Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
A priori Kripke I 46
Necessary/not a priori: e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture: Goldbach's conjecture will turn out to be true or false but then by necessity.
I 75f
A priori/not necessary: e.g. determining the reference of the term "one meter": it is possible to know a priori that the length of this stick is one meter, and this would not be seen as a necessary truth.
I 127
Difference: a priori/necessary: Kripke: one could empirically discover the essence (e.g. water = H20).

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Bivalence Dummett II 103
Principle of Bivalence/Truth/Dummett: PoB already presumes the concept of truth - and that is transcendental in the case of undecidable sentences - it goes beyond our ability to recognize what a manifestation would be.
II 103f
Undecidability/anti-realism/Dummett: (without bivalence) The meaning theory will then no longer be purely descriptive in relation to our actual practice.
III (a) 17
Sense/Frege: Explanation of sense by truth conditions - Tractatus: dito: "Under which circumstances" - DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: For that one must already know what the statement that P is true means - Vs: if they then say P is true means the same as asserting P. - VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what should be explained. - VsRedundancy theory: we must either supplement it (not merely explain the meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence.

III (b) 74
Sense/Reference/Bivalence/Dummett: bivalence: Problem: not every sentence has such a sense that in principle we can recognize it as true if it is true (e.g. >unicorns, >Goldbach’s conjecture). - But Frege’s argument does not depend at all on bivalence.
III (b) 76
Bivalence, however, works for elementary clauses: if here the semantic value is the extension, it is not necessary to be possible to decide whether the predicate is true or not - perhaps application cannot be effectively decided, but the (undefined) predicate can be understood without allocating the semantic value (truth value) - therefore distinction between sense and semantic value. >Semantic Value.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Constructivism Waismann Friedrich Waismann Suchen und Finden in der Mathematik 1938 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967

76
Construction/Search/Mathematics/Waismann: e.g. false analogy: we are looking for a man with black hair and this and this appearance. In the case of the man, it would be possible to complete the description more and more without leading to a finding of such a man. I would not have the man yet.
In the construction it is so: as long as the construction is not completely described, I cannot be sure if what I am looking for is logically correct, so can be described at all.
The imperfect description leaves out just what would be necessary for something to be sought. It is therefore only an apparant description of the desired.
E.g. Proof of the Goldbach conjecture. p. 76. e.g. the proof of induction has been rediscovered and not just a combination of simpler conclusions.
---
77
To what extent is the search contained in the process of searching?
E.g. North Pole: someone shows a point on the plan, which is the specification of the target.
E.g. When searching the pentagon with a circle and a ruler, the question is: does the term allow for the search or not?
In the case of mathematics the specification of the construction does not allow the search! We can even think of two different terms of construction (a layman concept of the student and a mathematical one).
The space is, in reality, only the one that contains what is sought.

Waismann I
F. Waismann
Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996

Waismann II
F. Waismann
Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976

Deflationism Wright I 26ff
Deflationism: is directed against the "inflation" by creating more truth predicates: legitimate assertibility next to truth (> redundancy theory). Thesis: truth is no property, only a means of disquotation. ---
I 46
Deflation/Ramsey: was here first. (Recently: Horwich: "minimalism"): Truth assertorical - claiming, but not supported by adoption of metaphysical objects or situations. - Tarski: disquotation is sufficient. Truth is no substantial property of sentences. True sentences like "snow is white" and "Grass is green" have nothing in common.
Important: you can use the disquotation scheme without understanding the content. One can "truly" "approximate" the predicate. (Goldbach's conjecture).
Deflationism thesis: the content of the truth predicate is the same as the claim, which makes its assertoric use.
Deflationism: E.g. Goldbach's conjecture: the deflationism recognizes that there must be said more beyond Tarski. Also, cf. e.g. "Everything he said is true".
VsDeflationism: not a theory but a "potpourri". There is no clear thesis.
---
I 47 ff
Inflationism: a) "true" is merely a means of affirming, only expresses attitudes towards sentences. It does not formulate a standard. b) The disquotation scheme contains a (nearly) complete explanation of the meaning of the word. ("True").
---
I 293
Deflationism: every meaningful sentence (i.e. a sentence with truth-condition) is suitable for deflationary truth or falsity. But if truth is not deflationary, "true" must to refer to a substantial property of statements.
(Deflationism: truth is no property).
---
I 27
Deflationism/Wright: truth is no substantial property - disquotation is enough - "snow is white" and "grass is green" have nothing in common - content of the truth-predicate is the same as the claim which raises its claiming use - thesis the truth predicate is prescriptive and descriptive normative. ---
I 33 ~
Deflationism: the only standards of truth are the ones of legitimate assertibility (Assertibilität). ---
I 51
WrightVsDeflation: "minimalist", > href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/search.php?erweiterte_suche_1=minimalism&erweiterte_suche_2=Wright&x=0&y=0">"minimalism". ---
I 97
Vs (classical) Deflationism: no norm of truth-predicate may determine by itself that it is different from assertibility because the normative power of "true" and "assertible" coincides, but may diverge extensionally - then the disquotation scheme can play no central role - therefore statements may be true in a certain discourse, without being super-asserting - then truthmakers must be independent of our standards of recognisability (>realism/Wright). ---
Rorty I 38ff
Disquotation/Wright: the deflationist thinks through the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate would be completely determined.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Disjunction Logic Texts Read III 79
Disjunction / tautology / Read: In a sense, "A or B" follows from A alone - but then is not equivalent to "if ~ A, then B". Logical Constants.
Undecidability:
Re III 262
Not constructive: e.g. the proof that there are two irrational numbers a and b, so that a is highly b rational (the disjunction of alternatives is constructively unacceptable here). We have no construction by which we can determine whether root 2 to the power of root 2 is rational or not). The excluded third party is therefore intuitionistic and not a substantial assertion.

