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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Individuation | Lewis | IV 58 Relation/individuation/Lewis: Relations are usually individuated through coextension. I-Relation/R-Relation/Lewis: These two relations are identical because they are coextensive. Explanation: Def R-Relation/Identity/Continuity/Person/Lewis: a certain relation and connection among person states. Question: What conditions will survive the state in which you ask yourself this question? For example, if you walk out of a duplicator, who will you be, who will come out of the right or left door, or both? IV 58/59 The everyday mind, however, says something else: it asks itself whether the permanent person, which consists of the present states together with many other states, will continue to exist after the fight. Will you be identical to someone who lives after the fight? Seen in this light, continuity and identity do not seem to reconcile with each other. Solution: we must not compare the formal character of the identity itself with the formal character of the relation R. Of course, the relation is not the same as the identity. Instead, we must compare the I relation with the R relation. Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: Which of the permanent persons are identical to the former? But of course there are also I-relations between the individual states! (>I-relations: also exist between several things (other than identity). Proposition: each state (of a person) is I-relative and R-relative to exactly the same states. And also for all kinds of problem cases. >Identity/Lewis, >Identification, >Identity conditions. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Terminology | Lewis | Bigelow I 180 Definition Lagadonian Language/Lagadonian/Terminology/Swift/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: by this name Lewis calls such a language, following Gulliver's travels. (1986a(1), p. 145). It is a set theoretical structure on individuals, characteristics, and relations. 1. Lewis, David 1986a. Philosophical Papers, Volume II, Oxford: Oxford University Press Schwarz I 97 Properties/Lewis/Schwarz: Definition intrinsic property: never differ between perfect duplicates. Duplicate: Defined not by sum, but by distribution of the perfectly natural property. Def Perfectly natural property: (PNP) = fundamental property: all qualitative intrinsic differences between things (also possible worlds) are based on their instantiation. - E.g. Fred is the tallest in his family, but his duplicate is not in his family. - that depends on distribution of intrinsic properties: if we duplicate the entire family, the duplicate is sure to be the tallest there as well. IV 58 Relation/individuation/Lewis: Relations are usually individuated through coextension. I-Relation/R-Relation/Lewis: These two relations are identical because they are coextensive. Def R-Relation/Identity/Continuity/Person/Lewis: a certain relation and connection among person states. Question: What conditions will survive the state in which you ask yourself this question? For example, if you walk out of a duplicator, who will you be, who will come out of the right or left door, or both? Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: Which of the permanent persons are identical to the former? But of course there are also I-relations between the individual states! IV 259 Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: wipes out the difference between intensional and extensional language - at the same time it eliminates technical vocabulary by existential quantification. "Ramsification" neutral level: there is a system of categories, S, N, X/Y, there are three relationships of expressions to things: A-tension, B-tension, C-tension. I (b) 27 Theoretical Terms/TT/Lewis: (T terms) are names, not predicates or functions. I (b) 31 They can always be eliminabted by being replaced by their definientia. I (b) 34 Here: the T terms are names of mental states, the A terms are names for stimuli and responses and also for causal relationships. Theoretical terms: (T terms) are names, not predicates or functions. V 11 Compatibility/Possible world/Lewis: B is compatible with A in world i if an A world is closer to i than any non-B-world. - (Reversal of rather true) - then A were>>would C is true if C follows from A together with auxiliary hypotheses B1...Bn. - E.g. natural laws are compatible or completely incompatible with every assumption - thesis: then laws of nature are generalizations of what we consider to be particularly important. - Then conformity with Laws of Nature should be important for the similarity relation between possible worlds V 86 Principal Principle/main principle/probability/opportunity/Lewis: the Principal Principle is to be modeled according to our experience with direct conclusions. Exceptions: 1) it is about opportunity, not frequency. 2) Certainty of probabilities (opportunities) contributes to the resilience (resistance to new information). Schwarz I 99 Relations/Lewis: intrinsic: e.g., greater-relation (concerns only the two sides). Extrinsic: e.g. grandmother-relation (needs a third). Internal relation: (not equal to intrinsic relation): depends only on intrinsic properties and is reducible to them. External relation: is also intrinsic, but just not reducible. E.g., Spatiotemporal relation: "intrinsic with respect to pairs". Identity/partial relation/elementarity/Lewis: These are all no relations! |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parfit, D. | Lewis Vs Parfit, D. | IV 55 Identity/Continuity/Survival/Person/Lewis: Problem: we asked a question and got two answers: a) Identity: can only be total identity. b) Continuity: can be gradual. Which of these two should be relevant for survival? If we had to choose, we should prefer everyday platitude to philosophical subtlety. The only hope is that identity view and continuity version are somehow reconcilable. That I would like to defend VsParfit. IV 57 Identity/Continuity/Person/Parfit: Thesis: not