Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 44 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Categorical Imperative | Mead | Habermas IV 142 Categorical Imperative/Kant/Mead/Habermas: Mead takes up Kant's thoughts from the general public of our judgments. But he adds: We are what we are, through our relationship with others. Our goal must therefore inevitably be a social goal. (1) Habermas: this gives the Kantian argument a characteristic twist: the question as to why moral norms may claim social validity because of their universality is thus answered in social theory: Habermas IV 143 The unity of the collective is at stake in safeguarding the general interest. MeadVsKant: "Kant was of the opinion that we could only generalize the form. However, we generalize from the goal." (2) Habermas IV 144 Problem: how do we recognize the other and broader interests and bring them into a rational relationship? (3) The impartial consideration of all interests already presupposes a moral attitude. Solution/Mead: we must replace the categorical imperative with a process of discursive decision-making. Habermas IV 145 The subject cannot examine on its own whether an existing or recommended standard is in the general interest, but only in cooperation with all other parties concerned. Habermas: The process of internalization reaches its limits here (See Internalization/Mead, Internalization/Habermas). The actor can anticipate a reaction, but cannot foresee it. 1. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969, S.429f 2.Ebenda S. 430 3.Ebenda S. 439 |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Communication | Morris | Habermas IV 30 Communication/Morris/Habermas: Morris has introduced the semiotic basic concepts of signs, sign interpretation, sign meaning etc. with the help of the behavioral basic concepts in such a way that the structural relationship between intention and meaning can be described objectivistically, i.e. without anticipating the understanding of rule-guided behavior. (1) HabermasVsMorris: Morris refers to his teacher G.H. Mead, but misses his N.B.: Mead understands the meaning structure inherent to in animal behavior as a property of interaction systems that ensures a prior commonality between the organisms involved, initially established on an instinctive basis. The internalisation gradually replaces the instinct regulation by the cultural tradition running through linguistic communication. >Internalization, >Language, >Animals, >Animal language. MeadVsMorris: it is not enough to attribute consistent interpretations, Habermas IV 31 identical meanings must be required. The constancy of meaning of the symbols must not only be given by themselves, but must be recognizable for the symbol users themselves. >Interpretation, >Signals, >Signs, >Meaning, >Symbols. 1. Ch. Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Sings, Int. Found of the Unity of Sciences, Vol 1. Chicago, 1938; Ch. Morris, Sings, Language and Behavior, N.Y: 1946; Ch. Morris, Pragmatische Semiotik und Handlungstheorie, Frankfurt 1988. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Consciousness | Nietzsche | Ries II 104 Consciousness/Instinct/Nietzsche: behind the consciousness, there are instincts. >Drives/Nietzsche. --- Danto III 148 Consciousness/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche thesis: Consciousness has little to do with the individual itself. Rather, it has to do with the relationships between individuals. Cf. >Intersubjectivity, >Communication/Nietzsche. NietzscheVsTradition: Consciousness is not the highest form of individual existence, but rather a 'tool and detail of total life'.(1) Danto III 148 Communication/consciousness/Nietzsche/Danto: Consciousness stands for Nietzsche in relation to the ability of a person or animal to communicate and this ability in turn in relation to the need to communicate.(2) It is also about preserving a group. Danto III 149 Consciousness/Nietzsche: is actually only a network of connections between human and human and has developed only in relation to the degree of this usefulness.(3) Danto III 150/151 Consciousness/Nietzsche: Thesis: Consciousness does not really belong to the individual existence of the human being, but rather to what is community and herd nature in him/her. (on page 274). ((s) See also Language/Vygotsky, see also Private Language/Wittgenstein). Danto III 155 Consciousness/Causality/Nietzsche/Danto: Consciousness never provides us with an example of cause and effect.(4) >Cause/Nietzsche, >Effect/Nietzsche; cf. >Causality/Hume. Danto III 218 Consciousness/Internalization/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche calls the phenomenon internalization that a instinct still comes to light when prohibited, but not against an external object, but an internal object, the person itself. This phenomenon plays a role in the further development of consciousness.(5) >Internalisation. 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 587. 2. F. Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, KGW V, 2. S. 272f. 3. Ibid. 4. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 732. 5. F. Nietzsche Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, S 338. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Cultural Industry | Habermas | IV 572 Cultural industry/Horkheimer/Adorno/Habermas: according to Horkheimer and Adorno's ideas, communication flows controlled by the mass media take the place of those communication structures that once made public discussion and self-understanding of an audience of citizens and private individuals possible. The mass media represent an apparatus that completely penetrates and masters everyday communicative language. On the one hand, it transforms the authentic contents of modern culture into the stereotyped and ideologically effective stereotypes of a mass culture that merely doubles the existing; on the other hand, it consumes the culture purified from all subversive and transcendental moments for a comprehensive system of social control imposed on individuals that partly reinforces, partly replaces the weakened internal controls of behavior. >Mass culture, cf. >Dialectics of Enlightenment. The functioning of the cultural industry should be mirrored in the functioning of the psychic apparatus, which, as long as the internalization of paternal authority was still functioning, had subjected the driving nature to the control of the superego as technology had subjected the external nature of its domination. >Technology, >Governance, >Society, >Instrumental Reason, >Procedural Rationality. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Cultural Relativism | Deci | Corr I 450 Cultural Relativism/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: cultural relativists (e.g., Markus, Kitayama and Heiman 1996)(1) have claimed that the need for autonomy is not relevant for Eastern, collectivist cultures. Self-Determination TheoryVsCultural Relativism/DeciVsRelativism/RyanVsRelativism: SDT argues that satisfaction of the basic needs is essential for all people, several cross-cultural studies have been done to confirm that need satisfaction is essential in cultures that are vastly different. >Self-Determination Theory, >Self-Determination. Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan (2003)(2) investigated the internalization of the values of individualism (a strongly endorsed Western value) and collectivism (a strongly endorsed Eastern value) within four disparate cultures (Turkey, Korea, Russia and the United States). [They] found that the higher people’s relative autonomy for both individualist and collectivist practices, the higher their level of psychological wellbeing in each of the four cultures. That is, to the degree that people in any culture can enact a value autonomously, even if it does not match the dominant value of their culture, those individuals will display higher levels of wellbeing. >Autonomy, >Culture, >Cultural psychology, >Cultural differences. 1. Markus, H. R., Kitayama, S. and Heiman, R. J. 1996. Culture and basic psychological principles, in E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski (eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, pp. 857–913. New York: Guilford Press 2. Chirkov, V. Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y. and Kaplan, U. 2003. Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: a self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientations and well-being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84: 97–110 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Cultural Relativism | Ryan | Corr I 450 Cultural Relativism/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: cultural relativists (e.g., Markus, Kitayama and Heiman 1996)(1) have claimed that the need for autonomy is not relevant for Eastern, collectivist cultures. Self-Determination TheoryVsCultural Relativism/DeciVsRelativism/ RyanVsRelativism: SDT argues that satisfaction of the basic needs is essential for all people, several cross-cultural studies have been done to confirm that need satisfaction is essential in cultures that are vastly different. >Self-Determination Theory, >Self-Determination. Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan (2003)(2) investigated the internalization of the values of individualism (a strongly endorsed Western value) and collectivism (a strongly endorsed Eastern value) within four disparate cultures (Turkey, Korea, Russia and the United States). [They] found that the higher people’s relative autonomy for both individualist and collectivist practices, the higher their level of psychological wellbeing in each of the four cultures. That is, to the degree that people in any culture can enact a value autonomously, even if it does not match the dominant value of their culture, those individuals will display higher levels of wellbeing. >Autonomy, >Culture, >Cultural psychology, >Cultural differences. 1. Markus, H. R., Kitayama, S. and Heiman, R. J. 1996. Culture and basic psychological principles, in E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski (eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, pp. 857–913. New York: Guilford Press 2. Chirkov, V. Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y. and Kaplan, U. 2003. Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: a self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientations and well-being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84: 97–110 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Cultural Relativism | Self-Determination Theory | Corr I 450 Cultural Relativism/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: cultural relativists (e.g., Markus, Kitayama and Heiman 1996)(1) have claimed that the need for autonomy is not relevant for Eastern, collectivist cultures. Self-Determination TheoryVsCultural Relativism/DeciVsRelativism/ RyanVsRelativism: SDT argues that satisfaction of the basic needs is essential for all people, several cross-cultural studies have been done to confirm that need satisfaction is essential in cultures that are vastly different. >Self-Determination Theory, >Self-Determination. Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan (2003)(2) investigated the internalization of the values of individualism (a strongly endorsed Western value) and collectivism (a strongly endorsed Eastern value) within four disparate cultures (Turkey, Korea, Russia and the United States). [They] found that the higher people’s relative autonomy for both individualist and collectivist practices, the higher their level of psychological wellbeing in each of the four cultures. That is, to the degree that people in any culture can enact a value autonomously, even if it does not match the dominant value of their culture, those individuals will display higher levels of wellbeing. >Autonomy, >Culture, >Cultural psychology, >Cultural differences. 1. Markus, H. R., Kitayama, S. and Heiman, R. J. 1996. Culture and basic psychological principles, in E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski (eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, pp. 857–913. New York: Guilford Press 2. Chirkov, V. Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y. and Kaplan, U. 2003. Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: a self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientations and well-being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84: 97–110 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Environment | Deci | Corr I 444 Social Environment/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Psychology/Deci/Ryan: Thesis: social environments that facilitate satisfaction of the basic psychological needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness will lead to more autonomous types of motivation – namely, identified, integrated and intrinsic – whereas social environments that are thwarting of the basic needs will lead to either controlled motivation or amotivation. >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan. Initial work on the motivational effects of social environment environments was a set of laboratory experiments that examined how various factors such as rewards, feedback and deadlines affect intrinsic motivation. In the first studies, Deci (1971)(1) found that when participants received monetary rewards for solving an interesting spatial-relations puzzle, they were subsequently less intrinsically motivated for the activity than were participants who had done the same activity without receiving the rewards. The extrinsic rewards seemed to undermine the participants’ intrinsic motivations. This finding has been replicated dozens of times, and a meta-analysis (Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999)(2) confirmed this effect across more than 100 experiments. Studies (e.g., Vallerand and Reid 1984)(3) further showed that positive feedback enhanced the intrinsic motivation of participants relative to those who did not get the feedback. Thus, it appears that feedback that affirms competence when accompanied by a sense of autonomy typically enhances intrinsic motivation (Ryan 1982(4)). Corr I 447 Effects of the environment o internalization: SDT is built on the assumption that people are naturally inclined to internalize values and behaviours that are exhibited by important others in their socializing environment. (…) [but] only to the extent that people experience satisfaction of the basic needs as they are acquiring the values and behaviours. That is, environments that support need satisfaction will lead people to accept the structures that are endorsed by the social world, but those that are rejecting or controlling will impair internalization, leaving the people controlled either by external or introjected regulatory processes. >Regulation/Deci/Ryan. 1. Deci, E. L. 1971. Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 18: 105–15 2. Deci, E. L., Koestner, R. and Ryan, R. M. 1999. A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation, Psychological Bulletin 125: 627–68 3. Vallerand, R. J. and Reid, G. 1984. On the causal effects of perceived competence on intrinsic motivation: a test of cognitive evaluation theory, Journal of Sport Psychology 6: 94–102 4. Ryan, R. M. 1982. Control and information in the intrapersonal sphere: an extension of cognitive evaluation theory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 43: 450–61 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Environment | Ryan | Corr I 444 Social Environment/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Psychology/Deci/Ryan: Thesis: social environments that facilitate satisfaction of the basic psychological needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness will lead to more autonomous types of motivation – namely, identified, integrated and intrinsic – whereas social environments that are thwarting of the basic needs will lead to either controlled motivation or amotivation. >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan. Initial work on the motivational effects of social environment environments was a set of laboratory experiments that examined how various factors such as rewards, feedback and deadlines affect intrinsic motivation. In the first studies, Deci (1971)(1) found that when participants received monetary rewards for solving an interesting spatial-relations puzzle, they were subsequently less intrinsically motivated for the activity than were participants who had done the same activity without receiving the rewards. The extrinsic rewards seemed to undermine the participants’ intrinsic motivations. This finding has been replicated dozens of times, and a meta-analysis (Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999)(2) confirmed this effect across more than 100 experiments. Studies (e.g., Vallerand and Reid 1984)(3) further showed that positive feedback enhanced the intrinsic motivation of participants relative to those who did not get the feedback. Thus, it appears that feedback that affirms competence when accompanied by a sense of autonomy typically enhances intrinsic motivation (Ryan 1982(4)). Corr I 447 Effects of the environment o internalization: SDT is built on the assumption that people are naturally inclined to internalize values and behaviours that are exhibited by important others in their socializing environment. (…) [but] only to the extent that people experience satisfaction of the basic needs as they are acquiring the values and behaviours. That is, environments that support need satisfaction will lead people to accept the structures that are endorsed by the social world, but those that are rejecting or controlling will impair internalization, leaving the people controlled either by external or introjected regulatory processes. >Regulation/Deci/Ryan. 1. Deci, E. L. 1971. Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 18: 105–15 2. Deci, E. L., Koestner, R. and Ryan, R. M. 1999. A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation, Psychological Bulletin 125: 627–68 3. Vallerand, R. J. and Reid, G. 1984. On the causal effects of perceived competence on intrinsic motivation: a test of cognitive evaluation theory, Journal of Sport Psychology 6: 94–102 4. Ryan, R. M. 1982. Control and information in the intrapersonal sphere: an extension of cognitive evaluation theory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 43: 450–61 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Environment | Self-Determination Theory | Corr I 444 Social Environment/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Psychology/Deci/Ryan: Thesis: social environments that facilitate satisfaction of the basic psychological needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness will lead to more autonomous types of motivation – namely, identified, integrated and intrinsic – whereas social environments that are thwarting of the basic needs will lead to either controlled motivation or amotivation. >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan. Initial work on the motivational effects of social environment environments was a set of laboratory experiments that examined how various factors such as rewards, feedback and deadlines affect intrinsic motivation. In the first studies, Deci (1971)(1) found that when participants received monetary rewards for solving an interesting spatial-relations puzzle, they were subsequently less intrinsically motivated for the activity than were participants who had done the same activity without receiving the rewards. The extrinsic rewards seemed to undermine the participants’ intrinsic motivations. This finding has been replicated dozens of times, and a meta-analysis (Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999)(2) confirmed this effect across more than 100 experiments. Studies (e.g., Vallerand and Reid 1984)(3) further showed that positive feedback enhanced the intrinsic motivation of participants relative to those who did not get the feedback. Thus, it appears that feedback that affirms competence when accompanied by a sense of autonomy typically enhances intrinsic motivation (Ryan 1982(4)). Corr I 447 Effects of the environment o internalization: SDT is built on the assumption that people are naturally inclined to internalize values and behaviours that are exhibited by important others in their socializing environment. (…) [but] only to the extent that people experience satisfaction of the basic needs as they are acquiring the values and behaviours. That is, environments that support need satisfaction will lead people to accept the structures that are endorsed by the social world, but those that are rejecting or controlling will impair internalization, leaving the people controlled either by external or introjected regulatory processes. >Regulation/Deci/Ryan. 1. Deci, E. L. 1971. Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 18: 105–15 2. Deci, E. L., Koestner, R. and Ryan, R. M. 1999. A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation, Psychological Bulletin 125: 627–68 3. Vallerand, R. J. and Reid, G. 1984. On the causal effects of perceived competence on intrinsic motivation: a test of cognitive evaluation theory, Journal of Sport Psychology 6: 94–102 4. Ryan, R. M. 1982. Control and information in the intrapersonal sphere: an extension of cognitive evaluation theory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 43: 450–61 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Goals | Group Psychology | Haslam i 191 Goals/end/group behavior/Pratkanis/Turner/Group psychology: (…) individuals seek to maintain a positive image of their group and are more reactive to potential threats to that image. Image-threatening events, which can include complex and consequential tasks (particularly when they are subject to public scrutiny) shift group members’ goals towards image maintenance and away from other ends (e.g., deliberative, systematic decision-making). To the degree that image maintenance is supported by groupthink symptoms (e.g., beliefs in inherent morality, collective rationalization, stereotyping of outgroups), decision quality by the group tends to deteriorate. (Turner and Pratkanis (1998a)(1)). Haslam I 194 Adding nuance to Janis’ posited goal states (>Goals/Janis), Turner and Pratkanis (1998a)(1) and McCauley (1998)(2) point out that the goal of achieving consensus can serve different functions – for example, protecting a social identity or regaining a sense of certainty. In some instances (e.g., under collective threat), the goal of achieving consensus may be associated with specific content: that is, group members may want to reach consensus around a particular conclusion (e.g., a positive group image). In other cases (e.g., under deep uncertainty), any consensus at all might be acceptable, making groups willing to accept negative self-perceptions so long as they are convergent (e.g., see system justification theory; Jost and Banaji, 1994)(3). >System justification. Haslam I 195 Packer/Ungson: other potential goals could include: - a desire for the group to engage in effective collective action (for which consensus is perhaps a means to an end); - a desire for the group to reach a decision quickly (heightened perhaps in crisis situations, and reminiscent of speed/accuracy tradeoffs endemic to human cognition; e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974)(4); - a desire for the group to reach a decision with little effort (heightened when the group is overburdened with many complex issues); - a more individual set of desires to be positively regarded and to retain one’s position in the group (as per McCauley’s (1998)(2) social discomfort hypothesis). >Groupthink/Psychological theories. Identification/goals: Pursuit of group-related goals – whatever they are – is stronger to the extent that members identify with their groups (Abrams and Hogg, 1988)(5). Strongly identified group members seek to be regarded as loyal and to make decisions that serve the interests of the group. Norms/accuracy/Packer/Ungson: any one of the goals that conflict with accuracy and deliberation could produce groupthink-type symptoms, although, as pointed out by McCauley (1998)(2), the underlying mechanisms and precise manifestations could differ as a function of the goal in question (e.g., some producing internalization, some compliance). 1. Turner, M.E. and Pratkanis, A.R. (1998a) ‘A social identity maintenance model of groupthink’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 210–35. 2. McCauley, C. (1998) ‘Group dynamics in Janis’ theory of groupthink: Backward and forward’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 146–62. 3. Jost, J.T. and Banaji, M.R. (1994) ‘The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false consciousness’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 33: 1–27. 4. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974) ‘Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases’, Science, 185: 1124–3. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Goals | Pratkanis | Haslam I 191 Goals/end/group behavior/Pratkanis/Turner/Group psychology: (…) individuals seek to maintain a positive image of their group and are more reactive to potential threats to that image. Image-threatening events, which can include complex and consequential tasks (particularly when they are subject to public scrutiny) shift group members’ goals towards image maintenance and away from other ends (e.g., deliberative, systematic decision-making). To the degree that image maintenance is supported by groupthink symptoms (e.g., beliefs in inherent morality, collective rationalization, stereotyping of outgroups), decision quality by the group tends to deteriorate. (Turner and Pratkanis (1998a)(1)). Haslam I 194 Adding nuance to Janis’ posited goal states (>Goals/Janis), Turner and Pratkanis (1998a)(1) and McCauley (1998)(2) point out that the goal of achieving consensus can serve different functions – for example, protecting a social identity or regaining a sense of certainty. In some instances (e.g., under collective threat), the goal of achieving consensus may be associated with specific content: that is, group members may want to reach consensus around a particular conclusion (e.g., a positive group image). In other cases (e.g., under deep uncertainty), any consensus at all might be acceptable, making groups willing to accept negative self-perceptions so long as they are convergent (e.g., see system justification theory; Jost and Banaji, 1994)(3). >System justification. Haslam I 195 Packer/Ungson: other potential goals could include: - a desire for the group to engage in effective collective action (for which consensus is perhaps a means to an end); - a desire for the group to reach a decision quickly (heightened perhaps in crisis situations, and reminiscent of speed/accuracy tradeoffs endemic to human cognition; e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974)(4); - a desire for the group to reach a decision with little effort (heightened when the group is overburdened with many complex issues); - a more individual set of desires to be positively regarded and to retain one’s position in the group (as per McCauley’s (1998)(2) social discomfort hypothesis). >Groupthink/Psychological theories. Identification/goals: Pursuit of group-related goals – whatever they are – is stronger to the extent that members identify with their groups (Abrams and Hogg, 1988)(5). Strongly identified group members seek to be regarded as loyal and to make decisions that serve the interests of the group. Norms/accuracy/Packer/Ungson: any one of the goals that conflict with accuracy and deliberation could produce groupthink-type symptoms, although, as pointed out by McCauley (1998)(2), the underlying mechanisms and precise manifestations could differ as a function of the goal in question (e.g., some producing internalization, some compliance). 1. Turner, M.E. and Pratkanis, A.R. (1998a) ‘A social identity maintenance model of groupthink’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 210–35. 2. McCauley, C. (1998) ‘Group dynamics in Janis’ theory of groupthink: Backward and forward’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 146–62. 3. Jost, J.T. and Banaji, M.R. (1994) ‘The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false consciousness’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 33: 1–27. 4. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974) ‘Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases’, Science, 185: 1124–3. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Goals | Turner | Haslam i 191 Goals/end/group behavior/Pratkanis/Turner/Group psychology: (…) individuals seek to maintain a positive image of their group and are more reactive to potential threats to that image. Image-threatening events, which can include complex and consequential tasks (particularly when they are subject to public scrutiny) shift group members’ goals towards image maintenance and away from other ends (e.g., deliberative, systematic decision-making). To the degree that image maintenance is supported by groupthink symptoms (e.g., beliefs in inherent morality, collective rationalization, stereotyping of outgroups), decision quality by the group tends to deteriorate. (Turner and Pratkanis (1998a)(1)). Haslam I 194 Adding nuance to Janis’ posited goal states (>Goals/Janis), Turner and Pratkanis (1998a)(1) and McCauley (1998)(2) point out that the goal of achieving consensus can serve different functions – for example, protecting a social identity or regaining a sense of certainty. In some instances (e.g., under collective threat), the goal of achieving consensus may be associated with specific content: that is, group members may want to reach consensus around a particular conclusion (e.g., a positive group image). In other cases (e.g., under deep uncertainty), any consensus at all might be acceptable, making groups willing to accept negative self-perceptions so long as they are convergent (e.g., see system justification theory; Jost and Banaji, 1994)(3). >System justification. Haslam I 195 Packer/Ungson: other potential goals could include: - a desire for the group to engage in effective collective action (for which consensus is perhaps a means to an end); - a desire for the group to reach a decision quickly (heightened perhaps in crisis situations, and reminiscent of speed/accuracy tradeoffs endemic to human cognition; e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974)(4); - a desire for the group to reach a decision with little effort (heightened when the group is overburdened with many complex issues); - a more individual set of desires to be positively regarded and to retain one’s position in the group (as per McCauley’s (1998)(2) social discomfort hypothesis). >Groupthink/Psychological theories. Identification/goals: Pursuit of group-related goals – whatever they are – is stronger to the extent that members identify with their groups (Abrams and Hogg, 1988)(5). Strongly identified group members seek to be regarded as loyal and to make decisions that serve the interests of the group. Norms/accuracy/Packer/Ungson: any one of the goals that conflict with accuracy and deliberation could produce groupthink-type symptoms, although, as pointed out by McCauley (1998)(2), the underlying mechanisms and precise manifestations could differ as a function of the goal in question (e.g., some producing internalization, some compliance). 1. Turner, M.E. and Pratkanis, A.R. (1998a) ‘A social identity maintenance model of groupthink’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 210–35. 2. McCauley, C. (1998) ‘Group dynamics in Janis’ theory of groupthink: Backward and forward’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 146–62. 3. Jost, J.T. and Banaji, M.R. (1994) ‘The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false consciousness’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 33: 1–27. 4. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974) ‘Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases’, Science, 185: 1124–3. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Groupthink | Baron | Haslam I 193 Groupthink/Group dynamics/Baron: Robert S. Baron: Baron (2005)(1) argued that groupthink-like dynamics, including conformity, suppression of dissent, polarization, self-censorship, illusions of consensus and intergroup bias are actually commonplace – meaning that they are ubiquitous to pretty much any meaningful group. >Groupthink, >Group behavior, >Conformity. Baron (2005)(1) further argued that failures to find strong or consistent evidence for the antecedent conditions of groupthink may actually reflect the fact that it is so common. In other words, there is little variation to detect because most groups exhibit groupthink-like symptoms and defective decision-making processes. Group think model/Baron: Baron (2005) proposed a ubiquity model of groupthink, arguing that many of the symptoms identified by Janis (1972(2), 1982(3)) are common in groups and arise from three interactive (again, not additive) antecedent factors. 1) At least a minimal degree of social identification (defined in social identity/self-categorization-like terms) is required. Identification with the group matters, in part, because it tends to increase both normative social influence (i.e., compliance), as well as informational social influence (i.e., internalization). 2) For social influence to occur and for identification to produce groupthink-like symptoms, the group must have a clear norm or set of norms for individuals to follow. 3) Social influence is more likely to the degree that individual group members possess low self-efficacy or confidence regarding their abilities to understand or uniquely contribute to decision-making. >Social influence, >Social identity, >Decision-making processes. 1. Baron, R.S. (2005) ‘So right it’s wrong: Groupthink and the ubiquitous nature of polarized group decision-making’, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 37: 219–253. 2. Janis, I.L. (1972) Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 3. Janis, I.L. (1982) Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Groupthink | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 182 Groupthink/psychological theories: Example: after the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion which had been planned by a group of highly intelligent people the question came up how this failure had been possible. >Group think/Janis. Psychological tradition: Beginning of the 1970s theory and research on group and organizational decision-making were dominated by individualistic subjective utility theory (Kramer, 1998)(1), according to which a single person’s subjective evaluations of risk and reward affect their decision-making processes. >Decision-making processes. JanisVsTradition: stressed the group dynamics underlying these decisions. In particular, he theorized Haslam I 183 that the cohesiveness of groups could motivate their members to prioritize group harmony and unanimity over careful deliberation when making decisions. >Group cohesion. Haslam I 187 Criticisms VsJanis: Philip Tetlock (1979)(2): Consistent with the groupthink model, public statements in groupthink cases were more simplistic and tended to make more ingroup-favouring references than public statements in non-groupthink cases. However, inconsistent with the model, public statements in groupthink cases were no more likely to make negative references to outgroups. Clark McCauley (1989)(3): three of [Janis’] cases (i.e., North Korea, Pearl Harbor, Watergate) indeed appeared to involve group members internalizing collective beliefs (i.e., privately agreeing with group decisions). However, he concluded that the Bay of Pigs invasion and Vietnam War escalation were better characterized as involving compliance – that is, members publicly expressed agreement with group positions without privately accepting them, presumably due to social pressures to conform. TetlockVsJanis: (Tetlock et al 1992)(4): The authors found some evidence consistent with the groupthink model: structural and procedural faults (e.g., directive leadership, decision-making procedures) predicted groupthink symptoms. However, in contrast to Janis’ original formulation, group cohesiveness and high stress conditions did not emerge as key antecedents to groupthink symptoms. Haslam I 188 PetersonVsJanis: (Peterson et al. 1998)(5) found support for the idea that decision-making styles and procedures have important implications for the success and failures of real corporations. However, there were some caveats: (…) ’unsuccessful groups’ identified by Peterson and colleagues did not resemble the sorts of groups likely to be plagued by groupthink as characterized by Janis; rather, they tended to have weaker leaders and less cohesion. In contrast, ‘successful groups’ were characterized by stronger leaders, greater willingness to take risks, and more optimism. Laboratory studies: have generally focused on manipulating groupthink antecedents (e.g., cohesion, decision-making procedures) to examine their effects on groupthink symptoms and decision quality. Cohesion has been manipulated in a variety of ways: giving false feedback regarding the compatibility of group members’ attitudes, offering rewards to Haslam I 189 successful groups, forming groups from friends vs. strangers, or highlighting shared group membership among individuals (for a review, see Esser, 1998(6): 127–133). Results: these laboratory studies have not found a consistent causal relationship between group cohesion and groupthink symptoms. However,(…) the inconsistency of these results may have much to do with inconsistency in the way cohesion has been defined and operationalized. VsJanis: although there are empirical observations that some of Janis’ (1972(7), 1982(8)) antecedents may produce certain groupthink symptoms, it seems fair to say that there is little or no evidence from either case or lab studies for a strict model in which all of Janis’ (1972(7), 1982(8)) antecedents must be present to elicit the symptoms of groupthink, or in which all groupthink symptoms necessarily co-occur. There is also little evidence for an additive model in which the accumulation of antecedents produces more or stronger symptoms (see Turner and Pratkanis, 1998b). Haslam I 193 Group dynamics: Robert S. Baron: Baron (2005)(9) argued that groupthink-like dynamics, including conformity, suppression of dissent, polarization, self-censorship, illusions of consensus and intergroup bias are actually commonplace – meaning that they are ubiquitous to pretty much any meaningful group. Baron (2005)(9) further argued that failures to find strong or consistent evidence for the antecedent conditions of groupthink may actually reflect the fact that it is so common. In other words, there is little variation to detect because most groups exhibit groupthink-like symptoms and defective decision-making processes. >Groupthink/Packer. 1. Kramer, R.M. (1998) ‘Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam decisions 25 years later: How well has the groupthink hypothesis stood the test of time?’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 236–71. 2. Tetlock, P.E. (1979) ‘Identifying victims of groupthink’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37: 1314–24. 3. McCauley, C. (1989) ‘The nature of social influence in groupthink: Compliance and internalization’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57: 250–60. 4. Tetlock, P.E., Peterson, R.S., McGuire, C., Chang, S. and Feld, P. (1992) ‘Assessing political group dynamics: A test of the groupthink model’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63: 403–25. 5. Peterson, R.S., Owens, P.D., Tetlock, P.E., Fan, E.T. and Martorana, P. (1998) ‘Group dynamics in top management teams: Groupthink, vigilance, and alternative models of organizational failure and success’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 272–305. 6. Esser, J.K. (1998) ‘Alive and well after 25 years: A review of groupthink research’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 116–41. 7. Janis, I.L. (1972) Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 8. Janis, I.L. (1982) Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 9. Baron, R.S. (2005) ‘So right it’s wrong: Groupthink and the ubiquitous nature of polarized group decision-making’, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 37: 219–253. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Internalisation | Deci | Corr I 442 Internalization/Motivation/Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan: internalization is a developmental process through which external values and regulations can, to varying degrees, be taken in and integrated with one’s sense of self. Self-Determination Theory/SDT proposes that there is a natural developmental tendency for people to take in the values, behaviours and opinions they encounter in their lives and to move toward accepting them as their own. However, this process will function more or less effectively depending on the degree to which the person experiences basic psychological need satisfaction while that process is operating. >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan, >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Autonomy/Deci/Ryan. Corr I 447 Many studies have supported the hypothesizes that need supportive social contexts lead to fuller internalization of values and behavioural regulations (e.g., Niemiec, Lynch, Vansteenkiste et al. 2006(1); Williams and Deci 1996(2)). In one laboratory experiment (Deci, Eghrari, Patrick and Leone 1994)(3) found that three facilitating factors – namely, - providing a rationale for a requested behaviour, - acknowledging people’s feelings about the behaviour, and - highlighting choice rather than control all contributed to facilitating internalization of extrinsic motivation. 1. Niemiec, C. P., Lynch, M. F., Vansteenkiste, M., Bernstein, J., Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2006. The antecedents and consequences of autonomous self-regulation for college: a self-determination theory perspective 2. Williams, G. C. and Deci, E. L. 1996. Internalization of biopsychosocial values by medical students: a test of self-determination theory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 70: 767–79 3. Deci, E. L., Eghrari, H., Patrick, B. C. and Leone, D. R. 1994. Facilitating internalization: the self-determination theory perspective, Journal of Personality 62: 119–42 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Internalisation | Ryan | Corr I 442 Internalization/Motivation/Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan: internalization is a developmental process through which external values and regulations can, to varying degrees, be taken in and integrated with one’s sense of self. Self-Determination Theory/SDT proposes that there is a natural developmental tendency for people to take in the values, behaviours and opinions they encounter in their lives and to move toward accepting them as their own. However, this process will function more or less effectively depending on the degree to which the person experiences basic psychological need satisfaction while that process is operating. >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan, >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Autonomy/Deci/Ryan. Corr I 447 Many studies have supported the hypothesizes that need supportive social contexts lead to fuller internalization of values and behavioural regulations (e.g., Niemiec, Lynch, Vansteenkiste et al. 2006(1); Williams and Deci 1996(2)). In one laboratory experiment (Deci, Eghrari, Patrick and Leone 1994)(3) found that three facilitating factors – namely, - providing a rationale for a requested behaviour, - acknowledging people’s feelings about the behaviour, and - highlighting choice rather than control all contributed to facilitating internalization of extrinsic motivation. 1. Niemiec, C. P., Lynch, M. F., Vansteenkiste, M., Bernstein, J., Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2006. The antecedents and consequences of autonomous self-regulation for college: a self-determination theory perspective 2. Williams, G. C. and Deci, E. L. 1996. Internalization of biopsychosocial values by medical students: a test of self-determination theory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 70: 767–79 3. Deci, E. L., Eghrari, H., Patrick, B. C. and Leone, D. R. 1994. Facilitating internalization: the self-determination theory perspective, Journal of Personality 62: 119–42 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Internalisation | Self-Determination Theory | Corr I 442 Internalization/Motivation/Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan: internalization is a developmental process through which external values and regulations can, to varying degrees, be taken in and integrated with one’s sense of self. Self-Determination Theory/SDT proposes that there is a natural developmental tendency for people to take in the values, behaviours and opinions they encounter in their lives and to move toward accepting them as their own. However, this process will function more or less effectively depending on the degree to which the person experiences basic psychological need satisfaction while that process is operating. >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan, >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Autonomy/Deci/Ryan. Corr I 447 Many studies have supported the hypothesizes that need supportive social contexts lead to fuller internalization of values and behavioural regulations (e.g., Niemiec, Lynch, Vansteenkiste et al. 2006(1); Williams and Deci 1996(2)). In one laboratory experiment (Deci, Eghrari, Patrick and Leone 1994)(3) found that three facilitating factors – namely, - providing a rationale for a requested behaviour, - acknowledging people’s feelings about the behaviour, and - highlighting choice rather than control all contributed to facilitating internalization of extrinsic motivation. 1. Niemiec, C. P., Lynch, M. F., Vansteenkiste, M., Bernstein, J., Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2006. The antecedents and consequences of autonomous self-regulation for college: a self-determination theory perspective 2. Williams, G. C. and Deci, E. L. 1996. Internalization of biopsychosocial values by medical students: a test of self-determination theory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 70: 767–79 3. Deci, E. L., Eghrari, H., Patrick, B. C. and Leone, D. R. 1994. Facilitating internalization: the self-determination theory perspective, Journal of Personality 62: 119–42 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Interpenetration | Parsons | Habermas IV 337 Interpenetration/Parsons/Habermas: the term "interpenetration" appears simultaneously in Parsons(1) and Parsons(2). This is about how the three "systems" culture, society and personality (initially understood from the early Parsons in pre-theoretical terms) overlap and penetrate each other (interpenetrate). Habermas IV 338 Parsons/Habermas: places the mutual penetration of the systems in the foreground, after he could not clarify the institutionalization and internalization of cultural values in action theory. >Systems, >System theory. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Social System, NY 1951, 2. Talcott Parsons, Toward a General Theory of Action, NY 1951. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Intrinsicness | Deci | Corr I 442 intrinsic/extrinsic Motivation/Deci/Ryan: Def Intrinsic motivation/Deci/Ryan: refers to doing an activity because the activity itself is interesting and spontaneously satisfying (Ryan and Deci 2000)(1). Intrinsic motivation is said to be invariantly autonomous or self-determined because it is a reflection of people’s inner interests. In other words, when intrinsically motivated, people experience volition and a sense of choice as they fully endorse the activities in which they are engaged. Terminology: Csikszentmihalyi (1990)(2) referred to intrinsically motivated activities as autotelic. Def Extrinsic motivation/Deci/Ryan: In contrast, extrinsic motivation refers to doing an activity because it is instrumental to some operationally separable consequence. The classic instance of extrinsic motivation is doing an activity because it is expected to lead to a reward or the avoidance of a punishment. Self-Determination Theory/SDT: suggests, that extrinsic motivation can be internalized and thus can become a basis for autonomous actions. >Self-Determination/Deci/Ryan, >Internalization/Deci/Ryan. Four types of extrinsic motivation: external regulation introjected regulation identified regulation integrated regulation >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Environment/Deci/Ryan. Corr I 449 Intrinsicness/extrinsic/Self-Determination Theory/SDT//Deci/Ryan: which types of goals or aspirations do people pursue in their lives? Kasser and Ryan (1993(3), 1996(4)) examined two sets of goals: those for wealth, fame as intrinsic goals. The researchers hypothesized that the intrinsic goals would be associated with greater wellbeing than would the extrinsic goals because intrinsic goals are more closely linked to satisfaction of the basic psychological needs. Kasser and Ryan found that the relative importance people place on extrinsic goals was negatively related to indicators of wellbeing, whereas the relative importance they placed on intrinsic goals was positively related to the same indicators of wellbeing. Sheldon, Ryan, Deci and Kasser (2004)(5) showed that both the goal contents (extrinsic versus intrinsic) people pursue and the motives they have for pursuing the goals (controlled versus autonomous) are associated with their wellbeing. >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan. 1. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2000. The ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of goal pursuits: human needs and the self-determination of behaviour, Psychological Inquiry 11: 227–68 2. Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1990. Flow. New York: Harper and Row 3. Kasser, T. and Ryan, R. M. 1993. A dark side of the American dream: correlates of financial success as a central life aspiration, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65: 410–22 4. Kasser, T. and Ryan, R. M. 1996. Further examining the American dream: differential correlates of intrinsic and extrinsic goals, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 22: 80–7 5. Sheldon, K. M., Ryan, R. M., Deci, E. L. and Kasser, T. 2004. The independent effects of goal contents and motives on well-being: it’s both what you pursue and why you pursue it, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30: 475–86 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Intrinsicness | Ryan | Corr I 442 intrinsic/extrinsic Motivation/Deci/Ryan: Def Intrinsic motivation/Deci/Ryan: refers to doing an activity because the activity itself is interesting and spontaneously satisfying (Ryan and Deci 2000)(1). Intrinsic motivation is said to be invariantly autonomous or self-determined because it is a reflection of people’s inner interests. In other words, when intrinsically motivated, people experience volition and a sense of choice as they fully endorse the activities in which they are engaged. Terminology: Csikszentmihalyi (1990)(2) referred to intrinsically motivated activities as autotelic. Def Extrinsic motivation/Deci/Ryan: In contrast, extrinsic motivation refers to doing an activity because it is instrumental to some operationally separable consequence. The classic instance of extrinsic motivation is doing an activity because it is expected to lead to a reward or the avoidance of a punishment. Self-Determination Theory/SDT: suggests, that extrinsic motivation can be internalized and thus can become a basis for autonomous actions. >Self-Determination/Deci/Ryan, >Internalization/Deci/Ryan. Four types of extrinsic motivation: external regulation introjected regulation identified regulation integrated regulation >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Environment/Deci/Ryan. Corr I 449 Intrinsicness/extrinsic/Self-Determination Theory/SDT//Deci/Ryan: which types of goals or aspirations do people pursue in their lives? Kasser and Ryan (1993(3), 1996(4)) examined two sets of goals: those for wealth, fame as intrinsic goals. The researchers hypothesized that the intrinsic goals would be associated with greater wellbeing than would the extrinsic goals because intrinsic goals are more closely linked to satisfaction of the basic psychological needs. Kasser and Ryan found that the relative importance people place on extrinsic goals was negatively related to indicators of wellbeing, whereas the relative importance they placed on intrinsic goals was positively related to the same indicators of wellbeing. Sheldon, Ryan, Deci and Kasser (2004)(5) showed that both the goal contents (extrinsic versus intrinsic) people pursue and the motives they have for pursuing the goals (controlled versus autonomous) are associated with their wellbeing. >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan. 1. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2000. The ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of goal pursuits: human needs and the self-determination of behaviour, Psychological Inquiry 11: 227–68 2. Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1990. Flow. New York: Harper and Row 3. Kasser, T. and Ryan, R. M. 1993. A dark side of the American dream: correlates of financial success as a central life aspiration, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65: 410–22 4. Kasser, T. and Ryan, R. M. 1996. Further examining the American dream: differential correlates of intrinsic and extrinsic goals, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 22: 80–7 5. Sheldon, K. M., Ryan, R. M., Deci, E. L. and Kasser, T. 2004. The independent effects of goal contents and motives on well-being: it’s both what you pursue and why you pursue it, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30: 475–86 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Intrinsicness | Self-Determination Theory | Corr I 442 intrinsic/extrinsic Motivation/Deci/Ryan: Def Intrinsic motivation/Deci/Ryan: refers to doing an activity because the activity itself is interesting and spontaneously satisfying (Ryan and Deci 2000)(1). Intrinsic motivation is said to be invariantly autonomous or self-determined because it is a reflection of people’s inner interests. In other words, when intrinsically motivated, people experience volition and a sense of choice as they fully endorse the activities in which they are engaged. Terminology: Csikszentmihalyi (1990)(2) referred to intrinsically motivated activities as autotelic. Def Extrinsic motivation/Deci/Ryan: In contrast, extrinsic motivation refers to doing an activity because it is instrumental to some operationally separable consequence. The classic instance of extrinsic motivation is doing an activity because it is expected to lead to a reward or the avoidance of a punishment. Self-Determination Theory/SDT: suggests, that extrinsic motivation can be internalized and thus can become a basis for autonomous actions. >Self-Determination/Deci/Ryan, >Internalization/Deci/Ryan. Four types of extrinsic motivation: external regulation introjected regulation identified regulation integrated regulation >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Environment/Deci/Ryan. Corr I 449 Intrinsicness/extrinsic/Self-Determination Theory/SDT//Deci/Ryan: which types of goals or aspirations do people pursue in their lives? Kasser and Ryan (1993(3), 1996(4)) examined two sets of goals: those for wealth, fame as intrinsic goals. The researchers hypothesized that the intrinsic goals would be associated with greater wellbeing than would the extrinsic goals because intrinsic goals are more closely linked to satisfaction of the basic psychological needs. Kasser and Ryan found that the relative importance people place on extrinsic goals was negatively related to indicators of wellbeing, whereas the relative importance they placed on intrinsic goals was positively related to the same indicators of wellbeing. Sheldon, Ryan, Deci and Kasser (2004)(5) showed that both the goal contents (extrinsic versus intrinsic) people pursue and the motives they have for pursuing the goals (controlled versus autonomous) are associated with their wellbeing. >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan. 1. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2000. The ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of goal pursuits: human needs and the self-determination of behaviour, Psychological Inquiry 11: 227–68 2. Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1990. Flow. New York: Harper and Row 3. Kasser, T. and Ryan, R. M. 1993. A dark side of the American dream: correlates of financial success as a central life aspiration, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65: 410–22 4. Kasser, T. and Ryan, R. M. 1996. Further examining the American dream: differential correlates of intrinsic and extrinsic goals, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 22: 80–7 5. Sheldon, K. M., Ryan, R. M., Deci, E. L. and Kasser, T. 2004. The independent effects of goal contents and motives on well-being: it’s both what you pursue and why you pursue it, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30: 475–86 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Judgments | Brandom | I 146f Correct judgments are normative terms. Not natural. Conflicting judgments are not prohibited by the laws of nature. I 235 Judgment/Dummett/Brandom: judgments do not act as an expression of an inner judgment act, but as an internalization of the external act of assertion. >Assertions. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Law | Hobbes | Habermas IV 122 Law/Hobbes/Habermas: Question: How can a contract bind the parties if the sacred basis of the law has been removed? Solution/Hobbes/Weber/Habermas: the standard answer since Hobbes and up to Max Weber is that modern law is compulsory law. The internalization of moral corresponds to a complementary transformation of the law into an externally imposed, state-authorized power based on the state sanction apparatus. The quasi automatic enforceability of the fulfilment of legal claims Habermas IV 123 is to guarantee obedience. >Coercion, >Obedience. DurkheimVsHobbes/DurkheimVsWeber/Habermas: Durkheim is not satisfied with that. Obedience must also have a moral core. The legal system is in fact part of a political order with which it would fall if it could not claim legitimacy. >Order, >Legitimacy. Höffe I 222 Validity/Law/Laws/Hobbes/Höffe: Because of the authorization, the Höffe I 223 authority to make decisions does not stem from " his own grace". Because of the social contract, in Hobbes' case it is also not "by the grace of God", but ultimately "by virtue of the consent of all those affected", all those with legal rights. Thus, a second level of authority, legitimacy, is added to the moment of legality. In any case, the succinct formula "validity by virtue of authority" reads fully developed: "validity by virtue of a power authorised by each person concerned", or in shorter form: "validity by virtue of freely recognised authority" or "validity by consensus". >Legal Positivism/Hobbes. In the case of theories of validity, two basic forms are often opposed to each other, the theories of power and the theories of consent or recognition. Although Hobbes is usually assigned to the power theorists because of his "validity by virtue of authority", in reality he is to be assigned to both groups of theories because of the basic recognition of the persons concerned. And because the authority is authorized over the basic recognition, his theory of law belongs additionally to a third theory group, the empowerment theories. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Law | Weber | Habermas III 231 Law/Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization the cognitive independence of law and moral, i.e. the replacement of moral-practical insights of ethical and legal doctrines, principles, maxims and decision rules of world views in which they were initially embedded. Cosmological, religious and metaphysical worldviews are structured in such a way that the internal difference between theoretical and practical reason cannot yet come into effect. >Morality, >Ethics, >Worldviews, >Rationalization, >Rationality. Habermas III 232 The autonomisation of law and moral leads to formal law and to profane ethics of conviction and responsibility. >Ethics of conviction, >Responsibility. Of course, this autonomization is still in the making even within religious systems of interpretation. This leads to the dichotomization between a search for salvation, which is oriented towards inner salvation goods and means of salvation, and the realization of an outer, objectified world. Weber shows how ethics of conviction approaches develop from this religiousness of conviction. (1) >Religion. Habermas III 278 Law/Weber/Habermas: for the emergence of modern law, Weber must postulate a process that is assumed in parallel, even if not simultaneously by him for the rationalization of worldviews. >World View/Weber. The availability of post-traditional legal concepts is not yet identical with the enforcement of a modern legal system. Only on the basis of rational natural law can legal matters be reconstructed in basic concepts of formal law in such a way that legal institutions can be created that formally satisfy universalist principles. These must regulate private commercial transactions between the owners of goods and the complementary activities of the public administration. HabermasVsWeber: this does not show the parallelism of these two processes clearly enough. Habermas III 332 Law/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Weber's theoretical position of law in his theory of rationalization is ambiguous in that it simultaneously permits the institutionalization of procedural rational economic and administrative action and also seems to make the detachment of subsystems from their moral-practical foundations possible. Cf. >Natural Justice. The dialectical explanation of the conflicting developments of the development of science and religion cannot be applied to the development of law, since it appears from the outset in a secularized form. Habermas: Weber reinterprets modern law in such a way that it is separated from the evaluative value sphere. Habermas III 346 HabermasVsWeber: Weber empirically reinterprets the problem of legitimacy and decouples the political system from forms of moral-practical rationality; he also cuts the formation of political will back to processes of power acquisition and power competition. >Legitimacy, >Justification, >Ultimate justification. Law/Weber: as far as the normative agreement is based on tradition, Weber speaks of conventional community action. To the extent that this is replaced by success-oriented, purpose-oriented action, the problem arises as to how these new scopes can in turn be legitimate, i.e. normatively bindingly ordered. Rational social action takes the place of conventional community action. >Purpose rationality, >Conventions, >Community. Habermas III 347 Only the procedure of coming into being justifies the assumption that a normative agreement is rationally motivated. Only within normatively defined limits may legal entities act rationally without regard to conventions. HabermasVsWeber: Weber fluctuates here between discursive agreement and arbitrary statute. Habermas III 351 Modern civil private law/Weber/Habermas: is characterised by three formal features: positivity, legalism and formality. Def positivity/Habermas: positively set law is not generated by interpretation of recognized and sacred traditions, it rather expresses the will of a sovereign Habermas III 352 legislator, which uses legal organisational means to regulate social offences conventionally. Def Legalism/Habermas: legal entities are not subject to any moral motives other than general legal obedience. It protects their private inclinations within sanctioned boundaries. Not only bad convictions, but also actions that deviate from the norm are sanctioned, assuming accountability. Def Formality/Law/Habermas: Modern law defines areas of legitimate arbitrariness of private individuals. The arbitrary freedom of legal entities in a morally neutralized area of private actions with legal consequences is assumed. Private law transactions can therefore be regulated negatively by restricting authorisations that are recognised in principle (instead of a positive regulation of concrete obligations and material bids). Anything that is not prohibited by law is permitted