Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Facts Millikan I 104
Facts/Real value/Millikan: the real value of a sentence is the fact in the world. Wrong sentence/correspondence/Millikan: here the singular term has an indirect, "piggyback" - relation to its referent.
N.B.: but this is not the relation of a "should-be-like-that".
Correspondence: takes place only in true sentences.
Normal relation/E.g. Unicorn/Millikan: (in the wrong sentence > non-existence) the "should-correspond" is not correspondence, but the possession of meaning! Its referring is its having a certain kind of meaning or sense.
I 222
Negative fact/Millikan: we must be able to show that a negative act is still something else than the non-existence of a positive fact. And we cannot do that. We just moved around in circles. Non-existent fact/Millikan: a non-existent fact cannot be an object of an icon and not an object of a representation.
Negative fact/Millikan: a negative would then have to be something other than a non-existent fact.
N.B.: but if we can show that, we do not even have to accept that "non-p" says "that p does not exist".
Negative sentence/image/fact/negation/Millikan: what I then have to assert is that negative sentences represent actual and/or existing world states (facts).
It is well known how to do this:
Negation/solution: one simply says that the negation is only applied to the logical predicate of the sentence ((s) internal negation). In doing so, the meaning of the predicate is changed, so that the predicate applies (maps) to the opposite as it usually does.
I 223
This can then also be extended to more complex sentences with >external negation: E.g. "No A is φ" becomes "Every A is non-φ".
MilllikanVs: the difficulties with this approach are also well-known:
1. Problem: how to interpret the function of "not" in very simple sentences of the form "x is not" E.g. "Pegasus is not (pause)" Here "not" can be interpreted as operating over predicates! Sentences of the form "x is not" are, of course, equivalent to sentences of the form "x does not exist".
Problem: we have said that "exists" is not a representation. Thus "not" cannot be interpreted as always operating on a predicate of a representative sentence.
For example, "Cicero is not Brutus" cannot operate on a logical predicate of the sentence, since simple identity sentences have no logical predicate. So "not" has to have other functions.
Problem: In which relations do these different functions stand together? For we should assume that "not" does not have different meanings in different contexts.
I 226
Negative Facts/Imperative/Indicative/Not/Negation/Millikan: E.g. "do not do A" has the eigenfunction to produce the same state as the one which would make the indicative sentence "H did not do A" true. Making true: So, it is a question of creating a state that makes a sentence true.
Millikan: It is not a question of producing non-existent things, but of creating existential things.
E.g. "John did not go to the office". This is not a question of whether one has not an opinion in the end whether John is going to the office.
Negative Belief/Millikan: if a negative belief exists in this context, it must have a positive function.
Conversely, John has done something that was contrary to going to the office.
Alternative/Negation/Millikan: there is a structured space of alternatives, in which John necessarily acts.
Alternatives/complexity: the less complex they are described, the less their number.
Negative fact/negation/not/Millikan: thesis: if something is not the case, that means something else is the case.
E.g. to obey a negative command must be something that could have also caused a positive action.
But positive facts cause positive states. So that something is not the case,...
I 227
...must always correspond to the fact that something else is the case. Otherwise we could not explain how negative intentions can be executed.
Belief/conviction/real value: here it is parallel: intentions cause their real values. Conversely, real values of beliefs cause beliefs, e.g. because John's jacket is brown, I believed that John's jacket is brown.
Negative belief: correspondingly: real value of belief that John's jacket is not red must be the belief that it is not red, or - more specifically - brown. But I do not assure myself of this by not seeing the jacket, but by seeing that the jacket has a different color.
Opposite/Millikan: only properties and relations have opposites but these are not absolute. There must be a common foundation. We should assume that "not" has not different meanings in different contexts.
I 257
Negative sentence/Millikan: a negative sentence forms a positive fact (world state), not the absence of a fact.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Indeterminacy Millikan I 228
Not/Opposite/Millikan: Problem: there is no definite opposite that is mapped when "not" occurs in a sentence. >Negation, >Nonexistence, >Internal negation, >External negation.
"Not" transforms a definite predicate into an indefinite.
Cf. >Thought/Frege.
Opposite/definite/undefinite/Millikan: Thesis: the ontological phenomenon of the opposite is fundamental to the linguistic! Not the other way around!
Property/relation/Millikan: the identity of a property or relation is tied to the identity of its opposite, and that is a truth of ontology, not of logic.
Logical subject: has no opposite.
I 229
Therefore, it is not affected by the negation.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Lambda Calculus Bigelow I 98
Rules/composition/composition rules/syntax/Bigelow/Pargetter: one can also go the other way and want to simplify the rules. That is what the λ-categorical language/Lambda calculus/Lambda notation/Lambda abstraction/Bigelow/Pargetter does: (see also Cresswell I and II, as well as Montague).
>Lambda-Abstraction/Cresswell, >R. Montague.
For example: Negation: surprisingly, one can assign a referent to it and keep it thus out of the rules:
I 99
Vs: we then have another referential layer in the theory. Example
Negation: we can assign a set theoretical symbol that represents the value "true" or "false".
((s) Truth value/Frege/(s): assigns a referent to the negation, a "thing": "the false".
>Truth values, >Existence, >Objects, >Reference, >Sets, >Set theory.
Bigelow/Pargetter: then we have a judgement function that assigns the semantic value (or referent) V(a) to a symbol a.
>Valuation.
1: be "true".
0: be "false". Def semantic value: (the negation V(a)) is then the function ω~, so that

