Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Cogito Kant Danto I 179
KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanies thinking. ---
Bubner I 107
"I think"/Kant: forms the last performance of the synthesis, which cannot be derived further. Here, the action-character is most obvious. Self-consciousness produces the unity ipso actu in connection.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Correctness Brandom I 24 ff
Correctness/judgment/Kant/Brandom: normative, not governed by natural laws - contradictions not prohibited by natural laws. ---
I 48
KantVsDescartes: not correctness of representations, but of inferences is crucial. --
I 403
Definition correct: an inference from p to q is correct (in the sense of preserving the commitment) if the truth conditions of p are a subset of those of q.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Knowledge Kant Stroud I 130
Knowledge/skepticism/KantVsDescartes: Who reads a proof needs to know at the end. - Problem: this is only possible in the sciences, not in philosophy. - KantVsTradition: treats knowledge of the outside world always indirectly or inferentially. - Solution/Kant: immediate perception / = consciousness of external things. That is a sufficient proof of their reality. - With inferential access skepticism would be inevitable. - Per skepticism: forces to show that we have acquired our knowledge. KantVsMoore/Stroud: Moore does not show this.
---
I 134
Skepticism/Kant: is refuted only by a proof of realism.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
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Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Matter Kant Danto III 266
Matter/Body/KantVsDescartes/Kant/Danto: Kant adhered to a dynamic theory of matter. He turned against Cartesian physics, according to which everything can be explained by the geometric properties of matter. The basic physical concept of the Cartesians was extension. Kant replied, not by extension would bodies take up space, but by intensity. Kant: Matter is the moveable, as long as it fills a space. Fulfilling a space means resisting all moving things, which through its movement is trying to penetrate into a certain space (...).
The general principle of the dynamics of material nature is: that everything real of the objects of external sense, which that is not merely the determination of space, must be seen as a moving force; that is, whereby the so-called solid or the absolute impenetrability, as an empty concept, must be expelled from the natural sciences and be replaced by a force driving back (s). (I. Kant, Metaphysisch Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, in: Werke in 10 Bänden Ed. W. Weischedel, Special Edition, Vol. III, Darmstadt 1983) (second main piece: Erklärung 1, Lehrsatz 1; Allgemeine Anmerkung zur Dynamik).
Danto: Kant implicitly invoked this honor in his confusing discussion of intense magnitudes in the section 'Anticipations of Perception of First Criticism (see Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Acitivity, Cambridge, 1963, p.). 232f).
Danto: Mass is defined there by the intensity with which matter fills a given space.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Person Kant Strawson V 142
Person/personal identity/Descartes: (not physical!) - Our ordinary concept brings very well empirically applicable criteria for numerical identity of a subject with itself (concept!) - but not by self-ascription - "I" is simply used without criteria - KantVsDescartes: the only criteria would be: "the same person", "the same soul" - circular. ---
V 146
Kant: there is no inner intuition of the subject.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Reason Brandom I 395
Reason/Brandom: we are rational beings exactly as far as our recognition of discursive determinations makes a difference for what we will do next.
I 399
Mind/Brandom: Thesis: we gain mutual recognition out of our ability to say "we". ---
II 213
Definition mind/Brandom: the conceptual ability to understand rules - KantVsDescartes: normative rather than descriptive.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Skepticism Kant Stroud I 128
Skepticism/Kant: it remains a scandal of philosophy that the existence of things outside of us must be accepted solely on the basis of belief. - KantVsDescartes: the relation between philosophical question and everyday knowledge is more indirect and complex than he thought. - ((S) But for Kant the perception of external things is very direct.)
Stroud I 136
KantVsSkepticism: two stages: 1. prove external things (Moore has managed) - 2. show the general possibility of such evidence -
Stroud I 138
Stroud: Problem: we do not have a specific text (sentence) with which Kant would formulate his realism and could prove it to Moore.
Stroud I 142
Everyday knowledge is unproblematic, complete and does not have to be proved. ---
Stroud I 140
Skepticism/KantVsSkepticism: can never reach a conclusion because of the premises accepted by himself.
Stroud I 147
KantVsDescartes: he does not go far enough and relies too heavily on "testimonies" - (documents, evidence) - more important: the conditions of possibility -> Davidson: Kant: no study of our knowledge could show that we always perceive something other than the independent objects we assume around us. Solution/Kant: "Copernican revolution": idealism of all appearances. - "We only have direct consciousness of what belongs to us. Our perception depends on our capacity - wrong. That our experience would be in accordance with the things, but vice versa.
