Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ideal Observer | Hume | Rawls I 184 Ideal observer/society/order/justice/Hume/Rawls: something, e. g. a social system, is fair, if an ideal impartial observer from outside would judge this from a general point of view, if he had all relevant information about the circumstances. >Impartiality, >Idealization, >Observation, >Justice, >Circumstances. (See Roderick Firth, "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 12, 1952; F. C. Sharp, Good and Ill Wll, Chicago, 1950, pp. 156-162; D. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1888, esp. Bk III, pt. III, sec I, esp. Pp574-584. More general discussion: C. D. Broad, "Some Reflections on Moral-Sense Theories in Ethics". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 45 (1944-45); W. K. Kneale "Objectivity in Morals", Philosophy, vol. 25 (1950).) |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Ideal Observer | Rawls | I 185 Ideal observer/society/order/justice/Rawls: Variant of the ideal observer: let us assume that this would be a fully compassionate being. Then there is a possible derivation of the classical benefit principle, by assuming that it is this principle that gives the observer the most pleasure. I 186 A compassionate observer will put himself/herself in the place of the person he/she is watching. Cf. >Intersubjectivity. I 187 Utilitarianism/Individuals/Rawls: the classical Utilitarianism ignores in a certain sense the distinction of individual persons. The principle of rational choice of a human being is at the same time the principle of rational choice for everyone. >Rational Choice. N.B.: this makes this ideal person identical to the ideal compassionate observer. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Ideal Observer | Smith | Rawls I 184 Ideal observer/society/order/justice/dam Smith/Rawls: something, e. g. a social system, is fair, if an ideal impartial observer from outside would judge this from a general point of view, if he/she had all relevant information about the circumstances. (See Roderick Firth,"Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 12,1952; F. C. Sharp, Good and Ill Wll, Chicago, 1950, pp. 156-162; A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in L. A. Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, vol. I Oxford, 1897, pp. 257-277. >Observation, >Method, >Idealization, >Knowledge, >Impartiality, >Circumstances, >Economy, >Society, >Systems. For a more general discussion: C. D. Broad,"Some Reflections on Moral-Sense Theories in Ethics". Proceedings oft he he Aristotelian Society, vol. 45 (1944-45). W. K. Kneale "Objectivity in Morals", Philosophy, vol. 25 (1950).) |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Ideal Observer | Firth | Rawls I 185 Ideal Observer/Society/Order/Justice/R. Firth/Rawls: Firth assumes that an ideal observer has different general interests, even if they are not specific; and that these interests are even necessary if such an observer is to display significant moral reactions at all. >Interest, >Observation, >Morality, >Society, >Justice, >Injustice. Firth, however, does not say anything substantive about these interests that would enable to explain how his preferences and dislikes come about.(1) 1. R. Firth, "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 12,1952. |
Firth I Roderick Firth Max Black Ernest Nagel, et al. Science, Language, and Human Rights: American Philosophical Association 2012 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kant | Mackie Vs Kant | Stegmüller IV 319 KantVsDeterminism: freedom is a prerequisite of our moral thinking. MackieVsKant: this yields the prerequisite of a metaphysical objectivism. IV 320 VsDeterminism: undermines the possibility of moral judgement in general! One cannot have a conviction and at the same time assume that it is causally determined! VsVs: this reasoning is simply wrong: the determinacy does not undermine the correctness of the judgement! Determinism/Stegmüller: today we know too little to decide whether it is true or false. But if it were true, would it undermine our moral thinking? Terminology: Def Incompatibility Thesis/morality/Stegmüller: if determinism were true, there would be no moral thinking. Responsibility, duty, benevolence etc. became meaningless. Stegmüller IV 171 Mackie/VsKant: the categorical imperative is not of objective validity! There must be at least one premise that is not truth-apt, but expresses the fact that a decision has been made. Stegmüller IV 323 Self/MackieVsKant: supposed to act on the basis of rational arguments. Problem: how is that possible if the self is not causally connected to its acts by its reasons for action? How can actions belong to the self and yet be only random events? The theorist of incompatibility would have to construct an analogon to causality and deny its causal character at the same time. metaphysical Self/Kant/Stegmüller: essential for Kant, because it is the addressee of the moral ought. MackieVsKant: as a subjectivist he does not even need to introduce the metaphysical self. Stegmüller IV 431 God/immortality/morality/MackieVsKant: (i) has an ambivalent position: on the one hand primacy of practical reason whose claims are to be adopted by theoretical reason. On the other hand he asks if our knowledge is truly broadened by that. Kant: "Certainly, but only in a practical sense." Mackie: this revokes everything. Two possible interpretations: 1. Kant wants to say that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul can be proven as facts, 2. not as facts, but as the necessary conditions for our consciousness as a rational being. IV 432 MackieVsKant: greatest weakness: 1. the transition from "we should seek to promote the highest good" to "that must be still possible". Ought/Kant: elsewhere he had tried to show that the "Ought" presupposes a correspondent "Can." (Where?). But that had been about the obediance of the moral law. MackieVsKant: the analogy to the summum bonum does not make sense. But that be granted. 