Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Denotation | Quine | I 257 Indefinite terms do not denote objects. An indefinite singular term must therefore be in a purely denoting position: E.g. "The tax auditor is looking for someone" (the position is denoting - "someone" is not denoting). "Purely denoting" unambiguous (substitutability of identity) is not: "Tullius was a Roman" is trochaic - E.g. Tax auditor is looking for the director: -> propositional attitudes. Expression in quotation marks is not purely denoting. It has an ambiguous reference. Every truth function is transparent for denotation. Words denote, sentences do not denote (no singular term). Nevertheless, a sentence has a meaning: the singular term formed by bracketing of the sentence (this is no proposition). A proposition here is: completion of correct sentence to a timeless one. A timeless sentence is "The door is open": which door? This does not denote anything. I 413f Object: that what is denoted by singular terms, names and accepted as values. (But singular term is eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness". II 61 ff Naming: is a name or singular term. Denoting: is to predict - both are referencing, not meaning various descriptions can name the same thing but have a different meaning. VII (a) 10ff Singular Term/Quine: a singular term must not denote. It has a gap between meaning and denotation. VII (c) 48ff Singular Terms/Quine: singular terms designate ("name"). >Singular Terms/Quine. A general term: means (denotes). - (> Descriptions). VII (h) 140 Purely denoting position/Quine: E.g. "Giorgione was called so because of his size". "So" is not purely denoting. Correct would be: "Giorgione was called Giorgione because...". This is then usable: "Barbarelli was called Giorgione because...". Missing substitutability signals is not a purely denoting position. One might say: The following incidents were non-denoting: "9" and "Evening Star" or "number of planets" in (15) - (17) but it is not about that. The point is that the substitution makes true statements false. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Designation | Cresswell | II 119 Naming/Denotation/Cresswell: E.g. the predicate "was so called" is a property of pairs so that it consists, when a is the name of a. - (> inserting). ((s) Name not as a property, but "naming"as a feature of a word-object-pair). See also >denoting position/Quine, >Names of expressions, >Name of a sentence, >Names, >Naming, >Denotation, cf. >Predication. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Haecceitism | Chisholm | I 33f Haeccetism/Haeccitas/Chisholm: assumes a property "to be identical with me", the "this-ness" - comes from Frege/Husserl: everyone has his own idea of himself. ChisholmVsHaeccetism: no list of properties is possible. >Ontology, >Properties. I 36 Not each individual must have a detectable individual essence. Frank I 252 Haeccetism/ChisholmVsHaeccetist attributes: there aint. E.g. "Same as Quine", "the same as me "," the same as this". - ((s) > Corresponding to: "so" is not purely denotating: e.g." ...was so called because of his size"). Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Quine | I 366 Beliefs and quotes can be understood as infinitely many different things (>Vagueness). >Beliefs/Quine. I 377 Indirect speech: to put oneself in the mind state of the speaker, is not a measure of accuracy (translation) - no objectively correct translation. VI 97 Spelling/Quine: dissolves the syntax and the lexicon of each content sentence and merges it with the language of the interpreter - it then has no more complicated syntax than e.g. the addition sign. VI 98 (3) (Ex)(Pirmin believes "x is a spy") - Quote: what is quoted in (3) is nothing more than the name of a sequence with twelve letters. The "x" in it has nothing to do with the outer "E.g." - therefore spelling - QuineVs propositional attitude de re. >Propositional Attitude/Quine, >de re/Quine. VII (c) 53+ Quote/Quine: any nonsense can appear as a quote within normal language - problem: then it is part of the normal sentence - then it is no longer possible to exclude it from the set of meaningful strings - solution: a) narrow the term normality b) narrow the term appear - problem: we have an interest in not limiting the strings on the already known. VII (h) 141 Quote/Quine: does not necessarily destroy reference: E.g. "Giorgione" appoints a chess player (is true when he played chess). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Universal Instantiation | Quine | VII (h) 146 Definition Universal Instantiation/Quine: E.g. from everything is identical with itself, or (x) (x = x), we conclude Socrates = Socrates. - This is together with the existential generalization two aspects of the same principle - but not if the terms denote nothing. - E.g. Giorgione disappears (falsely) as opaque context in existential generalization: (Ex) (x has 6 letters) words: Something has 6 letters. - Even worse: it contains 6 letters - the prefix there is simply irrelevant, the sentence is just wrong. >Description levels. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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