Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Animal Studies Gosling Corr I 279
Animal studies/behavior/ethology/Gosling: Animal studies afford four major benefits over human research. (1) animal studies allow greater experimental control and facilitate more extensive experimental manipulations than is possible in studies of humans.
(2) observations of animals can be made in far greater detail and for more extensive periods than is possible for humans.
(3) the accelerated life history of many species means that longitudinal studies can be conducted in substantially shorter periods than possible with humans.
(4) for many species it is possible to obtain detailed quantitative and molecular genetic information and to conduct transgenic, knock-out and cloning studies (Gosling and Mollaghan 2006(1)).
Ultimately animal studies can be used to test specific hypotheses that, with humans, must often rely on sub-optimal designs. To illustrate, consider John Capitanio’s research programme, which for over a decade has been accruing personality data on over 175 rhesus monkeys (see Weinstein, Capitanio and Gosling 2008(2), for description of this research programme).
>Animal models.

1. Gosling, S. D. and Mollaghan, D. M. 2006. Animal research in social psychology: a bridge to functional genomics and other unique research opportunities, in P. A. M. van Lange (ed.), Bridging social psychology: benefits of transdisciplinary approaches, pp.123-8, Mahne NJ: Erlbaum
2. Weinstein, T. A. R., Capitanio, J. P. and Gosling, S. D. 2008. Personality in animals, in O. P. John, R. W. Robins and L. A. Pervin (eds.), Handbook of personality theory and research, pp. 328–48. New York: Guilford Press


Samuel D. Gosling and B. Austin Harley, „Animal models of personality and cross-species comparisons“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.)2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Holism Mayr I 42
Holism/Mayr: in its early form it lacked two important components: emergence and genetic program. >Genes, >Genetic information, >Emergence, >Dependence.

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998

Information Kauffman I 111
Order/Life/Human/Kauffman: the human is the product of two sources of order, not one. >Order/Kauffman, >Life/Kauffman, >Humans.
I 112
Information/order/life/emergence/Kauffman: most people assume that DNA and RNA are stable stores of genetic information. However, if life began with collective autocatalysis and later learned to incorporate DNA and genetic code, we must explain how these formations could be subject to hereditary variation and natural selection, even though they did not yet contain a genome! >Genes, >Selection.
On the one hand, evolution cannot proceed without matrices copying mechanisms, but on the other hand it is the one that combines the mechanisms.
>Evolution.
Could an autocatalytic formation evolve without it?
Solution: Spatial compartments (spaces divided by membranes) that split are capable of variation and evolution!
Solution: Assumption: every now and then random, uncatalysed reactions take place and produce new molecules. The metabolism (conversion, metabolism) would be extended by a reaction loop.
Evolution without genome, no DNA-like structure as a carrier of information.
>Life/Kauffman.
I 114
Catalysis/Autocatalysis/Kauffman: in the case of autocatalytic formations, there is no difference between genotype and phenotype. >Genotype, >Phenotype.
Life/emergence/Kauffman: this inevitably leads to the formation of a complex ecosystem. Molecules produced in a primordial cell can be transported into other primordial cells and influence reactions there.
Metabolic-based life does not arise as a whole or as a complex structure, but the entire spectrum of mutualism and competition is present from the very beginning. Not only evolution, but also co-evolution.
>Co-evolution.
I 115
Order/life/emergence/Kauffman: the autocatalytic formations must coordinate the behaviour of several thousand molecules. The potential chaos is beyond imagination. Therefore, another source of molecular order has to be discovered, the fundamental internal homeostasis (balance). Surprisingly simple boundary conditions are sufficient for this. >Beginning
I 148
Information/Genes/Kauffman: Question: What mechanism controls the implementation and suppression of certain genetic information? And how do the different cell types know which genes to use and when? J. Monod/Francois Jacob: Mid-1960s: Discovery of an operator that only releases a reaction at a certain point in time.
>J. Monod.
I 149
Also repressor. A small molecule can "switch on" a gene.
I 150
In the simplest case, two genes can suppress each other. Two possible patterns. >Genes.
Gene 1 is active and suppresses gene 2 or vice versa.
Both cell types would then have the same "genotype", the same genome, but they could realize different gene sets.
New horizon of knowledge: unexpected and far-reaching freedom at the molecular level.
The addition of the repressor to the operator at different points results in different receptivity to the operator on the DNA. Regulation.
I 151
This control mechanism by addition in two different places means complete freedom for the molecules to create genetic circuits of arbitrary logic and complexity. We must first learn to understand such systems.