Goldbach's conjecture: every even number greater than two should be the sum of two prime numbers. Not decidable. But we must not claim that it is either true or not.
Theorem of the Excluded Middle/Constructivism/Read: Constructivists often present so-called "weak counterexamples" against the Excluded Third.
If a is a real number, "a= 0" is not decidable. Consequently, the constructivist cannot claim that all real numbers are either identical with zero or not. (But this is more a question of representation). >Excluded middle.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001

Re III
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Necessity Kripke I 116
Necessary/not a priori: e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture: it will turn out with necessity. I would suggest, however, that it is not a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum of the properties which are usually attributed to him.
Kripke (VsTradition): molecular motion is necessarily identical with heat. We have discovered it, but it could not have been otherwise.
Physical truths are necessary:
e.g. heat = molecular motion - but this has no analogy to mind-brain identities.
I 116
Def necessity/Kripke: identity assertions in which both expressions designate rigidly constitute necessity. E.g. »Water is H20". Water could not have been something else. It is essential for water that it is this material with this atomic structure. Where there is no H20, there is no water.
Frank I 121f
Necessary/Kripke: compounds formed with two or more rigid designation expressions are necessary, e.g. that pain simply feels like pain. Contingent/Kripke: e.g. the fact that there are living beings on this planet (namely us) who feel heat a certain way. E.g. that heat feels to us as it feels. Tradition: a brain condition could also occur without pain.
I 122
Necessary/essential properties/KripkeVsTradition: the type of picking out pain (by experience) and the brain state (configuration of molecules) in both cases is essential and not accidental. The brain state could be singled out through contingent facts, but not the pain.

Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), pp. 253-355.


Kripke I 144
Necessary properties do not have to belong to the meaning. (The periodic table was discovered later). Scientific discoveries do not change the meaning. Meaning does not arise from properties. ---
Stalnaker I 188
Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: typical cases: statements that contain names e.g. Hesperus = Phosphorus (see below: they were determined by different causal chains). Statements about natural kinds: e.g. "the atomic weight of gold is 79".

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Prior Knowledge Norvig Norvig I 777
Prior knowledge/AI Research/Norvig/Russell: To understand the role of prior knowledge, we need to talk about the logical relationships among hypotheses, example descriptions, and classifications. Let Descriptions denote the conjunction of all the example descriptions in the training set, and let Classifications denote the conjunction of all the example classifications. Then a Hypothesis that “explains the observations” must satisfy the following property (recall that |= means “logically entails”):
Hypothesis ∧ Descriptions |= Classifications.

Entailment constraint: We call this kind of relationship an entailment constraint, in which Hypothesis is the “un-known.” Pure inductive learning means solving this constraint, where Hypothesis is drawn from some predefined hypothesis space. >Hypotheses/AI Research.
Software agents/knowledge/learning/Norvig: The modern approach is to design agents that already know something and are trying to learn some more. An autonomous learning agent that uses background knowledge must somehow obtain the background knowledge in the first place (…). This method must itself be a learning process. The agent’s life history will therefore be characterized by cumulative, or incremental, development.
Norvig I 778
Learning with background knowledge: allows much faster learning than one might expect from a pure induction program. Explanation based learning/EBL: the entailment constraints satisfied by EBL are the following:

Hypothesis ∧ Descriptions |= Classifications
Background |= Hypothesis.

