Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Alienation Hegel Gadamer I 352
Alienation/Reconciliation/Hegel/Gadamer: The life of the spirit consists (...) in recognizing oneself in otherness. The spirit, directed towards its self-knowledge, sees itself divided with what is foreign and must learn to reconcile with it by recognising it as its own and home. By dissolving the hardness of positivity, he is reconciled with himself. Insofar as such reconciliation is the historical work of the spirit, the historical behaviour of the spirit is neither self-reflection nor the mere formal-dialectical suspension of the self-alienation that has happened to it, but an experience that experiences reality and is itself real. >Experience/Gadamer.



Eco I 238
Alienation/MarxVsHegel/Eco: Hegel does not distinguish between externalization and alienation. (voluntary/unvoluntary). Eco: he could not, because as soon as the human objectifies himself in the world of the things he has created, in nature, which he has changed, a kind of inevitable tension arises, whose poles on the one hand are the control of the object and on the other hand the complete losing onself in it in a balance that can only be dialectical, i.e. in a permanent struggle.


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Eco I
U. Eco
Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967
German Edition:
Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Eco II
U, Eco
La struttura assente, Milano 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972
Alienation Marx Eco I 238
Alienation/MarxVsHegel/Eco: Hegel does not distinguish between externalization and alienation. (voluntary/involuntary). Eco: he could not, because as soon as the human objectifies himself in the world of the things he has created, in nature, which he has changed, a kind of inevitable tension arises, whose poles on the one hand are the control of the object and on the other hand the complete losing oneself in it in a balance that can only be dialectical, i.e. consists in a permanent struggle.
Habermas IV 501
Alienation/Marx/Habermas: in Marx and in the Marxist tradition, the concept of alienation has been applied above all to the way of life of wage workers. With the transition to value theory, however, Marx has already freed himself from the educational ideal determined by Herder and Romanticism(1). Value theory only retains the concept of exchange and thus a formal aspect of distributive justice. With the concept of transforming concrete labour into abstract labour, the concept of alienation loses its certainty. He no longer refers to the deviations from the model of an exemplary practice, but to the instrumentalization of a life presented as an end in itself. See Life/Marx.

1.Ch.Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge1975, S. 5-29; deutsch Frankfurt 1977.



Höffe I 364
Alienation/Marx/Höffe: (...) the Paris manuscripts(1) [expand] the critique of national economy into a philosophical anthropology about the nature of the human and his/her work. >National Economy/Marx. Anthropology/Marx: The guiding concept is the concept of alienation known from Rousseau's social contract and Hegel's phenomenology of the mind: that the human becomes alien to his/her nature.
Alienation/Hegel: For Hegel, the alienation that the slave experiences in confrontation with the master, nature and him- or herself is a necessary phase in the formation of consciousness. Marx: Marx, on the other hand, plays through Hegel's complex dialectic for the "material", basic economic relationship, for the "hostile struggle between capitalist and worker". Like Hegel, >Master/Slave/Hegel), Marx also ascribes to the first inferior, the slave, now the worker, the greater possibility of liberating him- or herself from alienation. In a captivating analysis, he blames the main obstacle to a better society, the private ownership of the means of production, for a fourfold alienation: alienation from the product of work, from the nature of work, from oneself as a worker and from society:
1) First, the worker -and in a modified form also the owner of capital- is alienated from his/her product, since the worker does not enjoy the commodity him- or herself; moreover, nature faces the worker as a hostile world.
2) Second, the laborers alienate themselves from themselves, from their life activity, for, since he/she does not affirm labor, he/she feels " with him- or herself when he/she is apart from labor and apart from him- or herself when he/she is working; his/her work is in essence forced labor.
Höffe I 365
3) (...) Thirdly, (...) the human alienates him- or herself from his/her being generic, since he/she does not find himself in the work of the genus, the worked nature. 4) (...) he/she still alienates him- or herself from his/her fellow humans, since they do not meet him/her as a human, but merely as laborers, and thus as means for his/her own individual life.


1. K. Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (1844) (Pariser Manuskripte)

Marx I
Karl Marx
Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957


Eco I
U. Eco
Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967
German Edition:
Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Eco II
U, Eco
La struttura assente, Milano 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Alienation Eco Eco I 238
Alienation/MarxVsHegel/Eco: Hegel does not differentiate between externalization and alienation (voluntary/unvoluntary). Eco: Hegel could not do this because as soon as the human objectifies himself/herself in the world of the things he/she has created in nature which he/she has changed, a kind of inevitable tension arises, whose poles on the one hand are the control of the object and on the other hand the complete getting lost in it in a balance that can only be dialectical, i.e. in a permanent struggle.