Kau II
Stuart Kauffman
At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995

Kauffman I
St. Kauffman
At Home in the Universe, New York 1995
German Edition:
Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998

Information Luhmann Reese-Schäfer II 31
Definition information/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: nothing but an event that causes a combination of differences.
Reese-Schäfer II 38
Def Information/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: event, that selects system states. Information reserves its meaning in the repetition, but loses the information value. - The event disappears. >Event/Luhmann, >Communication.
---
AU Cass 6
Information/Luhmann: there is no "genetical" information, because the genes only contain structures, not events.
Information/Luhmann: is selection of alternatives. - This presupposes that one defines a possibility range against others.
Information is only within systems - also the possibilities only exist in the system. - Not in the environment.
>System/Luhmann, >Environment/Talcott Parsons.
Time/information: time plays a role because the information disappears whith acquaintance. - Information is not transmitted. - ((s) because it is an event.)
---
AU Cass 13
Definition information/Maturana/Luhmann: Vs genetic information: Information is always a moment of communication, only within a system. It works as an information when it comes to finding the next operation - ((s) not circular: - "A works as A, when ...".)
Information: is not "data"; that would be "transmission theory".
Two aspects:
1st from which is selected
2nd this and nothing else is selected.
Only within a system information is possible. - The system determines what information is: e.g.
Socialist system, planned economy: only performance is an information.
Capitalist system: in capitalist systems unemployment numbers are no information.
Communication/Luhmann: no information without communication. - But communication may repeat itself, information does not.
Understanding: does not exist outside communication.
>Communication/Luhmann, >System/Luhmann, >Operation/Luhmann.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992
German Edition:
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997


Reese-Schäfer II
Walter Reese-Schäfer
Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001
Information Monod Dennett I 268
The information is present in the specific environmental conditions. Initial conditions ensure that one certain structure is selected from many possible ones. Through elimination ambiguity becomes clarity. ("Interpretation"). >Ambiguity, >Evolution, >Initial conditions, >Selection.
---
Monod I 29
Information/Monod: information requires a sender. (Also within a living being). For example, crystal/life: the amount of information encoded in the crystal structure is several orders of size smaller than that which is transmitted from one generation to another in the most primitive creature.
I 92
Information/Biology/Monod: the amount of information required to determine the three-dimensional structure of a protein is much greater than that required to establish the sequence. ElsässerVsMonod: Contradiction: On the one hand, the genome completely determines the function of a protein while the function is bound on the other hand to a three-dimensional structure whose information content is much greater than the direct genetic determination of the structure.
Elsässer: sees instead in the macroscopic development of the living beings a phenomenon, which is physically not explainable, because it seems to testify an "enrichment without cause".
>Emergence.
MonodVsElsässer: the objection is dispensed with when investigating the molecular level of epigenesis: information enrichment results from the fact that the genetic information (represented by the sequence) is actually expressed only under precisely defined initial conditions (in aqueous phase within certain narrow limits of temperature, the ion composition, etc.) so that only a single one of all possible structures can be realized.
Thus, the initial conditions contribute to the information that is finally contained in the globular structure, without specifying it!
Thus, in the structuring process of a globular protein, the microscopic image and the cause of the self-active epigenetic development of the organism can be seen simultaneously.

Mon I
J. Monod
Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris 1970
German Edition:
Zufall und Notwendigkeit Hamburg 1982


Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Language McGinn I 186
Language: from our ability to learn the native language very quickly, does not follow that we even remotely understand the principles of learning ability. Reason: as in other areas, the language ability is probably designed modular. There is no reason to believe that our reasoning ability is able to see through the operation of these modules.
I 187
There is no reason to believe that we even possess a second-level cognition, which grasps the first level performance.
I 232
Gene/McGinn: must include a marking of human grammar, so as to generate an innate language ability. (> Chomsky). Whether linguistics could read this genetic information one day, depends on whether the reason is able to give an account of what represents the genes already, and that is not necessarily true.
It could be that the grammatical encryption does not happen de dicto, but only de re.
But probably de dicto if the physical realization of the same grammatical properties may vary in different organisms.
---
II 53
McGinn pro Chomsky: pro innate language modules. >Chomsky.
II 71
Our language is useless when it comes to see the world as it is, as the eye cannot speak. E.g. functional analysis: what makes the kidney efficient as a filter system, it makes it as inefficient as the pumping system at the same time. >Functionalism, >Functional explanation.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

