond observation. XII 99 Epistemology/Quine: old: wanted to include empirical sciences, so to speak, to assemble them from sense data. New: now, conversely, epistemology is part of psychology. Quine: at the same time, the old relationship remains: epistemology is included in the empirical sciences and at the same time science is included in the epistemology. ((s) Epistemology studies the subject and the subject studies epistemology.) This is not a circle because we have given up the dream of deducing all science from sense data. This also solves the old mystery of seeing. See also Seeing/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Equality | Wessel | I 338 Meaning equality/equality of meaning/logic/Termini/Wessel: if two simple terms have the same meaning, they are also the same in sense, and vice versa, but the converse is not true for composite Termini. E.g. "rhombus", "equilateral rectangle": same meaning, but not the same sense if the second composed. >Stronger/weaker, >Asymmetry. Reason: the logical structure is not always coincident with the language. Morning star/Wessel: can be interpreted as a composite term: then, because morning and evening different meaning, the sense of compound Termini is different. >Morning Star/Evening Star, >Identity, >Intensions, >Extension. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
Equilibrium Price | Rothbard | Rothbard III 114 Equilibrium price/Rothbard: The amount offered for sale at each price is called the supply; the amount demanded for purchase at each price is called the demand. Rothbard III 115 As long as the demand exceeds the supply at any price, buyers will continue to overbid and the price will continue to rise. The converse occurs if the price begins near its highest point. Equilibrium price/supply/demand/Rothbard: If the overbidding of buyers will drive the price up whenever the quantity demanded is greater than the quantity supplied, and the underbidding of sellers drives the price down whenever supply is greater than demand, it is evident that the price of the good will find a resting point where the quantity demanded is equal to the quantity supplied (…). Rothbard III 116 Equilibrium: The specific feature of the “clearing of the market” performed by the equilibrium price is that, at this price alone, all those buyers and sellers who are willing to make exchanges can do so. >Market/Rothbard, >Price/Rothbard. Rothbard III 120 Demand/supply: (…) as the price increases, new suppliers with higher minimum selling prices are brought into the market, while demanders with low maximum buying prices will begin to drop out. Equilibrium price: (…) once the zone of intersection of the supply and demand curves has been determined, it is the buyers and sellers at the margin - in the area of the equilibrium point - that determine what the equilibrium price and the quantity exchanged will be. Rothbard III 132 Elasticity/speculation/demand: (…) the new demand curve, including anticipatory forecasting of the equilibrium price, is [more flattened], ((s)starting at a lower price). It is clear that such anticipations render the demand curve far more elastic, since more will be bought at the lower price and less at the higher. Rothbard III 133 Thus, the introduction of exchange-value can restrict demand above the anticipated equilibrium price and increase it below that price, although the final demand - to consume at the - equilibrium price will remain the same. >Speculation/Rothbard. Erroneous speculation: (…) we have assumed that this speculative supply and demand, this anticipating of the equilibrium price, has been correct, and we have seen that these correct anticipations have hastened the establishment of equilibrium. Suppose, however, that most of these expectations are erroneous. Suppose, for example, that the demanders tend to assume that the equilibrium price will be lower than it actually is. Does this change the equilibrium price or obstruct the passage to that price? Solution: As soon as the price settles at ((s) around the equilibirum price), the demanders see that shortages develop at this price, that they would like to buy more than is available, and the overbidding of the demanders raises the price again to the genuine equilibrium price. The same process of revelation of error occurs in the case of errors of anticipation by suppliers, and thus the forces of the market tend inexorably toward the establishment of the genuine equilibrium price, undistorted by speculative errors, which tend to reveal themselves and be eliminated. >Utility/Rothbard. Rothbard III 142 Exchange: exchanges will (…) take place in a quantity and at a final price determined by the intersection of the new combination of supply and demand schedules. This may set a different quantity of exchanges at the old equilibrium price or at a new price, depending on their specific content. Or it may happen that the new combination of schedules - in the new period of time - will be identical with the old and therefore set the same quantity of exchanges and the same price as on the old market. >Stock keeping/Rothbard, >Utility/Rothbard. Equilibrium: The market is always tending quickly toward its equilibrium position, and the wider the market is, and the better the communication among its participants, the more quickly will this position be established for any set of schedules. >Price/Rothbard, >Demand/Rothbard, >Supply/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
Evidence | Nozick | II 237 Knowledge/Riddles/Kripke/Nozick: conundrum: why would you seek evidence against something that you know. - You know then that the evidence must be wrong. Nozick: a theory of knowledge must be able to handle it. >Knowledge, >Theory of knowledge, >Recognition, >Certainty. Solution: conversely, if one does not know that the evidence is misleading, one should not ignore it. >Method. II 250 Evidence/hypothesis/Nozick: often evidence can apply, even if the hypothesis is false. >Truth, >Hypotheses. Test: search for data that would not apply if the hypothesis was true, but the evidence is not. - Then, the hypothesis has not passed the test. II 254f Evidence/hypotheses/Nozick/(s): the initial probability (P0) of the hypothesis must be considered. One cannot just put up any hypothesis. Therefore conclusion from P (evidence e I Hypo h)> = 0.95, P (e,~h) <= 0.05 not sure if e is more likely to follow from h-h or not, depends on which of the two weighted conditional probabilities is greater, P (el h) times P0(h) or P(e l ~ h) times P0(not-h). >Bayesianism, >Conditional probability. II 261 Evidence/hypothesis/theory/Nozick: if e is evidence for hypothesis h, depends on what other theories we have that connects e and h . Problem: the other theories could in turn be embedded in a wider context, etc. - regress. >Regress, >Context, >Dependence. PutnamVsTradition: therefore "evidence for" is not a formal logical relation. - It is rather dependent on other theories. Cf. >Ontological Relativity, >Internal Realism. II 262 Induction/evidence/logic/Nozick: the inductive logic is twofold relative 1. probability is relative to the evidence 2. There must be a principle of total evidence, which is applied to the probability statements. >Induction. Some authors: Solution: an evidence is an evidence for what it explains. >Explanation, >Causal explanation. NozickVs: much evidence is not explanatory - e.g. lightning/thunder do not explain themselves mutually. E.g. a symptom makes probably more, but they do not explain mutually. Perhaps there are quite general statistical relations between statements - e.g. principles of the uniformity of nature. >Symptoms, >Uniformity, >Regularity. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
Exhaustible Resources | Sraffa | Kurz I 304 Exhaustible resources/Sraffa/Kurz: (…) it is to be noted that the problem of exhaustible resources, or 'wasting assets', as Sraffa used to call them, was on his mind from an early time of his (re)constructive work, which started in the second half of the 1920s, and the problem remained there until his respective work culminated in the publication of his 1960 book(1). And Sraffa was also aware from an early time onwards that the problem caused diffculties for the long-period method. In a note dated 25 March 1946 he counterposed the difference between the physical real cost pproach to the problem of value and distribution, which he had endorsed, and the classical-Marxian labour theory of value. He actually insisted that the former was able to deal with exhaustible resources, whereas the latter was not: „The difference between the 'Physical real costs' and the Ricardo-Marxian theory of 'labour costs' is that the first does, and the latter does not, include in them the natural resources that are used up in the course of production (such as coal, iron, exhaustion of land) - [Air, water etc. are not used up: as there is an unlimited supply, no subtraction can be made from [infinite]]. This is fundamental because it does away with 'human energy' and such metaphysical things.“ He added with regard to the natural ingredients of production: „But how are we going to replace these natural things? There are 3 cases: a) they can be reproduced by labour (land properties, With manure and so on); b) they can be substituted by labour (coal by hydroelectric plant: or by spending in research and discovery of new sources and new methods of economising) c) they cannot be either reproduced nor substituted - and in this case they cannot find a place in a theory of continuous production and consumption: they are dynamical facts, that is a stock that is being gradually exhausted and cannot be renewed, and must ultimately lead to the destruction of the society. But this case does not satisfy our condition of a society that just manages to keep continuously alive.“ (Sraffa Papers, D3/12/42: 33)(2) Kurz: In Sraffa's View exhaustible resources thus constitute 'dynamical facts' which cannot be studied rigorously in a framework in which prices and income distribution do not change. A dynamic theory is needed. However, Sraffa was sceptical that a reliable dynamic theory could be elaborated. Kurz I 306 Natural resources/Sraffa: „Natural resources which are used in production, such as land and mineral deposits, and which being in Short supply enable their owners to obtain a rent, can be said to occupy among means of production a position equivalent to that of 'non-basics' among products. Being employed in production, but not themselves produced, they are the converse of commodities which, although produced, are not used in production.“ (Sraffa 1960: 74)(1) Machines/investment goods/Sraffa: „Machines of an obsolete type which are still in use are similar to land in so far as they are employed as means of production, although not currently produced.“ (Sraffa 1960: 78)(1) >Exhaustible resources/Parrinello. 1. Sraffa, P. (1960). Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Taken from the work Sraffa carried out in the period 1927–1931 (unpublished papers). Kurz, Heinz D. and Salvadori, Neri. „The 'classical' approach to exhaustible resources. Parrinello and the others.“ In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Sraffa I Piero Sraffa Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge 1960 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
Existence Predicate | Stalnaker | I 150f Barcan formula/BF/Stalnaker: the Barcan formula involves the interaction of the universal quantifier with the necessity operator: (BF) "x^NF > N"x^F A (CBF) N"x^F > x^NF. Kripke (1963)(1): Kripke's semantics showed which semantic assumptions are needed additionally. He showed a fallacy in the evidence that was allegedly derived, in lacking these assumptions - it is valid if wRu, Du < Dw. >Domains, >Converse. That is, if the domain of the accessible worlds is a subset of the domain of departing worlds. This applies vice versa for the converse. Qualified converse of Barcan formula/Stalnaker: a qualified converse of the Barcan formula is made with the existence assumption (QCBF) N"x^F > x^N Ex > F). Existence predicate e: Ey ^ (x = y ). >Existence predicate, >Barcan-formula. 1. S. A. Kripke, 1963. Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I Normal Modal Propositional Calculi. Mathematical Logic Quarterly Volume 9, Issue 5‐6 |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Experience | Hegel | Gadamer I 359 Experience/Dialectic Experience/Hegel/Aristoteles: [In Hegel] the moment of historicity wins its right. He thinks of experience as the accomplishing skepticism. We saw (>Experience/Gadamer) that the experience that one makes changes his whole knowledge. Strictly speaking, one cannot have the same experience twice. Gadamer I 360 [Hegel] has shown in his "Phenomenology of the Spirit" how the consciousness, which wants to become certain of itself, makes its experiences. The object of consciousness is the "in itself", but what is "in itself" can only be known in the way it presents itself to the experiencing consciousness. Thus, the experiencing consciousness experiences this very thing: the appearance of the object is "for us" itself(1). Hegel: "The dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself, both on its knowledge and on its object, in so far as the new true object springs from it, is actually that which is called experience. Gadamer: We recall the above and ask ourselves what Hegel, who obviously wants to say something here about the general nature of experience, means. HeideggerVsHegel: It seems to me that Heidegger was right to point out that Hegel here does not interpret experience dialectically, but conversely, what is dialectical, thinks from the essence of experience.(2) Hegel/Gadamer: According to Hegel, experience has the structure of a reversal of consciousness and therefore it is a dialectical movement. >Dialectic/Hegel, >Dialectic, >Consciousness. Hegel pretends that what would otherwise be understood by experience is something else, provided that we generally "make the experience of the untruth of this first concept on another object" (and not so that the object itself changes). But it's only apparently different. In truth, the philosophical consciousness sees through what the experiencing consciousness actually does when it goes from one to the other: it reverses itself. So Hegel claims that the true essence of experience itself is to reverse itself in this way. Hegel/Gadamer: (...) Experience [is] first always the experience of nothingness. Faced with the experience of another object, both our knowledge and its object change. One now knows it differently and better, and i.e. the object itself "does not endure". The new object contains the truth about the old one. Consciousness/Hegel: What Hegel describes as experience in this way is the experience that the consciousness makes with itself. "The principle of experience contains the infinitely important provision that for accepting and keeping for oneself a content, the person him- or herself must be present, more specifically, that he or she must find such content united with the certainty of him- or herself(3). Gadamer I 361 Reversal/Hegel/Gadamer: The concept of experience means just this, that such unity with oneself is only established. This is the reversal that happens to the consciousness of recognizing oneself in the stranger, the other person. >Subject-object problem, >Subject/Hegel, >Intersubjectivity. Absolute Knowledge/Hegel: According to Hegel, it is of course necessary that the path of experience of consciousness leads to a knowledge of oneself that no longer has any other, foreign, apart from oneself. For him, the completion of experience is the "science", the certainty of him- or herself in knowledge. The standard by which the person thinks experience is thus that of knowing oneself. Therefore, the dialectic of experience must end with the overcoming of all experience, which is achieved in absolute knowledge, that is, in the complete identity of consciousness and object. 1. Hegel, Phänomenologie, Einleitung (ed. Hoffmeister p. 73) 2. Heidegger, Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung (Holzwege p. 169). 3. Hegel, Enzyklopädie, § 7. Brandom I 156 Representation/Kant: involved in inferential relations between sentences - Hegel turns the order: resulting from experience as inferential activity. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
Experiments | Heidegger | Gribbin III 277 Physics/experiment/Heidegger: the physics is not experimental physics because it uses equipment. - But conversely, because the theory of nature is then to present itself as a predicted relationship of forces, the experiment is ordered - namely for questioning - how nature, once asked, pronounces itself. >Nature, >Natural laws/Heidegger, >Physics, cf. >Experiments/Duhem, >Physics/Duhem. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gribbin I John Gribbin Schrödinger’s Kitten and the Search for Reality, London 1995 German Edition: Schrödingers Kätzchen und die Suche nach der Wirklichkeit Frankfurt/M. 1998 Gribbin II John Gribbin In Search of Schrödinger’s Cat, London 1984 German Edition: Auf der Suche nach Schrödingers Katze. Quantenphysik und WIrklichkeit München 1987 |
Extraversion | Matthews | Corr I 420 Extraversion/Cognitive-adaptive theory/Matthews: the cognitive-adaptive theory of personality traits (Matthews 1999(1), 2000(2), 2008a(3); Matthews and Zeidner 2004(4)) proposes that traits have functional coherence, not structural coherence. Extraversion/Matthews: may be seen as an adaptation to socially demanding environments. Cognitive features of Extraversion such as efficient multitasking, verbal skills and rapid response work together to facilitate adaptation. Conversely, the various characteristics of Introversion support adaptation to solitary environments requiring self-direction. >Self-regulation/Matthews, >Personality traits. 1. Matthews, G. 1999. Personality and skill: a cognitive-adaptive framework, in P. L. Ackerman, P. C. Kyllonen and R. D. Roberts (eds.), The future of learning and individual differences research: processes, traits, and content, pp. 251–70. Washington, DC: APA 2. Matthews, G. 2000. A cognitive science critique of biological theories of personality traits, History and Philosophy of Psychology 2: 1–17 3. Matthews, G. 2008a. Personality and information processing: a cognitive-adaptive theory, in G. J. Boyle, G. Matthews and D. H. Saklofske (eds.), Handbook of personality theory and testing, vol. I, Personality theories and models, pp. 56–79. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 4. Matthews, G. and Zeidner, M. 2004. Traits, states and the trilogy of mind: an adaptive perspective on intellectual functioning, in D. Dai and R. J. Sternberg (eds.), Motivation, emotion, and cognition: integrative perspectives on intellectual functioning and development, pp. 143–74. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
Facts | Millikan | I 104 Facts/Real value/Millikan: the real value of a sentence is the fact in the world. Wrong sentence/correspondence/Millikan: here the singular term has an indirect, "piggyback" - relation to its referent. N.B.: but this is not the relation of a "should-be-like-that". Correspondence: takes place only in true sentences. Normal relation/E.g. Unicorn/Millikan: (in the wrong sentence > non-existence) the "should-correspond" is not correspondence, but the possession of meaning! Its referring is its having a certain kind of meaning or sense. I 222 Negative fact/Millikan: we must be able to show that a negative act is still something else than the non-existence of a positive fact. And we cannot do that. We just moved around in circles. Non-existent fact/Millikan: a non-existent fact cannot be an object of an icon and not an object of a representation. Negative fact/Millikan: a negative would then have to be something other than a non-existent fact. N.B.: but if we can show that, we do not even have to accept that "non-p" says "that p does not exist". Negative sentence/image/fact/negation/Millikan: what I then have to assert is that negative sentences represent actual and/or existing world states (facts). It is well known how to do this: Negation/solution: one simply says that the negation is only applied to the logical predicate of the sentence ((s) internal negation). In doing so, the meaning of the predicate is changed, so that the predicate applies (maps) to the opposite as it usually does. I 223 This can then also be extended to more complex sentences with >external negation: E.g. "No A is φ" becomes "Every A is non-φ". MilllikanVs: the difficulties with this approach are also well-known: 1. Problem: how to interpret the function of "not" in very simple sentences of the form "x is not" E.g. "Pegasus is not (pause)" Here "not" can be interpreted as operating over predicates! Sentences of the form "x is not" are, of course, equivalent to sentences of the form "x does not exist". Problem: we have said that "exists" is not a representation. Thus "not" cannot be interpreted as always operating on a predicate of a representative sentence. For example, "Cicero is not Brutus" cannot operate on a logical predicate of the sentence, since simple identity sentences have no logical predicate. So "not" has to have other functions. Problem: In which relations do these different functions stand together? For we should assume that "not" does not have different meanings in different contexts. I 226 Negative Facts/Imperative/Indicative/Not/Negation/Millikan: E.g. "do not do A" has the eigenfunction to produce the same state as the one which would make the indicative sentence "H did not do A" true. Making true: So, it is a question of creating a state that makes a sentence true. Millikan: It is not a question of producing non-existent things, but of creating existential things. E.g. "John did not go to the office". This is not a question of whether one has not an opinion in the end whether John is going to the office. Negative Belief/Millikan: if a negative belief exists in this context, it must have a positive function. Conversely, John has done something that was contrary to going to the office. Alternative/Negation/Millikan: there is a structured space of alternatives, in which John necessarily acts. Alternatives/complexity: the less complex they are described, the less their number. Negative fact/negation/not/Millikan: thesis: if something is not the case, that means something else is the case. E.g. to obey a negative command must be something that could have also caused a positive action. But positive facts cause positive states. So that something is not the case,... I 227 ...must always correspond to the fact that something else is the case. Otherwise we could not explain how negative intentions can be executed. Belief/conviction/real value: here it is parallel: intentions cause their real values. Conversely, real values of beliefs cause beliefs, e.g. because John's jacket is brown, I believed that John's jacket is brown. Negative belief: correspondingly: real value of belief that John's jacket is not red must be the belief that it is not red, or - more specifically - brown. But I do not assure myself of this by not seeing the jacket, but by seeing that the jacket has a different color. Opposite/Millikan: only properties and relations have opposites but these are not absolute. There must be a common foundation. We should assume that "not" has not different meanings in different contexts. I 257 Negative sentence/Millikan: a negative sentence forms a positive fact (world state), not the absence of a fact. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Fields | Quine | IX 17 Definition Field/relations/set theory/Quine: "(RU ^ R)''ϑ" ((s) is an association of relation with its converse mapped to the universal class. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Five-Factor Model | McCrae | Corr I 148 Five-Factor Model/McCrae: [the] five factors provide a structure in which most personality traits can be classified. This structure arises because traits co-vary. For example, people who are sociable and assertive tend also to be cheerful and energetic; they are high on the Extraversion (E) factor, which is said to be defined by sociability, assertiveness, cheerfulness and energy. However, people who are sociable and assertive may or may not be intellectually curious and imaginative. Those traits define a separate factor, Openness to Experience (O). Neuroticism versus Emotional Stability (N), Agreeableness versus Antagonism (A), and Conscientiousness (C) are the remaining factors. Cf. >Neuroticism, >Agreeableness, >Openness to experience, >Conscientiousness, >Introversion, >Extraversion. Corr I 149 Lexical hypothesis: argues that traits are so important in human affairs that common words will have been invented to name them all. >Lexical hypothesis/psychological theories. Corr I 152 Per FFM/pro Five-Factor Model/McCrae: There is now consensus that the general personality dimension of N is associated with most personality disorders (Widiger and Costa 2002)(1), that E predisposes people to be happy (DeNeve and Cooper 1998)(2), that O predicts social and political liberalism (McCrae 1996)(3), that low A is a risk factor for substance abuse (Ball 2002)(4), that C is associated with good job performance (Barrick and Mount 1991)(5). The utility of the FFM has been securely demonstrated. Corr I 152/153 VsFFM/VsFive-Factor Model/McCrae: A. a) Advocates of a person-centred approach claim that types more faithfully represent the operation of psychological processes than do variable-centred traits (see Asendorpf, Caspi and Hofstee 2002(6), for a balanced discussion of these issues). b) Social cognitive theorists (Cervone 2004(7) have argued that traits merely describe, without explaining, behaviour (see McCrae and Costa 2008a(8) for a rebuttal (McCraeVsCervone, CostaVsCervone). c) The FFM itself does not constitute a full theory of personality, explaining human development, day-to-day functioning and social interactions in cultural context (McAdams and Pals 2006)(9). McCraeVsMcAdams, McCraeVsPals: see (McCrae and Costa 2003(10), 2008b(11). B. Some authors propose some variation on or refinement of the FFM: Research in different languages led to proposals of models with more or less factors. De Raad and Peabody (2005)(12) reported analyses of trait descriptive adjectives in Dutch, Italian, Czech, Hungarian and Polish samples and found more robust support for a three-factor model consisting of E, A and C than for the FFM. Conversely, Ashton and colleagues (Ashton and Lee 2005(13); Ashton, Lee, Perugini et al. 2004)(14) reported lexical studies in a number of languages in which six replicable factors appeared. Corr I 155 There has been made a sub division into facets within the personality traits of the FFM: NEO-PI-R: has thirty facet scales, six for each factor. They were chosen to represent the most important constructs in the personality literature, while at the same time being maximally distinct.(Costa and McCrae 1995a)(15). VsNEO-PI-R/VsMcCrae/VsCosta: The facet system of the NEO-PI-R has been criticized as being arbitrary, because ‘the key ingredient for a system to provide an adequate lower order structure of the Big Five is some empirical foundation to selecting lower-order traits’ in contrast to the ‘theoretical insight and intuition’ used in developing the NEO-PI-R (Roberts, Walton and Viechtbauer 2006(16), p. 29). 1. Widiger, T. A. and Costa, P. T., Jr 2002. Five-Factor Model personality disorder research, in P. T. Costa, Jr and T. A. Widiger (eds.), Personality disorders and the Five-Factor Model of personality, 2nd edn, pp. 59–87. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association 2. DeNeve, K. M. and Cooper, H. 1998. The happy personality: a meta-analysis of 137 personality traits and subjective well-being, Psychological Bulletin 124: 197–229 3. McCrae, R. R. 1996. Social consequences of experiential Openness, Psychological Bulletin 120: 323–37 4. Ball, S. A. 2002. Big Five, Alternative Five, and seven personality dimensions: validity in substance-dependent patients, in P. T. Costa, Jr and T. A. Widiger (eds.), Personality disorders and the Five-Factor Model of personality, 2nd edn, pp. 177–201. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association 5. Barrick, M. R. and Mount, M. K. 1991. The Big Five personality dimensions and job performance: a meta-analysis, Personnel Psychology 44: 1–26 6. Asendorpf, J. B., Caspi, A. and Hofstee, W. K. B. 2002. The puzzle of personality types [Special Issue], European Journal of Personality 16(S1) Ashton, M. C. and Lee, K. 2005. Honesty-Humility, the Big Five, and the Five-Factor Model, Journal of Personality 73: 1321–53 7. Cervone, D. 2004. Personality assessment: tapping the social-cognitive architecture of personality, Behaviour Therapy 35: 113–29 8. McCrae, R. R., and Costa, P. T. 2008a. Empirical and theoretical status of the Five-Factor Model of personality traits, in G. Boyle, G. Matthews and D. H. Saklofske (eds.), Sage handbook of personality theory and assessment, vol. I, pp. 273–94. Los Angeles, CA: Sage 9. McAdams, D. P. and Pals, J. L. 2006. A new Big Five: fundamental principles for an integrative science of personality, American Psychologist 61: 204–17 10. McCrae, R. R., and Costa, P. T. 2003. Personality in adulthood: a Five-Factor Theory perspective, 2nd edn. New York: Guilford 11. McCrae, R. R., and Costa, P. T. 2008b. The Five-Factor Theory of personality, in O. P. John, R. W. Robins and L. A. Pervin (eds.), Handbook of personality: theory and research, 3rd edn, pp. 159–81. New York: Guilford Press 12. De Raad, B. and Peabody, D. 2005. Cross-culturally recurrent personality factors: analyses of three factors, European Journal of Personality 19: 451–74 13. Ashton, M. C. and Lee, K. 2005. Honesty-Humility, the Big Five, and the Five-Factor Model, Journal of Personality 73: 1321–53 14. Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., Perugini, M., Szarota, P., De Vries, R. E., Di Blass, L., Boies, K. and De Raad, B. 2004. A six-factor structure of personality descriptive adjectives: solutions from psycholexical studies in seven languages, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 86: 356–66 15. Costa, P. T., Jr., and McCrae, R. R. 1995a. Domains and facets: hierarchical personality assessment using the Revised NEO Personality Inventory, Journal of Personality Assessment 64: 21–50 16. Roberts, B. W., Walton, K. E. and Viechtbauer, W. 2006. Personality traits change in adulthood: reply to Costa and McCrae (2006), Psychological Bulletin 132: 29–32 Robert R. McCrae, “The Five-Factor Model of personality traits: consensus and controversy”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
Functions | Mates | I 56 Functions/Mates: A function is a subset of the two-place relations. - Although the converse is a function, the function is one to one. - You need to define equal cardinality. >Sets, >Set theory, >Relations, >Uniqueness, >Definitions, >Definability. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
Functions | Russell | I XII / XIII Function/Russell/Gödel: Axiom: functions can only occur "through their values", i.e. they are extensional. >Extensionality, >Extension. I 58 Function/Russell: presupposes values, but values do not presuppose a function - ((s) In order for 16 to be a square number, there must be a natural number 16 first, etc.) I 69 Function/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell: no object, since ambiguous - "values of j z^" are assigned to the j and not to the z. I 72 Def A-Functions/Principia Mathematica/Russell: functions that make sense for a given argument a - ((s) E.g. reversal of function: for example, y = x² can give the value y = 4 for x = 2). - A-function: now we can conversely search for functions that give the value 4 E.g. root of - 16, 2² and any number of others - E.g. "A satisfies all functions that belong to the selection in question": we replace a by a variable and get an a-function. However, and according to the circle fault principle, it may not be an element of this selection, since it refers to the totality of this selection - the selection consists of all those functions that satisfy f(jz^) - then the function is (j). ({f(jz^)) implies jx} where x is the argument - such that there are other a-functions for any possible selection of a-functions that are outside of the selection - ((s) > "Everythingl he said"). I 107 Derived function/notation/Principia Mathematica/Russell: (derived from a predicative function). "f{z^(q,z)}" - defined as follows: if a function f(y ! z^) is given, our derived function must be: "there is a predicative function, which is formally equivalent to j z^ and satisfies f" - always extensional. I 119 Function/Truth/Principia Mathematica/Russell: a function that is always true, can still be false for the argument (ix)( j x) - if this object does not exist. I 119 Function/Waverley/Identity/Equivalence/Principia Mathematica/Russell: the functions x = Scott and x = author of Waverley are formally equivalent - but not identical, because George IV did not want to know if Scott = Scott. I 144 Varying function/variable function/variability/Principia Mathematica/Russell: old: only transition from e.g. "Socrates is mortal" to "Socrates is wise" (from f ! x to f ! y) (sic) - new: (Second Edition): now the transition to "Plato is mortal" is also possible - (from j ! a to y ! a) - "notation: Greek letters: stand for individuals, Latin ones for predicates -> E.g. "Napoleon had all the properties of a great emperor" - Function as variable. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
Gain and Loss | Rothbard | Rothbard III 511 Gain and Loss/Rothbard: A grave error is made by a host of writers and economists in considering only profits in the economy. Almost no account is taken of losses. The economy should not be characterized as a “profit economy,” but as a “profit and loss economy.”(1) Losses: A loss occurs when an entrepreneur has made a poor estimate of his future selling prices and revenues. He bought factors, say, for 1,000 ounces, developed them into a product, and then sold it for 900 ounces. >Entrepreneurship/Rothbard. Speculation: He erred in not realizing that the factors were overpriced and overcapitalized on the market in relation to their discounted marginal value products, i.e., to the prices of his output. >Production factors/Rothbard. Profit: Every entrepreneur, therefore, invests in a process because he expects to make a profit, i.e., because he believes that the market has underpriced and undercapitalized the factors in relation to their future rents. If his belief is justified, he makes a profit. If his belief is unjustified, and the market, for example, has really overpriced the factors, he will suffer losses. The nature of loss has to be carefully defined. Suppose an entrepreneur, the market rate of interest being 5 percent, buys factors at 1,000 and sells their product for 1,020 one year later. Has he suffered a “loss” or made a “profit”? Rothbard III 512 At first, it might seem that he has not taken a loss. After all, he gained back the principal plus an extra 20 ounces, for a 2-percent net return or gain. However, closer inspection reveals that he could have made a 5-percent net return anywhere on his capital, since this is the going interest return. >Interest rate. He could have made it, say, investing in any other enterprise or in lending money to consumer-borrowers. In this venture he did not even earn the interest gain. Costs: The “cost” of his investment, therefore, was not simply his expenses on factors—1,000—but also his forgone opportunity of earning interest at 5 percent, i.e., an additional 50. He therefore suffered a loss of 30 ounces. Rothbard III 514 Def profit/Rothbard: (…) profits are an index that maladjustments are being met and combatted by the profit-making entrepreneurs. These maladjustments are the inevitable concomitants of the real world of change. Entrepreneur: A man earns profits only if he has, by superior foresight and judgment, uncovered a maladjustment - specifically an undervaluation of certain factors by the market. By stepping into this situation and gaining the profit, he calls everyone’s attention to that maladjustment and sets forces into motion that eventually eliminate it. If we must condemn anyone, it should not be the profit-making entrepreneur, but the one that has suffered losses. For losses are a sign that he has added further to a maladjustment (…) Rothbard III 515 Market: The market is no respecter of past laurels, however large. Moreover, the size of a man’s investment is no guarantee whatever of a large profit or against grievous losses. Capital does not “beget” profit. >Entrepreneurship/Mises. Rothbard III 812 Gains and losses/Rothbard: When a change in the money relation causes prices to rise, the man whose selling price rises before his buying prices gains, and the man whose buying prices rise first, loses. The one who gains the most from the transition period is the one whose selling price rises first and buying prices last. Conversely, when prices fall, the man whose buying prices fall before his selling price gains, and the man whose selling price falls before his buying prices, loses. >Money market/Rothbard, >Money supply/Rothbard, >Demand for money/Rothbard. Causation/gains and losses: (…) there is nothing about rising prices that causes gains or about falling prices that causes losses. In either situation, some people gain and some people lose from the change, the gainers being the ones with the greatest and lengthiest positive differential between their selling and their buying prices, and the losers the ones with the greatest and longest negative differential in these movements. Which people gain and which lose from any given change is an empirical question, dependent on the location of changes in elements of the money relation, institutional conditions, anticipations, speeds of reaction, etc. >Buying price/Rothbard, >Selling price/Rothbard, >Price/Rothbard, >Purchasing power/Rothbard. 1. “One thing I miss . . . in discussion generally in the field, is any use of words recognizing that profit means profit or loss and is in fact as likely to be a loss as a gain.” Frank H. Knight, “An Appraisal of Economic Change: Discussion,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May, 1954, p. 63. Professor Knight’s great contributions to profit theory are in sharp contrast to his errors in capital and interest theory. See his famous work, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (3rd ed.; London: London School of Economics, 1940). Perhaps the best presentation presentation of profit theory is in Ludwig von Mises, “Profit and Loss” in Planning for Freedom (South Holland, Ill.: Libertarian Press, 1952), pp. 108–51. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
General Terms | Locke | Euchner I 20 General term/generality/knowledge/Locke: Disputation with general concepts (e.g. being, essence, soul, substance) does not lead to knowledge of real facts. They are merely "verbal" and not "instructive". Conversely all instructive universal sentences (about natural qualities) are uncertain. >Universal statement, >Generality, >Recognition, >State of affairs, cf. >Analyticity/syntheticity. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
Gresham’s Law | Rothbard | Rothbard III 898 Gresham’s Law/Rothbard: Relative prices: Our analysis of the effects of price control applies also, as Mises has brilliantly shown, to control over the price ("exchange rate") of one money in terms of another.(1) >Price control/Rothbard. This was partially seen in Gresham's Law, one of the first economic laws to be discovered. Few have realized that this law is merely a specific instance of the general consequences of price controls. Perhaps this failure is due to the misleading formulation of Gresham's Law, which is usually phrased: "Bad money drives good money out of circulation." Problem/Rothbard: Taken at its face value, this is a paradox that violates the general rule of the market that the best methods of satisfying consumers tend to win out over the poorer. Coinage: The phrasing has been fallaciously used even by those who generally favor the free market, to justify a State monopoly over the coinage of gold and silver. Actually, Gresham's Law should read: "Money overvalued by the State will drive money undervalued by the State out of circulation." Price control/relative prices: Whenever the State sets an arbitrary value or price on one money in terms of another, it thereby establishes an effective minimum price control on one money and a maximum price control on the other, the "prices" being in terms of each other. >Relative price/Rothbard. Bimetallism: This, for example, was the essence of bimetallism. Under bimetallism, a nation recognized gold and silver as moneys, but set an arbitrary price, or exchange ratio, between them. When this arbitrary price differed, as it was bound to do, from the free-market price (and this became ever more likely as time passed and the free-market price changed, while the government's arbitrary price remained the same), one money became overvalued and the other undervalued by the government. Thus, suppose that a country used gold and silver as moneys, and the government set the ratio between them at 16 ounces of silver : 1 ounce of gold. Rothbard III 899 The market price, perhaps 16:1 at the time of the price control, then changes to 15:1. What is the result? Silver is now being arbitrarily undervalued by the government and gold arbitrarily overvalued. In other words, silver is fixed cheaper than it really is in terms of gold on the market, and gold is forced to be more expensive than it really is in terms of silver. The government has imposed a price maximum on silver and a price minimum on gold, in terms of each other. The same consequences now follow as from any effective price control. With a price maximum on silver, the gold demand for silver in exchange now exceeds the silver demand for gold (conversely, With a price minimum on gold, the silver demand for gold is less than the gold demand for silver). 1. Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Nachdruck durch das Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 432 n., 447, 469, 776. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
Hegel | Heidegger | Gadamer I 274 Hegel/Heidegger/Gadamer: Heidegger's proof that in the concept of spirit in Hegel and of consciousness in Descartes, the Greek ontology of substance prevails, which interprets being as being present and in the present (... ) certainly goes beyond the self-understanding of modern metaphysics, but not arbitrarily, but from an "intention" (>Seinsfrage) that actually makes this tradition understandable by revealing the ontological premises of the concept of subjectivity. >Subjectivity, >Consciousness, >Spirit/Hegel, >Metaphysics. Understanding/Heidegger: So it is not at all a matter of securing oneself against the tradition that raises its voice from the text, but on the contrary, to keep away what can prevent one from understanding it from the point of view of its content. It is the obscure prejudices, whose dominion makes us deaf to the thing that speaks in tradition. >Prejudice. Kant/Heidegger: Conversely, Heidegger discovers in Kant's critique of "dogmatic" metaphysics the idea of a metaphysics of finiteness, against which his own ontological design has to prove itself. >Understanding/Heidegger, >I. Kant, >HeideggerVsHegel. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Hermeneutics | Dilthey | Gadamer I 180 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: [On the theological, especially Lutheran interpretation of the Bible]: (...) Reformation theology does not seem (...) to be consistent. By finally using the Protestant formulas of faith as a guideline for the understanding of the unity of the Bible, it too abolishes the principle of the Scriptures in favour of an albeit short-term Reformation tradition. Not only the Counter-Reformation theology has argued against this but also Dilthey(1). He mocks these contradictions of Protestant hermeneutics from the standpoint of full self-confidence of the historical humanities. Development of Dilthey's hermeneutics: First of all the hermeneutics had to break free from all dogmatic limitations and free itself, in order to ascend to the universal significance of a historical organon. This happened in the 18th century, when men like Semler and Ernesti realized that an adequate understanding of Scripture was the recognition of the diversity of their authors, thus presupposing the abandonment of the dogmatic unity of the canon. With this "liberation of interpretation from "dogma" (Dilthey), the collection of the Holy Scriptures of Christanity moved into the role of a collection of historical sources, which as written works had to be subjected not only to a grammatical but also to a historical interpretation(2). DiltheyVsTradition: The old principle of interpretation, to understand the individual from the whole, was now no longer related and limited to the dogmatic unity of the canon, but went to the comprehensiveness of the historical Gadamer I 181 reality, to the wholeness of which the individual historical document belongs. Gadamer: (...) just as there is now no longer any difference between the interpretation of sacred or profane scriptures and thus only hermeneutics exists, so in the end this hermeneutics is not only a propaedeutic function of all historiography as the art of the correct interpretation of written sources, but also overlaps the whole business of historiography itself. For what is true of the written sources, that every sentence in them can only be understood from the context, is also true of the contents they report. Their meaning is also not clear in itself. The world-historical context in which the individual objects of historical research, large and small, show themselves in their true relative importance, is itself a whole, from which all individual things are first fully understood in their sense and which, conversely, can only be fully understood from these details. Gadamer I 182 Tradition: In itself, the history of understanding has been accompanied by theoretical reflection since the days of ancient philology. But these reflections have the character of an "art doctrine", i.e. they want to serve the art of understanding, such as the rhetoric of oratory, the poetics of poetry and its evaluation. In this sense, the theological hermeneutics of patristics and that of the Reformation was also an art doctrine. DiltheyVsTradition/Gadamer: But now understanding is made as such. ((s) VsDilthey: Cf. >Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher.) Gadamer I 202 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: Historical interpretation can serve as a means of understanding a given text, even if it sees in it a mere source that is integrated into the whole of historical tradition. In clear methodological reflection, however, we find this expressed neither by Ranke nor by the sharp methodologist Droysen, but only by Dilthey, who consciously takes up Romantic hermeneutics and expands it into a historical methodology, indeed into an epistemology of the humanities. Ditlhey: Not only do the sources encounter as texts, but historical reality itself is a text to be understood. With this transfer of hermeneutics to history, however, Dilthey is only the interpreter of the historical school. He formulates what Ranke and Droysen basically think. Historical School/Dilthey/HegelVsHistorism/Gadamer: We will see that Hegel's philosophy of world history, against which the historical school rebelled (DiltheyVsHegel), recognized the importance of history for the being of the mind and the knowledge of truth incomparably deeper than the great historians, who did not want to admit their dependence on it. Gadamer I 245 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: As we saw with Schleiermacher, the model of his hermeneutics is the congenial understanding that can be achieved in the relationship between the I and the You. The author's opinion can be seen directly from his text. The interpreter is absolutely simultaneous with his or her author. This is the triumph of the philological method to grasp past spirit as present, foreign as familiar. Dilthey: Dilthey is completely imbued with this triumph. He bases on it the equality of the humanities. Just as scientific knowledge always questions the present through a discovery within it, so the scholar of humanities questions texts. In this way Dilthey believed he was fulfilling the task which he felt was his own, to justify the humanities epistemologically by conceiving of the historical world as a text to be deciphered. >Text/Dilthey. 1. Cf. Dilthey II, 126 Anm. 3 the criticism of Flacius by Richard Simon. 2. Semler, who makes this demand, admittedly means with it still to serve the sense of salvation of the Bible, provided that the historically understanding "is now also able to speak of these objects in such a way now, as the changed time and other circumstances of the people beside us make it necessary" (quoted after G. Ebeling, RGG3 Hermeneutics), i.e. history in the service of the applicatio. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Historicity | Heidegger | Gadamer I 266 Historicity/Heidegger/Gadamer: (...) that we only make history as far as we are ourselves, means that the historicity of human Dasein in all its movement of the present and of forgetting is the condition for us to make present what has been. >Dasein/Heidegger, >History/Heidegger, >Existence/Heidegger, >Time/Heidegger. Gadamer I 267 Gadamer: [the question is] whether something for the construction of a historical hermeneutics can be gained from the ontological radicalization which was brought by Heidegger. Heidegger's intention was certainly different, and one must be careful not to draw hasty conclusions from his existential analysis of the historicity of Dasein. According to Heidegger, the existential analysis of Dasein does not imply a specific historical ideal of existence. To that extent it claims even for a theological statement about the human and his or her existence in belief an a priori neutral validity. This may be a problematic claim for the self-understanding of belief, as for instance the dispute about Bultmann shows. (>Bultmann/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics. Conversely, it is by no means excluded that there are contentwise certain (existential) preconditions for Christian theology as well as for the historical humanities, under which they stand. But just for that reason one will have to accept that existential analytics itself, according to its own intention, does not contain any idealization and therefore cannot be criticized as such (however often this has been tried). It is a mere misunderstanding, if one sees in the temporality structure of concern a certain existential ideal, which one could counter with more pleasing moods (Bollnow)(1), for example, the ideal of carelessness, or with Nietzsche the natural innocence of animals and children. One cannot deny that this, too, is an ideal of existence. With this, however, it is true of it that his structure is the existential one, as Heidegger has shown it. >Animals/Heidegger. 1. O.F. Bollnow, Das Wesen der Stimmungen, Freiburg 1943. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Hoarding (Economics) | Rothbard | Rothbard III 775 Hoarding/money/Rothbard: The very word "hoarding" is a most inappropriate one to use in economics, since it is laden with connotations of vicious antisocial action. But there is nothing at all antisocial about either "hoarding" or "dishoarding." "Hoarding" is simply an increase in the demand for money, and the result of this change in valuations is that People get what they desire, i.e., an increase in the real value of their cash balances and of the monetary unit.(1) Conversely, if the People desire a Iowering of their real cash balances or in the value of the monetary unit, they may accomplish this through "dishoarding." No other significant economic relation - real income, capital structure, etc. - need be changed at all. Rothbard III 776 DefinabilityVsHoarding: (…) there is no theoretical way of defining "hoarding" beyond a simple addition to one's cash balance in a certain period of time. Yet most writers use the term in a normative fashion, implying that there is some vague standard below which a cash balance is legitimate and above which it is antisocial and vicious. But any quantitative limit set on the demand-for-money schedule would be completely arbitrary and unwarranted. >Keynesianism/Rothbard, >Keynesianism, >Quantity theory, >Consumption function. Rothbard III 778 KeynesianismVsHording: Keynesian law: The Keynesian law asserts social expenditures to be Iower than social income above point A, and higher than social income below point A, so that A will be the equilibrium point for social income to equal expenditure. For if social income is higher than A, social expenditures will be Iower than income, and income will therefore tend to decline from one day to the next until the equilibrium point A is reached. If social income is Iower than A, dishoarding will occur, expenditures will be higher than income, until finally A is reached again. RothbardVsKeynes/RothbardVsKeynesianism: (…) suppose that we now grant the validity of such a law; the only comment can be an impertinent: So what? What if there is a fall in the national income? Since the fall need only be in money terms, and real income, real capital, etc., may remain the same, Why any alarm? The only change is that the hoarders have accomplished their objective of increasing their real cash balances and increasing the real value of the monetary unit. It is true that the picture is rather more complex for the transition process until equilibrium is reached, (…) But the Keynesian system attempts to establish the perniciousness of the equilibrium position, and this it cannot do. 1. See the excellent article by W.H. Hutt, “The Significance of Price Flexibility” in Hazlitt, Critics of Keynseian Economics, pp. 383-406. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
