Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| de se | Cresswell | II 121 De se/Lewis: is an attitude that someone has to himself. II 123 De se/Indirect speech/Kaplan/Cresswell: (Kaplan 1978)(1) E.g. "his pants are on fire" - "My God, that’s me". Not sufficient: a description that singles out Kaplan for Kaplan, - because that is compatible with it that he does not know that he himself is Kaplan. Sufficient: "...he himself ...". Analog: time: de nunc: statement on the date at which it is located - "it is now four o’clock". Differently: "Zeus says" four o’clock"" - this could be a timetable information. >He/He himself, >Quasi-indicator, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Self-ascription. II 124 Solution/Cresswell: triple: of world time, person. >Centered world, >Possible worlds, >Person, >Time. 1. Kaplan, D. (1978). "Dthat". In P. Cole (ed) Syntax and Semantics 9: Pragmatics. New York: Academic Press. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Demonstratives | Stalnaker | I 197 dthat/Kaplan/rigid making operator/Stalnaker (Kaplan 1978)(1): the object always refers back to the actual world. >make rigid. Then the speaker is in each of the possible worlds the speaker from the original world. >Rigidity. 1. Kaplan, David (1978): "Dthat", Syntax and Semantics, vol. 9, ed. P. Cole New York: Academic Press. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Dualism | Chalmers | I 125 Dualism/Consciousness/Chalmers: we have seen that materialism failed because of the lack of logical supervenience of conscious experience on physical facts. >Supervenience, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Consciousness, >Materialism. This is followed by a dualism, but not a Cartesian dualism, which assumes a "mind in the machine", which performs extra causal work. Instead, for us, a kind of property duelism follows. > Property dualism/Chalmers, cf. >R. Descartes. I 134 Dualism/Chalmers: you could avoid the dualism by referring to a zombie world that is physically identical to ours as being described as false. >Zombies/Chalmers. I 135 This world would at the same time be identical and different. We could make the physical properties rigid with the operator "dthat", e.g. dthat (plays the role of ...). >"dthat", >Rigidity, >Operators, >Properties. N.B.: then the zombie world would not have some features that our world has. N.B.: then consciousness could metaphysically supervene on other properties. That would be an interesting argument. >Metaphysical possibility, >Metaphysics. ChalmersVsVs: 1. this is speculative. 2. (more direct): it is based on an incorrect semantics of physical concepts. I 136 For example, an electron with unrecognized properties would still be called an electron, but not an electron with the properties of a proton. >Change in meaning, >Change in theory. Metaphysics/Chalmers: semantics is not so decisive here, but the metaphysical question remains. I 154 Dualism/Definition Proto-phanomenal property/Chalmers: involves as the only one not experiencing itself, but several simultaneously existing could have this. This is strange to us, but cannot be excluded a priori. This would suggest a causal role of the phenomenal. Cf. >Emergence, >Emergence/Chalmers, >Causality, >Phenomena, >Experience, >Knowing how. To represent such a theory would simply mean to accept another possible world where something else had the role of causation, but such a world would not be logically excluded. >Causation. I 155 Dualism/Chalmers: if we were to take such a position, we would represent an essential dualism. >Essentialism. ChalmersVsDualism: one can also understand this position non-dualist, albeit not as a materialistic monism. It then provides a network of intrinsic properties that "realizes" the extrinsic physical properties. >Monism, >Extrinsic, >Intrinsic, cf. >Exemplification. The laws are still the physical ones. In extreme form, when all intrinsic properties are phenomenal, we are dealing with a variant of idealism, but according to Berkeley's type. >G. Berkeley, >Idealism. It would most likely correspond to a version of Russel's neutral monism: I 155 Monism/Russell/Chalmers: neutral monism: the fundamental properties of the world are neither physical nor phenomenal, but the physical and the phenomenal are both built up from this fundamental. The phenomenal is formed from the intrinsic natures, the physical from the extrinsic. I 156 Dualism/Definition Interactionistic Dualism/Definition Interactionism/Chalmers: here, experience fills the causal gaps in the physical process. >Experience. ChalmersVs: that creates more problems than it solves. It does not solve the problems with epiphenomenalism. >Epiphenomenalism. Pro: the only argument for interactionist dualism are some properties of quantum mechanics that could be better explained. (> Eccles 1986)(1) I 157 ChalmersVsEccles: the effects would be much too small to cause any eventual behavioral changes. Other counter examples: VsInteractionistic Dualism/VsInteractionism/Chalmers: 1. it contradicts the quantum mechanical postulate that the microscopic "decisions" are random. 