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Actions | Frith | I 99 Action/consciousness/Daniel Wegner/Frith: Thesis: we have no direct knowledge that we are the originators of our actions. >Knowledge, >Intentionality, >Intentions. I 100 E.g. There is a second test partner, who actually works with the experimental director, and who moves the mouse in a computer test almost in unison to you, but sometimes not, or with time delay. N.B.: then you will think you are the one who moves the mouse (or cursor). This is also true vice versa. I 102 Action/Frith: for example, a person on a treadmill should perform various responses to changes in the resistance or the speed increase, e.g. maintaining the energy, the tempo, etc. N.B.: the people changed their way of walking several seconds before they had noticed the change in the resistance of the treadmill! I 202 Originator/action/movement/foreign psychological/sovereignty/Frith: something that is as private as pain is the experience that we are the originators of our actions. >Authorship, >Libet experiment. Cause/effect/Frith: cause and effect are connected here to units, as, for exampe, color, form and movement are connected to form objects. Object/thing/Frith: thesis: the object arises from a combination of form, color and movement. I 252 Action/freedom/freedom of will/Frith: why does my brain make me feel like a free acting being? Thesis: it is beneficial for us to feel like free actors. Why this is the case, I can only answer very speculatively: I 253 It has to do with altruism. Altruism/Frith: altruism is one of the most difficult problems in evolutionary biology. J. B. S. Haldane: "I would sacrifice my life for two brothers or eight cousins." Def Dictator Game/Frith: e.g. a player gets a hundred dollars and can decide how much of it he/she gives to another player, which he/she does not know and of which he/she knows that this person will never meet him/her again. Most people give about $30. Def Ultimatum Game/Frith: here the other players can influence the result: if the one rejects the offer, both will leave with empty hands. If a player gives less than 30 dollars, he is usually punished by the other players. Thesis: we have a strong sense of fairness. >Fairness, >Ultimatum game. Def altruistic punishment/Frith: sometimes we even pay to punish someone else, e.g. free riders. With them we have no compassion. Our brain rewards us for the punishment of free riders. >Free rider. Def 2n level free rider/Frith: free riders are people who rely on others carrying out the punishment and never do it themselves. Freedom/freedom of will/Frith: freedom is a consequence of the fact that we are experiencing ourselves as free actors, that we also assume this of other people. >Intersubjectivity. Child: differs between intentional and unintentional action already at the age of three years. >Stages of development. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
Brain/Brain State | Chalmers | I XI Brain/Chalmers: how could a physical system such as a brain also be an experiencer? Why should there be something like how it is to be such a system? >Experience, >Knowledge how, >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 115 Brain/Neurobiology/Neurophysiology/Awareness/Explanation/Chalmers: There are approaches by Francis Crick and Christof Koch (1990) (1) on 40 Hertz oscillation... I 116 ...and by Gerald Edelman (1989) (2) who explain the phenomenal side of consciousness just as little as cognitive models. >Cognition/Chalmers. I 238 Brain state/Chalmers: what are the physical correlations to conscious experiences? Crick and Koch (1990): Thesis: 40 Hertz oscillations in the cortex are the neural correlates of the experience. Baars (1988) (3): thesis: a global "work space" is the basis for information processing of experiences in which the contents correspond directly to the contents of the work space. Farah (1994) (4) Thesis: Consciousness is associated with high-quality representations in the brain. Libet (1993) (5) Thesis: Consciousness is associated with neuronal activities that last long enough, with the minimum duration being about 500 milliseconds. 1. F. H. C. Crick and C. Koch, Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Seminars in the Neurosciences 2, 1990: pp. 263-75 2. G. Edelman, The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness. New York 1989. 3. B. J. Baars, A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness, Cambridge 1988 4. M. Farah, Visual perception and visual awareness after brain damage. In: C. Umilta and M. Moscovitch (Eds) Conscious and Nonconsious Information Processing: Attention and Performance 15, Cambridge 1994 5. B. Libet, The neural time factor in conscious and unconscious events. IN: Experimental and Theoretical studies of Consciousness. Ciba Foundation Symposium 174. New York 1993. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