Norvig I 779
(…) it was initially thought to be a way to learn from examples. But because it requires that the background knowledge be sufficient to explain the hypothesis, which in turn explains the observations, the agent does not actually learn anything factually new from the example. The agent could have derived the example from what it already knew, although that might have required an unreasonable amount of computation. EBL is now viewed as a method for converting first-principles theories into useful, special purpose knowledge. Relevance/observations/RBL: the prior knowledge background concerns the relevance of a set of features to the goal predicate. This knowledge, together with the observations, allows the agent to infer a new, general rule that explains the observations:

Hypothesis ∧ Descriptions |= Classifications ,
Background ∧ Descriptions ∧ Classifications |= Hypothesis.

We call this kind of generalization relevance-based learning, or RBL. (…) whereas RBL does make use of the content of the observations, it does not produce hypotheses that go beyond the logical content of the background knowledge and the observations. It is a deductive form of learning and cannot by itself account for the creation of new knowledge starting from scratch.
Entailment constraint:

Background ∧ Hypothesis ∧ Descriptions |= Classifications.

That is, the background knowledge and the new hypothesis combine to explain the examples.
Knowledge-based inductive learning/KBIL algorithms: Algorithms that satisfy [the entailment] constraint are called knowledge-based inductive learning, or KBIL, algorithms. KBIL algorithms, (…) have been studied mainly in the field of inductive logic programming, or ILP.
Norvig I 780
Explanation-based learning: The basic idea of memo functions is to accumulate a database of input–output pairs; when the function is called, it first checks the database to see whether it can avoid solving the problem from scratch. Explanation-based learning takes this a good deal further, by creating general rules that cover an entire class of cases.
Norvig I 781
General rules: The basic idea behind EBL is first to construct an explanation of the observation using prior knowledge, and then to establish a definition of the class of cases for which the same explanation structure can be used. This definition provides the basis for a rule covering all of the cases in the class. Explanation: The “explanation” can be a logical proof, but more generally it can be any reasoning or problem-solving process whose steps are well defined. The key is to be able to identify the necessary conditions for those same steps to apply to another case.
Norvig I 782
EBL: 1. Given an example, construct a proof that the goal predicate applies to the example using the available background knowledge.
Norvig I 783
2. In parallel, construct a generalized proof tree for the variabilized goal using the same inference steps as in the original proof. 3. Construct a new rule whose left-hand side consists of the leaves of the proof tree and whose right-hand side is the variabilized goal (after applying the necessary bindings from the generalized proof).
4. Drop any conditions from the left-hand side that are true regardless of the values of the variables in the goal.
Norvig I 794
Inverse resolution: Inverse resolution is based on the observation that if the example Classifications follow from Background ∧ Hypothesis ∧ Descriptions, then one must be able to prove this fact by resolution (because resolution is complete). If we can “run the proof backward,” then we can find a Hypothesis such that the proof goes through.
Norvig I 795
Inverse entailment: The idea is to change the entailment constraint
Background ∧ Hypothesis ∧ Descriptions |= Classifications

to the logically equivalent form

Background ∧ Descriptions ∧ ¬Classifications |= ¬Hypothesis.