ω ~ (1) = 0 ω ~ (0) = 1

is appropriate for compound expressions (internal/external negation, conjunction, etc.)
>Semantic value, >Outer negation, >Negation, >Conjunction.
I 100
Lambda categorical language/λ/Lambda/Rules/Bigelow/Pargetter: such languages have extremely few composition rules. We have more referring symbols for this.
>Rules, >Symbols.
Realism: would describe this as ontologically honest.
Semantics/Bigelow/Pargetter: but the realist does not have to commit himself to one semantics instead of another.
>Realism.
The semantics does not decide upon ontology.
>Semantics, >Ontology.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Negation Wessel I 157
Negation/Frege: Frege does not distinguish between internal and external negation. >Internal negation, >External negation, >Negation/Frege, >G. Frege.
I 325
Terms/Negation/Wessel: singular terms and categorical terms (which include everything) can not be negated. >Singular terms.
General terms can be negated.
>General terms.
Negation of singular terms: is only possible in a range of 2 items and again leads to a singular term.
"Non-object": is no term!
Negation of "swimmer" is not "non-swimmers", but also e.g., iron.

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

Predicates Millikan I 109
Subject/predicate/picture/Millikan: thesis: there is no difference between the way in which logical subjects of sentences map...
I 110
...the world, and the way in which logical predicates do this. 1. Because one can replace predicates by other predicates, e.g. "... swims" by "... flies", they are still not to be viewed as objects.
(BrandomVsMillikan/(s): distinction between the frame and the insertion-"gap").
2. Question: Do predicates have to correspond to universals when we treat them as substances? In any case, we must not look at them as single objects, but rather as in tradition as thought objects or as possibilities.
Universals/Millikan: universals as thought objects; are they in nature?
Predicates/Millikan: every simple predicate must reflect a historically variability rooted in nature ((s) disjunction, >disjunctive).
Complex Predicates/Millikan: They too are supposed to reflect variables of nature, but they do not have to be things.
Property/kind/Millikan: property and kind have only one settlement space: that is nature itself.
>Natural kind.
I 111
3. Relation/property/Millikan: as variants within facts they receive intentionality from causal and explanatory connections! Then they must be in the same way in nature as is their identity or their sameness. >Identity/Millikan, >Terminology/Millikan.
I 227
Negation/Predicate/Logical Subject/Millikan: the common basis in the opposite corresponds to the logical subject. E.g. Bill cannot be both large and small at the same time. >Negation/Millikan.
Negation: operates on the logical predicate. It does not change the meaning (the mapping rules). It operates on the part of the logical predicate, which is the grammatical predicate of the sentence.
E.g. "painfully disappointed, Johnny never came back".
Embedded sentence: "Johny was painfully disappointed": is embedded in the grammatical subject.
Truthmaker: Problem: e.g. "some day-active bats are not herbivores" is not made true by the fact that all bats are nocturnal.
Negative sentence: its function is to give positive information. A useful negative sentence will limit the domain of possibilities.
