Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Logic | Logic Texts | Hoyningen-Huene II 148f Relation of logic to reality: A: No one can read this book in three days. B: A hard-working student can read this book in three days. Whether there are hard-working students is something that cannot be captured with the statement logic. The inconsistency of the example can only be detected with the predicate logic. Other inconsistencies cannot be captured by the means of logic at all: A: Hans is a giant. - B: Hans is a dwarf. --- Read III 62f Difference compact/non-compact: classical logic is a logic of the 1st level. A categorical set of axioms for arithmetic must be a second-level logic. (Quantifiers also for properties). >Second order logic. Logic first order/second order are not to be distinguished syntactically, but semantically! E.g. Napoleon has all properties of an emperor: are not syntactically to be distinguished, whether logic 1st or 2nd level. III 70ff VsClassical Logic: This reduction, of course, fails. For "nothing is round and square" is necessarily true, but its non-logical components cannot be interpreted in any way that makes this statement false. Allowing variable areas of definition for classical representation was a catastrophe. The modality has returned. We can make a substitution, but we cannot really change the range. >Range, >Modality. If an object is round, it follows that it is not square. But this conclusion is not valid thanks to the form, but thanks to the content. III 79 It was a mistake to express the truth-preservation criterion as "it is impossible that the premisses are true and the conclusion false". Because it is not so obvious that there is a need to conclude from A to B. Provided he is cowardly, it follows that he is either cowardly or - what one wants. But simply from the fact that he is cowardly does not follow that if he is not cowardly - what one wants. >EFQ/ex falso quodlibet. III 151 Logic 1st order: individuals, 2nd order: variables for predicates, distribution of the predicates by quantifiers. 1st level allows restricted vocabulary of the 2nd level: existence and universal quantifier! >Existential quantification, >Universal quantification, >Existence predicate, >Existence. III 161 Free logic: no existence assumptions - no conclusion from the absence of the truth value to falsehood - global evaluation. >Truth value, >Truth value gaps, >Truth value agglomeration, >Valuation. --- Menne I 26 Justification of Logic/Menne: the so-called logical principles of identity, of consistency, and the excluded middle are not sufficient to derive the logic. In addition, ten theorems and rules of the propositional logic are needed, just to derive the syllogistic exactly. These axioms do not represent obvious ontological principles. Kant: transcendental justification of logic. It must be valid a priori. >Logic/Kant. Menne I 28 The justification from the language: oversees that there is no explicit logic at all if the language itself already contained logic. Precisely because language does not always proceed logically, the logic is needed for the standardization of language. Menne: there must be a recursive procedure for justification. >Justification, >Recursion. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Me I A. Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1997 |
| Logic | Simons | I 259 Free logic/Simons: free logic rejects conditionals of the form "N (Fa> (Ex) Fx)" ((s) no linking of existence generalization and necessity). Free logic: above: singular terms refer to 1 or 0 items. WigginsVsFree Logic/free logic: instead of existence generalization we assume a weaker scheme: (Ex)(x = a) , Fa I- (Ex)Fx. >Free logic, >Existential Generalization, >Necessity, >Singular terms, >Reference. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Logic | Stalnaker | I 147 Free logic/interpretation/Stalnaker: in the free logic you can still decide that sentences with non-referring singular terms shall be wrong. >Reference, >Singular terms, >Free logic, >Interpretation. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Formalism | Frege Vs Formalism | Brandom I 606 FregeVsFormalists: How can evidence be provided that something falls under a concept? Frege uses the concept of necessity to prove the existence of an object. Brandom I 609 Free Logic: "Pegasus is a winged horse" is regarded as true, although the object does not exist physically. It can serve as substituent. FregeVs. (>Read). Brandom I 620 Frege: Pegasus has "sense" but no "meaning". FregeVsFormalism: Important argument: it is not enough merely to refer to the Peano axioms, identities such as "1 = successor to the number 0" are trivial. They do not combine two different ways of picking out an object. Solution: Abstraction: it is necessary to connect the use of the expressions of the successor numbers with the already common expressions. Frege I 130 Equation/Frege: you must not put the definite article on one side of an equation and the indefinite article on the other. FregeVsFormalism: a purely formal theory is sufficient. It’s only an instruction for the definitions, not a definition as such. I 131 Number System/Expansion/Frege: in the expansion, the meaning cannot be fixed arbitrarily. E.g. the meaning of the square root is not already unchangeable before the definitions, but it is determined by these. ((s) Contradiction? Anyway, Frege is getting at meaning as use). Number i/Frege: it does not matter whether a second, a millimeter or something else is to play a role in this. I 132 It is only important that the additions and multiplication sentences apply. By the way, i falls out of the equation again. But, E.g. with "a ´bi" you have to explain what meaning "total" has in this case. It is not enough to call for a sense. That would be just ink on paper. (FregeVsHilbert). Bigelow I 182 Consistency/FregeVsFormalism/FregeVsHilbert/Bigelow/Pargetter: Existence precedes consistency. For consistency presupposes the existence of a consistently described object. If it exists, the corresponding description is consistent. If it does not exist, how can we guarantee consistency? Frege I 125 Concept/Frege: How can you prove that it does not contain a contradiction? Not by the determination of the definition. I 126 E.g. ledger lines in a triangle: it is not sufficient for proof of their existence that no contradiction is discovered in on their concept. Proof of the disambiguity of a concept can strictly only be carried out by something falling under it. The reverse would be a mistake. E.g. Hankel: equation x + b = c: if b is > c, there is no natural number x which solves the problem. I 127 Hankel: but nothing keeps us from considering the difference (c - b) as a sign that solves the problem! Sign/FregeVsHankel/FregeVsFormalism: there is something that hinders us: E.g. considering (2 - 3) readily as a sign that solves the problem: an empty sign does not solve the problem, but is only ink on paper. Its use as such would then be a logical error. Even in cases where the solution is possible, it is not the sign that is the solution, but the content. Wittgenstein I 27 Frege/Earlier Wittgenstein/Hintikka: ((FregeVsFormalism) in the philosophy of logic and mathematics). Frege dispensed with any attempt to attribute a semantic content to his logical axioms and rules of evidence. Likewise, Wittgenstein: "In logical syntax, the meaning of a sign must never play a role, it may only require the description of the expressions." Therefore, it is incorrect to assert that the Tractatus represents the view of the inexpressibility of language par excellence. The inexpressibility of semantics is merely limited to semantics, I 28 syntax can certainly be linguistically expressed! In a letter to Schlick, Wittgenstein makes the accusation that Carnap had taken his ideas, without pointing this out (08.08.32)! |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Free Logic | Wiggins Vs Free Logic | Simons I 259 Free Logic/Necessity/Existence/Substantial/Simons: exactly these conditionals are rejected in the free logic. But: WigginsVsFree Logic. Instead: Def Good Name/Wiggins: one whose carrier exists. Simons: probably they support existential generalization. Free LogicVsWiggins: good names differ from bad ones exactly in that for good names the existential statement "(Ex)(x = a)" is true and that is exactly what generalization allows us on the basis of the weaker schema: (Ex)(x = a) , Fa I- (Ex)Fx that accepts Free Logic. Simons: if the modal logic allows that not everything that exists necessarily exists. (What it should). |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Various Authors | Read Vs Various Authors | Re III 166 VsOutside Domain/ Free Logic: Unsatisfactory at Free Logic with outside domain is the bivalence, forced to decide whether a statement is true or false. Solution: Free Logic without reference. It refers to nothing, so the statements do not have to have a truth value. |
Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Free Logic | Versus | Simons I 259 WigginsVsFree Logic - Free logic: instead of existential quantification: weaker scheme: (Ex) (x = a), Fa I- (Ex) Fx. WigginsVs - instead: "good name"/Wiggins: one whose carrier exists. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| |||