Conditional | Jackson | Lewis V 153 Conditional/Grice/Lewis: if P (A > C) is high because P (A) is low (> ex falso quodlibet), what is then the meaning of "If A, then B"? Why should one not say the strongest: that it is almost as likely as not A? JacksonVsGrice/JacksonVsLewis: we often claim things that are much weaker than we could actually claim, and this for a good reason. I assume that your belief system is similar to mine, but not completely equal. E.g. Suppose you know something what seems to me very unlikely today, but I would like to say something useful anyway. So I say something weaker, so you can take me at any rate at the word. >Assertions, >Stronger/weaker. --- Lewis V 153 Definition robust/Jackson/Lewis: A is robust in relation to B, (with respect to one's subjective probability at a time) iff. the probability of A and the probability of A conditionally to B are close, and both are high,... >Probability, >Subjective probability, >Objective probability. --- V 154 ...so if one learns that B still considers A to be probable. Jackson: the weaker can then be more robust in terms of something that you think is more unlikely, but still do not want to ignore. If it is useless to say the weaker, how useless it is then to assert the weaker and the stronger together! And yet we do it! E.g. Lewis: "Bruce sleeps in the clothes box or elsewhere on the ground floor". Jackson: Explanation: it has the purpose to assert the stronger and the same purpose to assert the more robust. If both are different, we assert both. Robustness/indicative conditional/Lewis: an indicative conditional is a truth-functional conditional, which conventionally implies robustness with respect to the antecedent (conventional implicature). Therefore the probability P (A > C) and P (A > C) must both be high. This is the reason why the assertiveness of the indicative conditional is associated with the corresponding conditional probability. >Conditional probability, >Conditionals, >Truth functions. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
Dispositions | Schurz | I 102 Dispositional terms/Disposition/Schurz: It is impossible to trace dispositional terms completely to observational terms by extensional definitions. >Observation, >Observation sentences, >Extension, >Extensionality. I 103 Carnap's paradox/problem: if circumstances do not occur at all, implication is true because of EFQ. >EFQ = ex falso quodlibet. Solution/Carnap: bilateral reduction theorem: "given, the circumstances are met..." >Reduction. Law-like implication/notation/Schurz: >g: Is intended to exclude merely accidental circumstances. Is equivalent to counterfactual conditionals. Solution for: "If this diamond never comes into contact with water, it will dissolve in water." Correct: If it came into contact with water, it would dissolve. Law-like implication/(s): is intensional. >Implication. Dispositional term /Schurz: is a functional feature. Theoretical term /Schurz: is a structural feature. Structural feature: is cause of many dispositions, but not identical with them. I 104 Semantic: dispositional terms are defined by a single law-like regularity (regularity). Theoretical terms/semantic: TT, on the other hand, express themselves in many law-like regularities. >Theoretical terms. Disposition/Quine: should be identified with causative microstructure. >Microstructure. SchurzVsQuine: different structural features can produce the same disposition. E.g. Assume an extraterrestrial water soluble substance. E.g. Elasticity of metal is caused by different microstructure than that of rubber. Problem: Water solubility of sugar would then be different water solubility than that of the alien substance. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
Ex falso quodlibet/EFQ | Classical Economics | ||
Ex falso quodlibet/EFQ | Logic Texts | Sainsbury V 200 EFQ/ex falso quodlibet/Sainsbury : this is no problem at all for the classical logician, because no contradiction is true! Even if the arguments are classically valid, they are not conclusive. We could never use them to deduce anything because we could never prove the premises. As soon as even one true contradiction is allowed, the absurd consequence would be that all statements are true. >Implication, >Paradox of implication, >Strict implication. Dialethism: The dialethists therefore reject the classical rule of inference. >Dialethism. It is surprising how little is lost by this modification of classical logic. EFQ/Classical Logic: an argument whose premises contain a contradiction is an argument whose premises cannot all be true, and thus one that excludes the possibility that the argument leads from truth to falsity. EFQ/Dialethism: does not assume that a contradiction cannot be true and therefore is not forced to consider that every conclusion with a contradiction is valid under the premises. >Contradiction, >Dialethism, >Bivalence. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
Free Will | Frith | I 85 Libet/Experiment/Frith: (1983)(1): e.g. raising a finger when one feels the desire to do so. The brain activity was measured with an EEG. It was already known that there was an activity before the spontaneous movement (standby potential). The activity can arise up to one second before the lifting of the finger. New: Libet: the people should remember the moment when they felt the desire. I 86 This point of time they could read on a special clock. The experiment was repeated and confirmed with different clocks. Desire: occurred about 200 msec before the actual lifting of the finger. N.B.: the characteristic change in brain activity, the standby potential occurred approximately 500 msec before actual lifting. Interpretation: does the experiment show that we have no free will? Problem: the alternatives are extremely trivial. I 87 