I 228
External negation: "it is not the case that ..." may also affect more than the grammatical predicate. >External negation.
I 272
Subject/Predicate/Strawson/Millikan: (Subject and predicate in "Logic and Grammar") Millikan: I replaced "general concept" here by "properties": fundamental asymmetry: particular: space-temporal, exemplifying properties that come from a certain domain.
Then we know for each property that it is in competition with others.
Asymmetry: there is no such competition for particulars. No individual competes with others for properties within a domain.
No things are related to each other, so that for each property that exemplifies the one, it would follow that the other does not exemplify them (even not at the same time).
MillikanVsStrawson: but what is "logical competition" among properties? It is traditionally recognized among concepts, but we cannot transfer it to properties and relations.
>Particulars/Strawson.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Predication Wessel I 154f
Predication/Wessel: Difference: negation of the attribution of predicates requires distinguishing inner/outer negation. >Internal negation, >External negation, >Negation.
Propositional logic: only external negation: the whole statement is negated.
>Propositional logic.
Internal negation: the predicate is denied.
>Predicates, >Attribution.
It must be possible to express "neither s ‹ P nor s ‹/ P": e.g. "The moon is neither honest nor not honest".
This has nothing to do with the sentence about the law of the excluded middle. "The moon is not honest": the sentence is ambiguous on its own.
>Excluded Middle, >Ambiguity, cf. >Sense, >Senseless.

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

Rules Bigelow I 98
Rules/composition/composition rules/syntax/Bigelow/Pargetter: you can also go the other way and want to simplify the rules. That is what makes the λ-categorical language/Lambda/Lambda Calculus/Lambda Notation/Lambda Abstraction/Bigelow/Pargetter: ((see also Cresswell I and II. and Montague).
>Lambda abstraction, >Lambda calculus, >M.J. Cresswell, >R. Montague.
For example: Negation: you can surprisingly assign a referent to it and keep it out of the rules.
>Reference, >Negation, >Rules.
I 99
Vs: we then have another referential layer in the theory. Example:
Negation: we can assign a set theoretical symbol to it that represents the value "true" or "false".
((s) Truth values/s): assigns a referent to the negation, a "thing": "the
False".
>Truth values, >Truth values/Frege.
Bigelow/Pargetter: then we have a judgement function that assigns the semantic value (or referent) V (a) to a symbol a.
1: be "true".
0: be "false". + Def semantic value: (of the negation V (a)) is then the function ω ~, so that
ω ~ (1) = 0 ω ~ (0) = 1
correspondingly for compound expressions (internal/external negation, conjunction, etc.)
>Outer Negation.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Truth Wessel I 157
Truth/Wessel: only sentences with nonempty object domain can be true. >Truth values, >Existence, >Domain.
I 332
Truth/Wessel: in case of the truth predicate internal and external negation coincide. >Truth predicate, >Internal negation, >External negation, >Negation,
"true"/external: 0-place predicate. (Putnam: satisfied by zero sequence ).
>Satisfaction, >Satisfiability, >Predicates.

