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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Phonetics | Psychological Theories | Slater I 192 Phonetics/psychological theories: Liberman, Harris, Hoffman, and Griffith (1957)(1) summarized a decade of research at Haskins Laboratories that revealed a special property of the human adult auditory system. In contrast to every other type of auditory stimulus, whose perception conformed to invariant principles such as Weber’s Law. Def Weber’s Law: differences in intensity and frequency are discriminated in proportional steps, not absolute steps. LibermanVsWeber’s Law: Liberman et al. provided compelling evidence that certain classes of speech sounds (notably stop consonants) are not perceived in this monotonic manner. Rather, speech is perceived in a non-monotonic manner, with discontinuities in discrimination that fall approximately at the edges of perceptual categories. Subsequent work from Haskins (Liberman, Harris, Kinney, & Lane, 1961(2); Liberman, Cooper, Shankweiler, & Studdert Kennedy, 1967)(3) provided even more definitive evidence for what became known as categorical perception (CP). Categorical Perception (CP): This special mode of perception was characterized by two crucial properties: (a) tokens presented from a physical continuum were identified (labeled) as a member of one category or the other, with a sharp transition in identification (ID) at the category boundary, and (b) failure of within-category discrimination and a peak in between-category discrimination for tokens that straddled the category boundary. >Language development/psychological theories. Language development: Because no speech production was required to document the presence of CP, one could avoid the circular logic of claiming that competence was limited by production deficiencies. Thus, if one could develop a method to test infants on a speech perception task, and if their performance conformed to the CP pattern of discrimination and identification observed in adults, then the presence of a functioning speech mode (i.e., an innate and linguistically relevant perceptual system) would be demonstrated. Slater I 197 Development: There is no question that infants are better at some phonetic discrimination than adults. For example, infants from a Japanese speaking environment can discriminate the /ri-/li contrast (Tsushima et al., 1994)(4), even though it is not used phonemically by adult speakers of Japanese, and these adult speakers have great difficulty improving their /r/-/l/ discrimination even after extensive training (Lively, Pisoni, Yamada, Tohkura & Yamada, 1994)(5). This suggests that listening experience must play a substantial role in at least some phonetic category discrimination. Werker and Tees (1984) were the first to show the time-course of such a tuning by the listening environment. Infants from an English speaking environment were able at six months of age to discriminate two non-native phonetic contrasts (from Hindi and from Salish, a Native American language), thereby surpassing their adult English speaking parents. But by 12 months of age the discriminative abilities of infants from an English speaking environment for these two non-native contrasts had fallen to near chance. Slater I 198 Consonant discrimination: (…) experience with the native language can exert a substantial role in consonant discrimination over the second six months of postnatal life. (…) Kuhl, Williams, Lacerda, Stevens, and Lindblom (1992)(6) showed that the effect of native language experience operates even earlier over vowel contrasts, with language-specific tuning by six months of age. Recent evidence from Kuhl, Tsao, and Liu (2003)(7) suggests that social interaction, rather than mere passive listening, plays a key role in this process of attuning the phonetic categories, and further work from Tsao, Liu, and Kuhl(2004)(8) suggests that early attunement is predictive of later levels of vocabulary size. >Phonemes, >Phonology, >Categorical perception, >P.D. Eimas. 1. Liberman, A. M., Harris, K. S., Hoffman, H. S., & Griffith, B.C. (1957). The discrimination of speech sounds within and across phoneme boundaries. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54, 358—368. 2. Liberman, A. M., Harris, K. S., Kinney, J., & Lane, H. (1961). The discrimination of relative onset-time of the components of certain speech and non-speech patterns. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 61,379—388. 3. Liberman, A. M., Cooper, F. S., Shankweiler, D. P., & Studdert-Kennedy, M. (1967). Perception of the speech code. Psychological Review, 74, 431—461. 