Icons | Peirce | Berka I 29 Icon/Peirce: degenerate relation between sign and object: mere similarity. I 30 Conclusion/Peirce: needs in addition to symbol (for truth) and index (both together (for sentence formation) the 3rd character: the icon: because inference consists in the observation that where certain relations exist, some other relations can be found. >Conclusion, >Symbols, >Icons, >Relations. These relations must be represented by an icon - e.g. the middle term of the syllogism must actually occur in both premises.(1) >Syllogisms, >Premises. I 35f Icon/logic/Peirce: Icons of logic: 1. Identity formula: x > y (implication) - second switch-over of antecedents (premises) - 3. transitivity of the copula (= modus barbara) -> copy of a final chain - ((s) icons/Peirce/(s): always have to do with representation and observability of similarity). I 37 Icons/logic/Peirce: 4. Icon: negation: b should be so that we can write, b > x whatever x may be, then b is wrong ((s) EFQM) - ..if from the truth of x the falsity of y follows, then, also conversely, from the truth of y follows the falsity of x - 5. Icon: law of excluded third. I 48 Icons/logic/Peirce: 9. Icon: every individual can be considered as a unit class - 10. Icon: complement - 11. Icon: Association - 12. Two distinct classes must differ in at least one element.(1). >Index/Peirce, >Symbol/Peirce, >Signs/Peirce. 1. Ch. S. Peirce, On the algebra of logic. A contribution to the philosophy of notation. American Journal of Mathematics 7 (1885), pp. 180-202 – Neudruck in: Peirce, Ch. S., Collected Papers ed. C. Hartstone/P. Weiss/A. W. Burks, Cambridge/MA 1931-1958, Vol. III, pp. 210-249 |
Peir I Ch. S. Peirce Philosophical Writings 2011 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
Identity | Henrich | Habermas IV 153 Identity/Philosophy/Psychology/HenrichVsMead/Henrich/Habermas: Henrich thesis: "the connection between genuine philosophical problems and what the term "identity", infiltrated into the psychological enlightenment of the general world, (is) only completely indirect.(1) Habermas: Henrich rightly insists on the distinction between the question of numerical identification and the question of "identity", Habermas IV 154 when it is meant that a person can simultaneously appear as autonomous and unmistakable in his/her actions: Henrich: In philosophical theory identity is a predicate that has a special function; by means of it a single thing or object as such is distinguished from others of the same kind; conversely, this predicate allows to say that under different conditions and in different ways of access only one single object can be thematic. Such identity does not require the identical individuals to be distinguished from one another by special qualities. It certainly does not require that a basic pattern of qualities can be shown in them, in relation to which they orient their behaviour or by which this behaviour can be explained in a uniform context. Even a thing that is completely erratic, or a person who changes lifestyle and beliefs with the weather (...), can be characterized in this formal sense as "identical to himself/herself". If something is a single thing, identity must be assigned to it. It makes no sense to say that it is acquiring or losing identity.(2) Social psychology/identity/Henrich: The concept of social psychological identity has a completely different logical constitution. Here "identity" is a complex characteristic that people can acquire from a certain age. >Person. They do not have to have these characteristics and cannot possess them at all times. Once they have acquired them, they are 'independent' by virtue of their characteristic. They can free themselves from the influence of others; they can give their lives a form and continuity which they previously possessed, if at all, only under external influence. In this sense, they are autonomous individuals by virtue of their "identity". And one sees which associations play between the philosophical concept of identity and the social-psychological one. But this does not change the fact that the meanings of the two are completely different. Any number of individuals can be independent in exactly the same way. If so, they cannot be distinguished as individuals by their 'identity'.(3) >Indistinguishability, cf. >Leibniz principle. Habermas: Henrich refers explicitly to Meads social psychology. >Criteria/Henrich. 1.D Henrich, Identität, in: O. Marquard, K. Stierle, Identität, Poetik und Hermeneutik, Bd. VIII, München, 1979, S. 371ff. 2.Ebenda S. 372f 3.Ebenda. |
Henr I Dieter Henrich Denken und Selbstsein: Vorlesungen über Subjektivität Frankfurt/M. 2016 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
Identity | Stalnaker | I 14 Vague identity/Stalnaker: vague identity can at most occur with vague terms in identity-statements. >Vagueness. Solution/counterpart theory/Stalnaker: if cross-wordly-relation between classes of deputies ((s) counterparts) exists and not between individuals themselves, then the relation must not be the one of identity, and this other relation may be vague.) >Counterparts, >Counterpart theory, >Cross world identity, >Possible worlds. I 126 Contingent Identity/Stalnaker: it is of course not the case that the actualism requires contingent identity, the above examples can be explained away. >Actualism. One cannot simply reject the possibility on the basis of semantics and logic of identity. Necessary identity: that means, that the thesis that all identity is necessary is a metaphysical thesis. >Identity/Kripke. I 131 Identity/necessary/contingent/Stalnaker: according to the modal quantifier theory all identity is necessary. We do not want this, e.g. a thing can have more counterparts in another possible world. I 132 Solution: there are different ways of picking. I 133 Vague identity/Stalnaker/Nathan SalmonVsVague Identity: (Salmon 1981(1), 243) according to Salmon identity cannot be vague: e.g. suppose there is a pair of entities x and y so that it is vague if they are one and the same thing - then this pair is certainly not the same pair like the pair, in which this is definitely true that x is the same thing as itself - but it is not vague, if the two pairs are identical or differentiated. I 134 Vague identity/identity statement/vague objects/Stalnaker: e.g. M is a specific piece of land within the indeterminate Mt Rainier. a) Mt. Rainier is an indefinite object: then it is wrong to say that M = Mt. Rainier. b ) If it is about a statement instead of an object: then it is indeterminate. I 135f Vague identity/Stalnaker: e.g. there are two fish restaurants called Bookbinder's. Only one can be the same as the original. Endurantism: Problem: "B0": (the original) is then an ambiguous term. Perdurantism: here it is clear. >Perdurantism, cf. >Endurantism. I 138 Vague identity/SalmonVsVague identity/uncertainty/Stalnaker: Salmon's argument shows that if we manage to pick out two entities a and b that there then has to be a fact, whether the two are one thing or two different things (Stalnaker pro Salmon, Nathan). Conversely: if it is undetermined whether a = b, then it is uncertain what "a" refers to or what "b" refers to. But this does not give us a reason to suppose that facts together with terms have to decide this. Salmon just shows that when facts and terms do not decide that it is then indeterminate. I 140 StalnakerVsSalmon: Salmon's vagueness is a vagueness of reference. I 139 Identity/indefinite/Kripke: (1971(2), 50-1) e.g. would the table T be the same in the actual world if in the past the constituting molecules were spread a little differently? Here, the answer can be vague. I 148 Identity/one-digit predicates/Stalnaker: one cannot generally treat sentences as predications. >Predication, >Sentences. E.g. x^(Hx u Gx) is an instance of the form Fs, but "(Hs and Gs)" is not. Therefore, our identity-scheme is more limited than Leibniz' law is normally formulated. >Leibniz Principle. I 154f Definition essential identity/Stalnaker: all things x and y, which are identical, are essentially identical, i.e. identical in all possible worlds, in which this thing exists ((s) that means, the existence is made a prerequisite, not the identity for the existence.) ((s) necessary identity/Stalnaker/(s): here the situation is reversed: if x and y are necessarily identical, they must exist in all possible worlds - or if a thing does not exist in a possible world, it may, in the possible worlds in which it exists, not be necessarily identical). Necessary identity/logical form: x^(x = y)> N(x = y) fails in the standard semantics and in counterpart theory, because a thing can exist contingently and include self-identity existence. Counterpart theory. Two different things may be identical, without being essentially identical, e.g. two possible worlds a and b, each possible for the respective other, and two distinct things have the same counterpart in b, namely 3. Then the pair satisfies the identity-relation in b, but because 1 exists in the world a and is from 2 different, the pair does not satisfy N(Ex> x = y) in b. >Cross world identity. 1. Salmon, Wesley C. 1981. Rational prediction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (2):115-125 2. Kripke, Saul S. Identity and NEcessity. In Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York: New York University Press. pp. 135-164 (1971). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Impossible World | Stalnaker | I 58 Contradiction/LewisVsImpossible World/Lewis: there is no object, no matter how fantastic, about which one could say the truth by contradicting oneself. >Existence, >Non-existence, >Contradictions. I 58 Impossible world/Stalnaker: problem: If the possible world is defined by a contradiction P and ~P, this contradiction is transmitted to the real world through the modal operator "in w, P" because it is then true in the real world that it is true in the other possible world. I 59 Another problem: if there is an impossible world, the possible world with P and those with ~P are no longer complements. >Complementarity. Problem: even the most bizarre possible world will not be at the same time in a set of possible worlds and its complement. I 62 Solution: new definition of impossible world: an impossible world is a world about which a contradiction is true. This does not makes the real world impossible. I 63 Impossible world/Actualism/Stalnaker: the actualist has no problems with an impossible world, because he/she can simply understand them as conflicting sets of propositions. >Actualism/Stalnaker. LewisVs/LewisVsErsatz world: conversely, propositions are sets of possible worlds. >ersatz world. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Indistinguishability | Strawson | I 185 A-expressions: are substantive B-expressions: are predicative. I 201f Difference A/B/differentiation/Strawson: a series of statements, contain a constant B (predicate) and a variable A element (singular nouns). - Tt could be followed by a statement that contains the same B-El but no A - from that finding conversely would not follow the earlier findings. ((s) For this kind of aymmetry also see >Predicates/Brandom, >Singular terms/Brandom.) I.e. in place of the A no variables can occur. - (Quine ditto). >Singular terms, >Predicates. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
Infinity | Quine | V 165 Infinity/material/Quine: if you need an infinite number of characters (e.g. for natural numbers) you cannot say, a sign is a physical object, because then you will soon come to an end. Also forms are not used as classes of inscriptions. These are again physical realizations of forms. IX 64 Infinity/Quine: is only necessary for induction - x = {y}, y = {z}, z = {w} ... ad infinitum - this is the case if {,,,x}. XIII 96 Infinite Numbers/Quine: For example, suppose we randomly assign items to any class, the only limitation is that no object can belong to more than one class. Problem: then there will not be enough items for all classes! A class for which there is no correlate will be the class of all objects that do not belong to their correlated classes. Because its correlate should belong to it, iff it does not belong to it. Cantor: proved in 1890 that the classes of items of any kind exceed the number of items. XIII 97 The reason for this has to do with the paradoxes, if the relation, which is mentioned there, is specified correctly. It turns out that there are infinitely many different infinities. For example, there are more classes of integers than there are integers. But since there are infinitely many integers, the infinity of infinitely many classes of integers must be of a higher kind. For example, there are also more classes of classes of integers than there are classes of integers. This is an even higher infinity. This can be continued infinitely many times. The argument here depended on the class of non-elements of their own correlated classes (nonmembers of own correlated classes). Russell's Antinomy/Quine: depended on the class of nonelements of selves. Cantor's Paradox/Quine: if one takes the correlation as self-correlation, Cantor's paradox amounts to Russell's Paradox. That is how Russell came up with it. Cantor/Theorem/Quine: his theorem itself is not a paradox. Russell's Antinomy/Solution/Quine: is prevented by excluding a special case from Cantor's theorem that leads to it. (See Paradoxes) Cantor Theorem/Corollar/unspecifiable classes/Quine: the existence of unspecifiable classes follows as a corollar from Cantor's theorem. I.e. classes for which we cannot specify the containment condition. There is no other identifying move either. For example, the infinite totality of grammatically constructible expressions in a language. According to Cantor's theorem, the class of such expressions already exceeds the expressions themselves. Classes/larger/smaller/criterion/Quine: our criterion for larger and smaller classes here was correlation. Def greater/classes/quantities/Quine: one class is larger than another if not each of its elements can be paired with an element of the other class. XIII 98 Problem: according to this criterion, no class can be larger than one of its real subclasses (subsets). For example, the class of positive integers is not larger than the class of even numbers. Because we can always form pairs between their elements. This simply shows that infinite sets behave unusually. Infinite/larger/smaller/class/quantities/Quine: should we change our criterion because of this? We have the choice: a) We can say that an infinite class need not be larger than its real subclasses, or b) change the criterion and say that a class is always larger than its real parts, only that they can sometimes be exhausted by correlation with elements of a smaller class. Pro a): is simpler and standard. This was also Dedekind's definition of infinity. Infinite/false: a student once wrote that an infinite class would be "one that is a real part of itself". This is not true, but it is a class that is not larger than a (some) real part of itself. For example the positive integers are not more numerous than the even numbers. E.g. also not more numerous than the multiples of 3 (after the same consideration). And they are also not less numerous than the rational numbers! Solution: any fraction (ratio) can be expressed by x/y, where x and y are positive integers, and this pair can be uniquely represented by a positive integer 2x times 3y. Conversely, we get the fraction by seeing how often this integer is divisible by 2 or by 3. Infinite/Quine: before we learned from Cantor that there are different infinities, we would not have been surprised that there are not more fractions than integers. XIII 99 But now we are surprised! Unspecifiable: since there are more real numbers than there are expressions (names), there are unspecifiable real numbers. Names/Expressions/Quine: there are no more names (expressions) than there are positive integers. Solution: simply arrange the names (expressions alphabetically within each length). Then you can number them with positive integers. Real Numbers/Cantor/Quine: Cantor showed that there are as many real numbers as there are classes of positive integers. We have seen above (see decimals and dimidials above) that the real numbers between 0 and 1 are in correlation with the infinite class of positive integers. >Numbers/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Inflation | Rothbard | II 160 Inflation/Rothbard: Great Britain suspended specie payments indefinitely so as to permit the Bank of England, and the banking system as a whole, to maintain and greatly expand the previously inflated system of fractional reserve banking. Accordingly, the bank was able to greatly inflate credit and the money supply of notes and deposits. >Gold standard/Rothbard, >Central banks/Rothbard, >Bullionism/Rothbard. Rothbard III 990 Def Inflation/Rothbard: The process of issuing pseudo warehouse receipts or, more exactly, the process of issuing money beyond any increase in the stock of specie, may be called inflation.(1) Def Deflation/Rothbard: A contraction in the money supply outstanding over any period (aside from a possible net decrease in specie) may be called deflation. Clearly, inflation is the primary event and the primary purpose of monetary intervention. There can be no deflation without an inflation having occurred in some previous period of time. Interventions: A priori, almost all intervention will be inflationary. For not only must all monetary intervention begin with inflation; the great gain to be derived from inflation comes from the issuer's putting new money into circulation. >Quasi-money/Rothbard, >Money/Rothbard, >Money substitutes/Rothbard. Money supply: The increasing money supply is only a social waste and can only advantage some at the expense of others. And the benefits and burdens are distributed as just outlined: the early-comers gaining at the expense of later-comers. Credit expansion/Rothbard: If inflation is any increase in the supply of money not matched by an increase in the gold or silver stock available, the method of inflation just depicted is called credit expansion - the creation of new money-substitutes, entering the economy on the credit market. As will be seen below, while credit expansion by a bank seems far more sober and respectable than outright spending of new money, it actually has far graver consequences for the economic system, consequences which most people would find especially undesirable. This inflationary credit is called circulating credit, as distinguished from the lending of saved funds - called commodity credit. Rothbard III 991 Prices/New equilibrium: (…) prices will not have increased uniformly in the new equilibrium; the purchasing power of the monetary unit has fallen, but not equiproportionally over the entire array of exchange-values. Since some prices have risen more than others, therefore, some people will be permanent gainers, and some permanent losers, from the inflation.(1) Victims of inflation: Particularly hard hit by an inflation, of course, are the relatively "fixed" income groups, who end their losses only after a long period or not at all. Pensioners and annuitants who have contracted for a fixed money income are examples of permanent as well as short-run losers. Life insurance benefits are permanently slashed.(2) Rothbard III 992 Investment/consumption: Inflation also changes the market's consumption/investment ratio. Superficially, it seems that credit expansion greatly increases capital, for the new money enters the market as equivalent to new savings for lending. Since the new "bank money" is apparently added to the supply of savings on the credit market, businesses can now borrow at a Iower rate of interest; hence inflationary credit expansion seems to offer the ideal escape from time preference, as well as an inexhaustible fount of added capital. Actually, this effect is illusory. On the contrary, inflation reduces saving and investment, thus Iowering society's standard of living. It may even cause large-scale capital consumption. 1) In the first place, as we just have seen, existing creditors are injured. This will tend to discourage lending in the future and thereby discourage saving-investment. 2) Secondly (…) the inflationary process inherently yields a purchasing-power profit to the businessman, since he purchases factors and sells them at a later time when all prices are higher. The businessman may thus keep abreast of the price increase (we are here exempting from variations in price increases the terms-of-trade component), neither Iosing nor gaining from the inflation. But business accounting is traditionally geared to a world where the value of the monetary unit is stable. Rothbard III 993 Capital goods: Capital goods purchased are entered in the asset column "at cost," i.e., at the price paid for them. When the firm later sells the product, the extra inflationary gain is not really a gain at all; for it must be absorbed in purchasing the replaced capital good at a higher price. Inflation, therefore, tricks the businessman: it destroys one of his main signposts and leads him to believe that he has gained extra profits when he is just able to replace capital. Accounting error: The accounting error stemming from inflation has (…) economic consequences. The firms with the greatest degree of error will be those with capital equipment bought more preponderantly when prices were Iowest. If the inflation has been going on for a while, these will be the firms with the oldest equipment. Their seemingly great profits will attract other firms into the field, and there will be a completely unjustified expansion of investment in a seemingly high-profit area. Conversely, there will be a deficiency of investment elsewhere. Allocation: Thus, the error distorts the market's system of allocating resources and reduces its effectiveness in satisfying the consumer. The error will also be greatest in those firms with a greater proportion of capital equipment to product, and similar distorting effects will take place through excessive investment in heavily "capitalized" industries, offset by underinvestment elsewhere.(3) >Credit expansion/Rothbard, >Time preference/Rothbard, >Money supply/Rothbard. Rothbard III 1018 Inflation/Rothbard: When the government and the banking system begin inflating, the public will usually aid them unwittingly in this task. The public, not cognizant of the true nature of the process, believes that the rise in prices is transient and that prices will soon return to "normal." Hoarding: (…) people will therefore hoard more money, i.e., keep a greater proportion of their income in the form of cash balances. >Hoarding/Rothbard, >Cash balance/Rothbard. Demand for money/prices: The social demand for money, in short, increases. As a result, prices tend to increase less than proportionately to the increase in the quantity of money. Government: The government obtains more real resources from the public than it had expected, since the public's demand for these resources has declined. Eventually, the public begins to realize what is taking place. Government: It seems that the government is attempting to use inflation as a permanent form of taxation. But the public has a weapon to combat this depredation. Consumption: Once people realize that the government will continue to inflate, and therefore that prices will continue to rise, they will step up their purchases of goods. For they will realize that they are gaining by buying now, instead of waiting until a future date when the value of the monetary unit will be Iower and prices higher. In other words, the social demand for money falls, and prices now begin to rise more rapidly than the increase in the supply of money. Hyperinflation: When this happens, the confiscation by the government, or the "taxation" effect of inflation, will be Iower than the government had expected, for the increased money will be reduced in purchasing power by the greater rise in prices. This stage of the inflation is the beginning of hyperinflation, of the run-away boom.(4) Demand for money: The Iower demand for money allows fewer resources to be extracted by the government, but the government can still obtain resources so long as the market continues to use the money. Prices: The accelerated price rise will, in fact, lead to complaints of a "scarcity of money" and stimulate the government to greater efforts of inflation, thereby causing even more accelerated price increases. Flight from money: This process will not continue long, however. As the rise in prices continues, the public begins a "flight from money," getting rid of money as soon as possible in order to invest in real goods - almost any real goods - as a store of value for the future. Prices: This mad scramble away from money, Iowering the demand for money to hold practically to zero, causes prices to rise upward in astronomical proportions. The value of the monetary unit falls practically to zero. The devastation and havoc that the runaway boom causes among the populace is enormous. Society: The relatively fixed-income groups are wiped out. Production declines drastically (sending up prices further), as people lose the incentive to work - since they must spend much of their time getting rid of money. The main desideratum becomes getting hold of real goods, whatever they may be, and spending money as soon as received. Market: When this runaway stage is reached, the economy in effect breaks down, the market is virtually ended, and society reverts to a state of virtual barter and complete impoverishment.(5) Commodities are then slowly built up as media of exchange. The public has rid itself of the inflation burden by its ultimate weapon: Iowering the demand for money to such an extent that the government's money has become worthless. When all other limits and forms of persuasion fail, this is the only way - through chaos and economic breakdown - for the people to force a return to the "hard" commodity money of the free market. Rothbard III 1021 Interventions: Movements in the supply-of-goods and in the demand-for-money schedules are all the results of voluntary changes of preferences on the market. The same is true for increases in the supply of gold or silver. But increases in fiduciary or fiat media are acts of fraudulent intervention in the market, distorting voluntary preferences and the voluntarily determined pattern of income and wealth. Def Inflation/Rothbard: Therefore, the most expedient definition of "inflation" is: an increase in the supply of money beyond any increase in specie.(6) Rothbard III 1022 RothbrdVsGovernment policies: The absurdity of the various governmental programs for "fighting inflation" now becomes evident. Most people believe that government offcials must constantly pace the ramparts, armed With a huge variety of "control" programs designed to combat the inflation enemy. Yet all that is really necessary is that the government and the banks (…) cease inflating.(7) Inflationary pressure: The absurdity of the term "inflationary pressure" also becomes clear. Either the government and banks are inflating or they are not; there is no such thing as "inflationary pressure."(8) 1. Cf. Mises, Theory of Money and Credit. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953 and 1957 Reprinted by Liberty Fund, 1995. pp. 140-42. 2. 1081 The avowed goal of Keynes' inflationist program was the "euthanasia of the rentier." Did Keynes realize that he was advocating the not-so-merciful annihilation of some of the most unfit-for-labor groups in the entire population - groups whose marginal value productivity consisted almost exclusively in their savings? Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1936. Reprinted by Prometheus Books, 1997. p. 376. 3.For an interesting discussion of some aspects of the accounting error, see W.T. Baxter, "The Accountant's Contribution to the Trade Cycle," Economica, May, 195 5 , pp. 99-112. Also see Mises, Theory of Money and Credit, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953 and 1957. Reprinted by Liberty Fund, 1995. pp. 202-04; and Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 546 f. 4. Cf. the analysis by John Maynard Keynes in his A Tract on Monetary Reform (London: Macmillan & Co., 1923), chap. ii, section 1. 5. On runaway inflation, see Mises, Theory of Money and Credit, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953 and 1957. Reprinted by Liberty Fund, 1995. Mises, Richard von. Probability, Statistics, and Truth, 2nd ed. New York: Macmillan, 1957. Reprinted by Dover Publications, 1981. pp. 227-31. 6. Inflation is here defined as any increase in the money supply greater than an increase in specie, not as a big change in that supply. As here defined, therefore, the terms "inflation" and "deflation" are praxeological categories. See Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 419-20. But also see Mises' remarks in Aaron Director, ed., Defense, Controls, and Inflation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 3 n. 7. See George Ferdinand, "Review of Albert G. Hart, Defense without Inflation," Christian Economics, Vol. III, No. 19 (October 23, 1951). 8. See Mises in Director, Defense, Controls, and Inflation, p. 334. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
Intentionality | Hintikka | II XVII Intentionality/Hintikka: thesis: intentionality has a multi-world character. Def intentional/Hintikka: a concept is intentional iff. its semantic explanation involves several possible scenarios and their relation to each other. This places intentionality close to intensionality. >Intensionality. Thesis: intentionality is a gradual matter. There are types and dimensions of intentionality that are not all equally interesting. Just as possible worlds can differ. Chisholm/Hintikka: Chisholm has proved intentionality in the logical behavior of certain concepts. II 183 Def intentional/intentionality/Hintikka: thesis: it is a sign of intentionality when possible worlds are used to explain the semantics of the concept. >Possible worlds. Intentionality/Hintikka: we can also call it intensionality: One has to look at a background of alternatives (unrealized possibilities) when one considers the consciousness of a subject. Intentionality/Brentano/Husserl/Hintikka: for the two, "directedness at an object" was essential for intentionality. An intentional term "points behind itself". HintikkaVsHusserl/HintikkaVsBrentano. William Kneale: ditto. KnealeVsHusserl/KnealeVsBrentano. II 188 Intentionality/Hintikka: intentionality is a gradual matter. This is obvious if it is true that we always have to look at unrealized possibilities when it comes to intentionality. "Ontological Power"/Hintikka: the greater the ontological power of a mind, the more one can go beyond the actual world. Degree of Intentionality/Hintikka: the degree of intentionality is measured by the distance to the actual world. II 196 Condition c: "What is, is necessary what it is and no other thing." Intentionality/Hintikka: that the failure of (c) (preservation of identity, VsSeparation) is a criterion for them, can be seen in their behavior in changing concepts: necessity (logical, physical, and analytical) satisfies condition c). ("What is, is necessary what it is and no other thing".) Conversely, certain other concepts are obviously more intentional than necessity, and they violate c). >Logical necessity, >Analytical necessity. II 197 E.g. "Not everything what is, is so that it is known what it is, nor that it is no other thing". |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
Intentions | Ricoeur | II 21 Intention/Ricoeur: [The] notion of bringing experience to language is the ontological condition of reference, an ontological condition reflected within language as a postulate which has not immanent justification; the postulate according to which we presuppose the existence of singular things which we identify. But this intentional pointing toward the extra-linguistic would rely on a mere postulate and would remain a questionable leap beyond language if this exteriorization were not the counterpart of a previous and more originary move starting from the experience of being in the world and proceeding from this ontological condition towards its expression in language. It is because there is first something to say, because we have an experience to bring to language, that conversely, language is not only directed towards ideal meanings but also refers to what is. >Discourse/Ricoeur, >Dialogue/Ricoeur, >Literature/Ricoeur, >Intentional Fallacy/Wimsatt. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
Interaction | Lamiell | Corr I 83 Interaction/personality traits/measurement/LamiellVsTradition/Lamiell: instead of a normative measurement of persons in order to come to a characterization of persons (see >measurement/Lamiell) we need in interactive approach. >person/Lamiell, >Allport/Lamiell, >comparisons/Lamiell. The lesson here is that considerations of an essentially interactive sort must inevitably be invoked in person characterization even where one’s ultimate ultimate objective is to derive normative characterizations. The converse of this is not true: characterizations grounded in considerations of an interactive nature can be formulated meaningfully wholly apart from considerations of a normative nature. James T. Lamiell, “The characterization of persons: some fundamental conceptual issues”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
Interest Rates | Rothbard | Rothbard III 347 Interest rates/Rothbard: We here assume that the pure capitalists never purchase as a whole a factor that in itself could yield several units of service. They can only hire the services of factors per unit of time. >Factors of production/Rothbard, >Costs of production/Rothbard. E.g., A laborer cannot be bought, then, but his services can be bought over a period of time; i.e., he can be rented or hired. Rothbard III 349 Production/factors of production/investments/Rothbard: In the monetary economy, since money enters into all transactions, the discount of a future good against a present good can, in all cases, be expressed in terms of one good: money. This is so because the money commodity is a present good and because claims to future goods are almost always expressed in terms of future money income. The concept of rate of return is necessary in order for [the producer or investor] to compare different potential investments for different periods of time and involving different sums of money. For any amount of money that he saves, he would like to earn the greatest amount of net return, i.e., the greatest rate of net return. The absolute amount of return has to be reduced to units of time, and this is done by determining the rate per unit of time. Rothbard III 350 Pure interest rate/Evenly rotating economy/Rothbard: [in an evenly rotating economy], there is no entrepreneurial uncertainty, and the rate of net return is the pure exchange ratio between present and future goods. This rate of return is the rate of interest. This pure rate of interest will be uniform for all periods of time and for all lines of production and will remain constant in the evenly rotating economy. >Evenly rotating economy (ERE)/Rothbard. Rothbard III 351 Production: Suppose that at some time the rates of interest earned are not uniform as between several lines of production. If capitalists are generally earning 5 percent interest, and a capitalist is obtaining 7 percent in a particular line, other capitalists will enter this line and bid away the factors of production from him by raising factor prices. Rothbard III 370 Evenly rotating economy (ERE) /Rothbard: (…) in the ERE the interest return on monetary investment (the pure rate of interest) is the same everywhere in the economy, regardless of the type of product or the specific conditions of its production. Not only must the interest rate be uniform for each good; it must be uniform for every stage of every good. For suppose that the interest rate were higher in the higher stages than in the lower stages. Then capitalists would abandon producing in the lower stage, and shift to the higher stage, where the interest return is greater. Interest rate/production: It is important to realize that the interest rate is equal to the rate of price spread in the various stages. Too many writers consider the rate of interest as only the price of loans on the loan market. In reality, (…) the rate of interest pervades all time markets, and the productive loan market is a strictly subsidiary time market of only derivative importance.(1) Duration/time/production: We may now remove our restrictive assumption about the equality of duration of the various stages. (…) suppose that the uniform interest rate in the economy is 5 percent. This is 5 percent for a certain unit period of time, say a year. A production process or investment covering a period of two years will, in equilibrium, then earn 10 percent, the equivalent of 5 percent per year. The same will obtain for a stage of production of any length of time. Thus, irregularity or integration of stages does not hamper the equilibrating process in the slightest. Rothbard III 374 Production: The capitalists’ function is thus a time function, and their income is precisely an income representing the agio of present as compared to future goods. This interest income, then, is not derived from the concrete, heterogeneous capital goods, but from the generalized investment of time.(2) It comes from a willingness to sacrifice present goods for the purchase of future goods (the factor services). Rothbard III 375 Time preference/Rothbard: (…) a good at present is worth more now than its present value as a future good. Because money is the general medium of exchange, for the time market as well as for other markets, money is the present good, and the future goods are present expectations of the future acquisition of money. It follows from the law of time preference that present money is worth more than present expectations of the same amount of future money. In other words, future money (as we may call present expectations of money in the future) will always exchange at a discount compared to present money. This discount on future goods as compared with present goods (or, conversely, the premium commanded by present goods over future goods) is the rate of interest. Rothbard III 388 The time-market schedules of all individuals are aggregated on the market to form market-supply and market-demand schedules for present goods in terms of future goods. The supply schedule will increase with an increase in the rate of interest, and the demand schedule will fall with the higher rates of interest. Aggregating the supply and demand schedules on the time Rothbard III 389 market for all individuals in the market, we obtain (…) [a] demand curve for present goods in terms of the supply of future goods; it slopes rightward as the rate of interest falls. (…) the supply curve of present goods [is indicated] in terms of the demand for future goods; it slopes rightward as the rate of interest increases. The intersection of the two curves determines the equilibrium rate of interest—the rate of interest as it would tend to be in the evenly rotating economy. This pure rate of interest, then, is determined solely by the time preferences of the individuals in the society, and by no other factor.(3) >Evenly Rotating Economy, >Time preference/Rothbard. Rothbard III 405 It seems likely that the demand schedule for present goods by the original productive factors will be highly inelastic in response to changes in the interest rate. With the large base amount, the discounting by various rates of interest will very likely make little difference to the factor-owner.(4) Large changes in the interest rate, which would make an enormous difference to capitalists and determine huge differences in interest income and the profitableness of various lengthy productive processes, would have a negligible effect on the earnings of the owners of the original productive factors. Rothbard III 773 Interest rates/Rothbard: In the determination of the interest rate, we must (…) take account of allocating one's money stock by adding to or subtracting from one's cash balance. A man may allocate his money to consumption, investment, or addition to his cash balance. Time preference: His time preferences govern the proportion which an individual devotes to present and to future goods, i.e., to consumption and to investment. Cash balance: Now suppose a man's demand-for-money schedule increases, and he therefore decides to allocate a proportion of his money income to increasing his cash balance. There is no reason to suppose that this increase affects the consumption/investment proportion at all. Time preference: It could, but if so, it would mean a change in his time preference schedule as well as in his demand for money. >Cash balance/Rothbard. Demand for money: If the demand for money increases, there is no reason why a change in the demandfor money should affect the interest rate one iota. There is no necessity at all for an increase in the demand for money to raise the interest rate, or a decline to Iower it - no more than the opposite. In fact, there is no causal connection between the two; (…). >Demand for money/Rothbard. Rothbard III 997 Interest rate/money supply/Rothbard: Equilibrium: It should not be surprising that the market tends to revert to its preferred ratios. The same process (…) takes place in all prices after a change in the money stock. Increased money always begins in one area of the economy, raising prices there, and filters and diffuses eventually over the whole economy, which then roughly returns to an equilibrium pattern conforming to the value of the money. Rothbard III 998 The market therefore reacts to a distortion ofthe free-market interest rate by proceeding to revert to that very rate. The distortion caused by credit expansion deceives businessmen into believing that more savings are available and causes them to malinvest - to invest in projects that will turn out to be unprofitable when consumers have a chance to reassert their true preferences. This reassertion takes place fairly quickly – as soon as owners of factors receive their increased incomes and spend them. Market interest rate/money supply/Economic theories/Rothbard: This theory permits us to resolve an age-old controversy among economists: whether an increase in the money supply can Iower the market rate of interest. Rothbard III 998 Mercantilism/Keynesianism: To the mercantilists - and to the Keynesians - it was obvious that an increased money stock permanently Iowered the rate of interest (given the demand for money). Classical economics: To the classicists it was obvious that changes in the money stock could affect only the value of the monetary unit, and not the rate of interest. RothbardVsMercantilism/RothbardVsKeynesianism: The answer is that an increase in the supply of money does Iower the rate of interest when it enters the market as credit expansion, but only temporarily. In the long run (and this long run is not very "long"), the market re-establishes the free-market time-preference interest rate and eliminates the change. In the long run a change in the money stock affects only the value of the monetary unit. >Savings/Rothbard, >Inflation/Rothbard, >Credit expansion/Rothbard. Rothbard III 1002 Interest rate/Rothbard: (…) credit expansion does not necessarily Iower the interest rate below the rate previously recorded; it Iowers the rate below what it would have been in the free market and thus creates distortion and malinvestment. >Business cycle/Rothbard. Market interest rate/purchasing power: Recorded interest rates in the boom will generally rise, in fact, because of the purchasing-power component in the market interest rate. An increase in prices (…) generates a positive purchasing-power component in the natural interest rate, i.e., the rate of return earned by businessmen on the market. >Natural interest rate. Rothbard III 1003 Free market: In the free market this would quickly be reflected in the Ioan rate, which (…) is completely dependent on the natural rate. But a continual influx of circulating credit prevents the Ioan rate from catching up with the natural rate, and thereby generates the business-cycle process.(5) Loans: A further corollary of this bank-created discrepancy between the Ioan rate and the natural rate is that creditors on the Ioan market suffer losses for the benefit of their debtors: the capitalists on the stock market or those who own their own businesses. The latter gain during the boom by the differential between the Ioan rate and the natural rate, while the creditors (apart from banks, which create their own money) lose to the same extent. 1. In the reams of commentary on J.M. Keynes’ General Theory, no one has noticed the very revealing passage in which Keynes criticizes Mises’ discussion of this point. Keynes asserted that Mises’ “peculiar” new theory of interest “confused” the “marginal efficiency of capital” (the net rate of return on an investment) with the rate of interest. The point is that the “marginal efficiency of capital” is indeed the rate of interest! It is a price on the time market. It was precisely this “natural” rate, rather than the loan rate, that had been a central problem of interest theory for many years. The essentials of this doctrine were set forth by Böhm-Bawerk in Capital and Interest and should therefore not have been surprising to Keynes. See John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1936), pp. 192–93. It is precisely this preoccupation with the relatively unimportant problems of the loan market that constitutes one of the greatest defects of the Keynesian theory of interest. (RothbardVsKeynes). 2. As Böhm-Bawerk declared: Interest . . . may be obtained from any capital, no matter what be the kind of goods of which the capital consists: from goods that are barren as well as from those that are naturally fruitful; from perishable as well as from durable goods; from goods that can be replaced and from goods that cannot be replaced; from money as well as from commodities. (Böhm-Bawerk, Capital and Interest, p. 1) 3. The importance of time preference was first seen by Böhm-Bawerk in his Capital and Interest. The sole importance of time preference has been grasped by extremely few economists, notably by Frank A. Fetter and Ludwig von Mises. See Fetter, Economic Principles, pp. 235-316; idem, “Interest Theories, Old and New,” American Economic Review, March, 1914, pp. 68-92; and Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 476-534. 4. The rate of interest, however, will make a great deal of difference in so far as he is an owner and seller of a durable good. Land is, of course, durable almost by definition - in fact, generally permanent. So far, we have been dealing only with the sale of factor services, i.e., the “hire” or rent” of the factor, and abstracting from the sale or valuation of durable factors, which embody future services. Durable land (…) is “capitalized,” i.e., the value of the factor as a whole is the discounted sum of its future MVP’s ((marginal value product), and there the interest rate will make a significant difference. The price of durable land, however, is irrelevant to the supply schedule of land services in demand for present money. 5. Since Knut Wicksell is one of the fathers of this business-cycle approach, it is important to stress that our usage of "natural rate" differs from his. Wicksell's "natural rate" was akin to our "free-market rate"; our "natural rate" is the rate of return earned by businesses on the existing market without considering Ioan interest. It corresponds to what has been misleadingly called the "normal profit rate," but is actually the basic rate of interest. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