Eco I
U. Eco
Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967
German Edition:
Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Eco II
U, Eco
La struttura assente, Milano 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972

Bourgeois/Citizen Marx Mause I 49
Bourgeois/citoyen/MarxVsHegel/Marx: The "political state" (Marx 1956b, p. 351), which historically helped the "bourgeois society" (1) to assert it, is the mere guarantor of this atomistic society of the selfish bourgeois pursuing its private interests, whose rights it protects in the form of liberal fundamental and human rights (2). In this way it preserves the bourgeois way of existence of (...) a human being alienated from his "species-being" (3), isolated individual, who sees in his peers not the communitarian opportunity for realization, but the barrier of his freedom. The citoyen is nothing more than the idealized projection of this alienated species-being, and the state, which according to this idealization presents itself as the Republican realizing space of this citoyen, actually proves to be an instrument for stabilizing bourgeois society and the competition of its members. Under the historical conditions of bourgeois society, therefore, the citoyen always remains subordinate to the bourgeois, and likewise the relationship between politics and economy appears in the form of a purpose-means reversal.
Republicanism/MarxVsRousseau, MarxVsHegel: The republican goal planned by Rousseau and Hegel is therefore not achievable for Marx within the limits of the existing economic system.


1. K. Marx, Zur Judenfrage. In Marx Engels Werke, Bd.  1 (MEW 1), Hrsg. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Berlin 1956, S. 354-356,366-370.
2. Ibid. p. 361-367
3. Ibid. p. 366,370.

Marx I
Karl Marx
Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
History Marx Höffe I 368
History/Marx/Höffe: [Marx](1) begins with the analysis of commodity and money as the factual preconditions and formal elements. He concedes to capital the world-historical task of developing all productive forces of labor. On the other hand, however, it prevents what is indispensable for a truly humane economy: that work or the worker becomes the subject of social processes. Determinism: Freely borrowing from Hegel's philosophy of history, Marx thinks deterministically. For in his view, the allegedly undeniable "impoverishment of the masses" follows a mechanism that inevitably leads to the self-absorption of capital. In his view, there is a growing concentration of capital, in the course of which more and more owners of capital are expropriated, which should have an obvious consequence: As misery grows, so does the indignation of an ever larger organized labor force.


1. K. Marx Das Kapital Vol. I 1867, Vol. II & II 1885 (= MEW 23-25)



Gaus I 80
History/Marx/Levine, Andrew: Hegel’s philosophy of history was, of course, the immediate inspiration for Marx’s attempt to make sense of history as such. But Marx broke ranks with Hegel and the entire tradition that his work culminated in by rejecting teleology and, with it, the project of discovering what historical events mean. Marx retained Hegel’s sense of history’s intelligibility; he sought to provide an account of real historical structures and of the direction of historical change. MarxVsHegel: But, for Marx, history is as meaningless as nature is. Like nature too, it has properties that are independent of investigators’ interests and that are in principle capable of being known. The philosophers of history, Hegel especially, had grasped aspects of real history, but through the distorting lens of their own teleological convictions. Marx set them right, without succumbing to the atheoreticism of contemporary historians.
History/MarxismVsMarx: Western Marxisms, for all their differences, were of one mind in distancing themselves from Marx’s theory of history. The historical materialist orthodoxy of the Second and Third Internationals was, in the eyes of Western Marxists, too fatalistic to pass muster. It failed to accord human agency its due. Its commitment to historical inevitability even seemed to render the very idea of politics otiose. If the end is already given, one can perhaps hasten its coming, but nothing can fundamentally change the ultimate outcome. This, it seemed to them, was a formula for quiescence, for passively awaiting the revolution. But the historical materialism Western Marxists faulted was not exactly the historical materialism Cohen defended. >History/Cohen.


Levine, Andrew 2004. A future for Marxism?“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.