Freedom of Will/Frith: the experiment does not show that we do not have free will, but that we are not aware of having made the choice at an earlier point of time. >Consciousness, >Decisions, >Will. I 204 Libet/experiment/experiments/time/clock/Frith: Variant: reacting to a tone with pressing a button. The clock to be observed was a special dial on a computer screen. N.B.: the "mental" and the physical time did not agree. In your head pressing the button occurs a bit later and the sound of the bell occurs somewhat earlier. Mental time/Frith: here the components of the action are connected. >Time, >Time perception, >Subjectivity. I 205 Variant: the finger twitch is triggered from the outside by a magnetic pulse. Then you do not feel like you are the originator. >Authorship. I 206 Action: the finger-twitch is no action then. The brain no longer connects the sound and the twitching. >Actions, >Behavior. Mental time: is here pulled apart. N.B.: by doing this, the brain realizes that you are not the originator. >Brain, >Brain states, >Brain/Frith. I 249 Libet/experiment/freedom/freedom of will/will/Frith: the instruction to behave self-determined leads to an illusory freedom. Instead we play a complex game with the experimenter. >Experiments, >Method. 1. B Libet, C A Gleason, E W Wright, D K Pearl (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain Sep;106 (Pt 3):623-42. doi: 10.1093/brain/106.3.623. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
Implication Paradox | Logic Texts | Hoyningen-Huene II 117 Problem: Ex falso quodlibet: According to classical logic, anything can be deduced from a false premise. >ex falso quodlibet/EFQ. Hoyningen-Huene II 118 Here opinions differ. Problem: if there is no transfer of truth. Premises and conclusions are [sometimes] completely independent of each other. II 119 According to the argumentation with truth transfer, [such] conclusions are incorrect. Possible solution: Strengthening by the aspect of relevance: II 123 "Strict implication." [An inference] is incorrect because nothing can be inferred from A u ~A. Caution: A u ~A could now be reformulated as A u B! (~A = B) Here the (actually not forbidden) substitution destroys the characteristic. >Strict implication, >Relevance. II 127 Although it is incorrect for the case B = ~A, it can be useful to deduce A from A u B without scruples, even if one does not know whether B = ~A. II 128 The classical propositional logic proves to be possibly inadequate here. >Propositional logic. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 |
Impossible World | Logic Texts | Read III 113 Impossible world/contradictory conditional sentences/Stalnaker/Read: (not counterfactual, here the front link is impossibly true). Solution: Impossible world, where every statement is true. ((s) Then A and not-A ist true at the same time.) Then the contradictory conditional sentences are also all true. Lewis: they are true in an empty way. Read: Worlds (or theories) are concluded with logical consequence. - Then there is only one impossible world. Problem/Read: if we reject EFQ, we need a range of worlds that are both possible and impossible. >EFQ/ex falso quodlibet, >Possible world. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
Logic | Logic Texts | Hoyningen-Huene II 148f Relation of logic to reality: A: No one can read this book in three days. B: A hard-working student can read this book in three days. Whether there are hard-working students is something that cannot be captured with the statement logic. The inconsistency of the example can only be detected with the predicate logic. Other inconsistencies cannot be captured by the means of logic at all: A: Hans is a giant. - B: Hans is a dwarf. --- Read III 62f Difference compact/non-compact: classical logic is a logic of the 1st level. A categorical set of axioms for arithmetic must be a second-level logic. (Quantifiers also for properties). >Second order logic. Logic first order/second order are not to be distinguished syntactically, but semantically! E.g. Napoleon has all properties of an emperor: are not syntactically to be distinguished, whether logic 1st or 2nd level. III 70ff VsClassical Logic: This reduction, of course, fails. For "nothing is round and square" is necessarily true, but its non-logical components cannot be interpreted in any way that makes this statement false. Allowing variable areas of definition for classical representation was a catastrophe. The modality has returned. We can make a substitution, but we cannot really change the range. >Range, >Modality. If an object is round, it follows that it is not square. But this conclusion is not valid thanks to the form, but thanks to the content. III 79 It was a mistake to express the truth-preservation criterion as "it is impossible that the premisses are true and the conclusion false". Because it is not so obvious that there is a need to conclude from A to B. Provided he is cowardly, it follows that he is either cowardly or - what one wants. But simply from the fact that he is cowardly does not follow that if he is not cowardly - what one wants. >EFQ/ex falso quodlibet. III 151 Logic 1st order: individuals, 2nd order: variables for predicates, distribution of the predicates by quantifiers. 