Stroud I 149
Things of the outer world/objects/world/reality/Kant/Stroud: all our perception, whether internal or external, and all "external objects of perception ... we have to regard them as representations of what we can be immediately conscious . - ((s) so the thing is the representation of our consciousness -> transcendental idealism - founds the a priori character of our knowledge of space and time (geometry). - Therefore things cannot exist independently of our thoughts and experiences.
Stroud I 163
StroudVsKant: that we need to be aware of our experiences is the return of the "epistemic priority" (from Descartes).
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Thinking Danto I 179
KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanies thinking.
It would completely miss the structure of thinking to say that the various assumptions are purely coincidentally associated in his mind.

I 307
Pavlov: associations are only external, ideas are not necessarily comboined.
Consequently, there are the logical links in addition to what can be causally associated with it.

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Thinking Kant Danto V 2
KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanies thinking. ---
Strawson V 61
Subject/thinking/Kant: there is a "way of thinking of an object in general" - Strawson:> objectivity/Strawson, objectivity/Kant.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Descartes, R. Brandom Vs Descartes, R. Brandom I 40
BrandomVsDescartes: failed to show what it means to grasp or understand such contents as representations. He does not explain what makes a rabbit thought to a thought, which is about rabbits or anything at all. He also does not explain what it means that someone understands a thought as a thought.
I 131
BrandomVsDescartes: has burdened the tradition of representation: the privileging of knowledge and therefore the successful representation against the understanding and the intended representation. For Descartes representational intention is "as if about" intrinsic and characteristic property of thoughts. He does not explain the importance of understanding.
II 13
Kant and Descartes: mind primary, secondary language - BrandomVsKant and BrandomVsDescartes.
II 17
BrandomVsDescartes: expression rather than representation (Sellars ditto).
II 69
Content / representation / BrandomVsDescartes: possession of representational content as unexplained explainer.
II 213
Mind / Brandom: the conceptual ability to understand rules. KantVsDescartes: normative rather than descriptive.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Descartes, R. Carnap Vs Descartes, R. VI 226
Ego/Carnap: is a class of elementary experiences. No bundle, because classes do not consist of their elements! CarnapVsDescartes: the existence of the ego is not a primordial fact of the given. From "cogito" does not follow "sum". Carnap: the ego does not belong to expression of the fundamental experience. But the "this experience". Thinking/RussellVsDescartes: "it thinks". (> Lichtenberg). ("Mind", p.18).
Stroud I 196
KantVsDescartes/CarnapVsDescartes. Frame/Reference system/Carnap/Stroud: for Carnap there is no point of view from which one can judge a frame as adequate or inadequate. That would be an "external" question.
Kant/Stroud: Kant's parallel to this is transcendental idealism: if things were independent of us, skepticism would be inevitable.
Problem: the transcendental idealism should not be crossed with the verification principle. Is Carnap's own positive theory better off here? That is a question of its status. It pursues the same goal as Kant: to explain the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, but without going beyond the limits of comprehensibility.
General/special/internal/external/generalization/Stroud: it would be necessary to explain how the general sceptical conclusion can be meaningless, even if the particular everyday empirical assertions are meaningful. This cannot simply be because one is general and the other particular.
Descartes/Stroud: the particular is representative in its argument and can therefore be generalized. The uncertainty in the individual case is representative of all our knowledge. This is the strength of the argument.
VerificationismVsGeneralization: he considers this generalization suspicious.
CarnapVsSkepticism/CarnapVsDescartes: statements that make sense within a reference system cannot be applied to the reference system itself.
Stroud: but this is the problem inside/outside and not a question of generality or special.
StroudVsCarnap: so he has to show that movement from the inside out is impossible and not the generalization. But he needed an explanation why the traditional view of the relation between "internal" and "external" questions is wrong if he wants to avoid skepticism. ((s) Why Question).
Special/VerificationismVsDescartes: Thesis: the single sentence of Descartes is meaningless from the beginning. (Because unverifiable). (StroudVsVs).
