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Aesthetic Perception | Hamann | Gadamer I 95 Aesthetic Perception/Hamann/Gadamer: The basic aesthetic concept from which Hamann starts is the "self-importance of perception". With this concept, apparently the same is said with Kant's doctrine of the purposeful agreement, with the state of our cognitive faculty in general. Gadamer: What is self-important instead of externally-important wants to cut off the reference to that from which its meaning could be determined. GadamerVsHamann: Can such a term provide a solid basis for aesthetics? Can the term be used at all by a perception? Shouldn't one also grant the concept of the aesthetic what is due to perception, namely that it hears what is true, that it remains related to knowledge? It is indeed good to remember Aristotle. Perception/Aristotle/Gadamer: Aristotle showed that all aisthesis is general, even if every sense has its specific field and that what is directly given in it is insofar not general. But the specific perception of a given sense as such is an abstraction. In truth, we always only look in a general way at what is given to us sensually in detail(1). Gadamer I 96 A. GadamerVsHamann: Now seeing is certainly distinguished by the fact that it does not rush to relate the sight to a generality, the known meaning, the intended purpose or the like, but dwells on the sight as aesthetic. But that is not the reason why we do not stop referring in seeing in such a way, for example to see this white appearance, which we admire aesthetically, nevertheless as a human being. Our perception is never a simple reflection of what is given to the senses. Rather, the newer psychology, especially the astute criticism, which Scheler, as well as W. Koehler, E. Strauß, M. Wertheimer, among others, exercised on the concept of pure perception(2) teaches that this concept stems from an epistemological dogmatism. B. GadamerVsHamann: Even the perception conceived as adequate would never be a simple reflection of what is. For it would always remain an understanding as something. Every understanding as [something] articulates what is there by looking away from [something], looking at [something], seeing [something] together as [something] - and all this can again be in the centre of an attention or become exposed on the periphery and in the background. Thus there is no doubt that seeing, as an articulating reading of what is there, looks away, as it were, so that it is no longer there for seeing; but also that it is guided by its anticipations which are not there. This criticism of the doctrine of pure perception, which was practiced from pragmatic experience, was then turned into the fundamental by Heidegger. In this way, however, it also applies to aesthetic consciousness, although here seeing does not simply linger over what is seen, e.g. its general usefulness for something, but rather dwells on the sight. Dwelling in looking and hearing is not simply seeing the pure sight, but remains itself an understanding as ... Gadamer I 97 Art/Perception: The mode of being of the perceived is not presence. Where it is a matter of meaningful representation, e.g. in the case of works of fine art, insofar as they are not abstract and non-representational, the meaningfulness is obviously serving as a guideline for the reading of the sight. Only when we "recognize" what is represented we are able to "read" a picture - yes, only then is it basically a picture. >Seeing/Gadamer. C. Form/Content/GadamerVsHamann: It is therefore an inverted formalism, which moreover may invoke Kant to seek the unity of the aesthetic entity in contrast to its content solely in its form. Kant had something quite different in mind with his concept of form. Not against the meaningful content of a work of art, but against the mere sensual appeal of the material - the concept of form in his work describes the construction of the aesthetic structure. >Form and Content/Gadamer. 1. Aristoteles, De anima, 425 a 25. 2. M. Scheler, in »Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft«, 1926, S. 397 ff. Jetzt Ges. Werke 8, S. 315ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Beginning | Hegel | Bubner I 61 Beginning/End/Hegel/Bubner: just like in a symphony the first note does not say that it is the beginning of a piece of music, the last note does not show that it is the end. The determination of the beginning and the end of a systematically developed context always requires external mediation. In Hegel, this mediation is done by Method Reflection. >Mediation, >Mediation/Hegel. The first insight concerns the unfoundedness of the assumption made in each case. I 62 External Mediation/Hegel: for him the method reflection plays this role. The assumption made in each case is unfounded! Last chapter of logic: What is still to be considered here is not a content as such, but the general nature of its form, that is the method. >Logic/Hegel. Content/Form/Generality/Hegel/Bubner: However, throughout the entire logic, Hegel emphasized that the content cannot be separated from the form. >Form/Content. The general nature of form must not be simply the form in which the concept with its manifold provisions was the content of the logical sciences. >Generality, >Generalization. On the contrary, the general formality is rather one which befits all those forms, under which the unified concept allowed for the topic of logic. ((s) Form of thought: is befitting). This generality then applies to only one position outside the logic. Cf. >Circularity, >Levels/order, >Levels of Description, >Perspective. An overview of the whole becomes possible as soon as the absolute immanence is abandoned, and you know that nothing is left out. >Wholes, >Totality. Beginning/End/Hegel: consequently, the beginning and the conclusion can only be established by a mediation which creates a transition between the systematic connection and the exterior. I 63 Method/Science/Hegel/Bubner: where science is practiced there is no question of method, because the "thing itself" guarantees the law of action. (Unlike with the symphony). ((s) Thus there is no "inner necessity" of art for Hegel as Kandinsky propagated.) >Science, >Art/Hegel. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