Norvig I 796
An inverse resolution procedure that inverts a complete resolution strategy is, in principle, a complete algorithm for learning first-order theories. That is, if some unknown Hypothesis generates a set of examples, then an inverse resolution procedure can generate Hypothesis from the examples. This observation suggests an interesting possibility: Suppose that the available examples include a variety of trajectories of falling bodies. Would an inverse resolution program be theoretically capable of inferring the law of gravity? The answer is clearly yes, because the law of gravity allows one to explain the examples, given suitable background mathematics.
Norvig I 798
Literature: The current-best-hypothesis approach is an old idea in philosophy (Mill, 1843)(1). Early work in cognitive psychology also suggested that it is a natural form of concept learning in humans (Bruner et al., 1957)(2). In AI, the approach is most closely associated with the work of Patrick Winston, whose Ph.D. thesis (Winston, 1970)(3) addressed the problem of learning descriptions of complex objects. Version space: The version space method (Mitchell, 1977(4), 1982(5)) takes a different approach, maintaining the set of all consistent hypotheses and eliminating thosefound to be inconsistent with new examples. The approach was used in the Meta-DENDRAL
Norvig I 799
expert system for chemistry (Buchanan and Mitchell, 1978)(6), and later in Mitchell’s (1983)(7) LEX system, which learns to solve calculus problems. A third influential thread was formed by the work of Michalski and colleagues on the AQ series of algorithms, which learned sets of logical rules (Michalski, 1969(8); Michalski et al., 1986(9)). EBL: EBL had its roots in the techniques used by the STRIPS planner (Fikes et al., 1972)(10). When a plan was constructed, a generalized version of it was saved in a plan library and used in later planning as a macro-operator. Similar ideas appeared in Anderson’s ACT* architecture, under the heading of knowledge compilation (Anderson, 1983)(11), and in the SOAR architecture, as chunking (Laird et al., 1986)(12). Schema acquisition (DeJong, 1981)(13), analytical generalization (Mitchell, 1982)(5), and constraint-based generalization (Minton, 1984)(14) were immediate precursors of the rapid growth of interest in EBL stimulated by the papers of Mitchell et al. (1986)(15) and DeJong and Mooney (1986)(16). Hirsh (1987) introduced the EBL algorithm described in the text, showing how it could be incorporated directly into a logic programming system. Van Harmelen and Bundy (1988)(18) explain EBL as a variant of the partial evaluation method used in program analysis systems (Jones et al., 1993)(19).
VsEBL: Initial enthusiasm for EBL was tempered by Minton’s finding (1988)(20) that, without extensive
extra work, EBL could easily slow down a program significantly. Formal probabilistic analysis of the expected payoff of EBL can be found in Greiner (1989)(21) and Subramanian and Feldman (1990)(22). An excellent survey of early work on EBL appears in Dietterich (1990)(23).
Relevance: Relevance information in the form of functional dependencies was first developed in the database community, where it is used to structure large sets of attributes into manageable subsets. Functional dependencies were used for analogical reasoning by Carbonell and Collins (1973)(24) and rediscovered and given a full logical analysis by Davies and Russell (Davies, 1985(25); Davies and Russell, 1987(26)).
Prior knowledge: Their role as prior knowledge in inductive learning was explored by Russell and Grosof (1987)(27). The equivalence of determinations to a restricted-vocabulary hypothesis space was proved in Russell (1988)(28).
Learning: Learning algorithms for determinations and the improved performance obtained by RBDTL were first shown in the FOCUS algorithm, due to Almuallim and Dietterich (1991)(29). Tadepalli (1993)(30) describes a very ingenious algorithm for learning with determinations that shows large improvements in earning speed.
Inverse deduction: The idea that inductive learning can be performed by inverse deduction can be traced to W. S. Jevons (1874)(31) (…).
Computational investigations began with the remarkable Ph.D. thesis by
Norvig I 800
Gordon Plotkin (1971)(32) at Edinburgh. Although Plotkin developed many of the theorems and methods that are in current use in ILP, he was discouraged by some undecidability results for certain subproblems in induction. MIS (Shapiro, 1981)(33) reintroduced the problem of learning logic programs, but was seen mainly as a contribution to the theory of automated debugging. Induction/rules: Work on rule induction, such as the ID3 (Quinlan, 1986)(34) and CN2 (Clark and Niblett, 1989)(35) systems, led to FOIL (Quinlan, 1990)(36), which for the first time allowed practical induction of relational rules.
Relational Learning: The field of relational learning was reinvigorated by Muggleton and Buntine (1988)(37), whose CIGOL program incorporated a slightly incomplete version of inverse resolution and was capable of generating new predicates. The inverse resolution method also appears in (Russell, 1986)(38), with a simple algorithm given in a footnote. The next major system was GOLEM (Muggleton and Feng, 1990)(39), which uses a covering algorithm based on Plotkin’s concept of relative least general generalization. ITOU (Rouveirol and Puget, 1989)(40) and CLINT (De Raedt, 1992)(41) were other systems of that era.
Natural language: More recently, PROGOL (Muggleton, 1995)(42) has taken a hybrid (top-down and bottom-up) approach to inverse entailment and has been applied to a number of practical problems, particularly in biology and natural language processing.
Uncertainty: Muggleton (2000)(43) describes an extension of PROGOL to handle uncertainty in the form of stochastic logic programs.
Inductive logic programming /ILP: A formal analysis of ILP methods appears in Muggleton (1991)(44), a large collection of papers in Muggleton (1992)(45), and a collection of techniques and applications in the book by Lavrauc and Duzeroski (1994)(46). Page and Srinivasan (2002)(47) give a more recent overview of the field’s history and challenges for the future. Early complexity results by Haussler (1989) suggested that learning first-order sentences was intractible. However, with better understanding of the importance of syntactic restrictions on clauses, positive results have been obtained even for clauses with recursion (Duzeroski et al., 1992)(48). Learnability results for ILP are surveyed by Kietz and Duzeroski (1994)(49) and Cohen and Page (1995)(50).
Discovery systems/VsILP: Although ILP now seems to be the dominant approach to constructive induction, it has not been the only approach taken. So-called discovery systems aim to model the process of scientific discovery of new concepts, usually by a direct search in the space of concept definitions. Doug Lenat’s Automated Mathematician, or AM (Davis and Lenat, 1982)(51), used discovery heuristics expressed as expert system rules to guide its search for concepts and conjectures in elementary number theory. Unlike most systems designed for mathematical reasoning, AM lacked a concept of proof and could only make conjectures. It rediscovered Goldbach’s conjecture and the Unique Prime Factorization theorem.
AM’s architecture was generalized in the EURISKO system (Lenat, 1983)(52) by adding a mechanism capable of rewriting the system’s own discovery heuristics. EURISKO was applied in a number of areas other than mathematical discovery, although with less success than AM. The methodology of AM and EURISKO has been controversial (Ritchie and Hanna, 1984; Lenat and Brown, 1984).