Laws Mayr I 44
Laws/Biology: at the molecular level all, and on the cell level most of the functions of the organisms follow the laws of physics and chemistry. There is nothing left that would require a vitalist explanation.
>Vitalism, >Explanation, >Causal explanation.
Genetic program: contains historically acquired information (3.8 billion years of evolution).
>Evolution, >Genetic information, >Heredity, >Inheritance,
>Physics, >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Genes.

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998

Nature versus Nurture Psychological Theories Upton I 2
Nature vs. nurture/psychological theories/Upton: In this context, nature refers to traits, abilities and capacities that are inherited. It includes anything produced by the predetermined unfolding of genetic information. Development that relies on nature alone is known as maturation. Nurture refers to the environmental influences that shape development. This includes the way we are raised as children, the attitudes and behaviours of our peer group, our experiences and even the choices we make as we get older. Societal factors, such as the socio-economic circumstances in which we find ourselves, may also be important.
>Nature, >Genes, >Genetic variation, >Abilities, >Heritability, >Parent-child relationship,

>Culture, >Cultural relativism, >Cultural psychology, >Relativism, >Environment, >Circumstances, >Situations.


Upton I
Penney Upton
Developmental Psychology 2011
Property Steiner Gaus I 127
Property/Hillel Steiner/Gaus/Mack: SteinerVsLocke:(...) while Steiner(1) insists that we own our bodies (though not our 'germ line genetic information'), he rejects the simple version of Lockean theory, according to which simply by mixing our labour with an unowned resource we appropriate the resource. But if we cannot justly appropriate nature that way, how do we generate just claims over natural resources? Egalitarianism: Steiner is attracted to a quick route to egalitarianism. This quick argument for equality requires two premises:
(1) justice involves treating equally those who are in relevant respects equal, and treating unequally those who are in relevant respects unequal; and
(2) in these matters there are no relevant differences; so
(3) justice demands equality.
Gaus: This argument leads Steiner to the claim that everyone is entitled to equal freedom and so to some sort of equal share of natural resources (1994(1): 216, 235).
This equality of ownership may also be depicted as a version of the Lockean theory, in which we originally hold the world in common (Otsuka, 1998)(2).
GausVsSteiner, Hillel: Consider: (1) if justice involves treating equally those who are in relevant respects equal; and (2') because of thorough-going scepticism about public reasons, it cannot be shown that people are equal in any relevant way; then (3') justice doesn't demand treating everyone
Gaus I 128
equally.
1. Steiner, Hillel (1994) An Essay on Rights. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
2. Otsuka, Michael (1998) 'Self-ownership and equality: a Lockean reconciliation '. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27 (Winter): 65-92.

Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Time Flusser I 119
Time in the image/Flusser: can be turned into circles: the time in the image is a stream that flows on the surface to hold its elements together. E. g. H O H (in a frame) means a scene in which the orbiting time arranges the elements spatially.
I 120
You can roll them spatially apart on two sides:"H2O": then hydrogen and oxygen are causes, 2. 2H + O, then they are consequences of water. In the first explanation, the scene meant by the picture is the end point of a synthetic process, in the second, of an analytical process. Both explanations order the elements in chronological order.
>Analyticity/Syntheticity, >Meaning/Intending.
I 121
However, the information originally contained in the picture is lost, which affects the spatial and especially not procedural relation. The two explanations are in a sense profanations of the original saint. >Space, >Processes.
The order of the picture is not an explanatory order like that of the text, but a total order.
>Explanation, >Order, >Images/Flusser.
I 132
Time/Flusser: whatever the time experienced may be, it cannot be linear: it comes from all sides. It cannot flow from the past to the future, because it is the future and not the past that arrives. The present cannot be a point on a ray, for it is the place where all time gathers, i.e. becomes present.
>Past, >Present, >Future,
On the other hand, the historical time cannot be more abstract than the magical time, because it can pre-program our concrete experience just as well as the magical time.
>Magical thinking.
You can believe in them as well as in the magical one. Recipients of a textual message (linear) live in a completely different world than that of the magical mood.
>Texts/Flusser.
They no longer experience the world as "scenes" but as "events" and that means: they experience time as irrevocable.
>Events.
I 214 ff
Time/Flusser: Time experience in linear consciousness experiences time as a stream flowing from the past into the future, historical past is irrevocably past. For techno-imaginary consciousness this is pure madness.
a) as soon as you get an impression of the concept of historical time, it becomes apparent that it flows in the opposite direction: from the future to the past: what arrives is not yesterday, but tomorrow.
b) Presence becomes visible as the center of time. Time is recognizable as a tendency to visualization.
For historical consciousness, the present is a point on a line, so the present is unreal once it is, it is no longer.
>Historiography, >History.
I 215
For historical consciousness, only becoming is true. For techno-imagination (TI), such an ontology is a typical example of madness.
>Terminology/Flusser.
1st consequence: For them, only the present is real, because it is the place where the only possible (the future) arrives to be realized, (meaning at the present).
2nd consequence: The past is a hole in the present. However, the past does not appear as a "third time form" (besides the present and the future) but as an aspect of the present - as a "memory."
I 216
3rd Consequence: "politicization" of time: I am constant, the world is variable. Trying to expand the present so that others can be with me in it. 4th Consequence: historical causal chains become senseless: the future arrives, it does not "follow" from something. Birds, for example, do not build nests "because" they are programmed by genetic information, but during nest building it turns out that birds have genetic information.
For example, the French Revolution does not lead to the Russian Revolution, but the Russian Revolution shows that the French Revolution had an internal contradiction.
Although we have this new experience of time, we will not have the consciousness of having it.
I 217
A new, inprogressive future is on the horizon. Progress has been "suspended" in the past.
>Progress.

Fl I
V. Flusser
Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996


The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Various Authors Luhmann Vs Various Authors Habermas I 436
VsParsons: simply reproduces the classical model through systems. (Social system = action system). Luhmann instead: human as part of the environment of society. This changes the premises of all questions. Methodical anti-humanism.
Habermas I 440
LuhmannVsHumanism: "Cardinal Error". A fusion of social and material dimensions.
Reese-Schäfer II 28
LuhmannVsDualism: of observer and object. Universality/Vs: the total view, the universality had to be given up and was replaced by "critique", with which the subject's point of view on universality is rounded up again". Foundation/Luhmann: there is no last stop. (Like Quine, Sellars, Rorty).
Reese-Schäfer II 42
VsMarx: rejects the speech of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly aspire to the same good. Contradiction/Luhmann: arises only from the self-reference of sense. Not as in Marx.
Contradictions/Legal System: does not serve for the avoidance, but for the regulation of conflicts.
Reese-Schäfer II 78
Freedom of Value: (Max Weber): the renunciation of valuations is, so to speak, the blind spot of a second level observation.
Reese-Schäfer II 89
Vs Right Politics: here there is no theory at all that would be able to read other theories. There is only apercus or certain literary guiding ideas. Reese-Schäfer II 90/91
VsGehlen: we do not have to subordinate ourselves to the institutions.
Reese-Schäfer II 102
VsAction Theory: a very vague concept of individuals that can only be defined by pointing at people. Thus language habits are presented as language knowledge: because language requires us to employ subjects. LL. Language.
Reese-Schäfer II 103
Reason/VsAdorno: one should not resign oneself (dialectic of the Enlightenment) but ask whether it does not get better without reason!
Reese-Schäfer II 112
Overstimulation/LuhmannVsTradition: cannot take place at all. For already the neurophysiological apparatus drastically shields the consciousness. The operative medium sense does the rest.
Reese-Schäfer II 138
Human/Gehlen: tried to determine the human from its difference to the animal. (LuhmannVs).
AU Cass. 3
VsParsons: Terminology limited by structural functionalism: one could not ask about the function of structures, or examine terms such as inventory or inventory prerequisite, variable or the whole methodological area. Limitation by the fact that a certain object was assumed as given. There were no criteria for the existence of the object - instead the theory must be able to contain all deviance and dysfunction. (not possible with Parsons) - Question: in which time period and which bandwidths is a system identifiable? (e.g. Revolution: is society still the same society afterwards?) Inventory criteria Biology: Definition by death. The living reproduces itself by its own means. Self-reference (important in modern system theory) is not possible within the framework of the Parsons' model. Therefore we need interdisciplinary solutions.

