Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 19 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Attributes | Logic Texts | Read III 210 Attributive Adjectives / Read: what is large for a mouse is not large for an elephant - e.g. "great", "few", "high", "good", "beautiful". >Sorites, >Vagueness. Vagueness: Max Black: Vagueness is not ambiguity and also not generality. It can be difficult to draw a line between what is a chair and what is not. This is where vagueness comes in and threatens the sorites. Read III 211 Tarski: separation of the language levels: Suppose we wanted to say that "15 is little" is neither true nor false. According to the T-scheme, "15 is little" is not false" is equivalent to "15 is little". So ""A" is neither true nor false" is equivalent to "15 is both little and not little". This is a contradiction. >Double negation, >Negation, >Description levels, >Levels (Order). Application/Penumbra/Read: to call it a penumbra means that it is not wrong to apply it here. It is then not wrong to say that 15 is little, and not wrong to say that 15 is not little for the same reason. So it seems that it is not wrong to say that 15 is both little and not little, which is a contradiction. >Contradiction. Vagueness/Read: the world itself is not vague. There are no vague objects. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Compactness | Logic Texts | Read III 59 Compactness: the classic logical conclusion is compact. To understand this, we must acknowledge that the set of premises can be infinite. Classically, every logical truth (of which there are infinite numbers) is a conclusion from any statement. This can be multiplied, by double negation, the conjunction of itself with its double negation, and so on. III 60 The classical compactness does not mean that a conclusion cannot have an infinite number of premises, it can. But classically it is valid exactly when the conclusion follows from a finite subset of the premises. Compactness limits the expressiveness of a logic. Proof: is performed purely syntactically. In itself, the proof has no meaning. Its correctness is defined based on its form and structure. >Proof. III 61 The counterpart of proof is completeness: there should be a derivation. >Incompleteness/logic texts. III 61 The Omega rule (>Incompleteness/logic texts) is not accepted as a rule of orthodox, classical proof theory. How can I do this? According to classical representation, a rule is valid if the premises are true and the conclusion is false by no interpretation over any range of definition. How can the premises A(0),A(1) etc. was, but be false for each n,A(n)? III 61/62 The explanation lies in the limitation of the expressiveness. In non-compact logic, there may be a categorical set of formulas for arithmetic, but the proof methods require compactness. For expressiveness: >Richness, >Meta language, >Object language. Difference compact/non compact: classical logic is a 1st order logic. A categorical set of axioms for arithmetic must be a second order logic. ((s) quantifiers also for properties). >Quantifier, cf. >Schematic letters. For example, Napoleon had all the properties of a great general: "for every quality f, if for every person x, if x was a great general, then x had f, then Napoleon had f". In reality it is a little more subtle. For syntactically one cannot distinguish whether a formula is like the 1st or 2nd level above. >2nd order logic. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Dialectic | Adorno | Grenz I 14 Dialectic/Adorno/Grenz: the process breaks into an expressive (physiognomic) and a certain (negating) part. >Negation/Adorno. Grenz I 50 Dialectic/double negation/PopperVsDialectic/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno agrees with Popper's dialectic criticism: the equating of the negation of the negation with the positivity is the quintessence of the identification and thus of the reification. >Dialectic, >K.R. Popper. Grenz I 75 Dialectic/Adorno/Grenz: a) As a method, means of knowledge: the determined negation. b) Dialectic of natural history: unity of nature and history. This has objective character in the sense of reality... I 76 ...of the existing. >History/Adorno, >Cognition, >Recognition/Adorno, >Theory of Knowledge/Adorno. I Grenz 103 Dialectic at a standstill/Benjamin/Grenz: Thesis: in cultural phenomena, the dialectic of natural history stands still for us in a double sense: neither are 'structures' dynamical as something produced from preceeding structures or producing new structures, nor can the dynamism... I 104 ...of the development of the productive forces be gained from it. What can be deciphered in them is solely the difference between possibility and reality. >Relations of Production. --- XIII 40f Mediation/Dialectic/Adorno: the possibility, in the face of the antithetical concepts, to come to a real thought at all (e.g., empiricism/rationalism, idealism/realism) is to be sought in that way by going into these concepts onself, and to find their opposite in them oneself, instead of making up mediating worldviews between them, such as the so-called critical realism. >Thinking/Adorno, >Concepts/Adorno. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Intuitionism | Intuitionism: A) intuitionism in mathematics assumes that the objects to be inspected, e.g. numbers are only constructed in the process of the investigation and are therefore not finished objects, which are discovered. This has an effect on the double negation and the sentence of the excluded middle. B) Intuitionism of ethics assumes that moral principles are fixed and are immediately (or intuitively) knowable. |
