Disputed term/author/ism | Author![]() |
Entry![]() |
Reference![]() |
---|---|---|---|
Noise | Neumann | Brockman I 164 Noise/symbols/Neumann/Gershenfeld: Von Neumann presented in 1952(1) a result corresponding to Shannon’s for computation (they had met at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton), showing that it was possible to compute reliably with an unreliable computing device by using symbols rather than continuous quantities. This was, again, a scaling argument, with a linear increase in the physical resources representing the symbol resulting in an exponential reduction in the error rate as long as the noise was below a threshold. That’s what makes it possible to have a billion transistors in a computer chip, with the last one as useful as the first one. This relationship led to an exponential increase in computing performance, which solved a second problem in AI: how to process exponentially increasing amounts of data. >Artificial intelligence/Gershenfeld. 1. No source indicated. Gershenfeld, Neil „Scaling”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
NeumJ I J. v. Neumann The Computer and the Brain New Haven 2012 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
Noise | Shannon | Brockman I 163 Noise/Shannon/Gershenfeld: Shannon showed in 1948(1) that by communicating with symbols rather than continuous quantities, the behavior is very different. >Symbols, >Communication, >Analog/digital. Converting speech waveforms to the binary values of 1 and O is an example, but many other sets of symbols can be (and are) used in digital communications. What matters is not the particular symbols but rather the ability to detect and correct errors. Shannon found that if the noise is above a threshold (which depends on the system design), then there are certain to be errors. But if the noise is below a threshold, then a linear increase in the physical resources representing the symbol results in an exponential decrease in the likelihood of making an error in correctly receiving the symbol. Such scaling falls off so quickly that the probability of an error can be so small as to effectively never happen. Each symbol sent multiplies rather than adds to the certainty, so that the probability of a mistake can go from 0.1 to 0.01 to 0.001, and so forth. This exponential decrease in communication errors made possible an exponential increase Brockman I 164 In the capacity of communication networks. >Networks. 1. Claude Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, Bell System Technical Journal (1948), Vol. 27/3 Gershenfeld, Neil „Scaling”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
![]() |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author![]() |
Entry![]() |
Reference![]() |
---|---|---|---|
Artificial Intelligence | Gödel Vs Artificial Intelligence | Dennett I 603 Library of BabelGodel / Turing: showed that this set belongs to a different set in the Library of Babel: the set of all possible computers. Each Turing machine in which happens to be a consistent algorithm runs for evidence of mathematical truths is associated with a Godel s theorem, an arithmetic truth that they can not prove. Dennett: So what? Mind / Godel: it shows that the mind can not simply be like machines. People can do things which machines can t. DennettVs! DennettVsGödel: problem: how can you find out, whether a mathematician proved a theorem, or has only made a noise like a parrot? (> Behavior). |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Disquotation | Putnam Vs Disquotation | Putnam VII 431 Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism: >Disquotationalism). Truth/Putnam: is a property - >PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (R. Rorty, The Mirror of Nature): truth is no property. --- Horwich I 455 Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism"). Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory, Horwich I 456 and that the knowledge of the truth conditions was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions. Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y". ((s) eliminative reductionism). PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions. Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise. Instead: Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true). Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 --- Horwich I XIV VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (disquotational scheme). Horwich I XVI Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows. --- Horwich I 457 Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because: If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity". Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game. RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game. Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically. Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities. --- Williams II 497 Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition. Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory. Williams II 502 Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide. PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion. M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that? Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence. PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use. Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification. Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth. Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Evolution Theory | Luhmann Vs Evolution Theory | AU Cass 14 Theory of Evolution / system theory/ST / Luhmann: e. th. takes the chance to explain the totality, which ST can not. Selection / Luhmann: is not provided in the system, but arises from the context. Therefore, conceptually weak concept - becaus e.th. uses statistics instead of causality. Explanation / theory / Luhmann: other theories explain the background noise ("order from noise") as a matter for a transformation into order within the system. LuhmannVs: here is not said exactly how this is done. This is the idea that information is a native product. But how the transformation happens is not explained. Therefore we need Structural coupling. (Cass.6) Double contingency: > theory of evolution: Parallel: somehow there is a split between variation and selection and thus structural changes are encouraged, evolution suggests itself to the establishment of order. And that can not be explained from the primordial soup or "initial conditions" (also not from language or social order) alone. (No "initial conditions." This is double contingency, the invention of a reference problem for rational analysis. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
Formalism | Bigelow Vs Formalism | I 176 Symbol/Blackening/Bigelow/Pargetter: some authors say that symbols are mere blackening of the paper (e.g. numbers) or mere sounds. BigelowVsFormalism: Problem: on the one hand, there are then too many symbols, on the other hand there are too few. too few: there is no corresponding blackening or noise for very large numbers. too many: for smaller numbers, there are too many different ways of representation, more than numbers is distinguished. E.g. "4", "four", "IV". |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
Goedel, K. | Dennett Vs Goedel, K. | I 603 Gödel number/Dennett: Goedel numbers make it possible to arrange all possible axiom systems in alphabetical order. Goedel/Turing: showed that this set belongs to a different set in the Library of Babel: the set of all possible computers. Each Turing machine in which happens that a consistent algorithm runs for proving mathematical truths is associated with a Godel s theorem - with an arithmetic truth that it can not prove. Dennett: So what? Mind/Goedel: it shows that the mind can not simply be like machines. People can do things which may not be performed by machines. DennettVs! DennettVsGödel: problem: how can you find out, whether a mathematician has proved a theorem, or has only made a noise like a parrot? (> Proofs). |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Grice, P.H. | Avramides Vs Grice, P.H. | Avramidis I 15 Understanding/Grice/Avramides: according to Grice understanding is an inference from noise chains I 16 on the intentions of the speaker and from there on a piece of knowledge about the world. VsGrice: this brings too much psychology into play. Avra I 93 VsGrice/Avramides: it was criticized that his approach requires the listener to distinguish some speaker’s intentions before he understands utterances. (Platts 1979 pp. 91). GriceVsVs: could respond that this is simply not necessary. Because it is not important to find out how communication occurs. I 94 What Grice is actually interested in: what constitutes meaning is to be separated from any method of interpretation (translation?). (> Biro). |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
Hume, D. | Ryle Vs Hume, D. | I 341 Impressions/Ideas/Notion/Emotion/Hume/Ryle: Hume is known to have believed that there were both "impressions" and "ideas", both sensations and notions. He looked in vain for a demarcation line. "Ideas"/Hume/Ryle: he thought they were generally paler than impressions and later in their formation, as they are traces, references and reproductions of impressions. Yet he realized that impressions may have any degree of pallor or weakness. And that ideas, although they are representations, do not appear with the stamp "copy", just as impressions do not appear as "original". According to Hume, therefore, an inspection cannot determine whether a perception is an impression or an idea. I 342 RyleVsHume: Hume's mistake was to confuse "seeing" and seeing and "perception" and perception. And to assume that "perception" is a genus of which there are two types, namely impressions and ghosts or echoes of impressions. E.g. Ghosts: There are no such ghosts, and if they did exist, they themselves would only be impressions. And they would belong to seeing, not to "seeing". Hume's attempt to distinguish between impressions and ideas as between things that are "living" and less "alive", was one of two serious errors. Suppose first that "alive" means "agile" in Hume. Someone can vividly imagine something, but he cannot vividly see. Idea/Ryle: can be "more vivid" than a different idea, but Impressions/Ryle: cannot be described as vivid, just like babies are not more lifelike than dolls. Someone who does not play is neither convincing, nor not convincing, and can therefore not be more convincing than an actor. RyleVsHume: let us assume then, that Hume understood "alive" to mean "intensive", "strong". Then he was in error in another respect. For while emotions can be compared in terms of their strength and intensity, so they cannot be compared with ideas in this regard. E.g. if I imagine to hear a huge noise, I hear neither a loud nor a soft noise. I have no auditory sensation at all. E.g. a scream that I imagine is not deafening, but on the other hand it is not a soft murmur either. Neither does it drown an actual murmur, nor will it be drowned by it. I 370 Fantasy/Notion/Ryle: in imaginary landscapes it is pointless to ask whether they are properly imagined, like with melodies that are not yet complete. E.g. Nevertheless, the actor pretends to give a convincing representation of a Martian. I 372 "Seeing"/RyleVsHume: now we see Hume's other mistake: in the mistaken belief that "seeing" and "hearing" consists in the having of shadow sensations (which includes the other error that such a thing exists), he championed the causal theory that you cannot have a particular idea, without previously having had the corresponding sensation. The only thing that is true about this theory, is: what I see in my mind's eye, is in some way linked to what I have seen before. But the nature of this link does not correspond to Hume's idea in any way. I 373 Memory/Notion/RyleVsTrace Theory: its followers should try to imagine the case where someone has a melody going through his head over and over again. Is that a reactivated trace of an auditory sensation, or a number of reactivated traces a series of auditory sensations? |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
