Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 35 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Animal Language | Deacon | I 34 Animal language/Deacon: the communication of other species is never a "simpler form" of human language. It is not language at all. >Communication. Biological explanation/Deacon: is always evolutionary and tries to show continuity. However, there are no animal precursors to the emergence of human language, let alone an ascending scale of complexity. (See Robin Dunbar, Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language, 1997(1); and Dunbar 1992 a(2), b(3)). I 54 Animal language/animals/Deacon: the misconception that animal calls and gestures are like words or phrases can be traced back to misunderstandings about the concept of reference. >Reference, >Gestures. Behaviorism: some behaviorists have suggested that animal cries are just external expressions of internal states and therefore have nothing to do with reference. >Behaviorism. Cognitive behaviorists saw calls as equivalent to words. One study played a central role in this. Seyfarth/Cheney: Thesis: Warning calls of guenons are like names for predators in the distance. (See Seyfarth, Cheney and Marler 1980(4)). I 56 In response to various calls, the monkeys left the trees (warning of eagles) or jumped on trees (leopards) or peeked into bushes (snake). Deacon: this is evolutionary easy to explain. Since the saving behaviour cannot always look the same and is even mutually exclusive, different calls have to be distinguished. (See also Hauser, 1996(5)). Animal calls/Cheney/Seyfarth/Deacon: Cheney and Seyfarth initially assumed that the animal calls were names for the predators. These were accepted instead of a complete sentence, i.e. as "holophrastic" utterances. Holophrastic utterances/Deacon: it is disputed how much syntactic potential lies in them. >Wittgenstein language game "Platte", cf. >Subsententials. Animal communication: the thesis was put forward that warning cries were different from cries of pain or grimaces by referring to something else... I 57 ...than the inner state of the animal. Reference/DeaconVsCheney/DeaconVsSeyfarth: it was implicitly assumed that pain cries, for example, could not be referring. Such assumptions give rise to the idea of a "proto-language" with calls as "vocabulary". >Vocabulary, >Words, >Signs, >Signals. Then you could imagine an animal language evolution with grammar and syntax that emerged later. This whole house of cards is falling apart however. (See also Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990(6)). Reference/Deacon: is not limited to language. Symptoms can refer to something other than themselves. For example, laughter: is congenital in humans. It does not have to be produced intentionally and can be simulated in social contexts. But laughter can also refer to things, even to absent ones. In this way alarm calls also refer. >Innateness. I 58 Language/DeaconVsSeyfarth/DeaconVsCheney: e.g. laughter differs from speech by the fact that it is contagious. In a room full of laughing people, it is hard to be serious. The idea of a room full of people repeating just one sentence is absurd. Intentionality/Intention/animal calls/Deacon: Animal calls do not fulfil the Grice criterion for messages either: "I think you believe that I believe x". Animal calls are involuntary and contagious. >Language, >P. Grice. I 59 Solution/Deacon: it is more about spreading excitement than sharing information. Reference/Deacon: therefore, reference is not the distinguishing feature between animal calls and words. Both can refer to inner states and things in the outer world. We must therefore distinguish between different types of reference rather than distinguish between referring and allegedly non-referring signals. >Reference/Deacon. I 65 Animal language/Herrnstein/Deacon: (Herrnstein 1980(7)): Experiments with pigeons who had successfully learned an arbitrary sign language and cooperation. I 66 Symbolic reference/Deacon: this simple form of reference with the characteristic learned association, randomness of characters, transmission of information between individuals are not sufficient to define symbolic reference. A symbolic reference system does not simply consist of words without syntax. >Symbolic reference, >Syntax. I 67 Animal calls: in one sense their understanding is innate, on the other hand the connection to the referent is not necessary. The reference is somewhat flexible. Some connections are built in prenatal, others are learned. I 68 Symbolic competence: is that which goes beyond parrot-like expressions. For this purpose, one has to distinguish between contextually determined causes of expression and memorized dictations. >Symbolic communication, >Symbolic learning, >Symbolic representation. 1. Dunbar, R. (1997). Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Dunbar, R. (1992a). Co-evolution of neocortex size, group size and language in humans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 3. Dunbar, R. (1992b). Neocortex size as a constraint on group sizes in primates. Journal of Human Evolution 20, 469-493. 4. Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Marler, P. (1980): Vervet monkey alarm calls: Semantic communication in a free-ranging primate. Animal Behaviour, 28(4), 1070–1094. 5. Hauser, M. D. (1996): The evolution of communication. The MIT Press. 6. Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990): How monkeys see the world: Inside the mind of another species. University of Chicago Press. 7. Herrnstein, R. (1980). Symbolic communication between two pigeons (Columba domestica). Science 210. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Artificial Intelligence | Dragan | Brockman I 139 Artificial intelligence/Dragan: [The] need to understand human actions and decisions applies to physical and nonphysical robots alike. For an AI with, say, a financial or economic role, the mismatch between what it expects us to do and what we actually do could have even worse consequences. One alternative is for the robot not to predict human actions but instead just protect against the worst-case human action. Often when robots do that, though, they stop being all that useful. With cars, this results in being stuck, because it makes every move too risky. (…) robots will need accurate (or at least reasonable) predictive models of whatever people might decide to do. Our state definition can’t just include the physical position of humans in the world. Instead, we’ll also need to estimate something internal to people. What makes the problem more complicated is the fact that people don’t make decisions in isolation. Much like the robot treating human actions as clues to human internal states, people will change their beliefs about the robot as they observe its actions. Unfortunately, the giving of clues Brockman I 140 doesn’t come as naturally to robots as it does to humans; we’ve had a lot of practice communicating implicitly with people. >Value alignment problem/Dragan. >Artificial Intelligence >Artificial consciousness >Artificial General Intelligence >Strong Artificial Intelligence >Machine Learning >Neural Networks >Superintelligence. Dragan, Anca, “Putting the Human into the AI Equation” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Behaviorism | Sellars | Rorty I 118 SellarsVsRyle: 1) the parallel statement about macro/micro-phenomena does not compel into the operationalist thesis that there can be no micro-entities. >Operationalism. 2) Similarly, the fact that behavior is evidence for sensations ("built into the logic" of sensation concepts) does not mean that there can be no sensations. >Sensations, >Experience, >Appearance. Privileged status: is not logically, but merely empirically privileged. (Prerequisite for Sellars, however, was Quine's attack on the distinction between logical and empirical.) >Two Dogmas/Quine, >Empiricism/Quine, >Analyticity/Quine. Ryle's error was: the evidence of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states shows that in reality there were no internal states. >Dispositions/Ryle, >Gilbert Ryle. Just as wrong as the instrumentalistic approach: "There are no positrons, there are merely dispositions of electrons to...", "there are no physical objects, there are merely dispositions of sense data to...". >Instrumentalism, Cf. >Constructivism, >Sense data. --- Rorty VI 182 Behavior/Sellars: a difference which is not apparent in behavior is not a difference that makes a difference. --- Sellars I XXIXf Methodological Behaviorism (Sellars): VsLogical behaviorism. Logical behaviorism: is essentially a thesis on the meaning of mental terms. (Carnap, Hempel) mainly concentrated on 'pain' as a psychological predicate. PutnamVsLogical Behaviorism: E.g. "Super Spartans" who never expressed their pain in any way. Methodological Behaviorism: (Sellars) introduces mental terms with view to observable behavior, but does not maintain that these terms should be defined in terms of behavior. >Observation, >Observation language, >Mental Objects, >Intensional objects, >Objects of belief, >Objects of Thought, >Mentalism. I 91 Behaviorism: also requires theoretical terms (to assume thoughts). >Theoretical terms, >Unobservables. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Causal Theory of Knowledge | Brandom | I 310ff Causal theory of knowledge/GoldmanVs/Barn facades: classic causal theory: Knowledge for the wrong reasons no knowledge. Alvin Goldman: example: residents of real-barn province expresses genuine knowledge - the knowledge of the resident of the fassade province no real knowledge - Problem: mere chance whether real barn - the difference of circumstances has influence, even if they are causally irrelevant. >Barn facades. Quantity: few (unrecognizable) sparrow dummies do not turn a reliable onlooker into an unreliable one; they will, however, when there are many dummies - reliability is the correct term for the barn ((s) The method does not change when many dummies are used.) I 312 Goldman: underlines the possibility of gerrymandering: it depends on whether you are in the center or at the edge of the province when it comes to allocating values. >Gerrymandering. --- II 149 Knowledge/Causal Theory of Knowledge/Goldman/Brandom: objective probability can only specified relative to a reference class - but the world itself does not distinguish such classes - so the choice of the reference class in turn is not determined objectively by naturalistically specifiable facts. >Facts. II 149 f Barn facades/Goldman/Brandom: VsCausal Theory - Pioneer of reliability theories - Causal chain must be ideal - E.g. facades of provinces, each with changed practices: fake/real ... etc. - then it depends entirely on the choice of the reference class, whether the sight of a real barn is knowledge - maximum reliable: the narrowest reference class. Internalism/twin earth: it could be argued that the internal states are similar - Goldman/Brandom: all in all, the presence of fakes (barn facades) in the surroundings is causally irrelevant. >Cf. >Twin earth. II 152 Brandom: the circumstances are external! ((s) so it is true?). BrandomVsQuine: Goldman does not support the naturalistic epistemology, because knowledge is independent of the choice of the reference class - so one argument place remains empty. - It depends on how we describe the convinced person: as a citizen of the country, the state, etc. And that would be just the naturalistically formulated ones. - Definition naturalistic blind spot of the reliability theories/Brandom: whether an observer is reliable or not depends on the choice of reference classes (barn province), and thus on external circumstances that have nothing to do with the object under observation. II 155 Reliability theories: good reason for not separating belief from good inference - difference: knowledge/authorization for knowledge. >Reliability theory. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Consciousness | Chalmers | I XI Definition The Easy Problem/Consciousness/Chalmers: “easy” problems of consciousness: How does the brain process environmental stimulation? I XII How does it integrate information? How do we produce reports on internal states? I XIII If you only work on the "easy” problem, you get one sort of theory; if you believe, that there is a further “hard” problem, then you get another. Cf. >Computer model, >Computation, >Thinking, >World/thinking, >Stimuli, >Stimulus meaning, >Information, >Cognition, >Cognitive psychology. I XII Definition The Hard Problem of Consciousness/Chalmers: Why is all this processing (of stimulation, of information) accompanied by an experienced inner life? Thesis: The standard methods of neuroscience and cognitive science do not work in addressing them. I 4 Central is experience, but it is not definition. It is fruitless to define conscious experience in terms of more primitive notions. >Experience. I 5 When I am talking about it here, I mean only the subjective quality of experience. ((s) And this is not to be confused with self-experience). Cf. >Knowing how, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Self-consciousness. I 26 Consciousness/Chalmers: also this term has two aspects: A) psychological (behavior explaining, functional) - concerns reports and introspective accessibility to information. (From now on called "consciousness"). >Awareness/Chalmers, >Behavior, >Explanation, >Introspection. B) phenomenal (>Qualia/Chalmers, see also more authors on qualities). Psychological Consciousness/Chalmers: psychological consciousness is introspection, alertness, ability to reflect the content of mental states, self-awareness. >Content, >Mental states. 71 Consciousness/Chalmers: as almost the only phenomenon, conscious experience does not logically supervene on something else. Otherwise, virtually all natural phenomena are globally logically supervenient to facts about atoms, electromagnetic fields, etc. But that does not mean that all higher-level properties are based on micro-physical laws. >Supervenience. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Consciousness | Güzeldere | Metz I, 403f The consciousness of mental states is perceived as "perception-like" by Locke, Armstrong, Churchland and Lycan. Whereas Rosenthal, Carruthers, Dennett and Descartes perceive it as "thought-like". >Mental states, >Internal states, >Thinking, >Thoughts, >Self-knowledge, cf. >Self-consciousness; >J. Locke, >D. Armstrong, >Paul Churchland, >Patricia Churchland, >W. Lycan, >D. Rosenthal, >D. Dennett, >R. Descartes. |