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

Vagueness Logic Texts Read III 210
Vagueness/Max Black: Vagueness is not ambiguity and also not generality. It can be difficult to draw a line between what is a chair, and what is not. Here, vagueness sets in and threatens the Sorites. >Sorites, >Ambiguity.
Read III 211
Vagueness: the world itself is not vague. There are no vague objects.
Read III 216
E.g. Everest, Gaurisankar: Suppose it is vague exactly where a mountain begins and where it ends. And vague, whether Everest and Gaurisankar are identical (for it is unclear whether their half-shadows are the same). So the Everest has the property of being Gaurisankar in a vague way.
If the boundary (interpretation or naming) is vague between two things, one is the other in a vague way.
>Name, >Naming, >Reference, >Predication.
But Gaurisankar does not have this property! It is clear that Gaurisankar is Gaurisankar. (Like Everest is Everest) (> properties / >limits). This is the reason why there are no vague objects.
Sorites/Vagueness: Gaurisankar is in a vague way Mt. Everest.
But: in a certain way Gaurisankar.
Attributive adjectives: big for mouse/small for elephant - but there are no vague objects.
Sorites: separation of the "truth predicates": "not not little" is unequal "little".
External negation/Carnap: "~ ~ A" is not meaningful in vagueness.
Read III 230
The degree distributions do not function like probabilistic distributions. Blur: does not help in Sorites - degree distribution is not probability distribution.
Read III 232
The blur suggests that the grid we place over reality does not exactly correspond to our concepts. ---
Sainsbury V 54
Epistemic theory of vagueness/Read: a fact is present, but not knowable. > Causal theory of knowledge: must not have happened by chance. Tolerant concepts, no knowledge - yet vague predicates draw sharp boundaries.
Sainsbury V 56
Intensification theory/vagueness/Sainsbury: Thesis: not all premises should be true. +
Sainsbury V 72
Omniscience/vagueness/Sainsbury: e.g. whether this object is red, an omniscient being cannot answer better than we do. >Omniscience.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001

Re III
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Sai I
R.M. Sainsbury
Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995
German Edition:
Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Aristotle Frege Vs Aristotle Berka I 92
Syllogisms/FregeVsAristotle: his different types of inferences (when deriving one judgment from several) can all be represented by a single one: common form: if M is true, and N is true, A applies as well. Because it is possible to manage with a single type of inference, it is a commandment of clarity, to do just that. In addition: it would otherwise be no reason to remain with the Aristotelian ones, but you could add new ones into the indefinite.(1)
1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964

Stepanians I 9
Frege/Stepanians: his main question was: What are numbers? Thesis: they are something purely logical and therefore all propositions of arithmetic must be logically provable. I 10 FregeVsAristotle/Stepanians: not all propositions can be reduced to the form "S is P". Grammar/Frege: Mixes the logical and the psychological. I 11 Language/Philosophy of Language/Frege: ... the task of philosophy is to break the rule of the word over the human mind. Hence my Begriffsschrift. I 53 Quantifier/Quantifiers/Aristotle/Stepanians: even Aristotle had quantifiers: "all", "some", "none". Problem/Logic//VsAristotle: his system reached its limits as soon as the quantifiers occurred not only in the subject, but also in the predicate. E.g. "All the boys love all the girls." Solution/Frege: Begriffsschrift: expression of generality where it does not matter how many quantifiers occur in the subject or in the predicate. I 54 Generality/Frege: E.g. "2x2 = 4": where is the subject where the predicate? Solution/Frege: Letters/Frege: there are two types of characters in arithmetic: letters, each of which either represents a) an number left indeterminate or b) a function left indeterminate. Generality/Frege: is made possible by this indeterminacy! We can use the letters to express generality: E.g. (a+b)c = ac + bc. Ad a) includes characters such as +, - , 0, 1, 2... each of which has a particular meaning. Law/Generality/Frege/Stepanians: if we replace in a real equation as E.g. 3 + 2 = 2 + 3 the special numbers with letters, we get a law. Conversely, by inserting the same numbers for the same letters we can discover an infinite number of truths.
I 55
Generality/Frege/Stepanians: Important argument: generality no longer refers either to the subject or to the predicate. E.g. "The number 11 is smaller than the number 13": Subject "The number 11",
Predicate "is smaller than the number 13" ((s) VsStepanians: "Number 13" is not the predicate!) Both
may be replaced with characters.
Generalization/Frege/Stepanians: is an operation on the total content of the sentence.
Letters/Variables/Spelling/Frege/Stepanians: where Frege used a, b, c, etc., we use today x, y, z....
Variables/Arithmetic/Logic/Stepanians: while in arithmetic the variables stand for numbers, this limitation to one domain in logic must be abolished. I 56
Domain/Universal Proposition/Conditions/Frege/Stepanians: Frege does not define a scope: E.g. "x is confused" should only apply to the realm of philosophers. Instead: condition: if something is a philosopher, it is confused. I 57 Important argument: this applies for everything, without exception, even for Sam’s goldfish: if x is a philosopher, x is confused. ((s)> counterfactual conditional). Generalization/Generality/FregeVsAristotle: the generalization applies to the whole sentence, not for either the subject or the predicate. Problem: how can the generalized be subjected to other operations E.g. specify exceptions, that not everything is confused? Wrong solution: "not x is confused". At best, "x is not confused", but that boils down to the fact that nothing is confused.
I 58
Solution/Frege: external negation (operator that is applied to the whole sentence) ~(X) is confused. Boy/Girl/Aristotle/Frege/Stepanians: Solution/Frege: Whatever X and Y may be, if x is a boy and y is a girl, then x loves y.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

