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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assertive Force | Geach | I 262 Assertive force/assertoric force/Geach: assertive force is demonstrated by the fact that a sentence is not included in a longer one. Cf. >Brandom: free-standing content. The assertion stroke adds no idea - so it should not be confudes with "it’s true that .."; ("true"can occur even in a not assertive sentence without changing its meaning). >Truth value, >Truth predicate, >Redundancy theory, >Assertion stroke. Error: to infer from this that "exist" adds no concept. (GeachVsHume). >Existence predicate. The sssertion stroke is a indefinable basic concept, cannot be explained. VsAttribution-theory: the predicate "poor" has no more claiming force than any other predicate, namely, none. >Predicates/Geach, >Predication/Geach. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Rigidity | Cresswell | II 154 Rigidity/make rigid/description/Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1977(1), 259f): normal description/logical form/Cresswell: "The F is G" is true in every possible world w iff the thing (unambiguous) which is F in w, is also G in W . Rigid description/logical form: here, that is true in w iff the thing that is in the actual world F, is w in G, no matter if it is there F in w or not. - Which world is the actual one, is relative to the respective possible world. >Actuality, >Cross world identity, >Modal properties. Solution: double indexing: two possible worlds: "The F is G" is true in w2 seen from w1, iff the thing that is F is in w1 G w2. >Twodimensional Semantics. Make rigid: Makes that a sentence like "The F is G" can also stand alone. >Free-standing content. Instead: truth conditions/Cresswell: if one sees the principle advantage of truth conditions over truth values in that, that the truth conditions provide the right input conditions for further embedding, then the make rigid is not so important. >Truth values, >Truth conditions. II 155 Rigid/non-rigid/belief/modal logic/Cresswell: In contrast to modal contexts, the description is interpreted as non-rigid in belief contexts. Modal Context: is rigid. >Modal logic. 1. Saul A. Kripke 1977. Speker's Reference and Semantic Reference. Midwest Studies In Philosophy Volume 2, Issue 1 p. 255-276 - https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1977.tb00045.x |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Terminology | Brandom | I 327 RDRD/Brandom: reliable distinctive reaction disposition: basis for non-inferential (direct) authority of observations. I 486f Designation/Brandom: that there is a truth value at all. I 509 Free-standing content/multi-value I 530 Definition SMSIC/Brandom: simple material substitution-inferential definition - connects the expression "the inventor" with another one - additional information which makes the attribution of the true identity of "Franklin was an inventor, but also Postmaster General, and printer, and spoke French ..." to a single object possible - but not within propositional attitudes. I 531 Content of an expression: is determined by the set of SMSICs (simple material substitution-inferential definitions) that link it with other expressions. I 532 SMSIC symmetrical for singular term. I 487 Multi-valued logic/Brandom: Definition designated: the fact that a statement has any truth value at all. Designation indicates what truth is designated: requires a definition on the assertion. Definition Multi-valued: embedded content - ((s) a particular one of several possible truth values). Interpretation: assigns two types of value: a) whether designated, b) which multi- value. Standard situation: it is defined which multi-values are designated. Designation value: everything that plays a role for pragmatic significance of free-standing sentences. bottom-up: Designation > formal validity Basic principle: the substitution never changes with the same multi-value designation. I 488 Multi-values = equivalence classes from logically derivable sentences - Designation = logical validity. --- II 178 Status/Brandom: its transmission means: a particular status of the premise ensures that it is also attributed to the conclusion - this applies to definition-preserving inferences: Deduction - but not for Definition authority-preserving inferences: Induction. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Variables | Mates | I 36 Variable/Mates: for them names or descriptions are used. >Names, >Descriptions, >Inserting. Values: values include all objects, which can be designated by these expressions (according to a convention). >Naming, >Denotation, >Domains. I 37 no changeable things, also no names of changeable things. >Numbers/Frege, >Variables/Frege. I 66 Variable/free/bound/Mates: E.g. "(x)F"x": here bound for the second time. Problem: simultaneously within "F"x" free. - ((S) considered without quantifier. >Bound variables, >Free variables, >Quantifiers, >Quantification. I 67 and formulas (if used) may occur bound. >Logical formulas. I 68 (s) An entire formula always occurs free of course. Cf. >Free-standing content/Brandom, cf. >Generalization/Mates. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
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