Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 16 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Brains in a Vat Putnam VI 391
Brains in a vat/BIV/metaphysical realism/Putnam: brains in a vat is a part of metaphysical realism, not of internal realism. Then "verified" does not imply "true". >Internal realism, >Metaphysical realism. ---
V 21f
Brains in a vat/Reference/Putnam: the language of brains in the vat does not refer to anything in the outside world. There is no reference. They cannot even think "We are brains in a vat".
V 77ff
Bracketing/Putnam: parenthetical thoughts have no reference conditions that would make them true. Internalism: (existential questions only within a theory:) as brains in a vat we cannot think here that we are in the vat, except the bracketed sense.
V 179
Brains in a vat/PutnamVsBrains in a vat: our worldview is coherent, because, taken as a whole, it includes an explanation of our activity of coping and developing a world theory. ---
I (a) 21
Brains in a vat/Putnam: brains in a vat cannot refer to brains in a vat. Meanings are not in the head.
I (f) 156f
Brains in a vat/Putnam: brains in a vat is no problem for internalism, there are no possible worlds. Externalism: here it is possible that some brains are outside the vat. >Internalism, >Externalism.
Realism: realism asserts extrinsic connections between signs and things that help explain the nature of the reference.
PutnamVs: e.g. textbooks are the main cause of my beliefs about electrons, but my use of the word "electron" does not refer to these books. VsRealism: realism cannot determine the "right kind of causality". >Reference.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Content Searle I 66f
Wide Content: wide content encompasses the causal relations to the world beyond the words so that meanings are not in the head (Putnam pro, but not "wide content". (> Content/Fodor), >Meanings not "in the head", >wide/narrow content.
II 26f
The fulfillment of conditions is fixed by propositional content. There is not a desire or belief without fulfillment conditions (i.e. no regress). >Satisfaction condition/Searle, >Regress.
II 80
Deception: e.g. the moon is bigger on the horizon - that is part of the content. Solution: if we had no beliefs, we would believe the moon had changed its size.
II 87
Content/Searle: the content is not the same as the object.
II 196
Hallucination/deception: brains in the vat have exactly the same intentional content.
II 319
Intentional Content/Pierre Example/Searle: intentional content is sufficient, and that is different in "London is ugly" and "Londres est jolie". Kripke: intentional content is not rigid, because descriptions are not rigid either. Names: names are neither equivalent to descriptions nor to intentional contents. >Pierre-Example.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Elm/Beech Example Elm/Beech example, philosophy: thought experiment of H. Putnam (Putnam, H. Reason, truth and history, Cambridge, 2008). The speaker cannot distinguish elms and beeches, but he knows that both are different trees. What is the status of his knowledge? Putnam draws the conclusion that meanings are not in the head. See also reference, knowledge, causal theory, meaning, thought experiments.

Elm/Beech Example Searle II 254f
Meaning/SearleVsPutnam/Searle: meaning is in the head, they depend on >Satisfaction conditions of intentionality. Putnam: meanings are not in the head and conditions in the world are decisive. An indexical determination and not the concept fixes the meaning. Searle: meaning is not determined by ideolect. Cf. >Twin earth, >Idiolect.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Meaning Davidson I (c) 64
Meaning/Davidson: Quine has revolutionized our understanding of communication by having shown that there is not more about meaning than what a person with the associated facilities is able to learn by observing. Causal theory of meaning/VsDescartes: Senses do not matter - only in learning, but then contingently. (VsScepticism)
>Causal theory of reference, >Skepticism.
I (c) 47
Def Meaning (interpretation): The meaning of a sentence is given by the fact that the sentence is assigned a semantic space in the structure of records that make up a language . The meaning of a sentence consists in being the holder of this place and no other place in the macro structure of the language. This is the only content of the concept of meaning for Davidson. >Sentence meaning, >Meaning theory.
Glüer II 53
DavidsonVsSocial nature of meaning: Idiolect in principle is also to be interpreted (via causal hypotheses). Putnam/Kripke: causal theory: correct link between word and object.
DavdisonVsPutnam: Interpretation of whole sentences. >Use theory, >Interpretation, >Radical interpretation.

