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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Difference Principle | Rawls | I 75 Difference principle/theory of justice as fairness/Rawls: the difference principle eliminates the uncertainty of the efficiency principle (>Efficiency/Rawls, Pareto-Optimum/Rawls) by defining a position from which the social and economic inequalities of the basic structure ((s) of a society to be built) can be assessed. Assuming the institutional framework of Liberal equality (see Equality/Rawls) and fairness of opportunity, the expectations of the better-offs are fair if and only if they are part of a scheme that improves the expectations of the most disadvantaged members. I 76 The difference principle states that equal distribution of goods is preferable, as long as a different distribution does not favour both sides (better and worse) at the same time. I 77 RawlsVsUtilitarianism: Classical utilitarianism is indifferent to how a constant sum of benefits is distributed. It only calls for equality up to a certain threshold. >Utilitarianism. I 78 Difference Principle/Special Cases/Rawls: 1. Special Case: If the expectation of the worst-off person cannot be improved, no change in the income situation of a better-off person can bring about an improvement in the situation of the worse-off person. 2. Special case: occurs when the expectations of all those who are better off at least contribute to the prosperity of those who are worse off. This means that when their expectations fall, those of the less well-off fall as well. However, the maximum has not yet been reached. I 79 Inequality/Rawls: how unfair a (distribution) scheme is depends on how excessive the expectations of the better-offs are and to what extent they depend on violations of the other principles of justice and fair equal opportunities. >Injustice, >Inequalities. Difference principle/Rawls: is a maximization principle. We must make a strict distinction between cases where it works and cases where it does not (see Special Cases 1 and 2 above). The difference principle is compatible with the principle of efficiency. Democracy/Rawls: a democratic constitution is not consistent with the efficiency principle alone, if it is understood in such a way that only changes that improve the situation of all people are allowed. Reason: Justice... I 80 ...requires some changes that are not efficient in this sense. Difference principle/justice: since the distribution in an initial state can never be exactly determined, it does not play a decisive role if the difference principle is applied. >Justice, >Principles/Rawls. Chain connection/prosperity/company/Rawls: we assume a chain connection, i. e. if the expectation of the worst-offs is raised by a measure, then this will also apply to all positions between these and the best placed persons. However, if there are breakages, those who are in such a position have no right of veto against the improvements for those who are worse off. I 82 Difference principle/Rawls: does not depend on contingent actual deviations from the chain connection, which rarely works perfectly anyway. Problem: we assume close-kitness of the chain connection, but in many cases an improvement of the better-offs may have no effect at all on the situation of the worse-off. More entries on >Difference principle. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Difference Principle | Sandel | Brocker I 674 Difference Principle/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: the difference principle states that social and economic inequalities only have a right to exist if they bring the greatest possible advantage to the least beneficiaries in a society. (1) Sandel: does not deny that in an assumed initial situation for a society to be established (see Veil of ignorance/Rawls), this leads to subjects choosing in their own interest a principle that is as advantageous as possible for the less beneficiaries (since they do not know whether they themselves will belong to the less beneficiaries). See Rawls/Nozick). Solution/Sandel: one can only defend Rawls against Nozick's accusations if one assumes that the talents that lead to different social and economic positions are not at all the talents of individual individuals, but talents that are ascribed from the outset to the community of all subjects behind the "veil of ignorance. (2) Problem: that would run counter to Rawl's own theory of intersubjectivity. (See Subjectivity/Sandel); more entries on >difference principle. 1. John Rawls, Theorie der Gerechtigkeit,1975, (engl. 1971) p. 96. 2. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 101, 141. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Bayesianism | Schurz Vs Bayesianism | I 161 Bayes/Bayesianismus/Schurz: Grundprinzip: es muss immer von gewissen initial probabilities ausgegangen werden. Die initial prob. von E kann jedoch eliminiert werden, wenn man sich auf komparative Hypothesenbewertungen beschränkt. Indifference Principle: die Annahme gleicher initial prob. für konkurrierende Hypothesen. Likelihood-Intuition: subjektive Rechtfertigung: unter Annahme des indifference principle ist die Höhe der Likelihood von E gegeben H ein Indikator für die subjective prblty von H gegeben E. Vs: das krankt daran, dass das indifference principle selbst problematisch ist: I 162 VsIndifference Principle/Schurz: initial distributions sind sprachabhängig! Bsp eine für die Wellenlänge (X) indifferente Verteilung ist nach Umrechnung auf die Frequenz (Y :=1/X) nicht mehr indifferent! I 163 Statistik: einführende Literatur. Skyrms 1989, Bortz 1985. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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