Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Attributive/referential | Donnellan | I 183 Def Referential/Donnellan: is supposed to enable the listener to single out the person the speaker is talking about. - E.g. "The killer of Schmidt is insane": in any case, the person who rioted in court, even if he is not the killer. - Here, empty descriptions do not fail. - ((s) The description may also be wrong, and still identify the person.) Attributive/Donnellan: "whoever it is": E.g. An absent murderer can be anyone, but definitely the murderer - ((s), the description must be apply). >Descriptions. I 191 Referential/Donnellan: Here it is probable that the speaker believes that the reference is satisfied. An incorrect description would mislead the listeners. Attributive/Donnellan: the same possibility of incorrect description does not exist here: "Whoever it is" cannot be described incorrectly, the speaker believes a disjunction: "him or him or him..." - attributively used descriptions may fail and yet express something true. E.g. "The House of Deputies (correctly House of Representatives) includes representatives of two parties" - No problem, if it is clear what the speaker means, you can correct him. >Meaning (Intending). I 195 Intent/Intention/Meaning/Donnellan: it's not about what someone wanted to say - otherwise you could take any description - nevertheless, the intention decides about referential or attributive use. I 199 Champagne Example/Donnellan: attributively no problem. I ~ 202 Referential/Donnellan: could also be called a weak reference: whatever - real reference: attributive. >Champagne example. I 202 Problem of the Statement/Donnellan: E.g. (Linsky): her husband is kind to her (in the café, but he is not her husband) - referentially true - attributive: if phi, then psi, but there is no phi, then it's not correct to say: he says of him... (de re) - but referential: he said correctly of the so described that he ... ((s) also de re!) - Kripke: precisely not like distinction de re/de dicto - E.g. If the described person is also the president of the college, it is true of the president that he is kind - referential: here the speaker does not even have to agree. Wolf I 18 Name/Description/Donnellan: a) referential use: the reference can succeed, even if the description is not true: E.g. The man in court is not the murderer, but he is correctly determined as the one who behaves wildly. b) attributive use: "whoever it was" applies if we have no specific person in mind. ((s)> role functional role: what ever it is.) >Roles, >Functional role. Chisholm II 109 Donnellan/referential/attributive/Brandl: can the distinction not be explained by the fact that in one instance reference is made by signs and in another instance by speakers? No, then the referential use would only have drawn attention to a problem of pragmatics. Then Russell could have simply expanded his theory pragmatically. Brandl: one can make the distinction referential/attributive even more pronounced if one applies it to precisely those signs with which the speaker makes it clear from the outset that he/she is not referring to a whole range of objects. Newen I 94 Referential/Predicative/Singular Terms/Identification/Name/Strawson: Thesis: Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referentially - descriptions: have at most predicative, i.e. descriptive, meaning (but can also refer simultaneously) Ad Newen I 94 Referential/(s): selecting an object - attributive/(s): attributing properties. Newen I 95 Attributive/Donnellan/(s): in the absence of the subject matter in question - referential/(s): in the presence of the subject matter in question Newen I 95 DonnellanVsRussell: he has overlooked the referential use. He only considers the attributive use, because... Descriptions/Russell: ...are syncategorematic expressions for him, which themselves cannot refer. >Syncategorematic. Newen I 96 Referential/description/KripkeVsDonnellan: the referential use of descriptions has absolutely nothing to do with the semantics of descriptions. Referential use is possible and communication can succeed with it, but it belongs to pragmatics. Pragmatics: examines what is meant (contextual). It does not examine the context-independent semantics. Solution/Kripke: to make a distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference. >Speaker reference, >Reference. Semantic meaning: is given by Russell's truth conditions: the murderer of Schmidt is insane iff the murderer of Schmidt is insane. >Truth conditions. |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Attributive/referential | Kripke | II 209 KripkeVsDonnellan: Donnellan's theory is correct, but does not refute Russell's (better, because more consistent) theory. The distinction referential/attributive has nothing to do with distinction de re/de dicto (Donnellan ditto). >de re, >de dicto. II 236f Referential/attributive/KripkeVsDonnellan: the distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference is needed anyway, it is sufficient instead of the distinction referential/attributive. E.g. the real husband is irrelevant. I might not have confused two people - I just believe that a person has a property that it lacks in reality. II 222 E.g. "Her husband is kind to her"/Linsky/Kripke: problem with the statement: is it true? The use cannot be analyzed here, only the meanings of the sentence. In the referential use it is unclear what is meant by "statement". >Donnellan. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| de dicto | Kripke | II 209 KripkeVsDonnellan: Donnellan's theory is correct, but does not refute Russell’s (better, because more consistent) theory. The distinction referential/attributive has nothing to do with distinction de re/de dicto (Donnellan ditto). >referential/attributive/Kripke, >Donnellan. II 216 Donnellan/Kripke: de dicto: can be neither attributive nor referential: the quote is not about an object (this is already found in Frege). Referential: cannot be de re, e.g. "The number of planets is odd": is attributive, i.e. not about this exact subject "whatever". "Necessarily odd": is just as attributive, e.g. "The murderer, no matter who, has committed the murder": is just as attributive, but de re. Indirect speech: is neither referential nor attributive. >Indirect speech, >de re, >Planets example. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Kripke | Nagel I 63 ff Meaning/Kripke/Nagel: problem: there is a gap between the normative and non-normative. Meaning implies the difference between right and wrong answers. Behavior, beliefs, dispositional or experience-based facts imply no such consequences. Therefore, these cannot consist in those. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference, >Reference/Kripke, >Semantic facts, >Norm, >Experience. --- McGinn I 117 ff McGinn: irreducibility theory: Kripke: intended sense should be an undefined fundamental part of the world while the semantic expressions in analytical terms are considered to be as fundamental as the basic concepts of geometry. Words and concepts are in a representational relationship to the world but it is impossible that an explanation would indicate what the relationship is and on what it depends on. It is a simple fact that we mean things as we do because we digest and kick them. --- II 210 Meaning/Russell/KripkeVsDonnellan: it is about the fact that something is the only thing that fulfils the designation "the φ-er "ψ-s: ""φ(x) ∧ (y)(φ(y) > y = x)". --- Stegmüller IV 50 Kripke’s Wittgenstein: not a fact: even an "omniscient" being could not know what we mean - there is no fact of meaning -> Non-factualism. Important argument: the skeptical problem is not epistemic, it is ontologic. Vs "best explanation": it would also falsely recognize the problem as epistemic. >Kripke's Wittgenstein, >Rule following, >Private language. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Speaker Meaning | Kripke | II 226 Meaning/to mean/Grice: there is a distinction between what the words of the speaker mean on a certain occasion and what he meant. Kripke: what words mean on a certain occasion is determined on this occasion by these conventions together with the intentions of the speaker and various factors of the context. >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference, >referential/attributive, >Context, >Meaning (Intending). II 230 Irony/Kripke: irony does not change the meaning, "a great friend" does not have a "quote-sign meaning", but is determined by the speech act. >Convention, >Speech act. II 237 KripkeVsDonnellan: English is not so ambiguous, e.g. ambiguous language: could confuse "der" and "ter" "der"/Kripke: a corresponding statement is true iff an object is the only one to satisfy it. "ter": here it is crucial what the speaker means. Conclusion: in English there can be a distinction: "ter" is probably rigid. >Rigidity. The speaker meaning in all possible worlds is always what the speaker believes. Then "Jones said ter man she married is nice to her" is actually not an appropriate representation. Therefore Donnellan says that in the referential case it is difficult to speak of a "statement" ("problem of statement"). |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Speaker Meaning | Searle | VI 179 Example: KripkeVsDonnellan: (similar to Searle): we need a differentiation between speaker reference/semantic reference: if the speaker is wrong, the semantic reference can go to something other than what he is talking about. >Speaker reference, >Referene, >Donnellan, >KripkeVsDonnellan. VI 179/180 Searle: but that is not quite correct: for example "The King"/"The Usurper": the speaker does not even have to think that the object fulfills the description. >Description. Kripke: in a given idiolect, the semantic reference (without indexical components) is determined by a general intention of the speaker. The speaker reference is determined by a specific intention. Semantic reference/speaker reference/Kripke: in the case of an error both can vary. Idiolect/Kripke: here the semantic relation is determined by a general intention, the speaker reference is determined by a specific intention of the speaker. >Idiolect. SearleVsKripke: if I have both general and specific intention, then I have no general statements with respect to descriptions. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Terminology | Kripke | I 125 Schmidentical/Schidentity: there is artificial identity between the subject and itself. Kripke: that is quite alright and useful. --- II 232f Russell Language/Kripke: the weak form of the Russell language: is like English. The only truth conditions by Russell are: the present king of France must exist in order for the sentence "The present king of France is bald" to be true. Medium form of Russell language: descriptions have Russell’s deep structure: there is exactly one... . Strong form of Russell language: has no descriptions, only there is exactly one... . Champagne e.g.: has the weak and medium form: here the speaker thinks (albeit erroneously) that the truth conditions are satisfied. Strong form: here the use could become the rule, because the definite article is prohibited. Since the phenomenon occurs in all three languages, there can be no argument that English is not a Russell language. --- Newen I 97 Russell Language/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: the Russell language contains only the attributive reading. (~ Homophone truth conditions). Contrast: D Language/Kripke: the D language includes a referential and attributive reading. KripkeVsDonnellan: e.g. "her husband is kind to her": here you need the referential and the attributive reading at the same time (not alternating). "He is nice, but he is not her husband". |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Donnellan, K. | Kripke Vs Donnellan, K. | Searle VI 179 KripkeVsDonnellan: (similar to Searle): Distinction spokesperson reference/semantic terms: if the speaker is wrong, the semantic relation may refer to somethings different than what he is talking about. VI 179/180 Searle: That is, however, not quite right: e.g. "King" / usurper: the speaker does not even need to have the opinion that the object fulfills the description. # Kripke: In a given idiolect the semantic relation (without indexical parts) is determined by a general intention of the speaker. The reference of the speaker is determined by a specific intention. SearleVsKripke: This is precisely where the approach gets stuck: In the sense that when I have general as well as specific intentions, I actually have no general intentions towards descriptions. If I needed it, I would have an infinite number of them. E.g. (without index): "The man who is eating a ham sandwich on the Empire State Building at 10 clock on June 6, 53." According to Kripke this is intended in my idiolect through my general intention. VI 181 Searle: I know what the term means, because I know what the case would need to be if it were correct to apply it. SearleVsKripke: Beyond that no general intentions are necessary. There are also an infinite number of cases in which I have no general intention. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Donnellan, K. | Newen Vs Donnellan, K. | NS I 96 Referential/Description/KripkeVsDonnellan: the referential use of descriptions has nothing to do with the semantics of descriptions! It is possible and with it communication can succeed, but it belongs to pragmatics (and is therefore dependent on context). But it is only parasitically to the attributive reading that exclusively indicates the actual meaning of descriptions correctly. NS I 97 Speaker Reference/KripkeVsDonnellan/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: instead of referential use of descriptions. What the speaker meant on one occasion. We also need the concept of the intended object. This may even differ from the actually referenced object! ((s) Unlike the Godel Schmidt example). On the other hand: Semantic Meaning/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: is only specified correctly by Russell's truth conditions (tr.cond.): E.g. Schmidt's killer is insane iff. the killer of Schmidt is insane. Russell Language/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: only contains the attributive interpretation. On the other hand: D-Language/Kripke: contains referential and attributive interpretation. Russell Language: Russell's truth conditions NS I 98 Referential/Deception/Russell Language: there is also a referential use here, but only if someone erroneously thinks that he refers to someone in particular. He is mistaken to believe that Russell's truth conditions are fulfilled. The speaker only says pragmatically and not semantically that the predicate is satisfied. D-Language/Kripke: E.g. in the cafe: "Her husband is kind to her." difference: a) "No, he is not kind, but this is not her husband." b) "He (this one!) is kind to her, but