Kant | Putnam Vs Kant | VI 402ff Knowledge/I/Kant/Putnam: Kant's picture of knowledge understood this as a "representation", a kind of game. I am the author of this game. I: But the author of the game also appears in the game itself (as in Pirandello). "Empirical I"/Kant/Putnam: the author in the game is not the "real author", he is the "empirical I". transcendental ego/Kant/Putnam: is the "real" author of the game. (Outside the game). I/internal realism/PutnamVsKant: I'd modify his picture in two respects: 1. The authors (in the plural, my picture is social) do not write one but several versions. 2. The authors in the stories are the real authors. PutnamVsSkepticism: N.B.: that would be "crazy" if these are only fictions. Because a fictional character cannot be a real author. But these are true stories. --- V 52 Determinism/Kant: said that such a defense component is of rationality itself. We do not discover the principle of determinism, but we impose it on the world. PutnamVsKant: this goes too far. The price would be a too great complication of our knowledge system. V 88 Putnam: one could read Kant as if he had first obtained the position of the internalism. Of course, not explicitly. V 89 I suggest to read it as if he said that Locke's thesis about the secondary qualities applies to all qualities: the simple, the primary and the secondary. V 90 If all properties are secondary: then everything what we say about an object has the form: it is such that it affects us in this or that way. Our ideas of objects are not copies of mind independent things. PutnamVsKant: today the concept of the noumenal world is considered an unnecessary metaphysical element in its thinking. V 118 Rationality/Putnam: is not determined by unalterable rule directories, as Kant believed, described to our transcendental nature. PutnamVsKant: the whole idea of a transcendental nature (noumenal) is nonsense. --- Putnam I (c) 93 Reference/theory/Putnam: one can also say it very briefly. "electron" refers to electrons, how else should we say within a conceptual system with "electron" as a primitive term, whereupon "electron" refers to? This also solves to a certain extent the "dilemma of Quine" and Kant: "Quinean Dilemma"/Putnam: (also in Kant): there is a real world, but we can only describe it with our conceptual system. PutnamVsQuine/PutnamVsKant: so what? How else should we describe it otherwise? should we use the term system of someone else? I (f) 169 Noumenon/noumenal world/PutnamVsKant: is now regarded as an unnecessary metaphysical element. Properties/Kant/Putnam: N.B.: the subtle point is that Kant thinks that all this also applies to sensation ("objects of the inner sense") as well as to external objects. E.g. "E is like this here" (whereby you concentrate on E) means: "E is like E".: Kant: in reality no judgment has come about. Puntam: merely an inarticulate sound, a noise. I (f) 169/170 Putnam: if "red" on the other hand is a real classification expression when I say that this sensation E belongs to the same class as sensations that I call "red" on other occasions, then my judgment goes beyond what is immediately given. Sensation/similarity/Noumenon/PutnamVsKant: whether the sensations that I have at different times, (noumenal) are "really" all similar, this question makes no sense. Kant ignores this completely. The sensations that I call "red", cannot be compared directly with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property as the objects which I call "gold", neither can they be directly compared with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property. The objects are similar for me, they are red for me. That is my sensation. Properties/PutnamVsKant: if he says that all properties are secondary (that is, they are assets) then this would be the property of a noumenal object, to invoke in us the impression of pinewood, for example. I (f) 170/171 At this point, he is close to saying that he gives up the correspondence theory. Definition Truth/Kant: "the agreement of knowledge with its object". PeirceVsKant: this is a nominal definition of truth. Assets/Kant: is attributed to the whole noumenal world. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Kripke, S. A. | Anscombe Vs Kripke, S. A. | Frank I 84 I/Descartes: not a kind of body. I could assume that I don’t have a body. I/Augustine: "the mind knows of itself, that it is thinking." "It knows its own substance." Kripke/Anscombe: K. tried to rehabilitate Descartes’ argument for his dualism. AnscombeVsKripke: he neglects his first person character by making it an argument for the non-identity of Descartes with his own body. I 85 According to this, Descartes would have had to doubt the existence of Descartes as a human being, and in any case the existence of this figure in the world of his time, of this Frenchman, christened René... Descartes/AnscombeVsKripke: "I am not Descartes" was for him like "I’m not a body!" Forcing the argument into the third person perspective by replacing "I" with "Descartes" means to neglect this. Descartes never thought, "Descartes is not Descartes" (which according to Anscombe is ascribed to him by Kripke). I 85/86 AnscombeVsKripke: this discussion is not about the usual