Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 31 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bayesianism | Schurz | I 110 Bayes Theorem/Schurz: Its importance lies in cases where one is mainly interested in w(Ai I B) (subjective probability), but only the inverse conditional probability w(B I Ai) is accessible. >Subjective probability/Schurz, >Probability/Schurz, >Probability theory/Schurz. I 61 Bayes/Bayesianism/Schurz/Basic principle: certain init. prblties must always be assumed. Indifference principle: the same init. prblties for competing hypotheses. Vs: the output distributions are language dependent - E.g. a distribution can be indifferent with respect to the wavelength, but in relation to frequency it is no longer indifferent. I 161 Bayes/Bayesianism/Schurz: Basic principle: certain initial probabilities must always be assumed. However, the initial probability of E can be eliminated if one restricts oneself to comparative hypothesis evaluations. Indifference principle: the assumption of equal initial probabilities for competing hypotheses. Likelihood intuition: subjective justification: assuming the indifference principle, the level of likelihood of E given H is an indicator of the subjective probability of H given E. Vs: this suffers from the fact that the indifference principle itself is problematic: I 162 Vsindifference principle/Schurz: output distributions are language-dependent! E.g. a distribution indifferent for wavelength (X) is no longer indifferent after conversion to frequency (Y :=1/X)! >Likelihood/Schurz. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Civil Disobedience | Rawls | I 363 Civilian disobedience/Rawls: a theory of civil disobedience is only put forward for the special case of an approximately fair society in which some serious injustices nevertheless occur. Since I assume that an approximately fair state is democratic, the theory concerns disobedience opposed to legitimately established democratic structures. This is not about militant forms of agitation or overcoming corrupt regimes. In the case outlined above, non-violent opposition is certainly justified. A problem arises when duties conflict with one another. It touches nature and limits of the majority rule. Therefore, the problem is a crucial test for all moral democracy theories. A theory of constitutional theory of civil disobedience has three parts: 1. The nature of the disagreement shall be defined and distinguished from other forms of opposition such as demonstrations or legal submissions. 2. Reasons and conditions for justified civil disobedience shall be specified. 3. The role of civil disobedience in a constitutional system must be determined. I 364 Ad 1.: Def Civil Disobedience/Rawls: is a public, non-violent, conscious political act against the law with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or government policy(1). This disobedience does not necessarily break the same law as the one being protested against. I 365 Civil disobedience is a political act guided by political principles. I 366 Non-violence: Civil disobedience is non-violent because it expresses resistance to individual laws within the limits of legal obedience. I 372 Ad 2: Reasons for civil disobedience may be obvious violations of the two principles of justice, but these are rarely specific, e. g. when minorities are disadvantaged. It is even more difficult to identify violations of the principle of difference (see Difference Principle/Rawls.) because it is primarily applied to economic and social institutions. Statistical observations must also be included. Examples would be unjust tax laws; however, if a protest is based only on public perception, there is a problem as to whether this perception is clear enough. I 373 A clearer case is the violation of the principle of equal freedoms. If previous appeals to the majority have proved fruitless, this is another justification for civil disobedience. A previously oppressed religious minority will hardly succeed if it relies solely on normal political procedures. I 375 If different groups are disadvantaged, it is a good thing that the differences between them can be neglected. I 376 If all the conditions for civil disobedience are to be fulfilled, it is still necessary to ask whether it is wise to act. I 382 Ad 3: What is the role of civil disobedience within a constitutional system in the context of democratic politics, which can be roughly described as fair? Answer: it is about appealing to the majority's sense of justice and showing a clear testimony of a violation of free cooperation. >Cooperation, >Majorities. I 383 The strength of this appeal depends on the democratic conception of society as a cooperation system. However, if the protesters think of another form of society, this form of protest would probably be out of place. 1. Here, I follow the definition of H. A. Bedau, "On Civil Disobedience", Journal of Philosophy, vol. 58 (1961), pp. 653-661, similar to Martin Luther King: "Letter from Birmingham City Jail", (1963), reprinted in H. A. Bedau, ed. Civil Disobedience (New York, 1969), pp. 72-89. >Rights, >Law, >Benefit, >Democracy, >Deliberative democracy, >Constitution, >Freedom, >Coercion, >Civil rights >Community, >Society >Duty |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Difference Principle | |||
| Difference Principle | Rawls | I 75 Difference principle/theory of justice as fairness/Rawls: the difference principle eliminates the uncertainty of the efficiency principle (>Efficiency/Rawls, Pareto-Optimum/Rawls) by defining a position from which the social and economic inequalities of the basic structure ((s) of a society to be built) can be assessed. Assuming the institutional framework of Liberal equality (see Equality/Rawls) and fairness of opportunity, the expectations of the better-offs are fair if and only if they are part of a scheme that improves the expectations of the most disadvantaged members. I 76 The difference principle states that equal distribution of goods is preferable, as long as a different distribution does not favour both sides (better and worse) at the same time. I 77 RawlsVsUtilitarianism: Classical utilitarianism is indifferent to how a constant sum of benefits is distributed. It only calls for equality up to a certain threshold. >Utilitarianism. I 78 Difference Principle/Special Cases/Rawls: 1. Special Case: If the expectation of the worst-off person cannot be improved, no change in the income situation of a better-off person can bring about an improvement in the situation of the worse-off person. 2. Special case: occurs when the expectations of all those who are better off at least contribute to the prosperity of those who are worse off. This means that when their expectations fall, those of the less well-off fall as well. However, the maximum has not yet been reached. I 79 Inequality/Rawls: how unfair a (distribution) scheme is depends on how excessive the expectations of the better-offs are and to what extent they depend on violations of the other principles of justice and fair equal opportunities. >Injustice, >Inequalities. Difference principle/Rawls: is a maximization principle. We must make a strict distinction between cases where it works and cases where it does not (see Special Cases 1 and 2 above). The difference principle is compatible with the principle of efficiency. Democracy/Rawls: a democratic constitution is not consistent with the efficiency principle alone, if it is understood in such a way that only changes that improve the situation of all people are allowed. Reason: Justice... I 80 ...requires some changes that are not efficient in this sense. Difference principle/justice: since the distribution in an initial state can never be exactly determined, it does not play a decisive role if the difference principle is applied. >Justice, >Principles/Rawls. Chain connection/prosperity/company/Rawls: we assume a chain connection, i. e. if the expectation of the worst-offs is raised by a measure, then this will also apply to all positions between these and the best placed persons. However, if there are breakages, those who are in such a position have no right of veto against the improvements for those who are worse off. I 82 Difference principle/Rawls: does not depend on contingent actual deviations from the chain connection, which rarely works perfectly anyway. Problem: we assume close-kitness of the chain connection, but in many cases an improvement of the better-offs may have no effect at all on the situation of the worse-off. More entries on >Difference principle. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Difference Principle | Sandel | Brocker I 674 Difference Principle/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: the difference principle states that social and economic inequalities only have a right to exist if they bring the greatest possible advantage to the least beneficiaries in a society. (1) Sandel: does not deny that in an assumed initial situation for a society to be established (see Veil of ignorance/Rawls), this leads to subjects choosing in their own interest a principle that is as advantageous as possible for the less beneficiaries (since they do not know whether they themselves will belong to the less beneficiaries). See Rawls/Nozick). Solution/Sandel: one can only defend Rawls against Nozick's accusations if one assumes that the talents that lead to different social and economic positions are not at all the talents of individual individuals, but talents that are ascribed from the outset to the community of all subjects behind the "veil of ignorance. (2) Problem: that would run counter to Rawl's own theory of intersubjectivity. (See Subjectivity/Sandel); more entries on >difference principle. 1. John Rawls, Theorie der Gerechtigkeit,1975, (engl. 1971) p. 96. 2. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 101, 141. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Distributive Justice | Rawls | I 274 Distributive Justice/Rawls: thesis: only by shaping markets can the problem of fair distribution be solved as a case of pure procedural justice. In this way, we also maintain efficiency and the important freedom of individual career choice. >Justice, >Markets. I 275 Institutions: We need a suitable social system to ensure distributive justice, no matter how historical coincidences turn out. The basic institutions required for this purpose include a constitution guaranteeing equal civil rights, freedom of thought and consciousness, political freedom, a fair electoral system and fair legislation, fair equal opportunities and free choice of profession. >Freedom, >Liberty/Rawls, >Institutions, >Equal Opportunities. The government must also ensure support for the socially disadvantaged and in the event of illness. The institutions that are supposed to guarantee this can be divided into four branches(1). I 276 1. Assignment: the pricing system must be kept competitive. Problem: Efficiency. The allocation system is concerned with taxes and subsidies in order to be able to correct deviations from the market. 2. Stabilization: this branch is concerned with full employment in the sense that everyone can take up the profession he/she wants and that economic development is effective. The first two branches together ensure the efficiency of the market economy. >Efficiency/Rawls. 3. Transfer: this is about social security (social minimum). Here needs have to be considered and classified. >Social minimum. Problem: A competitive system of market prices does not provide any orientation here. This leads to a division of labour between parts of the social system. I 277 4. distribution: The institutions that enable distributive justice are tax legislation and property law. 1. An equal distribution of property appears to be a necessary condition for maintaining equal freedoms. I 278 Inequality: the inequality of inherited goods is not inherently worse than that of intelligence. The point is that all inequalities are dealt with by the difference principle, so that they ultimately benefit the weakest. (See Difference Principle/Rawls). 2. Tax legislation that provides the state with revenue to guarantee public goods. I 279 The details of the design are a matter of political theory and not of the theory of justice. >Taxation. 1. See R. A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, New York, 1959, ch. I. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Envy | Rawls | I 530 Envy/Psychology/Society/Justice/Rawls: We assume that people are not influenced by psychological tendencies in the initial situation of a society to be built (in which no one knows their future position). >Veil of ignorance. I 531 Psychology: only comes into consideration at a later stage. Envy can become a problem if the social differences have become very large due to the difference principle. >Difference Principle/Rawls. I 532 Envy: we refer to interpersonal comparisons in the use of objective primary goods (e. g. freedoms, income, prosperity). The hostile observation of the larger shares of others would then be envy, even if these differences do not imply any reduction of our own shares. Those who notice the envy of others may develop a fear of attack. Thus, envy reduces the benefits of all members of the community. A jealous person could also be tempted to take actions that make all those involved look worse, only to reduce the discrepancy with the better frames. Kant calls the envy therefore a vice of misanthropy (cf. I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, p. II, § 36). I 533 Since envy is not a moral feeling, we do not need a moral principle to explain it. It is sufficient to note that the better situation of others attracts our attention. Def Envy/Rawls: On the other hand, it is a moral feeling. It arises when we think that the reason why we have less than others, is either the result of unjust institutions or a misconduct on the part of the better-offs. Those who display resentment must be prepared to justify it and show why certain institutions of society work to their disadvantage or that others have cheated on them. Envy: differs from moral feelings by the perspective from which a situation is viewed. I 535 General Envy/Rawls: differs considerably from the individual: their reasons are a lack of self-confidence coupled with a feeling of powerlessness. (Cf. F. Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morals (New York, 1967) I, secs, 10,11,14,14,16, II sec. 11, III secs. 14-16; Max Scheler, Ressentiment (Glencoe, Ill., 1961), pp. 45-50.) Conditions for the emergence of envy are: 1. lack of self-esteem, 2. a situation that is experienced as painful and degrading, 3. the assessment of one's own social position as one that does not allow for a change of situation. I 536 Solution/Rawls: many aspects of a well-ordered society alleviate these conditions if they do not even prevent them. Ad 1: The treaty doctrine of the concept of justice supports the development of self-esteem (see Self-Esteem/Rawls). The principles of justice ensure that inequalities can be accepted by all if they can be explained by flanking principles such as the principle of difference. Ad 2: We also compare the prosperity of others within the framework of social groups that have skills comparable to ours. I 537 In a fair society, it is not all too often that situations arise in which different levels of prosperity manifest themselves in options for action. Ad 3: At least a well-ordered society like any other provides constructive alternative to hostile outbreaks. >Society/Rawls. 1. Cf. I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, S. II, § 36. 2. Cf. F. Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morals (New York, 1967) I, Abschn. 10,11,14,14,16, II Abschn. 11, III Abschn. 14-16; 3. Max Scheler, Ressentiment (Glencoe, Ill., 1961) S. 45-50. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Equal Opportunities | Hegel | Rawls I 300 Equal Opportunity/Hegel/Rawls: Hegel believed that limitations of equal opportunities, e. g. the Primogeniture ((s) first-born successor, only the first-born receives the inheritance) were essential for securing the landowner class, which is suitable for rule. This enabled the class to fight for its independence from the state, its quest for profit and the fight against the adversities of civil society. (G. W. F. Hegel; Philosophy of Right, § 306, Oxford, 1942), p. 199. I 301 RawlsVsHegel: it is not enough to accept how Burke and Hegel did that these forms of inequality also benefited the poorer people. >Inequality, >Injustice, >Generational Justice. We would also have to accept as a condition that, by correcting these injustices, the prospects of those who are worse off would be further worsened. The argumentation that all would benefit would only apply if the lexical order of principles (processing in turn, See Principles/Rawls) were to be abolished. >Difference Principle. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Equal Opportunities | Rawls | I 65 Freedom/Equal Opportunities/Rawls: If freedom means equal opportunities, there are two options: a) equal career opportunities for gifted individuals: this is also compatible with a natural aristocracy and corresponds to a system of natural freedom. On the other hand, equal opportunities for everyone - irrespective of their talent - must be realised in a democratic equality. The third possibility is liberal equality. >Freedom, >Equality. I 66 Principle of efficiency/Rawls: simply corresponds to the Pareto optimum(1). I 67 The point is that a configuration is always efficient when it is impossible to change it without putting people (at least one person) at a disadvantage. I 83 Fair equal opportunities/procedural justice/Rawls: we must not confuse fair equal opportunities with career opportunities for gifted people. Due to the difference principle (see Difference Principle/Rawls) it differs from the Liberal interpretation. >Liberalism. I 84 It is not a question of all positions being open to everyone, but this may improve the situation of all members, even if certain groups are excluded from certain positions. However, it is now the case that the actions of those who have been dismissed are justified due to considerations of justice. They would have been deprived of one of the basic forms of human fulfillment. There is an interdependence between what people do and what they are entitled to do. As a result, the question of procedural justice comes into play. >Procedural justice/Rawls. I 87 Equal opportunities: plays the role of ensuring that procedural justice prevails in a cooperation model. 1. See V. Pareto, Manuel d’économie politique, Paris, 1909, ch. VI, §53 and appendix, §89. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Equality | Rawls | I 7 Equality/Inequality/Rawls: the structure of societies is intuitively designed in such a way that people are born into different social positions and thus different expectations with regard to life are defined. Therefore, the social institutions favor certain positions opposed to others. >Society/Rawls, >Institutions/Rawls. These are, in particular, deep inequalities which cannot be justified by appeal to merit. These inequalities, which may be the basic structure of any society, are the ones to which the principles of social justice must be applied to first and foremost. >Justice/Rawls, >Inequalities. I 75 Equality/Democratic Equality/Rawls: Democratic Equality (correcting contingent social inequalities) is achieved by combining equality of opportunity with the difference principle. >Equal opportunities, >Difference principle. I 329 Equality/values/intrinsic/Rawls: that people have the same value is not a necessary condition for them to enjoy equal freedoms. But it is also not a sufficient condition: it is sometimes said that equal fundamental rights are derived from the same opportunities for individuals to develop themselves further. >Sufficiency. RawlsVs: it is not clear why this should be the case. Here the concepts of right and value are mixed up. >Law, >Values. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Gender Roles | Rawls | I 99 Gender Roles/Rawls: Justice as Fairness evaluates a social system from the position of equal civil rights and the different levels of prosperity and income. >Roles/Rawls. However, there are natural properties that lead to the unequal distribution of relevant positions and which cannot be changed, e. g. gender roles. Inequality/solution/Rawls: here the difference principle helps (See Difference Principle/Rawls) to mitigate inequalities: disadvantaged groups must always benefit from inequality. However, such inequalities rarely occur. >Inequality. In cases of conflict, the interests of a more general viewpoint outweigh the interests of a more individual position. >Conflicts. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Inequalities | Rawls | I 100 Inequality/Rawls: there is a principle of remedy for individuals who are disadvantaged because of their natural endowment, at least for the first few years of school. I 101 To my knowledge, however, this principle has never been more than a prima facie principle(1)(2). Rawls: However, the principle of remedy must always be taken into account, no matter what other principles we follow. Difference principle/Rawls: secures resources, e. g. for the promotion of disadvantaged people. >Difference Principle/Rawls. It has the same intention as the principle of remedy. I 102 The basic structure (of a society to be built) can be arranged in such a way that natural inequalities, which cannot be changed, have an effect for the benefit of the most disadvantaged. Nature/natural distribution/Rawls: is neither fair nor unfair. What is fair or unfair are the institutions that deal with this distribution. In justice as fairness ((s) Rawl's approach), members agree to participate in the fate of others. I 103 VsRawls: now one could argue that the preferred ones expect a bigger gain for themselves if they agree to the arrangement. RawlsVsVs: however, this requires a cooperation scheme. I 104 It is nobody's merit to be able to take a certain position in a community through natural talent or disadvantage. Since no right to a certain cooperation scheme with advantages for the better follows from this, it is the difference principle that can be accepted by all. The concept of merit simply cannot be used here. >Income. I 171 Inequality/Economy/Economics/Mathematics/Rawls: we must not underestimate the continuing effect of our individual initial conditions, talents and our original place in society and trust that mathematically appealing solutions would at some point provide a balance. Resolution/Rawls: our principles of justice must remedy the situation. >Principles/Rawls. I 226 Inequality/politics/economy/Rawls: thesis: the effects of injustice in the political system are much more serious and long-lasting than market irregularities. Political power expands rapidly and becomes uneven. Those who take advantage of this can easily move into positions of power by taking advantage of the apparatus of state institutions and law. Equal suffrage is not a secure means of combating this(3). >Markets. 1. See H. Spiegelberg, "A Defense of Human Equality" Philosophical Review, vol 53,1944, pp. 101,113-123. 2. D. D. Raphael, "Justice and Liberty", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 51,1950-1951, pp. 187f. 3. See F. H. Knight, The Ethics of Competition and Other Essays, (New York, 1935) pp. 293-305. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Interest | Singer | I 21 Interest/equality/Principle/P. Singer: also in the pursuit of our principle that we assess interests independently of people, we must, of course, take into account what interests someone has and that may vary greatly, depending on the gifts he has. But intelligence has nothing to do with the fundamental interests of people, such as pain prevention or food procurement. >Equality, >Inequality, >Society. I 22 Slavery/P. Singer: Considering interests: the suffering inflicted on the slave is much stronger than the slave owner's benefit. Therefore, an intellect-based slave society is excluded by our principle of equal weighing of interests as well as cruder forms of racism and sexism, or discrimination on the basis of disabilities. >Slavery, >Governance. Marginal utility/P. Singer: the more a person benefits from a thing, the less he gains by extra supply with this thing. Such a principle can play a role in the balancing of the care of differently severely injured people. Cf. >Pareto optimum, >Maximin rule, >Difference principle. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Justice | Pettit | Brocker I 858 Justice/PettitVsRawls/Pettit: Pettit has stylized himself as a republican opponent of Rawl's theory of justice. He wants to oppose Rawl's model (see Justice/Rawls) with its own model, which "in a more substantial way" elaborates the ideas of freedom and social justice.(1)(2) Rawls/(s): is based on principles instead of "contents". >Principles, >J. Rawls. Brocker I 859 RichterVsRawls: Pettit's model appears weak precisely where the concrete allocation of functions to public participation for the purpose of defining and controlling options for action by the state is concerned. Moreover, ironically, Rawls and Pettit's models resemble each other at precisely those points where Pettit claims to present the alternative to liberal political theory. Cf. >Liberalism. It is Rawl's principle of difference that makes it possible to solve the problems raised by Pettit. (3) >Difference Principle/Rawls. 1. Philip Pettit, »Depoliticizing Democracy«, in: Ratio Juris 17/1, 2004 2. Philip Pettit, Beyond Rawls, 2012, 107ff 3. John Rawls, Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, 1975, S. 96 Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Justice | International Political Theory | Gaus I 294 Justice/International political theory/Brown: The reinvigoration of theories of justice begun by John Rawls's A Theory of Justice(1) (...) here, the technicalities of Rawls's scheme will be taken for granted, and the focus will be on their international implications (Brown, 1997(2); 2002a(3); 2002b)(4). International justice/Brown: of the 'difference principle'. International society is not a 'co-operative venture for mutual advantage'; individual societies are assumed to be bounded and self-sufficient, and so there is nothing that could provide the basic materials for redistribution required by the notion of international distributive justice. VsRawls: For a theory of social justice to have nothing to say about the extraordinary inequalities that exist between societies appears perverse. International Justice/BarryVsRawls: Brian Barry this is symptomatic of wider problems with Rawls's project. International justice poses problems that are structurally similar to those posed by, for example, intergenerational justice and environmental justice; in each case the central notion of a contract based, at least in part, on the search for mutual advantage by the contractors, cannot easily respond to the interests of those who cannot be present as contractors, which category includes foreigners. Moreover, the requirement that arrangements be, in some sense, based on reciprocity is equally if not more limiting (Barry, 1989)(5). >Justice/Barry, >Jutice/Beitz, >International relations/Pogge. Gaus I 295 Borders/boundaries/refugees: Since existing boundaries are clearly not the result of any kind of contract - nor are they 'natural' - what, if any, justification can be given for the norm which assigns to state authorities the right to control such borders, and thus creates categories such as 'political refugee' and 'economic migrant'? Pogge(5) suggests none, and the majority of cosmopolitan liberals agree (Barry and Goodin, 1992(6); O'Neill, 1994(7)). However, as most cosmopolitans also agree, there are obviously practical problems with such a position, and liberal nationalists such as Michael Walzer and David Miller argue that Rawls was essentially correct to assume that distributive justice can only be a feature of bounded communities (Miller and Walzer, 1995(8)). A socially just society will involve redistribution of resources, and the willingness of citizens to redistribute depends crucially on the existence of a sense of community (Miller, 1995)(9). Equality/inequality/justice/Brown: problem: a world of socially just communities might still be a radically unequal world. Can such a state of affairs truly be just? Liberalism/Brown: There is an impasse here which is symptomatic of a wider set of problems for contemporary cosmopolitan liberalism (Brown, 2000a)(3). The distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' is difficult to justify rationally, but a politics without this distinction, a politics without borders, is, in the world as it is, unattainable and undesirable, unless a libertarian conception of liberalism be taken to its limits, as Hillel Steiner (1992)(10) advocates. >Hillel Steiner. 1. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2. Brown, C. (1997) 'Review essay: theories of international justice'. British Journal of Political Science, 27:273—9. 3. Brown, C. (2000a) 'On the borders of (international) political theory'. In N. O'Sullivan, ed., Political Theory in Transition. London: Routledge. 4. Brown, C. (2000b) 'Cultural diversity and international political theory'. Review of International Studies, 26: 199-213. 5. Pogge, T. (1989) Realizing Rawls. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 6. Barry, B. and R. E. Goodin, eds (1992) Free Movement. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 7. O'Neill, O. (1994) 'Justice and boundaries'. In C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe. London: Routledge, 69-88. 8. Miller, D. and M. Walzer, eds (1995) Pluralism, Justice and Equality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 9. Miller, D. (1995) On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 486—93. 10. Steiner, H. (1992) 'Libertarianism and the transnational migration of people'. In B. Barry and R. E. Goodin, eds, Free Movement. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Justice | Beitz | Gaus I 294 Justice/international relations/Beitz/Brown: BeitzVsRawls: Beitz offers two reasons why Rawls is wrong. Cf. >Justice/Rawls, >Distributive Justice/Rawls. 1) even if we accept that states are separate self-contained societies, their representatives would insist on a more wide-ranging contract than Rawls envisages. But, 2) since states are not self-contained there is no reason to look for a second contract between them; instead Rawls's full account of justice should be applied worldwide, including a global 'difference principle'. >Difference principle/Rawls. Ad 1) Beitz's first argument concerns the treatment of 'natural' resources. He argues contra Rawls that the representatives of states meeting in the second original position would not agree to a rule that confirmed that natural resources belong to the states whose territory encompasses them; risk-averse representatives would introduce a rule that distributed the world's resources equally, via some kind of global wealth tax. This is, on the face of it, a rather strong and widely supported argument; (...), Barry also argues for a global tax system (>Justice/Barry), though without employing the veil of ignorance or a second original position, while Hillel Steiner (1999)(2) Gaus I 295 derives a similar idea for a redistributive global fund from libertarian foundations. (>Justice/Steiner). The main problem with these proposals is that they could produce unintended and counter-intuitive results; as Rawls (1999)(3) points out in his later defence of his position, the wealth of a state is only very loosely, if at all, correlated with its material resource base. 2) Beitz's second position is that, as a result of interdependence, the world must now be treated as a single society, which means that Rawls's full account of social justice applies, with no necessity for a second contract between state representatives. VsBeitz: the problem here is that, however interdependent the present world order may be, it can hardly be seen as a co-operative venture for mutual advantage given the gross inequalities it generates. The international economy is certainly based on the idea that everyone benefits from economic exchange, but it would be a particularly enthusiastic neoliberal who argued that this applies across the board to all interactions between rich and poor. BeitzVsVs: Beitz has now acknowledged the strength of this criticism and effectively abandoned much of the Rawlsian justification for his cosmopolitanism in a later article - but not the cosmopolitanism itself, which he now grounds in a Kantian account of the moral equality of persons (Beitz, 1983)(4). To some extent, Beitz's original position is restated by Thomas Pogge in his Realizing Rawls (1989)(5). >International relations/Pogge. 