he is not her husband." ((s) twice "he"). D-Language/Kripke: although the D-language can handle b) (it would say that this is the referential interpretation), a) is difficult to explain, because here the description would have to be used both referentially and attributively at the same time. NS I 99 KripkeVsDonnellan: if both interpretations are embedded in the semantics, we must assume, therefore, that e.g. "her husband" had two meanings simultaneously here. Newen/Schrenk: but there are new approaches that allow for both. Pragmatics/Semantics/Newen/Schrenk: their border demarcation is controversial. VsKripke: the referential use is still common. Thus pragmatics moves closer in the vicinity of semantics again. Neale, Stephen/Newen/Schrenk: ("Descriptions") pro Russell semantics ((s) meaning through homophonic truth conditions). |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Geach, P. | Donnellan Vs Geach, P. | I 246 Anaphora/DonnellanVsPeach: Pronouns can pick up a reference again. This questions the view that makes the speaker reference to a non-semantic concept. KripkeVs: Why? "He", "she", "it" can certainly refer to something catchy. Physical distinction is enough. I 247 KripkeVsDonnellan: his distinction is not itself a semantic one. |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Searle Vs Kripke, S. A. | Wolf II 30 Names/Understanding/Searle: to understanding belongs the knowledge of one or more descriptions. Extreme case: simply identify the object. Intentional relationship. SearleVsKripke: ignores the intentionality. Searle: Use of names is "mental reference" in a network of other intentional states and against a background of practice and pre-intentional assumptions. Searle II 292 SearleVsKripke: the representation of the baptism is completely descriptive. It gives us either an intentional content in spoken form (description) or provides us ostensively with the intentional content of a perception. II 293 By the way Kripke's theory does not use any causal link between the referring use of names and the named objects. The causal chains are not pure, every speaker must also have a intentionalistic member and intend to talk about the object. SearleVsKripke: Baptism should probably not be a cause, otherwise we would declare a successful reference to a chain of successful references. That would be circular. II 294 Names/Donnellan:(similar to Kripke) postulates a "historically correct explanation", and secondly, "who that is, from whom" the speaker wants to predicate something. This requires an omniscient observer. E.g. "Socrates had a snub nose". According to Donnellan owes this obviously no fact at all, which is about us, except for the causal chain. But for what keeps the omniscient observer looking for? Searle: surely for intentional causation and content. There are always counterexamples of names that do not work this way at all. II 295 Names/Rorty: Causal theory only needs "ordinary physical causation". Names/Gareth Evans: E.g. Madagascar originally referred to a part of continental Africa. The causal chain is thus a dissenting. Why does the name then today refer to the island? II 296 Names/description/SearleVsKripke: E.g. Concise Biographical Dictionary ". Ramses VIII is a Pharaoh of a series of pharaohs in ancient times, about whom nothing is known." In reality, the example shows that a lot of him is known. Yes, he is almost from an ideal case for the most naive version of the description theory. II 346 A perfect identifying description. It is parasitic to other speakers, but it is sufficient. SearleVsCausal theory/VsKripke: it exaggerates the analogy between reference and perception. Perception: is nailed to each point of the world. By causal self-referentiality of the intentional content. II 297 But with names that kind of causation does not exist (also of intentional causation). The conditions for successful use of a name can be met, even without causal connection. II 298 E.g. tribe with the taboo of talking about the dead, and baptism of newborn babies, in which all must participate. Meets descriptive theory. II 346 The teaching of names defines an intentional content, but no definition. II 300 E.g. meteorologists can predict storms. They also assign names. But the future events cannot cause the name uses. Searle IV 179 KripkeVsDonnellan: (similar to Searle): Distinction speaker reference/semantic terms: if the speaker is wrong, the semantic relation can go to something other than that of which he speaks. IV 179/180 Searle: However, that is not quite correct: E.g. "King" / usurper: the speaker does not even need to have the opinion that the object fulfils the description. Kripke: in a given idiolect the semantic relation is determined (without indexical shares) through a general intention of the speaker. The speaker reference is determined by a specific intention. SearleVsKripke: this is precisely where the approach is stuck: in the sense, as I have general and specific intentions, I have no general intentions towards descriptions. If I needed it, I would have an infinite number of them. E.g.