1st level allows restricted vocabulary of the 2nd level: existence and universal quantifier! >Existential quantification, >Universal quantification, >Existence predicate, >Existence. III 161 Free logic: no existence assumptions - no conclusion from the absence of the truth value to falsehood - global evaluation. >Truth value, >Truth value gaps, >Truth value agglomeration, >Valuation. --- Menne I 26 Justification of Logic/Menne: the so-called logical principles of identity, of consistency, and the excluded middle are not sufficient to derive the logic. In addition, ten theorems and rules of the propositional logic are needed, just to derive the syllogistic exactly. These axioms do not represent obvious ontological principles. Kant: transcendental justification of logic. It must be valid a priori. >Logic/Kant. Menne I 28 The justification from the language: oversees that there is no explicit logic at all if the language itself already contained logic. Precisely because language does not always proceed logically, the logic is needed for the standardization of language. Menne: there must be a recursive procedure for justification. >Justification, >Recursion. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Me I A. Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1997 |
Other Minds | Frith | I, 15ff Foreign psychological/Frith: the brain creates the illusion that the world of thought is isolated and private. The brain conceals from ourselves the unconscious conclusions it draws. Culture: culture has influenced the functioning of the brain. >Brain, >Brain states, >Brain/Frith, >Thoughts, >Thinking, >World/thinking. Culture: culture has influenced the way the brain works. >Culture. I 199 Empathy/foreign psychological/imitation/Frith: thesis: imitation opens the access to the private thought-world of others. Pain/Frith: we learn something about the pain of another by observing what he/she is doing and listening to what he/she says. >Pain, >Pain/Wittgenstein, >Intersubjectivity. Pain Matrix: are certain regions in the brain that become active when someone suffers. N.B.: therefore the physiological correlates of this experience are by no means private. Pain/N.B.: the subjective experience is not directly linked to the physical nature of the pain stimulus. A red-hot iron bar feels less painful when one is distracted. Placebos: can also alleviate the feeling of pain when the person merely assumes that they do alleviate the pain. Brain/pain: some regions correspond to the physical temperature of the iron bar, others with the subjective pain sensation. I 200 Foreign psychological/empathy: when we observe that someone is suffering pain, the same brain regions become active as if we have pain. I 201 Foreign psychological/pain/Frith: we construct mental models based on the stimuli that we would have ourselves. Because we are developing thought models of the physical world, we can share our experience in the mental world. I 202 Originator/action/movement/foreign psychological/sovereignty/Frith: something that is as private as pain: the experience that we are the originators of our actions. >Authorship, >First Person, >Actions, >Subject, cf. >Libet experiment. Cause/effect/Frith:cause and effect are connected here to units, as e.g. color, form and movement are connected to form objects. >Cause, >Effect. Object/thing/Frith: thesis: the object arises from a combination of form, color and movement. >Objects. I 208 Foreign psychological/Frith: precisely because we are not directly connected with the physical world, not even with the world of our body, we can enter the mental world of others. But there are problems because our image of the world is a fantasy image: Def "Supported Communication"/Frith: people with severe disability can communicate through an assistant. In tests, it can be found that it is the moderator who answers the questions. Until this is pointed out, he/she does not know this! The moderator is deceived about the origin. I 238 Foreign psychological/"thought reading"/Frith: it is possible to determine quite directly what is going on in the mind of another person, e.g. in a video of someone who lifts a box: one can see if it is heavier or lighter than what was the person told in the video before. So one can recognize wrong ideas in someone else. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
Premises | Genz | II 322 Ex falso quodlibet/EFQ/Genz: Ex falso quodlibet (EFQ) can be used for false "proof": E.g."If 2+2=5, then 2+3=6." EFQ/Genz: EFQ is correct because the conclusion is maintained if we take away the false premise. This is because it does not depend on the validity or invalidity of the premise. >Validity. Premise/Genz: the premise does not have to be made the basis of its conclusion, but it can be made the basis. >Consequence, >Conclusion, >Logic, >Implication, >Paradox of implication. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
Subjects | Frith | I 245 Action/subject/freedom of will/Frith: the ultimate illusion that our brain creates is that we are independent actors with an independent world of thought. >Actions, >I, >Self, cf. >Libet experiment. I 246 I/self/Frith: thesis: the "I" is created by my brain. >Brain, >Brain states, >Brain/Frith. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