Rorty VI 419
DavidsonVsQuine/Rorty: Davidson rejects the notion of "stimulus meaning": this would be like Newton’s attempt to climb to the "Newton of the mind". Instead: distal theory of meaning. There is no "central region" between linguistically formulated beliefs and physiology. >Proximal theory.

Davidson I 95
Causal theory of meaning: Meaning does not matter - only in learning, but then contingent (VsSkepticism).
I 99
DavidsonVsPutnam: that meanings are not in the head is not due to special names for natural kinds, but due to broad social character of language. >Natural kinds, >Communication.
Glüer II 50
Meaning/Davidson/Glüer: The interpretation is given by the fact that the semantic space of a sentence is located in the structure of sentences that make up the language - (multiple languages = truth - theories) possible - Def Meaning/Davidson: then consists in being the holder of this unique place in the macro structure of the language.
Glüer II 51
Meaning/Tarski/Davidson: Tarski-type theories are not based on meaning as defined entities (pro Davidson : Meaning is not fixed ultimately) - consequences: 1. DavidsonVsTarski: actually spoken language becomes ultimately irrelevant - 2. The trivial thesis that meaning is conventional, must be abandoned.
Frank I 672
Sunburn-example/Davidson: as sunburn is still a reddening of my skin, even though it was caused by the sun - not only external causation leads to the fact that meanings are not in the head - otherwise, pro Putnam: meanings are not in the head, but rather simple propositional attitudes. >Propositional attitudes.

Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Meaning Poundstone I 339
Meaning/PoundstoneVsPutnam: meaning is in your head, that is in the consciousness of the one who knows the encryption (cryptography). Vs: Putnam: meanings are not in the head.
>Twin Earth, >Meanings are not in the head, >Meaning/Putnam.
An extreme case: rules result in "iii ...".
Then it is divided between the text and key.
>Code, >Information, >Encoding, >Text, >Understanding, >Decoding.

Poundstone I
William Poundstone
Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988
German Edition:
Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995

Meaning Stalnaker I 204
Meaning/Stalnaker (like Putnam): meanings are not in the head. Reason: the reason that meanings are not in the head is because they are abstract objects. Abstract objects: abstract objects are associated with things, some of which are actually in the head - namely things that have meanings or content. ((s) e.g. phrases, signs, symbols).
>Meanings are not in the head, >Objects, >Content, >Abstract objects, >Abstract concepts.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Mental States Davidson I (b) 30
Twin Earth/Davidson: Subjective states do not arise as a consequence of the state of the brain or the nervous system.
I (b) 35
False theory: the objects would be the meanings of sentences (Vs), that is, the >propositions. DavidsonVs: with this, it would be so arranged that, e.g. if a Frenchman attributed the same state of consciousness to Paul as I do, the same subject would be named by us both, whereas this would not be the case in the theory under consideration, for the sentence in question of the Frenchman would not be the same as mine (falsely).
It should not concern us that the Frenchman and I use different words, it is similar to ounces and carats. (> Measuring).
My monism is ontological: it asserts that mental events and objects can also be described as physical. >">Anomalous Monism.

I (e) 99
Mind/Davidson: if we consider the subjective or mental exclusively as a consequence of the physical characteristics of a person, meanings cannot be something purely subjective or mental. (Putnam: Meanings are not in the head).
Frank I 626
Mind/Davidson: does not work without language, both equal.
Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984),
101-111
- - -
Frank I 657ff
Mental states/external attribution/Davidson: "narrow" state/twin earth: "inner", is solipsistic, as in Descartes. The narrow states are the same for the twin earth. BurgeVsPutnam: they do not exist.
SearleVsPutnam: narrow states are unnecessary, ordinary propositional attitudes suffice.
DavidsonVsSearle/VsBurge: ordinary mental states are narrow (internal) and at the same time "non-individualistic", i.e. externally identifiable.


Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Models Hacking I 357f
Model/Hacking: a model states interactivity between speculation and experiment. Models are in the head. Cf. >"Meanings are not in the head".
E.g.:
An atomic nucleus is treated temporarily as if it had an infinite mass.
Molecules are treated as a rigid rod.
We can ignore the spin.
>Method, >Quantum mechanics, >Physics.
CartwrightVsModel: in the examples above we see that not all can be true, but we all use them at the same time.
>Model theory.

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Natural Kinds Putnam Newen I 126f
Natural Kind/terms/Putnam/Newen/Schrenk: the reference of natural kinds can only be relatively stated to the environment and the prevailing natural conditions. N.B.: we can talk about natural species solely on the basis of examples. It is not necessary that we have an idea about the defining characteristics. E.g. water: in earlier times, one talked just the same about it as today, without having a clue of H2O. Def Natural Kind/Putnam/Newen/Schrenk: a natural kind is a unified type of individual things, whereby this type is defined by properties in nature and not by epistemic or pragmatic criteria. Implications: Putnam: thesis: meanings are not in the head, e.g. Twin Earth.
---
Putnam III 145
Natural Kind/Putnam: e.g. star has an artificial nature, i.e. their constellations. Natural kind: limits are also arbitrary here. ---
I (a) 38f
Natural Kind/Putnam: it is not analytic that tigers have stripes (not even a few). It is also not analytic that tigers are animals and lemons are fruits. One who uses the word "aluminum", does not have to differentiate it from molybdenum. >Elms/Beeches, >Analytic/synthetic.
What determines reference then? The causal connection to the event of introduction includes belonging to a linguistic community.
Stereotypes: temperature: has a strong stereotype; electricity: has a weak stereotype.
>Stereotypes.
I (e) 135ff
Natural Kind/Putnam: natural kinds are e.g. natural substances, genera and physical variables. >Criteria.
Putnam: early: natural kinds are defined by criteria. Putnam: later: they are defined through the world. What counts into that is determined by laws. These are not analytical definitions, all stereotypes can also be made true from other things.
>Laws, >Natural laws.
I (e) 138
Only the DNA decides what a lemon is.
I (e) 139
What makes the composition of any importance, is its connection to the laws of behavior. With the introduction of the term they are commonly not known.
I (e) 139
Natural Kind/Putnam: a natural kind must have the same composition or obey the same laws. Their names are not synonymous with markings: the research may result into something new.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000


New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Naturalism Searle I 66
Naturalization of content: naturalization of content is the separation of consciousness/intentionality (SearleVs: Searle is against such a separation). >Consciouness, >Intentionality.
Meaning/SearleVsPutnam/Searle: meanings are in the head. >Intentionality/Searle.
Putnam: Meanings are not in the head.

There is a thesis: intentionality is biological, teleological:
SearleVs: in a case of confusion we needed words like "horse-or-cow".
((s) > Disjunctive predicates.)

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Phenomena Feynman I 736
Phenomenon/Feynman: (context here: magnetic field, coil) the changeover from north to south should not concern us, the two are also mere agreements. -the change is not a phenomenon! ((s) The two would be reversed: top/bottom and right/left at the same time, therefore no change! (As if you looked at the original image from behind: now north is at the bottom, but the vector now also points to the right instead of to the left.)
I 736
True Phenomenon/Feynman: for example, if we have an electron moving through a field that points into the book page: if we then use the formula for the force v x B, we find that the electron, in accordance with the physical law, will deviate in the displayed direction. The phenomenon is that we have a coil with a current that runs in a certain circumferential direction, and an electron that circulates in a certain way. That is physics, regardless of how we call everything. ((s) Because the electron is not both positive and negative at the same time.)
Feynman: Now we carry out the same experiment in a mirror: now the force is reversed if we calculate it according to the same law, and this is good, for the corresponding movements are then mirror images.
>Chirality.
I 736
Reflection/Chirality/Symmetry/Feynman: the main thing is that in the study of any phenomenon there are always two or an even number of right-handed rules and that the phenomena as a result always look symmetrical. However, it may appear as if we could indicate the north pole of a magnet!
E.g. compass needle really points north.
Vs: but of course this is again a local property that has to do with the geography of the earth.
It is as if we were talking about in which direction Chicago is (north of Pittsburgh), so it does not count!
That the compass needle has a bluish color is only a convention!
If, however, a magnet had the property that small hairs grow on its north pole, but not on the south pole, that would be the end of the law of mirror symmetry.
E.g. telephone call to a Mars resident: we could send him right-polarized light and say: "This is right-turning light".
I 737
We could indicate our size in the diameter of hydrogen atoms. And this is how absolute length can be defined. But we could not define "left" with the fact that our heart beats on the left side. Maybe his beats on the right!
>Objectivity, cf. >Twin Earth, >"Meanings are not in the head".