both answers (continuity and identity) can be right, so we have to choose. a) Identity: is a relation with a certain formal character: it is one to one and cannot be gradual. b) Continuity: (and connectedness) (e.g. in relation to mental things) can be one to many or many to one as well as gradual. Parfit: therefore it is the continuity and connectedness that is relevant to personal (temporal) identity (survival). c) what is important for survival is not identity! At most a relation that coincides with identity to the extent that problem cases do not occur. LewisVsParfit: someone else could just as well represent the argument in the other direction and make identity relevant. And of course, identity is what matters in the end! Therefore, the divergence between a) and b) must be eliminated! I agree with Parfit that continuity and connectedness are crucial, but it is not an alternative to identity. Border case/Parfit: Problem: Border cases have to be decided arbitrarily somehow. Identity/continuity/survival/Person/LewisVsParfit: the opposition between identity and continuity is wrong. Intuitively, it's definitely about identity. It is literally about identity! Def Identity/Lewis: the relation in which everything stands to itself and to nothing else. ...+.... R-relation, I-Relation IV 58 Def R-Relation/Identity/Continuity/Person/Lewis: a certain relation and connectedness among person states. Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: Which of the permanent persons are identical to the previous ones? But of course there are also I-Relations between the individual states! IV 73 ParfitVsLewis: we should not cross our common views with the common sense. I.e. it is about another sense of survival. For example, shortly after the split, one of the two dP (continuants) dies, the other lives for a very long time. S is the state divided to t0 (before the split), but after it is known that the split will take place. Then the thought that we found in S is the desire for survival, and extremely like common sense and quite unphilosophical. Since S is a shared state (stage), it is also a shared desire. Problem: C2 has the survival he desires and he depends on mental continuity and connection. (RR) but what about C1 (the prematurely dying continuant)? IV 74 Lewis: I had written that what matters is identity in survival. Then for the short-living C1, the stage S to t0 is actually IR to states in the distant future such as S2, namely via the long-living C2! ParfitVsLewis: "But isn't that the wrong person?" Lewis: in fact, if C1 really wants him to survive (C1), then that wish is not fulfilled. (Lewis, however, deals with the more difficult problem): LewisVsParfit: but I don't think he can have this wish! There is a limit to everyday psychological desires under conditions of shared states. The shared state S thinks for both. Every thought it has must be shared. It cannot think one thing in the name of C1 and one thing in the name of C2. If, on the other hand, C1 and C2 are to share something that is understandable in everyday life, then it must be a "plural" wish, "let us survive". Here we must now distinguish between two pluralistic wishes: a) weak: lets at least one of us survive b) strong: lets us both survive. Because these desires are plural and not singular, they are not common sense. This is because everyday psychological survival is understood in terms of survival of dP rather than of relations of states. The weak desire of C1 corresponds to the desire for IR for future states. Then the IR also corresponds to the RR. and the corresponding wish. If C1's wish is strong, he will not be satisfied. Then it does not correspond to the "philosophical wish" either. IV 75 After RR for future stages and parfit is right VsLewis. LewisVsParfit: but should we say that C1 even has this strong desire? I don't think so. Because if C1 can have it, C2 can also have it. Example Suppose (according to Justin Leiber): a wish is recorded from time to time, but deleted after a certain time. This corresponds to the weak desire for survival, but not the strong one. Suppose the recording takes place at the time of the split, C1 dies shortly afterwards due to an accident. C2, survives. Additional complication: C" then undergoes a body transplant. If his desire to survive is to be fulfilled, then it is predominantly the weak desire. Person/Survival/Identity/LewisVsParfit: For example, until now we had assumed that both knew before the split that there would be a split. Now Suppose (variant): both do not know about the coming split. Question: can we not perfectly share the wish: "Let me survive"? Problem: that C1 and C2 share the desire is based on the false presupposition that they are one person. I.e. the "me" is a wrong identification. It cannot refer to C1 in C1' thoughts and not to C2 in his thoughts. For these thoughts are one and the same. Vs: but their desire to survive is fulfilled! At least that of C2 and that of C1 is not different. Then their wish cannot only consist in the unfulfillable singular wish. They must both also have a weak pluralistic desire, even if they do not know the division beforehand. N.B.: that then also applies to all of us, although we are not often divided, many of our current desires are not current occurrences: E.g. The desire to be spared unimaginable pain. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personal Identity | Lewis, D. | IV 58 Def R-Relation/Identity/Continuity/Person/Lewis: a specific relation and attachment among person states. Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: which of the permanent persons are identical with the former? But of course there are also I-relations between the individual states! (see below I-relations also exist between several things (other than identity). Thesis: every state (of a person) is I-relative and R-relative to exactly the same states. And also for all possible problem cases. I-Relation/R-Relation/Lewis: Thesis: both are identical because they are coextensive! |
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