1. Mill, J. S. (1843). A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence, and Methods of Scientific Investigation. J.W. Parker, London.
2. Bruner, J. S., Goodnow, J. J., and Austin, G. A. (1957). A Study of Thinking. Wiley.
3. Winston, P. H. (1970). Learning structural descriptions from examples. Technical report MAC-TR-76,
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
4. Mitchell, T.M. (1977). Version spaces: A candidate elimination approach to rule learning. In IJCAI-77,
pp. 305–310.
5. Mitchell, T. M. (1982). Generalization as search. AIJ, 18(2), 203–226. 6. Buchanan, B. G.,Mitchell, T.M., Smith, R. G., and Johnson, C. R. (1978). Models of learning systems.
In Encyclopedia of Computer Science and Technology, Vol. 11. Dekker.
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Machine Learning: An Artificial Intelligence Approach, pp. 163–190. Morgan Kaufmann.
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Norvig I
Peter Norvig
Stuart J. Russell
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010

Redundancy Theory Brandom I 433f
Redundancy theory/Brandom: VsPragmatism: has not recognized that the significance of the corresponding assertions must be the same - VsRamsey: E.g. "Goldbach’s Conjecture" is not equivalent to "the Goldbach's Conjecture is true". - Solution: Originally posted eradication > set of sentences. VsRamsey.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Reference Wright I 27
Deflationism / e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture: the deflationism recognizes, of course, that in addition to Tarski, something must be said, even e.g. "Everything he said is true."