Interpretation | Luther | Gadamer I 178 Bible/Interpretation/Sacred Scripture/Luther/Gadamer: The position of Luther(1) is approximately the following: Sacred Scripture is sui ipsius interpres. It does not require tradition to acquire the right understanding of it, nor does it require an art of interpretation in the style of the ancient doctrine of the fourfold sense of scripture; rather, the text of the Scripture has an unambiguous sense that can be determined from it itself, the sensus litteralis. The allegorical method in particular, which previously seemed indispensable for the dogmatic unity of biblical teaching, is only legitimate where the allegorical intention is given in the Scripture itself. Thus it is in place in the parable discourses. The Old Testament, on the other hand, must not gain its specifically Christian relevance through an allegorical interpretation. >Allegory. One has to understand it literally, and just by understanding it literally Gadamer I 179 and recognizing in it the position of the law, which is canceld out by the act of grace of Christ, it has a Christian meaning. The literal meaning of the Scriptures, of course, is not in every place and at any moment clearly understandable. For it is the whole of Holy Scripture that guides the understanding of the individual, just as, conversely, this whole is only acquired from the understanding of the individual that is carried out. Gadamer: Such a circular relationship between whole and part is nothing new in itself. This was already known in ancient rhetoric, which compared perfect speech with the organic body, the relationship between the head and the limbs. Luther and his successors transferred this image known from classical rhetoric to the process of understanding and developed as a general principle of text interpretation that all the details of a text are to be understood from the contextus, the context, and from the unified sense at which the whole is aimed, the scopus. >Circular reasoning, >Hermeneutic Circle, >Hermeneutics, >Context, >Understanding. Problem/GadamerVsLuther: 1. In invoking this principle for the interpretation of Holy Scripture, Reformation theology, for its part, remains caught in a dogmatically founded premise. It makes the precondition that the Bible itself is a unity. Gadamer I 180 GadamerVsLuther: 2. (...) the theology of the Reformation does not even appear to be consistent. By finally using the Protestant faith formulas as a guide for understanding the unity of the Bible, it too abolishes the principle of the Scriptures in favour of a, however, short-term Reformation tradition. Not only the counter-reformatory theology has argued against this but also Dilthey(2). >Reformation, >W. Dilthey. 1. According to K. Roll, the hermeneutical principles of the Lutheran Bible explanation have been thoroughly researched, especially by G. Ebeling. (G. Ebeling, Evangelienauslegung. Eine Untersuchung zu Luthers Hermeneutik [1942] and Die Anfänge von Luthers Hermeneutik [ZThK 48, 1951 , 172 -230] and more recently the Word of God and hermeneutics [ZThK 56, 1959]). 2. Cf. Dilthey II, 126 Note 3 the criticism of Flacius by Richard Simon. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Interpretation | Postmodernism | Gaus I 25 Interpretation/Postmodernism/Ball: The postmodern sensibility is not a single, stable thing. There are, to simplify somewhat, two main versions of postmodernist interpretation. One derives largely from Nietzsche and Foucault; the other, from Derrida. >Deconstruction/Derrida, >F. Nietzsche. A Foucauldian approach to interpretation seeks to expose and criticize the myriad ways in which human beings are ‘normalized’ or made into ‘subjects’, i.e. willing participants in their own subjugation (Foucault, 1980)(1). >M. Foucault. Thus a postmodernist perspective on the interpretation of texts typically focuses on the ways in which earlier thinkers (...) contributed ideas to the mentalité that paved the way for the creation and legitimation of the modern surveillance society. And conversely postmodernist interpreters look for earlier thinkers who challenged or questioned or undermined these ideas. This Foucauldian approach is well represented by William Connolly’s Political Theory and Modernity (1988)(2). Interpretation: A postmodernist rereading relocates and realigns earlier thinkers along altogether different axes. A postmodernist reading of the history of political thought not only exposes heretofore unsuspected villains, it also reveals heroes who have dared to resist the pressures and processes of ‘normalization’. Amongst the former are Hobbes and Rousseau. >Th. Hobbes, >J.-J. Rousseau. That the historical Rousseau was exceedingly critical of the historical Hobbes does not matter for a postmodernist reading. For we can now see them as birds of a feather, each having extended ‘the gaze’ ever more deeply into the inner recesses of the human psyche, thereby aiding and abetting the subjugation of modern men and women. BallVs: Whether this design was consciously formulated and put into play by the aristocratic French pornographer is, at best, doubtful; but like other postmodernist interpreters Connolly eschews any concern with such historical niceties as authorial intention. >W. Connolly. Gaus I 26 Truth/Postmodernism/Ball: Various criticisms can be levelled against a postmodernist perspective on interpretation. One is that we do sometimes wish, and legitimately so, to know whether something Marx or Mill said was true. We will not be helped by being told that true/false is a specious ‘binary’. >Truth values, >Bivalence, >Logic, >J. St. Mill, >K. Marx. More perniciously, with its emphasis on diverse, divergent and conflicting ‘readings’ or interpretations - there are allegedly no facts, only interpretation ‘all the way down’ - postmodernism is constitutionally unable to distinguish truth from falsehood and propaganda from fact. Cf. >False information, >Facts, >Truth, >Correctness. 1. Foucault, Michel 1980. Power/Knowledge, ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon. 2. Conolly, W.E. 1988. Political Theory and Modernity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ball, Terence. 2004. „History and the Interpretation of Texts“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
Judgments | Kant | Brandom I 516 Judgement/Kant: is the basic unit of consciousness. >Consciousness/Kant. --- Strawson V 64 Judgment/Kant: a valid judgment is independet from consciousness states - Strawson: then probably no experience without concepts - the deepest principle. - >Categories: unity of consciousness. Strawson V 63 Judgement/Kant: the same as to let fall objects under concepts. --- Bubner I 96 Judgment/Kant/Aristotle/Bubner: judgements are not like signs in direct relation to a particular world-givenness, but they represent something, or characterize something as something. They design a certain point of view on the world, which can be distinguished from other views. The judgment asserts that things behave as it is represented by the connection of two sentence elements. Cf. >Predication, >Statement, >Representation/Kant. But in this way, only separate things can be summarized! The unity thus arises from a specially accomplished connection. It is produced in the judgment and is therefore not a givenness of the world. This also explains the possibility of the falsehood of a sentence which is actually properly formed. Bubner I 100 Definition judgment/Kant/Bubner: is then called the particular idea, the content of which is the determinable relation of other representations, which in turn have a content which does not emerge from the formal connection alone. >Ideas/Kant. Bubner I 101 Judgment is, therefore, the mediate knowledge of an object, the representation of a representation of it. If, on the other hand, the content continually emerges from new representations, there would be a regress in judging. Solution: the relation of representations must itself become the object of an idea. Synthesis: is now the fact that this relationship can be specified, namely, that in the establishment of the relationship something own comes to consciousness, namely, the unity of the connected representations as such. That is the peculiar content of the judgment. Gadamer I 38 Urteilskraft/judgement/Kant/Gadamer: (...) where this term, as in Pietism or in the philosophy of the Scots (>Reid), means a polemical turn against metaphysics, it still remains in the line of its original critical function. In contrast, Kant's inclusion of this term is accentuated quite differently in the "Critique of Judgment"(1). Kant/Gadamer: The basic moral meaning of this term no longer has a systematic place with him. KantVsEmotivism/KantVsSensus communis: As is well known, he designed his moral philosophy almost in opposition to the doctrine of "moral feeling" developed in English philosophy. Thus the concept of sensus communis has been completely eliminated from moral philosophy by him. What appears with the unconditionality of a moral imperative cannot be based on a feeling, even if by this we do not mean the detail of feeling but the commonality of moral feeling. For the character of the imperative, which is suitable for morality, fundamentally excludes comparative reflection on others. The unconditionality of the moral commandment certainly does not mean that the moral consciousness should be rigid in judging others. Rather, it is morally imperative to abstract from the subjective private conditions of one's own judgement and to put oneself in the position of the other. >Morals/Kant. Gadamer I 39 Thus, for Kant, all that remains of the scope of what one might call sensual judgement is the aesthetic judgement of taste. Here one can speak of a real public spirit. As doubtful as it may be whether one may speak of knowledge in aesthetic taste, and so certainly not judge by concepts in aesthetic judgment it is clear that aesthetic taste is meant to be the imposition of a general mood, even if it is sensual and not conceptual. The true public spirit, then, says Kant, is taste. >Taste/ Kant. Gadamer I 44 It is (...) by no means the case that the power of judgement is productive only in the area of nature and art as a judgement of the beautiful and sublime, indeed one will not even say with Kant(2) that a productivity of judgment must be recognised there. Rather, the beauty in nature and art is to be supplemented by the whole vast sea of beauty which is spread out in the moral reality of man. Gadamer I 45 It is always obviously not only a matter of logical but also aesthetic judgement. The individual case in which the power of judgement is involved is never a mere case; it is not limited to being the particularity of a general law or concept. Rather, it is always an "individual case", and, typically, we say: a special case, a special case because it is not covered by the rule. Gadamer I 46 Humanities/aesthetics/ethics/Kant/Gadamer: If one now looks at the role Kant's critique of judgement plays within the history of the humanities, one will have to say that his transcendental-philosophical foundation of aesthetics was momentous on both sides and represents a turning point. It means the breaking off of a tradition, but at the same time the introduction of a new development. It restricted the concept of taste to the field in which it could claim independent and autonomous validity as a principle of its own power of judgement - and, conversely, thus restricted the concept of knowledge to the theoretical and practical use of reason. The transcendental intention that guided him found fulfillment in the limited phenomenon of judging the beautiful (and sublime) and referred the more general experiential concept of taste and the activity of aesthetic judgement in the field of law and custom from the center of philosophy. >Aesthetics/Kant. 1. Kritik der Urteilskraft, S 40. 2. Ebenda, S. VII. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Language | Quine | X 134 Language/Carnap/Quine: the language is presented as a deductive system Carnap - 1. Formation rules: Deliver the grammar and the lexicon so that they deliver the well formed formulas - 2. Transformation rules: these provide logical truths (including the mathematical, generally the analytical truths). >Logical Truth/Quine.# VI 17 Ontology/Language/Quine: as far as the assumption of a scientific theory can be called a linguistic matter, the assumption of an ontology can also be called a linguistic matter - but not more than this. >Ontology/Quine. VI 63 Language/Observation/Translation/Quine: most of our utterances are not correlated with stimuli at all, e.g. connectives etc. VI 64 The linguist can create an archive of uninterpreted sentences and dissect them. Recurring segments can be treated as words. (Analytical hypothesis). VI 65 Ultimately, we depend on very poor data material. We can expect successive statements to have something to do with each other. Later, the translator will be dependent on psychological hypotheses. What will the jungle inhabitants most likely believe to be true? What will they probably believe? VI 66 In this case, preference is given to recognizably rational translations. But to establish an alleged grammar and semantics of the natives would be nothing more than bad psychology. Instead one should assume that the psyche of the natives is largely like ours. VI 67 When the linguist discovers an error, he will wonder how far back it goes. VI 105 Language/QuineVsMentalism: The prerequisite of language is that people perceive that others perceive something. This, however, is the seduction to overstretch the mentalistic way of speaking. Mentalism. VII (b) 26 Definition/Quine: can serve two opposite purposes: 1. abbreviation and practical representation (short notation) 2. reverse: redundancy in grammar and vocabulary. Economical vocabulary leads to longer strings. Conversely, economical vocabulary simplifies the theoretical discourse about a language. Language/Quine: by habit these two types are fused together, one as part of the other: External language: is redundant in grammar and vocabulary and economical in terms of the length of strings. Partial language "primitive notation": is economical in grammar and vocabulary. VII (b) 27 Part and whole are connected by translation rules. We call these definitions. They are not assigned to one of the two languages, but connect them. But they are not arbitrary. They should show how primitive notations can serve all purposes. VII (d) 61 Language/Translation/Whorf/Cassirer/Quine: you cannot separate the language from the rest of the world. Differences in language will correspond to differences in life form. Therefore, it is not at all clear how to assume that words and syntax change from language to language while the content remains fixed. VII (d) 77 Introduction/Language/General Term/Quine: the use of general terms has probably arisen in the course of language development because similar stimuli cause similar reactions. Language would be impossible without general terms. In order to understand them, one must recognize the additional operator "class of" or "-ness" when introducing them. Failure to do so was probably the reason for accepting abstract entities. >General Terms/Quine. VII (d) 78 Science/Language/Quine: how much of our science is actually contributed by language, and how much is an original (real) reflection of reality? To answer this, we have to talk about both the world and the language! ((s) And that is already the answer!) Quine: and in order to talk about the world, we have to presuppose a certain conceptual scheme that belongs to our particular language. Conceptual Scheme/Quine: we were born into it, but we can change it bit by bit, like Neurath's ship. VII (d) 79 Language/Quine: its purpose is efficiency in communication and prediction. Elegance is even added as an end in itself. X 34/35 Truth/Language/Quine: Truth depends on language, because it is possible that sounds or characters in one language are equivalent to "2 < 5" and in another to "2 > 5". When meaning changes over many years within a language, we think that they are two different languages. Because of this relativity, it makes sense to attribute a truth value only to tokens of sentences. Truth/World/Quine: the desire for an extra-linguistic basis for truth arises only if one ignores the fact that the truth predicate has precisely the purpose of linking the mention of linguistic forms with the interest in the objective world. X 42 Immanent/Language/Quine: are immanent in language: educational rules, grammatical categories, the concept of the word, or technically: the morpheme. ad X 62 Object language/meta language/mention/use/(s): the object language is mentioned (spoken about), the meta language is used to speak about the object language. X 87 Language/Grammar/Quine: the same language - the same infinite set of sentences can be created with different educational rules from different lexicons. Therefore, the concept (definition) of logical truth is not transcendent, but (language) immanent. (logical truth: is always related to a certain language, because of grammatical structure). >Logical Truth/Quine. Dependence on language and its grammatization. XI 114 Theory/Language/Quine/Lauener: we do not have to have an interpreted language in order to formulate a theory afterwards. This is the rejection of the isolated content of theoretical sentences. Language/Syntax/Lauener: Language cannot be considered purely syntactically as the set of all correctly formed expressions, because an uninterpreted system is a mere formalism. ((s) Such a system is not truthful). XI 115 Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: a person's language and theory are different systems in any case, even if you would agree with Quine otherwise. XI 116 Quine: (ditto). Uncertainty of translation: because of it one cannot speak of a theory invariant to translations. Nor can one say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or conversely that different (even contradictory) theories can be expressed in one language. ((s) Because of the ontological statement that I cannot argue about ontology by telling the other that the things that exist in it do not exist in me, because then I contradict myself that there are things that do not exist). Lauener: that would correspond to the fallacy that language contributes to the syntax but theory to the empirical content. Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: i.e. not that there is no contradiction between the two at all: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, this means that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions. But there are also contexts where the distinction between language and theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language and theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network. V 32 Def Language/Quine: is a "complex of dispositions to linguistic behaviour". V 59 Language/Quine: ideas may be one way or the other, but words are out there where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words. Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve to transmit ideas! (> NominalismVsLocke). >Nominalism. Quine: it is probably true that when we learn a language we learn how to connect words with the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same? V 89 Composition/language/animal/animal language/Quine: animals lack the ability to assemble expressions. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Legal Hermeneutics | Gadamer | I 314 Legal Hermeneutics/Gadamer: The close connection that originally linked philological hermeneutics with legal and theological hermeneutics was based on the recognition of the application as an integrating moment of all understanding. Both for juridical hermeneutics and for theological hermeneutics, the tension that exists between the set text - the law or proclamation - on the one hand, and on the other hand, the meaning that its application acquires at the concrete moment of interpretation, whether in judgment or in preaching, is constitutive. A law does not want to be understood historically, but should be concretized in its validity through interpretation. Likewise, a religious proclamation text does not want to be understood as a mere historical document, but it is to be understood in such a way that it exercises its salvific effect. That includes in both cases that the text, whether law or salvation message, if it is to be understood appropriately, i.e. according to the claim which the text makes, must be understood anew and differently in every moment, i.e. in every concrete situation. >Situation. Understanding is always already application here. >Understanding/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer. I 315 Cognitive/normative: If one (...) distinguishes between cognitive, normative and reproductive interpretation, as E. Betti did in his "General Theory of Interpretation"(1) based on admirable knowledge and overview, one gets into difficulties in assigning phenomena to this classification. This applies first of all to the interpretation practiced in the sciences. Schleiermacher: If one compiles the theological interpretation with the juridical one and assigns it according to its normative function, one must, on the other hand, remember Schleiermacher, who, conversely, connects the theological interpretation in the closest possible way to the general, i.e. for him the philological-historical interpretation. In fact, the rift between cognitive and normative function runs right through theological hermeneutics and can hardly be closed by differentiating scientific knowledge from subsequent edifying application. It is clear that the same rift runs right through the middle of legal interpretation, in so far as recognition of the meaning of a legal text and its application to a specific case are not two separate acts but a single operation. I 332 Juristische Hermeneutik/Gadamer: Gewiss meint der Jurist stets das Gesetz selbst. Aber sein normativer Gehalt ist auf den gegebenen Fall hin zu bestimmen, auf den es angewandt werden soll. Um diesen genau zu ermitteln, bedarf es historischer Erkenntnis des ursprünglichen Sinnes, und nur um dessentwillen bezieht der juristische Ausleger den historischen Stellenwert mit ein, der dem Gesetz durch den Akt der Gesetzgebung zukommt. Rechtsgeschichte: Ganz anders der Rechtshistoriker. Er meint anscheinend nichts weiter als den ursprünglichen Sinn des Gesetzes, wie es gemeint war und galt, als es erlassen wurde. Aber wie kann er denselben erkennen? Gadamer I 333 Der Historiker muss die gleiche Reflexion leisten, die auch den Juristen leitet. [Jedoch]: der Historiker, der seinerseits keine juristische Aufgabe vor sich hat, sondern die geschichtliche Bedeutung dieses Gesetzes - wie Gadamer I 334 jeden anderen Inhalt geschichtlicher Überlieferung - ermitteln will, nicht davon absehen, dass es sich hier um eine Rechtsschöpfung handelt, die juristisch verstanden werden will. Er muss nicht nur historisch, sondern auch juristisch denken können. Juristische Hermeneutik/Gadamer: Der Historiker, der das Gesetz aus seiner historischen Ursprungssituation heraus verstehen will, kann von seiner rechtlichen Fortwirkung gar nicht absehen. Sie gibt ihm die Fragen, die er an die historische Überlieferung stellt, an die Hand. Gilt das nicht in Wahrheit von jedem Text, dass er in dem, was er sagt, verstanden werden muss? Heißt das nicht, dass es stets einer Umsetzung bedarf? Sofern der eigentliche Gegenstand des historischen Verstehens nicht Ereignisse sind, sondern ihre „Bedeutung“ ist solches Verstehen offenbar nicht richtig beschrieben, wenn man von einem an sich seienden Gegenstand und dem Zugehen des Subjekts auf diesen spricht. In Wahrheit liegt im historischen Verstehen immer schon darin, dass die auf uns kommende Überlieferung in die Gegenwart hinein spricht und in dieser Vermittlung - mehr noch: als diese Vermittlung - verstanden werden muss. Der Fall der juristischen Hermeneutik ist also in Wahrheit kein Sonderfall, sondern er ist geeignet, der historischen Hermeneutik ihre volle Problemweite wiederzugeben und damit die alte Einheit des hermeneutischen Problems wiederherzustellen, in der sich der Jurist und der Theologe mit dem Philologen begegnet. Cf. >Law, >History of Law, >Philosophy of Law, >Laws, >Understanding, >Hermeneutics. 1. Cf. E. Betti »Zur Grundlegung einer allgemeinen Auslegungslehre«, and his monumental main work: Allgemeine Auslegungslehre 1967. (for this: „Hermeneutik und Historismus“ (Vol. 2 of Ges. Werke, p. 387—424) and my work „Emilio Betti und das idealistische Erbe“ in: Quaderni Fiorentini 7 (1978), p. 5—11 , Ges. Werke vol. 4.) |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Logical Proper Names | Prior | I 150f Logical Proper Names/Prior: Logical proper names make complex predicates superfluous. N and M are l.E. if and only if any propositions in which they are both used (not only mentioned) express a relation between the objects to which they refer, and whose relation has a converse, so if φ and ψ are converses, [φMN] and [ψNM] are logically equivalent. >Predicates, >Equivalence, >Mention, >Use, >Mention/Use. An expression N is then a logical proper name (Russell's proper name, "this" etc.) only if [(δφ)N] is indistinguishable in meaning from [δ(φN)]. (Parenthesis)Prior: the latter contributes to the fact that one could say that logical proper names are always arguments of sentence-forming functions and never functions of such functions. >Functions. In general: a context of a context of a real "argument" x is a context of x. For example, "I think this is a human" is synonymous(!) with "This is a thought of mine, to be human". >Synonymy, >Context, >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 149 Bound Variables/Prior: stand for logical proper names - "For an x: 1. x φt , 2. Not other than x φt and 3. It is not the case that x ψt". >Variables, >Bound variables. I 152 Logical Proper Names/Prior: if expressions like "the φ-er" can be used as Russell's logical proper name, then without doubt all names can be used that way! >Logical proper names/Russell. But Peirce and Russell believe that this is not the case, real relations are expressed. >Relations/Russell, >B. Russell, >Ch. S. Peirce. I 155 Names/Relation/Logical Proper Names/Prior: if "Y" is a logical proper name, the following forms are equivalent: (A) X says that Y is bald (B) X says that Y is bald (C) Y is considered bald by YX. Problem: what are names in this sense anyway? >Proper names. Prior Thesis: There is a close relationship between names and the term "to be about something". >"About", >Predication, >Attribution. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
Modalities | Bigelow | I 101 Modality/Necessity/Possibility/Modal/Montague/Bigelow/Pargetter: Montague is extreme by Thesis: attributing modal operators (MO) to referents. >R. Montague, >Operators, >Modal operators, >Reference, >Objects, >Facts, >Platonism. Bigelow/Pargetter: instead, we can assume functions. >Functions. Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: our strategy will be an intermediate position: we only assign referents to names and open sentences. (Not to the modal operators "possible" and "necessary"). >Modalities, >Possibility, >Necessity. Name/individual constants/BigelowVsTarski: Tarski allowed only things as referents that can occupy a place at a time. >A. Tarski. We, on the other hand, will also allow Possibilia. Camps: Possibilia: Bigelow per Possibilia. Against: QuineVsPossibilia, TarskiVsPossibilia. >Possibilia, >Possibilism. Possibilia/Bigelow/Pargetter: Things that are not located anywhere but could have been. They are not universals at first! In the end, however, we will argue that they are universals after all. >Universals. Def predicate/Bigelow/Pargetter: at the end we will say that predicates refer to sets constructed from universals and possibilia. Modality/Modal Operator/Bigelow/Pargetter: for "possible", "necessary", "likely" we do not introduce referents, but rules. >Predicates, >Rules. I 290 Necessity/Modality/Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: although we do not define causes with necessary and sufficient conditions, there are connections between causes and necessity. In one sense, the effect is more than just a coincidental consequence. There are two ways that leads causation to modalities. 1. This comes from two terms of "cause", we call them "fat" and "thin" in analogy to Armstrong's "thick" and "thin" single particulars. (Armstrong 1978)(1) >D. Armstrong. a) Def thin cause/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: is simply the complex of particulars, properties and relations that are causally related to the effect. b) Def thick cause/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: additionally the external properties, including all force relations. Modality/Necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: comes into play, because there is certainly a necessary connection between thick causes and their effects. This is because a relation cannot exist if its Relata does not exist. >Cause, >Effect, >Causality, >Causal relationship. Forces/necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: this means that forces must be active. >Forces. I 291 Cause/effect/necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: this trivial statement explains why causes are necessary for their effects. Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: we can also consider it the rest of all causal interaction when everything else is eliminated. Conversely, if we are the only ones to remove the effect from the interaction, the effect must follow. 2. Necessity/Modality/Causation/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: the second way in which causation leads to modality has more to do with thin causes: We have seen that thin causes are not always sufficient and necessary conditions for an effect. >Sufficiency. Sometimes, however, thin causes are quite sufficient and necessary for the effect. Modality: comes into play when we modify Lewis' analysis to say that the next possible worlds are where the cause has this or that effect. This is true for most of the causes, and so we also have counterfactual conditionals again. Similarity metrics/similarity/next possible world/most similar/Bigelow/Pargetter: the proximity of possible worlds is determined by the individuals, properties and relations (1st and higher level) they have in common. >Counterfactual conditional. Similarity metrics/similarity/next possible world/most similar/Bigelow/Pargetter: the greater weight should have properties and relations of a higher level. That is, the next world will generally be the one that has most relations in common. If we then have the thick cause, the effect must also set in (necessity). >Similarity metrics, >Possible worlds, >Levels/order. I 292 Effect/Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: the effect will occur in the majority of the next possible worlds. I 383 Modality/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: the hardness of the mathematical "must" is something that has to be foreseen. Science: reveals necessities in nature. But these are only relative, conditional necessities. Natural necessity/natN/Bigelow/Pargetter: is always only relative, a conditional necessity. >Nature. Absolute necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: only arises from mathematics. >Absoluteness. I 384 Necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: imposes restrictions. Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: Science also shows us possibilities that we would never have seen without it. Mathematics again plays a key role here. Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: derives from mathematics, which cannot be separated from science. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter. Problem: must also be realism in relation to mathematical objects, and thus it becomes platonism. >Platonism, >G. Frege. Nominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: as a scientific realist, you can also be a nominalist. However, he must then either reject parts of the mathematics or take a strongly instrumentalistic view. >Nominalism, >Instrumentalism. I 385 Quine/Bigelow/Pargetter: was driven away from nominalism by his scientific realism. Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: much of his modal realism was formulated within a nominalist framework. His later preference for universals does not alter the fact that his central theories are based on individuals and sets. >W.V.O. Quine. Nominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: is only committed to antirealist consequences if he nourishes "worldly" presuppositions. >Antirealism, >Presuppositions. Scientific Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: should be a scientific Platonist at the same time. That means he needs mathematical entities and universals Bigelow/Pargetter pro. >Mathematical entities. Combinatorial theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: the world contains a collection of particulars and universals. This also gives us modalities. In this way, we obtain a world book that corresponds to a complex property that either instantiates the world or not. I 386 We call these possible worlds. 1. Armstrong, D.M. (1978). Universals and scientific realism. Cambridge University Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
Money Market | Rothbard | Rothbard III 535 Money market/money relation/Rothbard: Once an increase to a greater level of gross investment occurs, (…) it is not maintained automatically. Producers have to maintain the gross investment, and this will be done only if their time preferences remain at the lower rates and they continue to be willing to save a greater proportion of gross monetary income. (…) this maintenance and further progress can take place without any increase in the money supply or other change in the money relation. Progress can occur, in fact, with falling prices of all products and factors.(1) ((s) Rothbard does not use the term „Money market“ but „money relation“). Rothbard III 774 If the PPM (purchasing power per monetary unit) falls, then more money in the hands of an individual may not necessarily Iower the time-preference rate on his schedule, for the more money may only just compensate him for the fall in the PPM, and his "real money stock" may therefore be the same as before. >Cash balance/Rothbard. This again demonstrates that the money relation (money supply and demand for money) is neutral to time preference and the pure rate of interest. Prices: An increased demand for money, then, tends to Iower prices all around without changing time preference or the pure rate of interest. Rothbard III 765 Equilibrium/money utility: Goods are useful and scarce, and any increment in goods is a social benefit. But money is useful not directly, but only in exchanges. (…) as the stock of money in society changes, the objective exchange-value of money changes inversely (though not necessarily proportionally) until the money relation is again in equilibrium. When there is less money, the exchange-value of the monetary unit rises; when there is more money, the exchange-value of the monetary unit falls. >Demand for money/Rothbard. Rothbard III 811 A change in the money relation necessarily involves gains and losses because money is not neutral and price changes do not take place simultaneously. Equilibrium: Let us assume - and this will rarely hold in practice - that the final equilibrium position resulting from a change in the money relation is the same in all respects (including relative prices, individual values, etc.) as the previous equilibrium, except for the change in the purchasing power of money. Changes: Changes in the demand for money or the stock of money occur in step-by-step fashion, first having their effect in one area of the economy and then in the next. Because the market is a complex interacting network, and because some People react more quickly than others, movements of prices will differ in the speed of reaction to the changed situation. Rothbard III 812 Gains and losses: When a change in the money relation causes prices to rise, the man whose selling price rises before his buying prices gains, and the man whose buying prices rise first, loses. The one who gains the most from the transition period is the one whose selling price rises first and buying prices last. Conversely, when prices fall, the man whose buying prices fall before his selling price gains, and the man whose selling price falls before his buying prices, loses. Causation/gains and losses: (…) there is nothing about rising prices that causes gains or about falling prices that causes losses. In either situation, some people gain and some people lose from the change, the gainers being the ones with the greatest and lengthiest positive differential between their selling and their buying prices, and the losers the ones with the greatest and longest negative differential in these movements. Which people gain and which lose from any given change is an empirical question, dependent on the location of changes in elements of the money relation, institutional conditions, anticipations, speeds of reaction, etc. >Buying price/Rothbard, >Selling price/Rothbard. 1. Very few writers have realized this. See Hayek, "The 'Paradox' of Saving," pp. 214 ff., 253 ff. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
Money Supply | Rothbard | Rothbard III 765 Money supply/Rothbard: An increase in the supply of money confers no social benefit whatever; it simply benefits some at the expense of others, as will be detailed further below. Similarly, a decrease in the money stock involves no social loss. For money is used only for its purchasing power in exchange, and an increase in the money stock simply dilutes the purchasing power of each monetary unit. Conversely, a fall in the money stock increases the purchasing power of each unit. >Demand for money/Rothbard, >Money/Rothbard. Money supply David Hume: David Hume's famous example provides a highly oversimplified View of the effect of changes in the stock of money, but in the present context it is a valid illustration of the absurdity of the belief that an increased money supply can confer a social benefit or relieve any economic scarcity. Consider the magical situation where every man awakens one morning to find that his monetary assets have doubled. Has the wealth, or the real income, of society doubled? Certainly not. In fact, the real income - the actual goods and services supplied - remains unchanged. What has changed is simply the monetary unit, which has been diluted, and the purchasing power of the monetary unit will fall enough (i.e., prices of goods will rise) to bring the new money relation into equilibrium. Rothbard III 766 Economic law: One of the most important economic laws, therefore, is: Every supply of money is always utilized to its maximum extent, and hence no social utility can be conferred by increasing the supply of money. Gold/Rothbard: Some writers have inferred from this law that any factors devoted to gold mining are being used unproductively, because an increased supply of money does not confer a social benefit. They deduce from this that the government should restrict the amount of gold mining. RothbardVs: These critics fail to realize, however, that gold, the money-commodity, is used not only as money but also for nonmonetary purposes, either in consumption or in production. Hence, an increase in the supply of gold, although conferring no monetary benefit, does confer a social benefit by increasing the supply of gold for direct use. Rothbard III 765 Money supply David Hume/Rothbard: David Hume's famous example provides a highly oversimplified View of the effect of changes in the stock of money, but in the present context it is a valid illustration of the absurdity of the belief that an increased money supply can confer a social benefit or relieve any economic scarcity. Consider the magical situation where every man awakens one morning to find that his monetary assets have doubled. Has the wealth, or the real income, of society doubled? Certainly not. In fact, the real income - the actual goods and services supplied - remains unchanged. What has changed is simply the monetary unit, which has been diluted, and the purchasing power of the monetary unit will fall enough (i.e., prices of goods will rise) to bring the new money relation into equilibrium. >Money supply/Rothbard, >Demand for money/Rothbard, >Money/Rothbard. Rothbard III 802 Money supply/total stock/society/Rothbard: E.g., (…) if spurious warehouse receipts are printed, evidences of goods are issued and sold or loaned without any such goods being in existence. >Goods, >Stock keeping. Money: Money is the good most susceptible to these practices. For money (…) is generally not used directly at all, but only for exchanges. It is, furthermore, a widely homogeneous good, and therefore one ounce of gold is interchangeable with any other. Banks: Since it is convenient to transfer paper in exchange rather than carry gold, money warehouses (or banks) that build up public confidence will find that few People redeem their certificates. The banks will be particularly subject to the temptation to commit fraud and issue pseudo money certificates to circulate side by side with genuine money certificates as acceptable money-substitutes. Homogeneity: The fact that money is a homogeneous good means that people do not care whether the money they redeem is the original money they deposited. This makes bank frauds easier to accomplish. >Fraud/Rothbard, >Free Market/Rothbard, >Banks/Rothbard. Rothbard III 804 Money-substitutes: Since money-substitutes exchange as money on the market, we must consider them as part of the supply of money. It then becomes necessary to distinguish between money (in the broader sense) - the common medium of exchange - and money proper. Money proper: Money proper is the ultimate medium of exchange or standard money - here the money commodity - while the supply of money (in a broader sense) includes all the standard money plus the money-substitutes that are held in individuals' cash balances. In the cases cited above, gold was the money proper or standard money, while the receipts - the demand claims to gold - were the money-substitutes. Rothbard III 805 Money supply: Thus, the total supply of money is composed of the following elements: supply of money proper outside reserves + supply of money certificates + supply of uncovered money-substitutes. >Money substitutes/Rothbard. Certificates: The supply of money certificates has no effect on the size of the supply of money; an increase in this factor only decreases the Size of the first factor. The supply of money proper and the factors determining its Size have already been discussed. It depends on annual production compared to annual wear and tear, and thus, on the unhampered market, the supply of money-proper changes only slowly. >Banks/Rothbard, >Free market/Rothbard, >Monetization of debt/Rothbard, >Bank Reserve/Rothbard, >Money market/Rothbard. Rothbard III 997 Money supply/inflation/Rothbard: Investments: (…) bank credit expansion cannot increase capital investment by one iota. Investment can still come only from savings. Equilibrium: It should not be surprising that the market tends to revert to its preferred ratios. The same process (…) takes place in all prices after a change in the money stock. Increased money always begins in one area of the economy, raising prices there, and filters and diffuses eventually over the whole economy, which then roughly returns to an equilibrium pattern conforming to the value of the money. If the market then tends to return to its preferred price-ratios after a change in the money supply, it should be evident that this includes a return to its preferred saving-investment ratio, reflecting social time preferences. >Time preference/Rothbard, >Savings/Rothbard, >Inflation/Rothbard, >Credit expansion/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
Morning Star/Evening Star | Block | Fodor IV 168 Conceptual Role/Fine-Grained/Block/Fodor/Lepore: Problem: whether the conceptual (inferential) roles of morning star and evening star differ depends on how inferential roles themselves are individuated. This, in turn, depends on how fine-grained or coarse-grained they are perceived. a) as coarse-grained as the individuation of extensions: then the roles of MS/ES are not distinguished! (s) This is, in turn, distinguished from the distinction between the meta-language and the object language, for example, that "bachelor" starts with B). E.g. Suppose our concept of inference was based on material equivalence: IV 169 Then all coextensive expressions will have the same inferential roles. Conversely: E.g. if the inferential roles are as fine-grained as orthography (not only ES/MS but also distinction "bachelor" and "unmarried man"), then we lose the explanatory power for the (presumable) fact that synonymous expressions, other than merely coextensive ones, are substitutable salva veritate. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: 1) now we see: distinctions between inferential roles only solve Frege's problem if there is an adequate individualization principle for them. But there is no criterion for this! Block also called this the main problem. Thus it is not easier to distinguish between inferential roles than between meanings. > Fine grained/coarse grained. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
Necessity de re | Wiggins | II 309f Necessity de re/Wiggins: Problem: E.g. certainly Caesar can be essentially a person, without being in that way so that each sequence with Caesar satisfies in second place: (Human (x2)). Reason: it could be that "human" did not mean human. >Possible worlds, >Meaning. General problem: asymmetry, de re. E.g. Kripke: Elizabeth II is necessarily (de re), the daughter of George VI. But George VI does not necessarily have to have a daughter. E.g. Chisholm: if a table T has a leg L, then T must have L de re as part. But, to say of the table, that it necessarily consists of substructure and board, is not the same as to say that substructure and board are necessarily parts of the table - and also not that the board is necessarily connected to the substructure. Wiggins: nevertheless, if anything is certain, it is this: [(λx)(λy)[xRy] = [(λy)(λx)[y converse-Rx] It would be a perverse extreme in the other direction, if one wanted to banish the corresponding biconditional from the truth theory for L. Wiggins: no matter what one thinks of this mereological essentialism, it means that when the legs exist, the rest of the table needs not to exist. >Essentialism, >Mereology, >Mereological essentialism. Solution: more specific description of the essential properties, e.g. trough points in time: (t)(table exists at t)> (leg is part of table at t)) then necessary[(λy)(λw)[(t)((y exists at t) > (w is part of y at t)))], [table, leg]. II 311 That secures the desired asymmetry. Problem: There is a problem because the existential generalization does not work for the necessity-of-origin doctrine. More general solution: distinction: wrong: [Necessary[(λx)(λy)(x consists of y], [leg, table] There are undesirable consequences for existence that would be proven through it. And [Necessary [(λx) (x consists of table], [leg] this is also wrong. And finally: [Necessary (λy)(leg consists of y], [table] What is right or false depending on whether Kripke or Chisholm is right. >Necessity, >Necessity/Kripke. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