I 207
StroudVsVerificationism: he must now show why this verdict does not apply to all individual (special) sentences of everyday life. Verificationism would otherwise have to assume that our whole language (everyday language) is meaningless! (Because it is not verifiable according to skeptical criteria). For example "I don't know if explanation is caused by sitting in a draught" or "The aircraft spotter doesn't know if the aircraft is an F" would be damned as senseless! If verificationism condemns certain sentences as meaningless only if they are uttered, for example, by Descartes or another skeptic, he would have to show that there is a deviant use on such occasions. Otherwise he could not even indicate what VsDescartes is supposed to have gone wrong with his utterance. ((s) utterance here = action, not sentence, which should be meaningless, neither true nor false).

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Descartes, R. Kant Vs Descartes, R. Danto I 179
KantVsDescartes: The cogito, that "I think" is not an indubitable proposition, but something that accompanies every sentence you claim. KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanied thinking.

Kant I 73
Existence/cogito/Kant: feeling of existence has no concept. Nothing can be proven here. VsDescartes: "I ​​think, therefore I am," error: to infer from the concept to the existence of a thing.

Field I 80
KantVsOntological proof of God’s existence/KantVsDescartes: (KdrV, B622,3 4): You can never assert the categorical (non-conditional) existence of something. Justification: Contradictions usually originate from the fact that one or more objects are postulated, and then assumptions that are mutually inconsistent: e.g. a triangle and it being quadrilateral.
But there is no contradiction to deny the existence of a triangle!
For we have not made any conflicting assumptions. ((s) by only assuming a triangle.)
Kant: The same applies to the notion of an "absolutely necessary being": if we deny its existence, we deny it with all its predicates, but then no contradiction can arise.
Nothing can be negated with all predicates and yet leave a contradiction. (s) So there is no necessary existence.
Field: it can not be contradictory to deny the existence of numbers, because they have no mysterious force to leave a contradiction if they are not there. (s) Has the triangularity a mysterious force if there is no triangle? No, but that is a predicate without a carrier and not comparable here).

Stegmüller IV 362
Proof of God’s existence / Kant Descartes: Four points (CPR A 594 p): 1. "If I pick up the predicate in an identical judgment and keep the subject, the result is a contradiction." I lift both together, there is no contradiction. E.g. I cannot lift the omnipotence if God is the same as omnipotence. But if I say God is not, neither omnipotence nor any other of his predicates are given. IV 363 StegmüllerVsKant: One can ask why Kant is so sure that no negative existential proposition is self-contradictory and why therefore no existence statement of the form "there is an x" can be an analysis.
2. Kant (A 597): "You have already committed a contradiction when you brought into the concept of a thing, of which you only wanted to think its possibility,the notion of its existence". MackieVsKant: This is unfair! Kant’s argument is based on the idea that Descartes has an "an open mind" concerning the existence of God or not, hence something is read into the concept of existence. But Descartes does not pretend that he is open-minded regarding the response, he is rather completely sure regarding the existence. But then he does not postulate what needs to be proofed as proofed.
3. Kant (A 598): Analytic/Synthetic distinction: there can be no analytical statements about existence. (However, he does not justify this claim).
IV 364
VsKant: Analytical judgments on existence are in arithmetic, e.g. there is a prime number between 10 to 20 Frege: All arithmetic truths are analytic.
4. Kant: The logic of existence statements reflect an incorrect grammar: the auxiliary verb "be" is ambiguous here when it is used as a means of predication and existence. (> Copula).
MackieVsKant: Kant stops halfway: If to "exist" is not a predicate, then what is it?
Existential quantifier: exists only since Frege.
IV 365
MackieVsDescartes: That is a deadlier argument: the existential quantifier cannot be an attribute and cannot express perfection, which may possess a thing or not. E.g. therefore the Revenus resident cannot be refuted, which has no necessary perfection but only an artificial perfection. There is no distinction between natural and artificial perfection in the existential quantifier, there is now no distinction between natural and artificial perfection. Then Descartes’ argument about the distinction of natural/artificial, with God the only exception of a being no longer with natural perfection, is not valid anymore. DescartesVsFrege: his only rebuttal would be if he could prove that a "this tree" or "I" or "God exists" ((s) so (ix) Fx (iota operator, indicator statement) exists MackieVsDescartes / Stegmüller.: In any case, he has not done this.


Strawson V 22
"Refutation of idealism"/ Kant Descartes: So that self-consciousness is possible, it must be at least possible to distinguish between consequences of our experiences on the one hand, and consequences of the objects of our experience which they show independently. For that, the items must be so designed that they exist in a stable framework. The necessary differences of temporal relations must be taken within the experience. We must therefore have a direct and non-deductive awareness of objects in space. "The consciousness of my own existence is at the same time the non-deductive consciousness of the existence of other things beside me." Terms / Kant: not any amount of terms is sufficient for us, there must be concepts of persistent and re-identified objects among them.