reflexive pronoun, but about a strange reflexive which must be explained from the standpoint of the "I". Grammarians call it the "indirect reflexive". (In Greek it is a separate form.) E.g. "When John Smith spoke of James Robinson, he spoke of his brother, but he did not know that." So it is conceivable that someone does not know that the object of which he speaks is himself. Now, if "I" is compatible with ignorance, the reflexive pronoun cannot be used as usual. Now one may ask: was the person of which Smith intended to speak not Smith? Was the person not himself?. Answer: not in the relevant sense! Unless the reflexive pronoun is itself a sufficient proof of reference. And the usual reflexive pronoun cannot do that. I 96 I/Self/Logic/Anscombe: here, the "manner of givenness" is unimportant. Fra I 97 The logician understands that "I" in my mouth is just another name for "E.A.". His rule: if x makes assertions with "I" as the subject, then they are true iff the predicates of x are true. AnscombeVsLogic/AnscombeVsKripke: for this reason he makes the transition from "I" to "Descartes". But this is too superficial: If one is a speaker who says "I", then it is impossible to find out what it is that says "I". E.g. one does not look to see from which apparatus the noise comes. Thus, we have to compel our logician to assume a "guaranteed" reference of "I". Fra I 98 Problem: with a guaranteed reference there is no longer any difference between "I" and "A". |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Lewis, D. | Avramides Vs Lewis, D. | Avra I 28 Vs Lewis: It’s pointless to say that noises have truth conditions. LewisVsVs: I do not say that noise chains or signs themselves have truth conditions, I say, they have meaning or truth conditions relative to a language. (> Lewis 1983c, p. 173). |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
Operationalism | Putnam Vs Operationalism | V 50 Operationalism: clumsy agreement: when the needle of the voltmeter is deflected, current flows. PutnamVsOperationalism: 1. The connections between theory and experience (read) are probabilistic and cannot be properly formalized as perfect correlations. (Background noise, etc.). 2. Even these probabilistic connections are not simple semantic correlations but depend on the empirical theory, which is exposed to the revision. According to the naive operationalism the terms undergo each time a change of meaning when a new test procedure is developed. There is an operational notion after which theories are tested sentence after sentence. --- V 51 Solution: one can formulate the class of permissible to be accepted interpretations so that the sentence S is mostly true. (Attenuation). The ideal set of operational preconditions is what we gradually approach in the course of empirical research, and not something that we just agree on. E.g. a "permissible interpretation" is such that different effects always have different causes. --- V 70 Re-interpretation/language/PutnamVsOperationalism: the whole problem only arises when the permissible interpretations are only picked out by operational or theoretical preconditions. The embarrassing thereto is that operational plus theoretical preconditions represent the natural process. What remains is the looseness of the relationship between truth conditions and reference. --- V 71 Reference/Reference/PutnamVsOperationalism: is the reference, however, only determined by operational and theoretical preconditions, the reference of "x is in R y" is, in turn, undetermined. Knowing that (1) is true, is not useful. Each permissible model of our object language will correspond to one model in our meta-language, in which (1) applies, and the interpretation of "x is in R to y" will determine the interpretation of "x refers to y". However, this will only be a relation in each permissable model and it will nothing contribute to reduce the number of permissable models. FieldVs: this is not, of course, what Field intends. He claims (a) that there is a certain unique relationship between words and things, and (b) that this is the relationship that must also be used when assigning a truth value to (1) as the reference relation. PutnamVsField: but this cannot necessarily be expressed in that you simply pronounce (1), and it is a mystery how we could learn to express what Field wants to say. Field: a certain definite relationship between words and objects is true. PutnamVsField: if it is so that (1) is true in this view, whereby is it then made true? How is a particular correspondence R discarded? It appears, the fact that R is really the reference, should be a metaphysical inexplicable fact. (So magical theory of reference, as if reference to things is intrinsically adhered). (Not to be confused with Kripke 'metaphysically necessary' truth). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Philosophy | Feynman Vs Philosophy | I 232 Relativity Theory/RT/FeynmanVsPhilosophy: Philosophers have often misunderstood the theory of relativity. But it is true that the phenomena depend on the reference system. Scientific camps: there is a school of philosophers who are uneasy with the fact that we cannot determine the absolute velocity without looking outside. They would say that it is useless to speak of velocity without looking outside. I 233 FeynmanVs: these philosophers will always be there, they struggle at the periphery, they never really understand the subtleties and depths of the problem. Our inability to demonstrate absolute movement is a result of the experiment and not just of pure thought. If Newton was the first to formulate the principle of relativity, why did people in his time not make so much noise about "everything is relative"? Answer: because only with Maxwell’s equations and theory of electrodynamics laws of physics existed that suggest