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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coherence Theory | Neurath | Skirbekk, Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt/M 1996 Skirbekk I 207 Coherence Theory/Truth/Neurath: "correct" is a statement if you can incorporate it - then there is no concept of truth - nor empiricism >Correctness, >Coherence, cf. >Correspondence theory, >Correspondence, >Truth, >Empiricism. |
Neur I O. Neurath Philosophical Papers 1913-1946: With a Bibliography of Neurath in English (Vienna Circle Collection, Volume 16) 1983 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Carnap, R. | Wittgenstein Vs Carnap, R. | I 134 WittgensteinVsTarski/WittgensteinVsCarnap/Hintikka: would the logical semantics reject in the lump, because it cannot be articulated according to the conception of language as a universal medium. I 194 ff WittgensteinVsCarnap/Wittgenstein/Bio/Hintikka: accuses Carnap, he had used his idea of physicalist base language without permission and without reasonable notice. Neurath has demanded, as the first in the Vienna Circle, one should no longer speak of "experience content" and the "comparison between sentence and reality", but only of sentences. (> Coherence theory). II 333 Logic/WittgensteinVsCarnap: the attempt to construct a logic that should be prepared for any situation, is an absurdity of great importance, such as Carnap's construction of a relation system, but which leaves it open whether something fits to what gives it content. VI 94 WittgensteinVsCarnap/Schulte: one cannot assume a priori that elementary propositions should consist of binary relations. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Carnap, R. | Verschiedene Vs Carnap, R. | Skirbekk I 16 Probation: correspondence between sentence and the reality NeurathVsCarnap: coherence rather than correspondence. Carnap VI 177 Attribution/Quality/Sensory Quality/Carnap: there is no sharp line between attributable and non-attributable sensory qualities. Organ sensations can hardly or not at all be attributed to certain world lines (i.e. visual things). Example "melancholic forest": This attribution is justified! VI 178 Because it arouses a sensation of corresponding quality. Like sugar the sweet one. (external) VsCarnap: "pathetic fallacy". VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Theory of Colours): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (n of perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all. But these laws are of a much more complicated form. VI 71 Characteristics/characteristic/definition/constitution/Carnap: Problem: e.g. foreign psychic: the behavior is not the same as the foreign psychic itself! Realism: the angry behavior is not the anger itself. Solution/Carnap: but one can transform all scientific (not metaphysical) statements about F into statements about K while keeping the logical value (truth value). Then F and K are logically identical. (s) But not vice versa: the concept of behavior is not the concept of anger. VI 72 A meaning for K that did not agree with F could not be given scientifically! (many authors VsCarnap). Carnap: this has to do with Leibniz's identity. VI 78/79 Foreign Psychic/Carnap: every psychological process, if it occurs as foreign psychic, is in principle recognizable (by behavior) or questionable. So every statement can be transformed into a statement about the corresponding characteristics. It follows from this that all psychological objects can be traced back to physical objects (movements of expression, behaviour). (BergsonVsCarnap). |
Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Carnap, R. | Neurath Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap I 16 Probation/Carnap: correspondence between sentence and reality, NeurathVsCarnap: coherence instead of correspondence. Carnap: the thesis of verifiability must be attenuated to the thesis of probation ability. Rescher I 364 NeurathVsCarnap: there is no way to make finally secured clean log sentences the starting point of scholarship. 1) All actual statements can be refuted in principle. 2) The benchmark for judging statements is the comparison with the system at our disposal. NeurathVsCorrespondence Theory: against all talk of truth as correspondence with reality. |
Neur I O. Neurath Philosophical Papers 1913-1946: With a Bibliography of Neurath in English (Vienna Circle Collection, Volume 16) 1983 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