Step I
Markus Stepanians
Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001
Wittgenstein Millikan Vs Wittgenstein I 221
not/"not"/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: thesis: "not" is an operator which operates on the rest of the sentence by changing the meaning of the entire sentence. (s)VsWittgenstein/(s)VsMIllikan: Problem: a) "no" does not belong to the sentence, then it can be applied on the whole sentence "The sun is shining".
Wittgenstein: "no" changes the meaning of the sentence, to which it belongs.
b) it is part of the sentence, then it would have to be applied twice, the second time on itself. It only changes the meaning, if it is not part of the sentence.
Projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: then the sentence stands for something that does not exist.
Problem/Millikan: this leads to a reification of possibilities.
negative sentence/negation/existence/Millikan: negative sentences can not have non-existent facts as real value.
Justification: negative facts have no causal powers that could play a role in a normal explanation.
negative sentence/Millikan: we could assume that negative sentences are not representations. Ex "not-p" is to say "the fact that p does not exist". Wittgenstein has understood it roughly in that way.
Pointe: above we said that existence theorems are not representations.
projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but he does not think that sentences of the form "x does not exist" represent a non-existent fact. Then the variable "X" in "x does not exist" is not about names of individual things (objects, elementary objects) but about representations of possible states (possible facts).
Sense/non-existence/negation/Wittgenstein/Millikan: so it was possible for him to maintain that sentences of the form "x does not exist" have a meaning. ((s) > Meinong).
Millikan: in our terminology that is, they are representations (MillikanVs).
I 222
And at the same time he could argue that the most basic elements of all propositions correspond to real objects. Pointe: this made it possible that he could say "x does not exist" is always equivalent to a sentence of the form "not-p".
Millikan: couldn't we keep up at least one half of this equivalence? From "non-p" to "that p does not exist"?
MillikanVsWittgenstein: no, not even that we can.
When Wittgenstein was right and "not-p" says "that p does not exist", then that would mean for my position that negative sentences dont project world states and aren't representations.
Millikan: instead they would project linguistic facts, "not-p" would be an icon, but it does not represent, even though a world state would have the sentence type "p" as a variant.
Proto reference/Millikan. "P" would not be an underrepresented reference of "not-p" but a proto reference
.Question: would "not-p" be an icon of "p is false"?
Vs: then "not" would no longer be an operator!
Not/negation/operator/Wittgenstein/Millikan: that is, the projection rule for "not-p" is a function of the projection rule for "p".
1. If "no" would not be an operator, it could happen that someone does not understand the meaning of "p", but still the meaning of "not-p". Absurd.
2. if "not-p" says "that p does not exist", "not-p" would also have to be true if any version of "p" is not completely determined, has no custom meaning. Ex "Pegasus was not a winged horse" Ex "The present king of France is not bald" were true statements!
3. sure, ""p" is wrong" at least reflects (icons) that "p" has no real value. Accordingly: "x does not exist" then reflects the fact that "x" has no reference.
Pointe: if "not-p" says "that p" does not exist, it still projects a negative fact.
negative fact/Millikan: we should be able to show that a negative fact is still something else than the non-existence of a positive fact. But we can not. We have just moved in circles.
non-existent fact/Millikan: can not be a matter of an icon and not the object of a representation.
negative fact/Millikan: would have to be something other than a non-existent fact.
Pointe: but if we can show that, we don't need to assume any longer that "not-p" says "that p does not exist".