Marx I
Karl Marx
Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016

Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
History Fukuyama Brocker I 805
History/Fukuyama: Fukuyama's thesis of the "end of history" refers to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the East-West conflict or the Cold War. This endpoint is due to the victory of a liberal-market economical
Brocker I 806
and democratic system of western character through alternative models of order. The title refers to both Hegel's and Marx' thesis of the same name. History/Hegel: Hegel saw the end of history in the establishment of a liberal state.
History/MarxVsHegel/Marx: the end of history is only reached with the worldwide implementation of communism.
FukuyamaVsMarx: The enforcement of democracy and capitalism is at the end of history.
Democracy/Capitalism/Fukuyama: both have prevailed because they best meet two basic human needs:
Capitalism/Fukuyama: is the economic system that best achieves an efficient allocation of goods under conditions of scarcity.
Democracy/Fukuyama: is the model of order that relatively satisfies the human need for social recognition better than other systems.
Fukuyama does not predict a quick victory for democracy. The struggle for them continues between a so-called post-historical world (in the industrialized countries of the Global North) and a historical world (in the industrializing countries of the Global South). See Democracy/Fukuyama.
Brocker I 811
VsFukuyama: His theses were received as not particularly independent. It was pointed out that they already came up under Alexandre Kojève. (1) See also Master-Slave Dialectic/Kojève. Fukuyama's book seemed too pessimistic to many critics.
VsFukuyama: 1. The empirical validity of his presentation of history has been called into question.
Brocker I 812
FukuyamaVsVs: His thesis is not to be understood descriptive but normative . 2. Fukuyama's interpretation of the historical process as progress was criticized.
3. The same empiricism can also be interpreted differently than it was done by Fukuyama.

1. Shadia B. Drury, „The End of History and the New World Order“, in: International Journal 48/1, 1992/93, p. 80-99.


Anja Jetschke, „Francis Fukuyama, Das Ende der Geschichte“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

PolFuku I
Francis Fukuyama
The End of History and the Last Man New York 1992


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Negation Adorno Grenz I 50
Negation/AdornoVsHegel/Grenz: Adorno separates, against Hegel, the subjective from the objective positivity of negated negation. (Negative Dialektik, p. 159, FN). ---
I 50
Dialectic/double negation/PopperVsDialectic/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno agrees with Popper's dialectic criticism: the equation of the negation of the negation with the positivity is the quintessence of the identification and thus of the reification. ---
I 50
Negation/Adorno/Grenz: The consciousness of the absence of something or of falsehood; this moment of the particular negation as the subjective for its part, cannot and must not be credited to objective logic and even to metaphysics. (Negative Dialektik, p. 159, FN). ---
Grenz I 51
The definite negation does not alter the circumstances. It is only their consciousness. ---
I Grenz 80
Certain negation/MarxVsHegel/Grenz: e.g. the bourgeois revolution against the feudal society: N.B.: here, certain negation as a method was lost. Feudalism is abolished in the double sense: the rule of less over many is liquidated, the social character of the society is preserved. ---
Grenz I 83
Certain negation/AdornoVsHegel/AdornoVsMarx/Grenz: Adorno resolves the antinomy of the ambiguity of cancelling and incorporating of the practical element of history into the particular negation. ---
Grenz I 91
Certain negation/Adorno/Grenz: New conception as immanent criticism: a) As a cancellation conceptualized inner-worldly - so it escapes the immanence critique of Hegel.
---
I 92
b) Reveals the concept of purposive rationality as irrational (Dialektik der Aufklärung, p. 126). Thus the necessity arises to eradicate the something-characteristic of the particular nothing history-philosophical (Negative Dialektik, p.8). c) This necessity is supported by the pushing trough of nature-history antagonism.
Accordingly, the certain negation consists in the fact that the factual is opposed to its potentiality "which cannot suffice" (Ästhetische Theorie, p. 205).
---
Grenz I 106
Certain negation/art/Adorno/Grenz: Revealing the image content of a cultural phenomenon is only possible as a certain negation of its social content, or, what is the same, as gaining the truth of its untruth. ---
Grenz I 113
Double Negation/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno understands the negation of negation as negative: full of content, but without something-character. (Negative Dialektik, p.159f) ---
Grenz I 116
Negation/Adorno/Grenz: certain negation and something-character of the particular nothing are separated by the transformation of the certain negation into the physiognomical analysis and of the determined nothing into a category of experience which is based on being and is only polemically related. This is the performance of Adorno's negative dialectic, with which it brings historical and dialectical materialism to itself. ---
Grenz I 180
Negation/Adorno/Grenz: Results of physiognomic negations are artworks or hermetic texts. They thus fail as negations, inasmuch as they negatively negate the negativity of their neganda in practice, but do so without meaning, and thus undefined and diffusely. Theory: on the other hand, the theory-performed determination of beings as negative is merely theoretical, but determined.

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974


A X
Friedemann Grenz
Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984
State (Polity) Hegel Mause I 47
State/society/Hegel: Hegel reconstructs the relationship between the social order of the market and the political order of the constitutional-monarchical state within the framework of a theory of modern "morality" (1), which he describes on the basis of the three institutionalized spheres of socialization and action of "family", "bourgeois society" and "state" (2).
I 48
Bourgeois society/Hegel: Hegel describes this as the "state of need and understanding" (3), which he distinguishes from the "state" as the "reality of the moral idea" (4), that is, from the "state" of the third section of morality. (5) HegelVsRousseau: Hegel reconstructs the monarchical-constitutional state as a supraindividual moral communication and meaning context and thus reconstructs the Republican primacy of politics over the economy. MarxVsHegel, State/Marx.