Güzeldere I Güven Güzeldere "Is consciousness the perception of what passes in the mind?" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Criteria | Birnbacher | Metzinger II 719 "Thinking stones"/Birnbacher: for them we have no criterion. >Consciousness, >Thinking, >Brain. Metzinger II 720 Def Criterion/Wittgenstein: "good reasons" to support a hypothesis. Separated from "symptoms". >Symptoms. Birnbacher: Criteria are not strictly logically linked to the term whose fullfilment they indicate, but in the weaker sense of the language game community. >Language game, >Language community. According to Wittgenstein, criteria are not necessary conditions for existence, but they are necessary conditions for attributability. >Attribution. For example, conduct is not a necessary condition of the occurrence of certain internal states, but nevertheless a necessary condition of the attributability of such states. >Behavior, cf. >Supervenience, >Sufficiency. Metzinger II 720 Def Symptom/Wittgenstein: empirical correlate to the criteria. |
Birn I D. Birnbacher Analytische Einführung in die Ethik Berlin 2013 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Criteria | Wittgenstein | Metzinger II 720 Criterion/Wittgenstein: good reasons for a hypothesis - not logically linked to the concept in question - only in the weaker sense of the language community - Symptom: empirical correlate to the criterion" behavior: not necessary for the presence of internal states - but for their attribution. >Attribution, >Symptoms. Metzinger II 726 Criterion: can be behavior - but symptom: must be something physiological. >Behavior. Metzinger II 720 Concept/Attribution Criteria/Wittgenstein: belong to the concept - E.g. pain: not only what it is in itself, but also function in our lives. - N.B.: then artificial intelligence is logically impossible for Wittgenstein, because we only attribute the concept to humans. >Concepts, >Pain. --- Hintikka I 262 Criterion/Criteria/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: middle period: rule and criterion come together here - the concept of the criterion becomes important in late Wittgenstein. - At the same time, the rules stand back - middle period: rule and criterion come together here. - N.B.: criteria are nothing more than conventions - e.g. that someone with a toothache cups his cheek. - They are the hard rock of the expression toothache. - I do not identify my sensations by criteria, though. >Rules. Hintikka I 266 Criterion/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: late: new meaning of criterion: the entire language game is the only criterion for the use of the word - the criterion depends on the language game. - Just as there is no independent calculus of language - "there is no criterion for pain" - new: therefore also no longer the conventional cheek-cupping when you have a toothache - rule-following is not based on criteria. >Rule following. I 269 Late: behavior is not a criterion. I 269 We do not detect whether someone made a slip of the tongue by rules, but this is a separate language game. I 370 Belief/Criterion/Propositional Attitudes/Private Experiences/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: when Wittgenstein says: "an internal process requires external criteria", he does not refer to any internal processes or private experiences - but propositional attitudes such as beliefs, etc. - they need not be identified by a special feeling. - E.g. "I hope he'll come" is not a report on a state of mind - quite unlike sensations - different: "I always think of his coming": state of mind. - Propositional attitudes need criteria, because they do not include private experiences. >Propositional attitudes, >States of mind. --- Wittgenstein II 115 Understanding/Criterion/Wittgenstein: the criterion of understanding is that we can explain the sentence before we know whether it is true or false. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Dispositions | Rorty | Frank I 594 Disposition/realism/RortyVsArmstrong: the realistic conception of dispositions implies that physicalism must be true. - Then physicalism would be no empirical scientific truth (or theory) anymore. >Physicalism, >Realism. Frank I 595 Phenomenology/disposition/Armstrong: the phenomenalist, unlike the realist, cannot explain dispositions ((s) otherwise circular, because dispositions can also only be described) - He cannot explain why >counterfactual conditionals are true. >Phenomenalism. Richard Rorty (I970b). Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 --- Rorty I 115 Disposition/RortyVsRyle: 1) no necessary (conceptual, linguistic) connection between sensation and disposition as between heat and redness. >Sensation, >Necessity, >Necessity a posteriori, cf. >Feature (of a concept). Rorty: nevertheless, behaviorism is on the track of something right - it makes clear that the question "mental or not mental" becomes pointless. I 119 Dosposition/SellarsVsRyle/RortyVsRyle: his mistake was: proof of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states shows that there are no internal states in reality - (f.o.th.) - Wittgenstein: (PU § 308) the whole problem stems from the fact that we talk about things and leave their nature open. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Dissimilarity | Democritus | Adorno XIII 202 Dissimilarity/Democritus/Adorno: How is the dissimilarity in things created? The problem of all ancient philosophy was to state a unified principle, from which everything could be explained, and with which one could react against the infinite variety of natural mythology. Cf. >Totality/Ancient philosophy, >Unity/Aristotle, cf. >Unity/Plotinus, XIII 203 Atoms/Democritus/Adorno: Atoms do not have internal states, but only mechanical states. This notion that the essence of things can only be grasped from the outside and not from the inside, and that there is in fact no inner being, had a tremendous consequence for the entire history of the sciences. XIII 204 AristotleVsDemocritus/Adorno: Thesis: The objectivity and reality of forms is immanent to the things themselves. >Nature/Aristotle. Natural science: Modern science has criticized this Aristotelian and medieval view, and has no longer attempted to comprehend the matter from within, from these forms. One has simply observed and registered from the outside. This is VsKant, VsLeibniz, VsWolff. Scientific camp: Leibniz, Wolff per Aristotle. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Drugs | Corr | Corr I 364 Drugs/behavior/psychology/Corr: a more defensive person will perceive a threat of a fixed objective value as being more threatening (i.e., closer) than a less defensive person. Indeed, this hypothesis helps to explain the actions of drugs: they do not affect the intensity of a particular behaviour (e.g., avoidance); rather they affect ‘perceived distance’ (i.e., the magnitude of perceived threat), and thus they lead to different behaviours being shown (e.g., from avoidance to cautious approach). Corr I 365 Behavior/Corr: This form of analysis counsels us not to focus on behaviour per se, but rather to view behaviour as a reflection of central states of emotion and motivation: as an overt, and measurable, indicator of internal states. The important point is that the drug does not alter a specific risk assessment in any simple fashion, but leads to changes in behaviour that depend on the animal’s internal state (Blanchard and Blanchard 1990)(1). >Anxiety/Corr, >Behavior/Corr, >Perception/Corr. 1. Blanchard, R. J. and Blanchard, D. C. 1990. An ethoexperimental analysis of defense, fear and anxiety, in N. McNaughton and G. Andrews (eds.), Anxiety, pp. 12–133. Dunedin: Otago University Press Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Emotions | Emotion, philosophy of mind: is usually defined by examples such as joy, fear, anger in order to distinguish it from other internal states. It is controversial whether emotions are triggered solely by external circumstances. See also sensations, perception, mental states, mind states, consciousness, stimuli, introspection, other minds. |
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| Emotions | Deacon | I 428 Feelings/Deacon: one is tempted to say that the development of our language skills went hand in hand with a weakening of our sensitivity and empathy (compared to animals). >Animals, >Animal language. I 429 However, this only applies if language is regarded as a medium for communicating feelings. >Communication. If we follow the representational hierarchy, we can distinguish between three ways in which the emotional state of individuals can be reconciled with that of others. 1. spontaneous mimicry 2. reaction to shared external stimuli (this is indexical) 3. represent >Emotion, >Mimicry, >Stimuli, >Indexicality, >Internal states, >Other minds, >Representation, >Symbols/Deacon, |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Errors | Proust | I 226 Error/Evolution/Proust: the possibility of error represents an extremely important step within evolution. >Evolution, >Behavior, >Survival. Representation/Animal/Proust: in the case of lumpfishes, we cannot say that it is mistaken because its neural equipment does not allow it to make a distinction between its internal states and the representation. >Representation, >Internal states. |
Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Externalism | Davidson | Glüer II 185 Externalism/Putnam/Kripke: Externalism is about correct causal chains between word and object. > Causal theory. Externalism/DavidsonVsKripke, DavidsonVsPutnam: Externalism is about complete sentences and interpretation. Reference of single words/Davidson: is a theoretical construct - ((s) derived from whole sentences). I (a) 8 Def Externalism/Davidson: Events and objects by which a belief is evoked determine at the same time their content. DavidsonVs: (s) nothing outside the mind determines a belief. Externalism: shows the correctness (not infallibility) of the majority of judgments - (Davidson Pro). I (d) 72 Externalism/Davidson: pro this variant: Externalism stems from twin earth examples, not from linguistic division of labor. Therefore it is no threat of the first person authority. Radical interpretation: interpreter has to find out the factors, by means of indirect evidence, that first determine the content of the thought of the others - there is no room for error for one's own content because the same factors determine both thoughts. I (d) 74 Externalism/Burge: two forms: a) social, meaning from linguistic practice (community) b) importance of causal history (learning history) dependent on the individual. Burge: causal relationship to the object in order to comprehend content. DavidsonVsBurge: does not protect against error. Frank I 626ff Externalism/Davidson: It does not matter if mental states are individuated by something outside, just like sunburn ceases to be on the skin because it has an external cause. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 - - - Frank I 663 Externalism/first person/authority: If thoughts are externally determined, then the subject does not necessarily need to know what it thinks of - if the externalism is correct, then: VsFrege: thoughts cannot be completely comprehended. VsDescartes: inner states are not certain. Burge: False use of terms: There is the possibility to not know one's own thoughts. DavidsonVsBurge: Beliefs depend on other beliefs, therefore less strong possibility of error - DavidsonVsBurge: Intent of successful communication has no necessary connection to the correct identification of meaning. I 663-667 Externalism: Putnam: Distinguishing inner and "ordinary" external beliefs - Fodor: "methodological solipsism": is only observing internal states. Burge: External factors find their way into the determination of the contents via "thought experiments". - E.g., wrongly used terms: wrong beliefs about oneself e.g. "I have arthrite in the bones".) >Arthrite/shmarthrite. DavidsonVsBurge: initially pro: the content is not determined by what is going on in the person, but: content is determined so strong holistically that individual confusion of ideas cannot be so decisive, and therefore no rigid rules for the attribution of thoughts, we are not compelled to ascribe to the words of another person the same meaning as that person him- or herself. I 676 Mind/tradition/DavidsonVsDescartes: If there were a stage with alleged representatives of the objects, how can the mind pave its way out? - Anyway, the "objects" do not interest him, but their cousins, the propositions. But the mind has not the solution "in mind": externalism: all that helps to determine the object must likewise be grasped by the mind when it should know in which state it is. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| First Person | First person, philosophy: this is about the question, how far the internal states of a subject are only accessible for this subject. Approaches that focus on the language assume that the acquisition of public language is a precondition for this access. They further claim that the access is not different in principal from the acces we have to others. See also privileged access, introspection, subjectivity, objectivity. |
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| Folk Psychology | Boer | I XIII Folk psychology/Boer: presupposes a concept of normality and provides a network of contrafactual conditionals for the role that internal states play. Contrafactual conditional: attributes that-sentences. Believe/wish: is then a relation to a particular content. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