| Holism | Neurath Vs Holism | Brendel I125 Definitional Coherence Theory/Truth/Neurath/Brendel: Representatives: Neurath. (Neurath did not explicitly refer to himself as a coherence theorist NeurathVsCoherence Theory/NeurathVsHolism). I 126 Neurath: pro empiricism. Truth/Neurath: Thesis, the truth definition must be exhausted in a empiricist truth criterion. Log Sentence/Schlick: foundation, unrevisable. "purely observational sentences". Log Sentence/NeurathVsSchlick: revisable. Since they are selected on the basis of decisions. Reality/Neurath/Brendel: Thesis: talking about it is sheer metaphysics. Truth/Neurath/Brendel: Therefore, can only be understood relative to a system of sentences (>coherence theory). NeurathVsCorrespondence Theory: "correspondence with reality": is rejected. "True World": pointless. I 127 Selection/Neurath: from several consistent statement sets: without truth criterion, by extralogical moments. |
Neur I O. Neurath Philosophical Papers 1913-1946: With a Bibliography of Neurath in English (Vienna Circle Collection, Volume 16) 1983 |
| Maxwell, G. | Quine Vs Maxwell, G. | II 212ff Maxwell thesis: that our knowledge of the outside world exists in a commonality of structure. Quine: important truth. Definition structure is what we retain when we encode information. --- II 213 The speech about material objects has no qualitative similarities between the objects and the inner state of the speaker, but only one type of coding and of course, causal relations. Maxwell has a theory of relative accessibility of the foreign-psychological with which I agree in a strange way. Quine: difference: I assume that between the knowledge of two individuals with regard to the same things exists a more substantial similarity, than between knowledge and things. But to that, to which our most secure knowledge relates to, is not the knowledge of other people, but publicly perceptible bodies. --- II 213 Knowledge/Quine: between knowledge of two people more substantive similarity than between person and thing (language, observation term has consensus inclination). --- II 213 Properties/Quine: can be emergent: (water) table smooth, brown, but not atoms, similar to "swarm" and "waging war": only for masses because of that not unreal or subjective. Observation Termini have consensus inclination, because they are learned through ostension. --- II 214 Therefore, I share not Maxwell's theoretical belief that "The outside world is not observable." Quine: On the contrary, as an observation scene, the outside world has had little competition. Maxwell denies the colors of the bodies, since they would be accumulations of submicroscopic particles. QuineVsMaxwell: water remains liter for liter of water, even if sub-microscopic particles are rather oxygen and hydrogen. And that has nothing paradoxical. As little paradoxical as that a table remains smooth and brown square inch for square inch, although its submicroscopic particles are discrete, swinging and colorless,. (> Emergence). Qualities: Quine: the qualities of wateriness, of the smoothness and the "being brown" are similar to the properties of swarming and of waging war. They correspond exclusively to masses as properties. Thus they are not getting unreal or subjective. It is not necessary that a predicate is true for each part of the things to which it applies. Finally, not even a figure predicate would stand the test. That specifically wateriness, smoothness and "being brown" are similar in this regard to "being square" (one corner alone is not square) and to the swarming. This is a modern knowledge, it is not a contradiction. QuineVsMaxwell: he reified without questioning the sense data, Humean sensations, floating spots of color. If one attaches the color to a subjective "curtain", there is nothing else than to leave the bodies colorless. Quine pro Maxwell: We agree that bodies and our knowledge of them are not linked by common properties with each other, but only structurally and causally. --- II 214 Knowledge: structurally and causally related to the object, not by similarity. The curtain comes from the time when the philosophy wanted to be closer to the objects than the natural science, and when it claimed, to just pull those curtains aside. --- II 215 Quine: this and not behaviorism is the exaggerated empiricism which must be expelled. Neurath: Philosophy and Science are in the same boat. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Neurath, O. | Quine Vs Neurath, O. | X 99 QuineVsProtocol sentence/QineVsNeurath/Lauener: describes private, non-public accessible own-psychological experiences. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 |