Truth Value Gaps | Quine | I 307 Truth Value Gap/Non-existence/Quine: We interpreted "exists" as (Ex)(y=x) which applies to everything just like "x=x". But also with this procedure anomalies result. It seems strange that "Pegasus exists" should be wrong if "(x)(x exists)" is true and "Pegasus" takes a purely descriptive position. Something is wrong if Pegasus is granted the purely descriptive position. >Descriptive position. I 308 The sense should be that the term concerned is used exclusively to indicate an object about which the rest of the sentence can say something. We can call this "truth value gaps" (the expression comes from Strawson). With open sentences we have not been disturbed by the fact that they have no truth value, but they can already be recognized by the way they are written. Here the gaps are disturbing precisely because they are not recognizable. Perhaps best with trivalent logic ("undecidable")? QuineVs: one does not assume that the difficulties come from a pedantic distinction between what is true and what is neither true nor false. If one were to summarize both categories under the rubric of the false, nothing would be gained. For they are distinguished from one another by the fact that one category contains the negations of all their elements, while the other does not contain a single negation of their elements. I 318 Singular descriptions "the", e.g. "the setting of the sun" Iota operator "i" (inverted, without dot) (ix)(...x...) "This x, for that applies" Here no synonymy is claimed by additional information (as in § 33). The logical theory made possible by the canonical framework treats ambiguous terms and indicator words as if they had fixed objects of reference. I 319 Let us now compare the identity statement "y = (ix)(...x...)" with the quantification: (1) (x)(...x...if and only if x = y) can be read briefly as "...y...and exclusively y". If either (1) or the reformulation applies to an object y, both are probably true. Nevertheless, both may differ in their conditions of falsity with respect to truth values! Because one can understand these gaps in such a way that "y = (ix)(...x...)" in relation to each object y has no truth value, if it applies to none, while "...y....and exclusively y" is simply wrong in relation to any object, if it doesn't apply to any. So we can simply put our aversion to gaps into action and equate "y = (ix)( ...x...) with "...y... and exclusively y" and accordingly fill the truth value gaps of "y = (ix)(...x..)" with the truth value incorrectly. This step enables us to make the singular identifications disappear at all. I 327 Definition/singular terms/truth value gaps/Quine: if we interpret definitions as instructions for the transformation of singular terms, we can avoid the annoyance of truth value gaps: I 328 The definition of the singular descriptions is then simple as follows: Def Singular Description: Write "y = (ix)(...x...)" and "(ix)(...x...) exists" as notation variants of "...y...and exclusively y." And with recourse to §37: Write "(ix)(...x...) " as abbreviation of (7) (Ey)[y = (ix)(...x...) and y ], (In this representation, we have " y " as any open sentence.) If we apply the three parts of the above definition successively and repeatedly, they are sufficient to make "(ix)(...x...)" accessible again to any position where free variables may occur. I 389/90 Conditional: the indicative conditional is unproblematic. In unquantified form "if p then q" it is perhaps best expressed as containing a truth value gap (§ 37) if its antecedence is false.(See also EFQ (ex falso quodlibet): ex falso quodlibet). I 449 In the case of the indicative conditional, the initial problems are the truth value gaps and the ambiguity of the truth conditions. They are solved by being able to dispense with the indicative conditional in favor of a truth function. I 447 StrawsonVsRussell: Strawson has misnamed Russell's theory of descriptions because of their treatment of truth value gaps. III 282 Truth Value Gap/Quine: comes from everyday language, in logic we have to fill it. And be it arbitrary. Every sentence should have a truth value (true or false). >Everyday language. XI 39 Canonical Notation/Quine/Lauener: closes truth value gaps. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Truth Values | Dummett | I 11 f Def Truth Value/Frege/Dummett: of the sentence: the reference - the (Fregean) " Bedeutung" ("meaning") of the sentence. I 20f Dummett: E.g. assuming the condition for true/Fals would be stated, but the two truth values were only marked with A and B, then it would be impossible to figure out which one, A or B, stood for t. One would have to recognize at least in a sample sentence what weight the speakers assign to the assertoric statement of this sentence. II 112 Def Non-designated Truth Value/Dummett: the way in which a sentence can be wrong. Def Designated truth value/Dummett: the way in which a sentence can be true - this is irrelevant for atomic sentences, only relevant for the way they contribute to a complex sentence - i.e. what the condition for an designated truth value for a composite sentence is. The truth value of the whole sentence does not arise simply from the truth value of the sub-sentences - or the subsentences do not only contribute their own truth value - or if we had a meaning theory for the whole language, perhaps we might not be able to explain the meanings of the logical constants by verification of the subsentences. - (These are three formulations for the same