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| Logic | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 138 Frege/logic/Hintikka: his logic is considered as the theory of complex sentences - Wittgenstein in contrast: easiest parts of the world - eliminate logical constants - They do not represent. >Logical constants, >Representation. I 205 Logic/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: no other author than Wittgenstein has ever had the thought, in the logic it had ultimately no more explanation than what is given to us in experience through the simple objects - all phenomenology is just logic. - HusserlVs - Husserl: possibilities are motivated by background beliefs. --- II 160 Logic/WittgensteinVsFrege: 1. It is rather arbitrary, what we call a sentence - therefore logic means something else in my opinion than in Frege's. 2. VsFrege: All words are equally important - Frege: thesis: "Word", "sentence", "world" are more important. >Sentences, >Words, >World, >Symbols. II 238 Logic/arbitrary/Wittgenstein: the rules of logic are insofar arbitrary that they can be eliminated for greater expressiveness - E.g. sentence of the excluded third (SaD) is invalid - at least "contradiction" is used in different meanings - as well as double negation -. Some authors: "the application is different." WittgensteinVs: one cannot talk independently of a sign from its use. - ((S) Then it is another sign - against see below. >Signs, >Use. II 328 The sentence of the excluded third is universal. II 327 Logic/Wittgenstein: it is not a science, but a calculus - in it you can make inventions, but no discoveries. II 333 Logic/WittgensteinVsCarnap: one cannot construct a logic for all cases - because one cannot abstract both applications from the application. --- VI 85 Logic/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Schulte: not we express with the signs what we want - but in the logic the nature of the nature-necessary sign states itself - (6,124). VI 89 Logic/border/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the logic is not given a limit through the use of the language, of course - it is, so to speak, the common framework of "my" and "your" language. VI 118 Logic/Wittgenstein: say/show: logic says nothing, it shows something about necessity - grammatical sentences (about the language) thus fall out of the language game -> training: no speakable rules but blind following. TrainingVsExplanation, instead: Description - (> tell/show: Explanation/Wittgenstein). --- IV 101 Logic/Tractatus: (6.1264) each sentence of logic is a, in characters expressed, modus ponens - (And this cannot be expressed by one sentence). - (> Show/tell: > Ostension/Wittgenstein). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Logical Constants | Quine | X 112 Translation/logic/logical constants/meaning/Radical Interpretation/Gavagai/Quine: E.g. conjunction: if someone agrees with a composite sentence, but not with one of its constituents, then that is a reason not to consider the composite sentence as a conjunction. - "Our translation forces our logic on him". - We integrate our logic into the translation rules. >Connectives/Quine. Circumstances: are also integrated into translation rules - e.g. if someone does not agree with a sentence while it is raining, we do not translate it with "it is raining". - ((s) f.o.th- not-not/double negation/ weaker than position). >Translation/Quine. Radical interpretation: encompasses only circumstances and consistent meaning of logical constants ((s) or logical truths. Principle: E.g. receiving the evident: evident sentences should proceed with the translation to real and possibly evident sentences ((s) Due to the split circumstances). X 118 Adjunction/negation/logical operators/Quine: are immanent, not transcendent, because with a different logic, we cannot maintain their meanings. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Negation | Adorno | Grenz I 50 Negation/AdornoVsHegel/Grenz: Adorno separates, against Hegel, the subjective from the objective positivity of negated negation.(1) >Subjectivity/Adorno, >G.W.F. Hegel. I 50 Dialectic/double negation/PopperVsDialectic/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno agrees with Popper's dialectic criticism: the equation of the negation of the negation with the positivity is the quintessence of the identification and thus of the reification. I 50 Negation/Adorno/Grenz: The consciousness of the absence of something or of falsehood; this moment of the particular negation as the subjective for its part, cannot and must not be credited to objective logic and even to metaphysics.(2) >Objectivity. Grenz I 51 The definite negation does not alter the circumstances. It is only their consciousness. I Grenz 80 Certain negation/MarxVsHegel/Grenz: e.g. the bourgeois revolution against the feudal society: N.B.: here, certain negation as a method was lost. Feudalism is abolished in the double sense: the rule of less over many is liquidated, the social character of the society is preserved. Grenz I 83 Certain negation/AdornoVsHegel/AdornoVsMarx/Grenz: Adorno resolves the antinomy of the ambiguity of cancelling and incorporating of the practical element of history into the particular negation. >History/Adorno. Grenz I 91 Certain negation/Adorno/Grenz: New conception as immanent criticism: a) As a cancellation conceptualized inner-worldly - so it escapes the immanence critique of Hegel. I 92 b) Reveals the concept of purposive rationality as irrational.