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Sense Frege Dummett III 56 ff
Sense/Frege: two arguments: 1) The sentence is the smallest unit.
2) Truth plays the crucial role in explaining the meaning.
Sense: sense is part of the meaning and relevant for truth or falsehood. The meaning of a sentence, as such, does not determine the truth. So the sense only determines the truth conditions.
Truth also depends on nature of the world. When sense determines the semantic value, the contribution of the world is already presumed.
Dummett III 64
Sense/Reference/Frege: the argument (a sentence is the smallest unit of sense) has two premises: a) all predicative knowledge is based on propositional knowledge,
b) for certain predicative knowledge there is more than just one proposition.
Therefore, no mere knowledge of the reference is possible.
Dummett III 74
Sense/Dummett: sense is not only acquired by verification method, but by understanding the circumstances which must be realized (e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture). Sense/reference/bivalence/Dummett: bivalence: Problem: not every sentence has such a sense that we can, in principle, recognize it as true if it is true (unicorn, Goldbach’s conjecture). But Frege’s argument does not depend on bivalence.
Dummett III 76
Bivalence does apply, however, for elementary propositions: if the semantic value here is the extension, it does not have to be decided whether the predicate is true or not. It may not be possible to effectively decide the application, but the (undefined) predicate can be understood without being able to allocate the semantic value (here truth value). Therefore, there is a distinction between sense and semantic value.
Dummett III 133
Sense/Frege/Dummett: sense is constituted by the manner of givenness but it is not identical with it.
Frege V 100f
Meaning/sense/Frege/Husted: if both were equal, a sentence could not say anything that everyone who knows the name did not know already. The meaning of a name: is the object. The fact that a name stands for an object is a result, not part of the fact that it has a purpose.
V 103
Frege: the sense of the sentence is the truth condition >Understanding/Dummett, >Understanding/Wittgenstein - Understanding, knowing what must be the case.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Deflationism Wright Vs Deflationism I 26
Truth: is there a concept of truth that is free of metaphysical obligations and yet assertoric? Deflation/Deflationism/Deflationary Approach: Ramsey was the first here. (Recently: Horwich: "Minimalism"): Truth assertoric (asserting, but not supported by assumption of metaphysical objects or facts). Tarski's quoting is sufficient.
Truth is not a substantial property of sentences. True sentences like "snow is white" and "grass is green" have nothing in common!
Important: you can use the disquotation scheme without understanding the content! You can "approach" the predicate "true". (Goldbach's conjecture).
Deflationism Thesis: the content of the predicate of truth is the same as the claim its assertoric use makes.
WrightVsDeflationism: instead "minimal truth ability", "minimal truth" here "minimalism": core existence of recognized standards.
I 35
Legitimate Assertiveness/Assertibility/Negation: Example "It is not the case that "P" is T then and only if it is not the case that "P" is T.
This is not valid for legitimate assertiveness from right to left! Namely, if the level of information is neutral (undecidable). (But for truth)(neutrality, >undecidability).
It is then correct to claim that it is not the case that P is assertible, but incorrect to claim that the negation of P is justifiably assertible.
Therefore, we must distinguish between "T" and "assertible". "("assertible": from now on for "legitimate assertible"). (VsDeflationism that recognizes only one norm.)
I 47
VsDeflationism: not a theory, but a "potpourri". There is no unambiguous thesis at all.
I 48
InflationismVsDeflationism: (uncertain) DS' "P" is true(E!P)("P" says that P & P) (! = that which exists enough for P)
I 53
Minimalism/Wright: recognizes, in contrast to deflationism, that truth is a real property. The possession of this property is normatively different from legitimate assertiveness. (VsDeflationism).
I 97
WrightVsDeflationism Thesis: the classical deflationary view of truth is in itself unstable. No norm of the predicate of truth can state that it differs from legitimate assertiveness. With this consequence, however, the central role ascribed to the quotation scheme - and thus also to negation equivalence - is not compatible.
The normative power of "true" and "justifiably claimable" coincides, but can potentially diverge extensionally.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Redundancy Theory Brandom Vs Redundancy Theory I 434
E.g. Vsredundancy theory "Goldbach s conjecture is true".
I 438
This sentence is not interchangeable with "Goldbach s conjecture".VsRamsey. E.g. »everything the oracle says is true," is not open to simpler approaches of redundancy and disquotation.
I 468
Brandom: "true" expresses a pro-sentence-forming operator. Its syntax and grammar is very different from that of a predicate. Just as "no" is not the necessary grammatical form to pick out a person .