V 23
StrawsonVsKant: In the analogies, he always tries to squeeze more out of the arguments than there actually is. Self-awareness/Consciousness/Kant/Strawson: The distinctions must be created in the concepts themselves, because there is no such thing as a pure perception of the reference system!
V 103
KantVsDescartes: self-awareness is only possible through the perception of external objects. Substance, cause and community (or reciprocal interaction is a necessary condition for objective experience. And these concepts become only meaningful regarding external objects. Strawson: Kant relies here very little on his theories from the transcendental aesthetic as premises for its arguments in the analysis.

Strawson V 140
Def Soul/Descartes/Strawson: All of us know by the mere fact of conscious awareness that he exists as a (Cartesian), thinking substance, e.g. that it is capable as an intangible, lasting, not composite individual subject of ideas and experiences as well as an existence in complete independence of a body or of matter. KantVsDescartes: Which infringes the principle of sense: there is no empirical application criteria for this claim.
KantVsDescartes, KantVs rational psychology: Analysis of the origins of appearance: Mix-up of the unity of experiences and the experience of unity.
V 143
KantVsDescartes: After all, it is the unity of consciousness, which we, if the semblance has us under control, take erroneously for awareness of a unified subject.
V 145
Def rational psychology/(Descartes): Asserts that every person has immediate safety regarding the existence of his soul as an immaterial substance. KantVsDescartes: However,the only criteria for it would be "the same man, the same soul". Deathblow for rational psychology.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Kant Descartes Vs Kant Stroud I 131
World/reality/Kant: the outer things we know of must have a "reality" that does not allow them to be opened up inferentially (A 371). Direct Perception/= Consciousness/Kant/Stroud: direct consciousness of things (of this kind) is then a sufficient proof of their reality!
Stroud: thus we are in the everyday situation where the "external perception" (Kant) provides the immediate proof of something real in space. (A 375).
DescartesVsKant: could say that Kant is not in a position to do so.
Stroud: it is not about which of the two gives the correct description of the situation.
KantVsDescartes: his description cannot be correct. But he does not simply give a competing alternative. Rather, he defines conditions for access to knowledge. >Knowledge/Kant.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Kant Stroud Vs Kant I 145
Def Reality/Real/(Kant: "whatever is connected with a perception according to empirical laws is real". (A 376)).
I 146
StroudVsKant: but he does not go into detail how we can distinguish reality from appearance in individual cases where the question might arise.
I 159
Skepticism/transcendental/StroudVsKant: does he really refute skepticism with his transcendental philosophy? Is it a better answer than others? 1. We can only understand his answer if we understand and accept his transcendental approach. We must then also accept his idealism.
I 160
Understanding/Stroud: we should do best when we observe people and their behavior (>Behaviorism). But that would be an empirical study. It would be about language, language behaviour and language acquisition.
StroudVsKant: we understand his argument only if we understand his concept of a priori knowledge. And this investigation presupposes that we accept transcendental idealism. That seems circular! (Circle):
to understand idealism again, we must understand the particular nature of the investigation that makes idealism transcendental.
I 161
2. StroudVsKant: (this would even be Kantian reasons VsKant): according to Kant, thoughts are only possible if they are applied to what categories can be applied to. But this is only possible within the framework of possible experiences. The concepts must be able to have an empirical application. ((s) So they must be learned in empiricism). StroudVsKant: then how is it possible that we can have (transcendental) thoughts at all that are not determined by empirical conditions?
a) empirically:
For example, if expressions such as "directly perceive" and "independently of us" are given in everyday empirical use, then we see ((s) according to Kant!) that
the sentence "We perceive independent things directly" is true. Empirically understood this simply means: e.g. without mirrors or screens.
b) transcendental: other language use:
here the sentence "we perceive independent things directly" does not express truth.
((s) Beware, Stroud does not say that he is wrong according to Kant).
StroudVsKant: with the transcendental meaning we thus move away from everyday language.
KantVsStroud: would reply that this use must be understandable for us, otherwise knowledge about the world would not be possible.