(3) Thus the necessity arises to eradicate the something-characteristic of the particular nothing history-philosophical.(4) c) This necessity is supported by the pushing trough of nature-history antagonism. Accordingly, the certain negation consists in the fact that the factual is opposed to its potentiality "which cannot suffice".(5) Grenz I 106 Certain negation/art/Adorno/Grenz: Revealing the image content of a cultural phenomenon is only possible as a certain negation of its social content, or, what is the same, as gaining the truth of its untruth. >Art/Adorno, >Works of art/Adorno, >Truth/Adorno, >Truth content/Adorno. Grenz I 113 Double Negation/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno understands the negation of negation as negative: full of content, but without something-character.(6) Grenz I 116 Negation/Adorno/Grenz: certain negation and something-character of the particular nothing are separated by the transformation of the certain negation into the physiognomical analysis and of the determined nothing into a category of experience which is based on being and is only polemically related. This is the performance of Adorno's negative dialectic, with which it brings historical and dialectical materialism to itself. >Materialism/Adorno. Grenz I 180 Negation/Adorno/Grenz: Results of physiognomic negations are artworks or hermetic texts. They thus fail as negations, inasmuch as they negatively negate the negativity of their neganda in practice, but do so without meaning, and thus undefined and diffusely. Theory: on the other hand, the theory-performed determination of beings as negative is merely theoretical, but determined. 1. Th. W. Adorno. Negative Dialektik, In: Gesammelte Schriften, Band 6: Negative Dialektik. Jargon der Eigentlichkeit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1970.p. 159, FN 2. Ebenda. 3. Negative Dialektik, p. 8 4. Th. W. Adorno. Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente. Amsterdam 1947. p 126. 5. Th. W. Adorno. Ästhetische Theorie, In: Gesammelte Schriften 7, Rolf Tiedemann (Hg.), Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. 1970. p. 205. 6. Negative Dialektik, p. 159f |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Negation | Cresswell | II 73 Double Negation/possible worlds/Proposition/indirect speech/Cresswell: Solution: if propositions are nothing but sets of possible worlds. Then not-not-a means the same as a - (because of the complement formation of the set). >Double negation, >Possible worlds. Indirect speech: problem: if propositions should be something else than sets of possible worlds: then it may be that the speaker has said nothing at all. Then the double negation is something else. ((s) "He has not said anything to this" does not mean that he rejects a.) >Indirect speech. II 73 Problem: but then the truth value differs against the logic. >Truth values. Solution/Cresswell: Hyperintensionality: hyperintensional propositions express (despite the same intension of a and not-not-a) different propositions. ((s) Then intension is unequal proposition). >Hyperintensionality. Solution/Cresswell: Structural ambiguity: "saying" is sometimes applied to whole sentence, sometimes to parts. VsHyperintensionality: before, the meaning of "not" was clear, it is now unclear. II 74f Double Negation/Cresswell: another problem: we can add to maximum consistent sets of propositions further inconsistent propositions. - The sets are then equal with respect to the consistent propositions and differ only in the inconsistent ones. >maximum consistent. N.B.: if there are only possible worlds (no impossible world), a and ~~a are equal. Impossible world: if they are admitted, there is a difference between position and double negation. - that is because "~" is then no real negation. >Impossible world. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Negation | Dummett | II 118 Double Negation/Dummett: weaker claim as an assertion: that the sentence can not be falsified. See also >Multi-valued Logic/Dummett. III 14 Negation/Dummett: there is no single rule for the negation. ((s) Because of the different logical operations like "and", "or" etc.). III 15 Problem: how do we determine the general sense of negation when the sense of the original sentence is given? III 29 Even in the negation of statements there must be something [that corresponds to the facts of the statement]. Cf. >Negative facts. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Negation | Geach | I 16ff Negation/Geach: the problem with compound expressions is always the negation (with "all", "some"). >All/Geach, >Each/every/Geach, >Sentences, >Quantification, cf. >Someone/Geach. I, 45ff Negation/Geach: in the subject-predicate-sentence: negation is only possible from the predicate, not from the subject. Modernity: quantification: also the negation of "there is" is possible. New: also subject negation is possible: E.g. "not everyone is ..." I 75 Negation/Russell: cannot be applied as a primitive term to propositions, therefore: All x are F: Negation: some x are not F ". Negation: not via a sentence: "Do not open the door" is on the same level as "Open the door". Negation is not "logical secondary". >Negation/Frege, >Thought/Frege. Asymmetry: only with identifying predicates: e.g. the same man/not the same man - subject negation: "not everyone is ..." - predicate negation: Socrates is not ... ". Negation is not parasitic to affirmation. - There is no added meaning. - Otherwise there would be a summation with double negation. >Double negation. I 260 Negation/assertion/Geach: propositions can be put forward without asserting them. For example, "p > q" therefore we need a negation which is not polar to the assertion. >Proposition, >Assertion. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Negation | Nozick | II 234 double negation: "not-(not-q)" is weaker than "q" - it is the same as "may" ("might") - not the same as "would". >Stronger/weaker, cf. >Strength of theories, >Double negation, >Multi-valued logic, >Truth values, >Truth. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Negation | Quine | X 113f Double Negation/Quine: E.g. Sentence of the excluded middle/Quine. (1) Every closed sentence is true or false - (2) Every closed sentence or its negation is true. - (3) Every closed sentence is true or not true - multivalent logic: truth value 1, 2, 3: "2" and "3" are summarized as "false" - then the negation of 2 and 3 leads to 1 - from 1 to (2 v 3) - Problem: for truth functions we have to decide: the negation always has to lead from 1 to 2 or 3 - then the double negation does not work anymore. >Excluded Middle/Quine. X 111 Deviating Logic/Dialethism/Sentence of the excluded middle/translation/meaning/negation/Quine: some in science reject the sentence of the excluded middle and occasionally consider a sentence and its negation both true. Vs: as an objection one hears that any conjunction of the form "p.~p" ((s) AZ: when the form is presented) logically implies any sentence. (EFQ). If one now accepts the negation together with the sentence, the distinction would be true/false and thus the whole science. Solution/VsVs: the contradictions could perhaps be isolated. QuineVsDialethism/QuineVsPriest: in this dispute, no side knows what they are actually talking about. One only thinks one is talking about negation, i.e. "~" or the sign for "not". In reality, however, the sign "~" has nothing to do with negation if the conjunction "p.~p" is considered true. QuineVsDeviating Logic: it only changes the subject. X 118 Adjunction/Negation/logical operators/Quine: are inherent, not transcendent. Because with a deviating logic we cannot maintain its meanings. Intuitionism: is therefore not a different opinion about the laws for the operators. Rather, he fights them as useless for science. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Negation | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 150 Negation/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the negation is the same picture - the sense of which is, however, reversed - (polarized) - so that the sentence negation is eliminated. Negation/Frege/Russell/Hintikka: negations of the predicate eliminate them and instead add the sentence negation. II 51 Negation/Wittgenstein: its meaning can only be expressed through rules of use. II 51 Denial/negation/Wittgenstein: there must be an agreement: E.g. the red light is on its own not the instruction to stop. It must be explained with the help of language. The meaning of "no" can only be expressed in rules that apply to its manner of use. II 72 Negation/explanation/Russell: explained ~ p by saying that ~ p is true when p is false, and vice versa. II 73 Negation/WittgensteinVsRussell: but that is no explanation of negation, because it could also apply to other than the negative sentences. (> Truth table). II 74 Negation/fact/Wittgenstein: what corresponds to the sentence "the door is not open" if it is open? But here a mistaken analogy comes into play, because it is nothing that corresponds to p. And that, what corresponds to ~ p , is not being the case of p. II 75 Denial/negation/understanding/Wittgenstein: the understanding of "no" is like understanding a chess move. >Chess. II 113 Fact/negation/Wittgenstein: there are no positive or negative facts. "Positive" and "negative" refer to the form of the sentences and not to the facts. >Facts. II 114 A negative statement has not meaning in the same way as a positive statement; it cannot be described by positive terms and maintain its negative meaning. >Thoughts/Frege. II 221 Internal negation/Wittgenstein: the statement "this table is green" does not form part of the statement "this table is not green"? - ((s) claim, not sentence) - Wittgenstein: we rather draw a picture. >Picture theory. II 234 Generality/general things/general/negation/Wittgenstein: the grammars of the generality and the negation are ambiguous in incredible ways. >Generality. E.g. "This square is white" I could translate it as: "all the points of this square are white". Then we cannot say: "a point is not white" without introducing new conventions. Negation/"all"/Wittgenstein: both have different grammars. One has raised the question whether the negation of sentences implies the same as a disjunction of sentences. In certain cases, it is actually so: E.g. disjunction: "this is one of the primary colors, but not red", which means: "this is white or yellow or green or blue or black." However, there is no disjunction which corresponds to "Schmitz is not in this room". >Disjunction. Double Negation/Wittgenstein: is frequently used in the sense of a simple negation. E.g. "I like it and I do not