negative sentence/projection/fact/negation/Millikan: what I have to claim is that negative sentences depict real or existing world states (facts).
It is well known how such a thing is done:
Negation/solution: one simply says that the negation is applied only to the logical predicate of the sentence ((S) internal negation). Here, the meaning of the predicate is changed so that the predicate applies to the opposite (depicts) as of what it normally does.
I 223
This can then be extended to more complex sentences with external negation: Ex "No A is " becomes "Every A is non-".
MilllikanVs: the difficulties with this approach are also well known:
1. Problem: how can the function of "not" be interpreted in very simple sentences of the form "X is not" Ex "Pegasus is not (pause)". Here, "not" can be interpreted as operating through predicates! Sentences of the form "X is not" are of course equivalent to sentences of the form "x does not exist."
Problem: we have said that "existing" is no representation. So "not" can not be interpreted as always operating on a predicate of a representative sentence.
Ex "Cicero is not Brutus" can not operate on a logical predicate of the sentence, because simple identity sentences have no logical predicate. So "not" must have still other functions.
Problem: how do these different functions relate to each other? Because we should assume that "not" does not have different meanings in different contexts.
meaningless/meaningless sentences/negation/projection/Millikan: here there is the same problem:
Ex "Gold is not square". The sentence does not become true just because gold would have another form than to be a square.
Problem: the corresponding affirmative sentences have no sense!
Yet Ex "Gold is not square" seems to say something real.
Problem: in turn: if "not" has a different function here than in representing sentences, we still need to explain this function.
2. Problem: (Important): the projective rules between simple sentences of the form "X is not " and its real value.
real value/negation/Millikan: is the real value of a negative sentence the world state? Ex The fact of John's not-being-tall? Or a precise fact as Johns being-exactly-180cm?
I 224
Millikan: the latter is correct. Representation/negation/Millikan: thesis: negative representations have an undefined sense. ((S) But Millikan admits that negations are representations, unlike identity sentences and existence sentences).
Millikan: as in vague denotations, real values are determined if they occur in true sentences, but they must not be identified by the hearer to meet their intrinsic function.
Opposite/negative sentence/representation/Millikan: thesis: negative sentences whose opposites are normal representative sentences must project positive facts themselves.
I 229
"not"/negation/negative sentence/representation/SaD/Millikan: thesis: the law of the excluded third is inapplicable for simple representative negative sentences. Ex additionsally to the possibility that a predicate and its opposite are true, there is the possibility that the subject of the sentence does not exist. And that's just the way that the sentence has no particular Fregean sense. "P or not-p": only makes sense if "p" has a sense.
Negation: their function is never (in the context of representative sentences) to show that the sentence would not make sense.
sense/Millikan: one can not know a priori if a sentence makes sense.
Negation/representation/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein: his mistake (in the Tractatus) was to believe that if everyone sees that "x" in "x does not exist" has a meaning that the negative sentence is then a negative representation.
Rationalism/Millikan: the rationalist belief that one could know a priori the difference between sense and non-sense.

I 303
Sensation Language/sensation/private language/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein/Millikan: the problem is not quite what Wittgenstein meant. It is not impossible to develop a private language, but one can not develop languages that speak only of what can be seen only once and from a single point of view.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
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