in this area. Habermas: the system functionality corresponding to these characteristics results from legal structures in which procedural rational action can become general. It does not explain how these legal structures themselves are possible. Habermas III 353 Rather, the form of modern law is explained by the post-traditional structures of consciousness it embodies. HabermasVsWeber: Weber would have to understand the modern legal system as an order of life, which is assigned to the moral-practical way of life. But Weber's attempt to view the rationalization of law exclusively from the point of view of rationality of purpose contradicts this. Habermas: only at a post-conventional level does the idea of the fundamental critiqueability and need for justification of legal norms emerge. Habermas III 354 Modern Law/Weber/Habermas: separates morality and legality. This requires practical justification. The moral-free sphere of law refers to a moral based on principles. The achievement of making something positive is to shift justification problems, i.e. to relieve the technical handling of the law of justification problems, but not to eliminate these justification problems. This justification, which has become structurally necessary, is expressed in the catalogue of fundamental rights contained in the civil constitutions alongside the principle of popular sovereignty. Habermas III 357 Modern Law/Weber: For Weber, modern law in the positivist sense is to be understood as the law that is set by decision and completely detached from rational agreement, from concepts of justification, no matter how formal they may be. ((s) > Carl Schmitt's Decisionism/Weber). WeberVsNatural justice: Thesis: There can be no purely formal natural justice. Being-Should/Weber: The supposed to be valid is considered to be identical with that which in fact exists everywhere on average; the 'norms' obtained by logical processing of concepts of legal or ethical, belong in the same sense as the 'natural laws' to those generally binding rules which 'God himself cannot change' and against which a legal system must not attempt to rebel. (2) >Natural Justice. Habermas III 358 HabermasVsWeber: Weber confuses the formal characteristics of a post-traditional level of justification with particular material values. Nor does he sufficiently distinguish between structural and content-related aspects in rational natural justice and can therefore equate "nature" and "reason" with value contents, from which modern law, in the strict sense, is detached as an instrument for asserting any values and interests. >Foundation/Weber. Habermas III 362 Procedural legitimacy/procedural rationality/law/HabermasVsWeber: as soon as the rationalization of law is reinterpreted as a question of the procedural rational organization of procedural rational management and administration, questions of the institutional embodiment of moral-practical rationality cannot only be pushed aside, but downright turned into its opposite: These now appear as a source of irrationality, at least of "motives that weaken the formal rationalism of law".(3) Habermas: Weber confuses the recourse to the establishment of legal rule with a reference to particular values. Habermas IV 122 Law/Weber/Habermas: Question: How can a contract bind the parties if the sacred basis of the law has been removed? Solution/Hobbes/Weber/Habermas: the standard answer since Hobbes and up to Max Weber is that modern law is compulsory law. The internalization of moral corresponds to a complementary transformation of the law into an externally imposed, state-authorized power based on the state sanction apparatus. The quasi automatic enforceability of the fulfilment of legal claims Habermas IV 123 is to guarantee obedience. >Obedience. DurkheimVsHobbes/DurkheimVsWeber/Habermas: Durkheim is not satisfied with that. Obedience must also have a moral core. The legal system is in fact part of a political order with which it would fall if it could not claim legitimacy. >E. Durkheim. 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I. 1963, p. 541. 2.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Ed. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 638 3.Ibid p. 654 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Morality | Behaviorism | Slater I 166 Morality/Behaviorism: Prior to Kohlberg and Piaget, (>Morality/Kohlberg, >Morality/Piaget) the dominant views of moral development were the behaviorist approach, which focuses on how behaviors are acquired through conditioning, the socialization approach, which emphasizes the internalization of social norms, and the psychodynamic approach, which emphasizes the role of unconscious motives in human behavior. Each of these approaches depicts children as passive recipients of values and norms that are imposed on them either externally, or internally via unconscious processes. KohlbergVsBehaviorism: In contrast, Kohlberg characterized children’s moral reasoning as evolving as they interact in complex social environments and gain experience with social roles (Turiel, 2008)(1). Kohlberg argued that even young children have the mental and emotional capacity to make sense of their social environment and reflect upon the moral implications of their behavior. >About Behaviorism. 1. Turiel, E. (2008). The development of children’s orientations toward moral, social, and personal orders: More than a sequence in development. Human Development, 51, 21—39. Gail D. Heyman and Kang Lee, “Moral Development. Revisiting Kohlberg’s Stages“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Morality | Kohlberg | Slater I 165 Morality/Kohlberg: Like Piaget (>Morality/Piaget), Kohlberg (1963/2008)(1)) asked children to reason about situation. E.g., the Heinz dilemma. Def Heinz dilemma: Mr. Heinz, the husband of a woman with cancer, broke into a pharmacy to steal a drug after the pharmacist refused to give him the drug at a reduced price or on credit. The children, (boys aged from 10 to 13 years) were then engaged in extended discussions about this problem. Stages/Kohlberg: 6 stages of morality grouped into three levels: First Level: the Pre-Moral Level, judgments are characterized by self-interest. Stage 1 orientation focuses on avoiding punishment and demonstrating obedience for its own sake, Stage 2 orientation focuses on what Kohlberg called “naive instrumental hedonism” which is often characterized as “you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours.” Second Level: the Morality of Conventional Role-Conformity, in which judgments are characterized by an emphasis on social relationships and an appreciation of norms and conventions. Stage 3 orientation focuses on maintaining positive relations with others by following expected societal standards for being good, and a Stage 4 orientation focuses on respecting laws in order to maintain social order. Third Level: Morality of Self-Accepted Moral Principles, with judgments characterized by a focus on the internally held moral principles. Stage 5 orientation focuses on coordinating the interest of the group with important universal values such as the need to preserve life, and Stage 6 focuses on acting according to conscience in relation to basic principles of fairness such as equality and human rights. Kohlberg Thesis: it is necessary for individuals to pass through the stages in sequence, and the pattern of intercorrelations (…) supported the notion that the higher levels of moral reasoning replace the lower levels as children develop. Prior to Kohlberg and Piaget, the dominant views of moral development were the behaviorist approach, which focuses on how behaviors are acquired through conditioning, the socialization approach, which emphasizes the internalization of social norms, and the psychodynamic approach, which emphasizes the role of unconscious motives in human behavior. Each of these approaches depicts children as passive recipients of values and norms that are imposed on them either externally, or internally via unconscious processes. In contrast, Kohlberg characterized children’s moral reasoning as evolving as they interact in complex social environments and gain experience with social roles (Turiel, 2008)(2). Kohlberg argued that even young children have the mental and emotional capacity to make sense of their social environment and reflect upon the moral implications of their behavior. >Stages of development, >Morality/Turiel. 1. Kohlberg, L. (1963/2008). The development of children’s orientations toward a moral order. I: Sequence in the development of moral thought. Human Development, 51, 8—20. 2. Turiel, E. (2008). The development of children’s orientations toward moral, social, and personal orders: More than a sequence in development. Human Development, 51, 21—39. Gail D. Heyman and Kang Lee, “Moral Development. Revisiting Kohlberg’s Stages“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications Upton I 124 Post-conventional Morality/Kohlberg/Upton: Kohlberg (1958(1) suggested that most adolescents reach level II [conventional morality] and most of us stay at this level of reasoning during adulthood. Only a few individuals reach the post-conventional level of reasoning; indeed, Kohlberg found stage 6 to be so rare that it has since been removed from the theory. >VsKohlberg. 1. Kohlberg, L (1958). The development of modes of moral thinking and choice in the years 10 to 16. Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Chicago. |
Kohlb I Lawrence Kohlberg The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice New York 1981 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Motivation | Deci | Corr I 442 Motivation/Deci/Ryan: Def Intrinsic motivation/Deci/Ryan: refers to doing an activity because the activity itself is interesting and spontaneously satisfying (Ryan and Deci 2000)(1). Intrinsic motivation is said to be invariantly autonomous or self-determined because it is a reflection of people’s inner interests. In other words, when intrinsically motivated, people experience volition and a sense of choice as they fully endorse the activities in which they are engaged. Terminology: Csikszentmihalyi (1990)(2) referred to intrinsically motivated activities as autotelic. Def Extrinsic motivation/Deci/Ryan: In contrast, extrinsic motivation refers to doing an activity because it is instrumental to some operationally separable consequence. The classic instance of extrinsic motivation is doing an activity because it is expected to lead to a reward or the avoidance of a punishment. Self-Determination Theory/SDT: suggests, that extrinsic motivation can be internalized and thus can become a basis for autonomous actions. >Self-Determination/Deci/Ryan, >Internalization/Deci/Ryan. Four types of extrinsic motivation: external regulation introjected regulation identified regulation integrated regulation >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Environment/Deci/Ryan. 1. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2000. The ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of goal pursuits: human needs and the self-determination of behaviour, Psychological Inquiry 11: 227–68 2. Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1990. Flow. New York: Harper and Row Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Corr II 140 Deci suggested that whether rewards, feedback, and other events enhance or diminish intrinsic motivation will be a function of how they affect feelings of self-determination (being an origin) and competence (experiences of effectance). >Self-Determination/Deci/Ryan. II 141 Deci began with this question: if a monetary reward is offered for performing an activity one already finds interesting, what effect will this reward have on subsequent intrinsic motivation? Operant psychology maintained (albeit using different language) that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation would be additive. Counter to this, Deci (1971)(1) anticipated that the motivational impact of rewards might depend on how they are experienced. Building on de Charms (1968)(2), Deci reasoned that the application of contingent extrinsic rewards to an intrinsically motivated activity could prompt a change in the “perceived locus of causality” from internal (IPLOC) to external (EPLOC). In other words, offering rewards would shift participants’ perceived locus of causality from internal to external, undermining their experience of being an origin, and thus their intrinsic motivation. Alternatively, Deci reasoned that rewards that did not interfere with participants’ experiences of ‘self-determination and competence’ should not produce this undermining effect on subsequent intrinsic motivation. Deci’s primary measure of intrinsic motivation was what he called the free-choice behavioural paradigm, a strategy upon which most subsequent experimental work on intrinsic motivation has been based. In this approach, intrinsic motivation is operationalized as the amount of time participants spend engaged with II 142 a target activity when they are alone, are not being observed, are free to choose what to do, have alternative activities available, and have no explicit incentives for continuing on the target task. Experiments/Deci: [In an experiment with three different groups solving a puzzle] Deci (1971)(1) [found] a potential negative effect of rewards on post-reward persistence, an outcome not previously observed in experiments with humans. Specifically, participants who had received extrinsic rewards for solving these interesting puzzles spent much less time working on the puzzles during the final free-choice period than they had in the initial one (…). II 142 [In another experiment, conducted at a college newspaper office, Deci showed] that faster work (better performance) is indicative of higher intrinsic motivation. [Deci conducted a third experiment which was almost identical to the first “puzzle experiment.] This time, however, Deci used ‘verbal rewards’ (praise and positive feedback) rather than financial rewards as the experimental manipulation. Deci hypothesized that verbal rewards like these would typically not be experienced as controlling, but rather as ‘encouragement’. Therefore, unlike contingent financial rewards, this type of verbal reward would be unlikely to create an EPLOC or undermine intrinsic motivation. II 144 As expected, results showed no undermining effect of these verbal rewards on intrinsic motivation. II 145 Based on these early experiments (Deci 1971(1), 1972a(3), 1972b(4)), Deci introduced a tentative cognitive evaluation theory (CET) to account for his varied results. He argued that there are at least two aspects to any external reward: a ‘controlling’ aspect and an ‘informational’ aspect. The controlling aspect leads to a decrease in intrinsic motivation by changing the perceived locus of causality from internal to external. The informational aspect leads to an increase in intrinsic motivation by increasing the person’s sense of ‘competence and self-determination’. II 146 VsDeci: Most outstanding is that all three of the 1971 studies are statistically underpowered – or carried out with very small samples. (…) many findings do not reach an acceptable level of inferential statistical significance; several findings are trends or significant but with weak effects. [Moreover] the research was exclusively based on a relatively homogeneous group of northeastern US university students. 1. Deci, E. L. (1971). Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 18, 105–115. 2. de Charms, R. (1968). Personal causation: The internal affective determinants of behavior. New York: Academic Press. 3. Deci, E. L. (1972a). The effects of contingent and non-contingent rewards and controls on intrinsic motivation. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 8, 217–229. 4. Deci, E. L. (1972b). Intrinsic motivation, extrinsic reinforcement, and inequity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 22, 113–120. Ryan, Richard M; Ryan, William S and Di Domenico, Stefano I.: “Effects of Rewards on Self-Determination and Intrinsic Motivation Revisiting Deci (1971)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 137-154. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Motivation | Ryan | Corr I 442 Motivation/Deci/Ryan: Def Intrinsic motivation/Deci/Ryan: refers to doing an activity because the activity itself is interesting and spontaneously satisfying (Ryan and Deci 2000)(1). Intrinsic motivation is said to be invariantly autonomous or self-determined because it is a reflection of people’s inner interests. In other words, when intrinsically motivated, people experience volition and a sense of choice as they fully endorse the activities in which they are engaged. Terminology: Csikszentmihalyi (1990)(2) referred to intrinsically motivated activities as autotelic. Def Extrinsic motivation/Deci/Ryan: In contrast, extrinsic motivation refers to doing an activity because it is instrumental to some operationally separable consequence. The classic instance of extrinsic motivation is doing an activity because it is expected to lead to a reward or the avoidance of a punishment. Self-Determination Theory/SDT: suggests, that extrinsic motivation can be internalized and thus can become a basis for autonomous actions. >Self-Determination/Deci/Ryan, >Internalization/Deci/Ryan. Four types of extrinsic motivation: external regulation introjected regulation identified regulation integrated regulation >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Environment/Deci/Ryan. 1. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2000. The ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of goal pursuits: human needs and the self-determination of behaviour, Psychological Inquiry 11: 227–68 2. Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1990. Flow. New York: Harper and Row Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Corr II 140 Deci suggested that whether rewards, feedback, and other events enhance or diminish intrinsic motivation will be a function of how they affect feelings of self-determination (being an origin) and competence (experiences of effectance). II 141 Deci began with this question: if a monetary reward is offered for performing an activity one already finds interesting, what effect will this reward have on subsequent intrinsic motivation? Operant psychology maintained (albeit using different language) that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation would be additive. Counter to this, Deci (1971)(1) anticipated that the motivational impact of rewards might depend on how they are experienced. Building on de Charms (1968)(2), Deci reasoned that the application of contingent extrinsic rewards to an intrinsically motivated activity could prompt a change in the “perceived locus of causality” from internal (IPLOC) to external (EPLOC). In other words, offering rewards would shift participants’ perceived locus of causality from internal to external, undermining their experience of being an origin, and thus their intrinsic motivation. Alternatively, Deci reasoned that rewards that did not interfere with participants’ experiences of ‘self-determination and competence’ should not produce this undermining effect on subsequent intrinsic motivation. Deci’s primary measure of intrinsic motivation was what he called the free-choice behavioural paradigm, a strategy upon which most subsequent experimental work on intrinsic motivation has been based. In this approach, intrinsic motivation is operationalized as the amount of time participants spend engaged with II 142 a target activity when they are alone, are not being observed, are free to choose what to do, have alternative activities available, and have no explicit incentives for continuing on the target task. Experiments/Deci: [In an experiment with three different groups solving a puzzle] Deci (1971)(1) [found] a potential negative effect of rewards on post-reward persistence, an outcome not previously observed in experiments with humans. Specifically, participants who had received extrinsic rewards for solving these interesting puzzles spent much less time working on the puzzles during the final free-choice period than they had in the initial one (…). II 142 [In another experiment, conducted at a college newspaper office, Deci showed] that faster work (better performance) is indicative of higher intrinsic motivation. [Deci conducted a third experiment which was almost identical to the first “puzzle experiment.] This time, however, Deci used ‘verbal rewards’ (praise and positive feedback) rather than financial rewards as the experimental manipulation. Deci hypothesized that verbal rewards like these would typically not be experienced as controlling, but rather as ‘encouragement’. Therefore, unlike contingent financial rewards, this type of verbal reward would be unlikely to create an EPLOC or undermine intrinsic motivation. II 144 As expected, results showed no undermining effect of these verbal rewards on intrinsic motivation. II 145 Based on these early experiments (Deci 1971(1), 1972a(3), 1972b(4)), Deci introduced a tentative cognitive evaluation theory (CET) to account for his varied results. He argued that there are at least two aspects to any external reward: a ‘controlling’ aspect and an ‘informational’ aspect. The controlling aspect leads to a decrease in intrinsic motivation by changing the perceived locus of causality from internal to external. The informational aspect leads to an increase in intrinsic motivation by increasing the person’s sense of ‘competence and self-determination’. II 146 VsDeci: Most outstanding is that all three of the 1971 studies are statistically underpowered – or carried out with very small samples. (…) many findings do not reach an acceptable level of inferential statistical significance; several findings are trends or significant but with weak effects. [Moreover] the research was exclusively based on a relatively homogeneous group of northeastern US university students. 1. Deci, E. L. (1971). Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 18, 105–115. 2. de Charms, R. (1968). Personal causation: The internal affective determinants of behavior. New York: Academic Press. 3. Deci, E. L. (1972a). The effects of contingent and non-contingent rewards and controls on intrinsic motivation. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 8, 217–229. 4. Deci, E. L. (1972b). Intrinsic motivation, extrinsic reinforcement, and inequity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 22, 113–120. Ryan, Richard M; Ryan, William S and Di Domenico, Stefano I.: “Effects of Rewards on Self-Determination and Intrinsic Motivation Revisiting Deci (1971)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 137-154. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Motivation | Self-Determination Theory | Corr I 442 Motivation/Deci/Ryan: Def Intrinsic motivation/Deci/Ryan: refers to doing an activity because the activity itself is interesting and spontaneously satisfying (Ryan and Deci 2000)(1). Intrinsic motivation is said to be invariantly autonomous or self-determined because it is a reflection of people’s inner interests. In other words, when intrinsically motivated, people experience volition and a sense of choice as they fully endorse the activities in which they are engaged. Terminology: Csikszentmihalyi (1990)(2) referred to intrinsically motivated activities as autotelic. Def Extrinsic motivation/Deci/Ryan: In contrast, extrinsic motivation refers to doing an activity because it is instrumental to some operationally separable consequence. The classic instance of extrinsic motivation is doing an activity because it is expected to lead to a reward or the avoidance of a punishment. Self-Determination Theory/SDT: suggests, that extrinsic motivation can be internalized and thus can become a basis for autonomous actions. >Self-Determination/Deci/Ryan, >Internalization/Deci/Ryan. Four types of extrinsic motivation: external regulation introjected regulation identified regulation integrated regulation >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Environment/Deci/Ryan. 1. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2000. The ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of goal pursuits: human needs and the self-determination of behaviour, Psychological Inquiry 11: 227–68 2. Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1990. Flow. New York: Harper and Row Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Norms | Economic Theories | Parisi I 167 Norms/Economic theories/Wangenheim: Social norms and their evolution have been widely discussed in economics. The argument on stability of norms in evolutionary settings starts by rather simple situations with only two alternative behaviors, of which one becomes a social norm (see for example the overview articles by Ostrom, 2000(1), and Elster 1989(2) as well as the seminal book by Ullman-Margalit, 1977)(3). It has been extended in particular in relation to experimental game theory in which the obvious existence of norms had to be explained (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999(4); Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004(5); Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000(6)). Indirect evolution: The indirect evolutionary approach (Güth and Yaari, 1992(7); Güth, 1995(8); Güth and Ockenfels, 2000(9)), which separates preferences from fitness but lets preferences evolve according to the fitness of the actions they induce for rational agents, suggests itself for modeling the evolution of norms, if they are interpreted as preferences deviating from material pay-offs. Dekel et al. (2007)(10) offer very general results on the stability of norms in such settings with various degrees of information on the preferences of other individuals. Parisi I 168 Influence of law on norms: Parisi and Wangenheim (2006)(11) show in an interactive opinion formation model with an ordered set of possible social norms that law may not only trigger the evolution of social norms in the same direction as the law goes but also Parisi I 169 in the reverse direction. This may occur particularly when legal change is too far from social norms and thus triggers hidden or open opposition. They also show that legal strategies like front-loading the enforcement of legal rules may avoid such countervailing effect - possibly only at high costs, though. Carbonara et al. (2008a(12), 2008b(13)) study such strategies against countervailing effects of social norms on legislation in more detail. Carbonara et al. (2012)(14) elaborate on the double function of law - incentives and expression of a majority's opinions affecting internalization of norms - and dwell on their interplay. 1. Ostrom, E. (2000). "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms." Journal of Economic Perspectives 14: 137-158. 2. Elster, J. (1989). "Social Norms and Economic Theory." Journal of Economic Perspectives 3: 99-117. 3. Ullman-Margalit, E. (1977). The Emergence of Norms. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 4. Fehr, E. and K. M. Schmidt (1999). "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation." Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 817-868. 5. Fehr, E. and U. Fischbacher (2004). "Social Norms and Human Cooperation." Trends in cognitive Sciences 8: 185-190. 6. Bolton, G. E. and A. Ockenfels (2000). "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition." American Economic Review 90: 166-193. 7. Güth, W. and M. Yaari (1992). "An Evolutionary Approach to Explain Reciprocal Behavior in a Simple Strategic Game," in U. Witt, ed., Explaining Process and Change - Approaches to Evolutionary Economics, 23-34. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 8. Güth, W. (1995). "An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives." International Journal of Game Theory 24:323-344. 9. Güth, W. and A. Ockenfels (2000). "Evolutionary Norm Enforcement." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 156: 33 5-347. 10. Dekel, E., J. C. Ely, and O. Yilankaya (2007). "Evolution of Preferences." Review of Economic studies 74:685-704. 11. Parisi, F. and G. v. Wangenheim (2006). "Legislation and Countervailing Effects from Social Norms," in C. Schubert and G. v. Wangenheim, eds., Evolution and Design of Institutions, 25-55. London: Routledge. 12. Carbonara, Emanuela, Francesco Parisi, and Georg von Wangenheim (2008a). "Lawmakers as Norm Entrepreneurs." Review of Law and Economics 4:779-799. 13. Carbonara, E., F. Parisi, and G. von Wangenheim (2008b). "Legal Innovation and the Compliance Paradox." Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology 9: 837-860. 14. Carbonara, E., F. Parisi, and G. v. Wangenheim (2012). "Unjust Laws and Illegal Norms." International Review of Law and Economics 32: 285-299. Wangenheim, Georg von. „Evolutionary Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Property Rights | Demsetz | Henderson I 38 Property rights/Demsetz/Henderson/Globerman: A primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities. >Externalities. Every cost and benefit associated with social interdependencies is a potential externality. One condition is necessary to make costs and benefits externalities. The cost of a transaction in the rights between the parties (internalization) must exceed the gains from internalization.“(1) >Property rights/Anthropology. Property rights/Anthropology: Although economists are known to make unjustified fun of anthropologists, [Harold] Demsetz(1) took them seriously and read their literature. The specific area Demsetz studied was the development of property rights, or the lack of their development, among Aboriginal Canadians and native Americans. Speck: Anthropologist Frank G. Speck, wrote Demsetz, had "discovered that the Indians of the Labrador Peninsula had a long-established tradition of property in land."(1) The Speck Article(2) that Demsetz cited had been published way back in 1915. His finding was at odds with what anthropologists knew about Indians in the American Southwest. Leacock: Anthropologist Eleanor Leacock, noting that difference, inquired further into the situation of the Labrador Indians and wrote up her findings in 1954(3). According to Demsetz, "Leacock clearly established the fact that a close relationship existed, both historically and geographically, between the development of private rights in land and the development of the commercial fur trade" (1967(1): 351 ). Reading Leacock's article gave Demsetz his "aha" moment. He noted that although the factual basis of the correlation was solid, no theory that he knew ofhad related private property in land to the fact of the fur trade. But to Demsetz it seemed obvious. 1. Demsetz, Harold (1967). Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 57, 2: 347-359. 2. Speck, Frank G. (1915, January 16). The Basis of American Indian Ownership of Land. Old Penn Weekly Review (Univ. of Pennsylvania): 491-95. 3.Leacock, Eleanor Burke. (1954). The Montagnais „hunting territory“ and the fur trade. (tDAR id: 256329). National Archeological Database (NADB). |
EconDems I Harold Demsetz Toward a theory of property rights 1967 Henderson I David R. Henderson Steven Globerman The Essential UCLA School of Economics Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2019 |