| Neurath, O. | Schlick Vs Neurath, O. | Hempel I 104 Protocol statement/SchlickVsCarnap/VsNeurath: their thesis that a statement is true if it is proven adequately by a protocol statement, is leading to absurd results, unless the idea of absolutely true protocol statements is rejected. There are obviously many different systems of protocol statements. After Carnap and Neurath each of these different, incompatible systems were true. For each tale a system of protocol statements could be set up. Carnap, Neurath: There is actually no formal or logical difference between the systems, however, an empirical! The historical fact that there is an excellent system that the humanity and the scientists of our culture actually accept. Hempel I 105 In fact, the majority of scientists sooner or later come to an agreement. Protocol statements/Carnap: how do we learn to produce "true" protocol statements? Obviously by conditioning. For example, by learning to read gauges properly or by stating reliably: "this document comes from the 17th century." Hempel I 106 In the new form of Carnap's theory protocol statements are even more radically stripped of their base character: they lose their originally awarded irrefutability. Popper: Statements of all forms may occur as protocol statements. Hempel I 107 At the end of the term will be superfluous. Fact/statement/Hempel: transition from substantive to formal speech. Coherence theory/Carnap/Neurath: do not settle for a pure coherence theory, but for a limited. Rescher I 348 SchlickVsNeurath: there may not be mere conherence in the scientific knowledge: there can be no knowledge of any truth, if there is nothing of which we are absolutely certain. |
Schlick I Moritz Schlick "Facts and Propositions" Analysis 2 (1935) pp. 65-70 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich 1994 Schlick II M. Schlick General Theory of Knowledge 1985 Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
| Schlick, M. | Carnap Vs Schlick, M. | Schurz I 14 Observation Sentences/Logical Empiricism: new: observation sentences are no longer considered irrefutable. ("Protocol sentence debate", CarnapVsSchlick and NeurathVsSchlick). > ">Protocol sentences. Empiricism: means then that only observation sentences have a preferential role. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Supervaluation | Quine Vs Supervaluation | Field II IX Supervaluation/Semantics/Lewis/Fine/Field: (Lewis 1970a), (Kit Fine 1975): both propagate supervaluationist semantics for vague languages. Field: both are right: indeterminacy is not a big problem for the correspondence theory. Indeterminacy: seems to be a bigger problem for deflationism at first. Because it does not seem clear how indeterminacy can be solved within their own language. Quine/Field: had a big problem with that (see section 7). SomeVsQuine: Indeterminacy within their own language would simply be incoherent. II 24 Propositional Conditions/Truth/T-Theory/Quine: (1953b, p 138) Propositional conditions are all it takes to make the term "true" clear. (Field ditto). Reference/Field: then we may wonder why we ever need causal theories of reference? "Denoted" and "true" become sufficiently clear through scheme (T). If we want more to pin language to reality, we overlook that we are on Neurath's ship! Quine/Field: has hinted at something like that in § 6 of W + O (Quine 1960). FieldVsQuine: but that is not due to the inscrutability of reference, to the under-determinacy of theories or to the ontological relativity. In a T theory or a theory of primitive reference we try to explain a connection between language and the world. We do not try to put ourselves outside of theories. Reference/Field: here, psychological and neurophysiological models will be important. Conceptual Scheme/Field: but we do not need to stick our conceptual scheme to the outside of reality, but without access via psychological models our conceptual scheme collapses from the inside. According to our theory, it would be extremely unlikely in any case that there should be non-physical connections between the word and the world. II 63 Synonymy/Quine/Field: intralinguistic synonymy is much easier than inter-linguistic. Quine e.g. Everest/Gaurisankar/Field: (1960, W + O, § 9, 11): (designed as a one-word sentences): here, the fact that the stimulus is different was to make the speaker prefer one over the other. The different meaning is revealed by the fact that the sentences are not intra-subjectively synonymous for most members of the language community. FieldVsQuine: "consent initiative" is too behavioristic. That causes Quine to unnecessary concern about the second intention. Second Intention/Quine/Field: verbal stimulation as e.g. "Agree to one-word sentences beginning with "E" or I'll beat the brains out of you." (W + O § 48-9). Field: nevertheless Quine's argumentation seems to be generally correct: we can explain intra-linguistic differences by evidence considerations. Advantage: that explains meaning differences where they are suspected, but without referring to possible worlds. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Wittgenstein | Verschiedene Vs Wittgenstein | Hempel I 97 NeurathVsTractatus: (Carnap was the first to discover the implications of Neurath's ideas.) Neurath: Science is a system of statements consisting of statements of only one kind. Each statement can be combined or compared with any other. But statements are never compared with a "reality", with "facts". I 98 A separation of statements and facts is the result of a doubling metaphysics. Neurath VsWittgenstein: third phase of turning away from the Tractatus: even this principle is still eliminated: it is easily imaginable that the protocol of a certain observer contains two statements that contradict each other. Then, in practice, one drops one of the two sentences. I 100 Protocol sentences can therefore no longer be regarded as an unchangeable basis. I 101 Neurath: we are not against a judge, but the judge is deductible. Stegmüller IV 76 Kripke's Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/VsKripke: some defend Wittgenstein against Kripke: Kripke did not represent conceptual nihilism or meaning nihilism. IV 77 Stegmüller: But that is not what it is about: it is about the possibility of capturing meanings. But the concept of "meaning" becomes meaningless if people do not have the opportunity to grasp it! Not the grasping of objects is the problem, but the grasping of the intensional structures, the intention, the Fregesian sense, which precede the denotates. Stegmüller IV 152 GoldfarbVsKripke: the relation token/type is a special case of the "continuation of a series" and the "rule sequence". Goldfarb: this is not correct: 1. In order to determine whether two tokens belong to the same type, one simply has to be able to detect the perceptible similarity. 2. "Type" is not a sequence to be generated according to a rule, but an unordered set! Also not for the Platonist. GoldfarbVsKripke: the conditions of justification (conditions of assertiveness) do not replace the conditions of truth at all, but are only a trivial reformulation. Wittgenstein VI 167 Original Meter/Sense/Wittgenstein/Schulte: also here misunderstanding: one has said: VI 167/168 VsWittgenstein: even if the sentence "The original meter is not 1m long" is always wrong, it still makes sense! Schulte: but this does not agree with Wittgenstein's conception of "sense". ((s) To have meaning means to be able to be negated.). Schulte: the train must have a joke in the language game! Example: "The original meter is not 1m long" is not a valid move and it is also not a joke. VI 175 VsWittgenstein/Schulte: it confuses the theory of meaning and the theory of knowledge. Never taken seriously by Wittgenstein. Wants to overcome borders anyway, although such theories do not belong to his philosophy at all. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wittgenstein | Neurath Vs Wittgenstein | Hempel I 100 NeurathVsWittgenstein: third phase of turning away from the Tractatus: even this principle is still under elimination: it is easily conceivable that the protocol of a particular observer contains two statements that contradict each other. Then, in practice, one of the two sets is dropped. Log sentences can thus no longer be regarded as immutable basis. |
Neur I O. Neurath Philosophical Papers 1913-1946: With a Bibliography of Neurath in English (Vienna Circle Collection, Volume 16) 1983 Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Verifierbarkeit | Carnap, R. | I 16 Probation: correspondence between sentence and the reality NeurathVsCarnap: coherence rather than correspondence. Carnap: the thesis of verifiability must be mitigated to the thesis of probation ability. |
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| Basis Sentence | Schlick, M. | Hempel I 102 Schlick: do not dispense entirely on basis sets, otherwise relativism" I 104 SchlickVsCarnap / VsNeurath: the thesis that a statement is true if it is proven by protocol sentences leads to absurd results, as far as the idea of absolutely true pr. s. is rejected.- There are obviously many different systems of pr. s. by Carnap and Neurath each of these different, incompatible systems were true. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
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