I 162
StroudVsKant: this leads to two problems: 1. Suppose we accepted Kant's transcendentalism:
Question: why would the rejection of idealism at the transcendental level be more attractive than accepting it at the empirical level?
Why does Kant reject empirical idealism?
((s) "Condition"/empirical/(s): a condition cannot be understood empirically. But their fulfilment > Fact. But one cannot see that a fact is supposed to fulfil something.)
Solution: making a corresponding sentence true. (But this sentence must be expressed first).
StroudVsKant: if the argument is that our knowledge would otherwise be limited to the things we know are dependent on us, why should we then seek "refuge" in the view that our knowledge is limited to things we have recognized as (transcendently spoken) dependent on us?
Skepticism/StroudVsKant: is so painful precisely because it does not allow knowledge of independent things. Why should Kant's solution be less painful just because it is transcendental?
Empirical Idealism/KantVsStroud: cannot be true.
2. Question about the strength of the guarantee that Kant's transcendentalism exists:
This corresponds to the question why Kant rejects transcendental realism.
KantVsTranscendental Realism: would not be a correct explanation of our knowledge because - if it were true - we could never directly perceive things independent of ourselves and therefore could never be certain of their existence.
Transcendental realism thus opens the way for empirical idealism by perceiving external things as something separate from the senses.
Problem: we can then be aware of our representations, but we do not know if something existing corresponds to them!
StroudVsKant: he rejects these attitudes for the only reason for which transcendental explanations can be rejected at all: that they provide no explanation, how is it possible that we know something?
StroudVsKant: why does he think that empirical idealism paves the way for transcendental realism?
Probably because he believes that the only things we can directly perceive are the things that depend on us. And he does not assume this as an empirical thesis, but only as a transcendental one.
The sentence "everything we perceive is dependent on us" is true when understood transcendently.
Kant/Stroud: probably he assumes this because he does not understand how perception is possible without the perception of a "representation" or something "in us".
StroudVsKant: this is how the thesis of the "epistemic priority" appears here
again:
I 164
shifted from the empirical to the transcendental level. Perception/Kant/Stroud: he can only accept direct perception of independent things empirically spoken because he does not accept them transcendently spoken.
StroudVsKant: important: that this is the only point he rejects.
Kant: if we treat external things as things in themselves, it is impossible to understand how we can arrive at knowledge.
StroudVsKant: Suppose Kant were right that transcendental realism leaves our knowledge of external things unexplained.
Question: why is that alone sufficient to make our theory wrong, transcendentally speaking? Couldn't it simply be transcendentally true that things cannot be known?
Kant/Stroud: would say no, as he understands "transcendental" as following: transcendental knowledge is part of the explanation of our knowledge.
Direct Perception/Kant: is only possible of dependent things (representations etc.).
Transcendental Realism/Kant/Stroud: would then have to say that there are also independent things. Namely, those that correspond to these representations. But then we would be forced to conclude that all our representations (sensory experiences) would be inadequate to establish the reality of these things. (A 369). The outer things would then be separate from the things we are aware of.
StroudVsKant: the only problem of transcendental realism is that it prevents our explanation of "how knowledge is possible".
I 165
Problem: then there is no independent way to determine his truth or falsehood. The only test of his acceptability is whether he makes an explanation possible. Transcendental Aesthetics/Transcendental Idealism/Kant/Stroud: Transcendental idealism is integrated into transcendental aesthetics: (A 378), independent of these consequences.
StroudVsKant: but it is not bound differently than transcendental or a priori as an a priori condition of an investigation of the conditions of possibility of knowledge. And this is the only way how a transcendental theory can be founded at all: that it is the only possible explanation of our synthetically a priori possible knowledge in geometry and arithmetic.
Skepticism/StroudVsKant: so there is no independent possibility to justify a transcendental theory. ((s) than that it is the only explanation for something else). Then one has to ask whether skepticism has been refuted at all.
I 166
Skepticism/StroudVsKant: there are at least two ways in which an explanation of our knowledge of the outer world can fail: If skepticism were true; Kant claims to have at least empirically refuted this, but only by putting in place a transcendental version of the same description.
Understanding/StroudVsKant: if we understand transcendentalism (transcendental use of our words) at all, this use is not satisfactory. It still represents knowledge as limited to what I understand to be dependent on me.
I am once again a prisoner of my subjectivity.
Transcendental Idealism/StroudVsKant: is ultimately difficult to distinguish from skepticism.