2. then, the thesis that we should seek to promote the highest good includes that we can seek to promote it. To conclude therefrom the possibility of a full realization is ineligible. Moral/MackieVsKant: Kant cannot even assert that the possible realization were a necessary condition for moral thinking. IV 433 MackieVsKant: the tension between his theism on the one hand and his emphasis on the autonomy of morality on the other is irresolvable. KantVsPopular notion: neither our knowledge of God and his will nor this will itself are a rationale of the moral law, but only reason! Therefore, "self-legislation" of practical reason. MackieVsKant: yet, Kant speaks misleadingly of "laws of the Supreme Being". But God himself is just another rational being! MackieVsKant: the correspondence of morality and happiness is still represented in an unconscious thinking in terms of reward and punishment. The consistent recognition of the autonomy of morality should have brought him towards more of a Stoic conception: that morality requires no other happiness than the awareness of righteousness itself (possibly Hume, Marc Aurel, Adam Smith).. Morality/God/Kant: Kant seems to have been aware of this difficulty. In his Metaphysics of Morals he anticipates the argument of conscience by J. H. Newman. Also, he oscillates between the idea of God as a purely intellectual construction (e.g. Adam Smith's ideal observer) and the assumption of a real existence. V 437 MackieVsMoral proofs of God: there are better explanations for action than for the existence of a divine person. Practical decisions must be based on convictions about facts and not vice versa! Whatever we are inclined to view as a rational act is no evidence of what is actually the case. IV 438 MackieVsKant: problem with his moral argument: if a particular practical principle presupposes certain factual allegations, then the reason, as pure as it may be, cannot claim to have demonstrated the validity of this practical principle, if it did not prove the validity of the relevant factual allegations independently. IV 461 Freedom/determinism/morality/Mackie/Stegmüller: other kinds of freedom are fully compatible with determinism (e.g. freedom of neurotic compulsion)! IV 462 Will/Kant: (Metaphysics of Morals): "is a kind of causality of living beings, as long as they are reasonable, and freedom would be the property of this causality, since it can take effect independent of external determining causes." "external causes": reward, punishment, but also desires and inclinations! Autonomy/Kant/Stegmüller: here, consistency with its own ideal of reason is an end in itself. MackieVsKant: misapprehension: he probably even thought himself to have characterized the contra-causal free will, but in fact he distinguished between external causes and the autonomous efficacy of the will. And that is something completely different! IV 463 autonomous activity: completely compatible with two assumptions: 1. that there are sufficient preliminary causes for the will to have a certain strength. 2. that, whatever such a will does, is dependent on the character of the person and his*her strength of will. Will/capriciousness(Willkür)/Kant/Stegmüller: later he differentiates the two: the latter is the only one that posses contra-causal freedom; it is the free will in its usual sense. Freedom/Kant: (late) he moves completely towards autonomy (autonomous legality of the will). Vs: but that is not a solution to our problem. Judgement/conviction/Kant/Stegmüller: (Metaphysics of Morals): it is not possible to render a judgement in the theoretical (speuculative) realm or to express a genuine conviction, while at the same time admitting to having been externally induced to do so. IV 464 Judgement/conviction/MackieVsKant: whoever makes a rational judgement cannot interpret it in a way that it was reached incorrectly. However, there is no problem in seriously holding a rational conviction and at the same time acknowledging that it has been reached in an appropriate manner. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Popper, K. | Martin Vs Popper, K. | Arm II 81 Verificationism/Martin: ironically, the weak verficationism itself is verification transcendent: any finite set of confirmations is consistent with the falsity of the confirmed! The incompleteness is further underlined by the fact that typically the execution of one set of verifications excludes another set. VsPopper: the reference to falsification does not change anything. "Ideal observer": doesn't help either II 82 because the "ideality" is just as incompletely verified. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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