like it". II 239 Who says we do not mean them in that sense, is saying that there are different types of double negation. Some say: "the application will be different." But how can one speak of a system of signs, without talking of the application. >Use, >Signs. E.g. I can lay my hands together so that they are covering each other. But one can ask: How would you like to explain "cover" with or without reference to something that is brought to cover? II 276 Double negation/Wittgenstein: double negation equals affirmation: it is not a determination about our habits, because then it would be a statement of natural history and not even a true one. It may be that the double negation means the negation in a symbol system. >Symbols. II 282 Negation/disjunction/Repertoire/Wittgenstein: if one has a distinct repertoire one can equate negation "not-p" with a disjunction e.g. "q v r v s" - that does not work, with e.g. "not this red here". - Delimited repertoire: E.g. permutations. Philosophy/Wittgenstein: the words "true" and "false" are two words, of which the philosophy was so far dependent. The philosophy is always based on questions without sense. We can completely abolish true and false. Instead, "sentence" and "negation". ((s)> referential quantification, > semantic ascent). II 288 Shadow/negation/world/reality/figure/Wittgenstein: we believe the sentences must correspond at least with something like a shadow. But nothing is thus obtained. After all, why in the world should there be a shadow of that reality? The confusing of the negation is in the thought, a symbol must correspond to something. >World, >Reality. How can you know what is meant when no equivalent is there? Nevertheless, you must know what you mean. >Meaning (Intending). II 289 Negation/Wittgenstein: E.g. "here is not a chair" corresponds to that here is the place and somewhere in the world are chairs. E.g. "I wish Schmitz may come" erroneous idea: that the sentence must consist of somehow jointed portions, like a box has a bottom and a lid. II 290 Negation/understanding/Wittgenstein: if one has understood "~ p", one must also have understood "p". But if p is false, there is nothing that corresponds to it. What does it mean to understand a command, if you do not follow him? By forming an image one does not get closer to the execution. >Understanding. --- IV 79 Negation/denial/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 5,513 one could say, two sentences are opposed to one another if they have nothing in common - and: every sentence has only one negative - ((s)> completeness,> maximum). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Possibility | Aristotle | Berka I 137 Possibility/Aristotle: 1 unilateral: what is not necessary. ("normal" definition today). 2 two-sided: what is neither necessary nor required (not impossible). (This is leading to problems). "Pure chance"/Aristotle ... follows from the "two-sided" possibility: For a certain P: it is possible that p, and it is possible that non-P. >Contingency, >Necessity, >Negation, >Double negation. |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Propositional Attitudes | Cresswell | II 31 Propositional attitudes/attribution/ambiguity/Cresswell: 1. Thesis: sentences with propositional attitude are ambiguous - 2. Thesis: the ambiguity is located in the word "that" - that is, the ambiguity is not located in the attitude verb or somewhere in the complement sentence. >That, >That sentences, >Opacity, >Ambiguity. II 35 Propositional Attitude/that-sentence/ambiguity/Cresswell: this is always about whether "that" is applied to the whole following sentence, or to its parts (the references of the individual parts). The ambiguity lies not in a peculiarity of faith. >Beliefs, >Compositionality. II 54 Object/propositional attitude/Cresswell: a) as a question of the meaning of the that-sentence. This is what this book is all about b) Question, what makes the sentence true. >Truthmakers. Answer: that (1) is true, because Ambrose expresses a certain sentence. Object: is then the sentence which Ambrose actually utters - that may have been quite different sentences. In any case, the sentence will represent that it will rain. Def object: is then a representation. ((s) representation/(s): comes into play because it could have been different sentences.) Problem: the object of an attribution of propositional attitudes cannot be the meaning because we can understand it without knowing if it was exactly this sentence. II 55 Def object/attitude/propositional attitude/Terminology/Cresswell: I call the object of the attitude the sentence that is actually uttered. Fodor is concerned with objects. Def content: be the meaning of the that-sentence - it is about contents in this book - different objects (sentences) can have the same content. >Content, >Sentences. II 88f Iterated propositional attitudes/Cresswell: E.g. Natasha believes that Mortimer believes ... No problem: if "that" is applied to entire sentences (that0) - (similar to the double negation). - Problem: if the that is applied to individual structures - E.g. (7 + 5) + 2 - ((s) misleading). No problem: if the + is a function of numbers (i.e. the referent of the digits) Problem: if + should operate on structures (= sense of numeric expressions). II 160 Object/propositional attitude/Cresswell: the objects are not determined by the content. That is, that an explanation of action by desire/faith could sometimes be undefined. >Opacity. Content: is simply not sufficient for a determination of the object. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Situation Semantics | Barwise | Cresswell II 169 Situation semantics/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: (Barwise/Perry, 1983)(1): here it is explicitly denied that logically equivalent sentences in contexts with propositional attitudes are interchangeable. (1983(1), 175, 1981b(4), 676f) - e.g. double negation in the attribution of propositional attitudes. >Equivalence, >Double negation. Solution: partial character of situations. - Not everything has to be given - or the speaker may have to suspend judgment. ("do not ..."). >Situations. Def sentence meaning/Barwise/Perry: a relation between situations. Cresswell I 63 Situation SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/knowledge/meaning/Barwise/Perry/BarweiseVsCresswell/ PerryVsCresswell/Cresswell: the possible worlds are too big to explain what the speaker knows when he/she utters a meaningful sentence. Possible worlds: are complete possible situations. >Possible worlds, >Possible World Semantics. Situation semantics: we need a more partial type of entity. ((s) partial, not complete). CresswellVsSituation Semantics: (Cresswell 1985a(2), 168 ff, 1985b(3), Chapter 7) Solution/Cresswell: Thesis: The situations only have to be partial in the sense that they are small worlds. Def Abstract Situation/Barwise/Perry: (1983(1), 57 ff): abstract situations are theoretical constructs used for an adequate semantic modeling of reality consisting of real situations. Cresswell: I ignore this distinction here. The semantics of possible worlds is better here, even if one differentiates between reality and theoretical representation. >Possible World Semantics. What we need to compare are abstract situations and worlds. I 64 Situation-SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/BarwiseVsCresswell: there are often two propositions, one of which is believed by the person, but the other is not, but both are still true in the same worlds - for example, all logical and mathematical truths - but they are not all known, otherwise there could be no progress. I 65 CresswellVs: the situations should play roles that cannot be played at the same time. Solution: Semantics of possible worlds: the roles are played by entities of different kinds. Solution: Context with space-time specification. >Context. False sentences: describe non-actual situations. I 66 Sentences describe situations in a context - context is itself a situation that provides the listener with time, place, etc. Interpretation/Barwise: Meaning of sentences in a context. >Interpretation, >Sentence meaning. Meaning/CresswellVsSituation Semantics/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry: Meaning: = set of worlds in which they are true. Problem: Meanings are often equated with proposition, and then there are problems in playing roles that they cannot play at the same time. I 67 On the other hand, some of the other things that Barwise and Perry ask for from situations behave like worlds! For example: Mollie barks e*: = in I, Mollie, yes. That describes a situation e iff e* < e. ((s) Subset of situations where Mollie barks otherwise? Or where Mollie exists and someone barks?). Def Generation property/terminology/Cresswell: (generation property): sentences that describe a situation have a situation property ((s) that is part of a set of situations). A sentence ? has the generation property in terms of a context u, iff there is a situation e*, so that u[[φ]] e iff e* < e. ((s) If there is a sentence that is more general than the sentence "Mollie barks in the space-time situation I" Or: Generation property is the property that embeds the sentence in the context, because proposition as sets of worlds must not be limited to a single situation.) The sentence φ has the generation property (simpliciter) iff it has it in every context. Atomic sentence/Barwise/Perry: Thesis: all atomic sentences have the generation property. >Atomic sentences. Cresswell: if situations are to be understood as proposition, all sentences should have the generation property. And that is because the generating situation e* can be understood as the proposition expressed by the sentence ? in context u. In fact, we do not need the other situations at all! We can say that e* is the only situation described by φ in u. But that doesn't matter, because each e* determines the only class of e's, so e* < e, and each class generated by an e* determines that e* uniquely. 1. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1983). Situations and Attitudes. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Edited by John Perry 2. M. J. Cresswell (1985a) Situations and Attitudes. Philosophical Review 94 (2):293 3. M. J. Cresswell (1985b). Structured meanings. MIT Press 4. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1981), 6 : 387 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1981.tb00447.x |