Feynman I
Richard Feynman
The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963
German Edition:
Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001

Feynman II
R. Feynman
The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967
German Edition:
Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993

Representation Esfeld I 136 ~
Representation: harmless: beliefs represent things and facts of the world but they are not the original semantic property of beliefs. EsfeldVsDescartes: representation is intentional, not preconceptive. >Intentionality, >Representations/Descartes.
Representation/Descartes:
1st A belief represents things.
2nd Access is only guaranteed by representation. 3. The things of which we are conscious, are representations (strong representation, realism).
>Beliefs, >Realism.
Fodor: Fodor is pro Descartes, the content of belief states is derived from original representative content.
Problem: which causality is effective right now? Which characteristic is relevant? This does not allow conclusions.
>Jerry Fodor.
I 144ff
Representative semantics/Esfeld: Vs: similarity is not an explanation. But which one is the correct causal relation? >Similarity, >Explanation, >Semantics.
VsRepresentation: a causal relation is not fixable. A representation cannot distinguish between reference (extension) and meaning (intension) - meaning is therefore not in the head.
>Reference, >Causal relation, >Meanings are not in the head.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Twin Earth Monod Dennett I 268
Twin Earth/Monod/Dennett: Monod posed and solved the problem of Putnam's twin earth: meaning is not in the head, it is also not quite in the DNA. >Twin earth, >Meanings are not in the head, >Meaning.
Dennett: this also applies to the poetry.
>Hermeneutic circle.
In the opinion of some authors, "gene centrality" is thus disproved.
>Genes.
Dennett: that was an over-simplification anyway.
I 271
Niche: every functional structure implicitly carries information about the environment in itself. >Niches.

Mon I
J. Monod
Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris 1970
German Edition:
Zufall und Notwendigkeit Hamburg 1982


Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Twin Earth Poundstone I 323
Twin Earth/PoundstoneVsPutnam: long molecular chains correspond with sticky liquids - then no confusability - the water would be undrinkable - thought experiments: physical feasibility is relevant - Twin Earth/Poundstone: only possible connection: hydrogen/oxygen (peroxide): extremely unstable. when ammonia is liquid, mercury is fixed - completely different world. ((s) H2O/XYZ cannot be the only change then. - Poundstone argues holistically.)
Putnam: on the twin earth we would make identical experiences. - But there is more than a reality that fits to it.
>Knowledge, >Certainty, >Skepticism, >Experience, >Perception, cf. >Qualia.
I 327
Translation/Twin Earth/PoundstoneVsPutnam: Variant: supposing there is a text of "Schiller", "The Maid of Orleans" - but translation would result into Urfaust. - Then we might have a slogan: "meanings are not in the book". >Meaning/Putnam, >Meanings are not in the head, >Twin Earth.
Vs: such a translation would not be possible because the word frequencies would have to give the same pattern in each translation.
Cf. >Theorem of Löwenheim.
Solution: algorithm which completely modifies the text.
N.B.: there is no evidence that the Voynich manuscript is not a translation of a known text.
>Proofs, >Provability.

