Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kant | Quine Vs Kant | Danto I 132 QuineVsKant, QuineVsAnalyticity: Kant’s conception of contradiction is quite unclear. It presupposes the notion of analyticity, instead of making it clear. Quine: Def contradiction "P and not-P." But: "Bachelors are no unmarried, adult men" is not formally contradictory! This was not recognized by Kant. Quine IV 407 Analyticity/QuineVsKant: talk of "containment" is a) metaphorical in terms of concepts. It is b) too narrow, because it is tailored to subject-predicate sentences. It is not readily applicable to relations: E.g. "If Hans is the father of Peter, then Peter is not the father of Hans." c) the indication that a proposition is analytic if its negation is contradictory does not help, since "contradictory" is just as much in need of explanation here. Analytical/Kant/Quine: Kant does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context! Quine VII (b) 20 Analyticity/Kant/Quine: derived from Hume's distinction between Relations of ideas and Relations of facts. Leibniz: distinguishing Truths of fact and Rational truths. (Of which we hear that their negation is supposed to be self-contradictory!) VII (b) 20/21 QuineVsKant: two shortcomings: 1) It is limited to statements of the subject-predicate form 2) It appeals to a concept of limitation, which moves on a metaphorical level. Analytic/Quine: but can be reformulated as a true by virtue of the meanings and regardless of the facts. Quine XI 72 Analytic/QuineVsLeibniz/Lauener: the concept of the possible world is itself in need of explanation. QuineVsKant: the self-contradiction we involve ourselves in, according to Kant, when denying analytic sentences is itself in need of explanation. Stroud I 210 Experience/Empirical/Sensation/Sensory/Reality/World/Kant/Stroud: this is what it looked like for Kant: a completely general distinction between what we experience through the senses and truths about the world would exclude us forever from knowledge. Stroud I 211 Stroud: perhaps these fatal consequences only exist within the traditional philosophical conception of the function of the epistemes. (>QuineVsTraditional Epistemology, QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge). Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: would then only apply to the distant position (outside the frame of reference)! But then we could avoid skepticism and maintain the general distinction between the empirically given ((SellarsVs!) and what is true or false about the outside world. All we would have to avoid, would be a "distant position" (outside the frame of reference). Stroud I 214 Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/Stroud: Kant distinguishes philosophy from everything else (>"prima philosophia"). QuineVsKant: there is no a priori knowledge here. Skepticism/Kant/Quine/Stroud: both accept the "Keptian Conditional" or the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If the skeptic was able to ask a meaningful question, the skeptical conclusion (that we know nothing) would be correct. Stroud I 215 Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: it is not clear whether Quine actually answers the skeptical question at all. Knowledge/Quine: asks how we obtain a theory of the world. This looks like a very general problem. Input/Quine: is "lean": E.g. reflections of light, bright/dark contrasts, temperature variations, etc. Output/Quine: in contrast, is extremely rich. This brings us to under-determination empiricism. We get an extremely sophisticated three-dimensional image and a history of the world only through the mediation of the surfaces of the objects and our nerve endings. Reality/World/Knowledge/Quine: the relation between input and output itself is the subject of an investigation, it is itself a natural phenomenon. Stroud I 248 Knowledge/Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: a completely general distinction between a) everything we learn through the senses on one side, and b) what is true or false about the world on the other side would forever exclude us from knowledge. (see above). StroudVsQuine: that is fatal for the project of naturalized epistemology. Because it excludes us from our own knowledge of the world and leaves us no independent reason to accept that any of our projections are true. Stroud I 249 QuineVsKant/QuineVsStroud: precisely this separation (differentiation) is a liberation of science. It shows us that all the information about external things I can get through the senses is limited to two-dimensional optical projections. Stroud: if this is really what "Science tells us" (NNK, 68), then how can the separation (differentiation) have the consequences that I draw from this? Would I not simply contradict scientific facts? StroudVsQuine: No: nothing I say implies that I cannot observe any person in interaction with their environment and isolate some events on its sensory surfaces from everything else. Important argument: we know - and he probably also knows - a lot of things that happen in the world beyond those events. He himself will also know little about the events that take place on his sensory surfaces. Important argument: these events (which do not directly impact his senses) should be considered as part of what causes his belief ((s) and possibly generates knowledge). Surely, without any sensory experience we would come to no belief about the world at all. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
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