Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Colour | Jackson | McGinn II 34 Colors/Frank Jackson/E.g. Mary: the famous color researcher Mary was born and raised in a black and white room. She is a gifted physicist and learns everything physical, what there is to know about the human brain. (with a black/white monitor). One day she is released into the colored outside world. (She is not color blind). N.B.: she says: "I have learned" how it is "to perceive the color red." (How it feels). McGinn/Jackson: if true, then she did not know all about the mind, when she was in her room, although she knew everything about the brain. Jackson: Mary-example: (color researcher in the room): "know-how-it-is" - without this, there is no complete knowledge. - Mary, as a brain researcher, does not yet know all about the mind. >Knowing how, >Qualia, >Experience. --- Schwarz I 160 Color researcher Mary/Jackson: (1998c)(1): Jackson is of the opinion that the consequences of the Mary example are so implausible that a mistake must be stuck somewhere. 1. Frank Jackson [1998c]: “Postscript on Qualia”. In [Jackson 1998b], 76–80 |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Descriptions | Davidson | Action is description-dependent (Mary-example: Mary shots the lion and kills the cow.) - Events are description-independent. >Events/Davidson, >actions/Davidson. Glüer II 101 Description/Event/Davidson: E.g. Mary shot at the burglar, but he dies much later. Identity theory of the events: Problem: the same action. Solution: these are descriptions of the same event tokens - Mary only has to pull the trigger, the rest does the nature. --- Frank I 675 Description/Identity/Externalism/Davidson: Problem: For example, the sunburn, although as such only describable in relation to the sun, is identical with a condition of my skin that can be described without reference to external factors. >Externalism. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Events | Davidson | Events/Action/Davidson: action is description-dependent (Mary-example: Mary shoots the lion and kills the cow). - In contrast: Events are independent of description. >Description dependence. Glüer II 86 ff VsEvent-Ontology: various authors: Events are actually superfluous, because adverbial modifications can also be realized with more economical ontology. Montague, Clark, Parsons: "modifier theory": has no events, ia not restricted to "restrictive" adverbs, but more complex logical apparatus. Jaegwon Kim: identifies events not as individualized individuals, but with the help of properties. Davidson bases his entire philosophy on the ontology of particular events. >Ontology/Davidson. Distinguishing between event token and description. Only then, it is clear, what sense it makes to speak of variously described event tokens, as far as these descriptions contain no intentional adverbs. Thus, there is no subclass of intentional actions. >Actions, >Intentions. But Mary has long since stopped shooting when the burglar dies. But that does not change the fact that it is about descriptions of one and the same event token. The rest is left to nature. Mountaineer-Example: is a mere event, not an intentional action. Event/Davidson: all events can be explained in principle with regard to the operations of the natural laws. (McDowell). Glüer II 97 Def Events/Davidson/Glüer: an identity statement "a = b" for events is true iff a and b have identical causes and consequences - Glüer: then the causal relationship forms a coordinate system in which each event is uniquely determined - QuineVsDavidson: Regress: Causes and consequences are again events, which have again a place in the net - Davidson: VsDavidson: assumes Quine's criterion for objects: Glüer II 89 Def Identity for objects/Quine: have the same space time coordinates - Event/Davidson/new: two events can happen at the same time in the same location. >Identification. Glüer II 189 Problem: E.g. muscle soreness in singing running - Solution/Davidson: Language instead of coordinates - metaphysical ontological assumptions of everyday language. Solution/Davidson: Description. Glüer II 101 Description/event/Davidson: E.g. Mary shot at the burglar, but he dies much later. - Identity theory of the events: Problem: the same action - solution: these are descriptions of the same event tokens - Mary only needs to pull the trigger to kill, the rest does the nature. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Learning | Jackson | Schwarz I 157 Phenomenon/phenomenal properties/knowledge-how/Lewis/Schwarz: in addition to the fact that there can be independent phenomenal facts next to the physical facts, and besides the zombie intuition this speaks in favour of being able to learn such facts! E.g. Jackson: Mary learns phenomenal facts about colours. >Colours, >Colour words, >Knowing how, >Phenomena. Schwarz I 158 Colour explorer Mary/Jackson/Knowledge-how/Lewis/Schwarz: E.g. when she is released, she learns something new: "How it is" to have a red experience. LewisVs: for him, the gain in knowledge is a problem only if it can really rule out open possibilities with regard to the world. According to Lewis, such possibilities must not exist: the physical facts leave no alternatives open in reference to the world. No problem is Mary's new information about her own situation in the world. (Lewis pro: 1988e(1), 268ff, 287) Schwarz: only now she can ask if other people also have this (kind of) experience. Fact/Mary: It is also unproblematic that she now now internally represents facts that were previously known to her when she acquires new "terms" that were not previously available to her. (Lewis pro: she acquires new forms of representation (1983d(2), 131f) Mary-Example/Lewis: but this is not an interesting advance in knowledge! Mary-Example/McMullen, (1985)(3)/Perry (2001)(4): this is essentially indexical and/or demonstrative information. >Qualia. 