that one could measure one’s speed without observing the outside world. Soon it was however found experimentally that it it is impossible!. Movement/FeynmanVsPhilosophy: there is a camp of philosophers who assert that movement cannot be proven at all except by observing the outside world. FeymanVs: that’s just not true! Only uniform rectilinear movement cannot be proven (if one is affected by it oneself). E.g. if we rotate in space, we experience a "centrifugal force" ((s) pseudo-force, but noticeable). E.g. the Earth’s rotation can be detected with the Foucault pendulum, without looking "outside". (Internal evidence). I 234 Philosophy/Feynman: if the philosopher is a good one, he comes back and says, "we really do rotate relative to the stars, therefore they must cause the centrifugal force" Feynman: According to all we know that is true. But currently we cannot say whether the centrifugal force would exist, if there were no stars, we just do not know. Then the philosopher might assume he proved that there is only relative movement to the stars. FeynmanVs:... it is just equally obvious that linear movement relative to the stars is not precisely detectable. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
Relativism | Putnam Vs Relativism | V 163 VsRelativism: it is obviously contradictory to represent a point of view, while one simultaneously claimes that no position is justified to a greater extent than any other. And if, any position is good as much as any other, why should the position that relativism is false, not be worth as much as another point of view? ((s) The Relativism has to put itself as absolutism). Relativism, modern form/VsVs: given the overabundance of relativistic theories that are thrown today on the market by clever people that seems insufficient. Why would an intelligent relativism admit that (for it) any other view is as true as any other? It cannot let you deter, to say that its view is not true for you, but it can respond that truth means for yourself much less (for it) than truth for it. It is important to note that if everything is relative, also the Relative is relative. --- V 166 Relativism/Putnam: could make the idea his own, that truth is the idealization of rational acceptability. ("If I only watch myself carefully enough"). But unreal conditional clauses (counterfactual conditionals, co.co.) are interpreted differently by different philosophers. VsRelativism: if now the relativist interprets statements about what he would think under such and such circumstances, in this realistic way, he would have stopped being the relativist, because he would have recognized a class of absolute truths. PutnamVsRelativism: when he claims that even in one's own case, one could not differentiate between being entitled to and believing being entitled to, then what is speaking except the generation of noise to generate feelings at its best? The relativist must ultimately deny that a thought invloves something. VsRelativism: the relativist overlooks the fact that it is a requirement of his own thinking itself, that there is such a thing as objective "accuracy". --- V 217 Relativism/Foucault/Ethnology: Foucault argues quite different than the ethnologists: he does not argue that earlier practices had more rationality, as it appears, but that all practices are less rational than we think. VsRelativism: falls into the trap of the conclusion, all rational argumentation is merely rationalization, to then keep trying to argue rationally for this position. --- V 22 VsRelativism: E.g. trough aggression and fantasy people can be inflamed, until all the people are getting bloodthirsty. But this does not show that all value judgments are irrational, but only that some are. --- PutnamVsRelativism: what relativist believes "true only for my subculture ...". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
![]() |
Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus![]() |
Entry![]() |
Reference![]() |
---|---|---|---|
Atomism, Semantical | Pro | Fodor / Lepore IV 32 Semantic atomism: thesis: the meaning of an expression can not be determined through its role in the language, but by direct relation symbol - world. Per: Locke / Hume / Hobbes / Berkeley / behaviorism / Dewey a) Locke / Hume / Berkeley: Ideas, ideas are associated b) behaviorism: Meaning behavior includes gestures (noise). |
|
![]() |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author![]() |
Entry![]() |
Reference![]() |
---|---|---|---|
Meaning Theory | Schiffer, St. | I 261 Meaning / BT / language / Schiffer: all theories of language and thought go from false assumptions - Error: to think that language comprehension would be a process of inferences. I 264 Solution / Schiffer: we ourselves are still cognitive mechanisms, noise-generating physical information-processing systems. I B264 Schiffer: ultimately it is the way in which we use characters and sounds - described non-semantically and non-psychologically - which explains our semantic knowledge (given the conceptual roles of our neural terms). |
|
![]() |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author![]() |
Entry![]() |
Reference![]() |
---|---|---|---|
Consciousness | Jackendoff, R. | Pinker I 176 Seeing / visual information processing / Pinker: levels: rods and cones on intermediate levels for the representation of edges, depth and surface up to the recognition of objects. Jackendoff: thesis: the access awareness taps into the middle tier. People are unaware of the lowest level. I 176/177 Analog for listening: we do not perceive one (uninterrupted) chain of sounds, but defined words. Memory: these figures and not amorphous noises remain in the memory. Unconscious parallel processing has its limitations, the higher levels must choose. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
![]() |