1. Beitz, C. R. (2000) Political Theory and International Relations (1979), 2nd edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2. Steiner, H. (1999) 'Just taxation and international redistribution'. In I. Shapiro and L. Brilmayer, eds, Global Justice: NOMOS XLI. New York: New York University Press, 171-91. 3. Rawls, J. (1999) The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 4. Beitz, C. R. (1983) 'Cosmopolitan ideas and national sovereignty'. Journal of Philosophy, 80: 591-600. 5. Pogge, T. (1989) Realizing Rawls. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Meritocracy | Rawls | I 106 Meritocracy/Rawls: there is an inequality between upper and lower classes in terms of life, rights and privileges(1). Equal opportunities: means equal opportunities for the happier people to leave the more unhappy behind them(2). >Equal chances, >Equality, >Inequalities, >Injustice. I 107 Rawls: A meritocratic society is a danger to other interpretations of the principles of justice, but not to the democratic conception. Solution/Rawls: Difference principle: Expenditure on, for example, the educational system does not primarily serve to increase the return flow of trained skills, but also to enrich the personal and social life of citizens, including the disadvantaged. This is becoming increasingly important when a society evolves. >Difference principle. 1. See Michael Young, The Rise of Meritocracy, London, 1958. 2. See John Schar, "Equality of Opportunity and Beyond", Nomos IX, Equality ed J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman, New York, 1967. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Method | Rawls | I 39 The problem of priorities/principles/Rawls: this is about establishing the priority of the fair or the law before the good. "Lexical Order": the requirement to fulfil a principle before the following principle can be fulfilled. Principle of freedom, principle of equal opportunities, difference principle. >Freedom, >Equal opprtunities, >Difference principle. I 43 Methods/Rawls: Principles/Intuition/Rawls: A. In the initial position for the establishment of a society, the weighting of principles must be discussed between the individual members. They will aim for a different weighting of their own accord. B. Another possibility is the lexical order for the execution of principles in an order to be selected. I 43 The sequence itself is simply serial and avoids having to weigh the principles against each other from the very beginning. >Principles/Rawls. Problem: in a lexical order, the principles discussed first must have certain limitations so that they do not exclude issues to be addressed later. Solution/Rawls: to treat the principle of justice as the first principle makes it possible to work on further principles afterwards. This would not be possible if the principle of usefulness were put at the beginning. I 45 Justice/Principles/Rawls: we should develop a concept of justice that, however influenced by intuition, tends to converge our judgments on justice. >Justice/Rawls. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Principles | Rawls | I 4 Principles/Society/Rawls: 1. Everyone accepts and knows that the other members of society accept the same principles of justice. 2. The basic social institutions fulfill these principles in general and are known for doing so. I 7 Principles/Rawls: we are only interested in general principles of the justice of society as a whole, not in such special or private communities or for cross-national institutions. I 10/11 Principles/Justice/Rawls: Principles must be defined at the beginning. Our point of departure, the situation of equality, which should follow an election, corresponds to the natural state of the traditional theories of the social contract, but it is neither a concrete historical situation nor a primitive culture. >Social contract, >Natural state, >Equality. It is a purely hypothetical situation which should lead to a certain realization of justice. >Justice/Rawls. I 41 Principles/MillVsIntuitionism/Mill/Rawls: Mill argued that the principle of usefulness could be the only supreme principle, since otherwise there could be no arbitrator between competing criteria(1). >J.St. Mill, >Competition, >Interests, >Utility principle, >Utilitarianism. Principles/Sidgwick: the principle of usefulness is the only one that can play this role(2). >H. Sidgwick. Rawls: that is what made the classical doctrine so attractive: that it tries to solve the problem of priorities and avoids intuitionism. >Intuitionism/Economics, >Priorities, >Preferences. RawlsVsMill/RawlsVsSidgwick/RawlsVsUtilitarism: we need to realize that there may be no way to dissolve the plurality of the different principles. >VsUtilitarianism. I 43 Principles/Rawls: I suggest that even in the "lexical order" (the piecemeal processing of principles according to an external order) the principle of equal distribution of rights should be treated as a priority rather than the regulation of economic or social inequalities. I 61 Principles/justice/Rawls: provisional wording: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others. 2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they (a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and (b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone. The two principles are applied in chronological order. This means that abandoning the first principle cannot be offset by greater social or economic benefits. I 62 Deviations from equal distribution of social rights or economic benefits can only be justified by the fact that this is to everyone's advantage. ((s) This is a reference to utilitarianism. I 63 The chronological order of compliance also excludes that fundamental freedoms can be exchanged for economic benefits. I 64 Similarly, the chronological order of the principles means that people can only ever be talked about in the form of social role holders. I 83 Principles/Rawls: Redrafting of the Second Principle: Social and economic inequality must be arranged in such a way that (a) it provides the greatest benefit for the worst-off people and (b) it is linked to administrative bodies and positions which are open to all under conditions of fair equal opportunities. I 89 I assume that the two parts of the principle are arranged lexically. I 116 Principles/Rawls: there is nothing inconsistent about the fact that fairness makes unconditional principles possible. It is sufficient to show that, in the initial situation (of a society to be established), the parties agree to principles that define the natural obligations that then apply without fail. ((s)VsRawls: Contradiction: Rawls himself says that the natural duties, for example not to be cruel, are not subject to agreements. (See Rawls I 114). I 250 Principles/Rawls: reformulation in the light of the consideration of contingent individual and historical inequalities: First principle: Every person must have an equal right to the most comprehensive system of equal fundamental rights that is compatible with an equal system of freedom for all. Priority rule: the principles of justice are built in lexical order and therefore freedom can only be restricted for the benefit of freedom. There are two cases here: a) a less comprehensive freedom must increase the freedom of the total system of freedom shared by all, b) a restricted freedom must be acceptable to those affected by it. I 253 Principles/Categorical imperative/Kant/Rawls: in the sense of Kant, these principles are also categorical imperatives. They do not require any particular social conditions or individual goals. Only an interest in primary public goods (e. g. freedom) is assumed. The preference for these in turn is derived from the most general assumptions about rationality and the conditions of human life. I 302 Principles/Rawls: final version for Institutions/Rawls: the two principles of justice (see above) plus priority rules: 1. Priority rule: the principles of justice must be dealt with in lexical order, so that freedom may only be restricted in favour of greater freedom. Two cases are possible: a) Restricted freedom must strengthen the overall system of freedoms that benefit all. b) Freedom that is not equal must be accepted by those who enjoy fewer freedoms. 