I.e. not that it is the same as empirical idealism, but that it is unsatisfactory as an explanation, namely on the empirical level!
I 167
Transcendental Idealism/KantVsStroud/KantVsDescartes: Kant would say: "I won't lose anything if I accept it". My knowledge is not limited to the things that are empirically dependent or are only empirically subjective. I am theoretically able to deliver the best physics, chemistry and other sciences. I am in a better position than Descartes.
StroudVsKant: but then, according to Kant, all our scientific knowledge is still subjective or dependent on our human sensitivity.
I 168
Knowledge/Explanation/StroudVsKant: but we could also do without an explanation in another way: not because skepticism was true (and thus nothing could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be conclusively posed! (>Carnap, see below). Kant/Stroud: N.B.: pleads in a way for a limited ("deflationary") view that corresponds to this critique. ((s) deflationary here: not aimed at the most comprehensive framework, see below).
KantVsDescartes: if its question could be asked coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate.
StroudVsKant: but he does not explain what Descartes was concerned about.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Leibniz, G.W. Stegmüller Vs Leibniz, G.W. Stegmüller IV 388
Contingency/Leibniz: every thing is contingent, which is why it would not be so if another thing were different. All things are causally connected. The world is the totality of these things, which is why the world as a whole is also contingent!
World/Leibniz: it may well be that the series of causes is unlimited. Leibniz does not necessarily assume a temporal beginning!
Sufficient Reason/Leibniz: must then lie outside the world! It must be something else than the world!
IV 389
He must be a necessary being. VsLeibniz: 1. How do we know that everything needs a sufficient reason?
2. Can there be a necessary being that has a sufficient reason in itself?
If the second question is answered negatively, the totality has no sufficient reason!
KantVsLeibniz: the cosmological proof is implicitly based on the (refuted) ontological proof. (See KantVsDescartes).
IV 390
Existence/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: the view that the concept of existence is completely absorbed in the existence quantifier is controversial! Existence/Contingency/StegmüllerVsLeibniz: we could understand necessary existence as negation of contingency.
Problem: 1. the premise that the world as a whole is contingent (it would not exist if something else had been different) would have to be dropped: even if every part of the world is contingent, there is nothing to suggest that the world as a whole would not exist unless (sic?) something else was or would have been different.
The conclusion from the contingency of each part to the contingency of the whole is inadmissible.
Alternative 2: Contingency: something is contingent even if it could not exist.
IV 392
This must be combined with the above remark that it would not be logically impossible that the claimed necessary being could not exist either. But this is incomprehensible. Sufficient Reason/VsLeibniz: (ad (i)): how do we know that everything must have a sufficient reason? So far nobody has been able to show a necessity a priori for this. That would not have any plausibility either:
1. It is true that we are always looking for symmetries, but there is no guarantee that we will always find them.
2. We are always within our world, extrapolations are not allowed!
Even if now everything within the world had a sufficient reason, we would have no right to conclude on a sufficient reason outside the world.
Common argument: things must be comprehensible through and through.
MackieVs: that is not true at all!
IV 393
We have no reason to believe that the universe is oriented toward our intellectual needs.

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Skepticism Kant Vs Skepticism Stroud I 129
Skepticism/knowledge/KantVsDescartes: The relation between the philosophical question and our everyday or scientific knowledge is more indirect and complex than he thought. ((s) (see below): But for Kant the perception of external things is very direct). Descartes/Stroud: for him the skepticism is inevitable!
Kant: would agree. That is why he developed another concept.
"Scandal"/Kant: that a theory has never been developed in the history of philosophy that avoids skepticism.
Knowledge/theory/Kant/Stroud: there are conditions to be met by any theory of knowledge: the theory must not be deny that there are external things. Suppose there were no external world, then Descartes’ skepticism would loose its sting! Then there would be no limit to my knowledge that I know nothing about the things except me, because there would be nothing after all.
I 130
Def problematic idealism/Kant/Stroud: Thesis: that the world which is independent from us is unknowable. Or that the world is dubious or not reliable as other things that we know. That makes everything problematic. (B 274) KantVsIdealism: misinterprets our actual situation in the world.
Knowledge/Kant/Stroud: whoever reads the proof, must know at the end that the example is a goldfinch or actually three typographical errors.
Stroud: these are not really high standards. It seems that every access to knowledge needs to meet this standard.
Problem: virtually no philosophical theory satisfies this condition!