Participation | Rawls | I 221 Participation/Political life/Society/Rawls: in connection with the political process, I call the principle of equal freedoms the principle of equal participation. It means that all citizens have an equal right to participate in the constitutent process and to have a say in its outcome. Problem: what happens when this principle reaches its limits? I 223 Three points concern the equality of rights, as it is affected by the principle of participation: 1. its meaning, 2. its scope, 3. the measures that increase its value. Ad. 1: The principle of a citizen - one vote guarantees that each vote has approximately the same value. Conversely, this requires that each Member of Parliament (with one vote) represents the same number of voters. In order to do this, however, electoral districts must be delimited impartially. >Gerrymandering. I 224 Ad. 2: How broadly defined are political freedoms? This is due to the extent to which the Constitution has been achieved by the majority. If the mere majority rule is restricted for any reason - e. g. in order to ensure plurality - political freedom is less extended. Participation: is restricted by constitutional patterns such as two-chamber system, separation of powers, written laws. Ad. 3.: the value of political freedom must be strengthened by giving everyone the opportunity to participate. I 225 Eligibility for election to public office must not depend on the membership of a particular social or economic class. Problem: how can you secure this? Equal access to information and equal opportunities for input(1). Rawls: Property should be widely distributed,... I 226 ...political parties should be made independent of private economic interests by allocating tax revenue to them. Political parties should also be independent of non-public influences. >Property, >Political parties. I 227 Participation/Rawls: this is about institutions, not what makes an ideal citizen. I 228 The question of civic obligations must be separated from this. 1. See R. A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chicago, 1956, pp. 67-75. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
Personality Traits | Developmental Psychology | Corr I 192 Personality traits/developmental psychology/Donnellan/Robins: we emphasize that the potential neurobiological bases of the Big Five in no way precludes the possibility that personality traits are affected by life experiences and change over time. >Five-factor model, >Personality, >Agreeableness, >Openness, >Extraversion, >Neuroticism. Corr I 193 How stable is personality? There is no simple answer to these types of questions because there are different ways of conceptualizing and measuring stability and change (e.g., Caspi and Shiner 2006(1); Roberts and Pomerantz 2004(2)). 2004). The broadest distinction is between homotypic and heterotypic stability (or continuity). A. Homotypic stability refers to the stability of the exact same thoughts, feelings and behaviours across time. B. Heterotypic stability refers to the stability of personality traits that are theorized to have different manifestations at different ages. Heterotypic stability can only be understood with reference to a theory that specifies how the same trait ‘looks’ (i.e., manifests itself) at different ages and it broadly refers to the degree of personality coherence across development. What is the evidence for heterotypic continuity? Longitudinal studies covering long periods of the lifespan provide important evidence of personality coherence. For example, Caspi, Moffitt, Newman and Silva (1996)(3) found that children who were rated as being irritable and impulsive by clinical examiners at age three were more likely to be dependent on alcohol and to have been convicted of a violent crime by age twenty-one. Corr I 193 The superficial manifestations of self-control are likely to be quite different in pre-schoolers and adolescents; however, the underlying psychological characteristic of being able to forgo immediate impulses to obtain desired long-term outcomes seems to have an appreciable degree of consistency across development. Homotypic stability concerns the evaluation of different kinds of change using the exact same measure of personality across time or across age groups. Four types of stability and change are typically examined: (a) absolute stability (i.e., mean-level stability), (b) differential stability (i.e., rank-order consistency), (c) structural stability, and (d) ipsative stability. Corr I 194 b) Differential stability reflects the degree to which the relative ordering of individuals on a given trait is consistent over time. For example, a population could increase substantially on a trait but the rank ordering of individuals would be maintained if everyone increased by exactly the same amount. Conversely, the rank ordering of individuals could change substantially over time but without any aggregate increases or decreases (e.g., if the number of people who decreased offset the number of people who increased). c) Structural stability refers to similarity over time in patterns of co-variation among traits, or items on a personality scale. For example, one can use structural equation modelling techniques to test whether the intercorrelations among the Big Five domains are the same at the beginning versus the end of college (Robins, Fraley, Roberts and Trzesniewski 2001)(4). Likewise, investigations of structural stability often include the testing of measurement invariance (e.g., Allemand, Zimprich and Hertzog 2007)(5). d) Ipsative stability refers to continuity in the patterning of personality characteristics within a person and how well the relative salience (or extremity) of these attributes is preserved over time. For example, a researcher might investigate the degree to which an individual’s Big Five profile is stable over time – if an individual’s cardinal (i.e., most characteristic) trait in adolescence is Openness to Experience, Corr I 195 is this also likely to be true in adulthood? Examinations of these kinds of questions are fairly rare and often use methods that quantify the similarity of personality profiles such as within-person correlation coefficients (e.g., Ozer and Gjerde 1989)(6). >Five-Factor Model/Developmental psychology. 1. Caspi, A. and Shiner, R. L. 2006. Personality development, in W. Damon and R. Lerner (Series eds.) and N. Eisenberg (Vol. ed.), Handbook of child psychology, vol. III, Social, emotional, and personality development, 6th edn, pp. 300–65. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley 2. Roberts, B. W. and Pomerantz, E. M. 2004. On traits, situations, and their integration: a developmental perspective, Personality and Social Psychology Review 8: 402–16 3. Caspi, A., Moffitt, T. E., Newman, D. L. and Silva, P. A. 1996. Behavioural observations at age 3 years predict adult psychiatric disorders, Archives of General Psychiatry 53: 1033–9 4. Robins, R. W., Fraley, R. C., Roberts, B. W. and Trzesniewski, K. H. 2001. A longitudinal study of personality change in young adulthood, Journal of Personality 69: 617–40 5. Allemand, M., Zimprich, D. and Hertzog, C. 2007. Cross-sectional age differences and longitudinal age changes of personality in middle adulthood and old age, Journal of Personality 75: 323–58 6. Ozer, D. J. and Gjerde, P. F. 1989. Patterns of personality consistency and change from childhood through adolescence, Journal of Personality 57: 483–507 M. Brent Donnellan and Richard W. Robins, “The development of personality across the lifespan”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
Phronesis | Aristotle | Gadamer I 27 Phronesis/AristotleVsPlato/Aristotle/Gadamer: It is (...) a positive, ethical motive [in the judgement] effective, which enters into the Roman Stoic doctrine of the sensus communis. The comprehension and moral coping with the concrete situation requires a (...) subsumption of the given under the general, i.e. the purpose that one pursues, that the right thing arises from it. Thus, it presupposes a direction of the will, i.e. a moral being (hexis) already. Therefore the phronesis is a "spiritual virtue" according to Aristotle(1). He sees in it not simply an ability (dynamis), but a determination of moral being, which cannot be without the whole of the "ethical virtues", just as conversely these cannot be without them. Although this virtue in its exercise has the effect of distinguishing the feasible from the infeasible, it is not simply practical wisdom and general resourcefulness. Its distinction between the doable and the undoable has always included the distinction between the decent and the unseemly, and thus presupposes a moral attitude which in turn trains it. It is this motif, developed by Aristotle against Plato's "idea of the good", to which, according to Vico's reference to the sensus communis, the matter refers. >Sensus communis/Vico, >Sensus communis/Thomas. 1. Aristoteles, Eth. Nic. Z. 9, 1141b 33. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Price | Rothbard | Rothbard II 166 Prices/Demand for money/Rothbard: (…) partial ‘real’ factors - such as government expenditures abroad, a sudden scarcity of food, or ‘a sudden diminution of the confidence of foreigners, in consequence of any great national disaster’ - could influence overall prices or the status of the pound in the foreign exchange market. But (…) such influences can only be trivial and temporary. The overriding causes of such price or exchange movements - not just in some remote ‘long run’ but a all times except temporary deviations - are monetary changes in the supply of and demand for money. Changes in ‘real’ factors can only have an important impact on exchange rates and general prices by altering the composition and the height of the demand for money on the market. But since market demands for money are neither homogeneous nor uniform nor do they ever change Rothbard II 167 equiproportionately, real changes will almost always have an impact on the demand for money. Salerno: ... since real disturbances are invariably attended by ‘distribution effects’, i.e. gains and losses of income and wealth by the affected market participants, it is most improbable that initially nonmonetary disturbances would not ultimately entail relative changes in the various national demands for money...[U]nder inconvertible conditions, the relative changes in the demands for the various national currencies, their quantities remaining unchanged, would be reflected in their long-run appreciation or depreciation on the foreign exchange market.(1) >Price theory/Rothbard. 1. Joseph Salerno. 1980. ‘The Doctrinal Antecedents of the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments’ (doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University, 1980), pp. 299-300. Rothbard III 105 Price/exchange/Rothbard: One of the most important problems in economic analysis is the question: What principles determine the formation of prices on the free market? What can be said by logical derivation from the fundamental assumption of human action in order to explain the determination of all prices in interpersonal exchanges, past, present, and future? >Exchange/Rothbard, >Terms of Trade/Rothbard, >Markets/Rothbard. Rothbard III 108 In order for an exchange to be made, then, the minimum selling price of the seller must be lower than the maximum buying price of the buyer for that good. (…) the price of the good in isolated exchange will be established somewhere between the maximum buying price and the minimum selling price (…). We cannot say at which point the price will be set. That depends on the data of each particular case, on the specific conditions prevailing. In particular, it will depend upon the bargaining skill (…). Rothbard III 110 Competition: [in this case] the price in the exchange will be high enough to exclude the “less capable” or “less urgent” buyer - the one whose value scale does not permit him to offer as high a price as the other, “more capable,” buyer. (…) the addition of another competing buyer for the product considerably narrows the zone of bargaining in determining the price that will be set. Rothbard III 111 The general rule still holds: The price will be between the maximum buying price of the most capable and that of the next most capable competitor, including the former and excluding the latter.(1) It is also evident that the narrowing of the bargaining zone has taken place in an upward direction, and to the advantage of the seller of the product. >Auctions. Rothbard III 112 Universal competition: (…) in a modern, complex economy based on an intricate network of exchanges [there is a] two-sided competition of buyers and sellers. Rothbard III 114 As the offering price rises, the disproportion between the amount offered for sale and the amount demanded for purchase at the given price diminishes, but as long as the latter is greater than the former, mutual overbidding of buyers will continue to raise the price. The amount offered for sale at each price is called the supply; the amount demanded for purchase at each price is called the demand. Rothbard III 115 As long as the demand exceeds the supply at any price, buyers will continue to overbid and the price will continue to rise. The converse occurs if the price begins near its highest point. Equilibrium price/supply/demand/Rothbard: If the overbidding of buyers will drive the price up whenever the quantity demanded is greater than the quantity supplied, and the underbidding of sellers drives the price down whenever supply is greater than demand, it is evident that the price of the good will find a resting point where the quantity demanded is equal to the quantity supplied (…). Rothbard III 116 Value/exchange/Rothbard: Evidently, the more capable or “more urgent,” buyers (and sellers) - the supramarginal (which includes the marginal) - obtain a psychic surplus in this exchange, for they are better off than they would have been if the price had been higher (or lower). However, since goods can be ranked only on each individual’s value scale, and no measurement of psychic gain can be made either for one individual or between different individuals, little of value can be said about this psychic gain except that it exists. Equilibrium: The specific feature of the “clearing of the market” performed by the equilibrium price is that, at this price alone, all those buyers and sellers who are willing to make exchanges can do so. >Market/Rothbard. Rothbard III 117 Market/Rothbard: It is important to realize that this process of overbidding of buyers and underbidding of sellers always takes place in the market, even if the surface aspects of the specific case make it appear that only the sellers (or buyers) are setting the price. ((s) see above, equilibirum price). Rothbard III 119 Once the market price is established, it is clear that one price must rule over the entire market. Rothbard III 120 Demand/supply: (…) as the price increases, new suppliers with higher minimum selling prices are brought into the market, while demanders with low maximum buying prices will begin to drop out. Equilibrium price: (…) once the zone of intersection of the supply and demand curves has been determined, it is the buyers and sellers at the margin - in the area of the equilibrium point - that determine what the equilibrium price and the quantity exchanged will be. Rothbard III 122 Now we can remove this restriction and complete our analysis of the real world of exchange by permitting suppliers and demanders to exchange any number of [goods] that they may desire.(…) the removal of our implicit restriction makes no substantial change in the analysis. Rothbard III 229 Price/Rothbard: it is obvious that man, in his capacity as a buyer of consumers’ goods with money, will seek to buy each particular good at the lowest money price possible. For a man who owns money and seeks to buy consumers’ goods, it is clear that the lower the money prices of the goods he seeks to buy, the greater is his psychic income; for the more goods he can buy, the more uses he can make with the same amount of his money. The buyer will therefore seek the lowest money prices for the goods he buys. Thus, ceteris paribus, the psychic income of man as a seller for money is maximized by selling the good at the highest money price obtainable; the psychic income of man as a buyer with money is maximized by buying the good for the lowest money price obtainable. >Cash balance, >Value, >Market, >Exchange/Rothbard, >Allocation/Rothbard, >Income/Rothbard, >Indirect exchange. Rothbard III 234 Indirect exchange: (…) with money being used for all exchanges, money prices serve as a common denominator of all exchange ratios. Rothbard III 235 Instead of a myriad of isolated markets for each good and every other good, each good exchanges for money, and the exchange ratios between every good and every other good can easily be estimated by observing their money prices. Barter: Here it must be emphasized that these exchange ratios are only hypothetical, and can be computed at all only because of the exchanges against money. It is only through the use of money that we can hypothetically estimate these “barter ratios,” and it is only by intermediate exchanges against money that one good can finally be exchanged for the other at the hypothetical ratio. >Demand/Rothbard, >Supply/Rothbard. Rothbard III 341 Price/production costs/Rothbard: (…) once the product has been made, "cost" has no influence on the price of the product. Past costs, being ephemeral, are irrelevant to present determination of prices. The agitation that often takes place over sales "below cost" is now placed in its proper perspective. It is obvious that, in the relevant sense of "cost," no such sales can take Place. The sale of an already produced good is likely to be costless, and if it is not, and price is below its costs, then the seller will hold on to the good rather than make the sale. That costs do have an influence in production is not denied by anyone. However, the influence is not directly on the price, but on the amount that will be produced or, more specifically, on the degree to which factors will be used. >Factors of production/Rothbard. Rothbard III 464 Marginal utility/price/Rothbard: The marginal utility of a unit of a good is determined by a man’s diminishing marginal utility schedule evaluating a certain supply or stock of that good. Similarly, the market’s establishment of the price of a consumers’ good is determined by the aggregate consumer demand schedules—diminishing—and their intersection with the given supply or stock of a good. >Factor market/Rothbard, >Marginal product/Rothbard. Rothbard III 774 Price/Time preference/demand for money/interest//Rothbard: Time Preference and the Individual's money stock: (…) an individual's money stock Iowers the effective time-preference rate along the time-preference schedule, and conversely a decrease raises the time-preference rate (see above). Demand for money/cash balance/interest: Why does this not apply here? Simply because we were dealing with each individual's money stock and assuming that the "real" exchange-value of each unit of money remained the same. Money units: In this case time-preference schedule relates to "real" monetary units, not simply to money itself. If the social stock of money changes or if the demand for money changes, the objective exchange-value of a monetary unit (the PPM; purchasing power of monetary unit) will change also. If the PPM falls, then more money in the hands of an individual may not necessarily Iower the time-preference rate on his schedule, for the more money may only just compensate him for the fall in the PPM, and his "real money stock" may therefore be the same as before. >Cash balance/Rothbard. This again demonstrates that the money relation (money supply and demand for money) is neutral to time preference and the pure rate of interest. Prices: An increased demand for money, then, tends to Iower prices all around without changing time preference or the pure rate of interest. Rothbard III 816 Price/goods/money/Rothbard: The price of goods-in-general will now be determined by the monetary demand for all goods (factor of increase) and the stock of all goods (factor of decrease). Demand: Now, when all goods are considered, the exchange demand for goods equals the stock of money minus the reservation demand for money. (In contrast to any specific good, there is no need to subtract people's expenditures on other goods.) The total demand for goods, then, equals the stock of money minus the reservation demand for money, plus the reservation demand for all goods. Goods: The ultimate determinants of the price of all goods are: the stock of money and the reservation demand for goods (factors of increase), and the stock of all goods and the reservation demand for money (factors of decrease). Purchasing power: Now let us consider the obverse Side: the PPM (purchasing power oft he monetary unit). The PPM (…) is determined by the demand for money (factor of increase) and the stock of money (factor of decrease). The exchange demand for money equals the stock of all goods minus the reservation demand for all goods. Therefore, the ultimate determinants of the PPM are: the stock of all goods and the reservation demand for money (factors of increase), and the stock of money and the reservation demand for goods (factors of decrease). Symmetry: We see that this is the exact obverse of the determinants of the price of all goods, which, in turn, is the reciprocal of the PPM. Barter/exchange: Thus, the analysis of the money side and the goods side of prices is completely harmonious. No longer is there need for an arbitrary division between a barter-type analysis of relative goods-prices and a holistic analysis of the PPM. >Economy/Rothbard. 1. Auction sales are examples of markets for one unit of a good with one seller and many buyers. Cf. Boulding, Economic Analysis, pp. 41-43. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
Price Control | Rothbard | Rothbard III 891 Price control/Rothbard: A triangular intervention occurs when an intervener either compels a pair ofpeople to make an exchange or prohibits them from making an exchange. The coercion may be imposed on the terms of the exchange or on the nature of one or both of the products being exchanged or on the people doing the exchanging. The former type of triangular intervention is called a price control, because it deals specifically with the terms, i.e., the price, at which the exchange is made; Product control: the latter may be called product control, as dealing specifically with the nature of the product or of the producer. Rothbard III 892 Price control: An example of price control is a decree by the government that no one may buy or sell a certain product at more (or, alternatively, less) than X gold ounces per pound; Product control: an example of product control is the prohibition of the sale of this product or prohibition of the sale by any but certain persons selected by the government. Rothbard: Clearly both forms of control have various repercussions on both the price and the nature of the product. Efficiency: A price control may be effective or ineffective. It will be ineffective ifthe regulation has no influence on the market price.(1) (…) should a customer wish to order an unusual custom-built automobile for which the seller would charge over [the normal price], then the regulation now becomes effective and changes transactions from what they would have been on the free market. There are two types of effective price control: a maximum price control that prohibits all exchanges of a good above a certain price, with the controlled price being below the market equilibrium price; and a minimum price control prohibiting exchanges below a certain price, this fixed price being above market equilibrium. Rothbard III 892 Maximum price/Rothbard: In any shortage, consumers rush to buy goods which are not available at the price. Some must do without, others must patronize the market, revived as illegal or "black," paying a premium for the risk of punishment that sellers now undergo. The chief charac- teristic of a price maximum is the queue, the endless "lining up" for goods that are not suffcient to supply the People at the rear of the line. All sorts of subterfuges are invented by People desperately seeking to arrive at the clearance of supply and demand once provided by the market. "Under-the-table" deals, bribes, favoritism for older customers, etc., are inevitable features of a market shackled by the price maximum.(2) >Interventions/Rothbard. Elasticity: (…) even if the stock of a good is frozen for the foreseeable future and the supply line is vertical, this artificial shortage will still develop and all these consequences ensue. The more "elastic" the supply, i.e., the more resources shift out of production, the more aggravated, ceteris paribus, the shortage will be. The firms that leave production are the ones nearest the margin. Selective price control: If the price control is "selective," i.e., is imposed on one or a few products, the economy will not be as universally dislocated as under general maxima, but the artificial shortage created in the particular line will be even more pronounced, since entrepreneurs and factors can shift to the production and sale of other products (preferably substitutes). Substitutes: The prices of the substitutes will go up as the "excess" demand is channeled off in their direction. RothbardvsPrice control: In the light of this fact, the typical governmental reason for selective price control - "We must impose controls on this necessary product so long as it continues in short supply" - is revealed to be an almost ludicrous error. For the truth is the reverse: price control creates an artificial shortage of the product, which continues as long as the control is in existence - in fact, becomes ever worse as resources have time to shift to other products. Rothbard III 894 Minimum price control: (…) while the effect of a maximum price is to create an artificial shortage, a minimum price creates an artificial unsold surplus (…). The unsold surplus exists (…) but a more elastic supply will, ceteris paribus, aggravate the surplus. Once again, the market is not cleared. The artificially high price at first attracts resources into the field, while, at the same time, discouraging buyer demand. Rothbard III 895 Selective price control: Under selective price control, resources will leave other fields where they benefit themselves and consumers better, and transfer to this field, where they overproduce and suffer losses as a result. >Overproduction. Entrepreneurship: This offers an interesting example of intervention tampering with the market and causing entrepreneurial losses. Entrepreneurs operate on the basis of certain criteria: prices, interest rate, etc., established by the free market. EntrepreneursVsInterventions: Interventionary tampering with these signals destroys the continual market tendency to adjustment and brings about losses and misallocation of resources in satisfying consumer wants. Economy/price maxima: General, overall price maxima dislocate the entire economy and deny consumers the enjoyment of substitutes. Inflation: General price maxima are usually imposed for the announced purpose of "preventing inflation" - invariably while the government is inflating the money supply by a large amount. Overall price maxima are equivalent to imposing a minimum on the PPM (purchasing power of the monetary unit). >Inflation. Rothbard III 896 The principles of maximum and minimum price control apply to any prices, whatever they may be: of consumers' goods, capital goods, land or labor services, or, (…) the "price" of money in terms of other goods. Minimum wage: They apply, for example, to minimum wage laws. When a minimum wage law is effective, i.e., where it imposes a wage above the market value of a grade of labor (above the laborer's discounted marginal value product), the supply of labor services exceeds the demand, and the "unsold surplus" of labor services means involuntary mass unemployment. Selective, as opposed to general, minimum wage rates, create unemployment in particular industries and tend to perpetuate these pockets by attracting labor to the higher rates. Labor is eventually forced to enter less remunerative, less value-productive lines. This analysis applies whether the minimum wage is imposed by the State or by a labor union. >Trade Unions/Rothbard, >Wages/Rothbard, >Minimum wage/Rothbard, >Unemployment/Rothbard. Rothbard III 897 Relative prices: Our analysis of the effects of price control applies also, as Mises has brilliantly shown, to control over the price ("exchange rate") of one money in terms of another.(3) This was partially seen in Gresham's Law, one of the first economic laws to be discovered. Few have realized that this law is merely a specific instance of the general consequences of price controls. Perhaps this failure is due to the misleading formulation of Gresham's Law. >Gresham's Law/Rothbard. Rothbard III 899 Bimetallism: suppose that a country used gold and silver as moneys, and the government set the ratio between them at 16 ounces of silver : 1 ounce of gold. The market price, perhaps 16:1 at the time of the price control, then changes to 15:1. What is the result? Silver is now being arbitrarily undervalued by the government and gold arbitrarily overvalued. In other words, silver is fixed cheaper than it really is in terms of gold on the market, and gold is forced to be more expensive than it really is in terms of silver. The government has imposed a price maximum on silver and a price minimum on gold, in terms of each other. The same consequences now follow as from any effective price control. With a price maximum on silver, the gold demand for silver in exchange now exceeds the silver demand for gold (conversely, With a price minimum on gold, the silver demand for gold is less than the gold demand for silver). Problem: Gresham’s Law: Gold goes begging for silver in unsold surplus, while silver becomes scarce and disappears from circulation. Silver disappears to another country or area where it can be exchanged at the free-market price, and gold, in turn, flows into the country. World: If the bimetallism is worldwide, then silver disappears into the "black market," and offcial or open exchanges are made only with gold. VsBimetallism: No country, therefore, can maintain a bimetallic system in practice, since one money will always be undervalued or overvalued in terms of the other. The overvalued always displaces the other from circulation, the latter being scarce. >Bimetallism. Rothbard III 900 Consequences of price controls: (…) the price controls inevitably distort the production and allocation of resources and factors in the economy, thereby injuring again the bulk of consumers. Bureaucracy: And we must not overlook the army of bureaucrats who must be financed by the binary intervention of taxation and who must administer and enforce the myriad of regulations. This army, in itself, withdraws a mass of workers from productive labor and saddles them onto the remaining producers - thereby benefiting the bureaucrats, but injuring the rest of the people. 1. Of course, even a completely ineffective triangular control is likely to increase the government bureaucracy dealing With the matter and therefore increase the total amount of binary intervention over the taxpayer. 2. A "bribe" is only payment of the market price by a buyer. 3. Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 432 n., 447, 469, 776. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
Probability Theory | Schurz | I 110 Probability theory/theorems/Schurz: a) unconditioned probability: (objective und subjective) (T1) p(~A) = 1 – p(A) (complementary probability) (T2) p(A) ≤ 1 (upper bound) (T3) p(A u ~A) = 0 (contradiction) (T4) p(A1 v A2) = p(A1) + p(A2) – p(A1 u A2) (general law of addition). b) conditioned probability (for formulas X in antecedens position) (PT1) If B > A is exhaustive, gilt p(A I B) = 1. The converse is not valid. (PT2) p(A u B) = p(A I B) mal p(B) (PT3) Für jede Partition B1,...Bn: p(A) = ∑ 1≤i≤n p(A I Bi) times p(Bi) (general law of multiplication) (PT4): Def Bayes-Theorem, 1st version: p(A I B) = p(B I A) times p(A)/p(B) (PT5) Def Bayes-Theorem, 2nd version: for each partition A1,...An: p(Ai I B) = p(B I Ai) times p (Ai) /∑ 1≤i≤n p(B I Ai) times p(Ai). (PT6) Symmetry of probabilistic dependence: p(A I B) > p(A) iff p(B I A) > p(B) iff p(B I A) > p(B I ~A) (analog for ≥). Def Partition/Schurz: exhaustive disjunction. I 110 Consequence relation/probability/consequence/probability theory/Schurz: the probability-theoretic inference relation can be characterized as follows: a probability statement A follows probabilistically from a set D of probability statements iff. A follows logically from D and the Kolmogorov axioms (plus mathematical definitions). >Probability. I 112 Probability theory/Schurz: still unsolved problems: (a) objective probability: definitional problems. Definition of statistical probability: problem: with one random experiment one can potentially produce infinitely many infinitely increasing sequences of results, Why should they all have the same frequency limit? Why should they have one at all? Problem: even worse: from a given sequence of results, one can always construct a sequence with an arbitrarily deviating frequency limit value by arbitrary rearrangement or place selection. I 113 Law of large numbers/Schurz: ("naive statistical theory"): is supposed to be a solution for this problem: the assertion "p(Fx) = r" does not say then that in all random sequences the frequency limit is r, but only that it is r with probability 1. StegmüllerVs/KutscheraVs: This is circular! In the definiens of the expression "the probability of Fx is r" the expression "with probability 1" occurs again. Thus the probability is not reduced to frequency limits, but again to probability. >Circularity. Rearrangement/(s): only a problem with infinite sets, not with finite ones. Mises/solution: "statistical collective". 1. every possible outcome E has a frequency threshold in g, identified with probability p(E), and 2. this is insensitive to job selection. From this follows the general product rule/statistic: the probability of a sum is equal to the product of the individual probabilities: p(Fx1 u Gx2) = p(Fx1) times p(Gx2). Probability /propensity//Mises: this result of Mises is empirical, not a priori! It is a substantive dispositional statement about the real nature of the random experiment (>Ontology/Statistics). The Mises probability is also called propensity. >Propensity. Singular Propensity/Single Case Probability/Single Probability/Popper: many Vs. Probability theory/Schurz: problem: what is the empirical content of a statistical hypothesis and how is it tested? There is no observational statement that logically follows from this hypothesis. >Verification. That a random sequence has a certain frequency limit r is compatible for any n, no matter how large, with any frequency value hn unequal to r reached up to that point. Bayes/Schurz: this is often raised as an objection by Bayesians, but it merely expresses the fact that no observational theorems follow from statistical hypotheses. I 115 Verification/Statistics/Schurz: Statistical hypotheses are not deductively testable, but they are probabilistically testable, by sampling. I 115 Principal Principle/PP/Statistics/Schurz: subjective probabilities, if objective probabilities are known, must be consistent with them. Lewis (1980): singular PP: subjectivist. Here "objective" singular propensities are simply postulated. >Propensities. SchurzVsPropensity/SchurzVsPopper: it remains unclear what property a singular propensity should correspond to in the first place. Solution/de Finetti: one can also accept the objective notion of probability at the same time. Conditionalization/Statistics/Schurz: on an arbitrary experience datum E(b1...bn) over other individuals b1,..bn is important to derive two further versions of PP: 1. PP for random samples, which is needed for the subjective justification of the statistical likelihood intuition. 2. the conditional PP, for the principle of the closest reference class and subject to the inductive statistical specialization inference. PP: w(Fa I p(Fx) = r u E(b1,...bn)) = r PP for random samples: w(hn(Fx) = k/n I p(Fx) = r) = (nk) rk times (1 r)n k. Conditional PP: w(Fa I Ga u p(Fx I Gx) = r u E(b1,...bn)) = r. Principal principle: is only meaningful for subjective a priori probability. I.e. degrees of belief of a subject who has not yet had any experience. Actual degree of belief: for him the principle does not apply in general: e.g. if the coin already shows heads, (=Fa) so the act. dgr. of belief of it is of course = 1, while one knows that p(Fx) = ½. a priori probability function: here all background knowledge W must be explicitly written into the antecedent of a conditional probability statement w( I W). Actual: = personalistic. Apriori probability: connection with actual probability: Strict conditionalization/Schurz: let w0 be the a priori probability or probability at t0 and let w1 be the actual probability I 116 Wt the knowledge acquired between t0 and t1. Then for any A holds: Wt(A) = w0(A I Wt). Closest reference class/principle/Schurz: can be justified in this way: For a given event Fa, individual a can belong to very many reference classes assigning very different probabilities to Fx. Then we would get contradictory predictions. Question: But why should the appropriate reference class be the closest one? Because we can prove that it maximizes the frequency threshold of accurate predictions. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
Proportions | Bigelow | I 78 Proportion/Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: in any case, we can assume proportions between relations. >Relations, >Ontology, >Ontology/Bigelow. Problem: but not proportions between properties. >Properties. Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: but assumes that speed is a property rather than a relation. >Flux, >Flux/Bigelow. Vector: to explain its nature, we now need something that fills the gap between property and relation. >Vectors. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: for all things with the same property, there is a relation; that of accordance! Formally: if Fx and Fy, there is a relation RF, so that x RF y. Properties/Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: even if two individuals have different properties, there is a relation between them: formal: there is a relation RFG between Fx and Gy... I 79 ...so that x RFG y. At any rate, we assume this in case F and G are vectors of the same kind. For example, rotating homogeneous disk: 1. points on same radius (same direction): each has a different speed. Then there are some that are 1m/sec faster than others. etc. Relation: between properties: because point x has the property (here: speed or location?) it stands in a certain relation to the point y: it is so and so much faster. Properties/Bigelow/Pargetter: are therefore also in proportions. I 80 2. corresponding to points on the same circumference (same speed, different direction). Relations/Property/Bigelow/Pargetter: then we have relations between velocities with respect to size (if the points lie on the same radius) e.g. speed of x has r times the size of the velocity of y: x Pr y. For example, be a point at the same distance from the center of the borderline, then it has the same speed (size). z P0 y The two relations are summarized as follows x Pr y. z P0 y, then we have a derived relation between x and z. Definition derived relation P*/Bigelow/Pargetter: we define it by saying: x P* z iff for a y, x pr y and y p0 z,... I 81 Proportion/properties/Bigelow/Pargetter: on the rotating disk, two points will be placed in this "two-step-proportion" of the form P*. Namely, by virtue of their intrinsic properties. Vectors/Bigelow/Pargetter: the property of instantaneous speed are considered vectors because they are in a family of two-step proportions! n-step Proportion/Bigelow/Pargetter: this can be generalized to proportions that include n steps. This gives us more general vectors. Vector/Bigelow/Pargetter: the vector of a speed of a point on a rotating disk can be represented as an ordered pair of real numbers. General: all ordered n-tuples of real numbers can be understood as vectors. We need some for the flux theory, but not all of them. Vectors/Bigelow/Pargetter: are useful for representing physical properties, because they can be embedded in a network of proportions. I 358 Ratios/Bigelow/Pargetter: are special cases of real numbers. >Real numbers. Conversely however, not all real numbers correspond to ratios. Proportion/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a more general term than ratio and forms the basis for our system of real numbers. Some proportions in the geometry, for example, do not correspond to ratios. E.g. pentagon:.... |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
Propositional Knowledge | Dummett | II 69ff Propositional Knowledge/Meaning Theory/Dummett: even representation of a practical ability is propositional knowledge. >Representation, >Propositions. III (b) 62f Knowledge/Dummett: That the murderer is on the roof, is not knowledge-who. - All predictive knowledge is based on propositional knowledge, because all theoretical knowledge is propositional. - Attribution of knowledge never grasps the whole knowledge of the subject. Difference: to know the truth of a sentence/knowledge of the corresponding proposition. ((s) the fact). E.g. "That the earth is moving is true" is not the knowledge that the earth rotates. - Reason: there is also simple translation knowledge: the Earth moves = "la terra si muove". III (b) 68 Language/Propositional Knowledge/Dummett: usually there is little difference between knowledge of the proposition and knowledge of the truth of the sentence. - But propositional knowledge is not sufficient for language proficiency. - Propositional knowledge is not sufficient for word understanding. - Knowledge of a single proposition is not sufficient for understanding of words. - ((s) The word must be able to appear in several contexts.) - ((s) That is the converse to the substitution principle.) III (c) 106 Propositional Knowledge/Dummett: propositional knowledge is necessary to explain what the knowledge of the meaning consists of. - Knowledge that ... "the earth moves". III (c) 109 But also the proposition as such cannot play a role in the explanation of understanding (circular). III (c) 108 Understanding/Meaning/Propositional Knowledge: E.g. Kripke: "horses are called horses": those who know how to use "being called" must know that the sentence is true, even if he does not know what horses are. - However, then he would not know what truth is expressed by this; he does not know the proposition, he has no propositional knowledge. Understanding: not only knowledge that a sentence is true, but knowledge of the proposition - (but not necessary for knowing the truth). III (c) 111 Meaning theory/Dummett: the sense of it to show the correct derivation of consciousness of a truth. III (c) 112 Davidson: from capturing the axioms. Special case: "Homer denotes Homer": here one has to know that Homer refers to something. III (c) 113 DummettVs: not in order to know the meaning of "Homer" in our language. III (c) 117 Propositional Knowledge/DummettVsDavidson: Those who do not know what "the Earth" means learn something from the postulate "the Earth denotes the Earth": they learn that "the Earth" is a singular term. - But for meaning it is not sufficient to say that this is an axiom of English. - You need knowledge of the proposition. >Knowledge. III (c) 133 Propositional Knowledge/Dummett: logical form: "X knows that b is F" or "X knows that the Gs are F" - here the subject of the that-sentence stands within the opaque context of the that-sentence itself. >That-Clauses. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Psychology | Quine | V 58 Psychology/Peirce: can only be based on external facts - Quine: Problem: how can you do that when you do not speak of things such as internal ideas? - Solution: Let us talk about the language - ((s)> semantic ascent/Quine) - ((s) only shared situations and language behavior) - QuineVs: (see below) Psychology is not "shared observation" but observation sentences. simple compliance - ((s) Psychology does not identify the situation. >Observation Sentences/Quine XII 91 Epistemology/Psychology/Quine: if sensory stimuli are the only thing, why not just turn to psychology? TraditionVsPsychology/Quine: this used to appear circular. No Circle/QuineVsVs: Solution: we just have to refrain from deducting science from observations. If we only want to understand the connection between observation and science, we need all the information we can get. Also those from science, which is investigating exactly this connection. >Science/Quine XII 92 Psychology/Quine: cannot provide a translation into logical, set-theoretical and observation concepts such as rational reconstruction, because we have not grown up to learn this. That is precisely why we should insist on rational reconstruction: Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: pro: it makes the physicalistic terms superfluous at the end. XII 98 Epistemology/Quine: still exists within psychology and thus within empirical sciences. Epistemology studies the human subject. Aim: to find out how observation is related to theory and to what extent theory goes beyond observation. XII 99 Rational Reconstruction/Naturalized Epistemology/Quine: the rational reconstruction survives: by giving clues to psychological processes as an imaginative construction. >Rational Reconstruction/Quine New: that we can make free use of empirical psychology. >Epistemology/Quine: Old: wanted to include empirical sciences, so to speak, to assemble them from sense data. New: now, conversely, epistemology is part of psychology. >Epistemology/Quine XI 100 Gestalt Theory/Gestalt Psychology/Quine: VsSensory Atomism. QuineVs Gestalt Psychology: no matter if shape or atoms push themselves into the foreground of consciousness, we take the stimuli as input. Priority is what is causally closer. QuineVsAntipsychologism. I 44 Evidence/Irritation/Quine: any realistic theory of evidence is inextricably linked to the psychology of stimulus and reaction. To call a stone at close range a stone is already an extreme case. I 154 Like other sciences, psychology favours the uniformity of nature already in the criteria of its concepts. A connection between the individual senses cannot succeed. No chain of subliminal relationships ranges from sounds to colors. We need a separate quality space for each of the senses. Worse still: within one space we have to distinguish between subspaces: a red and a green ball can be less far apart in the quality space of the child than from a red cloth. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Purchasing Power | Rothbard | Rothbard III 237 Purchasing power/Rothbard: For every good except money, then, the purchasing power of its unit is identical to the money price that it can obtain on the market. What is the purchasing power of the monetary unit? Obviously, the purchasing power of, e.g., an ounce of gold can be considered only in relation to all the goods that the ounce could purchase or help to purchase. The purchasing power of the monetary unit consists of an array of all the particular goods-prices in the society in terms of the unit.(1) >Money/Rothbard, >Price/Rothbard. Rothbard III 300 Purchasing power/Rothbard: (…) it does not, as we perhaps might think, give any exact indication of the amount of services that each individual obtains purely from exchangeable consumers’ goods. An income of 50 ounces of gold in one year may not, and most likely will not, mean the same to him in terms of services from exchangeable goods as an income of 50 ounces in some other year. The purchasing power of money in terms of all other commodities is continually changing, and there is no way to measure such changes. >Income/Rothbard, >Allocation/Rothbard. Problem: (…) as historians rather than economists, we can make imprecise judgments comparing the “real” income rather than the monetary income between periods. Thus, if Jones received 1,000 ounces of income in one year and 1,200 in the next, and prices generally rose during the year, Jones’ “real income” in terms of goods purchasable by the money has risen considerably less than the nominal monetary increase or perhaps fallen. However (…) there is no precise method of measuring or even identifying the purchasing power of money and its changes. >Marginal utility of money/Rothbard. Rothbard III 314 [The] power of the monetary unit to purchase quantities of various goods is called the purchasing power of the monetary unit. This purchasing power of money consists of the array of all the given money prices on the market at any particular time, considered in terms of the prices of goods per unit of money. Regression theorem: (…) today's purchasing power of the monetary unit is determined by today’s marginal utilities of money and of goods, expressed in demand schedules, while today’s marginal utility of money is directly dependent on yesterday’s purchasing power of money. >Regression theorem. Rothbard III 762 Purchasing power/Rothbard: The purchasing power of money is (…) determined by two factors: the total demand schedule for money to hold and the stock of money in existence. >Demand for money/Rothbard. At the previous equilibrium PPM (purchasing power of money) point, (…) the demand for money now exceeds the stock available (…). The bids push the PPM upwards until it reaches the equilibrium point (…). The converse will be true for a shift of the total demand curve leftward - a decline in the total demand schedule. Then, the PPM will fall accordingly. Rothbard III 763 Equilibirum: Money will be sold at a lower PPM to induce people to hold it, and the PPM will fall until it reaches a new equilibrium point (…). At the new stock level there is an excess of stock, (…) over the total demand for money. Money will be sold at a Iower PPM to induce people to hold it, and the PPM will fall until it reaches a new equilibrium point (…). Conversely, if the stock of money is decreased, there will be an excess of demand for money at the existing PPM, and the PPM will rise until the new equilibrium point is reached. The effect of the quantity of money on its exchange-value is thus simply set forth in our analysis (…) The absurdity of classifying monetary theories into mutually exclusive divisions (such as "supply and demand theory," "quantity theory," "cash balance theory," "commodity theory," "income and expenditure theory") should now be evident.(2) For all these elements are found in this analysis. Money is a commodity; its supply or quantity is important in determining its exchange-value; demand for money for the cash balance is also important for this purpose; and the analysis can be applied to income and expenditure situations. >Quantity theory. Rothbard III 813 Purchasing power/Rothbard: (…) an increase in the stock of money leads to a fall in the PPM and a decrease in the stock of money leads to a rise in the PPM. However, there is no simple and uneventful rise and fall in the PPM. For a change in the stock of money is not automatically simultaneous. New money enters the system at some specific point and then becomes diffused in this way throughout the economy. The individuals who receive the new money first are the greatest gainers from the increased money; those who receive it last are the greatest losers, since all their buying prices have increased before their selling prices. >Buying price/Rothbard, >Selling price/Rothbard, >Price/Rothbard. Gains and losses: Monetarily, it is clear that the gains of the approximate first half of the recipients of new money are exactly counterbalanced by the losses of the second half. Conversely, if money should somehow disappear from the system, say through wear and tear or through being misplaced, the initial loser cuts his spending and suffers most, while the last Who feel the impact of a decreased money supply gain the most. For a decrease in the money supply results in losses for the first owners, Who suffer a cut in selling price before their buying prices are Iowered, and gains for the last, Who see their buying prices fall before their income is cut.(3) >Equilibrium/Rothbard. 1. Many writers interpret the “purchasing power of the monetary unit” as being some sort of “price level,” a measurable entity consisting of some sort of average of “all goods combined.” The major classical economists did not take this fallacious position: When they speak of the value of money or of the level of prices without explicit qualification, they mean the array of prices, of both commodities and services, in all its particularity and without conscious implication of any kind of statistical average. (Jacob Viner, Studies in the Theory of International Trade [New York: Harper & Bros., 1937], p. 314) Also cf. Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 1094. 2. A typical such classification can be found in Lester V. Chandler, An Introduction to Monetary Theory (New York: Harper & Bros., 1940). 3. See Mises, Theory of Money and Credit, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953 and 1957. Reprinted by Liberty Fund, 1995. pp. 131 - 45. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) | Rothbard | Rothbard III 828 Purchasing power parity/Rothbard: What determines the exchange rate between two (or more) moneys? Two different kinds of money will exchange in a ratio corresponding to the ratio of the purchasing power of each in terms of all the other economic goods. >Near money/Rothbard, >Exchange rate. Near money/silver/gold: Thus, suppose that there are two coexisting moneys, gold and silver, and the purchasing power of gold is double that of silver, i.e., that the money price of every commodity is double in terrns of silver what it is in terms of gold. One ounce of gold will then tend to exchange for two ounces of silver; the exchange ratio of gold and silver will tend to be 1:2. If the rate at any time deviates from 1 :2, market forces will tend to re-establish the parity between the purchasing powers and the exchange rate between them. Def Purchasing Power Parity (PPP): This equilibrium exchange rate between two moneys is termed the purchasing power parity. Thus, suppose that the exchange rate between gold and silver is 1:3, three ounces of silver exchanging for one ounce of gold. At the same time, the purchasing power of an ounce of gold is twice that of silver. It will now pay people to sell commodities for gold, exchange the gold for silver, and then exchange the silver back into commodities, thereby making a clear arbitrage gain. Rothbard III 829 Arbitrage: Arbitrage gains tend to eliminate themselves and to bring about equilibrium. Arbitrage will restore the exchange rate between silver and gold to its purchasing power parity. The fact that holders of gold increase their demand for silver in order to profit by the arbitrage action will make silver more expensive in terms of gold and, conversely, gold cheaper in terms of silver. The exchange rate is driven in the direction of 1:2. Purchasing power: Furthermore, holders of commodities are increasingly demanding gold to take advantage of the arbitrage, and this raises the purchasing power of gold. In addition, holders of silver are buying more commodities to make the arbitrage profit, and this action Iowers the purchasing power of silver. Hence the ratio of the purchasing powers moves from 1 in the direction of 1:3. The process stops when the exchange rate is again at purchasing power parity, when arbitrage gains cease. Equilibrium: (…) in the long run, the movement in the purchasing powers will probably not be important in the equilibrating process. With the arbitrage gains over, demands will probably revert back to what they were formerly, and the original ratio of purchasing powers will be restored. In the above case, the equilibrium rate will likely remain at 1:2. Exchange rate: Thus, the exchange rate between any two moneys will tend to be at the purchasing power parity. Any deviation from the parity will tend to eliminate itself and re-establish the parity rate. This holds true for any moneys, including those used mainly in different geographical areas. Whether the exchanges of moneys occur between citizens of the same or different geographical areas makes no economic difference, except for the costs of transport. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