2. Priority rule: (Justice precedes efficiency and prosperity): The second principle of justice is lexical superior to the principle of efficiency and the one of maximizing benefits,... I 303 .... fair equal opportunities are superior to the difference principle. Two cases are possible: a) Opportunity inequality must increase the chances of the disadvantaged. b) An extreme savings rate must reduce the burdens on those affected. >Equal opportunities. General conception: all primary social goods (freedoms, rights, income, prosperity, conditions for self-esteem, etc.) shall be distributed equally, except where an unequal distribution of some or all of these goods is to the benefit of the least favoured. I 446 Principles/Rawls: while the principles of justice are those chosen in the initial position, the principles of rational decision or rationality are not chosen at all. This leads to the distinction between right and good. >Society/Rawls. 1. Mill, A System of Logic, bk. VI, ch. XII, sec. 7 and Utilitarianism, ch. V, paers. 26-31. 2. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, bk. IV ch. II and III. |
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| Principles | Rescher | Rawls I 317 Principles/Fairness/RescherVsRawls/Rescher: Instead of the difference principle, one could set the criterion of average utility minus a fraction of the standard deviation.(1) This gives more consideration to the weaker than the average principle. >Average utility, >Difference principle. 1. N. Rescher, Distributive Justice (New York, 1966), pp. 35-38. |
Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Priorities | Rawls | I 39 The problem of priorities/principles/Rawls: this is about establishing the priority of the fair or the law before the good. >Law, >The Good. "Lexical Order": the requirement to fulfil a principle before the following principle can be fulfilled. Principle of freedom, principle of equal opportunities, difference principle. >Principles/Rawls, >Difference Principle, >Freedom, >Equality of Opportunity. I 40 Intuitionism: denies that there is a solution to the problem of priorities. >Intuitionism. I 40/41 Principles/UtilitarianismVsIntuitionism/Rawls: tries to avoid this indeterminacy, which weight is to be attached to the individual principles, and instead to set the principle of usefulness as the supreme one. >Utilitarianism, cf. >Preferences. |
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| Procedural Justice | Rawls | I 85 Procedural justice/Rawls: procedural justice comes into play when it is to be taken into account that there can be a general improvement for the better-off and the worse off, if not every position can be held by everyone. This stems from interdependence between what people do and what they are entitled to do(1)(2)(3). >Difference Principle/Rawls. Procedural justice: For example, when dividing a cake into several pieces, the last piece is given to the person who divides it. 1. there is a criterion independent of the procedure for determining what fair distribution is. 2. it is possible to establish a procedure that delivers the desired result. Incomplete procedural justice: can be found in court proceedings: it seems impossible to design procedural rules in such a way that they always lead to a correct result. >Court proceedings. I 86 Misjudgements: injustice does not originate from human error, but from a random combination of circumstances. So while here there is an independent criterion for the correct result (see point 1. above), there is no practicable procedure, which it certainly achieves. >Injustice, >Inequality. In contrast to that: Gambling/game/procedural justice/Rawls: in gambling there is a pure procedural justice without an independent criterion - justice results solely from the smooth running of the procedure. >Justice, >Criteria. Justice/Rawls: however, it is not possible to say that a fair state is one that results from a fair trial. Otherwise, any absurdly unequal distribution of goods could be justified if it had been achieved through gambling. I 87 Equal opportunities: plays the role of ensuring that procedural justice prevails in a cooperation model. >Equal opportunities. Procedural justice: makes it possible to ignore the highly complex circumstances in individual cases. >Circumstances, >Situations. 1. Literature on procedural justice: Brian Barry, Political Arguments, London 1965, ch. VI. 2. On the problem of fair distribution: R. D. Luce, Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions, New York, 1957. 3. Hugo Steinhaus "The Problem of Fair Division", Econometrica, vol. 16, 1948. |
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| Rawls | Nozick | Brocker I 674 Rawls/NozickVsRawls/Nozick: Rawls' difference principle boils down to that the better-off with their talents are used as a mere means of improving the social and economic situation of the worse-off. However, this would run counter to the deontological-Kantian claim.(1) >Difference Principle/Sandel, SandelVsRawls, >Deontology, >Ethics, >Morals. 1.Robert Nozick, Anarchie, Staat, Utopia, München 2006,(engl. 1971) p. 300f. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Rawls | Sandel | Brocker I 673 Rawls/Subject/Individual/Metaphysics/Subjectivity/Individuality/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: Sandel criticizes Rawl's conception of an assumed starting point for a society to be built (see Veil of Ignorance/Rawls, Reflective Equilibrium/Rawls, Veil of Ignorance/Sandel): 1. Rawls fails to achieve his own goal of reconstructing Kant's practical philosophy free of metaphysics and without reformulating the subject's specific theory. On the contrary, Rawls presupposes a specific theory of the subject ("mutual disinterest", subjectivity and identity independent of the subject's goals and purposes). (1) (See Subjectivity/Sandel). 2. this leads to an impoverishment of the possibilities of human self-conception in the political community. (2) 3. with this, the approach of Rawls is simply wrong, because people cannot understand each other in this way at all. (3) 4. The concept of Rawls' initial state is in contradiction to other elements of his theory, especially to the principle of difference (see Difference Principle/Rawls) and to his contract theory. (See Contract Theory/Rawls). See also Difference Principle/Sandel, Rawls/Nozick. 1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. 65 2. Ibid. p. 177 3. Ibid. p. 65. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Reciprocity | Rawls | I 103 Reciprocity/Rawls: For example, two representative people in a society, A is less, B is more favoured. A can accept the benefits that come with B if this improves its own expectations. If B weren't in position, A would be even worse off. This presupposes a scheme of social cooperation without which no one would have a satisfactory life. Differential principle/Rawls: ensures that everyone agrees to this cooperation. (See Difference Principle/Rawls). --- I 291 Reciprocity/Saving/generational justice/Rawls: generations should ask themselves how much they are willing to save when all others do the same. In doing so, they should establish a principle of fair saving that applies to all. --- I 288 Only the relatives of the very first generation do not benefit from this, but nobody knows in the initial situation of a society to be established which generation they belong to. --- I 290 Reciprocity/Rawls: The principle of reciprocity is usually used when it comes to compensating for advantages. But you cannot give anything back to the previous generation. This is the special case for reciprocity in saving. --- I 291 Alexander Herzen and also Kant complained about the