| Interpretation | Dennett | I 237 Artifact/interpretation/Game of Life/Conway/Dennett: Question: are the "Eater", "Glider", etc. designed objects or natural formations? The easiest Glider arises obviously from the rules, no one had to make it. ((s) >Game of Life/Conway; Cf. > Objet ambigu, Paul Valéry). --- Fodor IV 137 Interpretation theory/Dennett/Fodor/Lepore: (Brentano: Thesis: The intentional cannot be reduced to the physical). Dennett: i.e. ontologically, there are no such things as belief, desires, intentional phenomena! Interpretation: they are, however, indispensable as elements of interpretation (epistemic). ((s) That is, that intentionality (or its attribution) is accessible only by interpretation. ("Interpretivism", "interpretativism")). IV 138 Intentional attribution/Dennett: intentional attribution is always wrong. Because there is no intentionality which is ontological (merely as epistemically useful concepts), Vs intentional realism. >Attribution. Principle of Charity/Fodor/Lepore: must be intrinsically holistic, which is also accepted by Dennett. >Principle of Charity. Interpretation theory:/Fodor/Lepore: according to Dennett, there are two schools: 1. Def Projectivism/Dennett: one ascribes to the other the internal states that one would have oneself in the appropriate circumstances. 2. Def Normativism/Dennett: one ascribes to the other internal states which he should have in the circumstances. IV 139 There are, of course, close relations between normativism and holism. >Holism. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Knowledge | Goldman | II 149/150 Knowledge/Alvin Goldman/BrandomVsGoldman: Goldman's theory paved the way for the reliability theories, but it is a two-edged sword with regard to naturalized epistemology. >Epistemology naturalized, >Reliability theory. For his example, it is important that we assume that the causal chain is an ideal one. II 151-155 For example barn facades: one can imagine the facades of the province as embedded in a country with real barns, this in turn embedded in a state with facades, embedded in a continent with real facades, these on a planet with facades, this in turn embedded in a planet system with real barns and so on. Whether it is about knowledge when seeing a real barn, is then completely dependent on the choice of the reference class. The closest reference class is then highly reliable. There is much to be said against genuine knowledge. This reveals the inadequacy of classical internalism of justification. But e.g. twin earth/Brandom: a modern internalist could claim that the "internal states" are the same. All they have in common is that the subject cannot keep them apart. >Internalism, >Externalism, >Twin Earth. McDowell: but this fact does not have to be considered sufficient to identify their contents! >Content, >Identification. Goldman/Brandom: overall, the presence of barn façades in the area is causally irrelevant. II 152 Barn facades/Goldman: the candidate is not a reliable perceiver of barns. Brandom: the special thing about this case is that the circumstances are external. >Circumstances . BrandomVsGoldman: "Goldman's insight", however, does not support the naturalized epistemology because the knowledge is completely dependent on the choice of the reference class. An argument place therefore remains empty. >Knowledge, >Causal theory of knowledge. It depends on how we describe the convinced: as a member of the country, of the federal state, etc. And that would be precisely the naturalistically formulated facts. They then lead to different judgments about the reliability of the observer. Brandom: situations like those of the example can quite possibly arise. From this follows the: definition "blind spot" of the reliability theories/Brandom: whether or not an observer is reliable is dependent on the choice of reference classes (barn province), and thus on external circumstances which have nothing to do with the observed object. >Reference classes, >Blind spot. |
Gold I Alvin I. Goldman Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays Oxford 2015 |
| Mental States | Cresswell | II 160 Psychological States/Putnam/Cresswell: (Putnam, 1975, 138f)(1) Thesis: psychological states are public in the sense that different people can be in the same state. >Internal states, >Psychological state, >Mental state, >Brain/brain state. 1. Putnam, H. (1975). The Meaning of Meaning. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193 |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Mental States | Peacocke | I 4 Content/Peacocke: mental states have content. >Content, >Content of thought, >Propositional content. Sensation: sensation is fundamental. >Sensory impressions, >Sensation. Experience: is itself a psychological condition in its own right. >Experience. I 152 Mental state/Peacocke: to think that it’s cold, does not cause the judgment that it is cold. >Judgment, >Causation, >Thinking, >World/thinking. I 212 Immaterial/material/Peacocke: a mental state may consist in a concentration of any "substance" in neurons, or, otherwise: in a distribution. >Brain, >Brain states, >Internal states. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Mental States | Sterelny | I 371 Internal states/inner state/Sterelny: if one can detect an internal state, one does not longer need to detect each single connection between stimulus and behaviour. >Stimuli, >Stimulus meaning, >Behavior, >Brain states. |
Sterelny I Kim Sterelny "Primate Worlds", in: The Evolution of Cognition, C. Heyes/L. Huber (Eds.) Cambridge/MA 2000 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Sterelny II Kim Sterelny Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival of the Fittest Cambridge/UK 2007 |
| Mentalese | Peacocke | I 206 Mentalese/belief/Field/Peacocke: Field Thesis: systems that are sufficiently complex for belief terms, have systems of internal representations in which the sentence-analogues have significant grammatical structure. >Complexity, >Structure, >Systems, >Beliefs, >Thoughts, >Propositional Attitudes, >Thinking, >Representation, >Internal States, >Internal Objects, >Belief Objects, >Thought Objects, cf. >Artificial Intelligence. I 209 Mentalese/Peacocke: a model that works without the assumption of a language of thought would have to explain two things: 1. How can one ascribe propositional content, without referring to syntactic structures? - That means, relatively complex content must be attributed to syntactically unstructured (psychic) states. >Propositional content, >Content. 2. It must be shown, how these states interact with perception and behavior. >Perception, >Behavior. I 215 A simple model (relation instead of language) does not seem to require the instrumentalist conception of a rational actor. - On the contrary, if someone meets the relational model, a realism regarding mechanisms of rational belief-desire psychology would be justified. >Realism, >Rationality. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Necessity | Jackson | Schwarz I 226 Necessity a posteriori/Jackson/Schwarz: follow a priori from contingent truths about the current situation. (Lewis 1994b(1),296f,2002b(2), Jackson 1998a(3): 56 86). --- Stalnaker I 18 Necessity a posteriori/Jackson: necessity a posteriori is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It comes from an optional descriptive semantics which randomly characterizes natural languages: a mechanism to determine speakers. Thesis: there could also be languages without a fixed reference, which even tells to a certain extent how things are, namely without necessary truths a posteriori. >Necessity a posteriori, >Reference, cf. >Reference semantics. StalnakerVsJackson: however, if the reference-defining mechanisms are part of the meta-semantic history, they are not optional. They are part of the representation of what makes the fact that our utterances and internal states can have any representative properties at all. Necessary a posteriori truths are a feature of our intentionality. Two-dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: two-dimensional semantics can show how the possible and the truth interact, i.e. to separate semantic from factual questions in the context. >Two-dimensional semantics. I 19 But it does not provide a context-free canonical language, in which we can give a neutral representation of the possibility space. >Context. 1. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 2. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 3. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Necessity | Stalnaker | I 18 Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: necessity is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It results from optional descriptive semantics that happens to characterize natural languages: a mechanism of establishing references. >Necessity a posteriori, >Reference. StalnakerVsJackson: the reference-defining mechanisms are not optional as part of meta-semantics. They are part of the presentation of why internal states can be representational at all. >Representation, >Mental states. I 53 Necessary proposition/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis, there is only one necessary proposition: the set of all possible worlds. >Necessity/Lewis. In order to know that it is true, i.e. that the real world is within this set. For this, you do not need to know any facts about the modal reality. Necessary truth is not made true by the facts. >Facts, >Truthmakers, >Actual world/Lewis. I 64 Metaphysical necessity/metaphysical possibility/Lewis/Louis/Stalnaker: it means: if you have a range of all possibilities, you can quantify with them. The modal operators are then just the quantifiers. >Metaphysical possibility. Error: one can then still be wrong, but only about how one has to understand a sentence - not about how a possible situation would have to be. >Understanding, >Situations. I 189 Necessary a posteriori/contingent a priori/Stalnaker: assuming the inventor’s name was Judson - then both sentences, both "Judson invented the zipper" and "Julius invented ...", are necessary and both are contingent. >Reference/Stalnaker. Contingent: both are contingent because the statement about Judson is a priori equivalent to the one about Julius. Necessary: both are necessary because the statement "Julius is Judson" is a statement with two rigid designators - although the reference is determined by various causal chains. >Proper names, >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Contingency. I 201 Necessity/N/Quine/Kripke/Stalnaker: before Quine and Kripke, all N were considered to be verbal or conceptual. >de dicto, >Necessity/Kripke, >Necessity/Quine, >de re. Quine: one must always be skeptical about N, analyticity and a priori. Kripke: he was the first to move empiricism and terminology apart - by finding examples for contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori. Thereby, the separatation epistemic/metaphysical arose. >Epistemic/ontologic, >Metaphysics. I 202 Def nomologically necessary/Stalnaker: (in possible worlds x): nomologically necessary means true in all possible worlds that have the same laws as the possible world x ((s) relative to possible world x). Natural Laws/laws of nature/LoN/Stalnaker: thesis: laws of nature are contingent. They do not apply to possible worlds. >Natural laws, >Possible worlds. Some authors: laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. Logic/Stalnaker/(s): logic cannot show what is metaphysically possible. I 204 Necessity/conceptual/metaphysics/Stalnaker: the entire distinction is based on a confusion of a property of propositions with a property of linguistic and mental representations. Proposition: their contingency or necessity has nothing to do with our terms and their meanings. >Concepts, >Possibility. Possibilities: possibilities would be the same, even if we had never thought of them. >Conceivability/Chalmers. Conceptually possible: simple metaphysical possibilities that we can imagine are conceptually possible. >Metaphysical possibility. I 205 Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: the need stems from the fact that the secondary intension is necessary - the a posteriori character stems from the fact that the primary intension is a contingent proposition. >Intensions/Stalnaker. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Privileged Access | Rorty | I 119f Dosposition / SellarsVsRyle / RortyVsRyle: Ryle's error was: to assume that a proof of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states showed that there were no internal states in reality. >Sensation, >Necessity, cf. >Necessity a posteriori, cf. >Feature (of a concept). Wittgenstein (PI § 308), the whole problem stems from the fact that we talk about things, and leave open what their nature is. >Incorrigibility, >First Person, >Introspection. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Propositions | Loar | II 140 Proposition/Davidson: (meanings as entities) are not independent of descriptions: "The meaning of "Theaetetus flies". Problem: Relations between such descriptions cannot be specified in such a way that the compositionality can be shown. >Compositionality. LoarVsDavidson: instead: semantics of possible worlds. >Possible world semantics. II 147 Proposition/Loar: Problem: if the form of the words is irrelevant, the reference becomes doubtful - this happens when propositional attitudes are made a relation between speaker, sentence and an intentional entity. Solution/Frege: "that S" describes the meaning of "S" as an entity, but not S as "having a certain meaning". >Meaning/Frege. Even better solution: paratactic analysis/Davidson. >Paratactic analysis. Schiffer I 25f Loar/Schiffer: establishes a theory in which there are a pair of functions from propositions to internal states in which one is determined by the content of the theory. Propositions are then external indexes of the functional roles that you want to assign to physical states. So the propositions remained external to the system. Analogy: Physical Properties/Stalnaker: For example, having a certain height or weight. This can be seen as a relation between a thing and a number, because they belong to a family of properties that have a common structure with the real numbers. >Properties/Stalnaker. In this way one can also pick out propositions: as a relation between person and proposition. The theory then has a form where the quantified variables (the "φ-s") pass over functions that map propositions to physical Z-types. If the theory is true then these Z-types have the functional roles that determine the theory. (All this applies only with assumed relation theory, i.e. a relation to assumed objects of belief). >Relation theory, >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought. Schiffer I 45 Belief/Loar/Schiffer: Loar began with propositions. These later became superfluous. SchifferVsLoar: the theory is not completely general - only for normal adults. It is not immune to twin earth cases and arthritis examples ((s) >externalism, >arthritis/shmartritis). |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Rational Choice | Thaler | Mause I 67 Rational Choice/Thaler/Sunstein: Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler pursue two goals with their book Nudge (1): First, they advocate making the action-theoretical core of the rational-choice paradigm more realistic. They criticize the idea that people are able to make rational decisions on the basis of cost-benefit calculations, without being influenced by internal states (such as anxiety, anger or indignation) and intervening external factors (i.e., preferences are exogenous). Sunstein and Thaler argue that humans are not as rational as the model suggests. Rather, people make systematic mistakes, they decide and act irrationally and are therefore not always able to make decisions that are for their own good. This calls into question the basic assumption of libertarianism and liberalism, according to which people are "the best judges of their own interest" (Mill 2004, p. 292; cf. Mill 1988, pp. 16- 17, 132), with serious consequences. >Nudging. 1. Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, updated ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2009). 2. Mill, John Stuart, Principles of political economy with some of their applications to social philosophy, Hrsg. Stephen Nathanson. Indianapolis 2004. |