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Superassertibility Verschiedene Vs Superassertibility Wright I 68/69
Def Superassertibility/Wright: a statement is superassertible if it is justified, or can be justified, and if its justification would survive both the arbitrarily accurate verification of its ancestry and arbitrarily extensive additions and improvements to the information. Wright: For our purposes it is sufficient that the term is "relatively clear".
Superassertibility/Content: the opponents of the superassertibility would have to refute the simple notion that the content of the claim that P does not include the claim that P is justified, nor that P is believed.
The thought that neither the principle
the proposition that P is justified if and only if P,
nor the principle
It is believed that P, if and only if P ((s)) is absurd)
applies a priori.
Superassertibility: their representatives must justify the validity of (Es)
(Es) It is superassertible that P, if and only if P.
I 72
Negation: this problem will be solved if it applies: (DSS) "P" is superassertible if and only if P.
From this follows, as we have seen, the negation equivalence:
It is not the case that "P" is superassertible if and only if it is not the case that "P" is superassertible.
Here we can distinguish between propositions and sentence when it comes to negation.
Then the validity of DSS depends on Es. ("It is superassertible that P...)
VsEs/VsSuperassertibility: one could object that Es cannot be valid since it mixes the validity of certain high-level evidence for P with the validity of fact.
For example, the Goldbach conjecture may be undetectably true and therefore not be superassertible.
For example a superassertible proposition (brains in a vat) can be undetectably wrong.
Since Es can be victim of counterexamples at any time, it cannot be true a priori.
Therefore, superassertibility does not claim to be a truth predicate (T-predicate).
I 73
VsSuperassertibility: the critics claim that the following equivalence cannot be established: (because of counterexamples): (F) It is true that it is ∏ that P if and only if it is true that P
(F) However, contains two occurrences of a truth predicate that must be understood as distinct from the superassertibility. ((s) "∏" should be replaceable by "superassertible", but then allegedly does not guarantee equivalence). "∏" is more neutral than "true", which can mean true or assertible.
Example: It is possible that the Goldbach conjecture is true without it being true that it is superassertible (provable), but it is certainly not evident that the conjecture could be superassertible without it being superassertible that this is the case.
Pluralism: if, as minimalism thinks, there can be a pluralism of predicates of truth, then it is to be expected that the illusion of failure can be created if each occurrence of "true" is interpreted differently.
It is as if someone wanted to prove that physical necessity cannot qualify as a real concept of necessity because the concept does not satisfy the following principle:
Necessary (AB) |= Necessary(A) Necessary (B) ((s) right side weaker)
I 74
and would then try to support his thesis by interpreting the last occurrence of "necessary" in the sense of logical necessity. ((s) There is no "logical necessity" of any object "B"!
If we want to know if there are counterexamples to (Es), the right question is not whether F is fulfilled, but whether it is, which arises when the two tendentious occurrences of "true" are replaced by those of "∏".
(G) It is ∏ that it is ∏ that is P, if and only if it is ∏ that is P. (Wright pro).
G: Truth without limitation by evidence.
F: Superassertibility.
So whether it is in fact always when it is superassertible that P is also superassertible that this is the case and vice versa.
Problem: if any true predicate of truth can fulfill the equivalence scheme a priori, its two possible forms (true and assertible, claimable) must be a priori coextensive.
Thus, no predicate F can obviously function like a T-predicate if it has to function alongside another predicate G, which is already assumed to both fulfil the equivalence scheme and potentially diverge extensionally from F. (e.g. Goldbach's conjecture).
(Since it cannot apply a priori that (P is if and only if of P F) if a priori that P applies then and only if P is G, but not a priori that (P is G if and only if P is F). (s) So coextension needs equivalence (concordance in both directions), and not only concordance in one direction.
This weakens the original objection. It applies only to the following extent: if it is shown that a discourse is dominated by a truth concept - G - not restricted by evidence, then it is shown that superassertibility - F - is not a predicate of truth for this discourse. (For, trivially, if P is superassertible, evidence for P must be available.)
But this does not justify a global conclusion.
I 75
Oversimplification: (Gs) It is superassertible that it is superassertible that P is, if and only if it is superassertible that P is.
Correct: given the equivalence scheme (see above), only the cases are counterexamples for (Es) in which (Fs) also fails:
(Fs) It is true that it is superassertible that P is if and only if it is true that P.
So if (Gs) applies, we know that there are no counterexamples to (Es) and consequently (Es) applies. But only provided that there are no competing predicates of truth besides superassertibility!
I 76
Question: So is (Gs) unrestrictedly valid? It should be shown that the existence of an entitlement for P means that there is also an entitlement for the assertion that P is superassertible (showable in the future). For example, suppose the possession of an authorization for A also means possessing an authorization for B, and vice versa, but that for a reductio A is superassertible, B on the other hand is not!
Then a total state of information I entitles to A and also all its improvements I' and hypothetically also to B.
But: since B is not superassertible, there must be some improvement of I supporting A, but not B.
This shows that (i) the coincidence of the assertibility conditions is sufficient for (ii) both statements of a pair to be superassertible if this is true for either of them.
I 77
Superassertibility: it is less clear that the possession of an authority for the assertion also means the possession of the authority to view the statement as superassertible. Question: Can the authority to claim P coexist with the lack of authority to view P as a superassertible? ((s) Can something be assertible without being superassertible?)
Assertiveness/Strawson: the assertibility-conditional view offers "no explanation for what a speaker actually does when he/she uttered the sentence".





WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008