Content | Hegel | Bubner I 62 Content/Form/Generality/Hegel/Bubner: However, throughout the entire logic, Hegel emphasized that the content cannot be separated from the form. >Form/Content. The general nature of form must not be simply the form in which the concept with its manifold provisions was the content of the logical sciences. >Form, >Content. On the contrary, the general formality is rather one which befits all those forms, under which the unified concept allowed for the topic of logic. ((s) Form of thought: is befitting). >Generality. This generality then applies to only one position outside the logic. An overview of the whole becomes possible as soon as the absolute immanence is abandoned, and you know that nothing is left out. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
Forms | Habermas | IV 182 Form/Content/Method/Habermas: in a first formal-pragmatic investigation of the concept of the life world, as a horizon in which the communicative actors "always already" move, we accept a separation of form and content. In this way, we can take up questions that have so far been dealt with within the framework of transcendental philosophy, and thus focus our attention here on structures of the life world. >Form, >Content, >Life-world, >Horizon, >Inside/Outside. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
Forms | Hegel | Adorno XIII 70 Form/Content/Epistemology/finite/infinite/HegelVsKant/Adorno: in epistemology, Hegel rejects the Kantian separation of form and content as well as that of the knowledge of the finite and the infinite with extraordinary consistency. >Form/Content, >Finiteness, >Infinity, >Cognition, >I. Kant. Material/Hegel/Adorno: the material, in Hegel, is nothing external or accidental, but also mind itself. >Spirit/Hegel, >Knowledge/Hegel. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
Forms | Kant | Adorno XIII 71 Inner/outer/form/content/Idealism/Kant/Adorno: the consistent idealist does not recognize a being at all outside the mind, while Kant, in ethics, so also in aesthetics, referred back to subjective forms, which he believed to be separated from the content and in this way conceived essentially formal theories in both fields. >Content/Kant, >Form and content, >Aesthetics/Kant, >Ethics/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
History | Dilthey | Pfotenhauer IV 62 History/understanding/Vico/Dilthey: Dilthey wanted to adhere to Vico's principle of the general comprehensibility of historical phenomena. This should be asserted against the positivist indifference that was determined to look at history and nature in the same way. (DiltheyVsComte). >A. Comte. Dilthey's thesis: Dilthey proposed to interpret the event from the point of view of the objectives of interested, value-oriented subjects.(1) >Purposes, >Intentions, >Action. Pfotenhauer IV 63 HeideggerVsDilthey/GadamerVsDilthey/Pfotenhauer: From Heidegger(3) to Gadamer(3) the reproach of historical-esthetic presumption arose; one wanted to delightfully take posession of the humane in a way of understanding everything. The limitations of perspectives that have been shaped by biographical history are not methodically taken into account sufficiently. "Everyone is the most distant thing to oneself". >Understanding, >Hermeneutics, >Self-knowledge. Nietzsche's dictum could be regarded as a pointed wording for this objection. Pfotenhauer IV 97 Form/Content/Art/Nietzsche/Pfotenhauer: (F.Nietzsche 1888(4)): One is an artist at the price, that what all non-artists call 'form' is perceived as content, as the 'thing itself'. Content/Nietzsche/Pfotenhauer: the content would be the internal coherence itself, the internal coherence of the content. >Content, >Historiography. 1. M. Riedel Verstehen oder erklären? Stuttgart 1978, S. 19ff. 2. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen 1953, S. 397. 3. G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen 1972, S. 205ff. 4. F. Nietzsche, Nachgel. Fragm. Nov. 1887-März 1888, KGW VIII,2 S. 251f. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 |
Similarity | Logic Texts | II 60 Similarity/form/content/logic/Hoyningen-Huene: equality and diversity are part of the logical form, not of the content. --- Read III 105 Similarity analysis: a number of logical principles that are classically valid, fails here. For example, the Def Contraposition: that "If B, then not-A" from "if A, then not-B" follows. The similar world in which it rains can very well be one in which it rains only lightly. But the most similar world, in which it rains violently, cannot be one in which it does not rain at all. III 105f Similarity: But worlds in which Lewis is 2.02, 2.01, 2.005 meters tall are progressively similar to the real world, yet this sequence has no limit. >Similarity metrics/Lewis. III 111 Vs Similarity Theory: It makes all conditional sets with true if-and then-sentences true. But in this respect it is in error: many such conditional sentences are false. >Conditional, >Truth condition, >Truth-conditional semantics. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
Understanding | Feynman | I 32 Understanding/Feynman: even if we know all the rules, we do not need to understand why a certain move is made in the game. >Rules, >Game, cf. >Language game, >Chess. I 33 Nevertheless we assume that we understand the world when we understand the world. I 289 Understanding/Feynman: For example, the Dirac equation cannot be understood in a direct way. It has a simple form, but its consequences do not. >Form, >Content, >Form/Content. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
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Form/Content | Davidson, D. | Fod / Lep IV 121 Davidson: information about the form of the words, which are held to be true, are the decisive evidence for both, meaning attribution (content) and belief attribution! Thus, the epistemic conditions for both are inextricably linked. |
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