Barw I J. Barwise Situations and Attitudes Chicago 1999 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Truth | Leibniz | Holz I 44 Truth of reason/Truth of facts/Leibniz: Truth of reason: certain simple and original ideas, such as those of identity, are immediately seen as modes or forms of our sense-perception as categories of the givenness of beings. They are not mediated by perception, but are the determinateness of perception itself. >Perception/Leibniz. I 54 Def Truth/Leibniz/Holz: truth appears as a statement relation, in which the identity of different things is determined against each other. Def Experience/Leibniz/Holz: experience is the return of something different to their connection in such a relation. Discovery of the truth of different things, namely subject and predicate in synthetic sentences of experience. Truth/Leibniz/Holz: truth is not really in the identity of the subject A = A, but in the return of the predication to the identity of a certain predicate with a certain subject in which it is contained, thereby distinguishing the subject from other subjects. The truth of a proposition states that it can be traced back to an identical proposition (axiom). I 57 Truth/Leibniz: truth appears only mediated, in the medium of its opposite, of appearance (> Appearance/Hegel). Truth of facts/truth of reason/Leibniz: I gain the certainty of the facts, the vérités de fait only by means of their representation on the level of reason - the vérités de raison. This can show me the material truth but only as the not wrong. ((s) Double negation: is weaker.) In the reversal of the method of proof in truths of facts, the variety of experience and the unity of reason stand opposite to each other like a mirror image. I 63 Truth of facts/Leibniz: the truth of facts must exist, if anything should be said at all about the infinite manifoldness, and knowledge should thus be gained. Truth of reasons/Leibniz: truth of reasons is necessary, their opposite is impossible. Truth of facts/Leibniz: truth of facts is contingent, their opposite is possible. Holz: the difference between the two must not be misunderstood, otherwise Russell would be right: I 64/65 Russell: It is nonsense to say of a true proposition that it is not true in the sense of another, apotictically true proposition. ((s), for example, that a truth of reason contradicts a truth of facts). Holz: the difference lies in the argument. For the proof of truth of facts, we must examine the preceding chain of connections and because of the infinite divisibility of the bodies an infinite number of sentences. This can only do the infinite mind of God. >Order/Leibniz. Truth of reason/Leibniz: is the generic term for truths of reasons and truths of facts! The truth attribute of both lies in the fact that in the subject concept all its possible predicates are contained. "Praedicatum inest subiecto". Inclusion of the predicate in the subject: A is contained in Ax or Ax = A + B + ... X. I 66 This inclusion of the predicate is the foundation of truth. This is, according to structure, a reason of reason. >Predicate/Leibniz. Def truth/Leibniz/Holz: is then the constitution of that state in which identity comes to a being or a fact when it enters into a distinction between subject/predicate/definiendum/definiens. This state is where the fact appears as the concept of the fact. Truth is a reflexion relationship. I 68 "Overarching general"/Leibniz/Holz: the truth of reason is the genre which comprises two (and only two) species, namely the truth of reason itself and its opposite, the truths of facts. For the formal logician, this remains a systematic contradiction: Leibniz makes a distinction between necessary and contingent truths. Nevertheless, he comprehends both of them analytically! Holz: in fact, the relationship is not a formal logical one, but a dialectical one. > Josef König: "The Overarching General" as the basic logical figure of Leibniz's metaphysics, is necessary for the inexpressable multiplicity of the world, which can nevertheless be subjected to an order of reason. I 73 Complete concept/Leibniz: the complete concept contains all possible conditions and determinations for the existence of a particular being, is thus identical with the concept of the world as a whole. Only perceptible to an infinite mind. Overarching general: for the infinite mind, the distinction between truths of reason and truths of facts is again invalid. For him, everything is a truth of reason, or, one can say as well, everything is a truth of facts for him! For the finite mind, however, the truth of reason is the opposite of the truth of facts. Overarching general: the one involves its opposite. Truth/Cognition/Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: This again has the astounding consequence that Leibniz can only speak sensibly of two kinds of truth (truths of facts/truths of reason) when he comprehends the idea of the infinite mind (for which the two coincide) only as a metaphysical auxiliary construction. >Truth of reason, >Truth of facts. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Vagueness | Field | II 227 Vagueness/revision of the logic/Field: some authors: to allow double negation, to prohibit explicit contradictions, thus also not to allow negations of the law of the excluded middle (l.e.m.). >Negation, >Double negation, >Contradictions, >Stronger/Weaker, >Excluded middle. Then old version: if Jones is a limiting case for "Jones is bald", we cannot claim either "bald" or "not-bald", so we can now. New: neither claim: E.g. "Jones is bald or not bald" nor "It is not the case that Jones is either bald or not bald." On the other hand: Field: with definite-operator (definite): "It is not the case that Jones is either definitely bald or definitely not bald". - Without law of the excluded middle: "neither bald nor not bald". II 228 Limiting case/vagueness/definite-Operator/Field: we need the definite-operator