Qualities | Carnap | VI 130 Qualities/Carnap: are not constituted from the sensations, but conversely . VI 173 Quality in the narrow sense/Carnap: intensity at the skin senses - even the local signs (location). >Constitution system/Carnap. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
Radical Interpretation | Dummett | II 130 Radical Interpretation/RI/DummettVsDavidson: conversely, downstream from the theory of reference, the meaning - concrete statements are never predictable in circumstances, only general principles that rule judgments. Cf. >Principle of Charity. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Reason | Vico | Gadamer I 26 Reason/Knowledge/Vico/Gadamer: One finds in Vico(1) that he criticizes the Stoics because they believe in reason as regula veri, and conversely he praises the old academics who only assert the knowledge of not-knowing, and even more so the new academics because they are great in the art of argumentation (which belongs to the art of rhetoric). >Sensus communis/Vico, >Humanism/Vico. Gadamer I 26 Reason/Knowledge/Vico/Gadamer: According to Vico, what gives direction to the human will is not the abstract generality of reason, but the concrete generality that represents the commonality of a group, a people, a nation or the entire human race. The formation of this common sense is therefore of crucial importance for life. It is on this common sense of truth and rights, which is not knowledge for reasons, but which allows us to find the obvious (verisimile), that Vico bases the importance and the independent right of eloquence. >Knowledge/Vico. 1 .J. B. Vico, De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, mit Übertragung v. W. F. Otto. 1947. |
Vico I Giambattista Vico Prinzipien einer neuen Wissenschaft über die gemeinsame Natur der Völker Hamburg 2009 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Relations | Prior | I 63 Relation-in-extension/Prior: two-digit predicates can be associated in the same manner with relation-in-extension - E.g. Both: being-father-and-mother-of is not the same as both: be-greater-and-smaller-than but when the corresponding "relation-in-extension" are the same. I 111 Relation: Richard thinks of Joan": this is a relation (also a sentence about two people). But "Richard thinks that p": this is no relation. E.g. to think: "someone is next door" this is no relation to anyone - (also not, when someone makes the thought come true). >Reference, >Relation theory. Thinking needs no object. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief I 114 Thinking/Prior: needs no object: E.g. "someone is next door": no relation to someone. - In the sense of "about" (about, aboutness). >"About"/Prior. E.g. someone has stolen my pencil "until I realize that I have lost it. Solution/Prior: thinking - "of" one can think of something arbitrary, non-existent (or "of", "of", (later Vs). - But not thinking- "about". >Unicorn-example). "Of", "about" is ambiguous: I can also think that I think something of x and later learn that x does not exist, but that does not stop my thinking. >Non-existence. Prior: but not difference "thinking in general" and "content". >Content. Variant: "if I believe in the existence of x, I can think something of x": Vs: then someone who does not believe in it, cannot think that I think something of x. I 136 Relation/Prior: belief is no relation, otherwise relation to Cicero = relation to Tullius - real relations have converses. >Converse. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
Relations | Simons | I 328 Relations/topology/Simons: let R be a binary relation and a is a class of objects. Def left closed under R: is a, if no R-relationship runs from the outside to the inside, e.g. if nobody else owes Jack and Jill money, the pair is left closed under debt while everyone can owe the other something or any third party (external). Conversely to that: Def right closed under R: if no R-relationship runs from the inside to the outside, e.g. neither Jack nor Jill owes someone else something, regardless of whether they are creditors of a third party or among themselves. >Mereology, >Parts, >Wholes. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
Relative Price | Rothbard | Rothbard III 281 Relative Price/Rothbard: The available goods are ranked, along with the possibility of holding the money commodity in one’s cash balance, on each individual’s value scale. Then, in accordance with the rankings and the law of utility, the individual allocates his units of money to the most highly valued uses: the various consumers’ goods, investment in various factors, and addition to his cash balance. Rothbard III 282 The law of the interrelation of consumers' goods is: The more substitutes there are availablefor any given good, the more elastic will tend to be the demand schedules (individual and market)for that good. By the definition of "good," two goods cannot be "perfect substitutes" for each Other, since if consumers regarded two goods as completely identical, they would, by definition, be one good. All consumers' goods are, on the other hand, partial substitutes for one another. When a man ranks in his value scale the myriad of goods available and balances the diminishing utilities of each, he is treating them all as partial substitutes for one another. A change in ranking for one good by necessity changes the rankings of all the other goods, since all the rankings are ordinal and relative. A higher price for one good (owing, say, to a decrease in stock produced) will tend to shift the demand of consumers from that to other consumers' goods, and therefore their demand schedules will tend to increase. >Demand/Rothbard, >Supply/Rothbard, >Price/Rothbard. Conversely, an increased supply and a consequent Iowering of price for a good will tend to shift consumer demand from other goods to this one and Iower the demand schedules for the other goods (for some, of course, more than for others). It is a mistake to suppose that only technologically similar goods are substitutes for one another. The more money consumers spend on pork, the less they have to spend on beef, or the more money they spend on travel, the less they have to spend on TV sets. Suppose that a reduction in its supply raises the price of pork on the market; it is clear that the quantity demanded, and the price, of beef will be affected by this change. Elasticity: If the demand schedulefor pork is more than unitarily elastic in this range, then the higher price will cause less money to be spent on pork, and more money will tend to be shifted to such a substitute as beef. The demand schedules for beef will increase, and the price of beef will tend to rise. >Elasticity/Rothbard. Inelasticity: On the other hand, if the demand schedule for pork is inelastic, more consumers' money will be spent on pork, and the result will be a fall in the demand schedule for beef and consequently in its price. Rothbard III 283 Consumer goods: (…) consumers' goods, in so far as they are substitutes for one another, are related as follows: When the stock of A rises and the price of A therefore falls, (1) if the demand schedule for A is elastic, there will be a tendency for a decline in the demand schedules for B, C, D, etc., and consequent declines in their prices; (2) if the demand schedule for A is inelastic, there will be a rise in the demand schedules for B, C, D, etc., and a consequent rise in their prices; (3) if the demand schedule has exactly neutral (or unitary) elasticity, so that there is no change in the amount of money expended on A, there will be no effect on the demands for and the prices of the other goods. Rothbard III 285 While all consumers’ goods compete with one another for consumer purchases, some goods are also complementary to one another. These are goods whose uses are closely linked together by consumers, so that movements in demand for them are likely to be closely tied together. Rothbard III 286 This discussion of the interrelation of consumers’ goods has treated the effect only of changes from the stock, or supply, side. The effects are different when the change occurs in the demand schedule instead of in the quantity of stock. (…) the demand schedules are determined by individual value scales and that a rise in the marginal utility of a unit of A necessarily means a relative fall in the utility of the other consumers’ goods. >Marginal utility/Rothbard, >Stock keeping/Rothbard, >Comparative Advantage, >Durable goods. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
Representation (Presentation) | Gadamer | I 114 Representation/Game/Art/Gadamer: All representation is (...) as far as possible a representation for someone. The fact that this possibility is meant as such is what makes the play character of art so peculiar. The closed space of the world of the game lets the one wall fall, as it were.(1) The cult play and the play ("play" as in acting in a play, German: "Schauspiel") clearly do not represent in the same sense as the playing child. In that they represent, they do not point out, but at the same time point beyond themselves to those who watch and participate in them. Here, play is no longer the mere representation of an ordered movement, nor is it also the mere representation in which the playing child is absorbed, but it is "representing for ...". This instruction inherent in all representation is, as it were, fulfilled here and becomes constitutive for the existence of art. Cf. >Play/Gadamer. I 121 Performance/Act/Play/Theatre/Music/Gadamer: The performance of a play is (...) not simply detachable from it as something that does not belong to its essential being, but is as subjective and fluid as the aesthetic experiences in which it is experienced. Rather, it is in the performance and only in it - and this is most clearly demonstrated by the music - that one encounters the work itself, just as the divine is encountered in the cult. Here the methodical gain becomes visible, which the starting point of the concept of play brings in. The work of art cannot simply be isolated from the conditions of access under which it appears, (...) [The work] itself belongs in the world it presents itself to. Acting is only really where it is played (...). Art/Gadamer: The thesis is thus that the being of art cannot be determined as the object of an aesthetic consciousness, because conversely the I 122 aesthetic behaviour is more than it knows about itself. It is a part of the process of being of representation and belongs to the game as a game in its essence. I 137 Representation/Gadamer: The viewer does not behave in the distance of the aesthetic consciousness that is art, but in the communion of being there. Cf. >Aesthetic Consciousness/Gadamer. In the end, the real emphasis of the tragic phenomenon lies in what is presented and recognized there and in what participation is obviously not arbitrary. As much as the tragic play, which is festively performed in the theatre and which is an exceptional situation in the life of everyone, it is not like an adventurous experience and does not cause an intoxication of numbness from which one awakens to one's true being, but I 138 the elevatedness and the shock that comes over the viewer, in reality deepen his or her continuity with him- or herself. The tragic melancholy arises from the self-knowledge that the viewer receives. >Affirmation/Gadamer, >Tragedy/Gadamer, >Catharsis/Gadamer, >Literature/Gadamer. 1 Cf. Rudolf Kassner, Zahl und Gesicht, p. 161 f. Kassner suggests that "the most strange unity and duality of child and doll" is connected to the fact that the fourth "always open wall of the spectator" is missing here (as in the cultic act). I thus conclude that it is this fourth wall of the spectator, which closes the play world of the artwork. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Self- Consciousness | Castaneda | Frank I 211ff Self-consciousness/Fichte: all consciousness includes self-consciousness. >J.G. Fichte, >Consciousness/Fichte. CastanedaVsFichte: mixing of external reflexivity (in relation to others) and internal reflexivity (the fleeting egos among themselves). >I, Ego, Self/Castaneda. CastanedaVsKant: not apperception, but conversely! >Apperception. No I is a naked isolated individual, but a collective point of connections. False problem: how to be subject and object of self-reflection at the same time: starts from a false assumption of amonolithic self. >Subject-Object-Problem, >Subject, >Object. I 231f Self-consciousness/ Castaneda: is based on the basis of beliefs, that consist of a hierarchy of powers, dispositions and inclinations. Lowest levels: metaphysical, self-evident. - This postulates an infinite number of aspects. >Aspects, >Background. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Self- Identification | Strawson | Frank I 521 I/Self-Identification/Strawson: question: "Why are states of consciousness at all attributed to any subject and why are they attributed to exactly the same thing as certain physical properties? >Particulars/Strawson, >I, Ego, Self/Strawson, >Space/Strawson, >Body. EvansVsStrawson: "natural little theory of our world": 1st "I take this to be true and am on place p, so this applies to p" 2nd conversely, "if this does not apply to p, I can not perceive it" 3rd "before I was at p, so now I still have to be at p". Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Sets | Henkin | Quine IX 222 Set/Quine: the condition to be a set: "Ey(z ε y)". (6) {x:∀y[(0 ε y u S'' y ≤ y) › x ε y } ≠ {x: ∀y[(y e ϑ u 0 ε y u S''y ≤ y) › x ε y]}. Here the right side contains extras! 0,1,2 and their successors belong to both classes. An inequality should therefore discredit the right and not the left expression as a version of "N". IX 223 On the right, of course, there are no extras if there is a set of y whose elements are exactly 0,1,2 and their successors. Then, on the contrary, the right side will be exactly this class y. Conversely, if there is no such set y, then the right side contains extras. Because the formula proves to be stratified, so the class qualifies as a set, so it would itself be a set y, unless it contains extras. N.B.: can we in any case rely on the fact that the left side contains the scarcest of the two, exactly 0,1,2 and their successors? No! Henkin: simple proof that no definition of "N" of any kind enables us to prove that N contains just 0,1,2 and its successors without extras. As long as "0 ε N", "1 ε N", "2 ε N" etc. all apply, there can be no contradiction in the assumption that in addition an x ε N exists with (7) x ε N, x ≠ 0, x ≠ 1, x ≠ 2... ad infinitum Proof: ...since a proof can only use finitely many premises, any proof of a contradiction from (7) uses only finitely many of the premises (7), but any such finite set is true for a certain x. Classes/Quantification/Concepts/Quine: quantification via classes allows us to use concepts that would otherwise be out of our reach. (see above Section II) Example "and their successors". Example predecessor. Universe/Set Theory/Quine: is an unregulated matter that looks different from theory to theory. Concept/Set Theory: a similar relativity must be feared with the concepts. This was emphasized by Skolem (1922/23). Especially for the deceptively familiar "and its successors". >Consistency/Henkin. Def Omega-contradictory/(w)/Goedel: (Goedel 1931) is a system when there is a formula "Fx" such that any one of the statements "F0", "F1", "F2",... can be proved ad infinitum in the system, but also "Ex(x ε N and ~Fx)". >Proofs, >Provability. |
Henkin I Leon Henkin Retracing elementary mathematics New York 1962 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Similarity Metrics | Hintikka | II 192 Similarity/semantics of possible worlds/similarity metrics/Hintikka: similarity can be ascertained in two ways: 1. Ask what the maximum distance between possible worlds is. 2. Ask what the minimum distance is. Ad 1.: the factuality condition causes the distance to be zero (minimum distance). That is, that a given world is within its own alternatives. II 193 Intentionality/Hintikka: the failure of similarity metrics is an interesting criterion for intentionality. >Intentionality/Hintikka. E.g. knowledge, for this reason, is less intentional than belief. Factuality/Hintikka: the expression of factuality is misleading in the way that we can look at a lot of possible worlds, excluding the actual world, e.g. deontology. Deontology/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: with deontology it could be that we exclude the actual world from the set of possible worlds ((s) that we consider only desirable that deviate from reality). Hintikka: the idea is that whatever is compulsory in a given world is true in each of its deontic alternatives - because these alternatives would be deontically perfect worlds. Deontology/Hintikka: deontology is according to this explanation non-intentional. Phenomenology/Hintikka: the failure of the factuality condition is closely related to the ideas of phenomenology. Phenomenology is decisive for the possible non-existence of an object to which a mental act is directed. Act/Brentano/Hintikka: thesis: the object can be "non-existent" in it. Husserl/Hintikka: thesis: objects of files are judicial or otherwise propositional. Non-existence/intentionality/Brentano/Husserl/Hintikka: non-existence leads to a failure of factuality. Therefore, the failure of factuality is an important criterion for the understanding of phenomenology. Similarity Metrics/similarity/possible worlds/Hintikka: e.g. knowledge. Knowledge/belief/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: the maximum distance between worlds allowed by knowledge is greater than the maximum distance in the case of belief. Because knowledge entails belief, the worlds of belief are within the set of knowledge-worlds. According to the unrevised criterion, belief would be more intentional than knowledge. Vs: the opposite is the case. Logically Possible/Hintikka: some logically possible worlds are wilder and further away from the actual world than worlds that one believes. Nevertheless, logical modalities are less intentional than propositional attitudes. Problem: the measure of the maximum distance provides false results if we are dealing with different intensional terms. II 196 Condition c: "What is, is necessary what it is and no other thing." Intentionality/Hintikka: that the failure of (c) (preservation of identity, VsSeparation) is a criterion for them, can be seen in their behavior in changing concepts: necessity (logical, physical, and analytical) satisfies condition c). ("What is, is necessary what it is and no other thing".) Conversely, certain other concepts are obviously more intentional than necessity, and they violate c). >Logical necessity, >Analytical necessity. II 197 E.g. "Not everything what is, is so that it is known what it is, nor that it is no other thing". |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
Simultaneity | Kierkegaard | Gadamer I 132 Simultaneity/Kierkegaard/Gadamer: [The] concept of simultaneity originates, as is well known, from Kierkegaard, who gave it a special theological imprint(1). "Simultaneity" with Kierkegaard does not mean being at the same time, but formulates a task. This task is set for the believer, to communicate what is not at the same time, one's own presence and the saving act of Christ, and to communicate this totally with each other that they nevertheless experience it as a present (instead of at a distance back then) and that it is taken seriously. Gadamer: Conversely, the simultaneity of aesthetic consciousness is based on the concealment of the task set with simultaneity. >Simultaneity/Gadamer, >Aesthetic consciousness. 1. Kierkegaard, Philosophische Brocken, 4. Kap. |
Kier I S. Kierkegaard Philosophical Fragments 2009 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Socialism | Friedman | Brocker I 401 Socialism/Friedman: socialist planned economies stand for non-free societies because critics and opponents of the system do not have the resources to make their opinions known to a broad public, while, conversely, the publishers in capitalism also want to earn money from the sale of "revolutionary" literature. >Public sphere, >Democracy, >Society. Peter Spahn, „Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Sortals | Tugendhat | I 453 Sortal/Aristotle/Tugendhat: E.g. "chair" distinguished through function -> "bottom-up": we ask how singular term must function - sortal: allows to decide what belongs to it and what does not - no temporal, only spatial limits - (>continuant). Life phases of an object are not regarded as parts. >Parts, >Part-of-relation, >Temporal identity. I 457f Sortal/Tugendhat: allows new type of temporal-spatial identification - we should not presuppose perceptual object - then identification by distinguishing space-time locations. >Specification. I 460 Sortal: Not just imagination. Sortal predicates: presuppose a specific configuration of spatial or temporal extended - e.g. "the same cat". Conversely: sortal predicates are only explainable through space locations together with equal signs. >Equal sign. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
Sovereignty | International Political Theory | Gaus I 292 Sovereignty/International Political Theory/Brown: (...) the 'sovereignty' norms associated with the so-called Westphalia system, (...) endorse notions such as national self-determination and non-intervention and focus on the rights of states and/or political communities (...).Richard Tuck (1999)(1) has traced the way in which humanist, Roman and republican notions of politics contested with medieval, scholastic universalism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As Friedrich Kratochwil (1995)(2) has argued, the origin of the Westphalian notion of sovereignty is best understood in terms of the successful assertion by seventeenth-century rulers of the Roman notion of dominium with respect to their territories. Originally, sovereigns were - with one or two minor exceptions - actual individuals, but with the coming of nationalism in the nineteenth century, the system adapted to accommodate the idea of popular sovereignty, with the same rights and privileges assigned to the sovereign people as has been claimed by kings and princes. Self-determination/non-intervention: more, the doctrine of popular sovereignty became associated with the right to national self-determination, which, although initially subversive of multinational empires, ultimately strengthened the norm of non-intervention, by assigning a moral status to national autonomy. Thus were set in place the Westphalian norms that were challenged by the development of a human rights regime post-1945 (...). Westphalian order/Brown: why should states as opposed to individuals be assumed to be the normative focus of the system? Theorists of 'international society' offer two, conflicting rationales: a) that Westphalian norms allow for pluralism, the coexistence of competing conceptions of the good; and, b) conversely and from a solidarist viewpoint, that states are, in Hedley Bull's phrase, 'local agents of the common good' (1984(3): 14; Wheeler, 1992(4)). Ad a) The first of these ideas is best represented today by Terry Nardin's (1983)(5) Oakeshottian account of international society as a 'practical association', the international equivalent of Oakeshott's (1975)(6) 'civic association'. States are committed to the practices of conventional international law and diplomacy because they have no common projects; they simply desire to coexist under conditions of peace and (procedural) justice. Non-intervention: the norm of non- intervention protects the ability of states to be different, to develop their own sense of the good. This position is not, strictly speaking, anti-universalist, because it applies to all states, but it clearly stands in opposition to the substantive universalism of the international human rights regime. Partly for this reason Nardin (1989)(7) has recently somewhat distanced himself from his earlier work, but the latter still stands as the best defence of the conventional Westphalian norms currently available. >International political theory/Brown. Utilitarianism: the notion that states are local agents of the common good can be expressed in simple, utilitarian terms: a common good can be identified, but the world is simply too big and complex to allow for global government, and the interests of all are served by a plurality of governments. Vs: however, such a position does not require that states be sovereign, as opposed, for example, to being members of a global federation. Sovereignty/Hegel: a better defence of state sovereignty on these lines might be Hegelian: the rights of individuals are actually established by the state and therefore the sovereignty of the latter is not in conflict with the rights of the former. Mervyn Frost (1996)(8) provides a modern version of this argument. >Sovereignty/Walzer, >International law/International political theory. 1. Tuck, R. (1999) The Rights ofWar and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Kratochwil, F. (1995) 'Sovereignty as dominion: is there a right of humanitarian intervention?' In G. Lyons and M. Mastanduno, eds, Beyond Westphalia? Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 21-42. 3. Bull, H. (1984) Justice in International Relations: The Hagey Lectures. Waterloo, ON: University of Waterloo. 4. Wheeler, N. J. (1992) 'Pluralist and solidarist conceptions of international society: Bull and Vincent on humanltarian intervention'. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 21: 463-87. 5. Nardin, T. (1983) Law, Morality and the Relations of States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 6. Oakeshott, M. (1975) On Human Conduct. Oxford: Clarendon. 7. Nardin, T. (1989) 'The problem of relativism in international ethics'. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 18: 140-61. 8. Frost, M. (1996) Ethics in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
Strength of Theories | Avramides | I 66f stronger/weaker/theory/necessity/sufficiency/Bennett: E.g. we can strengthen a theory (analysis) in order to make the analysis sufficient. Then we can weaken it, to make it necessary. Stronger/weaker/Bennett/(s): extremely strong: logical truth, Weaker: empirical truth, which may prove to be wrong - Extremely weak: simultaneous truth of the conditional and its converse. Supervenience: much weaker than reductionism. >Supervenience, >Reductionism, >Conditional, >Necessity, >Logical truth. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
Supervenience | Pauen | Pauen I 123 Supervenience / Pauen: synonymous with "emergence": Origin: first half of the 20th century. - Two people that match in terms of their physical properties, can also have no differences in relation to moral points. - Conversely, the existence of physical differences is, however, compatible with moral conformity. In the philosophy of mind this is no ontological assumption. >Emergence, >Morality, >Ethics, >Behavior, >Consciousness, cf. >Identity theory. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
Tax Substitution | Economic Theories | Parisi I 323 Tax evasion/tax substitution/Economic theories: The literature on optimal redistributional instruments - both in law and economics and in public finance - is dominated by the tax substitution argument. The tax substitution argument shows that any redistribution effected outside the labor earnings tax system can be better accomplished by making appropriate adjustments to labor earnings taxation. >Tax systems. The implication is that the government should pursue distributional goals exclusively through the labor earnings tax system, while setting other policies without regard to their distributional impact. Both proponents and detractors of the tax substitution argument recognize that, like any argument, it requires assumptions. Controversy surrounds the nature of these assumptions. Proponents of the tax substitution argument refer to its key assumption as a “qualification” (Kaplow and Shavell, 2000(1), p. 822). Adopting the assumption is said to generate the “natural model” (Kaplow and Shavell, 2000(1), p. 821). Conversely, prescriptions of the model sans assumption are viewed as “exotic” (Bankman and Weisbach, 2007(2), p. 793), or as “theoretical curiosities” (Kaplow and Shavell, 2000(1), p. 822). Vs: Critics of the tax substitution argument regard its key assumption as result-driving, empirically ungrounded, and indeed facially implausible once clearly revealed (Sanchirico, 1997(3); 2000(4), p. 813; 2001(5), p. 1058; 2010a(6), pp. 874–875, 940; 2011a(7)). 1. Kaplow, Louis and Steven M. Shavell (2001). “Fairness Versus Welfare.” Harvard Law Review 114: 961–1388. 2. Bankman, Joseph and David A. Weisbach (2006). “The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax.” Stanford Law Review 58: 1413–1456. 3. Sanchirico, Chris William (1997). “Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View.” Discussion Paper No. 9798-04, Columbia Economics Department, available at 4. Sanchirico, Chris William (2000). “Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View.” Journal of Legal Studies 29: 797–820. 5. Sanchirico, Chris William (2001). “Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale.” Cornell Law Review 86: 1003–1089. 6. Sanchirico, Chris William (2010a). “A Critical Look at the Economic Argument for Taxing Only Labor Income.” Tax Law Review 63: 867–956. Web appendix available at 7. Sanchirico, Chris William (2011a). “Tax Eclecticism.” Tax Law Review 64: 149–228. Web appendix available at Chris William Sanchirico. “Optimal Redistributional Instruments in Law and Economics”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
Terminology | Stalnaker | Schwarz I 30 Def Perdurantism/Schwarz: thesis: timely extended things are usually composed of temporal parts. Schwarz I 31 Def Endurantism/Schwarz: (VsPerdurantism): thesis: things are completely (not only partially) present at any time at which they exist (like Aristotelian universals). Perdurantism: perdurantism can perceive objects as four-dimensional, extended both in time and space. Endurantism: endurantism can also assume that objects have temporal parts, e.g. a football game. Stalnaker I 135f Vague Identity/Stalnaker: e.g. there are two fish restaurants Bookbinder's - only one can be identical with the original one. Endurantism: problem: B0: (the original one) is then an ambiguous name. Perdurantism: here perdurantism is unique. Stalnaker I 81 Def Individualbegriff/Stalnaker: The individual concept is a function of possible worlds on individuals. Stalnaker I 91 Def weak supervenience/Stalnaker: Weak supervenience is found within a possible world. Strong Supervenience/Stalnaker: strong supervenience is found within one or in several. Global Supervenience/Stalnaker: Global supervenience is when any two possible worlds that are B indistinguishable are also A indistinguishable. Global Supervenience: Global supervenience must be improved. So it is not even sufficient for weak supervenience. I 124 Def Identity/Possible World Relative/Stalnaker: identity is always the binary relation whose extension in any possible world w is the set of pairs such that d is in the domain of w. I 267 Def minimal subject/terminology/Stalnaker: a minimal subject is Ex anything that is a representative, something that receives, stores, or transmits information. I 192 Def kontingent a priori/zwei-dimensionale Semantik/Stalnaker: Kontingent a priori ist eine Aussage mit einer kontingenten sekundären Intension, aber einer notwendigen primären. Def notwendig a posteriori: umgekehrt: Notwendig a posteriori sind notwendige sekundäre Intensionen, kontingente primäre. Pointe: Keine Proposition ist selbst kontingent a priori oder notwendig a posteriori. Es gibt nur verschiedene Weisen, in denen notwendige und kontingente Propositionen mit Aussagen assoziiert sind. Def Charakter/Kaplan: Charakter ist gleich Bedeutung. Er ist die Funktion von möglichen (Gebrauchs-) Kontexten auf Referenten. I 212 Def Local Descriptivism/Lewis/Stalnaker: local descriptivism is simply a way of explaining one part of speech by another. ((s) According to Lewis and Stalnaker, this is the only way). I 9 Def Property/Stalnaker: (a) thin/sparse definition: a trait is a way individuals can be grouped. b) richer definition/Stalnaker: (more robust): A trait is something upon which (in relation to which) individuals are grouped. I 103 Def Fundamental property/Stalnaker: a fundamental property must provide for distinctions between individuals that could not otherwise be explained. I 154f Def essential identity/Stalnaker: all things x and y that are identical are essentially identical, i.e. identical in all possible worlds in which the thing exists. I 34 Def Implication/Proposition/Stalnaker: (here): A implies B gdw. a set consisting of A and a contradiction of B is inconsistent. I 50 Def doxastically accessible/Lewis: Doxastically accessible means being compatible with other beliefs and knowledge. I 16 Def C-Intension/Jackson: A C-intension is c(x) expressed by u in x. Def A-intension/Jackson: The A-intension is determined by the propositional thought alone. Def necessary a posteriori statement: A necessary a posteriori statement is a statement with a necessary C-intension and a contingent A-intension. Def contingent a priori statement: a contingent a priori statement is conversely one with a necessary A-intension and a contingent C-intension. I 205 Def two-dimensional propositional intents/Stalnaker: a two-dimensional propositional intents is a function with two arguments, a centered world and a possible world. Its value is a truth value (WW). Def A-intentions/primary intension/primary sentence intension/stalnaker: an A-intention is a function with one argument, one centered world. Its value is a truth value. Def C-Intension/Secondary Intension/Secondary Sentence Intension/Stalnaker: A C-Intension is a function with an argument and a possible world. Its value is a truth value. I 15 Def Metaphysics/Stalnaker: metaphysics concerns the distinctions that must be made between possibilities. I 43 Def Liberal Platonism/LP/Terminology/Stalnaker: (early thesis): If practice is legitimate, (inferences, etc.) then we are really making assertions and semantics really tells us what the assertions say. I 61f Def Proposition/Stalnaker: a proposition is no more than a subregion, or subset of possible worlds. Def assertion/Stalnaker: asserting a proposition is nothing more than locating the real world in that subset. Def true-relative-to-x: To say a proposition is true relative to a world x is to say that the world x is in the subset (of possible worlds) that the proposition constitutes. Def true simpliciter: "True simpliciter" means to say that the real world is in this subset (of possible worlds constituting the proposition). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
Theological Hermeneutics | Gadamer | I 314 Theological Hermeneutics/Gadamer: The close connection that originally connected philological hermeneutics with juridical and theological hermeneutics was based on the recognition of the application as an integrating moment of all understanding. Both for juridical hermeneutics and for theological hermeneutics, the tension that exists between the set text - the law or proclamation - on the one hand, and on the other hand, the meaning that its application acquires at the concrete moment of interpretation, whether in judgment or in preaching, is constitutive. A law does not want to be understood historically, but should be concretized in its validity through interpretation. Likewise, a religious proclamation text does not want to be understood as a mere historical document, but it is to be understood in such a way that it exercises its salvific effect. In both cases this includes that the text, whether law or message of salvation, if it is to be adequately understood, i.e. in accordance with the claim that the text makes, in every moment, i.e. of each concrete >situation, must be understood in a new and different way. Understanding has always been application here. >Understanding/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer. I 315 Cognitive/normative: If one (...) distinguishes between cognitive, normative and reproductive interpretation, as E. Betti did in his "General Theory of Interpretation"(1) based on admirable knowledge and overview, one gets into difficulties in assigning phenomena to this classification. This applies first of all to the interpretation practiced in the sciences. Schleiermacher: If one compiles the theological interpretation with the juridical one and assigns it according to its normative function, one must, on the other hand, remember Schleiermacher, who, conversely, connects the theological interpretation in the closest possible way to the general, i.e. for him the philological-historical interpretation. In fact, the rift between cognitive and normative function runs right through theological hermeneutics and can hardly be closed by differentiating scientific knowledge from subsequent edifying application. It is clear that the same rift runs right through the middle of legal interpretation, in so far as recognition of the meaning of a legal text and its application to a specific case are not two separate acts but a single operation. I 336 Theological Hermeneutics/Gadamer: [in Protestant theology] there is insofar a correspondence to legal hermeneutics, because here too dogmatics cannot claim primacy. >Legal hermeneutics. The actual concretization of the proclamation happens in the sermon, just as that of the legal order happens in the judgment. But there is still a big difference. The sermon, unlike the judgment, is not a productive complement to the text it interprets. From the proclamation of the sermon therefore nothing grows out of the message of salvation in terms of content that could be compared with the supplementary legal force of the judgment. After all, it is not at all the case that the message of salvation only comes to its closer definition from the preacher's thought. As the preacher before the congregation, he does not speak with dogmatic authority, as the judge does. Admittedly, sermon is also about the interpretation of a valid truth, but this truth is proclamation, and whether it succeeds is decided not by the thoughts of the preacher, but by the power of the word itself (...). The proclamation of the word cannot be detached from their execution. All dogmatic fixation of the pure doctrine is secondary. >Theological Hermeneutics/Bultmann. 1. Cf. E. Betti »Zur Grundlegung einer allgemeinen Auslegungslehre«, and his monumental main work: Allgemeine Auslegungslehre 1967. (for this: „Hermeneutik und Historismus“ (Vol. 2 of Ges. Werke, p. 387—424) and my work „Emilio Betti und das idealistische Erbe“ in: Quaderni Fiorentini 7 (1978), p. 5—11 , Ges. Werke vol. 4.) |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Theory of Mind | Developmental Psychology | Slater I 155 Theory of Mind/ToM/false-belief task/FBT/developmental psychology: recent research in developmental pragmatics show that preverbal infants spontaneously take their audience’s perspective. 12-month olds’ pointing behaviors are best understood by positing that they are in some sense trying to influence the audience’s mental states (see Liszkowski, Carpenter, Henning, Striano, & Tomasello, 2004(1); Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007(2); Tomasello, Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 2007(3)). Conversely, infants are able to interpret adults’ points and gaze direction as cues to their communicative intentions. In particular, infants use these behaviors in word learning situations as crucial cues to the speaker’s referential intent (Bloom, 2000(4); Nurmsoo & Bloom, 2008(5)). More strikingly still, recent research demonstrates that manipulating whether or not a communicator has a false belief leads 17 month-olds to different interpretations of the same communicative act, thereby demonstrating early mental state attribution in pragmatic contexts (Southgate, Chevallier, & Csibra, 2010(6); for similar results in an active helping paradigm, see Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009(7)). These recent results using behavioral measures also answer one of the standard criticisms formulated against violation of expectancy paradigms (as in Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005(8), and Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007(9)), namely that indirect measures — such as looking times — cannot be straightforwardly used to infer complex underlying cognitive process. VsBaron-Cohen: these results show that caution is needed when interpreting failures at the Sally-Anne task. >Autism/Baron-Cohen, >False-Belief Task/psychological theories. 1. Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., Henning, A., Striano, T., & Tomasello, M. (2004). Twelve-month-olds point to share attention and interest. Developmental Science 7, 29 7—307. 2. Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Reference and attitude in infant pointing. Journal of Child Language, 34, 1—20. 3. Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., & Liszkowski, U. (2007). A new look at infant pointing. Child Development, 78, 705—722. 4. Bloom, P. (2000). How children learn the meanings of words. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 5. Nurmsoo, E., & Bloom, P. (2008). Preschoolers’ perspective taking in word learning: Do they blindly follow eye gaze? Psychological Science, 19, 211—215. 6. Southgate, V., Chevallier, C., & Csibra, G. (2010). 1 7-month-olds appeal to false beliefs to interpret others’ communication. Developmental Science, 13, 907—912. 7. Buttelmann, D., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief understanding in an active helping paradigm. Cognition, 1 12, 337—342. 8. Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs? Science, 308,5719,255—258. 9. Surian, L., Caldi, S., & Sperber, D. (2007). Attribution of beliefs by 13-month-old infants. Psychological Science, 18, 580—586. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