Poundstone I
William Poundstone
Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988
German Edition:
Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995

Word Meaning Deacon I 59
Word Meaning/Deacon: it is not the case that words differ from other signals by chance or conventionally.
I 60
Tradition: assumes that there are two kinds of referential or meaningful relations: a) transparent: here a similarity between the signal (word, picture, sign) and the object addressed (icon) works
>Icons.
b) opaque: this resemblance is missing here. Instead, additional knowledge about the code is required.
>Symbol.
Icon: Refers to similarity characteristics between the sign (word, sound, image) and the object. (Transparency).
>Similarity.
Symbol: refers without such similarity, instead a code has to be learned. (Opacity).
Signal: is simply a sign that is physically correlated with other objects without considering the semantics.
>Signal, >Semantics.
>Index, >Petrol gauge example, Dretske.
I 62
Reference: Examples such as the > twin earth show that reference does not generally need something like meaning to be determined. >Twin Earth, >Reference, >H. Putnam.
Reference/Solution/DeaconVsPutnam: what makes inanimate things such as blackening of the paper or a sign on the screen meaningful is an interpretation of which a crucial part really...
I 63
(even if not everything) happens „in the head“. Reference is not intrinsic "in the" word (noise, gesture), but reference is formed by a kind of response to it. Cf. >"Meanings are not in the head"/Putnam.
>Reference/Deacon, > Interpretation/Deacon, >Intrinsicness, >Words, >Subsententials, cf. >Sentences.

Dea I
T. W. Deacon
The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998

Dea II
Terrence W. Deacon
Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013


The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Externalism Davidson Vs Externalism I (d) 72
VsExternalism: In many cases, it is assumed that the externalism which refers to facts that lie outside the mind and may be unknown to the person concerned, cannot be reconciled with the authority of the first person. Putnam: meanings are not in the head, after all. The same is true for thoughts in general, in his opinion. (likewise Searle) DavidsonVs: This conclusion is not valid, at least not for my externalism. Which are the factors that determine the content of the thought of another person must be found out by the interpreter on the basis of indirect evidence, or suspected correctly. But because these factors determine both the content of this thought as well as the content of the thought that one believes to have, there is no room for errors regarding the content of one’s thoughts in the way they may arise for other thoughts.

Frank I 660
DavidsonVsExternalism: those who believe that the contents of our thoughts are often determined by factors of which we know nothing, have of course noticed that if they were right, the Cartesianism of self-assurance and the Fregean notion of the thoughts that are thought completely must be wrong. But they have barely made an attempt to solve the conflict with the strong intuition that we do have the authority of the first person indeed.

Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Woodfield, A. Davidson Vs Woodfield, A. Frank I 672
DavidsonVsPutnam: I doubt his assumption (1) that ordinary propositional attitudes are not in the head. And that the authority could not be applied apply to it because of that. This does not follow from the external individuation. E.g. Sunburn/Davidson: It is just as absurd to say that external cause leads to the fact that meanings are not in the head as to believe that, because sunburn is caused by the sun it is not a condition of my skin. E.g. Suppose it could be that someone else suffered an indistinguishable burning of the skin by some other cause (> "tie identical"/> Sellars). Nevertheless, only one of us has real sunburn, the other doesn’t. This is enough to show that a recognition of externalism does not discredit an identity theory of the mental with the physical. Andrew WoodfieldVs: "No de re state about an object outside the brain can possibly be identical to a state of this brain, since no brain state presupposes the existence of an external object." ((s) You can hallucinate everything). Concept/DavidsonVsWoodfield: individual states and events as such do not require anything conceptually! Some of their descriptions, however, do so very much!" E.g. my grandfather did not presuppose me, but if someone is described as my grandfather.
I 673
Then there must be other people apart from my grandfather, including myself.
I 674
DavidsonVsPutnam/DavidsonVsWoodfield: Both are wrong to assert that it is "absurd" to think that two physically identical people might differ in their ordinary psychological states. They can. (Twin earth) Twin earth/Putnam: (somewhere): psychological states identical DavidsonVsPutnam: not the identical (anomalous monism). This weakens the threat to first person authority, which then no longer simply arises from the fact that the contents are individuated externally.

Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994