2. a behavior that was triggered by these microscopic influences would have to differ from behavior triggered differently. ChalmersVsEccles: such theories are also silent on what should happen in the brain if the wave function collapses. ChalmersVsInteractionistic Dualism: this makes the phenomenal irrelevant. I 158 ChalmersVsEccles: if there are psychons, then they can manage with purely causal interactions, without assumed phenomenal properties. VsChalmers: one might object that psychons (or ectoplasm, or whatever) are constituted by phenomenal properties. ChalmersVsVs: even then their phenomenal properties are irrelevant to the explanation of behavior: in the history of causation, it is only the relational properties that count. Thus this adheres to the causal unity of the physical. ChalmersVsInteractionism/ChalmersVsEccles: even if one were assuming psychones, one could tell a story about zombies, which involved psychones. One would then again have to assume additional phenomenal properties of psychones without being able to prove them. I 162 Definition Interactionist Dualism/Chalmers: Chalmers accepts that consciousness is non-physical (VsMaterialism) but he denies that the physical world is causally closed so that consciousness can play an autonomous causal role. >Causal role, >Causality, >Causation. I 162 Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: so I characterize my own view: Thesis: Consciousness supervenes naturally on the physical, without supervening logically or "metaphysically". >Supervenience. I argue that materialism is wrong and that the realm of physical is causally completed. I 171 Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: my position is already implicitly shared by many who still call themselves "materialists". All I have done is to make the ontological implications of the naturalistic view explicit - that consciousness "emerges" from the physical. We do not have to give up much, what is important for our scientific world. Cf. >Emergence, >Emergence/Chalmers. 1. Eccles, J.C. (1986) Do Mental Events Cause Neural Events Analogously to the Probability Fields of Quantum Mechanics? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 227, 411-428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1986.0031 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Haecceitism | Haecceitism: the thesis that an object can be fixed by the identification as "this here" to allow further assertions on this subject to be stated. E.g. To claim that in a different world, this object is different. See also identification, identity, logical proper names, anti-haecceitism, index words, > indexicality, individuation, dthat, rigidity, possible worlds. |
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| Rigidity | Evans | Stalnaker I 198 "Dthat" rigidity: is a rigid-making operator: the object should thus be defined as the same in all possible worlds. Rigidity/rigid/Evans: e.g. Julius/Zip/Evans/Stalnaker: "The inventor of the zip, we call him Julius" - the example can be interpreted in two ways: A) as an abbreviation of a complex singular term "dthat [the inventor of the zip]". Then "inventor of the zip" is part of the meaning. And it is a logical truth that he invented it. B) as a determination: that Julius is the name of the person. Then it would be a semantic ((s) non-logical connection) between name and person. - Then the role of the description would be to set the reference. For example, someone hears the name: Case A) then he/she does not understand the utterance - then "dthat [the person to which Stalnaker referred to in the situation]" ad B) if the semantic properties of "Julius" are part of the historical causal chain, then the competent speaker does not need to know anything about it. Cf. >Operators. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Rigidity | Kaplan | Stalnaker I 197 dthat / Kaplan / rigid-making operator / Stalnaker (Kaplan 1978) - refers to the object always in relation to the actual world. - (Make rigid) - The reference in every world is then the original object from the actual world. >Index words, >Indexicality, >Names, >Designation, >Possible world, >Actual world, >I, Ego, Self/Kaplan. |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Rigidity | Stalnaker | I 81 Non-rigidness/non-rigid/predicate/Stalnaker: non-rigid predicates correspond to different intrinsic properties in various possible worlds. >Predicates, >Possible worlds, >Intrinsicness. I 185 Rigidness/Stalnaker: does rigidness presuppose cross world identity? >Cross world identity. I 197 Dthis/Dthat/Kaplan/Rigid-making operator/Stalnaker: (Kaplan 1978)(1): "dthis" and "dthat" always refer the object back to the actual world (i.e. they make it rigid). The reference is then in each possible world the original from the real world. >Dthat/Kaplan. I 198 E.g. Julius/Zipper/Evans/Stalnaker: the zipper example can be interpreted in two ways. a) As an abbreviation of a complex singular term dthis [the inventor of the zipper], then the inventor of the zipper is part of the meaning. And it is a logical truth that he invented it. b) As a definition: that Julius is the name of a person. Then it would be a semantic one ((s) not a logical connection) between the name and person. Then the role of the description, the reference, would have to be defined, e.g. someone overhears the name: case a) then this person does not understand the statement. Then dthis [the person to whom Stalnaker referred on the occasion]. Ad b) if the semantic properties of Julius are part of the historical causal chain, the competent speaker does not need to know anything about it. >Semantic properties. 1. Kaplan, David. 1978. Dthat. In Peter Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics. Academic Press. pp. 221--243 |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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