fact). >Compositionality. III (a) 20 Truth Value/Dummett: not by property of statements, but by behavior. - Compared to bet/command: requires: the antecedent lies in the power of the receiver: II (a) 21 Gap: if the child does not go out, it cannot have forgotten the jacket. - "Unconditional command": = material conditional: here there is no gap. III (a) 20 Meaning/Truth Value/Bet/Command/Dummett: There is an asymmetry: disobedience clearly leads to the right of disapproval - obedience does not lead to the right of reward (gap). Consequence: truth values are more likely to be extracted from bets (win/lose) than from command/behavior. III (a) 28 Designated Truth Value/Dummett: true or conditional with false antecedent (EFQ, >ex falso quodlibet) Non-designated truth value: wrong or the object is nonexistent. Validity/Multi-valued logic: valid in multi-value logic are the formulas that have a designated truth value for each allocation. >Multi-valued logic. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
World/Thinking | Frith | I 51 Brain/world/reality/perception/Frith: thesis: even if our brain works normally, we have no direct access to the world. >Reality, >External world, >Knowledge, >Certainty, >Perception. I 52 Nerve conduction/nerve pathways/Frith: conduction velocity: was first measured in 1852 (Helmholtz): 20 msec for 1 meter, sometimes even slower: 100 msec. Unconscious/Helmholtz/perception/Frith: thesis: (because of the slowness of nerve conduction) perception depends on "unconscious conclusions". >Unconscious, >Consciousness. Later he did not need this formulation any more, in order to avoid a confusion with Schopenhauer's linguistic usage. Cf. >Libet experiment. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
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Dialetheism | Quine Vs Dialetheism | X 111 Differing Logic/Dialethism/Law of Excluded Middle/Excl. Middle/S.E.M./Translation/Meaning/Negation/Quine: some in academia reject the S.E.M. and occasionally consider a sentence and its negation both to be true. Vs: as an objection it can be heard that every conjunction of the form "p.~p" ((s) quotation marks: when the form is presented) logically implies any proposition. (EFQ, ex falso quodlibet). If you now assume the negation together with the sentence, the distinction true/false would fall and with it the whole science. Solution/VsVs: the contradictions might perhaps be isolated. QuineVsDialethism: in this dispute no side knows what they are actually talking about. They only believe they are talking about negation i.e. "~" or the sign for "not". In reality, the sign "~" has nothing to do with negation anymore if the conjunction "p.~p" is considered to be true. QuineVsDiffering Logic: it only changes the subject. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Dualism | Libet Vs Dualism | Pauen I 63 Willensfreiheit/Libet: seine bekannten Versuche von 1985 zeigen, dass es zweifelhaft ist, dass eine Abhängigkeit von bewussten Entschluß und körperlicher Aktivität besteht! I 63/64 Es scheint, dass gewisse einfache Handlungen auf der neuronalen Ebene bereits eingeleitet werden, bevor der Willensakt stattgefunden hat! Die Interpretation der Experiment ist aber ebenso umstritten wie die Experimente selbst. Sollten sie sich durchsetzen, wäre das ein gravierender Einwand Vsinteraktionalistischen Dualismus. Sie führen zum Epiphänomenalismus. |
Lib I B. Libet Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness Cambridge 2005 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
Eccles, J.C. | Pauen Vs Eccles, J.C. | Pauen I 52 Def Psychons/Eccles: the smallest elements of mental states. Their activity only changes the probability of the release of transmitters. Therefore no conflict with energy conservation. Solution: quantum-mechanical deviations. (>Consciousness/Penrose). Eccles/Pauen: with this he approaches substance dualism again! Psychons are not properties, but independent entities that instantiate consciousness. Only dualism can ensure the free will (like Popper). Eccles/Popper: Thesis: the self-conscious mind is busy actively modifying brain events in accordance with its interests. Def Attachment Problem/Pauen: in view of the diversity of neuronal activity, the consistency of the first-person perspective can be explained only by the intervention of a conscious mind, but not by the neuronal activities. I 53 Attachment Problem/Pauen: there are now concrete neuro-biological proposals for a solution. Attachment Problem/Eccles: brings empirical evidence: Libet. "Ability of self-conscious mind" to perform "temporal tricks". Mind/Consciousness/Brain/Experiment/Benjamin Libet/Pauen: e.g. weak skin stimuli are only registered after 0.5 sec, but are dated back to the time when they actually occurred. Mind/Brain/Experiment/Kornhuber: even in the complete absence of physical stimuli neuronal activity can be caused solely by mental processes. EcclesVsMaterialism/EcclesVsIdentity Theory: unscientific superstition. PauenVsEccles: it is unclear whether the undisputed effects of the ideal world 3 on the physical world 1 can only be explained under the assumption of the existence of autonomous mental processes. E.g. If a glass breaks while a soprano singer is practicing, this explanation is inadmissible in any case! I 54 E.g. congresses have undisputed physical procedures, but they can all be explained intra-physically. E.g. the energy balance in the congress center. The mere discovery of a new method does not bring the scientists together. Only if acts of will were found that cannot be explained neurobiologically, the position of the monists would be shaken. I 55 VsEccles: he claims to possess such evidence, but the experiments by Libet and Kornhuber do not yield that: the results could only be evaluated as products of autonomous mental acts if physical causes can be excluded, and the experiments did not show that in the least. Since the brain has the ability to maintain activity for long periods even without external stimuli, also seemingly "spontaneous" reactions can be explained neurobiologically. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