to avoid a limiting case of the a limiting case. >dft-operator, >Terminology/Field. II 228 Def Weakly true/vagueness/truth/truth-predicate/Field: to be able to say general things about borderline cases. Not only that somebody represents a certain limiting case. >Generalization. Def paradigmatic borderline case: definitely a borderline case. Not weakly true/deflationism: e.g. "Either bald or not-bald is true". Then the Truth-predicate itself inherits the vagueness. It is not definitely true whether or not. Def Strongly true/Field: assuming, Jones is a limiting case: then neither "bald" nor its negation (strongly) plus classical logic: then the disjunction "bald or not bald" should be true even in strong interpretation. Law of the excluded middle: if we give it up: a) weakly true: then the disjunction is not true b) strongly true: then the disjunction is without truth value. Strongly true: is less vague, does not inherit the vagueness. Correctness: which interpretation is the correct one is only dependent on utility. >Correctness. Per weak truth: allows infinite conjunction and disjunction. This corresponds more to the theory of validity. - Only the weak Truth-concept is supplied by the disquotation scheme. Deflationism: deflationism additionally requires the definite-operator to declare the predicate strongly true. >Deflationism. II 230 Inflationism/Vagueness/FieldVsInflationism: Problem: the I. needs a thing that is "neither bald nor not bald". Inflationism: explains e.g. "weakly true" compositional. >Inflationism. Supervaluation/Sorites/Inflationism: "candidate of an extension". >Supervaluation. Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. - Then the limiting case without definite-operator: "Jones is bald in some extensions but not in all". II 233 Vagueness/Ontology/Field: Thesis: vgueness is a deficiency of language, not of the world. >Language dependence. II 234 Vagueness/radical non-classical logic/Field: here we do not need a definite-operator or distinction between strong/weak truth: e.g. Jones is a limiting case iff it is not the case that he is either bald or not bald. Deflationism/Field: seems to save a lot of trouble, because there is no definite-operator, one would have to understand. Vs: that deceives: the trouble is only postponed: here the logical rules for "not", etc. are much more complicated. ... + ... II 228 Weakly true:...++... |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Verificationism | Dummett | II 112ff Disjunction/Verification/Meaning Theory/Dummett: quite different than in the intuitionist logic: e.g. it was either an even or odd number of geese on the Capitol - should not have to guarantee that any one of the disjuncts can be verified - then the law of the excluded middle is assertible even if the sentence itself is undecidable. II 123 Verificationist Meaning Theory/Dummett: results from the assumption that we cannot have any concept of a fact that we cannot see - Important argument: then the non-occurrence of a non-discernible fact is not in itself another fact. -> anti-realism). - Then the fact that an assertion cannot be seen as neither correct nor incorrect is to be shown sufficiently that it can be neither correct nor incorrect - that only leads to bivalency in realism. II 126 Verific. Meaning Theory/Correctness/Realism/Anti-Realism/Dummett: a) Verificationist meaning theory: truth conditions visible: then two options: 1) assertion correct if shown that it is impossible to be incorrect - 2) incorrect, if not displayable as correct b) Realism: truth conditions not visible: then there is no difference, because the incorrectness conditions always exist if the correctness conditions do not exist, and vice versa - II 126 but even here incorrectness prevails. II 126 Verificationist Meaning Theory/Dummett: needs only effective, decidable concepts - (not realistic) - but neither classical nor intuitionistic logic! II 126 Meaning Theory/Verification/Logical Form/Dummett: double negation: ~~A l- A and l-A > ~~A but not A l- ~~A - also: l- A v ~A, l- ~(A & ~A), ~(A & B) -ll- ~A v ~B, ~(A v B) l- ~A & ~B, but not: ~A & ~ B l- ~(A v B). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tradition | Wessel Vs Tradition | I 16 Universality/WesselVsTradition: according to the traditional view there are individual domains in which the logical rules supposedly do not apply: e.g. states of change. In modern intuitionist mathematics, double negation is not equated with position. Wessel's Question: why do we regard these logical laws as universal and not others? Where is the boundary between universal and nonuniversal laws? Here one should not expect reasonable answers. Logical laws, by their very nature, do not allow for exceptions, I 17 and they do not depend on any peculiarities of an area. The only thing that depends on the range is which of the known laws are used. I 329 Definition/Wessel: it is always about the introduction of a new term for an already known (introduced) term. ta ‹_›def tb or a ‹_›def b. I 330 Tradition: a more general term is always restricted. (>genus, differentia specifica). Example electron: light, negative elementary particle. ta '_'def t(b lv P u Q) (b lv P u Q: "b with the property P u Q"). WesselVsTradition: a definition can also have a completely different form: ta '_' t(a1 v ...van) (e.g. "fruit", enumeration). |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
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