VsAction Theory: the concept of action is not suitable because an actor is assumed! But it also exists without an observer! In principle, an action can be presented as a solitary thing without social resonance! - Paradox/Luhmann: the procedure of the dissolution of the paradox is logically objectionable, but is constantly applied by the logicians themselves: they use a change of levels. The only question that must not be asked is: what is the unity of the difference of planes?
(AU Cass. 4)
VsEquilibrium Theories: questionable today; 1. from the point of view of natural science: it is precisely the imbalances which are stable, equilibrium is rather metaphor.
(AU Cass. 6)
Tradition: "Transmission of patterns from generation to generation". Stored value patterns that are offered again and again and adopted by the offspring. However, these patterns are still the same. VsTradition: Question: Where does identity come from in the first place? How could one talk about selfhood without an external observer? That will not be much different either with the assumptions of a reciprocal relationship with learning. Luhmann: instead: (Autopoiesis): Socialization is always self-socialization.
AU Cass 6
Information/Luhmann: the term must now be adapted to it! In the 70s one spoke of "genetic information", treated structures as informative, the genetic code contained information.
Luhmann: this is wrong, because genes only contain structures and no events!
The semantic side of the term remained unexplained for a long time, i.e. the question of what information can choose from.

Reese-Schäfer II 76
LuhmannVsMarx/Reese-Schäfer: rejects the talk of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly strive for the same good.
AU Cass 11
Emergence/Reductionism/System Theory/Luhmann: this does not even pose the actual question: what actually distinguishes an emergent system? What is the characteristic for the distinction from the basal state? What is the criterion that enables emergence? Will Martens: (Issue 4, Kölner Zeitschrift f. Sozialforschung): Autopoiesis of social systems.
It deals with the question following the concept of autopoiesis and communication.
Communication/Luhmann: Tripartite structure:
Information,
Communication, Understanding (not action sequences). (Comes from linguistics, but also antiquity!).
Martens: this tripartite division is the psychological foundation of communication. Communication must first be negotiated in the individual head, I must see what I assume to be unknown and what I want to choose, and my body must also be in good shape.
Marten's thesis: sociality only comes about in the synthesis of these three components.
Social things arise when information, communication and understanding are created as a unit with repercussions on the participating mental systems, which must behave accordingly.
The unity is only the synthesis itself, while the elements still have to be described psychologically or biologically etc. Without this foundation it does not work.
LuhmannVsMartens: I hope you fall for it! At first that sounds very plausible. But now comes the question:
What is communicated in the text by Martens? Certainly not the blood circulation! There is also no blood in the text! The editors would already fight this off, there is also no state of consciousness in the text! So I cannot imagine what the author was thinking! I can well imagine that he was supplied with blood and sat in front of the computer. And that he wanted to take part in the discussion.
Luhmann: these are all constructions which are suggested in communication, but which are not actually present in communication. (>Interpenetration).
Communication/LuhmannVsMartens: Question: what is actually claimed in the text, and does it not actually refute it itself?
Paradox: the text that tells of blood and thoughts claims to bring blood and thoughts, but it only brings letters and what a skilled reader can make of the text. That is communication. That is all I can actually see!
Communication/Luhmann: if you think realistically and operatively, you cannot see more in the text. We have to put the words together from the letters ourselves.
When psychic systems respond to communication, they change their internal states accordingly.
Communication/Luhmann: if one has received this message (from Martens), one can say: everything is actually correct, one could describe a communication completely on the basis of physical or psychological facts. Nothing would be missing, with the exception of autopoiesis itself.
Question: we have to explain how communication maintains itself without incorporating psychological and physical operations!
Luhmann: this reproduction of communication through communication goes only through total exclusion from physical, psychological, etc. operations.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992
German Edition:
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Reese-Schäfer II
Walter Reese-Schäfer
Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001