Epiphenomenalism | Pauen Vs Epiphenomenalism | Pauen I 67 Property Dualistic Variants/Epiphenomenalism: recently: advantage: the renunciation of interactions is obvious from the perspective of property dualism, because this position then also becomes acceptable for physicalism and complies with multiple realizability. Multiple Realizability/Pauen: a variety of neural activity can cause one and the same mental state. (E.g. split brain: takeover by other areas). This is a problem for the identity theory and materialism. I 68 Property-Dualistic Variants/Epiphenomenalism/Pauen: E.g. we are repeatedly dealing with events in everyday life that are by far not causally effective with all their properties. It is not the sound of the ball that destroys the window pane. Explanation/Epiphenomenalism: then come only neuronal, not mental properties can be considered here. Epiphenomenalism Pauen: is, unlike the identity theory, not forced to assume that consciousness is "nothing but" electrochemical processes. I 69 VsEpiphenomenalism/Pauen: 1) The experiments by Libet are not without controversy. 2) Libet himself admits that there might still be a conscious veto even after the build-up of the potential. 3) Nothing else speaks against the act of will being identical with the neural process. It might not have an effect, but it might leave traces in the memory. 4) PopperVsEpiphenomenalism: theory of evolution: without effect the consciousness would have no selective advantage. I 70 EpiphenomenalismVsVs: certain intelligent processes can possibly only occur together with consciousness. But there is no independent evidence for this. There are also no theoretical arguments for the necessity to combine mental and neural properties. Empirically recognized relations would not indicate the necessity. However, it would be possible that certain neural activities that are de facto linked to consciousness, could also occur without consciousness. Insofar, epiphenomenalism has no argument against the evolutionary objection. VsEpiphenomenalism Pauen: 5) violates the deeply rooted intuition that mental states are causally effective. E.g. We believe that our feelings are the cause for us to speak of sensations. E.g. That beliefs are responsible for ensuring that we act according to our beliefs. VsEpiphenomenalism Pauen: the absence of consciousness remains completely inconsequential. I 71 Test/Evidence/Proof/Experiment/VsEpiphenomenalism/Pauen: it is questionable whether empirical evidence of a stable psychophysical correlation under the premises of epiphenomenalism could actually preclude the possibility of a disintegration of mental and neural processes. Test: trivially, a test can only confirm a hypothesis if it was negative as long as the hypothesis was wrong. An experiment that always yields a positive result, regardless of the accuracy of the hypothesis, cannot be a real test. E.g. normally, we would take the statement of a subject that they feel severe pain as evidence of the mental state. Under the premise of epiphenomenalism we cannot do this, though: here, the statement solely depends on neuronal processes. Now that we want to verify whether mental states are involved, it can precisely not be assumed that they (according to epiphenomenalism) usually are involved as a side effect. What would happen now if the hypothetical case occurred and the mental processes failed to take place? I 72 Since they are causally irrelevant, their absence cannot have an effect. I.e. the subject would also speak of their pain if they lacked the experience! Therefore, empirical tests are not suitable to preclude a dissociation of neural and mental states. This does not only affect the perspective of the third, but even that of the first person: the installation of memory traces is causally caused by the event; therefore, the process cannot be affected by the absence of causally irrelevant mental properties. Then I would have to believe to remember an experience that I never had. E.g. The epiphenomenalist should not even be irritated if a device indicates a state of pain that he does not feel. I 73 The reason is always the same: since mental states are causally irrelevant, their absence is, too. VsEpiphenomenalism/Pauen: with this, he jeopardizes our beliefs about the existence of mental states (which he actually does not deny). E.g. If there is no causal difference between pain and happiness, we could not distinguish them in memory and behavior either! I 109 Identity TheoryVsEpiphenomenalism/Pauen: makes the causal efficacy of mental processes without effort, because they simply are always physical processes as well. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