| Regulation | Deci | Corr I 443 Regulation/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: External regulation depends on rewards and punishments. It is the least autonomous regulation. It can be powerfully motivating but does not reflect the people’s interests. >Motivation/Deci/Ryan. Introjected regulation: is partly but not fully internalized regulation. Thus, introjected regulation involves people controlling their own behaviours in order to maintain or affirm their self-worth, avoid guilt, or feel the approval of others. Identified regulation: is a more autonomous type of motivation. It results from people identifying with the personal importance of an activity for their own self-selected goals and values. When people have accepted a behavioural regulation as their own, the regulation will have been transformed and will likely be experienced as volitional and self-endorsed. Extrinsic motivation: results when the internalization process has functioned most effectively, is integrated regulation. It results from people assimilating an identification with other aspects of their core self. >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan, >Autonomy/Deci/Ryan. Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Regulation | Ryan | Corr I 443 Regulation/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan see also >Motivation/Deci/Ryan. External regulation depends on rewards and punishments. It is the least autonomous regulation. It can be powerfully motivating but does not reflect the people’s interests. Introjected regulation: is partly but not fully internalized regulation. Thus, introjected regulation involves people controlling their own behaviours in order to maintain or affirm their self-worth, avoid guilt, or feel the approval of others. Identified regulation: is a more autonomous type of motivation. It results from people identifying with the personal importance of an activity for their own self-selected goals and values. When people have accepted a behavioural regulation as their own, the regulation will have been transformed and will likely be experienced as volitional and self-endorsed. Extrinsic motivation: results when the internalization process has functioned most effectively, is integrated regulation. It results from people assimilating an identification with other aspects of their core self. >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan, >Autonomy/Deci/Ryan. Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Regulation | Self-Determination Theory | Corr I 443 Regulation/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: (> Introjected regulation: is partly but not fully internalized regulation. Thus, introjected regulation involves people controlling their own behaviours in order to maintain or affirm their self-worth, avoid guilt, or feel the approval of others. Identified regulation: is a more autonomous type of motivation. It results from people identifying with the personal importance of an activity for their own self-selected goals and values. When people have accepted a behavioural regulation as their own, the regulation will have been transformed and will likely be experienced as volitional and self-endorsed. Extrinsic motivation: results when the internalization process has functioned most effectively, is integrated regulation. It results from people assimilating an identification with other aspects of their core self. >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan, >Autonomy/Deci/Ryan. Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Representation | Attachment Theory | Corr I 230 Representation/Attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: mental representations of attachment figures (see relations/Bowlby) and self-sub-routines that develop through the internalization of caring and soothing qualities of attachment figures can serve as symbolic sources of support, comfort and protection (Mikulincer and Shaver 2004(1)). They can also provide models of effective, loving behaviour that influence the way a person regards and treats him- or herself in the temporary absence of an actual attachment figure. >Representation/Bowlby, >Attachment theory/Bowlby. Using contemporary research techniques, we (Mikulincer, Birnbaum and Woddis and Nachmias 2000(2); Mikulincer, Gillath and Shaver 2002(3)) have found Corr I 231 that adults react to even minimal threat cues with activation of proximity-related thoughts and mental representations of security-providing attachment figures. In these studies, subliminal priming with a threat word (e.g., illness, failure) was found to heighten the cognitive accessibility of attachment-related mental representations, indicated by faster lexical-decision times for proximity-related words (e.g., love, closeness) and the names of people nominated as providing protection and security (e.g., the name of a parent, spouse or close friend). >About the Attachment theory. 1. Mikulincer, M. and Shaver, P. R. 2004. Security-based self-representations in adulthood: contents and processes, in W. S. Rholes and J. A. Simpson (eds.), Adult attachment: theory, research, and clinical implications, pp. 159–95. New York: Guilford Press 2. Mikulincer, M., Birnbaum, G., Woddis, D. and Nachmias, O. 2000. Stress and accessibility of proximity-related thoughts: exploring the normative and intraindividual components of attachment theory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78: 509–23 3. Mikulincer, M., Gillath, O. and Shaver, P. R. 2002. Activation of the attachment system in adulthood: threat-related primes increase the accessibility of mental representations of attachment figures, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83: 881–95 Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Rules | Habermas | III 148 Rules/Habermas: For example, rules of operation (e. g. calculation rules) have no explanatory power; following them does not mean, as in the case of following rules of action, that the actor refers to something in the world and orients himself/herself towards claims of validity that are linked to motivational reasons for action. >Addition, >Quaddition, >Rule following, >Kripkes' Wittgenstein, >Nonfactualism. IV 36 Rules/Habermas: based on the model by Mead (see Internalisation/Mead) we assume that A does not produce his utterance (gesture, symbol) with the intention of following a rule and not in the expectation that the listener or listeners recognize the utterance as conforming to the rules. >Internalization/Mead. Behavioural expectations have only prognostic meaning, the conventional meaning component is missing. This means that expectations can be disappointed, but incorrect behavior cannot be recognized. According to Mead, the interaction works up to here through a mutual anticipation of reactions. (1) IV 39 Only when context-dependence has been overcome does the symbolic use of expressions or gestures of interaction occur. According to Mead, we can then say that meaning identity results from conventionally defined rules of use for symbols. >Use, >Symbols, >Understanding. 1. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969, S. 86. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Self | Habermas | IV 115 Self/Habermas: As soon as the ego masters the orientation to claims of validity, it can repeat the internalization of the discursive relationship. Now alter already meets it with the expectation that ego not only assumes the communicative role of the first person naively, but, if necessary, develops it into the role of a proponent within the framework of argumentation. >Argumentation. When ego adopts this attitude of alter, when it looks at itself with the eyes of an opponent as it responds to its criticism, it gains a reflected relationship to itself. Ego becomes capable of self-criticism by internalizing the role of the participant in the argument. >Intersubjectivity, >Interaction. IV 116 The self to which it then refers is not a mysterious authority, but is already familiar to it even from everyday communicative practice: it is it in the communicative role of the first person, as it claims the existence of facts in an objectifying attitude, or in an attitude conforming to norms it enters into an interpersonal relationship considered legitimate or makes a subjective experience accessible to an audience in an expressive attitude. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas Accordingly, ego (...) can relate to itself as a) an epistemic subject that is capable of learning and has already acquired a certain knowledge, or to itself as a b) a practical subject that can act and in interactions with its related persons has a certain character or has already formed a super-ego or c) to itself as a pathic (sic) subject that is sensitive (...) and is already delimited from the outside world by facts and norms in a privilegedly accessible, intuitively present realm of subjectivity. The subject is the same subject in all three aspects (epistemic, practical, pathic), no subsequent identification is required. These self-designations can only be taken up by ego in such a way that it confronts itself as a communicatively acting subject. IV 117 If the performative attitude secures unity in the change of modes, practical self-confidence retains a certain priority over epistemic and pathological self-confidence in the reflected self-image. >Subject/Habermas, >Self-consciousness. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Social Norms | Carbonara | Parisi I 466 Social Norms/Carbonara: In the study of social norms, “efficiency” has several standard meanings, notably Pareto efficiency, cost–benefit efficiency, and welfare maximization. “Unfairness” also has several possible meanings, but the most frequently discussed today is discrimination based on race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation. In some circumstances, social norms are efficient and fair, requiring no regulation so long as private and criminal law operate in the background. In other circumstances, unregulated social norms waste resources or discriminate against individuals or groups. The main issue (…) is that the social norms prevailing at some historical moment may be just an equilibrium among multiple equilibriums. >Efficiency, >Equilibrium. Parisi I 467 Legal norms: Legal norms seemingly reinforce existing social norms, bending them towards the law when discrepancy exists and favoring their creation where social norms do not exist. Parisi I 469 Social norms/Carbonara: (…) we could define a “perfect social norm” as a behavioral regularity caused by coordination, non-legal sanctions, and internalization. Efficiency; On the efficiency of social norms, see Posner (1996)(1) and Mahoney and Sanchirico (2000)(2). Fairness: The interplay of honor, stigma, and the law is often responsible Parisi I 470 for the perpetuation of such rules. Banabou and Tirole (2011)(3) show how such forces, together with the expressive power of the law, may explain why people resist legal changes that would enhance efficiency and lead to more “effective” laws. >Path dependence/Carbonara. 1. Posner, Eric A. (1996). “Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144: 1697–1744. 2. Mahoney, P. G. and C. W. Sanchirico (2000). “Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 149: 2027–2062. 3. Banabou, R. and J. Tirole (2011). “Laws and Norms.” NBER Working Paper 17579. Emanuela Carbonara. “Law and Social Norms”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Subjects | Habermas | IV 115 Subject/Habermas: As soon as the ego masters the orientation to claims of validity, it can repeat the internalization of the discursive relationship. Now alter already meets it with the expectation that ego not only assumes the communicative role of the first person naively, but, if necessary, develops it into the role of a proponent within the framework of argumentation. When ego adopts this attitude of alter, when it looks at itself with the eyes of an opponent as it responds to its criticism, it gains a reflected relationship to itself. Ego becomes capable of self-criticism by internalizing the role of the participant in the argument. IV 116 The self to which it then refers is not a mysterious authority, but is already familiar to it even from everyday communicative practice: it is it in the communicative role of the first person, as it claims the existence of facts in an objectifying attitude, or in an attitude conforming to norms it enters into an interpersonal relationship considered legitimate or makes a subjective experience accessible to an audience in an expressive attitude. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas >Person/Habermas, >Self/Habermas. Accordingly, ego (...) can relate to itself as a) an epistemic subject that is capable of learning and has already acquired a certain knowledge, or to itself as a b) a practical subject that can act and in interactions with its related persons has a certain character or has already formed a super-ego or c) to itself as a pathic (sic) subject that is sensitive (...) and is already delimited from the outside world by facts and norms in a privilegedly accessible, intuitively present realm of subjectivity. The subject is the same subject in all three aspects (epistemic, practical, pathic), no subsequent identification is required. These self-designations can only be taken up by ego in such a way that it confronts itself as a communicatively acting subject. IV 117 If the performative attitude secures unity in the change of modes, practical self-confidence retains a certain priority over epistemic and pathological self-confidence in the reflected self-image. >Self-awareness. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Terminology | Nietzsche | Ries II 11 Crisis/Nietzsche: is to be pushed forward to revaluate all values. Ries II 11 Amor fati/Nietzsche: the highest state a philosopher can attain: to think Dionysian in relation to existence. Ries II 13 Noon/Nietzsche: A mature old tree, embraced by the rich love of a vine and hidden from itself. At the moment of happiness, the course of time seems to stop. Ries II 16 Nietzsche: Seafaring passion for the "unknown", which lies in a direction "where all the suns of mankind have so far gone down". Ries II 17 Zarathustra/Nietzsche: Thesis: the meaning of life is love. Ries II 19 Happiness/Nietzsche: Zarathustra: the happiness of my existence, to express its puzzle form, I have already died as my father, as my mother I am still alive, and I am getting old. Ries II 20 Nietzsche/Biography: Nietzsche met Jacob Burckhardt. During the Franco-German war, he was a voluntary nurse for several months. Ries II 25 "Dark antiquity": The term comes from Jacob Burckhardt. (Not literally!). Ries II 28 Apollonian/Nietzsche: Symbol of the world as an apparition, in the sense of the Schopenhauer concept of imagination. Deceptive liberation from the terrible Dionysian knowledge of "primal pain". Apollonian/Nietzsche: Art medium Dionysian/Nietzsche: Wisdom Apollonian/Dionysian/Nietzsche: in the end, they both speak each other's language. There is no point in a world game circling in itself, which the will in eternal lust plays with itself. Ries II 29 Tragedy: Schopenhauer: Pathos as primal pain - Nietzsche primordial lust. Ries II 30 Nietzsche: Zarathustra: From the smile of Dionysus the Olympic gods were born, from his tears the human was created. Ries II 30 Pessimism/Nietzsche: "Beyond Good and Evil": a philosophy that dares to lower morality itself into the world of appearances, namely appearance as deception, illusion, delusion, error. Ries II 29/30 Nietzsche/Biography/Ries: by the "Birth of the Tragedy" he was scientifically dead as a philologist. Ries II 49 Human/All too human/Nietzsche: 2nd main piece: "The Wanderer and his Shadow": "Shadow philosophy"/Shadow/Nietzsche: in which the "objects" lose their physicality. Noon/Nietzsche: Whosoever had an active and stormy morning, whose soul is overwhelmed by a strange quietness around the noon of life... It is a death with awake eyes. Ries II 50 Jesus/Christianity/Nietzsche: Parable "The Prisoners" (The Gay Science): the son of the guard: I will save you, but only those of you who believe that I am the son (Jesus) of the prison guard. Ries II 55 Gay Science/Nietzsche: Science of the free spirit. Ries II 57 Eternal return/Nietzsche: (Zarathustra) the thought invaded Nietzsche in August 1881 at the lake of Silvaplana. Like when one day or at night a demon in your loneliest solitude stalked you and said: "You will have to live this life as you loved it and love it now, once more and countless times. And there will be nothing new about it, but every pain and every desire and every thought and sigh and all unspeakably small and big things of your life must come back to you and everything in the same order and also this spider and this moonlight between the trees... would you not bow down and grind your teeth and curse the demon who spoke like that? >Eternal return/Nietzsche. The question with everyone and everything: 'Do you want to do this again and again and countless times?' would lie as the heaviest weight on your actions!" Ries II 58/ 59 Zarathustra/Nietzsche: as a classic figure, reversal of history, "overcoming morality". Zarathustra, who once created the most fatal error of morality, himself - he is also the first to recognize him the heavyweight has given way from things. The whole divine horizon has