Brocker I 794
State/Hegel/HonnethVsHegel/Honneth: instead of understanding the moral sphere of the state as an intersubjective relationship of reciprocal acts of recognition (see Intersubjectivity/Hegel), Hegel treats the state in his later writings as if it were always an existing entity before all interaction. Consequently, it is only the vertically conceived relationships that the individuals maintain "to the higher authority of the state" as "the embodiment of the mental", "which in its approach suddenly assume the role that certain, highly demanding forms of mutual recognition should have played in a concept of moral recognition theory". (6) Solution/HonnethVsHegel: this results in the task of replacing Hegel's speculative categories with concepts of empirical science and thus making them
Brocker I 795
"empirically controllable". (7)

Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


1.G. W. F. Hegel Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Werke 7, Hrsg. Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, p. 292.
2. Ibid. p. 307.
3. Ibid. p. 340
4. Ibid. p. 389
5. Cf. K. Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, Hamburg 1986, S 261-264. 6. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 98
7. Ibid. p. 150


Höffe I 331
State/Hegel/Höffe: Hegel develops his system of political thought, the philosophy of law and state, against the background of his now expanded philosophical system(1). HegelVsKant: Against the - allegedly threatening in Kant - the danger of a purely through thought
Höffe I 332
conceived construction of normative claims, the subject area of the philosophy of law and state is considerably expanded. Instead of being content with a normative theory, an a priori theory of law and justice, Hegel also focuses on motivational, social, and above all institutional factors (...). Philosophical Philosophy of Law/Hegel: "(...) the idea of the law, (...) the concept of the law and its realization becomes the object"(2).
State: (...) [is the] "moral universe," [which] is to be understood as something reasonable.
Freedom: The guiding principle in legal and state theory is free will. From it Hegel wants to show how, under the condition of modernity, an epoch of alienation, he gradually attains his full, alienation-absorbing reality. >Freedom/Hegel, >Morals/Hegel, >Customs/Morality/Hegel.
Höffe I 336
The culmination of morality, its synthesis, at the same time the summit of Hegel's entire philosophy of law, is the state as a "mediated by itself", which is now far more than just a state of necessity and understanding. As a community in the literal sense it is the public institution responsible for the common good, the "reality of the moral idea". Because in it freedom attains its perfect form, it is not "something arbitrary" but "supreme duty," i.e. again a categorical imperative, for man to be a member of a State. [This is a] modern, namely no longer eudaimony-based, but freedom-based way (...).
Only in the living together of free and equal people can [the human] complete both his/her rational nature and his/her nature based on right and justice. >Society/Hegel.
Höffe I 337
From abstract law to morality, the "idea of free will in and for itself" finally develops into the unity and truth of both moments. In it, in morality, Hegel in turn advances from the natural spirit, the "family," through the stage of separation, the "bourgeois society," to objective freedom, the "State. Within the section "the State," however, there is surprisingly, instead of a further stage, now a regression. For the opposition to free will, the full legal relations and the moral whole, is achieved already at the first stage, the "internal constitutional law". On the second stage, however, the "external constitutional law," the moral whole is exposed to chance. And the last stage is determined ambivalently with respect to free will.


1. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820
2. Ibid. § 1


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018

Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018

Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
State (Polity) Marx Mause I 49/50
State/MarxVsHegel/Marx: Hegel's state seems incapable of asserting its claimed primacy of politics over the economy; it is a powerless idealization and doubling of its real counterpart in social reality, which due to its actual dependence on bourgeois society does not offer an emancipatory perspective in the sense of the republican project that goes beyond the implementation of this social formation. (1) The "political state" (2), which historically helped the "bourgeois society" (3) to assert itself, is the mere guarantor of this atomistic society of the selfish bourgeois pursuing its private interests, whose rights it protects in the form of liberal fundamental and human rights (4).


1.K.Marx, Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts (§ §   261– 313). In Marx Engels Werke, Bd.   1 (MEW 1), Hrsg. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Berlin 1956, S.   275– 287
2. K. Marx, Zur Judenfrage. In Marx Engels Werke, Bd.  1 (MEW 1), Hrsg. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, 1. Berlin 1956, S. 351
3. Ibid. p. 354-356, 366-370.
4. Ibid. p. 361-367

Marx I
Karl Marx
Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018