KantVsDescartes: (end of the 1. Meditation) does not meet this condition.
KantVsSkepticism: therefore, any inferential approach must be avoided to avoid it.
World/reality/Kant: the external things which we know need to have a "reality"((s) a particular property?) which does not allow to be inferred . (A 371). ((s) Kant here similar to Hume: direct perception of things)).
immediate perception/= Awareness/Kant/Stroud: there is then a sufficient proof of the things’ (of this kind)reality! ((s)> proof of existence). (A 371).
Stroud: so that we are in a daily situation where the (Kant), "external perception [provides] ... the direct evidence of something real in space". (A 375).
DescartesVsKant: could say that Kant is actually not capable.
Stroud: But this is not a matter which one of both gives the correct description of the situation.
KantVsDescartes: its description cannot be correct. But he is not just giving a competing alternative. He rather gives conditions for the access to knowledge.
I 132
At least such theories must take account of the traditional skepticism. E.g. if Descartes was right, we could not know anything about the outside world. That is the reason why Kant does not allow to infer knowledge of external things. Otherwise, skepticism is inevitable.
Stroud: So it requires precisely the kind of knowledge that Moore gives!
I 140
Def "Epistemic Priority"/terminology/Stroud: you could call Descartes’ thesis that sensory experience, perception, representations (which Descartes calls Ideas’) are epistemically placed before the perceived objects.
I 141
Stroud: that means that epistemically subordinated things cannot be known without epistemically antecedent things being known. And not the other way around. That means that the latter are less knowable, so the outer world is less knowable than our sensory experiences. KantVsDescartes/KantVsEpistemic priority: this view needs to be rejected since it cannot explain how knowledge is actually possible!
Perception/KantVsDescartes: we perceive things directly, without conclusion.
Stroud: we understand Kant only when we understand Descartes.
Realism/KantVsSkepticism/KantVsDescartes: these considerations which involve him are those which lead to the epistemic priority (priority of sensations (or "ideas") before the objects).
I 142
We need to understand this in order to understand Kant’s version of realism. (VsMoores simple realism). That means the realism which explains how it is possible that we know something of the world? (Conditions of the possibility of knowledge).
I 146
Knowledge/KantVsSkeptizismus/Stroud: when external perception (experience) is the condition for inner experience, and when external experience is immediate then we can know (in general) that there is an external reality which corresponds to our sensory experiences (sensations).
I 147
Then there may be deception in individual cases, but no general skeptical questioning. KantVsSkeptizismus/KantVsDescartes: cannot be extended to all, it can only appear in individual cases.
Perception/KantVsDescartes: N.B. if one could assume the skepticism at any rate, one would have to assume that our perception has come about not directly but indirectly, inferentially (via conclusion).
KantVsDescartes: this does not go far enough and relies too heavily on the "testimonies" of our everyday expressions.
I 148
Descartes should have examined the conditions that actually make experience possible. KantVsSkepticism: even the "inner experience" of Descartes are possible only if he firstly has outer experiences. Therefore, the skeptical conclusion violates the conditions of experience in general. Descartes position itself is impossible:
no examination of our knowledge could show that we always perceive something other than the independent objects, which we believe exist around us.
Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: Kant accepts at least the conditional force ((s)e.g. the premises) of the traditional skepticism.
KantVsDescates: But he rejects the skeptical conclusion: they contradict every adequate philosophical theory of knowledge.
Solution/Kant: what we know touches the phenomena.
KantVsSkepticism/Stroud: The antecedent of the skeptical conclusion can only be true if the consequent is false.
Knowledge/world/KantVsMoore/Stroud: Thus, he has a different understanding of the relationship between philosophical study of knowledge and the knowledge in daily life.
I 159
Science/reality/everyday/knowledge/KantVsDescartes/Stroud: our everyday and scientific knowledge is invulnerable to skepticism. KantVsMoore: But there is no conclusion of our perceptions of knowledge about unrelated things.

I 168
Knowledge/explanation/StroudVsKant: But we could not need an explanation: not because skepticism were true (and therefore there would be nothing that could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be provided conclusively! (> Skepticism/Carnap). Kant/Stroud: Important argument: advocates in a manner for a limited ("deflationary") perspective, which corresponds to this criticism. ((s) "deflationary": here: not directed at the most comprehensive framework).
KantVsDescartes: when his question could be provided coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate.
StroudVsKant: this does then not explain what Descartes was concerned about.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984