EconThaler I Richard Thaler Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics New York 2016 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Reality | Reality, philosophy: it is controversial, which should be counted to reality, that is to say, the set of objects and states which occur in the world. Theories partially differ strongly regarding the definitions of facts and situations or the consideration of internal states of subjects. Thus, a situation can be described in many ways, whereby very different assumptions about the involved objects and relations come into play. See also ontology, realism, recognition, epistemology, constructivism, fact, situations, internal/external, totality, relations, simulation. |
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| Representation | Sterelny | I 363 Def Representation/Sterelny: an organism represents (and does not simply react to a single feature) if it can track this feature with more than one class of proximal stimuli. >Stimuli, >Behavior, >Proximal theory. I 365 Representation/Sterelny: Representation is more than registration. E.g. chimpanzees adapt to the psychological states (aggressiveness) of other chimpanzees. However, it is still one thing to track mental states, another to represent them. >Mental states, >Internal states. I 366 E.g., 1. A bonobo interprets the actions a, b, c.. as being of the same type, 2. they are produced by the same mental state Q (perhaps anger). 3. a, b, c, have no single sensory stimulus in common. 4. completeness I 367 Deception/error/correction: Stability: can then consist of the variety of observable stimuli. >Deceptions. On the other hand: reaction bandwidth is also important. I 368 Representation/Sterelny: Thesis: Representation develops in information-permeable environments. >Information/Sterelny. |
Sterelny I Kim Sterelny "Primate Worlds", in: The Evolution of Cognition, C. Heyes/L. Huber (Eds.) Cambridge/MA 2000 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Sterelny II Kim Sterelny Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival of the Fittest Cambridge/UK 2007 |
| Rylean Ancestors | Pauen | Pauen I 91 Sellars/Pauen: thesis: our seemingly direct experience of mental states is the product of theoretical generalizations. - Question: how could such a theory arise, if one does not know the (everyday psychological postulated) mental states from their own experience? >Mental states, >Generalization, >Experiences, >Everyday psychology. Solution: Rylean ancestors: Step 1: Language and ideas are exclusively linked to behavioral dispositions and verbal expressions. >Behavior, >Dispositions. Step 2: attribution of internal states, so thoughts. >Thoughts, >Internal states. Rylean ancestors/Sellars/Pauen: thesis: we do not know our mental states from own experience. Solution: 1. Language and ideas relate only to behavior 2. after that attribution of "thoughts"- one knows mental states (e.g. thoughts) not from the first-person perspective. >Behaviorism, >First Person. We do not have direct access to our inner states - only mediated through everyday psychology. Cf. >L. Wittgenstein. I 105 VsSellars/VsRylean ancestors/Pauen: implausible, how should one has ever come up with the idea to explain behavior with the attribution of mental states if one had not known them before from own experience. I 106 Sellars disregards that an explanation is conceivable even without such attributions. >Attributions, >W. Sellars. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Rylean Ancestors | Rorty | Frank I 602f Rylean ancestors/Sensations/Jones/Sellars/Rorty: according to the myth of "Jones" even sensations originally were theoretical entities. >Rylean ancestors/Sellars. "Inner" states that were postulated to explain the occurrence of certain thoughts. E.g. the thought thathere is a triangle in front of me when there is none. >Sensations (appearance, explained by sensation.) Also sensations had "inner properties" that they did not share with a physical object - "of" is not a relational expression in sensations. "of-red": the dash expresses the simplicity or unanalysability. >Simplicity, >Basic concepts, >Sensation. Jones: the man who invented the consciousness in Sellar’s myth - reports about internal states only after long learning - what is then "inner". Rorty: postulating something like this does not explain the "non-physical" (just as little as Ryle’s dispositions) - they do not put the physical in opposition to something else. - Instead of "thought about p" one might as well say: "brain process on p". >Theoretical Terms, >Sensation language. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Semantics | Stalnaker | I 17 Meta-Semantics/Stalnaker: meta-semantic facts: meta-semantic facts are e.g. which language is spoken in a possible world - or whether we interpret the language with our language from the real world or with the one they speak there - or if we actually denote the language of the real world or the local language of the possible worlds from the perspective of the possible worlds itself. These facts ensure that our signs have the representational properties that they have. On these facts, it depends what is said or thought. Cf. >Semantic facts. I 82 Semantics/syntax/language-independent/Stalnaker: the step from syntax to semantics frees the theory from language dependence. >Language dependence. I 149 Modal Semantics/Stalnaker: modal semantics should allocate a separate range to each possible world ((s) but then you can no longer call possible worlds "ways of how things could be"). I 191 Semantics/Stalnaker/(s): semantics is the meanig from the real world. Meta-semantics: meta-semantics is the meaning from respective possible worlds because meta-semantics asks by which facts the semantic value is created and the facts must be from the respective possible world. I 192 Semantics: semantics says which semantic values have the expressions of a language. Meta-semantics: meta-semantic says what facts determine the semantic values. Pre-Semantics/Kaplan: pre-semantics refers to those who believe that a name that is at the end of a historic chain means something. >David Kaplan. Semantics/Kaplan: semantics rather gives us the meaning than telling us how it could be discovered. this is similar to Kripke. I 196 Possible world/actual world/meta-semantics/MS/Stalnaker: meta-semantics: takes into account the facts that determine the semantic values, i.e. ultimately it takes into account the differences between possible worlds. Therefore, meta-semantics is suitable if you want to consider a possible world as actual world. It is the meta-semantically understood primary intension of a statement that provides the information that we want to transmit. >Intensions/Stalnaker. I 199 Two-dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: two-dimensional semantics should be interpreted meta-semantically - not semantically. >Twodimensional semantics. Meta-semantics: meta-semantics is fact based, therefore we do not have access to a priori truth. Semantics: semantics must take internal states. I 213/14 Semantics/meta-semantics/semantics/Stalnaker: e.g. assuming we can only say how things possibly are, given the facts, how they actually are. Then: semantics: the set S only expresses the proposition Q under condition P. Meta-semantics: sentence S expresses only a conditional proposition, not a singular one, i.e. not the content depends on the facts, but it is relative itself. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Thinking | Maturana | I 54 Def thinking / Maturana: the neurophysiological process, which consists in that the system interacts with some of its own internal states as if these were independent variables. >Systems/Maturana, >Operation/Maturana. Operation mode of the nervous system, which reflects functionally the internal anatomical projection to itself - necessary regardless of language. (Experiments with brain damage). >Language, >Thinking and language, >Thinking without language, >Nervous system. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Twodimensional Semantics | Stalnaker | I 17 Twodimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: Twodimensional semantics connects propositional thoughts with sentences, (s) i.e. that in a different possible world something else can be meant with the same expressions. The A-intension (independent of possible worlds) is then usually the only one to which the speaker has cognitive access. >Intensions/Stalnaker. Epistemological status: the epistemological status is therefore determined by the modal state of the A-intension. ((s) What can be known depends on the proposition (content) of the possible world-independent expression). I 18 Twodimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: twodimensional semantics can show how the possible and the true interact, i.e. separate semantic questions from factual ones in the context. I 19 But it does not provide a context-free canonical language in which we could provide a neutral view of the possibility space. I 192 Def contingent a priori/twodimensional semantics/Stalnaker: contingent a priori is a statement with a contingent secondary intension but not necessarily a primary one. Def necessary a posteriori: other way round: necessary a posteriori is a necessary secondary intension, contingent primary. >Terminology/Stalnaker. Important argument: no proposition is itself contingent a priori or necessary a posteriori. There are only different ways in which necessary and contingent propositions are associated with statements. Def Character/Kaplan: character corresponds to meaning. It is the function of possible (use) contexts on references. >Character/Kaplan. External: Newen/Schrenk: the character is the whole table of two-dimensional semantics. Kaplan: thesis: character and content must be separated. Character/meaning: character provides a rule that says how the reference is determined by facts about the context. Content/Kaplan: content corresponds to the secondary intension. >Content/Kaplan. Content: content is possibly unknown despite language skills. ((s) E.g. Two omniscient gods). >Two omniscient Gods. Character/(s):a character is e.g. who it could be in each case. Content: the content says who it actually is, e.g. to whom "I" refers. I 194 Content/secondary intension: content can be different in different possible worlds a) because the context is different and b) because the meaning is different. ((s) This is part of meta-semantics). >Terminology/Stalnaker. I 199 Twodimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: twodimensional semantics should be interpreted meta-semantically, not semantically. I 199 Meta-Semantics/Stalnaker: meta-semantics is fact dependent, therefore it does not give access to a priori truth. Semantics: semantics must assume internal states. I 212 Twodimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: primary propositions are the ones that represent the cognitive values of our thoughts. Secondary propositions/semantic: for Stalnaker, the secondary propositions are described and not expressed. Secondary proposition/semantic: secondary propositions are unambiguously defined as a function of the facts. Problem: they are not something to which we have cognitive access. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agassi, J. | Davidson Vs Agassi, J. | Frank I 640 Mental states/Other minds/Self-attribution/Agassi: Thesis: we know more about the internal states of others. Comon Sense: every person has access to some information that is available only to them. Agassi: but other scientific advances have also undermined the first person authority. Freud/Agassi: "I know your dreams better than you" Theory of perception/Agassi: "I can cause you illusions and describe your perceptions better than you can do it" Authority/DavidsonVsAgassi: apart from Freud, there is little that could threaten the authority of the first person. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Behaviorism | Block Vs Behaviorism | (I 161) Vsbehaviorism / Block: the desire to achieve the goal Z can not be identified with the disposition A in input environments where A leads to Z, since the agent can not know that A leads to Z. He could therefore not be disposed to do A. Solution: functionalism adds causal relations to other internal states. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Behaviorism | Functionalism Vs Behaviorism | Block I 161 FunctionalismVsBehaviorism: replaces the "sensory input" by "sensory inputs and mental states." Furthermore, the "action dispositions" of behaviorism by "Dispositions to act and presence of certain mental states." Functionalism = behaviorism plus mental states. Avra I 147 Def Functionalism/Avramides: every type of mind state is a state consisting of a disposition to act in certain ways and to have certain mind states ((s) tokens) if certain sensory outputs (?) and certain mind states are given. (?) (39). FunctionalismVsBehaviorism: does not deny that mind states can be a real part of causal explanations. It tries to explain what mind states are at all. If they are dispositions at all, then in a very broad sense (Ryle: "multi-traced dispositions"). VsFunctionalism: does not solve all the problems of behaviorism: because every attribution of propositional attitudes requires an indefinite number of other attributions of propositional attitudes (e.g., according to the different possibilities to make wishes come true). We cannot attribute a mind state without attributing other mind states. I 148 Holism/Avramides: therefore it is sometimes said that behaviorism is not able to find access to the holism of the mental. Solution: functionalism: was specially designed to take account of this holism. Frank I 130 FunctionalismVsBehaviorism: here it is recognized that the internal states of the system must play an important role. But they do not need to be physiologically explored! It is sufficient to characterize them abstractly (functionally). Therefore, also the primacy of behavioral observation is understandable. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Dennett, D. | Stalnaker Vs Dennett, D. | II 180 DennettVsSententialism/Dennett/Stalnaker: Vs propositions as belief objects. (relation theory). Solution/Dennett: "Organismic contribution" of the believer. Neutral with respect to the manner in which it is represented. Def notional attitude-Psychology/not. att./Dennett: (instead of propositional attitude) neutral in terms of the manner of representation. Defined in concepts of possible worlds (poss.w.), "notional worlds". Def prop att-psychology/Dennett: describes attitudes in concepts of wide content. Def sentential attitudes/sent. att./Dennett: syntactic, assumes Mentalese. Def notional world/Dennett: a fictional world that is constructed from a theorist as an external observer, II 181 to characterize the narrow attitudes of a subject. That means my twin on Twin Earth and I have the same notional world. Def narrow content/Dennett: is defined by a set of notional worlds that is the way in which a person who had actual world. notional world/Stalnaker: seem to be exactly the poss.w. that characterize the wide content in the psychology of propositional attitudes. StalnakerVsDennett: all poss.w. except one are fictitious – how can notional attitudes be different propositional attitudes. Why should not. att. be narrow and prop. att. wide? Narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: are then according to Dennett simply propositions. The difference is neither to be found in the worlds themselves nor the nature of the content if both are just sets of poss.w.. The difference lies in the different responses of the two theories to the question by virtue of which fact someone has a conviction with this content. Propositional atitude-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: according to it contents are a function of relation to the actual world although the Twin-Earth-Example shows that they cannot be purely internal. Notional attitudes/not. att.-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: shall explain how purely internal (intrinsic) properties can pick a set of poss.w. that is different than the set that is picked by propositional attitudes. Wide content: e.g. O'Leary (correctly) thinks that there is water on the ground floor. This is wrong in the twin earth (tw.e.) because it is not water but XYZ. narrow content/solution: "water-like stuff". Dennett/Fodor/Stalnaker: we can compare both approaches: II 182 Narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: he changes the nature of the belief object, narrow contents are no longer propositions but functions of context on propositions. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: is for Dennett of the same kind as further content: both are propositions - function of poss.w. (=notional worlds) to truth values (tr.v.). What changed compared to the wide content is the relation between a believer in a proposition by virtue of which the proposition correctly describes the conviction. StalnakerVsDennett: but in addition he still has to explain how the purely internal (intrinsic) properties of the subject determine the narrow content. Solution/Dennett: e.g. Suppose we know all about the dispositions and skills of a subject but nothing about its causal history. Then that is similar as if we find an ancient object and ask what it was good for ((s)Cf. > Paul Valéry, find on the beach, objet ambigu). Dennett: then we imagine what it was ideally created for. In the notional world of an organism we imagine how the environment looks like to which it is best suited. Solution: propositions that are true in such possible worlds (poss.w.) will be the narrow content of the convictions of these subjects. StalnakerVsDennett: which is now not what we want: those poss.w. look more so that the desires and needs of the organisms in them are fulfilled and not that their propositions are true in them. E.g. it is not clear that the antelope with its properties to respond to lions is better off in a world of lions or in one without. It could then do a better job in terms of survival and to reproduce. Ideal/ideal environment/Dennett: could also be a very ugly poss.w. in which the organisms are, however, prepared to survive in it. II 183 StalnakerVsDennett: that is better, surely we try to cope with the world in which we think we live. But something is missing: a) many properties that enable organisms to survive, have nothing to do with their convictions, b) the fact that some counterfactual skills would help us to survive in a counterfactual poss.w. is not sufficient for saying that such a counterfactual possibility is compatible with the poss.w. which we believe to be the actual world. E.g. Suppose there are no real predators of porcupines in the actual world, they carry their spines simply like that. Then it would be unrealistic to artificially populate their notional world with predators. E.g. Suppose a poss.w. with beings who would like to eat us humans because of our special odor. Then we should not use such a poss.w. to characterize our convictions. Solution/Stalnaker: a belief state must serve in any way to be receptive to information from the environment and the information must have a role in determining behavior. StalnakerVsDennett: if we understand him like that we are still dealing with wide content. II 184 Representation system/Stalnaker: is then able to be used in a set of alternative internal states that are systematically depending on the environment. S1, S2,.. are internal states Ei: a state of the environment. Then an individual is normally in a state Si if the environment is in state Si. Representation: then we could say that the organism represents the environment as being in state Ei. Content: we could also say that the states contain information about the environment. Assuming that the states determine a specific behavior to adequately behave in the environment Ei. Belief state/BS: then we can say that these representations are likely to be regarded as a general type of BS. That is like Dennett understands narrow content. Problem/StalnakerVsDennett: 1. the description of the environment is not ascribed to the organism. 2. Information is not distinguished from misinformation (error, deception). That means if it is in state Si it represents the environment as in Ei being no matter if it is. Problem: the concept which originates from a causal relation is again wide content. Important argument: if the environment would be radically different the subject might otherwise be sensitive to it or sensitive to other features ((s) would reverse everything) or it would not be sensitive to the environment at all! narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: problem: if the skills and dispositions of the organism are included in the descriptions of the content the actual world is initially essential. ((s) problem/Stalnaker/(s): how should we characterize their skills in a counterfactual poss.w.?) II 185 Dennett: if organisms are sneaky enough we might also here ascribe a narrow ((s) counterfactual) content. StalnakerVsDennett: I see no reason for such optimism. You cannot expect any information about virtual poss.w. expect when you do not make any assumptions about the actual world (act.wrld.) (actual environment). Ascription/content/conviction/belief/Stalnaker: in normal belief attributions we ignore not only fairytale worlds but in general all possibilities except the completely everyday! E.g. O’Leary: distinguishes only poss.w. in which the ground floor is dry or wet, II 186 not also such in which XYZ is floating around. Question: Would he then behave differently? Surely for olive oil but not for XYZ. Twin earth/tw.e./ascription: even if the behavior would not change in twin earth-cases, it is still reasonable not to ascribe tw.e.-cases. Context dependence/revisionism/Stalnaker: could argued that it is not twin earth but normal world which makes it unsuitable for scientific ascriptions. Dennett: stands up for his neutral approach (notional world). StalnakerVsDennett: nevertheless causal-informational representation is substantially relative to a set of alternative options (poss.w.). internal/intrinsic/causality/problem: the system of causal relations cannot itself be intrinsical to the representing. Theory: has admittedly a scope to choose between different possibilities of defining content II 187 StalnakerVsDennett: but there is no absolute neutral context without presuppositions about the environment. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: binds himself a hand on the back by forbidding himself the information that is accessible to wide content. StalnakerVsDennett: I believe that no sensible concept of content results from this restriction. II 238 Language dependency/ascription/belief/Stalnaker: this third type of language dependence is different from the other three. II 239 People must not be predisposed to express belief that type of language dependency at all. It may be unconscious or tacit assumptions. The content must also not involve any language. Dennett: e.g. Berdichev: we should distinguish simple language-specific cases - whose objects are informational states - from those, so propositions are saved - E.g. approval or opinions. StalnakerVsDennett: we should rather understand such cases as special cases of a more general belief that also non-linguistic beings like animals might have. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Externalism | Stalnaker Vs Externalism | II 170 Externalism/Stalnaker: this had amazing paradoxical consequences: 1. If what we think is not in the head we cannot know what we mean or think. Or at least not have the authority of the first person. Note: not necessarily: what follows is that the intrinsic state is not authoritative which means it does not follow that if the head of someone is in an intrinsic state that he has a certain conviction. But this does not mean that he does not have the authority of the first person. 2. The externalism threatens the explanatory role of mental states. We explain the behavior of people in the way that they believe and want something. Problem: how can mental states be causally relevant if they themselves depend on something outside? VsExternalism/Stalnaker: some grant it truth but deny its significance. It would only show that our normal concepts are inappropriate for behavior explanation. This suggests that we need to make only minor revisions. Solution/some: the def "organismic contribution": that is the component which is dependent or supervenient on internal states. VsExternalism/revisionism/terminology/Stalnaker: the revisionist objection against the externalism makes a positive and a negative assertion. a) negative assertion: there can be no behavior explanation which is not individualistic (non-externalist). b) positive assertion: although the normal psychological concepts are not individualistic, they can be reinterpreted to preserve the structure of intentional explanation. narrow content/Stalnaker: first, I examine a very simple causal analogue of the narrow content: a "narrow footprint". Example normal footprint: is a causal-relational concept. Something is a footprint by virtue of the manner in which it was created. It is not with the sand intrinsically. Versus: "Narrow footprint"/twin earth/tw.e./Stalnaker: e.g. here a footprint that is similiar to the one of Jone was accidentally created by a wave. Pointe: so there is something on the tw.e. which is intrinsically indistinguishable from a footprint, not a footprint. Then a philosopher might say with a sense for grip formulations: "Externalism": "Divide the cake in whatever way you want, footprints are not in the sand!". VsExternalism: revisionism might reply that this would only apply to colloquial terms and these are of no interest to science. Scientifically only states that are intrinsically with the sand count. Solution/revisionism/VsExternalism: the concept of narrow content (here: e.g. "narrow footprint"). narrow concept: here the relevant state is independent from the causal history. E.g. narrow footprint: is a foot shaped impression, howsoever caused. Then we could isolate that component which is intrinsically with the medium (here: the sand). II 172 ExternalismVsVs: pointe: the new concept is still a relational one! E.g. narrow footprints are now not anymore dependent on a specific cause but are still dependent on general causes which are extrinsically with the sand. E.g. assuming normal feet on the TE have a different shape. Then the footprint which was caused by a wave is not only not a normal footprint but also no narrow footprint. Then the footprint in the sand is just not in the shape of a foot. ((s) only if you transfer the shape from the actual world to the twin earth). Stalnaker: there are still a lot of everyday examples for this strategy: Disposition concept/Stalnaker: we begin with a causal interaction e.g. water solubility then we use counterfactual conditionals (co.co.) to obtain a stable property that the thing has no matter whether it comes to the interaction. intrinsically/Stalnaker: water solubility may be a purely intrinsic property, others not: e.g. observability also depends on the skills of the observer. Narrow concept/Stalnaker: e.g. belief may be a narrow description of the concept of knowledge in the sense that the dependence on special causes between facts and knower was replaced by a more general of patterns of causal relations between facts and internal states. Alternative: Def narrow footprint: "foot-shaped impression" is now reference-determining definde: it shall now mean, formed in the way how feet are formed in the actual world (act.wrld.). Important argument: then the by the wave formed impression on the TE is still a narrow footprint. intrinsically: so, it seems we have isolated a purely intrinsic state of the sand. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Externalism | Newen Vs Externalism | I 174 Natural Species/Putnam/Newen: E.g. water, oil, tiger: in doing so, we single out individual specimens, even if we I 175 are unaware of the essential conditions for the existence of the natural species. I 176 Meaning/Putnam: is therefore dependent on the surroundings. >Externalism. Externalism/Burge: Transfers Putnam's knowledge to the contents of beliefs. Twin Earth: shows that beliefs cannot be fully characterized by the internal states. Arthritis/Shmarthritis/Burge/Newen: Alfred's belief that he had arthritis in the thigh becomes a true statement when changing to a language community in which this is common. I 177 Point: in this, however, we still assume that the use is determined by experts. I.e. we still can make mistakes! We may use it correctly sometimes, even though we connect false beliefs with it! VsExternalism/Newen: Problem: Supervenience! E.g. 1) beliefs depend on the surroundings 2) brain states are independent of the surroundings 3) beliefs supervene on brain states. That is impossible, if some are dependent and the others are independent. I 178 It might so happen that different beliefs are present in the same brain states. VsExternalism/Knowledge/Belief/Newen: 2) argument VsExternalism: it is inconsistent with our self-knowledge. In general, we know what we believe. It might be, however, that the surroundings have such an influence that the content is changed. There are two positions a) incompatibility thesis: either the externalism or the everyday intuition is true b) compatibility thesis: both are compatible at the price that our everyday intuition is significantly attenuated. NS I 139 VsExternalism: simply saying that you need causal chains for successful reference is not enough. You must also say what kind they need to be. E.g. direct visual contact, hearsay, instrument monitoring, etc. E.g. phlogiston: it was believed to be responsible for combustion processes. Question: Why does "phlogiston" not refer to oxygen? Why did this reference not succeed? VsExternalism: Problem: it cannot give the following answer, because it brings out the thesis rejected by him: "Intention determines the extension". Externalism has to say that the theory is so fundamentally wrong that it is not satisfied by any substance. Therefore, "phlogiston" does not reference. VsExternalism: thus it cannot show how the causal chains are linked and owes us a theory of causal chains in general. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Fodor, J. | Stalnaker Vs Fodor, J. | II 176 Def narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: is a generalization of Kaplan's character in the sense that the context considers any for the speaker external fact that is relevant to the determination of the wide content. Extensional identity criterion/narrow content/Fodor: (1987, 30 – 48)(1): C: be the condition that is fulfilled by the twin-me on twin-earth, C’: by myself in the actual world. Since there is no miracle it must be true that when an organism shares the neurophysiological constitution of my twin and fulfills C it follows that his thoughts and my twin also share the truth conditions (tr.c.). So the extensional identity criterion is that two thought contents (mental content) are the same iff they cause the same mapping of thoughts and context on truth conditions. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: that tells us less than it appears about the mapping that is used here. Nor how the relevant function is determined by what is going on in the mind of the believer. II 177 StalnakerVsFodor: we consider the following parody of his argument: e.g. I have the property of being exactly three miles from a burning stable - my twin is located on twin earth at exactly the same place, but, however, has the property of being exactly three miles from a snowy henhouse. C: then there surely is a property for my twin due to which he is three miles from the henhouse while this property does not exist for me. We call this condition C. C’: is then the property that makes up for me that I am three miles from the burning stable which does not exist for my twin. Since there is no miracle, we know at least this much: both, my twin and I, would in our respective world be three miles from a snowy henhouse when condition C ruled and both three miles from a burning stable if C' ruled. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: which determines no function at all that makes the condition C' to the property to be three miles from a snowy henhouse and at the same time condition C to the property to be three miles from a burning stable - a function that allegedly makes the contribution of the location of the subject to a specific relational property. StalnakerVsFodor: there are such functions and there is no need to identify one of them with the contribution of my intrinsic localization with the special relational property. My twin cannot sensibly say: "I did my part, as I - if condition C had ruled, .... Each localization is in the way that for any external conditions if those conditions rule something in this localizations is three miles away from a burning stable. narrow content/Stalnaker: question: does my cousin have the same narrow content as my conviction that salt is soluble in water but not in something else? StalnakerVsFodor: his theory gives no indication as to how an answer to this question was to be found! Note: however for me it is not about an uncertainty at all, this is also true for wide content but that we do not know at all how to identify narrow content. II 180 Belief/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: his image of faith is decisively motivated by his approach that there is an internal language (Mentalese) which is saved in the internal Belief/Fodor: are saved inner propositions. ((s) not propositions). They are convictions by virtue of their internal functional role. They are also identifiable independent of the environment of the subject. Semantic properties/Fodor: however partly depend on what happens in the environment around it but the way how they depend on it is determined by purely internal states of the subject! StalnakerVsFodor: here strong empirical presuppositions are in play. Def narrow content/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: function of context (in a very wide sense) on truth conditional content. StalnakerVsFodor: this is attractive for his intentions but it does not explain how it ever comes to that. And how to identify any narrow content. Narrow content/Stalnaker: is there any way at all to identify narrow content that is not based on Mentalese? Yes, by Dennett (…+…) II 188 Def individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically. Important argument: thus it is not excluded that mental states are individuated due to relational properties. Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomically when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence StalnakerVsFodor: a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers. But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal powers. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis. Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger. StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of the strong with the weak thesis. Stalnaker: to exclude that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. E.g. Fodor: Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with an example of a causal irrelevant relational property: e.g. h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with heads up, II 189 t-particle: we call that way the same particle if the coin shows tails. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this distinction to explain the behavior of the particle. StalnakerVsFodor: but from this it does not follow that psychological states must be purely internal (intrinsic). (1) Fodor, J. A. (1987): Explorations in cognitive science, No. 2.Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. British Psychological Society; The MIT Press. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Functionalism | Field Vs Functionalism | II 43 Belief/Functionalism/Stalnaker/Lewis/Field: the thesis that belief is a functional state. (Regardless of the physical realization). Important argument: this involves no relation to a sentence or sentence analogue in a system of internal representations. II 44 Stalnaker: E.g. beings from other planets: ...Here we look at sensory inputs and assume that they are correlated with their survival. ...Then we manipulate the environment. Belief/Martians/Stalnaker: then we would not only attribute analogues of beliefs and desires, but them themselves. But we do not need to assume any language, not even Mentalese. (Stalnaker 1976, p. 82). Representation/FieldVsStalnaker: that does not allow us to distinguish whether such a functional theory of belief requires a system of internal representations. 1) We have not observed the entire behavior. 2) Even if: an assertion about behavior is not simply an assertion about behavior, it is an assertion about how the behavior is caused. FieldVsStalnaker: we need knowledge (or reasonable belief) about how behavior is produced in order to know (or believe) that a being has belief. Functionalism/Inner State/Field: an assertion about internal states of an organism is an assertion about those and not reducible to behavior. II 49 Functional Relation/Field: the functional relation psi is not itself a physical relation. FieldVsFunctionalism: Problem: even if we consider belief to be a functional relation, it does not solve Brentano’s problem, because here we would have to show that there could be physical relations between people and propositions. The only thing functionalism says is trivial: that my relation to propositions may differ from that of dogs or of myself 20 years ago. II 50 Def Orthographic Coincidence/Predicate/Single-Digit/Multi-Digit/Belief/Field: Thesis: all the various attributions E.g. "X believes Russell was bald", E.g. "X believes Russell was bald or snow is white", etc. should be regarded as primitive single-digit predicates. Then we could drop all two-digit predicates like E.g. "X believes that p" entirely. Orthographic coincidence: then the fact that the expression "believes that" occurs in both (supposedly) single-digit predicates would be without meaning, a mere orthographic coincidence. Likewise, the fact that both contain "Russell was bald". FieldVs: that cannot be taken seriously. But suppose it was serious, what would follow? FieldVsOrthographic coincidence: it would follow that there does not have to be a physical relationship between people and propositions. Because since we did not speak of a psychological relation, it is clear that there is no realization in which a physical relation would be needed. ((s) then there must be an infinite number of single-digit predicates that reflect the most complicated attitudes.) Field: although the error is so crude, it occurred to me myself (in the first paragraph of this section) when I tried to explain that functionalism makes representations superfluous: I said: "A state of an organism is a state of belief that p, if this state plays the right (appropriate) role in the psychology of the organism." II 51 Vs: in order for this to make sense the letter "p" must be understood here as an abbreviation for a particular sentence, E.g. "Either Russell was bald or snow is white". Field: I’m not saying that it is meaningless. But "appropriate role" suggests that we can define this particular state in a directly functional way. And that in turn suggests that the procedure that we need for "pain" could also be applied to "Russell was bald or snow is white". ((s) and that it is only an orthographic coincidence that we are not doing it). And that the corresponding simple expression represents a property. Solution: in order to avoid the "orthographic coincidence","X believes that p0" should not be considered as functionally definable for certain sentences p0, in such a way as that which is right for "X is in pain". ((s) as a function, no (too) specific sentence should be assumed, but something more general). Solution: It should be non-functionally defined from a relational predicate "X believes that p", which is functionally defined by (3). N.B.: then we need physical properties and quantities of possible worlds. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Goldman, A. | Brandom Vs Goldman, A. | II 151-155 BrandomVsGoldman: his theory paved the way for theories of reliability, but it is a double-edged sword in terms of naturalized epistemology. For his example it is important that we assume that the causal chain is an ideal one. E.g. barn facades / Brandom: you can think of the province as embedded in a country with real barns, this in turn embedded in a state with facades, embedded it in a continent with real ... But e.g. Twin Earth: a modern internalist could claim that the "internal states" be the same. All they have in common is that the subject can not tell them apart. McDowell: this fact has not to be considered as sufficient for the identification of their contents! Goldman / Brandom: it shows that the presence of barn facades in the area is causally irrelevant. BrandomVsGoldman: "Goldman s insight,"does not support the naturalized epistemology, because the knowledge is totally dependent on the choice of the reference class. An argument position therefore remains blank. It depends on how we describe the convinced person: as an inhabitant of the country, the state, etc. And that would be just the naturalistic formulable facts. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Hume, D. | Evans Vs Hume, D. | Frank I 531 EvansVsHume: We have discarded the background for the perception metaphor on which Hume founds his argument. We have nothing that could be construed as a "stumbling" over perceptions. The internal states are indeed no "objects". E.g. What we become aware of when we see the tree is nothing but the tree itself. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Internalism | Brandom Vs Internalism | Brandom II 151 E.g. Barn facades: you can picture this facades province as embedded in a country with real barns, this in turn embedded in a state with facades, embedded in a continent with real barns, that on a planet with facades which is in turn embedded in a planetary system with real barns etc. Whether the sight of a real barn is knowledge would then entirely dependent on the choice of the reference class! Maximum reliability is given with the narrowest reference class. VsInternalism: Many things speak agains real knowledge. This reveals the inadequacy of the classical justification-based internalism. But E.g. twin earth: a modern internalist could assert that the "internal states" are equal. All they have in common is that the subject cannot distinguish. McDowellVsInternalism: But this fact does not have to be regarded as sufficient to identify its contents!. Goldman/Brandom: all in all, it turns out that the presence of barn facades is causally irrelevant in the surroundings. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Jackson, F. | Stalnaker Vs Jackson, F. | I 18 Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: n.a.p. is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It arises from an optional descriptive semantics that characterizes the random natural languages: a mechanism for determining of references. Thesis: there could also be languages without determined reference that says even to some extent how things are, namely without necessary truths a posteriori. StalnakerVsJackson: but if the reference-determining mechanisms are part of a meta-semantically story they are not optional. They are part of the representation of what makes the fact that our statements and internal states can ever have representational properties. Necessary a posteriori truths are a feature of our intentionality. two dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: can show that the possible and the true interact that means separate semantically from factual questions in the context. I 19 But it does not provide a context-free canonical language in which we could give a neutral view of the possibility space. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kant | Strawson Vs Kant | Rorty VI 359 StrawsonVskKant/Rorty: shows that thanks to the progress since Kant some concepts are no longer that attractive: e.g. "in the mind", "created by the mind" (Wittgenstein, Ryle have dissuaded us from this). --- Strawson V 9 StrawsonVsKant: appears to violate his own principles by attempting to set sense limits from a point which is outside of them, and that, if they are properly marked, cannot exist. --- V 16 Continuous determination/Kant/Strawson: everywhere through the mind guaranteed applicability of the concepts. StrawsonVsKant: seed for the disastrous model of determination of the whole universe. --- V 19 StrawsonVsKant: this one had unlimited confidence in a certain complicated and symmetrical scheme, which he freely adopted from the formal logic as he understood it, and forced upon this the whole extent of his material. --- V 23 StrawsonVsKant: this one is constantly trying to squeeze out more of the arguments in the analogies than there is. --- V 25 StrawsonVsKant: the whole deduction is logically incorrect. The connection to the analysis is thin and is, if at all, brought about by the concept of "synthesis". --- V 37 Dialectic/Kant: primary goal: exposing the metaphysical illusion. Instrument: the principle of sense. Certain ideas that do not have any empirical application, are sources of appearance, yet they can have a useful or even necessary function for the extension of empirical knowledge. E.g. we think of internal states of affair, as if they were states of affair of an immaterial substance. ("regulative ideas"). StrawsonVsKant: which is obviously quite implausible. But why did he represent it? --- V 29 StrawsonVsKant: It is not clear that there is no empirical mediation of antinomies. --- V 32 Kant: I really appear to myself in the time but I do not really appear to myself in time. StrawsonVsKant: incomprehensible what "to appear" means here. It is no defense of an incomprehensible doctrine to say that its incomprehensibility is guaranteed by a product obtained from its principle. --- V 33/34 Space/time/StrawsonVsKant: Kant: things themselves not in space and time. Strawson: thereby the whole doctrine becomes incomprehensible. --- V 35 Synthetically a priori/StrawsonVsKant: Kant himself has no clear conception of what he means with it. The whole theory is not necessary. Instead, we should focus on an exploration and refining of our knowledge and social forms. --- V 36 Limit/StrawsonVsKant: to set the coherent thinking limits it is not necessary to think from both sides of these limits as Kant tried despite his denials. --- V 49 Space/Kant: our idea of space is not recovered from the experience, because the experience already presupposes the space. StrawsonVsKant: that is simply tautological. If "to presuppose" means more than a simple tautology, then the argument is not enlightening. --- V 50 StrawsonVsKant: he himself admits that it is contradictory to represent a relational view of space and time and to deny its transcendental ideality at the same time. --- V 58 StrawsonVsKant: there are the old debates about "inherent" ideas of space and time. They are unclear. There is the argument that the acquisition of skills presupposes the ability to acquire skills. Experience/space/time/properties/Kant/Strawson: problem: the manifestation of the corresponding trait in experience, his appearance in the world, can be ascribed only to our cognitive abilities, the nature of our skills, not to the things themselves. StrawsonVsKant: problem: then these ideas must themselves be prior to all experience in us. --- V 66 Categories/Strawson: we have to understand them here in the way that to the forms of logic the thought of their application is added in judgments. StrawsonVsKant: his subdivision of the categories puts quite a bit on the same level, which certainly cannot be regarded as equivalent as e.g. affirmative, negative, infinite. --- V 73 StrawsonVsKant: he thinks it is due to the (failed) metaphysical deduction (see above) entitled to identify "pure" concepts. --- V 75 StrawsonVsKant: why should the objects of consciousness not be understood as realities that are distinguished from the experiences of consciousness existence, even if sequence and arrangement coincide point by point with the experiences of consciousness? --- V 83 StrawsonVsKant: unity of the different experiences requires experience of objects. Can his thesis withstand the challenge? Why should not objects (accusatives) form such a sequence that no differentiation between their order and the corresponding experiences has to be made? E.g. Such items may be sensory data: red, round spots, tickling, smells, lightning, rectangles. --- V 84 Why should the terms not simply be such sensory quality concepts? StrawsonVsKant: it is very easy to imagine that experience exactly has this sort of unrelated impressions as its content. Impressions that neither require nor permit, to become "united in the concept of an object". StrawsonVsKant: the problem with the objects of experience is that their ESSE is at the same time entirely their percipi how their percipi nothing but their ESSE. That is, there is no real reason for distinguishing between the two. --- V 106 Room/persistence/Kant: The space alone is persistent. Any time determination presupposes something persistent. StrawsonVsKant: unclear. For the concept of self-consciousness the internal temporal relations of the sequence are completely insufficient. We need at least the idea of a system of temporal relations, which includes more than these experiences themselves. But there is no access for the subject itself to this broader system than by its own experiences. --- V 107 StrawsonVsKant: there is no independent argument that the objective order must be a spatial order. --- V 116 Causality/StrawsonVsKant: its concept is too rough. Kant is under the impression that he is dealing with a single application of a single concept of "necessity", but he shifts in his application, the meaning of this concept. The required sequence of perceptions is a conceptual, but the necessary sequence of changes is a causal one. --- V 118 Analogies/StrawsonVsKant: fundamental problem: the conditions of the possibility of objective determination of time. Possible objects/Kant: Problem: whether there should be a "at the same time" or "not at the same time" of possible and actually perceived objects. If there is no "at the same time", there can be no distinction made between possible and real objects. --- V 124 Pure space/Kant: is itself not an object of empirical perception. StrawsonVsKant: element of deceptive logic: Kant seems to think that certain formal properties of the uniform spatiotemporal frame must have direct correlates in the objects themselves. --- V 128 StrawsonVsKant: its entire treatment of objectivity is under considerable restriction, he relies nowhere on the factor onto which, for example, Wittgenstein strongly insists: the social nature of our concepts. --- V 157 StrawsonVsKant: but assuming that the physical space is euclidic, the world could be finite in an otherwise infinite empty space. And that would be no meaningless question. --- V 163 Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: from the fact that it seems to be the case that there are things which are ordered in time or space in a certain way, it does not follow that it either seems that all things appear as members of a limited series, neither that it seems that all things exist as members of an infinite series. In fact, neither of the two members of the disjunction is true. --- V 164 Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: certainly the notion of a sequential order is justified, but it does not follow that the concept for the "whole series" of things must apply. --- V 178 Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: he was mistaken that the antinomies are the field, on which the decisive battles are fought. --- V 184 Existence/Kant: "necessity of existence can only be recognized from the connection with what is perceived according to general laws of experience." StrawsonVsKant: this is a deviation from the critical resolution of antinomies and has to do with the interests of "pure practical reason": that is, with morality and the possibility of free action. --- V 194 StrawsonVsKant: we can draw the conclusion from the assertion that when a being of endless reality exists, it does not exists contingently, not reverse in that way that if something exists contingently, it is a character of endless reality. --- V 222 Transcendental idealism/Kant: claims, he is an empirical realism. Confidence must include an awareness of certain states of consciousness independent of objects. StrawsonVsKant: this is certainly a dualistic realism. This dualism questions the "our". --- V 249 StrawsonVsKant: to say that a physical object has the appearance, a kind of appearance of a physical character, means, trying to brighten an unclear term by another dubious, namely the one of the visual image. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Physicalism | Functionalism Vs Physicalism | Block I 162 FunctionalismVsPhysicalism: Physicalism is wrong if functionalism is true. Reason: Turing machine: you can always find a physical realization that fulfills the function but deserves a different physical description. Example: if pain is a functional state, it cannot be a brain state, because there are creatures without a brain that can realize the same Turing machine! FunctionalismVsPhysicalismus/Block: the argument aims rather at the fact that it is incomprehensible how a physical property of first order could be common to all and only all possible physical realizations of a given Turing machine state. I 162 According to that, physicalism is chauvinistic. The physicalist of all people excludes brainless creatures that still have a mind. Block I 210 FunctionalismVsPhysicalismus: it is difficult to understand how there should be a single characterization of internal states of all possible organisms that are functionally equivalent to a human being. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Rorty, R. | Davidson Vs Rorty, R. | II 131 The truth of a statement depends only on two things: on what the words mean the way they were used, and on the world. II 132 VsTranscendentalism: But you cannot separate linguistic competence and world influence. "Negative Transcendentalism". DavidsonVsRorty: this does not have the consequences Rorty wants. He wants to understand Davidson’s rejection of the third dogma as an argument against the possibility of epistemology. But Davidson only narrows the critical path, he does not leave it. Frank I 26 Def Myth of the Subjective/Davidson/Frank: the superstition that thoughts required "mental objects". Even in the supposed intimacy of the "first person authority" whose principal corrigibility is thus conceded, the social character of language and the external determinants of individuation are not canceled. We can make mistakes about what we believe! DavidsonVsRorty: authority of the 1st person not inherently contingent, it cannot disappear "like a face in the sand" (Foucault, Rorty pro Foucault). Davidson, late, pro externalism (pro Burge). Frank I 624 Mental/Davidson: Thesis: Primary to explain human actions. But only if attribution inter-subjectively verifiable. DavidsonVsRorty: not a purely private realm of mental phenomena, this would rule out any theory of human action a priori. The criteria for the attribution of mental states must be analyzed within our empirical psychological theory. I 641/642 Authority/Self-attribution/Rorty: Thesis: Self-attribution was originally carried out on the basis of the same kind of observation or behavior as external attribution! Later it was discovered that self-attribution could be performed without observation. It turned out to be the better behavior out explanations at the end. Davidson: Of course, this is not meant to be a serious anthropological information. DavidsonVsRorty: Question: what reason has Rorty presented for self-attribution which is not based on evidence (Wittgenstein) to concern the same conditions and events as the one based on observation? I 645 DavidsonVsRorty: the fact that the attribution of mental states is a convention, is uninformative and unsubstantiated. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 - - - Frank I 654 Incorrigibility/DavidsonVsRorty: Does not exist! We can make mistakes in terms of our own internal states and prop. att.s. But such cases are rare and cannot be the norm! Question: Can we think straight out that we have a belief which we do not have in reality? Many authors from of recent times: this could even happen quite easily. > Russell: Proposition. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Sellars, W. | Rorty Vs Sellars, W. | Frank 603 Ryle's Ancestors/Feelings/Jones/Sellars/Rorty: by the myth of "Jones" even sensations were originally theoretical entities, inner "states that were postulated to explain the occurrence of certain thoughts. E.g. the thought that there is a triangle in front of me even when there is none. (Appearance, explained by sensation.) Even sensations had "inner qualities" that they did not share with a physical object. "Of" is not a relational expression for feelings. "Of red": the hyphen is intended to express the simplicity or unanalysability. Jones: the man who invented consciousness in the myth of Sellars. Here feelings and thoughts are not considered immediate experiences, they were no objects of underived, inwardly perceptible reports, and certainly not of incorrigible reports. Only after the introduction of the myth and long learning, it turns out that people can give underived reports on their own internal states. Question: what's the feature of the mental here? Frank I 603/604 Thoughts and feelings have no common characteristic except: Armstrong's "states that are capable of producing a behavior". Question: what is it then to be "interior"? Rorty: postulating something like that does not explain the "non-physical" (just as little as >Ryle's dispositions). They do not contrast the physical to something else. Instead of "thought about p" you might as well say: "brain process over p". >Definition/Rorty, Knowledge/Rorty: Definition/Knowledge/Rorty: what matters is not a new word, but only the theoretically postulated internal characteristics of the relevant entities. (s) New properties instead of new words! Also not new entities! At least not refined microstructure. RortyVsSellars: Jones did not invent consciousness by inventing the concept of unobservable internal states, which have certain inner qualities. Jones only proposed a microstructure, but no explanation by specific mental events. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Various Authors | Luhmann Vs Various Authors | Habermas I 436 VsParsons: simply reproduces the classical model through systems. (Social system = action system). Luhmann instead: human as part of the environment of society. This changes the premises of all questions. Methodical anti-humanism. Habermas I 440 LuhmannVsHumanism: "Cardinal Error". A fusion of social and material dimensions. Reese-Schäfer II 28 LuhmannVsDualism: of observer and object. Universality/Vs: the total view, the universality had to be given up and was replaced by "critique", with which the subject's point of view on universality is rounded up again". Foundation/Luhmann: there is no last stop. (Like Quine, Sellars, Rorty). Reese-Schäfer II 42 VsMarx: rejects the speech of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly aspire to the same good. Contradiction/Luhmann: arises only from the self-reference of sense. Not as in Marx. Contradictions/Legal System: does not serve for the avoidance, but for the regulation of conflicts. Reese-Schäfer II 78 Freedom of Value: (Max Weber): the renunciation of valuations is, so to speak, the blind spot of a second level observation. Reese-Schäfer II 89 Vs Right Politics: here there is no theory at all that would be able to read other theories. There is only apercus or certain literary guiding ideas. Reese-Schäfer II 90/91 VsGehlen: we do not have to subordinate ourselves to the institutions. Reese-Schäfer II 102 VsAction Theory: a very vague concept of individuals that can only be defined by pointing at people. Thus language habits are presented as language knowledge: because language requires us to employ subjects. LL. Language. Reese-Schäfer II 103 Reason/VsAdorno: one should not resign oneself (dialectic of the Enlightenment) but ask whether it does not get better without reason! Reese-Schäfer II 112 Overstimulation/LuhmannVsTradition: cannot take place at all. For already the neurophysiological apparatus drastically shields the consciousness. The operative medium sense does the rest. Reese-Schäfer II 138 Human/Gehlen: tried to determine the human from its difference to the animal. (LuhmannVs). AU Cass. 3 VsParsons: Terminology limited by structural functionalism: one could not ask about the function of structures, or examine terms such as inventory or inventory prerequisite, variable or the whole methodological area. Limitation by the fact that a certain object was assumed as given. There were no criteria for the existence of the object - instead the theory must be able to contain all deviance and dysfunction. (not possible with Parsons) - Question: in which time period and which bandwidths is a system identifiable? (e.g. Revolution: is society still the same society afterwards?) Inventory criteria Biology: Definition by death. The living reproduces itself by its own means. Self-reference (important in modern system theory) is not possible within the framework of the Parsons' model. Therefore we need interdisciplinary solutions. VsAction Theory: the concept of action is not suitable because an actor is assumed! But it also exists without an observer! In principle, an action can be presented as a solitary thing without social resonance! - Paradox/Luhmann: the procedure of the dissolution of the paradox is logically objectionable, but is constantly applied by the logicians themselves: they use a change of levels. The only question that must not be asked is: what is the unity of the difference of planes? (AU Cass. 4) VsEquilibrium Theories: questionable today; 1. from the point of view of natural science: it is precisely the imbalances which are stable, equilibrium is rather metaphor. (AU Cass. 6) Tradition: "Transmission of patterns from generation to generation". Stored value patterns that are offered again and again and adopted by the offspring. However, these patterns are still the same. VsTradition: Question: Where does identity come from in the first place? How could one talk about selfhood without an external observer? That will not be much different either with the assumptions of a reciprocal relationship with learning. Luhmann: instead: (Autopoiesis): Socialization is always self-socialization. AU Cass 6 Information/Luhmann: the term must now be adapted to it! In the 70s one spoke of "genetic information", treated structures as informative, the genetic code contained information. Luhmann: this is wrong, because genes only contain structures and no events! The semantic side of the term remained unexplained for a long time, i.e. the question of what information can choose from. Reese-Schäfer II 76 LuhmannVsMarx/Reese-Schäfer: rejects the talk of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly strive for the same good. AU Cass 11 Emergence/Reductionism/System Theory/Luhmann: this does not even pose the actual question: what actually distinguishes an emergent system? What is the characteristic for the distinction from the basal state? What is the criterion that enables emergence? Will Martens: (Issue 4, Kölner Zeitschrift f. Sozialforschung): Autopoiesis of social systems. It deals with the question following the concept of autopoiesis and communication. Communication/Luhmann: Tripartite structure: Information, Communication, Understanding (not action sequences). (Comes from linguistics, but also antiquity!). Martens: this tripartite division is the psychological foundation of communication. Communication must first be negotiated in the individual head, I must see what I assume to be unknown and what I want to choose, and my body must also be in good shape. Marten's thesis: sociality only comes about in the synthesis of these three components. Social things arise when information, communication and understanding are created as a unit with repercussions on the participating mental systems, which must behave accordingly. The unity is only the synthesis itself, while the elements still have to be described psychologically or biologically etc. Without this foundation it does not work. LuhmannVsMartens: I hope you fall for it! At first that sounds very plausible. But now comes the question: What is communicated in the text by Martens? Certainly not the blood circulation! There is also no blood in the text! The editors would already fight this off, there is also no state of consciousness in the text! So I cannot imagine what the author was thinking! I can well imagine that he was supplied with blood and sat in front of the computer. And that he wanted to take part in the discussion. Luhmann: these are all constructions which are suggested in communication, but which are not actually present in communication. (>Interpenetration). Communication/LuhmannVsMartens: Question: what is actually claimed in the text, and does it not actually refute it itself? Paradox: the text that tells of blood and thoughts claims to bring blood and thoughts, but it only brings letters and what a skilled reader can make of the text. That is communication. That is all I can actually see! Communication/Luhmann: if you think realistically and operatively, you cannot see more in the text. We have to put the words together from the letters ourselves. When psychic systems respond to communication, they change their internal states accordingly. Communication/Luhmann: if one has received this message (from Martens), one can say: everything is actually correct, one could describe a communication completely on the basis of physical or psychological facts. Nothing would be missing, with the exception of autopoiesis itself. Question: we have to explain how communication maintains itself without incorporating psychological and physical operations! Luhmann: this reproduction of communication through communication goes only through total exclusion from physical, psychological, etc. operations. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Positivism | Danto, A. | I 263 Positivism / Danto: there is nothing to report about internal states because everything psychological consists only of conduct. |
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| necessary .a post | Jackson, F. | Staln I 18 Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts - it results from an optional descriptive semantics which randomly characterizes natural languages: a mechanism of determining referents - StalnakerVsJackson: as part of metasemantics, the reference-determining mechanisms are not optional - they are part of the representation of why internal states can be representative at all - thesis: there could also be languages without a fixed reference that even says to some extent how things are, and without necessary truths a posteriori. |
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| Sprache | Schiffer, St. | I 273 Schiffer: Language processing is done by a series of subdoxastic internal states. |
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| necessary a post | Stalnaker, R. | I 18 necessary a posteriori / Jackson is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts - it arises from a semantics randomly describing natural languages: a mechanism for determining of reference - StalnakerVsJackson: as part of the metasemantics, the reference-fixing mechanisms are not optional - they are part of the presentation, why internal states can be representational at all - there could be languages that have no specific reference that says to a certain extent, the way things are, without a posteriori necessary truths. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Other Minds | Agassi, J. | Frank I 640 Mental States / Other Minds / Self-attribution / Agassi: about the internal states of others we know better! Common sense: every person has access to any information that is available only to her. Agassi: but other scientific advances have undermined the first person authority: Freud / Agassi: "I know your dreams better than you do." Perception theory / Agassi: "I can cause delusions with you and describe your perceptions better than you can do it". Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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