(without index): "The man who eating a ham sandwich on the Empire State Building on 17/06/53 at 10 am." According to Kripke in my idiolect this is determined by my general intention. IV 181 Searle: I know what the term means, because I know what the case would be if it would be correct to apply it. SearleVsKripke: More than that, no general intentions are necessary. There are an infinite number of cases in which I have no general intent. Stalnaker I 173 SearleVsKripke: (Searle 1969 (1)) it is wrong to assume that there could be a class of logically proper names, that means names that consist solely to have a certain reference for an object. It is fundamentally wrong to assume that there are signs that have only denotation without connotation I 174 SearleVsKripke/Stalnaker: (Searle 1969(2)) (like Frege): describes an axiom of identification: "a generalization of Frege's dictum that every referring expression must have a sense". I 175 And it was also an attempt to say what the skills of the speaker are. Mill/Kripke/Stalnaker: do not seem to answer that. Competence/skills/FregeVsMill/Stalnaker: Mill does not explain the speaker's skill to pick his object. Stalnaker: but that can only be reviewed seriously, if the two issues are separated (see above). 1. J. Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge 1969, p. 93 2. Ibid. p. 80 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Russell, B. | Donnellan Vs Russell, B. | I 18/19 DonnellanVsRussell: has not grasped the referential use, but placed it in a strange construct of "logically proper names". DonnellanVsStrawson: does not see the difference ref/att correctly and mixes the two. Referential/Attributive/Donnellan: varies even when it comes to the importance of the distinction: 1) Text: only pragmatic distinction, 2) later: "semantic significance". KripkeVsDonnellan: denies semantic ambiguity of the use of descriptions. Both can be grasped with the Russell’s analysis: sentences of the form "The F which is G is H" have the same truth conditions, they are true, if the only F that fulfils G is actually H. I 193 DonnellanVsRussell: his strict implication works at most with attributive use. (But he does note make the distinction). I 194 Def Description/Russell: affects an entity which only it fulfills. Donnellan: that is certainly applicable to both uses(!). Ref/Att/Donnellan: if both are not distinguished, the danger is that it must be assumed that the speaker would have to refer to something without knowing it. E.g. "Presidential candidate": we had no idea that it would be Goldwater. Nevertheless, "presidential candidate" would absurdly refer to Goldwater. Solution: DonnellanVsRussell: attributive use. I 205 Logical Proper Names/"This"/Russell: refer to something without attributing properties! (Donnellan pro) Donnellan: It could eb said that they refer to the thing itself, not to the thing under the condition that it has any special properties. DonnellanVsRussell: he believed that this is something that a description cannot do. But it does work with referential use. I 275 Theory of Descriptions/Reference/Existence/Russell/Donnellan: Attributed to himself as a merit to explain the reference to non-existent things without the need to bring the idea of non-existent references of singular terms into play. His fully developed theory of singular terms extended this to the of proper names. Philosophy of logical atomism: names as covert descriptions. I 275/276 Here, the theory "proper names in the strict logical sense" was introduced, which is rarely found in everyday speech. ((s) logical proper names: "this", etc.) DonnellanVsRussell: we want to try to make Russell’s attempt at a solution (which has not failed) redundant with the "historic explanation". (> like ZinK). I 281 Logical Proper Names/DonellanVsRussell: have no place in a correct theory of reference. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: Russell’s view is incorrect in terms of common singular terms: it is not true that common proper names always have a descriptive content. Question: does this mean that ordinary singular terms might be able to fulfill the function which according to Russell only logical proper names can have?. I 283 Descriptions/DonellanVsRussell: it seems absurd to deny that in E.g. Waverley that what is described by the description, i.e. Scott, is not "part" of the expressed proposition. Russell: was of the opinion that such statements are not really statements about the described or the reference of the name, that they do not really name the described thing! Only logical proper names could accomplish the feat of actually mentioning a certain particular. "About"/Reference/DonnellanVsRussell: Putting great emphasis on concepts such as "about" would lead us into marshy terrain. We should require no definition of "about"!. It would be a delicate task to show that such a statement is either not a statement in any sense of "about" about the described thing or that there is a clear sense of "about" by it being not. I 285/286 DonnellanVsRussell: For his theory he paid the price of giving up the natural use of singular terms. RussellVsVs: but with the "natural conception" we end up at the Meinong population explosion. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: according to my theory names are no hidden descriptions. E.g. "Homer" is not an abbreviation for "The author of the Homeric poems". I 209 DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Question: Does he refute Russell? No, in itself not! For methodological considerations, Russell’s theory is better than many thought. Nevertheless, it will probably fail in the end. I 222 Statement/Donnellan/VsRussell/Kripke: It’s not so clear that Donnellan refutes Russell. E.g. "Her husband is kind to her": had Donnellan flatly asserted that this is true iff. the lover is nice, without regard to the niceness of the husband (is perhaps also nice), he would have started a dispute with Russell. But he does not assert this! If we now asked "Is the statement is true?", Donnellan would elude us. Because if description is used referentially, it is unclear what is meant by "statement". If the statement is to be that the husband is nice, the problem is: to decide whether ref. or att. Referential: in this case, we would repeat the speech act wrongly, Attributive: we ourselves would be referring to someone, and we can only do that if we ourselves believe that it is the husband. I 232 DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Are the two really conflicting? I propose a test: Test: if you consider whether a particular linguistic phenomenon in English is a counterexample to an analysis, you should consider a hypothetical language that is similar to English, except that here the analysis is assumed to be correct. If the phenomenon in question also appears in the corresponding (hypothetical) community, the fact that it occurs in English cannot refute the hypothesis that the analysis for English is correct!. DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Test: would the phenomenon ref/att occur in different languages?. I 234 E.g. Sparkling Wine: speakers of the weaker and middle languages think (albeit erroneously) that the truth conditions are fulfilled. Weak: here, the apparatus seems to be entirely adequate. The semantic reference is the only object. Our intuitions are fully explained. Strong: Here, the phenomenon may occur as well. Even ironic use may be clear if the affected person drinks soda. I 235 These uses would become more common in the strong language (which is not English, of course), because the definite article is prohibited. This leads to an expansion of the speaker reference: If the speaker thinks an item to be fulfilling (Ex)(φ x u ψx), it is the speaker reference, then it may indeed be fulfilling or not. Middle: if speaker reference is applicable in the strong one, it is just as easily transferred to the middle one, because the speaker reference of "ψ(ixφ(x)" is then the thing that the speaker has in mind, which is the only one to fulfill φ(x) and about which he wants to announce that it ψ-s. Conclusion: because the phenomenon occurs in all languages, the fact that it occurs in English can be no argument that English is not a Russell language. Newen/Schrenk I 95 Def Attributive/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the view of the body of Schmidt ((s) In the absence of the person in question, no matter whether it is them or not, "Whoever ...".). Def referential/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the face of a wild rampaging man at court - while Schmidt comes through the door - ((s) in view of the man in question, no matter whether it’s him or not. "This one, whatever he did..."). |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| referential/attributive | Kripke, S.A. | Wolf I /Kri II 208 KripkeVsDonnellan: he seems to think that the discussed phenomena (distinction referential/attributive) are incompatible with the suggestion that speaker-reference is a pragmatic term. Kripke thesis: exactly these phenomena even support this proposal! Wolf I / Kri II 231 Kripke thesis Donnellan's distinction referential/attributive generalized: a speaker may believe in a situation for one of two reasons that his specific intention coincides with his general intention: a) "simple" case: his specific intention is to refer to the semantic speaker. (by definition), this is Donnellan's attributive use) b) "complex" case: the intentions are different, but the speaker believes that they refer to the same subject. (referential) VsDonnellan: the referential must not be understood as a proper name because the distinction simple/complex is equally applicable to descriptions and names. |
K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
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