injustice that the later ones would benefit from the achievements of the former ones without giving anything back. RawlsVsKant/RawlsVsHerzen: these feelings are out of place: the relation is asymmetric, but this has to be corrected. First of all, the question of justice does not arise because of the extension of time in only one direction. What can be fair or unfair is the way in which institutions deal with this situation and with historical possibilities. If all generations, with the exception of the first, now benefit and everyone inherits from their ancestors, all they have to do is choose a fair saving principle that ensures that future generations will also benefit from their services. The only reciprocity between generations is virtual. However, each generation can regulate the details for itself. --- I 292 Solution/Rawls: To accept individuals as part of a family line that continues. The rest is governed by the two principles of justice. --- I 293 No disadvantaged person of any generation can then complain that others are not doing their part. People of different generations share duties and obligations as well as contemporaries. The present generation cannot do what it likes, but must behave in the manner prescribed by the principles that would be chosen in the initial situation where no one knows what role they themselves play. |
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| Reflective Equilibrium | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 226 Reflective equilibrium/Political philosophy/Lamont: theorists, the general population, and hopefully politicians, engage in a collective cognitive process through discussion and debate in order to come up with principles and policies to better cohere with the moral judgements and beliefs of the people. >Reflective equilibrium/Rawls. Of course, theorists can achieve such an equilibrium only by finding out what people believe (Miller, 1999(1): chs 3—4; Swift et al., 1995(2)). Fortunately, over the last couple of decades, there has been a sustained effort to collect the data necessary to this project (Elster, 1995(3); Hochschild, 1981(4); Kluegel and Smith, 1986(5); Miller, 1999(1)). Miller: David Miller (1999(1): ch. 4) has surveyed the empirical studies, partly summarizing the findings as follows: in people's thinking about social distribution, (there is) a tendency to favour more equality than presently exists in liberal democracies. This is partly to be explained by considerations of desert and need: people do not regard income inequalities of the size that currently obtain as deserved, and at the bottom of the scale they think it unfair that people cannot earn enough to meet their needs. (1999(1): 91) Frohling and Oppenheimer: In a series of experiments conducted to see what distributive principles people would choose, Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992(6)) presented the subjects with four principles for distributing income: (l) maximizing the average income, (2) maximiz- ing the minimum income, (3) maximizing the average subject to a floor constraint (no income to fall below $x), and (4) maximizing the average subject to a range constraint (the gap between top and bottom incomes not to exceed $y). Maximizing the average subject to a floor constraint (or safety net) was chosen by the vast majority of individuals, while maximizing the average was a distant second. Lamont: The alternative used to gauge support for the difference principle - maximizing the minimum income - had very little support. Rawls: So while Rawls (1993(7): 8) popularized the theory of reflective equilibrium, his own theory of distributive justice gains little support from it. >J. Rawls. VsRawls: Some critics of his difference principle provide one reason for this. Although the argument, outlined above, for the difference principle gives moral weight to reducing the influence of factors over which people have no control, it gives little positive weight to choice and responsibility. Under the difference principle, the social structure is designed to maximize the position of the least advantaged group (characterized by Rawls, 1972(8): 97, as the bottom socio-economic quartile), no matter what choices individual members of that group have made. If the general public has a stronger view of the moral weight that should be given to responsibility, as Samuel Scheffler (1992)(9) has argued they do, then the degree of support the public believes is owed to the disadvantaged will depend on whether the disadvantage is due to a disability, a lack of motivation, or an individual lifestyle choice. Such considerations have influenced resource egalitarians and desert theorists (...). >Inequalities/Dworkin, >Inequalities/Resource-based view (RBV), >Distributive justice/ Resource-based view (RBV), cf. >Distributive Justice/Libertarianism. 1. Miller, David (1999) Principles of Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Swift, A., G. Marshall, C. Burgoyne and D. Routh, (1995) 'Distributive justice: does it matter what the people think?' In James R. Kluegel, David S. Mason and Bernard Wegener, eds, Social Justice and Political Change. New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 15—47. 3. Elster, Jon (1995) 'The empirical study of justice'. In David Miller and Michael Walzer, eds, Pluralism, Justice, and Equality. New York: Oxford University Press, 81-98. 4. Hochschild, Jennifer L. (1981) What; Fair: American Beliefs about Distributive Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Kluegel, James R. and Eliot R. Smith (1986) Beliefs about Inequality. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine De Gruyter. 6. Frohlich, N. and J. Oppenheimer (1992) Choosing Justice: An Experimental Appoach to Ethical Theory. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 7. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 8. Rawls, John (1972) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 9. Schemer, Samuel (1992) 'Responsibility, reactive attitudes, and liberalism in philosophy and politics'. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Resentment | Rawls | I 530 Resentment/Psychology/Society/Rawls: We assume that people are not influenced by psychological tendencies in the initial situation of a society to be established (in which no one knows their future position). I 531 Psychology: only comes into consideration in a later stage. Disfavour can become a problem if the social differences have become very large due to the difference principle. >Difference Principle/Rawls. I 532 Resentment: we refer to interpersonal comparisons in the use of objective primary goods (e. g. freedoms, income, prosperity). The hostile contemplation of the larger shares of others would then be resentment, even if these differences do not imply any reduction of our own shares. Those who notice the resentment of others may develop a fear of attack. Thus, resentment reduces the benefits of all members of the community. An unfavourable person could also be tempted to take actions that make all those involved look worse, only to reduce the discrepancy between the worse-offs and the better-offs. Kant calls the resentment therefore a vice of hatred for mankind(1). I 533 Since resentment is not a moral feeling, we do not need a moral principle to explain it. It is sufficient to note that the better situation of others attracts our attention. Def Resentment/Rawls: On the other hand, it is a moral feeling. It is present when we think that the reason why we have less than others is either the result of unjust institutions or a misconduct on the part of the better-offs. Those who display resentment must be prepared to justify it and show why certain institutions of society work to their disadvantage or that others have cheated on them. Resentment: differs from moral feelings by the perspective from which a situation is viewed. 1. Cf. I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, p. II, § 36. |