been wiped away. Ries II 60/61 The last human/Nietzsche: Opposite image of the superhuman, vegetating at the end of civilization. The last man smells badly! Ries II 62 Three stages: past, present, future: Camel/Nietzsche: idealistic stage, obedience, theological absolutism "thou shalt". Löwe/Nietzsche: idealism turns against itself, against the thousand-years old "great dragon" of the "thou shalt" dominating it: "I will". Ries II 63 Kind/Nietzsche: but the freedom of this "I want" is still constituted by what it denies: morality, metaphysics, religion. Only the third stage brings the innocence of becoming beyond good and evil. >Morality/Nietzsche, >Metaphysics/Nietzsche, >Religion/Nietzsche. Ries II 64 Self-conquest/Nietzsche: Where I found something alive, I found the will to power... life itself spoke to me: I am what must always overcome itself. The will overcomes itself to its purest form: the will to power. Thus constant repetition, thereby circularity, thus return of the same always! Ries II 65 Dionysian/Nietzsche: Existence in Dionysian immediacy remains subject to appearances. Ries II 70 Redemption of the "higher humans": Figures/Equalities/Zarathustra/Nietzsche/Ries: Schopenhauer: Schopenhauer is caricatured by Nietzsche in the Zarathustra as the fortune teller of great fatigue. The two kings/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: 1. despiser of the false representation of the political 2. the Conscientious of the spirit (the scientist). The old Sorcerer/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: Richard Wagner. The old Pope/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: the pious man mourning for the "dead God" and pious in this grief. The ugliest man/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: "the murderer of God", the great self-loathing and disgusted by humans. The voluntary beggar/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: the selfless human. The shadow of Zarathustra: the free spirit. They are all as the "remnant of God" deeply desperate and failed. They all caricature themselves at the donkey festival. The always same Ries II A of the donkey as the Dionysian saying-yes to the whole of being. Ries II 71 Noon/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: through the "noon abyss" Zarathustra falls "into the well of eternity". The ship is no longer being praised for its departure into the unknown, but for its return to the "quietest bay". --- Danto III 207 Terminology/Blonde Beast/Nietzsche/Danto: the expression blonde beast has no direct reference to Germans or Aryans in Nietzsche. This passage refers to "Roman, Arabic, Germanic, Japanese nobility, Homeric heroes, Scandinavian Vikings".(1) Most likely, the "Blonde Beast" is a literary topos for "Lion", the so-called King of the Animals. Danto III 218 Internalisation/Terminology/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche calls internalisation the phenomenon that a drive still discharges when prohibited, but not against an external object, but rather an internal object, the person himself. This phenomenon plays a role in the further development of consciousness. (2) >Internalization. Danto III 219 Bad conscience: It is possible that people may remain in the state of mere self-aggression or mere self-loathing. That is what Nietzsche calls a guilty conscience. 1. Vgl. F. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, p. 289. 2. Ibid. p. 338 |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Utilitarianism | Parsons | Habermas IV 305 Utilitarianism/Parsons/ParsonsVsUtilitarism/Habermas: in "The Structure of Social Action" Parsons shows by the concept of purpose-rational action that utilitarianism cannot justify the subject's freedom of decision. >Procedural rationality, >Actions/Parsons. Habermas IV 311 The utilitarian dilemma: 1. The acotr faces exactly one objective world of existing facts and has a more or less exact empirical knowledge of this situation. Habermas IV 312 2. Success/Parsons: in this case is measured exclusively by whether the goal has been achieved. >Double Contingency/Parsons. Norms: are limited here to regulating the relationship between purposes, means and conditions. The choice of purposes is therefore left undetermined. "("randomness of ends").(1) 3. Purposive Rationality: does not provide for a mechanism through which the actions of different actors can be coordinated. This is what Parsons calls the "atomistic" concept of action. Stability can only result from coincidentally intertwined interests. Dilemma: how can freedom of decision as the core of freedom of action be developed from the utilitarian concept of action? Habermas IV 313 a) Purposes may vary regardless of means and conditions, this condition is necessary but not sufficient. As long as no values other than decision maxims are permitted, there is room for two opposing interpretations, both of which are incompatible with freedom of choice, both in a positivist and rationalist sense. b) the determination of purposes as a function of knowledge: Here the action is a process of rational adaptation to the conditions. The active role of the actor is reduced to understanding the situation. >Purposes. Problem: neither the rationalist nor the positivist interpretation of the utilitarian model of action Habermas IV 314 can explain why the actor can make mistakes in a not only cognitive sense. >Autonomy/Parsons. Habermas IV 321 Utilitarianism/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons sticks to the core of the utilitarian concept of action. Perhaps he believes he can only save voluntarism by conceiving freedom of choice as contingent freedom of choice, in the language of German idealism: as arbitrariness. >Voluntarism. Habermas IV 371 Utilitarianism/Parsons/ParsonsVsUtilitarianism/Habermas: from the criticism of utilitarianism, Parsons initially gained the idea of a selection of purposes regulated by values and maxims. Solution: cultural values should be related to action situations by means of institutionalisation and internalisation and be linked to sanctions; in this way they should gain the stability of substantial morality in the reality of life forms and life stories. >Cultural values, >Institutionalization, >Internalization, >Lifeworld. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 49. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Water Pollution | Demsetz | Henderson I 23 Water Pollution/property rights/Demsetz/Henderson/Globerman: Demsetz (1967(1) ) was one of the first economists to explain how weak or attenuated property rights can lead to water pollution. Property rights: A primary function of property rights is to guide incentives to achieve a greater internalization of what economists call externalities. >Externalities, >Social cost. Henderson I 24 Externalities: When externalities are internalized, people take account of how their actions physically interfere with other people's property. To illustrate, imagine that that there is a chemical plant on one side of a body of water and a fishing lodge on the other side. Value: If the body of water creates the greatest economic value as a location for fishing resorts, the emissions externality is a source of economic ineffciency. Damage: The failure of the chemical plant to take account of the physical damage it imposes on the fishing resort results in an ineffcient use of a scarce resource, i.e., the body of water. The externality, in turn, reflects the fact that property rights to the body of water are shared in common by the chemical plant and the fishing lodge. >Property rights/Alchian. Incentives/value: (…) if operating a fishing camp is the most valuable use of the body of water, the owners of the fishing camp have an incentive to negotiate with the owners of the chemical plant to get the plant to stop or reduce its emissions. At the extreme, the owners of the fishing resort might simply buy out the owners of the chemical plant and dismantle the plant. Either way, the owners of the fishing resort are either indirectly or directly converting a property right held in common into a property right effectively held by the fishing resort. >Efficiency. Solution/Internalization/Demsetz: The outcome is that the body of water will be dedicated to its highest-valued use. Henderson I 25 Problem/internalization/costs/Demsetz: Demsetz recognized that in some circumstances, the costs of transacting may make it uneconomical to convert commonly held property into a private property right so that externalities are "internalized." As Demsetz puts it, the costs of transacting in the rights between the parties (internalization) may exceed the gains from internalization. In such cases, government regulations on how commonly held property can be used might improve economic effciency if those regulations are guided by considerations of the economic value ofthe property in its alternative uses. >Regulatory economics, >Transaction cost, >Propery rights/Alchian. 1. Demsetz, Harold (1967). Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 57, 2: 347-359. |
EconDems I Harold Demsetz Toward a theory of property rights 1967 Henderson I David R. Henderson Steven Globerman The Essential UCLA School of Economics Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2019 |
| Working Models | Attachment Theory | Corr I 240 Working models/attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: Because working models, at least initially, are based on the internalization of specific interactions with a particular attachment figure, a person can hold multiple working models that differ in the outcome of the interaction (success or failure to attain security) and the strategy used to deal with insecurity in that interaction (hyperactivation or deactivation of the attachment system). Like other mental representations, these working models form excitatory and inhibitory associations with each other (e.g., experiencing or thinking about security attainment activates memories of congruent episodes of gaining protection and security), and these associations favour the formation of more abstract and generalized representations of self and others. In a recent study, Overall, Fletcher and Friesen (2003)(1) provided evidence for this hierarchical cognitive network of attachment working models. >About the Attachment theory. 1. Overall, N. C., Fletcher, G. J. O. and Friesen, M. D. 2003. Mapping the intimate relationship mind: comparisons between three models of attachment representations, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 29: 1479–93 Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Darwin, Ch. | Mill Vs Darwin, Ch. | Dennett I 695 Ethics / Dennett: Question: what are the consequences of the fact that we are acting under time pressure? (> Darwin: acting under >time pressure); MillVsDarwin. I 697 Darwin: it is the best for the people to follow their permanent pulses. Physics/Dennett: this is true, such as mathematics, throughout the universe (> Minsky); >BarrowVs. Darwinists VsMill: the representatives of the theory of utility (Mill) should bear in mind that when we are before a decision we usually do not have time to consider the impact on the general public. I 698 MillVsDarwin: E.g. Nobody said, the art of navigation is not was based on astronomy, because sailors do not have time to calculate the almanac. As rational beings they take the finished work calculated at sea. So rational people lead their lives with ready opinions about right and wrong, and more difficult questions with ready opinions of smart and stupid. (> Internalisation). DennettVsMill: his system was highly impractical. In practice, we see many reasons, including those which we should not overlook. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Mill Ja I James Mill Commerce Defended: An Answer to the Arguments by which Mr. Spence, Mr. Cobbett, and Others, Have Attempted to Prove that Commerce is Not a Source of National Wealth 1808 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Mill, J. St. | Dennett Vs Mill, J. St. | Dennett I 697 Ethics/Dennett: Question: What consequences result from the fact that we are acting under time pressure? > MillVsDarwin. I 695 Darwin: it is best for the human to follow their permanent impulses. Physics/Dennett: true, like mathematics, in the entire universe (> Minsky). BarrowVs. Darwin’s followers VsMill: the representatives of utility theory (Mill) should keep in mind that we usually do not have time to consider the impact on the general public when facing a decision. Dennett I 698 MillVsDarwin: No one asserts that the art of navigation is not based on astronomy, because sailors do not have time to calculate the almanac. As rational beings, they take the finished calculated work to sea. This way, rational people lead their lives with ready-made opinions about right and wrong and the more difficult questions of wise and foolish. (Internalization). DennettVsMill: this covered the fact that his system was highly impractical. In practice, we overlook many reasons, even those that we should not overlook. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 |
| Various Authors | Brandom Vs Various Authors | I 205 The approach advocated here is critical of three views: Vs 1) that the content is construed exclusively in accordance with the model of the representation of facts. 2) that the quality of the inference solely according to the model of formal validity, 3) that rationality is construed only according to the model of reasoning based on means or purposes. I 338 Brandom: VsReductionism, Brandom pro Relativism I 340 Beliefs: make a difference for what we say and do. They can only be understood in a context of social linguistic practice. First-person reflection is the internalization of third-person reflections. (Vs "privileged access"). I 542 BrandomVsFormalism: of course it is not the case, that something would be propositional in content only by virtue of its relation to accuracies in the inferential practice. Formalistic error: equals all accuracies of inference with logical correctness. I 822 VsTradition: so far, a clear distinction could be made between semantics and pragmatics only by largely overlookeding anaphoric phenomena. I 826 BrandomVsTradition: instead of non-perspective facts one must pay attention only to the structural characteristics of score keeping practices. II 13 VsBrandom: characterized as super-rationalist by others. The meaning of it all stems from the role in language use. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ryle | Versus | Brandom I 340 BrandomVsRyle: VsPrivileged Access - person-reflection is internalization of P-reflection. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 |
| Privileged Access | Versus | Brandom I 340 Kant: BrandomVsRyle: Vsprivileged access - person-reflection is internalization of P-reflection - on the other hand, later in the text: per. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ethics | Nagel, Th. | III 50 ... Neither do we examine the condition of taking the weakest, or most limited, or most economic principle that can be agreed with the source data, each of which goes back to our own perspective. (NagelVsAnalytical Philosophy). Nagel: Instead of this thesis, it is simply the case that we cannot help but believe in certain alternatives or at least consider them to be particularly plausible. I 51 Nagel: Thesis: it is occasionally better not to live with reasons, but because we cannot do otherwise! III 77 Nagel: Thesis: people have reason to take an interest in the freedom and general opportunities of others as well as in their own physical well-being. ((s) But not because of reciprocity!). Nagel: that does not mean, however, that the individual desires would have neutral value. (False conclusion everyone/all). III 96 Ethics/Nagel: Thesis: I believe in moral progress in the form of internalization of moral objectivity comparable to scientific progress. But there is no reason to believe that this process will be reductive, like the sciences. The clients of ethics are always individual individuals, different from each other, whose diversity guarantees that pluralism will remain an essential aspect of any appropriate morality. |
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