Time Preference | Rothbard | Rothbard III 375 Time preference/Rothbard: (…) a good at present is worth more now than its present value as a future good. Because money is the general medium of exchange, for the time market as well as for other markets, money is the present good, and the future goods are present expectations of the future acquisition of money. It follows from the law of time preference that present money is worth more than present expectations of the same amount of future money. In other words, future money (as we may call present expectations of money in the future) will always exchange at a discount compared to present money. This discount on future goods as compared with present goods (or, conversely, the premium commanded by present goods over future goods) is the rate of interest. Rothbard III 997 Time preference/money supply/inflation//Rothbard: If the market then tends to return to its preferred price-ratios after a change in the money supply, it should be evident that this includes a return to its preferred saving-investment ratio, reflecting social time preferences. >Savings/Rothbard, >Inflation/Rothbard, >Credit expansion/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
Tragedy | Gadamer | I 133 Tragic/Tragedy/Gadamer: [The tragic is] a basic phenomenon, a I 134 figure of meaning that is not only present in tragedy, the tragic work of art in the narrower sense, but can also have its place in other art genres, especially in the epic. As a matter of fact it is not at all a specifically artistic phenomenon, as long as it also occurs in life. For this reason, recent researchers (Richard Hamann(1), Max Scheler(2)) consider the tragic as an almost non-aesthetic moment. This is an ethical-metaphysical phenomenon that only intervenes in the area of aesthetic problems from the outside. But now that the concept of the aesthetic has revealed its questionability to us, we must ask ourselves conversely whether the tragic is not rather a basic aesthetic phenomenon. The being of the aesthetic had become visible to us as play and representation. Thus we may also ask the theory of the tragic game, the poetics of tragedy about the nature of tragedy. >Tragedy/Aristotle, >Fear/Aristotle, >Compassion/Aristotle, >Catharsis/Aristotle, >Affirmation/Gadamer. 1. Richard Hamann, Ästhetik, S. 97: »Das Tragische hat also mit Ästhetik nichts zu tun«; 2. Max Scheler, Vom Umsturz der Werte‘, „Zum Phänomen des Tragischen“: »Auch ob das Tragische ein wesentlich „ästhetisches Phänomen sei, ist zweifelhaft. « Zur Prägung des Begriffs „Tragödie“ vgl. E. Staiger, Die Kunst der Interpretation, S. 132ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Translation | Mates | I 93 Translation/formal language/Mates: a translation of everyday language in the artificial language is meaningless as long as the artificial language is not interpreted. >Interpretation, >Artificial language, >Formal language, >Formalization, >Natural language. "Minimum translation":a minimum translation translates true in true and false in false statements. >Truth preservation, >Truth transfer. I 102 Translation/meaning/sense/interpretation/Mates: to know whether something is a satisfactory translation (of a formal language), we need not only to know the meaning (reference), but also the sense - otherwise we can obtain various everyday language translations. Sense/Mates: cannot be stated in a list as meaning. >Sense. Meaning/Mates: meaning gives the non-logical constants truth conditions: E.g. 2 < 3 is true, if the smallest prime number is less than 3. >Meaning. Sense/Mates: sense provides the content: that the smallest ... is smaller. Reference/Mates: reference provides truth conditions: true, if ... >Truth conditions. Sense: content: that it is true. >Reference, >Content. I 110 Translation/variables/Mates: the translation is not affected by the substitution of the variables, but only by the substitution of the constants. >Variables, >Constants. I 111 Translation/summary/Mates: 1. meaningless without interpretation. (Assignment of objects to the individual constants) 2. If an interpretation is given, one can get a "standard translation" for every formal statement, and this by means of the definition of "true in interpretation I" - Problem: if the same interpretation is given in various ways (E.g. 2 = "smallest prime" or "sole even prime number") one can obtain several non-synonymous translations. >Way of givenness, >Intension. Two formal statements may be equivalent, without being equally good translations. >Equivalence. Conversely it is possible: that two statements are adequate but not equivalent - (only for ambiguity). >Adequacy, >Ambiguity. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
Truth | Meixner | I 114 Truth/Meixner: truth is the actuality of propositions, not the actuality of facts. >Propositions, >States of affairs, >Levels/order, >Description levels. Actuality of states of affairs: "it is the case that" (not actuality of propositions). >Actuality, >Actual World. The proposition is true if the state of affairs is actual. Anyway, the state of affairs is not true because the proposition is true, but conversely. Truth is secondary. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
Truth Theory | Davidson | II 34 Truth Theory/Tarski/Davidson: shows how the truth values of the sentences of L depend on their structures, and why some sentences contain others, and how words perform their function through their relationship to things in the world. >Truth values. Tarski: Meaning as the basic concept. II 35 FosterVsDavidson: Mistake: to overlook that someone could have a clear theory without knowing it. - Then there is no meaning theory. - (Davidson ditto). >Meaning theory. II 37 Truth Theory/Davidson: ""Snow is white" is true" is not an accidental fact about a sentence but a fact that interprets it. - This shows that the ability to interpret does not equal translation. >Interpretation, >Disquotation scheme. I (e) 111 Tarski: defines Truth - Davidson: Truth is an undefined basic concept. - "mine", "wanting to say": presupposes the concept of meaning. l (e) 111 Tarski: proceeds formally, Davidson empirical (laws instead of axioms, empirically verifiable). Glüer II 28f Truth Theory/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: Conversely: it is not required of T-equivalences that the right-hand side translates the left-hand side. - Definition Truth-Equivalence/Tarski: true iff the linked sentences (in the schema) have the same truth value under all circumstances. Glüer II 29 Then one must know for Davidson's reinterpreted convention truth (provides only true equivalences) when truth-equivalences are true. - It is therefore not necessary to know the meaning of both object language sentences and meta-language sentences. - ((s) the meaning is not presupposed. TarskiVsDavidson: the meaning of the sentence of both the object language and the meta-language must be known - truth-predicate/DavidsonVsTarski: his truth-predicate must be interpreted - Davidson: then the truth theory is an interpretation theory which, for each statement sentence S, a truth-equivalence derived from its structure, whose right-hand side indicates the truth conditions under which the left-hand side (S) is true. Glüer II 45 Truth Theory/Davidson/Glüer: for unknown language: 3 steps: 1. The totality of the data must be available, interpreter transmits his logic to the foreign language - basis: observations on sentences that are believed to be true at all times ) - 2. Predicates identified as such become the object of the interpretation (fulfillment conditions are approximated via opportunity sentences) - 3. Extension to general sentences (indirectly developed truth conditions). >Truth conditions. Glüer II 54/55 Truth Theory/Davidson: because of malapropisms: not structure, but intension has priority. >Intensions. Glüer II 56 Truth Theory: in principle, only for certain occasions correct - problem: for a theory of competence: there is no distinction anymore between the ability to know a language and to know about the world - language competency fuses with worlds. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
Understanding | Gadamer | I 270 Understanding/Hermeneutics/Heidegger/Gadamer: Heidegger only addressed the problem of historical hermeneutics and critique in order to unfold from there in ontological intention the preliminary structure of understanding(1). Gadamer: Conversely, we pursue the question of how hermeneutics, once freed from the ontological inhibitions of the objectivity concept of science, is able to do justice to the historicity of understanding. Understanding/Heidegger: [One will be allowed] to ask about the consequences that Heidegger's fundamental derivation of the circular structure of understanding from the temporality of >Dasein has for hermeneutics in the humanities. These consequences (...) could (...) consist (...) in the fact that the self-understanding of understanding, which is always practiced, would be corrected and cleansed of inappropriate adjustments - a process that would at most indirectly benefit the art of understanding. >Hermeneutic Circle/Heidegger, >Expectations/Gadamer. I 273 How should a text be protected from misunderstanding in advance? If you look more closely, you will see (...) that even opinions cannot be understood arbitrarily. As little as we can constantly misunderstand a use of language without the meaning of the whole being disturbed, as little can we blindly stick to our own pre-opinion on the matter when we understand the opinion of another. It is not as if, when we listen to someone or start to read something, we have to forget all our pre-opinions about the content and all of our own opinions. Only openness to the opinion of the other or the text is required. Such openness, however, always implies that one puts the other opinion in relation to the whole of one's own opinions or is in relation to it. Therefore, a hermeneutically trained awareness of the otherness of the text must be receptive from the outset. But such receptiveness requires I 274 neither factual nor even self-extinction, but includes the detached appropriation of one's own prejudices and preconceptions. It is important to be aware of one's own bias so that the test presents itself in its otherness and thus has the opportunity to play off its factual truth against one's own pre-opinion. I 295 Understanding/Gadamer: Understanding itself is not so much to be thought of as an act of subjectivity, but rather as an engagement with an event of tradition in which past and present are constantly communicated. I 304 Understanding/Gadamer: The first thing that understanding begins with is (...) that something appeals to us. This is the highest of all hermeneutical conditions. We now know what is required: a fundamental suspension of one's own prejudices. All suspension of judgements, however, and therefore even more so that of prejudices, has, logically seen, the structure of the question. I 311 Merging of horizons: There is as little a contemporary horizon for itself as there are historical horizons to be gained. Rather, understanding is always the process of merging such supposedly separate horizons. >Horizon/Gadamer. I 316 It is quite absurd to base the possibility of understanding texts on the premise of "congeniality" that should unite the creator and interpreter of a work. If that were really the case, the humanities would have a bad outlook. The miracle of understanding consists rather in the fact that it does not require congeniality to recognize what is truly significant and what is originally meaningful in the tradition. Rather, we are able to open ourselves to the superior claim of the text and understand the meaning in which it speaks to us. >Legal Hermeneutics, >Theological Hermeneutics. I 346 Understandig/Application/Gadamer: Application is not a subsequent application of some given generality, which would first be understood in itself, to a concrete case, but is only the real understanding of the general itself, which the given text is for us. Understanding proves to be a way of effect and knows itself as such effect. >History of Effect/Gadamer. I 399 Understanding/Gadamer: Not only is the preferred object of understanding, the tradition, of linguistic nature - understanding itself has a fundamental relationship to linguistics. We were based on the proposition that understanding is already interpreting, because it forms the hermeneutical >horizon in which the opinion of a text is expressed. But in order to be able to express the opinion of a text in its factual content, we have to translate it into our language, i.e. we put it in relation to the whole of possible opinions in which we are speaking and are ready to express ourselves. 1. Heideger, Sein und Zeit, 312ff |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Unity and Multiplicity | Gadamer | I 430 Unity and Multiplicity/Language/Word/Thinking/Gadamer: The difference between the unity of the divine word and the multiplicity of human words does not exhaust the situation. Rather, unity and multiplicity have a fundamentally dialectical relationship. The dialectic of this relationship dominates the whole essence of the word. Also I 431 from the divine word, the concept of multiplicity is not entirely remote. The divine word is indeed only one word that came into the world in the form of the Saviour, but if it remains a reality - and this is despite all the rejection of subordination, as we have seen - there is thus an essential relationship between the unity of the divine word and its appearance in the Church. Human Word/Gadamer: Conversely, in the human word the dialectical reference of the multiplicity of words to the unity of the word in its new light is revealed. Plato had recognized that the human word has the character of speech, i.e. that it expresses the unity of an opinion through the assembling of a multiplicity of words, and had developed this structure of the logos in a dialectical way. Aristotle then pointed out the logical structures that make up the sentence or judgement or the sentence context or the conclusion. But this is not the end of the story. The unity of the word, which is interpreted in the multiplicity of words, also makes something visible that does not fit into the essential structure of logic and brings out the character of the events in language: the process of concept formation. >Concept/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Universal History | Ranke | Gadamer I 206 Universal History/Ranke/Gadamer: Ranke: Thesis: "Every truly world-historical action, which never consists one-sidedly of mere annihilation, but rather knows how to develop a future in the fleeting moment of the present, includes a full and immediate feeling of its indestructible value"(1). Gadamer: Neither the privileged position of classical antiquity nor that of the present or a future to which it leads, neither decay nor progress, these traditional basic schemata of universal history, are compatible with genuine historical thinking. Conversely, the famous immediacy of all epochs to God is very compatible with the idea of the Gadamer I 207 world historical interrelation. For interrelation (...) is the manifestation of historical reality itself. What is historically real comes out "according to strict rules: what followed puts the effect and nature of what has just gone before in a bright, communal light"(2). That it is an uninterrupted interrelation of life that holds up in the change of human destinies is thus the first statement about the formal structure of history, to be "becoming in passing". After all, it is only from here that we can understand what, according to Ranke, is a "truly world-historical plot" and thus also what the interrelation of world history is actually based on. Aim of the history/Ranke: [History] has no telos that can be found and determined apart from it. In this respect there is no a priori visible necessity in history. But the structure of the historical interrelation is nevertheless a teleological one(3). The yardstick is success. We have seen that what follows first determines the significance of what has gone before. Gadamer: Ranke might have meant that as a mere condition of historical knowledge. In truth, this is also the basis for the actual weight that the meaning of history itself has. That something succeeds or fails is not only decisive for the meaning of this doing and lets it create a lasting effect or let it pass without effect, but this success or failure lets a whole interrelation of deeds and events make sense or become senseless. >Universal History/Gadamer, >Historism/Gadamer, >History/Historism. 1. Ranke, Weltgeschichte IX, 270. 2. Ranke, Lutherfragm. 1. 3. Vgl. Gerhard Masur, Rankes Begriff der Weltgeschichte, 1926 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Universals | Meixner | Ad I 42 Universals/(s): can apply gradually. Facts: cannot apply gradually. Facts are mutually exclusive, universals are not. >States of affairs, >Facts. I 85 Exemplification: Ability to be at different places at the same time - applies to universals. >Exemplification. I 85 Non-predicative universals/Meixner: non-predicative: no property, no function: type objects/TO: objects! The letter that "looks like A", the logo of the Railroad Company, the Lion, the High C, the book Anna Karenina (not the figure), homo sapiens, carmine red (not crimson). Type objects are differently perceived mentally than predicative universals: differences between individual specimens do not stand out. - This does not apply to the corresponding properties. >Type/Token, >Properties, >Predicates, >Predication. I 86/87 Universals problem: narrow sense: Question whether some entities are abstract - not identical with the question of whether or not some entities are properties, relations, types or not? >Abstractness, >Abstract objects, >Relations. I 149 Def Normal Universal/NU/Meixner: is a finite-digit predicative universal. The results of a complete saturation of NU with entities are facts. >States of affairs, >Facts. Conversely: the results of the extraction of these entities from these facts are those normal universals - just like we differentiate facts as gross we also differentiate normal universals as gross. Coarse: e.g. the property of being an equiangular triangle is identical to the property of being a equilateral triangle. >Coarse-grained/fine-grained. Normal universals are identical if they have the same number of digits and can be saturated by the same entities. I 153 Universal Name: means the property. >Names, >Names of expressions, >Levels/order, >Meaning. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
Unobservables | Fraassen | I 54 Unobservability/Fraassen: as long as we do not forbid negation, we can express in an observation language that something is unobservable. And we can even express to a certain extent, how these unobserved entities are. E.g. Unobservable/Copenhagen interpretation: says that there are things that sometimes have a certain position and sometimes not. >Copenhagen Interpretation. N.B.: that was expressed without using a single theoretical term - e.g. the consequence of a theory: absolute space: would have neither position nor volume. - This has nothing to do with what exists in the observable world. >Ontology, >Existence. N.B.: a theory reduced to observation language would not be a description of a "part of the world". - ((s) because there is no meaningful separation observable/unobservable - Syntax/Fraassen: this is only a problem for the syntactic representation of theories. I 57 Limits of observability are empirical, not philosophical. >Observability. I 71 Unobservable/Truth/Theory/Fraassen: if a theory has implications about the unobservable, then evidence does not guarantee the truth of the theory. ((s) this practically always the case.) -Conversely, the evidence would never justify a conclusion that goes beyond this evidence. - Conclusions about what is observable also go beyond the evidence. >Evidence. I 72 Fraassen: There are no rationally compelling reasons to go beyond the evidence. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
Utility of Money | Rothbard | Rothbard III 764 Utility of Money/Rothbard: In the case of consumers' goods, we do not go behind their subjective utilities on people's value scales to investigate why they were preferred; economics must stop once the ranking has been made. Money as a good: In the case of money, however, we are confronted with a different problem. For the utility of money (…) depends solely on its prospective use as the general medium of exchange. >Demand for money/Rothbard. Hence the subjective utility of money is dependent on the objective exchange-value of money (…).(1) Demand for goods: or other goods, demand in the market is a means of routing commodities into the hands of their consumers. Demand for money: For money, on the other hand, the "price" of money is precisely the variable on which the demand schedule depends and to which almost the whole of the demand for money is keyed. Money price: without a price, or an objective exchange-value, any other good would be snapped up as a welcome free gift; but money, without a price, would not be used at all, since its entire use consists in its command of other goods on the market. The sole use of money is to be exchanged for goods, and if it had no price and therefore no exchange- value, it could not be exchanged and would no longer be used. >Money/Rothbard. Rothbard III 765 Money: Money, on the contrary, is solely useful for exchange purposes. Money, per se, cannot be consumed and cannot be used directly as a producers' good in the productive process. Money per se is therefore unproductive; it is dead stock and produces nothing. Land or capital is always in the form of some specific good, some specific productive instrument. Money always remains in someone's cash balance. >Cash balance/Rothbard, >Currency in circulation/Rothbard. Money utility: Goods are useful and scarce, and any increment in goods is a social benefit. But money is useful not directly, but only in exchanges. (…) as the stock of money in society changes, the objective exchange-value of money changes inversely (though not necessarily proportionally) until the money relation is again in equilibrium. When there is less money, the exchange-value of the monetary unit rises; when there is more money, the exchange-value of the monetary unit falls. >Demand for money/Rothbard. We conclude that there is no such thing as "too little" or "too much" money, that, whatever the social money stock, the benefits of money are always utilized to the maximum extent. Money supply: An increase in the supply of money confers no social benefit whatever; it simply benefits some at the expense of others, as will be detailed further below. Similarly, a decrease in the money stock involves no social loss. For money is used only for its purchasing power in exchange, and an increase in the money stock simply dilutes the purchasing power of each monetary unit. Conversely, a fall in the money stock increases the purchasing power of each unit. Rothbard III 766 Economic law: Every supply of money is always utilized to its maximum extent, and hence no social utility can be conferred by increasing the supply of money. >Money supply/David Hume. 1. See Mises, Theory of Money and Credit, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953 and 1957. Reprinted by Liberty Fund, 1995. p. 98. The entire volume is indispensable for the analysis of money. Also see Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. chap. xvii and chap. xx. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
Verification | Hempel | I 99 Verification/Natural Laws/Hempel: a general statement is checked by examining their singular consequences. Problem: each general statement specifies an infinite class of singular statements. Therefore, there is never a final verification. Conversely, no general law is derived formally from a finite set of singular statements. --- Bubner I 125 Confirmation/Hempel/Science Theory/Bubner: The relationship of logical inclusion of sentences avoids a crucial problem of induction. Both hypothetically valid laws or general statements as well as individual statements from observation are subject of logical consideration as sentences. Formal rules of derivation: Rehabilitation of deduction. With P. Oppenheim: D N Model: the deductive nomological explanation is a scientific explanation as a logical operation with sentences, i.e. the subsumption of sentences under sentences. The explanandum is subsumed under explanation reasons (explanas). The explanas disintegrates into antecedents conditions (C1, C2,... Ck) which describe an event and general law statements (L1, L2,... Lr) I 127 Deduction schema/Hempel: C1, C2,... Ck L1, L2,... Lr E (Description of the phenomenon) The laws are therefore subject to the premises. (Only significant innovation VsAristotle). GoodmanVsHempel: we need law-like statements instead of laws. Induction: the "new mystery of induction" does not concern the confirmation but the original creation of hypotheses. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
Verification (Confirmation) | Armstrong | III 42/43 Confirmation/Armstrong: confirmation of all G's are F: the refutation of the converse (a)Ga & Fa through ~Fa & Ga is no confirmation of the law. Tooley: from "it is a law that Fs are Gs" to "it is a law that ~Gs are ~Fs"? Armstrong: only: "It is the case...": there are no negative universals. - Still, the law is an explanation of the observation of instances of the counter position. Confirmation/Dretske: is a converse of an explanation. III 46 Conjunction of two properties is only in positive cases a confirmation of the law - negative cases: merely confirmation of a Humean regularity. I.e. a consequence of the law, but not the law itself. III 102 Confirmation/Armstrong: not a circle: if the law applies, the observation is explained. - Therefore, the observation confirms the existence of the law. Problem: ~ G"s that are ~F"s. (see above). - It is unclear whether they have confirmation power - Proposal: we could assume 2nd order confirmation. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
Word of God | Gadamer | I 424 Word of God/Gadamer: When Augustine and scholasticism deal with the problem of verbum in order to obtain the conceptual means for the mystery of the Trinity, it is exclusively this inner word, the word of the heart and its relationship with the intelligentia, that they make the subject of discussion. >Trinity/Gadamer, >Language/Christianity, >Creation Myth/Gadamer. The greater miracle of language is not that the word becomes flesh and comes out in the outer being, but that what comes out and is expressed in utterance is always already word. That the word is with God, and that is from eternity, is the Church's teaching, which is victorious in the defence against subordinationism, and which also lets the problem of language enter completely into the inner being of thought. >Language/Christianity, >Word/Augustine. I 425 Gadamer: What kind of word is that which remains an inner conversation of thought and does not take on a sound form? Does that even exist? Does not all our thinking always follow the trajectories of a certain language, and do we not know too well that one must think in a language if one really wants to speak it? >Language and Thought/Gadamer, >Language and Thought/Ancient Philosophy. Even if we remember the freedom that our reason retains in the face of the language-bound nature of our thinking, be it through the fact that it invents and uses artificial sign languages, be it through the fact that it knows how to translate from one language into the other, a beginning that also presupposes an elevation of the language-bound nature towards the intended meaning, then, nevertheless, every such elevation is itself again (...) a linguistic one. The "language of reason" is not a language in itself. In view of the irrevocability of our linguistic dependence, what is the point of speaking of an "inner word" that is, as it were, spoken in the pure language of reason? Language of Reason/Word of God/Gadamer: What should this "inner word" be? It cannot simply be the Greek logos, the conversation that the soul has with itself. Rather the mere fact that "logos" is represented by both "ratio" and "verbum" is an indication that the phenomena of I 426 language in the scholastic treatment of Greek metaphysics will be more prominent than was the case with the Greeks themselves. >Word of God/Scholastics. I 430 Word of God/Unity/Multiplicity/Gadamer: The difference between the unity of the divine word and the multiplicity of human words does not exhaust the facts. Rather unity and multiplicity have a fundamentally dialectical relationship. The dialectic of this relationship dominates the whole essence of the word. Also I 431 from the divine word, the concept of multiplicity is not entirely remote. The divine word is indeed only one word that came into the world in the form of the Saviour, but if it remains a reality - and this is despite all the rejection of subordination, as we have seen - there is thus an essential relationship between the unity of the divine word and its appearance in the Church. Proclamation/Gadamer: The proclamation of salvation, the content of the Christian message, is itself an event in its own right in sacrament and preaching, and yet it only makes clear what happened in Christ's act of redemption. In this respect, it is a single word, of which, after all, it is repeatedly proclaimed in the sermon. Obviously, in its character as a message there is already the reference to the variety of its proclamation, the meaning of the word cannot be detached from the event of the proclamation. The character of the event belongs rather to the sense itself. Speech Action/Speech Act/Gadamer: It is like a curse, which apparently cannot be removed from the fact that it is spoken by someone and about someone. What can be understood about it is not an abstract logical sense of the statement, but the intertwining that happens within it(1). Proclamation: The same applies to the unity and multiplicity of the word proclaimed by the Church. Christ's death on the cross and resurrection is the content of the proclamation of salvation, which is preached in every sermon. The risen Christ and the Christ preached are one and the same. Modern Protestant theology in particular has developed the eschatological character of faith based on this dialectical relationship. Human Word/Gadamer: Conversely, in the human word the dialectical relation of the multiplicity of words to the unity of the word in its new light is revealed. >Word/Gadamer. 1. Hans Lipp's, "Untersuchungen zu einer hermeneutischen Logik"(1938), and Austin's, "How to do things with words", are excellent examples of this. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Words | Gadamer | I 431 Word/Gadamer: Word of God: The risen and the preached Christ are one and the same. Modern Protestant theology in particular has developed the eschatological character of belief based on this dialectical relationship. >Word of God/Gadamer. Human Word/Unity/Multiplicity/Gadamer: Conversely, in the human word the dialectical relation of the multiplicity of words to the unity of the word in its new light is revealed. Plato had recognized that the human word has the character of speech, i.e. that it expresses the unity of an opinion through the order of a multiplicity of words, and had developed this structure of the logos in a dialectical way. Aristotle then pointed out the logical structures that make up the sentence or judgement or the sentence context or the conclusion. But the situation is not yet exhausted. The unity of the word, which is interpreted in the multiplicity of words, also makes something visible that does not fit into the essential structure of logic and brings out the character of the events in language: the process of concept formation. >Concept/Gadamer. I 461 Word/Gadamer: The word is not simply, as medieval thinking thought, the perfection of the species. If being is represented in the thinking spirit, then this is not the representation of a given order of being, whose true conditions are before the eyes of an infinite spirit (the Creator Spirit). Cf. >Creation Myth/Gadamer. The word, however, is also not an instrument that, like the language of mathematics, is capable of constructing an objectified universe of being that is made available through calculation. (Cf. >Sign/Plato). No more than an infinite spirit can an infinite will surpass the experience of being adequate to our finiteness. It is the center of language alone that, in relation to the whole of being, conveys the finite-historical essence of the human with him- or herself and with the world. >Language/Gadamer, >Unity and Multiplicity/Plato. I 462 "Centre of language"/Gadamer: Each word makes the whole of the language it belongs to sound and the whole of the world view it is based on appear. Every word therefore, as the event of its moment, also lets the unsaid be there, to which it refers in responding and waving. I 465 The important thing is that something happens here. Neither does the interpreter's consciousness master what reaches it as the Word of Tradition, nor can what happens be adequately described as the progressive realization of what is, so that an infinite intellect would contain all that which could ever speak from the whole of tradition. But the actual event is only made possible by this, namely that the word that has come to us as tradition and to which we have to listen, really meets us, as if it addressed us and meant I 466 ourselves. Object/Gadamer: (...) on the part of the "object" this event means the coming into play, the playing out of the content of the tradition in its new possibilities of meaning and resonance, each newly expanded by the other recipient. >Hearing/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
World | Evans | Frank I 521 EvansVsStrawson: "natural little theory of our world": 1st I take this to be true and am at the point p, so this applies to p 2nd conversely, if this does not apply to p, I can not perceive it 3rd I was at p before, so now I cannot be at p anymore". >Certainty, >Knowledge. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
World | Hegel | Adorno XII 174 World/Hegel/Adorno: not only the objective world is mediated by the subject but also the subjectivity and its categories are conversely mediated by the content and by the representational moments of knowledge. >Knowledge/Hegel, >Thinking/Hegel, >Mediation/Hegel, >Method/Hegel, >Dialectic/Hegel, >Totality, >Wholes, >Reality. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
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Aristotle | Frege Vs Aristotle | Berka I 92 Syllogisms/FregeVsAristotle: his different types of inferences (when deriving one judgment from several) can all be represented by a single one: common form: if M is true, and N is true, A applies as well. Because it is possible to manage with a single type of inference, it is a commandment of clarity, to do just that. In addition: it would otherwise be no reason to remain with the Aristotelian ones, but you could add new ones into the indefinite.(1) 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 Stepanians I 9 Frege/Stepanians: his main question was: What are numbers? Thesis: they are something purely logical and therefore all propositions of arithmetic must be logically provable. I 10 FregeVsAristotle/Stepanians: not all propositions can be reduced to the form "S is P". Grammar/Frege: Mixes the logical and the psychological. I 11 Language/Philosophy of Language/Frege: ... the task of philosophy is to break the rule of the word over the human mind. Hence my Begriffsschrift. I 53 Quantifier/Quantifiers/Aristotle/Stepanians: even Aristotle had quantifiers: "all", "some", "none". Problem/Logic//VsAristotle: his system reached its limits as soon as the quantifiers occurred not only in the subject, but also in the predicate. E.g. "All the boys love all the girls." Solution/Frege: Begriffsschrift: expression of generality where it does not matter how many quantifiers occur in the subject or in the predicate. I 54 Generality/Frege: E.g. "2x2 = 4": where is the subject where the predicate? Solution/Frege: Letters/Frege: there are two types of characters in arithmetic: letters, each of which either represents a) an number left indeterminate or b) a function left indeterminate. Generality/Frege: is made possible by this indeterminacy! We can use the letters to express generality: E.g. (a+b)c = ac + bc. Ad a) includes characters such as +, - , 0, 1, 2... each of which has a particular meaning. Law/Generality/Frege/Stepanians: if we replace in a real equation as E.g. 3 + 2 = 2 + 3 the special numbers with letters, we get a law. Conversely, by inserting the same numbers for the same letters we can discover an infinite number of truths. I 55 Generality/Frege/Stepanians: Important argument: generality no longer refers either to the subject or to the predicate. E.g. "The number 11 is smaller than the number 13": Subject "The number 11", Predicate "is smaller than the number 13" ((s) VsStepanians: "Number 13" is not the predicate!) Both may be replaced with characters. Generalization/Frege/Stepanians: is an operation on the total content of the sentence. Letters/Variables/Spelling/Frege/Stepanians: where Frege used a, b, c, etc., we use today x, y, z.... Variables/Arithmetic/Logic/Stepanians: while in arithmetic the variables stand for numbers, this limitation to one domain in logic must be abolished. I 56 Domain/Universal Proposition/Conditions/Frege/Stepanians: Frege does not define a scope: E.g. "x is confused" should only apply to the realm of philosophers. Instead: condition: if something is a philosopher, it is confused. I 57 Important argument: this applies for everything, without exception, even for Sam’s goldfish: if x is a philosopher, x is confused. ((s)> counterfactual conditional). Generalization/Generality/FregeVsAristotle: the generalization applies to the whole sentence, not for either the subject or the predicate. Problem: how can the generalized be subjected to other operations E.g. specify exceptions, that not everything is confused? Wrong solution: "not x is confused". At best, "x is not confused", but that boils down to the fact that nothing is confused. I 58 Solution/Frege: external negation (operator that is applied to the whole sentence) ~(X) is confused. Boy/Girl/Aristotle/Frege/Stepanians: Solution/Frege: Whatever X and Y may be, if x is a boy and y is a girl, then x loves y. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Step I Markus Stepanians Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
Carnap, R. | Quine Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap VII 151 Intensionalist Thesis of Pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intention is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the linguistic habits. Extensionalist Thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste, the linguist is free, because it can not be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise. Quine: the completed lexicon is ex pede Herculem i.e. we risk an error if we start at the bottom. But we can gain an advantage from it! However, if in the case of the lexicon we delay a definition of synonymy no problem arises as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false. Carnap VII 154 Intention/Carnap: essential task: to find out which variations of a given specimen in different ways (for example, size, shape, color) are allowed in the area of the predicate. Intention: can be defined as the range of the predicate. QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man on the street would be unwilling to say anything about non-existent objects. Carnap VII 155 CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man on the street is very well able to understand questions related to assumed counterfactual situations. Lanz I 271 QuineVsCarnap: criticism of the distinction analytic/synthetic. This distinction was important for logical empiricism, because it allows an understanding of philosophy that assigns philosophy an independent task which is clearly distinct from that of empirical sciences! Quine undermines this assumption: the lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! I 272 There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and sciences are on one and the same continuum. --- Newen I 123 Quine/Newen: is like Carnap in the spirit of empiricism, but has modified it radically. I 124 Thought/Frege: irreducible. Thought/QuineVsFrege: seeks a reductive explanation of sentence content (like Carnap). Base/QuineVsCarnap: not individual sense data, but objectively describable stimuli. Sentence Meaning/Quine/Newen: is determined by two quantities: 1) the amount of stimuli leading to approval 2) the amount of the stimuli leading to rejection. This only applies for occasion sentences. I125 Def Cognitively Equivalent/Quine/Newen: = same meaning: two sentences if they trigger the same behavior of consent or reflection. For the entire language: if it applies to all speakers. QuineVsCarnap: sentences take precedence over words. Quine I 73 QuineVsCarnap: difference to Carnap's empirical semantics: Carnap proposes to explore meaning by asking the subject whether they would apply it under different, previously described circumstances. Advantage: opposites of terms such as "Goblin" and "Unicorn" are preserved, even if the world falls short of examples that could be so sharply distinct from each other in such a way. I 74 Quine: the stimulus meaning has the same advantage, because there are stimulus patterns that would cause consent to the question "unicorn?", but not for "Goblin?" QuineVsCarnap: Carnap's approach presumes decisions about which descriptions of imaginary states are permissible. So, e.g. "Unicorn", would be undesired in descriptions to explore the meaning of "Unicorn". Difference: Quine restricts the use of unfulfilled conditionals to the researchers, Carnap makes his researcher himself submit such judgments to the informant for evaluation. Stimulus meaning can be determined already in the first stages of radical translation, where Carnap's questionnaire is not even available yet. Quine: theory has primarily to do with records, Carnap: to do with terms. I 466 For a long time, Carnap advocated the view that the real problems of philosophy are linguistic ones. Pragmatic questions about our language behavior, not about objects. Why should this not apply to theoretical questions in general? I 467 This goes hand in hand with the analyticity concept. (§ 14) In the end, the theoretical sentences generally can only be justified pragmatically. QuineVsCarnap: How can Carnap draw a line there and claim that this does not apply for certain areas? However, we note that there is a transition from statements about objects to statements about words, for example, when we skip classes when moving from questions about the existence of unicorns to questions about the existence of points and kilometers. Through the much-used method of "semantic ascent": the transition from statements about kilometers to statements about "kilometers". From content-related to formal speech. It is the transition from speech in certain terms to talk about these concepts. It is precisely the transition of which Carnap said that it undressed philosophical questions of their deceptive appearance and made them step forward in their true form. QuineVsCarnap: this part, however, I do not accept. The semantic ascent of which I speak can be used anywhere. (Carnap: "content-related" can also be called "material".) Ex If it came down to it, the sentence "In Tasmania there are Wombats" could be paraphrased like this: ""Wombat" applies to some creatures in Tasmania." IV 404 Carnap/(Logical Particles): ("The logical structure of the world"): Thesis: it is possible in principle to reduce all concepts to the immediately given. QuineVsCarnap: that is too reductionist: Disposition concepts such as "soluble" cannot be defined like this. (Even later recognized by Carnap himself). IV 416 QuineVsCarnap: Why all these inventive reconstructions? Ultimately sense stimuli are the only thing we have. We have to determine how the image of the world is constructed from them. Why not be content with psychology? V 28 Disposition/Quine: Problem: the dependence on certain ceteris paribus clauses. Potential disturbances must be eliminated. Solution: some authors: (like Chomsky) retreat to probabilities. V 29 Carnap: instead of probability: reduction sentences seen as idealizations to which corrections are made. Carnap conceives these corrections as re-definitions, i.e. they lead to analytic sentences that are true from the meaning. QuineVsCarnap: I make no distinction between analytical and other sentences. V 30 Reflexes/Holt/Quine: those that are conditioned later are not fundamentally different from innate ones. They consist of nerve paths with reduced resistance. Quine: therefore, one can conceive disposition as this path itself! ((s) I.e. pratically physical. Precisely as physical state.) Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to an eventually mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms. QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I, unlike the two, am satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary, of which some fundamental physical predicates were initially learned with the help of dipositioned speech. (Heuristic role). VII (b) 40 But his work is still only a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presume a world with few movements ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement is to be the guide for the construction of a world from experience. QuineVsCarnap: he seemed not to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked in reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain overall features and with increasing experience the truth values are revised in the same sense. X 127 Logical Truth/Carnap: Thesis: only the language and not the structure of the world makes them true. Truth/Logical Truth/QuineVsCarnap: is not a purely linguistic matter. Logic/QuineVsCarnap: the two breakdowns that we have just seen are similar in form and effect: 1) The logic is true because of the language only insofar as it is trivially true because of everything. 2) The logic is inseparable from the translation only insofar as all evident is inseparable from the translation. Logic/Language/Quine: the semantic ascent seems to speak for linguistic theory. QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T predicate) already exists and helps precisely to separate logic from language by pointing to the world. Logic: While talks a lot about language, it is geared towards the world and not towards language. This is accomplished by the T predicate. X 133 We learn logic by learning language. VsCarnap: but that does not differentiate logic from other areas of everyday knowledge! XI 99 QuineVsProtocol Sentence/QuineVsCarnap/Lauener: describes private, non-public autopsychological experiences. XI 129 Intention/Carnap/Lauener: (Meaning and Necessity): attempts to introduce intentions without thereby entangling himself in metaphysics. QuineVsCarnap: you cannot take advantage of a theory without paying the ontological bill. Therefore, the assumed objects must be values of the variable. Another way would be to say that certain predicates must be true for the theory to be true. But that means that it is the objects that must be the values of variables. To every value applies a predicate or its negation. ((s) >continuous determination). XI 130 Conversely, everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable. Because a predicate is an open sentence. XI 138 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: Ex "x is a thing": at a higher level of universality existence assumptions no longer refer to the world, but only to the choice of a suitable linguistic framework. QuineVsCarnap: this is merely a gradual difference. XI 142 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: (temporarily represented): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. Semantic Ascent/QuineVsCarnap: it must not be misused for evasive ontological maneuvers. XI 150 Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things only means choosing a certain language. It does not mean believing in these things. XI 151 CarnapVsQuine: his existence criterion (being the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in as far as it only expresses a linguistic choice. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be separated like that. Science is the continuation of our daily practice. XII 69 QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsUniversal Words: it is not said what exactly is the feature for the scope. Ontological Relativity/QuineVsCarnap: cannot be enlightened by internal/external questions, universal words or universal predicates. It has nothing to do with universal predicates. The question about an absolute ontology is pointless. The fact that they make sense in terms of a framework is not because the background theory has a wider scope. Absolute Ontology/Quine: what makes it pointless, is not its universality but its circularity. Ex "What is an F?" can only be answered by recourse to another term: "An F is a G." XII 89 Epistemology/Scope/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements + statements about the future are uncertain if understood as about sense data or sensations) is still unsolved. Carnap/Quine: his structures would have allowed translating all sentences about the world in sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms does not mean that it could be proved by means of logic and set theory from observation statements. ((s) means of expression are not evidence. (inside/outside, plain, circles).) Epistemology/Quine: Important argument: wanting to equip the truths about nature with the full authority of direct experience is just as much sentenced to failure as the reduction of truths in mathematics to the potential intelligibility of elementary logic. XII 91 Carnap/QuineVsCarnap: If Carnap had successfully carried out its construction, how could he have known if it is the right one? The question would have been empty! Any one would have appeared satisfactory if only it had represented the physical contents properly. This is the rational reconstruction. Def Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalistic statements from observation terms, logical and set-theoretical concepts. QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions and each would have appeared equally satisfactory,if only it had represented the physicalistic statements properly. But each would have been a great achievement. XII 92 QuineVsCarnap: unfortunately, the "structure" provides no reduction qua translation that would make the physicalist concepts redundant. It would not even do that if his sketch was elaborated. Problem: the point where Carnap explains how points in physical space and time are attributed sensory qualities. But that does not provide a key for the translation of scientific sentences into such that are formed of logic, set-theoretical and observation concepts. CarnapVsCarnap: later: ("Testability and Meaning", 1936): reduction propositions instead of definitions. XII 94 Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1) abandoned the attempt to deduce the truth about nature from sensory experience. With that he has made a substantial concession. 2) He has abandoned rational reconstruction, i.e. attempt to translate these truths in observation terms and logical mathematical tools. QuineVsPeirce: Suppose we meant that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence in observation language any differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation? Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could also be trapped in an infinitely long axiomatization. Important argument: thus the empiricist abandons the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements about reality could be expressed. Quine: the problem is not too high a complexity for a finite axiomatization, but holism: XII 95 Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference in the experience") only refers to theories as a whole, not to individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" would have to be one in which the texts, into which the logical mathematical observation terms are to be translated, are entire theories and not just terms or short sentences. Rational Reconstruction/QuineVsCarnap: would be a strange "translation": it would translate the whole (whole theories), but not the parts! Instead of "translation" we should just speak of observation bases of theories. pro Peirce: we can very well call this the meaning of empirical theories. ((s) Assigning whole theories to observations). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