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| Resource-based View (RBV) | Lamont | Gaus i 227 Resource-based view (RBV)/Lamont: The hope of Dworkin(1) and other resource theorists is that institutions can be designed with [a] hypothetical ideal in mind: individuals enjoy the fruit of, or bear the burden of, their choices, but the negative impact of luck is shared by society, unless individuals choose to face the risk alone. >Inequlities/Resource-based view (RBV), >Distributive Justice/Resource-based view (RBV). Problems: though this ideal is plausible, its full implementation in a real economy requires what now seems impossible: the measurement of differences in people's natural talents. There is no philosophical or empirical agreement about which talents are natural, the result of individuals' choices, or largely influenced by social factors beyond an individual's control. A system of special assistance to the physically and mentally handicapped and to the ill would be a partial implementation of Dworkin's compensation system, but most natural inequalities would be untouched by these measures. Despite its theoretical advantages, therefore, it is difficult to see 'equality of resources' as a practical improvement on the difference principle, at least until there are answers to these implementation questions. >Desert/Political philosophy, >Distributive Justice/Libertarianism. 1. Dworkin, Ronald (2000) Soveæign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
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| Roles | Rawls | I 96 Roles/social positions/society/Rawls: the roles in a community to be established will necessarily result in unequal opportunities for shaping. We use our two principles to prevent injustice: I 61 1. everyone must have the right to fundamental freedom 2. inequalities must be managed in such a way that they are to everyone's advantage, different positions must in principle be capable of being held by everyone. I 96 Positions: in most cases: 1. equal civil rights, 2. the position defined by income and prosperity. Representative members are then those who represent different levels of prosperity. I 97 Roles: the > I 99 In cases of conflict, the interests of a more general viewpoint outweigh the interests of a more individual position. This also applies, for example, when the advantages and disadvantages of free trade are weighed against protectionism. --- I 100 The relevant social positions then specify the general standpoint from which the two principles of justice are judged on the basic structure ((s) the initial state of a society to be established, in which the roles are not yet distributed according to Rawls). The principles ensure that no one benefits from natural coincidences except for the benefit of others. (1) See M. J. Bowman about the Fuchs criterion in "Poverty in an Affluent Socienty", in: Contemporary Economic Issues, ed. N. W. Chamberlain, Homewood, Illinois, 1969. |
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| Saving | Rawls | I 291 Savings/generational justice/reciprocity/Rawls: the generations should ask themselves how much they are prepared to save when all others do the same. In doing so, they should establish a principle of fair saving that applies to all. --- I 288 Only the relatives of the very first generation do not benefit from this, but nobody knows in the initial situation of a society to be established which generation they belong to. --- I 289 However, the principle of fair saving does not force us to continue saving forever. Details have to be clarified at a later date. Each generation has its own appropriate goals. Generations are no more subject to each other than individuals are subject to each other. No generation has special demands. --- I 290 Savings/Saving Rate/Wealth/Rawls: the last stage of a society does not have to be one of abundance. The principle of justice does not require previous generations to save money so that later generations will have more. Rather, saving is about enabling a fair society and equal freedoms. If more is saved, it is for other purposes. It would be a misunderstanding to think that the realisation of a good and fair society must wait until a high standard of living has been achieved. Reciprocity/Rawls: The principle of reciprocity is usually used when it comes to compensating for advantages. But you cannot give anything back to the previous generation. This is the special case for reciprocity in saving. --- I 291 Alexander Herzen and also Kant complained about the injustice that the later ones would benefit from the achievements of the former ones without giving anything back(1)(2). RawlsVsKant/RawlsVsHearts: these feelings are out of place: the relation is asymmetric, but this has to be corrected. First of all, the question of justice does not arise because of the extension of time in only one direction. What can be fair or unfair is the way in which institutions deal with this situation and with historical possibilities. If all generations, with the exception of the first, now benefit and everyone inherits from their ancestors, all they have to do is choose a fair saving principle that ensures that future generations will also benefit from their services. The only reciprocity between generations is virtual. However, each generation can regulate the details for itself. --- I 292 Fairness of savings/fair saving/Rawls: we accept the fictitious initial situation of a society to be established as present and ourselves as participants. This situation involves members of all possible generations. No one knows what generation he belongs to. So there is no reason for anyone to save money - either previous generations have saved or not. You cannot change that now. Solution/Rawls: to accept individuals as part of a family line that continues. The rest is governed by the two principles of justice. (See Principles/Rawls.) Just as the first principle of justice and the principle of equal opportunity limits the application of the principle of difference (see Difference Principle/Rawls) within a generation, the principle of fair saving limits its application between generations. --- I 293 No disadvantaged person of any generation can then complain that others are not doing their part. (1) Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose", quoted from Hans Reiss (ed.), Kant, Political Writings, Cambridge, 1970, p. 44. (2) Quote A. Herzen from Isaiah Berlin's Einführung zu Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution, New York, 1960 p. xx. |
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| Ultimate Justification | Singer | I 11 Ultimate justification/universalism/ethics/Utilitarianism/P. Singer: Thesis: The universal aspect of ethics provides a basis for starting with a generally understood utilitarianism. >Ethics, >Utilitarianism, >Preferential utilitarianism. If I want to generalize, I have to accept that my personal motives or preferences do not count more than the ones of others. >Preferences, >Generalization, >Equality, >Inequality, >Equal Opportunity. I 12 When I am in a group, it boils down to that the consequences of my actions are the best for all concerned. >Community, >Pareto optimum, cf. >Difference principle, cf. >Group behavior. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
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| Bayesianism | Schurz Vs Bayesianism | I 161 Bayes/Bayesianismus/Schurz: Grundprinzip: es muss immer von gewissen initial probabilities ausgegangen werden. Die initial prob. von E kann jedoch eliminiert werden, wenn man sich auf komparative Hypothesenbewertungen beschränkt. Indifference Principle: die Annahme gleicher initial prob. für konkurrierende Hypothesen. Likelihood-Intuition: subjektive Rechtfertigung: unter Annahme des indifference principle ist die Höhe der Likelihood von E gegeben H ein Indikator für die subjective prblty von H gegeben E. Vs: das krankt daran, dass das indifference principle selbst problematisch ist: I 162 VsIndifference Principle/Schurz: initial distributions sind sprachabhängig! Bsp eine für die Wellenlänge (X) indifferente Verteilung ist nach Umrechnung auf die Frequenz (Y :=1/X) nicht mehr indifferent! I 163 Statistik: einführende Literatur. Skyrms 1989, Bortz 1985. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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