1. David Lewis [1988e]: “What Experience Teaches”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 13: 29–57. 2. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 3. Carolyn McMullen [1985]: “‘Knowing what it’s Like’ and the Essential Indexical”. Philosophical Studies, 48: 211–233 4. John Perry [2001]: Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousnes. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Phenomena | Jackson | Schwarz I 157 Phenomenon/phenomenal characteristics/knowledge-how/Lewis/Schwarz: in addition to the fact that there can be independent phenomenal facts next to the physical facts, and besides the zombie intuition this speaks in favour of being able to learn such facts! E.g. Jackson: Mary learns phenomenal facts about colours. >Colours, >Mary-Example, >Knowing how, >Qualia, >Learning. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Qualia | Jackson | Pauen I 179 Colour researcher Mary/Jackson/Pauen: JacksonVsMonism! Unlike Nagel. E.g. Fred can see two completely different colours within the red spectrum. E.g.: Colour researcher Mary: she learns "how it is" when she leaves her black and white space. Thesis 1. Neurobiological knowledge is, in principle, incomplete with regard to phenomenal experiences. 2. The monism is false, phenomenal properties cannot be identical with neural properties! Phenomenal properties are causally ineffective side effects of mental states. (Epiphenomenalism). >Epiphenomenalism, >Mary-example, >Monism, >Knowing how. I 180 Jackson: Two Different Theses 1. Epistemological Theory: according to this theory neurobiological knowledge does not imply phenomenal knowledge (like Nagel). LewisVsJackson/Pauen: Mary does not acquire new knowledge, but only the ability to imagine colors from now on. She already had the relevant knowledge beforehand. JacksonVsLewis/Pauen: the knowledge goes beyond the ability: Mary can think about whether she has the same colour perceptions as other people. What is decisive here is the object of the consideration: the question whether their ideas of the phenomenal states of others apply or not. Nida Rümelin/Jackson/Pauen: (pro): the phenomenal knowledge here is a real knowledge: it allows the decision between previously open possibilities. I 181 LycanVsJackson/Pauen: does not give any argument VsMonism: knowledge does not have to refer to new facts outside of physics, it can simply be a new approach. Mary knew "all the facts" before her liberation, but she had only limited access to them. This is again an epistemic, not an ontological argument. Therefore no objection to monism is to be expected. A physical duplicate of Mary would have to have the same feelings. In any case, this is not excluded by Jackson. I 182 Thus, Jackson shows only the weaker variant of the distinction between neurobiological and phenomenal knowledge: they show that the gap exists, but not that it is not unbridgeable. Missing Qualia/Pauen: For example, two otherwise physically identical organisms differ completely from one another: one has no phenomenal sensations at all. N.B.: if this is possible, physiological knowledge can give no information about the mental states. LenzenVs: it is not clear in what sense this case is "possible": there are probably people whose entire behavior is without consciousness, others, where they are at least aware of some activities. Fallacy every/all/Pauen: now one can perhaps say that every single action could also be executed without consciousness, but not all actions! I 183 This is not possible because many actions require learning. We could never have learned them in this way! VsVs: the representative of the missing Qualia does not have to react to Lenzen, he can easily claim that the performance is "intuitively plausible". Thus the argument of the presupposition presupposes certain scenarios. In any case, one cannot (should not) deduce the possibility from the conceptuality. But only one such real possibility would provide a serious objection to the VsTheory of identity. VsMissing Qualia: mental states are degraded de facto into epiphenomena. 1. Dualistic distinction between mental and physical properties. I 184 2. It is assumed that the mental properties are not causally effective, otherwise their absence would be noticeable. >Qualia/Chalmers. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
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