Grice, P.H. | Jackson Vs Grice, P.H. | Lewis V 153 Implicature/Conversational Implicature/Grice/Lewis: E.g. "This time you are right" Implicature: "Otherwise you are usually wrong." Conventional Implicature/Jackson: E.g. "She votes liberal, but she's not an idiot" - "Most liberals are idiots". Conditional/Grice/Lewis: if P(A>C) is high mainly because P(A) is low (E.g. falso quodlibet), then what sense does it make to say "If A, then B"? Why should you not say the stronger one: that it is almost as likely non-A?. JacksonVsGrice/JacksonVsLewis: we often assert things that are much weaker than we could actually assert, and for good reason. Hereby I suppose this that your belief system is similar to mine, but not identical. E.g. Assuming you know something that strikes me as highly unlikely today, but I still want to say something useful. So I say something weaker, so that you can definitely take my word. Def Robust/Jackson/Lewis: A is robust relative to B (in terms of one's subjective probability at a time), iff. the probability of A and probability of A conditional to B are close to each other and are both high. V 154 so that if one learns that B, they still consider A probable. Jackson: the weaker thing can then be more robust with respect to something that you think is more unlikely, but that you do not want to ignore. If it is now useless, the to say weaker thing, how useless is it then to say the weaker thing and the stronger thing together! And yet we do it! E.g. Lewis: "Bruce sleeps in the clothes chest, or elsewhere on the ground floor". Jackson: Explanation: it makes sense to assert the stronger thing, and just as much sense to assert the more robust thing. If they differ, we assert both. Robustness/Indicative Conditional/IC/Lewis: an IC is a truth functional conditional, that conventionally implies robustness (convention implicature) with respect to the antecedent. Therefore, the probabilities P(A>C) and P(A>C) must both be high. That is the reason why the BH of the IC comes with the corresponding conditional probability. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
Popper, K. | Wessel Vs Popper, K. | I 149 Follow-up relationship/logic/sciences/methodology/Wessel: for the scientist it is not decisive whether his theories are consistent! It turns out that successful work with contradictory theories is possible within a certain framework. Frege's life's work is not meaningless either, although Russell revealed its contradictions. Contradiction/relation/conclusion/ex falso quodlibet/EFQ/Popper: one can construct a system in which contradictory statements do not result in any arbitrary statement. But such a system is very weak! Not even the modus ponens remains. I 150 Such a system is useless for drawing conclusions... WesselVsPopper: this is true for his system, but with the systems of the strict follow-up relationship there are systems that are complete and ex falso quodlibet do not apply. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
Various Authors | Brendel Vs Various Authors | I 88 EFQ/ex falso quodlibet/VsEFQ/Brendel: es wird oft eingewendet, dass diesem Prinzip nichts in unserem alltäglichen oder wissenschaftlichen Umgang mit Widersprüchen entspricht. EFQ/parakonsistente Logik: These: das EFQ-Prinzip kann nicht allgemeingültig sein, da es nicht-triviale parakonsistente Theorien gibt. starke parakonsistente Logik/Brendel: darüber hinaus: These: es gibt wahre Widersprüche. wahre Widersprüche/Priest: Bsp „naive Semantik“: eine semantisch geschlossene Alltagssprache ist ein „wahres widersprüchliches System“. Inkonsistenz/Widerspruch/parakonsistente Logik/Priest/Brendel: diese wahren Widersprüche („sowohl wahr als auch falsch“) bleiben in seinem System isoliert, sie infizieren nicht das gesamte System. 163 Glaubensinstabilität/BrendelVsGrim/Brendel: ihr Eintreten hängt jedoch davon ab, ob man wirklich gute Gründe hat. Das Schema kommt ebensowenig durch Diagonalisierung zustande. Daher sind die „guten Gründe“ nicht wirklich gute Gründe. Daher sollte man nicht an die Wahrheit von [Ap] glauben. Dann entsteht keine Glaubensinstabilität mehr. Insbesondere sollte ein allwissendes Subjekt [Ap] nicht akzeptieren. Lösung/Brendel: die vermeintliche Paradoxie kann hier gelöst werden, indem man die anfängliche Aussage negiert. |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
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Mental Field | Libet, B. | Pauen I / V V 61 Benjamin Libet: (1994) CMF-Hypothese (conscious mental field) These Prozesse des Bewußtseins als mentale Felder (wie Magnetfeld). Bündeln vielfältige neuronale Aktivitäten zu einheitlicher Erfahrung. Pauen: das ist mit den physikalischen Prinzipien vereinbar. (Kausale Geschlossenheit, physische Determination). Kein Verstoß gegen Energieerhaltung. Vielleicht spezifische Form der Feldenergie. I / V 62 Das ist eine Variante des interaktionalistischen Dualismus, die von empirischer Bestätigung der Interaktion abhängt. Bsp dazu müßte man ein Areal vollständig vom restlichen Gehirn isolieren, dann müßte sich die Versuchsperson quasi aus der Perspektive der dritten Person äußern. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
Libet, B. | |||
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