Cavell, St. | Fodor Vs Cavell, St. | III 222 Voluntary/CavellVsRyle: thesis: such contradictions are not empirical in any reasonable sense. III 224 FodorVsCavell: fallacy: Cavell overlooks the difference between what a native speaker says (when speaking) and what a native speaker says about what he/she and others say (metalinguistic comments). However, the latter need not be true for the linguist to begin his/her investigation. Cavell has not shown that an empirical description is possible only if the metalinguistic assertions are true. If the linguist wanted to separate true findings from false ones before starting with the description of the language, he/she would have to know a whole lot about the language before he/she begins with his/her work. If you cordon off empirical linguistics from grammar and semantics as domains where empiricism is not relevant, you make a distinction without a difference. Distinction without difference/Fodor: e.g. differentiating empirical linguistics from grammar and semantics as domains where empiricism is not relevant ist distinction without reference. III 225 Cavell: empirical are e.g. statements of native speakers about the phonology of the language, but not statements about syntax and semantics. FodorVsCavell: 1) this is inconsistent: conversely, every argument that shows that the native speaker is privileged to findings about syntax and semantics would equally show that he/she is privileged to such about the phonology. That would be a reductio ad absurdum of the argument, because then the native speaker could never err about pronunciation. 2) Even if CavellVsRyle was right, that would not show that Ryle’s error is not empirical. Language/empiricism/Cavell: his position is very extreme. Since he refers to the findings of native speakers as the truths of transcendental logic, he actually excludes the relevance of empirical confirmation! FodorVsCavell: he overlooks the fact that there are infinitely many findings that require empirical confirmation: e.g. "My name is not Stanley Cavell"... etc. FodorVsCavell: 1) error: the assumption that we could only question the findings in a sensible way if there is a specific reason to believe they might be wrong. This makes credulity a virtue and philosophy a vice. III 230 FodorVsCavell: 2) admittedly: it would be extraordinary to request reasons if we were often mistaken about what we say. Fodor: but if we are only sometimes mistaken, then it is always appropriate to demand reasons! From Cavell’s view it follows, however, that even if our lives depended on it, it would not be appropriate to question the findings! FodorVsCavell: 3) It is a wrong assumption that what we say about our language is rarely wrong. He overlooks his own distinction between type I and type II findings. He is certainly right that we do not often err about type I. Fodor: but we can often be mistaken with respect to type II findings: they are a kind of theory, an abstract representation of context properties (see above III 220 Type I Findings: "We say...... but we do not say...." ((s) use findings) Type II Findings: The addition of type I findings by explanations. Type III Findings: Generalizations). III 232 FodorVsCavell: e.g. baker/professor: can be understood in two ways: a) what type of information does the professor require? (Fodor: that would be non-empirical information. But Cavell is not asking for them. b) Cavell asks: if we already know that the language use of the baker is idiosyncratic, does then follow that the professor has no right to his "we" findings?. Cavell: No, that does not follow. Fodor: but you should bear in mind that this is irrelevant to the resolution of conflict between native speakers! FodorVsCavell: Cavell is right: the existence of different language use does not exclude the "we" findings. But he says the right thing for the wrong reasons: the finding of the professor is one about the standard use. There could be no generalizations at all if deviating use could not be tolerated in certain dimensions. III 233 FodorVsCavell: it looks philosophically more impressive if you say: "your deviating language use shields your view at reality," as if it merely restricted the possibilities of expression. But even that is not necessarily the case if someone uses two non-interchangeable words synonymously. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
Chomsky, N. | Maturana Vs Chomsky, N. | I 128 Syntax / Grammar: If recursion is possible, a closed area can be made of behavior: E.g. dance, human language. Within such a range, the syntactic or grammatical surface structure may be only the description of regularities. In principle, the surface structure can be arbitrary! Reason: its training is consensual coupling is dependent on the history and not a necessary result of any necessary physiology. I 129 Conversely, the "universal grammar" of linguists (MaturanaVsChomsky) is recursive only in the universality of the process of coupling structures. The causes of the ability to recursive structures coupling are not self-consensually. They are structurally and depend exclusively on the operations of the nervous system together as a closed neuronal network. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
Davidson, D. | Brandom Vs Davidson, D. | I 268 Objectivity/error: it is claimed that social practices suffice to impart objective representational content on allegations! These are then objective truth conditions. Even the entire community may be wrong with such an assessment! Universal error only possible with standards, not with concepts). (BrandomVsDavidson). I 931 Davidson: wants to derive all action from reasons. Therefore, irrational acts constitute a problem for him. I 932 BrandomVsDavidson: he confuses a global condition of intentions with a local one, because he makes no distinction between determination and authorization. I 383 VsDavidson: it may be that only the score keeper (not the actor) can demonstrate the practical justification. Even in such cases, the reasons would not act as causes. I 383 In addition, you can act on the grounds that you have or not. Davidson: intentions are comprehensive judgments in the light of all beliefs and desires. I 954 BrandomVsDavidson: unsatisfactory because desires and beliefs are treated as unanalyzed basic concepts. He did not explain the practices according to which those contents can be transferred. BrandomVsDavidson: Davidson does not distinguish between interpretations between languages and within a language. The interpretation at Davidson requires explanatory hypotheses and inferences from sounds which are emanated by another person. This was rightly countered with the argument that if you speak a common language, you do not hear sounds but meanings! This is about the necessary subcompetencies. I 692 Objectivity of conceptual standards: not only can we all individually (each of us) be wrong about it, but also all together! (electron, mass in the universe). Error about proper use. > BrandomVsDavidson: collectively false beliefs possible. I 957 Davidson: even if the powder had been wet, she would have managed to bend her finger. So there is something in every action that the actor intended and that he succeeded in doing. I 958 BrandomVsDavidson: our approach does not require such a theoretical definition. Citing RDRD is enough to solve the problem with the nervous mountain climbers (Davidson). This is a concrete alternative to Davidsons’ proposal of the "causation in the right way." I 729 Brandom: it does not matter whether the usually reliable ability fails in individual cases. If I spill the wine while reaching for the bread, there does not need to be anything that I intended to do and also succeeded in doing, according to our approach. I 747 Problem: the substitution in the field of "that" does not receive the truth value of the whole attribution. Solution: the sentence tokening in this field does not belong to the actual attribution! Davidson: reference and truth value changed with attribution. I 961 BrandomVsDavidson: he does not consider the possibility of considering the relationship between "that" and the following sentence tokening as an anaphoric one instead of a demonstrative one. II 48 BrandomVsDavidson: establishing prior request! Action/BrandomVsDavidson: we started elsewhere. Three distinctions: II 126 Acting intentionally: recognition of a practical definition b. Acting with reasons: be entitled to a definition. c. Acting for reasons: here, reasons are causes in cases where the recognition of a definition is triggered by suitable reflection. NS I 166 Reference/Brandom: is not a fundamental concept for him. But he has to explain it, because it is still a central concept. Solution/Brandom: formation of equivalence classes of sentences whose position in the network of inferences is preserved when terms are exchanged by co-referential terms. Truth/BrandomVsTarski/BrandomVsDavidson: he has to bend their definition in such a way that instead of truth characterizing the concept of inference ("from true premises to true conclusions"), conversely the concept of inference characterizes that of truth. To this end, Brandom considers the position of sentences beginning with "it is true that..." in our inference-networked language game. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
Davidson, D. | Lewis Vs Davidson, D. | Schwarz I 176 Wide content/xxternalism/Davidson/Schwarz: externalist theories often imply that humans with no proper relations to external objects, e.g. Davidson's "swampman" (1987)(1), have no wishes or opinions, even though they are built the same way like we are, they can converse with us, and their actions can be rationally explained by us. LewisVsDavidson: this seems unbelievable. (1994b(2), 315). Cf. >Narrow content, >externalism, >internalism. 1. D. Davidson [1987]: “Knowing One’s Own Mind". Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 60: 441–458 2. D. Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
Descartes, R. | Moore Vs Descartes, R. | Dream/MooreVsDescartes: if I do not know that I am not dreaming, then I do not know that I am getting up. StroudVsMoore: it is precisely this consequence of Descartes that leads to skepticism. I do not understand why Moore accepts them. I 121 MooreVsDescartes: but that is not a problem because it "cuts off both directions". Because when I know that I am getting up, I know that I am not dreaming. So: because I know that I am not dreaming, I know that I am getting up! StroudVsMoore: so he believes that his argument is empirical. But I do not see how that follows from this. Of course, skepticism can say the opposite (converse). ((s) If I do not know that I am not dreaming, I do not know whether to get up or dream to get up). Stroud: one argument is as good as the other. Stroud: is that justified? Example Scepticist: one does not know whether one gets up - this is analog to the argument E.g. DetectiveVsAssistent that the list is not complete. StroudVsMoore: but you cannot deduce a "draw" from it. The argument is not "cut off in both directions". He cannot say. For example "Because I know that the butler was the perpetrator, I know that the list is complete". The assistant did not check the list. StroudVsMoore/(s): Moore always refers to things on the list. StroudVsMoore: but he should show that he knows that the list cannot be incomplete. I 122 He cannot simply turn the sceptic's argument around as he does. ((s) Because he needs a distanced position (external knowledge) that skepticism takes, not by asserting something particular, but something general). N.B.: of course the detective could have been wrong and the assistant would have checked the list completely. I.e. in the detective's assertion there is nothing that implies something that would be impossible. ((s) So the position of skepticism is not to show the incompleteness of the list or a lack of authorization of the list.) Explanation: the "list" does not imply that an external point of view would be impossible.). Skepticism/Moore/Stroud: there are other places in his work where he moves towards skepticism (+) he never seems to have been satisfied with it. He even admits the "logical possibility" that if all his sensory impressions could be dream images, he would not know he was not sleeping. I 123 Solution/Moore: remembrance of something immediately previous. Skepticism/StroudVsMoore: it does not show that this logical possibility does not exist. |
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Doepke, F.C. | Simons Vs Doepke, F.C. | I 228 Composition/mereology/Doepke: e.g. the Ship of Theseus, but not the wood of the ship is composed of planks. Although each part of the collection of atoms of you is part you and each part of the wood is a part of the ship, you and the ship have additional parts that are not shared by the collection of atoms and of the wood. SimonsVsDoepke: if Cesar (C) and the collection of atoms or matter m to t coincide, that means that C t m then Cesar's heart h is part of m to t. ((s) that means that for every single moment it is no problem). Doepke: relies on intuition to deny it. Simons: we need good reasons to claim that the heart is not part of the matter. Pro CP: CP stands for simplicity but only at first glance. If coincidence is both necessary and sufficient for superposition,... I 229 ...then the relationship between mereological and spatial considerations are very direct. One can, for example, show that spatial extension is part of another, if one finds a continuant that occupied each one, so that the one continuant is part of the other (sic). Conversely, if s1 and s2 are regions, so that s1 < s2, then for every x, y, and t, so that s1 = rtx and s2 = rty: resulting sum x) does not tolerate the loss of a single part. It was a plural sum in the sense of SUM (see above). Problem: then it looks like that the wall may think in particular type changes, and therefore the wall would have to constitute the stones. This applies to everything that can lose parts without dying, e.g. snowball. Problem: then concepts such as "the stones that form the walls (compose) or "the snow that constituted the snowball" (sic) are time-variable designators. Constitution: we want to exclude reciprocal constitution. Solution: Def constitution/SimonsVsDoepke: :x constitutes y to t iff. x could be a substrate of y’s complete destruction. Complete destruction: what this means, however, varies with the context. I 240 Not every part has to be destroyed completely. Constitution/Simons: a constituted object can be destroyed completely by destroying a few components. This ensures the asymmetry of the constitution. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
Epistemology | Ryle Vs Epistemology | I 53 RyleVsEpistemology: demands, often wrongly, that dispositions express themselves similarly. Since they have realized that "knowledge" and "belief" are dispositional, they think that consequently there would have to be intellectually uniform processes. E.g. Someone who believes that the earth was round, would have to recognize and judge this repeatedly from time to time. I 174f Success Words/Ryle: absurd, pointless to say: that someone finds a treasure in vain, unsuccessfully wins a race, solves a puzzle wrong, a proves sentence invalidly. For this inability is a logical inability, it says nothing about human abilities, but only that winning unsuccessfully is a contradictory expression. RyleVsEpistemology: we will see later that the longing a guaranteed error-free observation is partly stirred by the fact that we do not recognize that observation is a success verb, so that a "faulty observation" is a contradictory expression like "contradictory evidence" or "unsuccessful healing"(correct would be: unsuccessful treatment), also "inconclusive observation" or futile observation are possible. Difference: whether it is a "search" word, or a "find" word. I 177 Deception/Ryle: we call feigned motives frauds or hypocrites, feigned inclinations are called charlatans and incompetents. Synonymous with the difference of ability and inclination. Knowledge/Belief/Ryle: epistemologists like to engage their readers in the distinction between knowledge and belief. Some say the difference is merely gradual, others that knowledge contains an introspective portion which belief lacks, or vice versa. (RyleVsEpistemology). In part, their confusion is because they consider "knowledge" and "belief" incident names. I 178 But even if they are recognized as a dispositional verbs, you also have to realize that they are dispositional verbs of entirely different kind. "Knowledge" is an ability word. The person can bring something in order or condition. "Belief", on the other hand, is a tendency verb and does not mean that something is ordered or produced. I 395 VsEpistemology/Ryle: epistemologists like to compare theoretical constructions with an act of seeing through, or similar to the teaching of a theory. RyleVs: as if Euclid had been equipped beforehand for what he was equipped for after acquisition of the theory. Conversely, epistemologists describe what Euclid did in teaching his theories as something that would be a revival of the original theory work (but is not). They describe path usage as if it were path construction. I 400 ff (+) Epistemology/Mental Processes/Event/Mental State/RyleVsEpistemology: wrong question, pointless: have you made two or three premises between breakfast and lunch? Have drawn one conclusion during dessert or more? Absurd. How long does a conclusion take? Epistemology/Mental States/Assets/RyleVsEpistemology: a realization is not an episode in the life of an explorer. A special division ability or squaring ability would have been expected of epistemology. It is certainly true, because tautological, that correct expressions have their meaning, but that does not entitle to ask where and when these meanings occur. The mere fact that an expression exists to be understood by anyone, says that the meaning of an expression cannot be marked as if it were an event, or as if it belonged to an event. (...) I 409 Processes end with judgments, they are not made of them. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
Field, H. | Putnam Vs Field, H. | Field IV 405 Internal realism/metaphysical/Putnam/Field: (ad Putnam: Reason, Truth, and History): FieldVsPutnam: the contrast between internal realism and metaphysical realism is not defined clearly enough. >Internal realism, >metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism/Field: comprises three theses, which are not separated by Putnam. 1. metaphysical realism 1: thesis, the world is made up of a unity of mentally independent objects. 2. metaphysical realism 2: thesis, there is exactly one true and complete description (theory) of the world. Metaphysical realism 2/Field: is not a consequence of the metaphysical realism 1 ((s) is independent) and is not a theory that any metaphysical realist would represent at all. Description/world/FieldVsPutnam: how can there only be a single description of the world ((s) or of anything)? The terms that we use are never inevitable; Beings that are very different from us, could need predicates with other extensions, and these could be totally indefinable in our language. Field IV 406 Why should such a strange description be "the same description"? Perhaps there is a very abstract characterization that allows this, but we do not have this yet. wrong solution: one cannot say, there is a single description that uses our own terms. Our current terms might not be sufficient for a description of the "complete" physics (or "complete" psychology, etc.). One could at most represent that there is, at best, a true and complete description that uses our terms. However, this must be treated with caution because of the vagueness of our present terms. Theory/world/FieldVsPutnam: the metaphysical realism should not only be distinguished from his opponent, the internal realism, by the adoption of one true theory. 3. Metaphysical realism 3/Field: Thesis, truth involves a kind of correspondence theory between words and external things. VsMetaphysical Realism 3/VsCorrespondence Theory/Field: the correspondence theory is rejected by many people, even from representatives of the metaphysical realism 1 (mentally independent objects). Field IV 429 Metaphysical realism/mR/FieldVsPutnam: a metaphysical realist is someone who accepts all of the three theses: Metaphysical realism 1: the world consists of a fixed totality of mentally independent objects. Metaphysical realism 2: there is only one true and complete description of the world. Metaphysical realism 3: truth involves a form of correspondence theory. PutnamVsField: these three have no clear content, when they are separated. What does "object" or "fixed totality", "all objects", "mentally independent" mean outside certain philosophical discourses? However, I can understand metaphysical realism 2 when I accept metaphysical realism 3. I: is a definite set of individuals. Williams II 430 P: set of all properties and relations Ideal Language: Suppose we have an ideal language with a name for each element of I and a predicate for each element of P. This language will not be countable (unless we take properties as extensions) and then only countable if the number of individuals is finite. But it is unique up to isomorphism; (but not further, unique up to isomorphism). Theory of World/Putnam: the amount of true propositions in relation to each particular type (up to any definite type) will also be unique. Whole/totality/Putnam: conversely, if we assume that there is an ideal theory of the world, then the concept of a "fixed totality" is (of individuals and their properties and relations) of course explained by the totality of the individuals which are identified with the range of individual variables, and the totality of the properties and relations with the region of the predicate variables within the theory. PutnamVsField: if he was right and there is no objective justification, how can there be objectivity of interpretation then? Field/Putnam: could cover two positions: 1. He could say that there is a fact in regard to what good "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention is. And that treatment of "electron" as a rigid designator (of "what entity whatsoever", which is responsible for certain effects and obeys certain laws, but no objective fact of justification. Or. 2. He could say that interpretation is subjective, but that this does not mean that the reference is subjective. Ad 1.: here he must claim that a real "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention of "general recognition" is separated, and also of "inductive competence", etc. Problem: why should then the decision that something ("approximately") obeys certain laws or disobeys, (what then applies to Bohr's electrons of 1900 and 1934, but not for phlogiston) be completely different by nature (and be isolable) from decisions on rationality in general? Ad 2.: this would mean that we have a term of reference, which is independent of procedures and practices with which we decide whether different people in different situations with different background beliefs actually refer on the same things. That seems incomprehensible. Reference/theory change/Putnam: We assume, of course, that people who have spoken 200 years ago about plants, referred, on the whole, to the same as we do. If everything would be subjective, there would be no inter-theoretical, interlinguistic term of reference and truth. If the reference is, however, objective, then I would ask why the terms of translation and interpretation are in a better shape than the term of justification. --- Putnam III 208 Reference/PutnamVsField: there is nothing that would be in the nature of reference and that would make sure that the connection for two expressions would ever result in outcomes by "and". In short, we need a theory of "reference by description". --- Putnam V 70 Reference/FieldVsPutnam: recently different view: reference is a "physicalist relationship": complex causal relationships between words or mental representations and objects. It is a task of empirical science to find out which physicalistic relationship this is about. PutnamVsField: this is not without problems. Suppose that there is a possible physicalist definition of reference and we also assume: (1) x refers to y if and only if x stands in R to y. Where R is a relationship that is scientifically defined, without semantic terms (such as "refers to"). Then (1) is a sentence that is true even when accepting the theory that the reference is only determined by operational or theoretical preconditions. Sentence (1) would thus be a part of our "reflective equilibrium" theory (see above) in the world, or of our "ideal boundaries" theory of the world. V 71 Reference/Reference/PutnamVsOperationalism: is the reference, however, only determined by operational and theoretical preconditions, the reference of "x is available in R y" is, in turn, undetermined. Knowing that (1) is true, is not of any use. Each permissible model of our object language will correspond to one model in our meta-language, in which (1) applies, and the interpretation of "x is in R to y" will determine the interpretation of "x refers to y". However, this will only be in a relation in each admissible model and it will not contribute anything to reduce the number of allowable models. FieldVs: this is not, of course, what Field intends. He claims (a) that there is a certain unique relationship between words and things, and (b) that this is the relationship that must also be used when assigning a truth value to (1) as the reference relation. PutnamVsField: that cannot necessarily be expressed by simply pronouncing (1), and it is a mystery how we could learn to express what Field wans to say. Field: a certain definite relationship between words and objects is true. PutnamVsField: if it is so that (1) is true in this view by what is it then made true? What makes a particular correspondence R to be discarded? It appears, that the fact, that R is actually the reference, is a metaphysical inexplicable fact. (So magical theory of reference, as if referring to things is intrinsically adhered). (Not to be confused with Kripke's "metaphysically necessary" truth). ---- Putnam I (c) 93 PutnamVsField: truth and reference are not causally explanatory terms. Anyway, in a certain sense: even if Boyd's causal explanations of the success of science are wrong, we still need them to do formal logic. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Frege, G. | Tugendhat Vs Frege, G. | II 237 Replaceability/Frege: he was of the opinion that the principle of replaceability could prove that the truth values of the sentences correspond to the objects of the names. TugendhatVsFrege: with this principle it can only be proved that conversely, the objects of the names correspond to the truth values of the propositions. II 238 Sentence/Proprietary Name/Tugendhat: names and sentences have something in common: the ability to have a meaning. II 243 Def indirect meaning/Frege: name of a sentence. Complex Sentences/Frege/Tugendhat: Truth functions of their subordinate clauses! Where this is not the case, partial sentences appear as names (indirect meaning, quotation). TugendhatVsFrege: the thought that the meaning of a sentence (in a technical sense) is only the truth value is mistaken. When a clause is nominalized, it expresses, according to Frege, only a part of a "thought". II 244 Tugendhat: the truth-value potential of such a proposition (which cannot stand for itself) cannot consist in a truth value. (Because the replacement cannot be performed). Meaning/Frege/Tugendhat: this shows once again that Frege's concept of meaning is functional: the meaning of an expression differs depending on whether he expresses his independent thought or only part of it. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
Frege, G. | Wittgenstein Vs Frege, G. | Brandom I 919 TractatusVsFrege: nothing can be considered an assertion, if not previously logical vocabulary is available, already the simplest assertion assumes the entire logic. --- Dummett I 32 Frege capturing of thought: psychic act - thought not the content of consciousness - consciousness subjective - thought objective - WittgensteinVs I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody (like Frege). Dummett I 62 Wittgenstein's criticism of the thought of a private ostensive definition states implicitly that color words can have no, corresponding with the Fregean assumption, subjective, incommunicable sense. (WittgensteinVsFrege, color words). But Frege represents anyway an objective sense of color words, provided that it is about understanding. Dummett I 158 WittgensteinVsDummett/WittgensteinVsFrege: rejects the view that the meaning of a statement must be indicated by description of their truth conditions. Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences. --- Wolf II 344 Names/meaning/existence/WittgensteinVsFrege: E.g. "Nothung has a sharp blade" also has sense if Nothung is smashed. II 345 Name not referent: if Mr N.N. dies, the name is not dead. Otherwise it would make no sense to say "Mr. N.N. died". --- Simons I 342 Sentence/context/copula/tradition/Simons: the context of the sentence provided the copula according to the traditional view: Copula/VsTradition: only accours as a normal word like the others in the sentence, so it cannot explain the context. Solution/Frege: unsaturated phrases. Sentence/WittgensteinVsFrege/Simons: context only simply common standing-next-to-each-other of words (names). That is, there is not one part of the sentence, which establishes the connection. Unsaturation/Simons: this perfectly matches the ontological dependence (oA): a phrase cannot exist without certain others! --- Wittgenstein I 16 Semantics/Wittgenstein/Frege/Hintikka: 1. main thesis of this chapter: Wittgenstein's attitude to inexpressibility of semantics is very similar to that of Frege. Wittgenstein represents in his early work as well as in the late work a clear and sweeping view of the nature of the relationship between language and the world. As Frege he believes they cannot be expressed verbally. Earlier WittgensteinVsFrege: by indirect use this view could be communicated. According to the thesis of language as a universal medium (SUM) it cannot be expressed in particular, what would be the case if the semantic relationships between language and the world would be different from the given ones? Wittgenstein I 45 Term/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: that a concept is essentially predicative, cannot be expressed by Frege linguistically, because he claims that the expression 'the term X' does not refer to a concept, but to an object. I 46 Term/Frege/RussellVsFrege/Hintikka: that is enough to show that the Fregean theory cannot be true: The theory consists of sentences, which, according to their own theory cannot be sentences, and if they cannot be sentences, they also cannot be true ". (RussellVsFrege) WittgensteinVsFrege/late: return to Russell's stricter standards unlike Frege and early Wittgenstein himself. Wittgenstein late: greatly emphasizes the purely descriptive. In Tractatus he had not hesitated to go beyond the vernacular. I 65ff Saturated/unsaturated/Frege/Tractatus/WittgensteinVsFrege: in Frege's distinction lurks a hidden contradiction. Both recognize the context principle. (Always full sentence critical for meaning). I 66 Frege: unsaturated entities (functions) need supplementing. The context principle states, however, neither saturated nor unsaturated symbols have independent meaning outside of sentences. So both need to be supplemented, so the difference is idle. The usual equation of the objects of Tractatus with individuals (i.e. saturated entities) is not only missed, but diametrically wrong. It is less misleading, to regard them all as functions I 222 Example number/number attribution/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: Figures do not require that the counted entities belong to a general area of all quantifiers. "Not even a certain universality is essential to the specified number. E.g. 'three equally big circles at equal distances' It will certainly not be: (Ex, y, z)xe circular and red, ye circular and red, etc ..." The objects Wittgenstein observes here, are apparently phenomenological objects. His arguments tend to show here that they are not only unable to be reproduced in the logical notation, but also that they are not real objects of knowledge in reality. ((s) that is not VsFrege here). Wittgenstein: Of course, you could write like this: There are three circles, which have the property of being red. I 223 But here the difference comes to light between inauthentic objects: color spots in the visual field, tones, etc., and the actual objects: elements of knowledge. (> Improper/actual, >sense data, >phenomenology). --- II 73 Negation/WittgensteinVsFrege: his explanation only works if his symbols can be substituted by the words. The negation is more complicated than that negation character. --- Wittgenstein VI 119 WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: he has not seen what is authorized on formalism that the symbols of mathematics are not the characters, but have no meaning. Frege: alternative: either mere ink strokes or characters of something. Then what they represent, is their meaning. WittgensteinVsFrege: that this alternative is not correct, shows chess: here we are not dealing with the wooden figures, and yet the figures represent nothing, they have no Fregean meaning (reference). There is simply a third one: the characters can be used as in the game. Wittgenstein VI 172 Name/Wittgenstein/Schulte: meaning is not the referent. (VsFrege). --- Sentence/character/Tractatus 3.14 .. the punctuation is a fact,. 3.141 The sentence is not a mixture of words. 3.143 ... that the punctuation is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression of writing. (WittgensteinVsFrege: so it was possible that Frege called the sentence a compound name). 3.1432 Not: "The complex character 'aRb' says that a stands in the relation R to b, but: that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says aRb ((s) So conversely: reality leads to the use of characters). (quotes sic). --- Wittgenstein IV 28 Mention/use/character/symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: their Begriffsschrift(1) does not yet exclude such errors. 3.326 In order to recognize the symbol through the character, you have to pay attention to the meaningful use. Wittgenstein IV 40 Sentence/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: the verb of the sentence is not "is true" or "is wrong", but the verb has already to include that, what is true. 4.064 The sentence must have a meaning. The affirmation does not give the sentence its meaning. IV 47 Formal concepts/Tractatus: (4.1272) E.g. "complex", "fact", "function", "number". WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: they are presented in the Begriffsschrift by variables, not represented by functions or classes. E.g. Expressions like "1 is a number" or "there is only one zero" or E.g. "2 + 2 = 4 at three o'clock" are nonsensical. 4.12721 the formal concept is already given with an object, which falls under it. IV 47/48 So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as basic concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: you cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as basic ideas, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers. Successor/Begriffsschrift/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 4.1273 E.g. b is successor of a: aRb, (Ex): aRx.xRb, (Ex,y): aRx.xRy.yRb ... General/something general/general public/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: the general term of a form-series can only be expressed by a variable, because the term "term of this form-series" is a formal term. Both have overlooked: the way, how they want to express general sentences, is circular. IV 49 Elementary proposition/atomism/Tractatus: 4.211 a character of an elementary proposition is that no elementary proposition can contradict it. The elementary proposition consists of names, it is a concatenation of names. WittgensteinVsFrege: it itself is not a name. IV 53 Truth conditions/truth/sentence/phrase/Tractatus: 4.431 of the sentence is an expression of its truth-conditions. (pro Frege). WittgensteinVsFrege: false explanation of the concept of truth: would "the truth" and "the false" really be objects and the arguments in ~p etc., then according to Frege the meaning of "~ p" is not at all determined. Punctuation/Tractatus: 4.44 the character that is created by the assignment of each mark "true" and the truth possibilities. Object/sentence/Tractatus: 4.441 it is clear that the complex of characters IV 54 Ttrue" and "false" do not correspond to an object. There are no "logical objects". Judgment line/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 4.442 the judgment line is logically quite meaningless. It indicates only that the authors in question consider the sentence to be true. Wittgenstein pro redundancy theory/Tractatus: (4.442), a sentence cannot say of itself that it is true. (VsFrege: VsJudgment stroke). IV 59 Meaning/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: (5.02) the confusion of argument and index is based on Frege's theory of meaning IV 60 of the sentences and functions. For Frege the sentences of logic were names, whose arguments the indices of these names. IV 62 Concluding/conclusion/result relation/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 5.132 the "Final Acts" that should justify the conclusions for the two, are senseless and would be superfluous. 5.133 All concluding happens a priori. 5.134 one cannot conclude an elementary proposition from another. ((s) Concluding: from sentences, not situations.) 5.135 In no way can be concluded from the existence of any situation to the existence of, IV 63 an entirely different situation. Causality: 5.136 a causal nexus which justifies such a conclusion, does not exist. 5.1361 The events of the future, cannot be concluded from the current. IV 70 Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are no primitive signs, let alone that they signify any relations. IV 101 Evidence/criterion/logic/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.1271 strange that such an exact thinker like Frege appealed to the obviousness as a criterion of the logical sentence. IV 102 Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essential of the equation is not that the sides have a different sense but the same meaning, but the essential is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions, that are connected by the equal sign, have the same meaning, since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 --- Wittgenstein II 343 Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs). Why wanted both so much to define the number? |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
Glanzberg, M. | Stalnaker Vs Glanzberg, M. | I 105 Infinite language/infinite/Stalnaker: we assumed here one with infinite quantification-prefixes and infinite Boolean combinations. Michael GlanzbergVsStalnaker: (2001) showed that only finite quantifications are sufficient. In such a language one can express that there are infinitely many different to each other objects by saying that there are at least n objects for each n. I 106 Stronger/weaker/language/Glanzberg: problem: such a language is too strong to deliver the kind of supervenience that we need for our philosophical discussion. A supervenience basis due to an infinite language will be too weak because then one can define arbitrary properties. Relevance/Glanzberg: to build an interesting concept of supervenience we need restrictions that exclude arbitrary properties. Only then we will get a strong thesis. (> stronger/weaker: >Strength of theories). StalnakerVsGlanzberg: I think our thesis is as strong as we need it. Namely because the strong supervenience from A to B’ is equivalent to the global one from A to B. This is the converse of the main thesis that was proved in the appendix. This follows from the following three facts that apply to any three sets of properties X, Y and Z where X' is the set of properties that can be defined in concepts of X properties in the infinite language. 1. If X strongly supervenes on Y, then X supervenes globally on Y ((s) strong supervenience implies a global one). 2. if X supervenes globally on Y and Y globally on Z then X supervenes globally on Z ((s) transitivity of global supervenience). 3. X’ supervenes globally on X. Global supervenience/Stalnaker: is clearly never trivial. It is obviously not true for arbitrary sets of properties A and B that A supervenes globally on B and is therefore also not generally true that A globally or strongly supervenes on the infinite closure (infinitary closure) B'. How expressive the infinite language may be it is not give us the strength to define properties that distinguish between B-undistinguishable possible worlds (poss.w.). StalnakerVsGlanzberg: with him it only seems so because his formal argument assumes that a full B-description of a poss.w. completely describes it but that is only true if all the properties globally supervene on the B-properties. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Goodman, N. | Putnam Vs Goodman, N. | III 145 Putnam: where do these worlds even come from? PutnamVsGoodman: this is a form of realism that is no less extreme than that of Hegel or Fichte! III 146 Goodman/Putnam: the limits of natural species are in some ways arbitrary, albeit less than in artificial species. (III 268, water always contains H4O2, H6O3, etc.). Not every glowing gas cloud is deemed star. Some stars do not shine. Is it not ourselves that by the inclusion and exclusion attribute all these different objects to a category? In this respect it has been us ourselves who has made them stars. PutnamVsGoodman: Now Goodman makes a daring extrapolation: then there should not be anything that we have not made to what it is. III 147 If we want to beat Goodman in his own chosen sport by trying to nominate a "substance independent of consciousness", we obviously get into great difficulties. But we can mitigate Goodman: There is actually a fundamental difference between such expressions as "constellation" and "Ursa Major" on the one hand and an expression like "Star" on the other. The extension of the term "Ursa Major" is determined by a language convention. A typical proper noun when learning. Which stars belong to it we learn by finding out what is called the "Ursa Major". III 148 That it includes all these stars, I would not call "analytical", because if one disappeared, we undoubtedly still spoke of Ursa Major and would say it no longer encompasses as many stars as previously. Which stars are Ursa Major is a question that does not concern the astrophysicist, but the ethnologist or the linguist. The word "star" (as opposed to the term "Ursa Major") is an extension that can not be determined by specifying a list! No single object belongs to an extension by the very fact that it is called a star. In this regard, the term "constellation" lies somewhere in the middle between "Ursa Major" and "star". If we find out that all the stars are giant dummies, we would say: "actually there are no stars", but not "actually, it's not Ursa Major." Would we no longer view it as a constellation? That's not certain! III 149 Goodman: asks: can you name anything that we did not create ourselves? PutnamVsGoodman: easy answer: we have not brought about the star Sirius itself. We have not even made it a star! We have brought about the term star, and it applies to Sirius. Our concept of bachelor applies to "Joseph Ullian", without, however, our language practice making him a bachelor! Objectivity/Putnam: We create the concepts, but we do not cause them to be true. III 154 Incompatibility/change of meaning/change of concept/change of theory/language/theories: (Goodman and Davidson find them so exciting): point, line, border etc. are used differently throughout the versions. Ex "points are converging sets of concentric spheres". Incompatible with the sentence: "Points are not sets, but individuals". Putnam: But that would be too easy! Goodman concludes, either there is no world or we lived in more than one. Davidson: the actually acknowledged phenomenon of equivalent descriptions would somehow hold a logical contradiction. PutnamVsGoodman, PutnamVsDavidson: we should simply drop the thought that the sentences discussed above maintained their so-called "meaning" when we pass from one version to another. III 157 Goodman: Challenge: "all right, then please describe this reality as it is, independent of these modes of expression." PutnamVsGoodman: but why would you assume that it is possible to describe the reality independent of our descriptions anyway? Why should that lead to the assumption that there is nothing but the descriptions? Finally, also according to our own descriptions it applies that the word "quark" is something completely different than a quark. I (k) 257 Ontology/Goodman/Putnam: in a sense, there is nothing we have not created! One can even conceive of elementary particles as dependent on our spirit. Putnam: it is really difficult to find any stuff "independent of spirit"! PutnamVsGoodman: in fact there is a difference between constellations and stars: the extension of "Big Dipper" is determined by linguistic convention. One can learn what stars are in the group, if one learns the meaning of the expression. A typical proper noun. It is not analytical that the Big Dipper includes the stars. Ex If one of the stars should disappear, we would still speak of the constellation. We would say: the Big Dipper no longer includes as many stars as previously, just like someone losing hair, yet the person remains the same. Ex if a new star appeared, we would not automatically include it in the constellation! Which stars belong to the constellation is a question for anthropologists or linguists, not for the astrophysicists. I (k) 257/258 The expression "star" in contrast to the expression "Big Dipper" is an extension which can not be defined by a list. No object is the extension of "star" because it is called a star. Ex Someone who believes that Sirius is a giant light bulb, would thus not demonstrate not knowing how to use the expression "star"! Conversely, someone who doubts that this constellation is the Big Dipper the fact shows not knowing how to use the expression "Big Dipper"! Ex If aliens have replaced all the stars of the Big Dipper with giant light bulbs, we would say: "That aren't really stars", but not "This is not really the Big Dipper". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Hintikka, J. | Quine Vs Hintikka, J. | I 73 Possibilia/Hintikka: Thesis: talk about human experience makes the assumption of possibilia necessary. (Unrealized possibilities). HintikkaVsQuine. Intentionality/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Husserl the essence of human thought is in relation with unrealized possibilities. Possibilia/Hintikka: we need them to deal with logically incompatible entities of the same logical type. Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: is the corresponding model theory. I 137 QuineVsModal Logic: Problem of cross-world identification. Cross-World Identificatin/Cross-Identification/Quine/(s): Problem of identity conditions. If no identity conditions (IC) are given, the question is pointless whether an individual is "the same as" one in a different possible world. HintikkaVsQuine: my modified approach goes beyond the scope of Quine's criticism. Worldlines/Hintikka: are fixed by us, not by God. Nevertheless, they are not arbitrary. Their boundaries are given by the continuity of time and space, memory, location, etc. I 138 It may even be that our presuppositions prove to be incorrect. Therefore, there can be no set of world lines that comprise all possible worlds we need in alethic modal logic. Modal Logic/Quantification/Quine/Hintikka: a realistic interpretation of quantified alethic ML is impossible. But for reasons more profound than Quine assumed. Cross-World Identification/HintikkaVsQuine: is not intrinsically impossible. Quine/Hintikka: has even accepted this lately, with limitations. Solution/Hintikka: Cross-world identification as re-identification. I 139 Propositional Attitude/Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: we will focus here on the problem of propositional attitudes. I 140 Quantification in Epistemic Contexts/Belief Contexts/Intensional/Hintikka: Ex (1) Albert knows who wrote Coningsby (2) (Ex) K Albert (x wrote Coningsby) Notation: (Ex) perspective (perceptual) identification (acquaintance) in the book: not reflected E). Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: e.g. (2) can only then be inferred from (3) K Albert (Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby) i.e. (3) * Albert knows that Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby. ... Only then can be concluded when we have an additional premise: (4) (Ex) K Albert (Beaconsfield = x) i.e. (5) Albert knows who Beaconsfield is. Quine per Hintikka: this solution is better than a criterion for rigid designators (rigidity, QuineVsKripke). Everyday Language: it's of course simply very natural to speak in a way that you say you know who or what something is. HintikkaVsQuine: he praises me for the wrong reasons. He turns things upside down. Although he does not commit the mistake I criticize, he forgives it. I 141 Formal Language/Logic/Canonical Notation/HintikkaVsQuine: we should view logical language as our native language and not set so much store by the translation into everyday language. It is only about semantic clarity anyway. I 145 HintikkaVsQuine: does not understand the role my uniqueness conditions play: Quine: says you can also transfer these conditions to belief, knowledge, etc. Quine: Hintikka requires that the subject know who or what the person or thing is. Who or what the term designates. HintikkaVsQuine: he thinks I only use some type of uniqueness condition. Solution: the semantic situation shows the difference: the relation between the conditions for different propositional attitudes (beliefs, see, know) is one of analogy, not of identity. Solution: the sets of compatible possible worlds in the case of knowing, seeing, memory, belief are different ones every time. I 146 Identification/Belief/Quine/QuineVsHintikka: any belief world (possible worlds) will include countless bodies and objects that are not individually recognizable, simply because the believer believes his world contains countless such objects. Identity: questions about the identity of these objects are pointless. Problem: if you quantify in belief contexts, how can you exclude them? Solution: the scope of variables to those objects about which the subject has a sufficiently clear idea, would have to be limited. Problem: how do you determine how clear these ideas must be? HintikkaVsQuine: the solution is quite simple if we quantify about individuals in doxastic possible worlds: Ex Operator: "in a world w1, compatible with everything Jack believes": Solution/Hintikka: we can quantify about the inhabitants of such worlds, by simply using a quantifier inside the operator. ((s) i.e. Jack, but not we, distinguish). Problem: it could be that we might want to consider the people as our neighbors from the real world w0. ("qua neighbors"). Hintikka: but that is a problem in itself and has nothing to do with uniqueness conditions. Problem: is more due to the notation of conventional modal logic which does not allow that us to turn around the evaluation process which runs from outside to inside so that it extends from the inside out. Solution/Saarinen: "retrospective" operators (see above) Solution/Hintikka: it may still be that we can track an individual back from w1 to w0, even if it does not meet the uniqueness conditions like (16) - (127). (They require an individual to be identifiable in all the possible worlds). HintikkaVsQuine: he is wrong in that the question of identity is pointless if not all the uniqueness conditions are met. On the contrary, it has to make sense for us to ever able to determine that the conditions are not met! Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: if it is not met, it only means that we cannot find an individual ((s) or its counterpart) in any possible world. Uniqueness Condition/QuineVsHintikka: Quine's most serious objection is that these conditions are always indicated (indexical) i.e. that they are context-dependent. I.e. only in a particular situation it is about whether an individual is the same. I 147 Knowing-Who/Knowing-What/Context/Quine: E.g. "Who is he?" only makes sense in a given situation. HintikkaVsQuine: of course he is right that the truth conditions vary with the situation, but that does not destroy the uniqueness conditions for epistemic logic. HintikkaVsQuine: he only misunderstands the role these conditions play. Truth Value/Hintikka: the truth value of sentences of the form (18) (Ex) K(b = x) and equally of (19) (Ex) K(b = x) become independent of the truth value of other types of simplest sentences! Question/Answer/T Question/Hintikka: we get a new class of atomic sentences! Solution: distinction between identification through acquaintance/description. I 148 World Lines/Identification/Cross-World Identity/Hintikka: Thesis the world lines have to be drawn before the conditions are ever applied. Drawing the world lines is never part of the application of the uniqueness conditions. ((s) otherwise circular). Truth Conditions/Atomic/Atomic Sentence/Hintikka: for my theory, the interplay of specific atomic and non-atomic sentences is essential: it shows how e.g. the truth value of sentences of the form "knows + -one-question-word" sentences depends on the truth value of sentences of the form (18) - (19). HintikkaVsQuine: his criticism is similar to one that would criticize traditional truth value tables, because some of the sentences that are used to put them together are also blurred. Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: is not affected by this criticism. All it claims is that once the world lines are drawn, the rest of the semantics remains as it was. I 160 Def Knowledge/Hintikka: what is true in all knowledge possible worlds (knowledge worlds) of a subject. And, conversely, what is true in all knowledge possible worlds of a person is their knowledge. Important argument: the world lines can be drawn differently, however, while the evaluations (the non-logical constants) remain the same. The variation of the world lines can then be "seen" in the variation of the semantic power of the phrase n of the form know + indirect question. I 161 Quine has used such variation to the reject the possible world semantics of sentences with "knowing-that". HintikkaVsQuine: for him it was actually about the structural (not the referential) system. And this remained untouched. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Hume, D. | Vollmer Vs Hume, D. | I 103 Causality/VollmerVsHume: not a layperson, but also not a scientist feels comfortable with Hume's observation. Causality/Hume: attributes causality to an instinct that we have in common with animals. Causality/KantVsHume: Instincts can fail, the law of causality does not seem to fail. I 105 Causality/Regularity/VsHume: For example, although day and night follow each other regularly, we do not say that day is the cause for night. VollmerVsHume: has no convincing argument for it! Vollmer: no energy transfer from day to night, so one cannot be the cause of the other! I 106 Causality/Energy transfer/VollmerVsHume: the frequency is not decisive, how else could we explain the expansion of the universe (which by definition is unique) by the Big Bang? Energy conservation is relevant for our ontological interpretation of causality, not frequency. It is essential for the possibility of an effective energy transfer. I 107 However, in principle there could also be causal processes in which only half of the released energy is transferred, while the other half disappears in violation of the conservation law! Conversely, the "cause" does not need to provide the total energy for the effect. (butterfly effect). Vollmer: small cause - big effect? - Yes, but without a minimum of energy transfer there is no effect, no causality. II 47 Natural Law/Law/General Sentence/Vollmer: three classes of true, general sentences: 1. Randomly true - for example all balls in this box are red 2. Lawfully true without energy transfer: E.g. duration of oscillation = 2π √ (pendulum length multiplied by acceleration due to gravity). 3. Causal laws (with energy transfer) E.g. heating leads to expansion This does not imply that this causal "necessity" gives causal assertions any unassailable status. Here, too, the hypothetical character of all our knowledge remains. Causality/VollmerVsHume: nevertheless, causal assertions say more than mere subsequent assertions: their empirical content is greater. This, of course, makes them easier to refute. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
Indispensability | Field Vs Indispensability | I 14 Indispensability Argument/Field: here it’s all about purposes - such an argument must be based on the best explanation (BE). I 17 FieldVsIndispensability Argument: we can show that there are good theories that do without mathematical entities - Justification/Field: is gradual. FieldVsIndispensability Argument: two points which together make it seem untenable: 1) if we can show that there are equally good theories that do not involve ME. I believe that we can show that in the case of ME, but not in the case of electrons! (Lit.Field: "Science without Numbers"). At the moment, we do not yet know exactly how to eliminate ME, and our method of ((s) complete) induction gives us some confidence in mathematical entities 2) Justification is not a question of all or nothing! (justification gradual) I 29 Indispensability Argument/Field: Might even be explained by way of evolutionary theory: that evolutionary pressure finally led us to find the empirically indispensable mathematical assumptions plausible. FieldVsVsBenacerraf:. Problem: the scope of mathematics which is used in empirical science is relatively small! That means that only this small portion could be confirmed as reliable by empiricism. And inferences on the rest of mathematics are not sustainable, there are simply too many possible answers to questions about large cardinals or the continuum hypothesis or even about the axiom of choice. These work well enough to provide us with the simpler "application mathematics". ((s) That means that we cannot infer a specific answer to the questions of the higher levels from application mathematics.) II 328 Utility/Truth/Mathematics/Putnam/Field: (Putnam 1971 locus classicus, unlike 1980): Thesis: we must consider mathematics as true in order to be able to explain its utility (benefit) in other fields. E.g. in science and metalogic. (i.e. the theory of logical consequence). Modality/Modal/Mathematics/Field: this is in contrast to his former view that we can use modality instead of mathematical objects to explain mathematical truth. II 329 Modal Explanation: will not work for other disciplines such as physics, however. (FieldVsPutnam, Field 1989/91: 252-69). Putnam/Field: the general form of his argument is this: (i) we must speak in terms of mathematical entities in order to study science, metalogic, etc. (ii) If need them for such important purposes, we have reason to believe that this kind of entities exists. VsPutnam/Field: there are two possible strategies against this: 1) Vs: "foolhardy" strategy: requires us to substantially change premise (i): we want to show that we basically do not need to make any assumptions which require mathematical entities. I.e. we could study physics and metalogic "nominalistically". Problem: in a practical sense, we still need the mathematical entities for physics and metalogic. We need to explain this practical indispensability. "foolhardy" strategyVs: in order to explain them, we just have to show that mathematical entities are only intended to facilitate inferences between nominalistic premises. And if this facilitation of inference is the only role of mathematical entities, then (ii) fails. Solution: In that case, something much weaker than truth (E.g. "conservatism") suffices as an explanation for this limited kind of utility. FieldVs: Unfortunately, the project of nominalization is not trivial. (Field 1980 for physics, 1991 for metalogic). At that time I found only few followers, but I am too stubborn to admit defeat. 2) Vs ("less foolhardy strategy"): questions (ii) more profoundly: it denies that we can move from the theoretical indispensability of existence assumptions to a rational belief in their truth. That is what Putnam calls "indispensability argument". Putnam pro. FieldVsPutnam: that requires some restrictions and ManyVsPutnam: these restrictions ultimately prevent an application in mathematics. And ultimately, because mathematical entities are simply not causally involved in physical effects. II 330 FieldVsPutnam: that’s plausible. PutnamVsVs: If mathematical entities are theoretically indispensable in causal explanations (such as (i) claims), however, there seems to be a sense in which they are very well causally involved. Conversely, it would have to be explained why they should not be causally involved. FieldVs: a closer look should reveal that the role of mathematical entities is not causal. And that it supports no indispensability argument. E.g. the role of quantities in physics was simply to allow us to assert the local compactness of physical space. Other E.g. role of quantities in physics. Allow us to accept (Cp) instead of (Cs). (Field, 1989) 1, 136-7). ... + ... |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Kleene, St. C. | Priest Vs Kleene, St. C. | Field II 145 Dialethism/Priest/Paradoxes/Field: (Priest 1998): Thesis: the sentence of the liar and its negation are both assertible (and also their conjunction). The rules of logic are attenuated (>stronger/weaker; >strenght of theories), so that not every assertion is assertible. Most attractive variant: builds on Kleene's trivalent logic. Trivalent Logic/Kleene/Priest/Field: Priest assumes here that the valid inferences are those that guarantee "correct assertion". But an assertion is only correct if it has one of the two highest truth values in the truth value table. Curry Paradox: is thus precluded, because the only conditional in this language is the material conditional. Material Conditional/Field: defined by ~ and v. In the logic of Kleene/Priest it does not entirely support the modus ponens. Liar/KleeneVsPriest: (and other "deviating" sentences): have truth value gaps. But there are no truth value clusters. Deviating Sentence: E.g. liar-sentence has no truth value clusters, but truth value gaps. Liar/PriestVsKleene: (and other deviating sentences): conversely have truth value clusters and no gaps. Problem/Kleene: here you cannot establish an equivalence between "p" and ""p"is true"! Because to assert a truth value gap in a sentence "A" would be to say: "~[true ("A") v true ("~A")]" and that should be equivalent to "~(A v ~A)", but a sentence of this form can never be legitimate in Kleene. Truth Value Gap/Logical Form/Field: asserting a truth value gap in a sentence "A" would be to say: "~[true ("A") v true ("~A")]" and that should be equivalent to "~(A v ~A)". Solution/Priest: if "A" is a deviating sentence, then it is a correct assertion as by Priest. The assertion of the absence of a truth value cluster in a sentence "A" would be the assertion "~ [(true ("A") and true ("~A)"]" which should be equivalent to "~(a u ~A)". Kleene cannot assert this absence for deviating sentences, Priest can. |
Pries I G. Priest Beyond the Limits of Thought Oxford 2001 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Kripke, S. A. | Cavell Vs Kripke, S. A. | I 216 Kripke's Wittgenstein: skeptical paradox: nothing, no rule, no presence can control the meaning of my words. That is the end of the possibility of meaning anything at all. Solution: Introduction of socially sanctioned conditions of assertiveness. Kripke: Main point: the absence of meaningful facts. CavellVsKripke: 1. probably Wittgenstein himself did not see the paradox that way. Nor would he demand such facts that guarantee meaning, and that should be more stable than our practice. I 217 CavellVsKripke: 2. Kripke goes unnoticed from "being inclined" to "being entitled": Wittgenstein: "I've exhausted the reasoning, I'm inclined to say." Kripke seems to believe (unlike Wittgenstein) that agreement is something like a contract. I 218 His solution is more skeptical than the problem it is supposed to solve. I (c) 220 Kripke's Wittgenstein/Cavell: for Kripke, rules are more fundamental than criteria for Wittgenstein's scepticism about meanings. CavellVsKripke: the problem of the ordinary remains underexposed. I (c) 221 For me, conversely, the rules are subordinate to the criteria. Kripke: E.g. "Tisuhl" Suppose I enter the Eiffel Tower for the first time and see a table standing at its foot. Do I know how to answer the skeptic who assumes that I meant "Tisuhl" in the past, that is, something that is a table not at the foot of the Eiffel Tower or a chair located there? Did I explicitly think of the Eiffel Tower when I first "grasped the concept of the table" and did I give myself instructions as to what I meant by "table"? CavellVsKripke: we can say with Wittgenstein: we are not equipped for all possibilities with rules and we come to an end with our reasons. Localization in the Eiffel Tower, like any other criterion, would be like a reason I can have to name any object as I call it outside the tower. I (c) 248 But I do not have any criteria yet, so I have not come to an end with my explanations, I have not even started with explanations yet. CavellVsKripke: what skepticism brings us to is something like a compulsion to remove criteria from us, but not, like Kripke, to arbitrarily handle criteria. I (c) 255 CavellVsKripke: he says that we "come to agreement" with regard to our criteria. But that would be a rejection of Wittgenstein's idea of agreement. For Wittgenstein, this lies in our reactions. We agree in walking, but that has not been attained. We have come to walk. I (c) 256 Concept/Wittgenstein: concepts lead us to investigations, they are the expression of our interest and guide our interest. Cavell: common terms have a history, mathematical ones do not. These have a before and after, no past and no future. Example "Tisuhl": shows that we can subject our ordinary concepts to a special form of mathematization. I (c) 257 CavellVsKripke: he robs us of our criteria, so he is too skeptical. Why should the answer not be: "So be it! |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
Moore, G.E. | Prior Vs Moore, G.E. | I 21 Correspondence Theory/Prior: now we can handle the fact that truth and falsity are not only applied to propositions, but also to beliefs and assertions. Truth/Belief/Logical Form/Prior: E.g. "X believes that there will be a nuclear war, and there will be one." (X believes that) p and p. (Parenthesis). Falsity: E.g. "X believes that there will be a nuclear war, but there not will be one." ((s) but = and.) X believes that p and ~p. Correspondence Theory: Aquinas' "adaequatio intellectus et rei" goes back to the Jewish Neo-Platonist Isaac Israeli from the 10th century. Locus classicus of modernity: Correspondence Theory/Moore: (G. E. Moore, Some main problems of philosophy, New York 1953) I 22 Example: Suppose a friend falsely believed that he (Moore) went on holiday and says: Moore: We should say, of course, that if this belief is true, then I must have gone on holiday, and vice versa (conversely): we should say that if I went, this belief is true, of course. Prior: so far it is Aristotelian. Now Moore continues, however, and says: Although its absence is a necessary and sufficient condition for the belief of his friend to be true, it cannot be what is meant by saying that the belief is true! Because: Moore: if we say "the belief that I'm gone, is true", we mean that the belief has a specific property that it shares with other true beliefs. But if we say: "I'm gone", we do not attribute a property to any proposition! We only express a fact, and this fact could also exist if no one believed that! Point/Moore: if no one believes it, the belief does not exist, and then this belief must be false, even if I'm away! ((s) then it must not be false, because nothing that does not exist must be anything or have any properties per se.) PriorVsMoore: he is forced to say that, because he assumes that belief consists in a relation between this belief and a fact. A relation that is not definable, but "familiar". ((s) > "overarching general": if the belief itself consists in a relation between (itself) the belief and a fact, the belief occurs twice. Problem: if it should be defined by this relation. But neither Moore nor Prior say that here. Instead: separating of levels. Belief/Name of the Belief). Moore: the "name of the belief" is to be: "The belief that I'm gone." Name of the fact: "I'm gone." Correspondence/Moore: relation between "the name of the belief and the name of the fact" is what he calls the correspondence. PriorVsMoore: (he probably discarded it later anyway). this is doubtful in two respects: 1) The reason he indicates for the fact that his absence should be constitutive for the truth of the belief of his friend, is at the same time the reason to say that "the former [was] no sufficient and necessary condition for the latter". 2) But if we corrected this with a truly sufficient condition, this correction would also give us a definition. I.e. the belief is true if X believes that p and it is the case that p. Correspondence would not be more, then. (Simply accordance with the facts). |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
Nagel, Th. | Evans Vs Nagel, Th. | Frank I 507 Self-Identification/Understanding/EvansVsNagel: I have already explained implicitly what it means to understand such an identity statement (generality clause). Persons are distinguished from others like ordinary material objects from other material objects. An identity statement does not necessarily make a difference for a spatiotemporal map of the world, but for the way in which the immediate environment is considered. EvansVsNagel: he looked for an impact at the wrong place. It is true that we cannot determine in a non-indexical identity statement whether it is true or not. But why should we assume that everything that is true could be represented in this way? Objectivity/Self-Identification/Nagel: a proposition like [I am t] is not objectively true from the standpoint of eternity. Evans: pro! Such a proposition can indeed only be made by the person himself. ((s) And he does not exist in eternity). But EvansVsNagel: that does not mean that we do not understand what it means that we are identical with the same spatio-temporal objects. Fra I 507/508 Otherwise our thinking about ourselves could not be subject to the generality clause. Evans: We would have to assume then that we had an idealistic conception of the self. Or demand just like Anscombe "I" refers to nothing. I/Self-Identification/Objectivity/EvansVsNagel: conversely, one could say just like our thoughts about ourselves demand that this connection with the world that is considered to be "objective" is understood, our "objective" thinking about the world also requires that this connection is understandable. Because nobody can be attributed an "objective" model of the world if he does not understand that he designs a model of the world in which he lives! Therefore, I believe that Nagel’s "gap" between the objective and the subjective only seems to exist. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Projectivism | Fodor Vs Projectivism | IV 139 Fodor/LeporeVsProjectivism/Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: 1) Projectivism is not able to construct existence quantifications that go beyond the contents of propositional attitudes. (In contrast to sentences that quote the content). E.g. Smith’s three-year-old hears his father talk about the distinction between analytic/Synthetic. He repeats later: "blahblahblah, analytical synthetical, blahblahblah". For the projection theory this is self-contradictory, because the state that is attributed by the (three-year-old) speaker is not a mental state after all!. IV 140 E.g. Twin Earth/TE: Suppose the people on the Twin Earth have already found out that what they call "water" is not H2O. Therefore, the belief they express with "water is wet" is not of the belief that water is wet! Because they are not in the correct causal relationship with water (but to XYZ). Perhaps you would like to say that there are at least one or two other beliefs which are expressed by the use of this expression (formula) by its twin. Fodor/Lepore: But how can they say that if you know (and you do) that the belief which it expresses is none that you could express at all? ((s) in order to make the projectivist speaker attribution). 1) VsProjectivism: must assert that there are no beliefs on the Twin Earth! Conversely, your twin would have to deny them any belief. These are not just technical difficulties. If projectivism is right, what you believe depends on the interpreter. Vs: but if anything is metaphysically independent from something else, then it is the fact that the repertoire of potential beliefs of a person is independent from the potential speech acts of someone else is. 2) VsProjectivism: cannot explain the "element of interpretation" of the intentional attribution. On the other hand, it does count as a variety of the interpretation theory. Why should the projectivist not assume the reality of the intentional after all. IV 141 Albeit one who rejects the usual assumptions about several-digit predicates of propositional attitudes? I.e. Projectivism: four-digit relation: 1) creature, 2) mental state, 3) propositional object 4) interpreter. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
Propositions | Mates Vs Propositions | I 24 Proposition/Mates: should be so-called abstracts, without a spatial temporal structure. The structure of the proposition must not be confused with the structure of the corresponding statement. But this happens frequently in the literature! Problem: how to find out the structure of a proposition that depends on the statement? MatesVsPropositions: Assertion/Mates: (what is claimed by the proposition or statement): corresponding problems as with proposition: The same statement with the same meaning (!) can make different assertions: Example He won the election. Reference: if I ((s) implicitly) refer to Kennedy, or to Nixon, I make different assertions with the same statement (sentence)! Mates: conversely, I can make the same assertion with different statements (sentences): Example Kennedy has won the election. I 25 Thus, I have made the same assertion as above with "he", but I have used another statement with a different meaning. MatesVsAssertions: its structure cannot be determined simply by looking at the corresponding statement (sentence). Nevertheless, the "friends of assertions" have no inhibitions to classify assertions as singular, universal, particulate, conjunctive, hypothetical, affirmative, necessary, etc., or to say: "Assertions have subject predicate structure". Or "assertions contain descriptions". MatesVsPropositions: due to the different structure compared to the corresponding sentences, you cannot do it there either. Thoughts/Mates: the same applies to thoughts. Because of the different structure (compared to the corresponding sentences) it is pointless to say, for example, they contained descriptions, or would be negative. MatesVsThoughts: we should not use them in logic. Just so that logic is not understood as "laws of thought". Judgement/Mates: the same applies to judgments, which are the most dubious of all terms here: there are hardly two authors who say the same thing about them. For example "activity of mind"; "comparison of two concepts or objects obtained by simple perception, etc.". MatesVsVerdict: we should not use them in logic, because logic does not deal with "mental acts". I 26 Proposition/judgement/thought/statement/Mates: much of what we say about the logical properties of statements (sentences) we can easily transfer to propositions, assertions, thoughts and judgements. We only want to avoid index words like "I", "here", "now" etc... Solution: by independence through completion by place and time indications. Assertion/statement/Mates: here the equivalence between both helps: a statement is true iff the assertion made with it is true. The same applies to thoughts and judgements. The rest can be forgotten! |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
Putnam, H. | Goodman Vs Putnam, H. | Horwich I 397 Realism/Incompatibility/Putnam/Early: in particular, I believed that what we refer to as "incompatible" can be applied to the same real object, though not within the same theory. E.g. this "real object" may be called a "point" in one theory, an "amount convergent segments" in another. Conversely: the same term can be applied to different objects in different theories. Putnam early: it is a property of the world (i.e. the WORLD) itself that it "allows different images": Problem/GoodmanVsPutnam (early): the price for this is that this view preserves the WORLD, but gives up an understandable concept of how the world is. Each of the many equivalent descriptions will only express one theory relative property of the world. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Realism | Idealism Vs Realism | Frank I 467 "I think"/Kant/Castaneda: "I think" puts everything into indirect speech! Consequence: VsFrege: according to Kant all his reference objects are not part of the semantics of singular terms! ((s) According to Frege, embedded sentences do not have a reference object of their own, but only denote the meaning of an object. Conversely, according to Kant, Frege's objects can only function as transcendent objects. (IdealismVsRealism). Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983), pp. 313-327. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Ryle, G. | Lewis Vs Ryle, G. | Lanz I 282 LewisVsRyle: psychological expressions are expressions for causal roles. Science is likely to identify the actual carriers of these causal roles as brain conditions. Lewis I 34 Everyday Psychology/LewisVsRyle: it has never been a newly invented scientific theory introducing terminology. The story that expressions for mental were introduced as theoretical terms is a myth! (>Sellars myth of our Rylean ancestors). Lewis: but although it's a myth, it can be a good one or a bad one: a good one if our names for states of mind actually mean exactly what they would mean if the myth were true. Note: Two myths that cannot be true together can be good together. Lewis I 35 My myth says: Names of color sensations are T-terms introduced by names of colors used as A-terms. Another myth says conversely: color names were T-terms introduced by names of color sensations used as A-terms. The two myths cannot be true together, because what should have been there first, the color or the color sensation? But they can both be good! We may be dealing with a compass. But, so what? |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
Various Authors | Hacking Vs Various Authors | I 98 Argument of Cosmic Coincidence: a good theory explains phenomena as contiguous which have not previously been thought of as related. Conversely, we arrive at the same raw entities with very different thought processes. I 227 Reichenbach: "Argument of the same cause" - also Salmon: E.g. Brownian movement, Avogadro number: you always come to the same number in different ways. HackingVs: petitio principii. Language/Bennett: developed, E.g. because one native wanted to warn another that a coconut was about to fall from a tree. HackingVsBennett: racist! In general, conjectures about the origin of language have a tendency to be unimaginative and patronizing. I 249 Bacon: "An experiment which is not preceded by theory is related to the natural sciences like the sound of a child’s rattle to music". HackingVsBacon: an experiment can be made out of mere curiosity and be equally fruitful!. I 299 Theory/Observation/Hanson: Noticing and observing are skills and abilities. E.g. positron. HackingVsHanson: you cannot train an assistant to make accurate observations without teaching him big theory. (still practiced in England today). |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
Various Authors | Cartwright Vs Various Authors | I 79 Mathematical explanation/Quantum damping/Agarwal: Important argument: There are six different approaches here with six different equations! (>Redundancy, alternative explanation). I 80 For example, There are various versions of the Schroedinger equation. I 81 Equation/Theoretical explanation/Laws/Cartwright: Thesis: these (alternative, redundant) explanations do not determine any objective laws. Equations/CartwrightVsAgarwal: the alternative equations are in competition with each other. They offer a variety of laws for the same phenomenon. AgarwalVsCartwright: he thinks that different approaches serve different purposes. That means they do not compete. I 94 Laws/Include/Explanation/Laws of Nature/LoN/Grünbaum: ("Science and Ideology", The Scientific Monthly, July 1954, p 13-19): while a more comprehensive law G contains a less comprehensive law L, and thus provides an explanation, it is not the cause of L. Laws are not explained by showing that the regularities which they assert arise from a causation, but that their truth is a special case of a more comprehensive truth. CartwrightVsGrünbaum: In this, it is assumed that the fundamental laws make the same assertions as the concrete ones which explain them. I 95 This then depends on the phenomenological laws being derived from the fundamental ones (>deduction >deductive) if the situation is specified. If the phenomenological laws are right, then the fundamental ones are too, at least in that situation. Problem: there is still a problem of induction: do the fundamental laws make correct generalizations about situations? Explanatory laws/Explanation/Cartwright: the explanatory laws are to explain the phenomenological ones and therefore a variety of other phenomenological laws in other situations. But they are much more economical (because they do not need to specify the special situations). Measuring/Reality/Realistic/Real/Cartwright: if we want to know which properties are real in a theory, we must look for the causal role. I 182 Measuring/Quantum Mechanics/QM/Problem: the static values of dynamic variables have no effect. Only if systems exchange energy, momentum or another conserved quantity, something happens in the QM. E.g. knowing the position of a particle, does not say anything about his future conduct. The detector only responds to a change in energy. Measuring/QM/Henry Margenau/Cartwright: (Margenau, Phil.of Science 4 (1937) p 352-6): Thesis: all measurements in QM are ultimately position measurements. Cartwright: but position measurements themselves are ultimately registrations of interactions at the destruction. This is inelastic, that is, the energy is not conserved in the particles. That means the detector absorbs the energy of the particle. This causes the detector to be ionized. Transitional prob/CartwrightVsMargenau: Solution: So it’s about the prob that the ionization of the detector takes place. Problem: there could be background radiation which causes the ionization without particles. Or, conversely, the disc could be ineffective, so that the energy of the particle is not registered. I 183 Problem/Cartwright: Another problem: the energy must be adequate. This could lead to inconsistencies. Soret effect: here we only need to assume simple linear additivity in our law of action, and we obtain a cross-over effect by adding a thermal diffusion factor to Fick’s law. Unfortunately this does not work for any random influences in the "Transport Theory" (heat transfer, etc.). I 65 Cross-over effect/Cartwright:. There is only one failed attempt to establish general principles for cross-over effects: by Onsager, 1931, further developed in the 1950s. But this was merely a Procrustes-like attempt that explains nothing new. VsOnsager: His principles are empty because they have to be interpreted once in one way and another time in a different way. They may not be followed literally, too much of it is up to the physicist’s imagination. Principle: is empty if it has to be interpreted differently on different occasions. I 174th Schroedinger equation/CartwrightVsSchroedinger equation: Problem: according to it, the electron in the accelerator has neither a particular direction nor a particular energy - SE is refuted daily by reducing the wave packet - not by measurement, but by preparation. I 75 Science/Explanation/Cartwright: the framework of modern physics is mathematical and good explanations will always allow precise calculations. Explanation/Rene Thom: (1972, p 5): Descartes: his vortexes and atom chains explained everything and calculated nothing. Newton: calculated everything and explained nothing. CartwrightVsThom: in modern science we have to keep causal and theoretical explanation apart as well, but they work differently: If we accept Descartes’ causal story, we must accept his assertions of linked atoms and vortexes as true. But we do not assume Newton’s law on the inverse square of the distance to be true or false. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
Williams, B. | Nozick Vs Williams, B. | II 29 Self/Person/Self-Identity/Identity/B.Williams: E.g. two stories that put together present us with a mystery: Case 1: a person enters a new body, or rather two persons exchange their bodies. Two persons, A and B enter a machine A body person: (now connected to the body A): has all the memories, all the knowledge, values, behaviors, etc. of the (former, complete) person B. In the body A is now the "vector product" of this B material with the physical boundaries of body A. Similarly, all the other way round for B. The situation is symmetrical. II 29/30 If A were to decide (after substitutions) now, which severe pain should be inflicted by the two bodies, then A would select the A body for it! Because he believes that he himself inhabits the B body. Case 2: Imagine someone tells them that they are to endure terrible pain. That frightens them. Next, they get the information that they will undergo an enormous change in their psychological constitution, perhaps to the extent that they will have exactly the same character, the memories and behaviors of someone else, who is currently alive. That will scare them even more. They do not want to lose their identity and suffer pain afterwards. Williams: question: why had person A not exactly the same concerns when she heard the first story, as in Case 2? What makes the first story a story about the transfer of a person to a different body and not a story about something that happens to a person who remains who they are? How can the difference consist in that in the first case, in addition to what happens to body A, II 31 also A's memories and mind end or are newly created in body B? Problem: what happens anywhere else can have no effect on whether A continues to live in body A. If this happens to a body, it is a psychological task and the acquisition of a new psyche. Question: how can two tasks and the acquisition of new memories and values result in the exchange of two bodies? Body A / B Body 1) Situation acquires memories + character of B/acquires memories + character of A 2) Situation acquires memories + character of B/keeps memories + character or perhaps entirely new Two principles should explain this: Principle 1/Williams: If x at t1 is the same individual as y after t2, then this can only depend on facts about x, y and the relations between them. No facts about any other existing thing are relevant. That entails: Principle 2/Williams: if y at t2 (is part of the same continuous particular like) x at t1, by virtue of a relation R to x at t1, then there could be another additional thing z at t2 that also (together with y) stands in R to x at t1. If this additional thing z at t2 exists, then neither z nor y would be identical to x. If this z could potentially exist now, although it does currently not exist, then y at t2 is not identical with y at t1, at least not by virtue of relation R! ((s) If there is a relation R that allows identity at a later time, then several things can "benefit" from that and then the identity (which must be unique) would be destroyed. This is true even if the existence of a second thing is merely possible.) II 32 Self/Identity/Person/Williams: Williams had formulated these two principles in three earlier publications to support his thesis: Physical identity is a necessary condition of personal identity. Otherwise it would be possible to imagine that e.g. a person enters a machine, disappears and appears again in another machine at a distance without having crossed the space between them. Or: E.g. There could be a third machine on the other side from which an also (qualitatively) different identical being emerges. Neither would be the original person who had entered the machine in the middle. Now, if in this case of double materialization the original person is not identical with either of the two later persons, so not even in the first case, where only one person appears in a different place. Williams: the mere possibility that someone appears intermittently in another place is sufficient to show that he himself cannot be the same person without doubling. 1) Principle: Identity of something cannot depend on whether there is another thing of some sort. 2) Principle: if it is possible that there was another thing that prevented identity, then there is no identity, even if this other thing did not exist! ((s) The first follows from the second here). NozickVsWilliams: both principles are wrong. 1) (without personal identity): E.g. the Vienna Circle was expelled from Vienna by the Nazis, one member, Reichenbach, came to Istanbul. Suppose there were 20 members of the circle, three of which went to Istanbul and continued to meet. In 1943, they hear that the others are dead. Now they are the Vienna Circle which meets in Istanbul. ((s) ArmstrongVs/ChisholmVs: a local property is not a property.) In 1945, they learn that 9 other members continued to meet in America and further developed the same philosophical program. Nozick: then the group in America is the Vienna Circle, the one in Istanbul is just the offshoot. Nozick: how is that possible? Either the group in Istanbul is the Vienna Circle or it is not. How can this be influenced by something that takes place elsewhere? ((s) Because subsets play a role here, which do not play a role, e.g. in personal identity. Analogue would have been to assume that some of the psychological characteristics are kept during the body changes). II 33 Nozick: E.g. would it not be clear that if the 9 others had survived living underground in Vienna, this would show that the Istanbul group is not the Vienna Circle? So the First Principle (Williams) cannot be applied here: it is not plausible to say that if the group of three in Istanbul is the same entity as the original Vienna Circle, that this can only depend on relations between the two ... Nozick: ...and not on whether anything else exists. Def "Next Successor"/Closest Continuer/Nozick: Solution: The Istanbul group is the next successor. Namely so if no other group exists. But if the group in America exists, it is the next successor. Which one constitutes the Vienna Circle depends (unlike Williams) on the existence of other things. Being something later means being the next successor. ((s) and being able to be called later then depends on the amount of shared properties). E.g. How many other groups of the Vienna Circle are there in exile? ("Scheme"). Identity in Time:/Nozick: it is no problem for something to replace its parts and to keep the identity. E.g. Ship of Theseus/Nozick: 2nd ship made of collection of discarded parts from the old ship: two originals? (Was already known in this form in antiquity). Next Successor: helps to structure the problem, but not solve it. Because the scheme does not say of itself, which dimension of weighted sum of dimensions determine the proximity. Two possibilities: a) spatio-temporal continuity b) continuity of the parts. If both are weighted equally, there is a stalemate. II 34 Neither of them is the next successor. And therefore none is the original. But even if one originally existed without the other, it would be the original as next successor. Perhaps the situation is not a stalemate, but an unclear weighting, the concepts may not be sharp enough to rank all possible combinations. Personal Identity/Nozick: this is different, especially when it comes to ourselves: here we are not ready, that it is a question of decision of the stipulation. Ship of Theseus/NozickVsWilliams: external facts about external things do matter: when we first hear the story, we are not in doubt, only once the variant with the second, reconstructed ship comes into play. Next Successor/Nozick: necessary condition for identity: something at t2 is not the same entity as x at t1 if it is not x's next successor. If two things are equally close, none of them is the next successor. Something can be the next successor of x without being close enough to x to be x itself! If the view of the next successor is correct, then our judgments about identity reflect weights of dimensions. Form of thought: reversal: we can conversely use these judgments to discover these dimensions. II 35 A property may be a factor for identity without being a necessary condition for it. Physical identity can also be an important factor. If something is the next successor, it does not mean that his properties are qualitatively the same as those of x, or are similar to them! Rather, they arise from the properties of x. They are definitely causally caused! Spatio-Temporal Continuity/Nozick: cannot be explained merely as a film without gaps. Counter-example: The replacement with another thing would not destroy the continuity of the film! Causal Relation/Next Successor: the causal relation does not need to involve temporal continuity! E.g. every single thing only possessed a flickering existence (like messages through the telephone). If this applies to all things, it is the best kind of continuity. NozickVsWilliams: but if you find that some things are not subject to the flickering of their existence, then you will no longer talk of other things as the best realizations of continuously existing things. Dependency of identity on other things! Theology/God/Identity/Nozick: Problem: if the causal component is required, and suppose God keeps everything in continuous existence, closing all causal connections in the process: how does God then distinguish the preservation of an old thing in continuity from the production of a new, qualitatively identical thing without interrupting a "movie"? II 36 Temporal Continuity/NozickVsWilliams: how much temporal continuity is necessary for a continuous object depends on how closely things are continuously related elsewhere. Psychology/Continuity/Identity/Nozick: experiments with objects which emerge (again) more or less changed after a time behind a screen. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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Thought | Frege, G. | Dum I 89 Frege: Thesis: of the primacy of thought over language. Dum I 92 DummettVsFrege: Conversely, his theory of perception contradicts his thesis that the human can only grasp those thoughts which he/she understands as the meaning of sentences. From this one can take two readings. Strongest reading: we can only think in language, weakest: none of us can have a thought that we cannot express. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 73 Question/Command/Wish/Frege: Thesis: a wish phrase, a question or a command contains no thoughts at all! |
SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 |
Barcan-Formula | Stalnaker, R. | I 145 Modal Propositional Logic/mAL/AL/extensional predicate logic/extPL/PL/Stalnaker: I want to investigate here 1. a weaker version of the converse of the barcan formula 2. the principle of necessity, not of identity but of diversity. Thesis: although both are validated by a very general semantic theory, they are independent principles that can no longer be derived by combining extensional predicate logic (PL) and modal propositional logic (AL). |
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