4. Tsushima, T. Takizawa, O., Sasaki, M., Siraki, S., Nishi, K., Kohno, M., Menyuk, P., & Best, C. (1994, October). Discrimination of English/r-l/ and/w-y/ by Japanese infants at 6—12 months: Language specific developmental changes in speech perception abilities. Paper presented at the International Conference on Spoken Language Processing, Yokohama, Japan. 5. Lively, S. E., Pisoni, D. B., Yamada, R. A., Tohkura, Y., & Yamada, T. (1994). Training Japanese listeners to identify English/r/ and /1/. III. Long-term retention of new phonetic categones. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 96, 2076—2087. 6. Kuhl, P. K., Williams, K. A., Lacerda, F., Stevens, K. N., & Lindbiom, B. (1992). Linguistic experience alters phonetic perception in infants by 6 months of age. Science, 255, 606—608. 7. Kuhi, P. K., Tsao. F.-M., & Liu, H.-M. (2003). Foreign-language experience in infancy Effects of short-term exposure and social interaction on phonetic learning. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100, 9096—9101. 8. Tsao, F.-M., Liu, H.-M., & Kuhl, P. K. (2004). Speech perception in infancy predicts language development in the second year of life: A longitudinal study. Child Development, 75, 1067—1084. Richard N. Aslin, “Language Development. Revisiting Eimas et al.‘s /ba/ and /pa/ Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Phonetics | Eimas | Slater I 193 Phonetics/Eimas: In their study (Eimas et al. 1971(1)) (>Language development/Eimas, >Language development/psychological theories) Eimas et al. presented both within-category and between-category differences to infants, and the expectation was that only the between-category differences would be discriminated. For historical accuracy, it is important to note that Moffitt (1971)(2) conducted a study of speech discrimination in 5—6 month olds that appeared in print before Eimas et al. (1971)(1), but only a between-category /ba/ — /ga/ contrast was tested. Using a heart-rate measure, Moffitt showed that infants can discriminate this contrast before six months of age. Slater I 192 Categorical Perception (CP): This special mode of perception was characterized by two crucial properties: (a) tokens presented from a physical continuum were identified (labeled) as a member of one category or the other, with a sharp transition in identification (ID) at the category boundary, and (b) failure of within-category discrimination and a peak in between-category discrimination for tokens that straddled the category boundary. Method of the study: High Amplitude Sucking (HAS) - was a form of operant conditioning in which sucking behavior led to the presentation of a reward. Slater I 194 Eimas et al. (1971)(1) used the HAS technique to measure the discrimination of two tokens that adults identify as different (20 msec VOT (voice onset time) = /ba/ and 40 msec VOT = / pa/), two tokens that adults identify as the same (-20 msec and O msec VOT = /ba/; 60 and 80 msec VOT = /pa/), and as a control condition two tokens that were identical (one of the six values of VOT: -20,0,20,40,60,80 msec). The minus VOT value denotes a sound for which the vocal chords begin to vibrate slightly before the sound is released. Thus, there was a between-category condition, a within-category condition, and a no-change control condition. Results: Only infants in the between-category condition showed evidence of discrimination; that is, they showed a significant recovery of sucking rate after the change in the speech stimulus. Infants in the within-category condition showed no evidence of an increase in sucking rate to a change in the speech stimulus, even though the physical change was of the same magnitude (20 msec) as in the between-category condition. And infants in the control condition did not show spontaneous recovery of sucking to the same repeating speech stimulus, thereby ruling out false evidence of discrimination in the between-category condition. Eimas et al.: “The discontinuity in discrimination at the region of the adult phonemic boundary was taken as evidence for categorical perception.” (1971(1), p. 306). “The means by which the categorical perception of speech, that is, perception in a linguistic mode, is accomplished may well be part of the biological makeup of the organism and, moreover, that these means must be operative at an unexpectedly early age.” (p. 306). >Language development/Eimas. 1. Eimas, P. D., Siqueland, E. R.,Jusczyk, P., & Vigorito, J. (1971). Speech perception in infants. Science, 171, 303-306. 2. Moffitt, A. R. (1971). Consonant cue perception by twenty- to twenty-four-week-old infants. Child Development, 42, 717—731. Richard N. Aslin, “Language Development. Revisiting Eimas et al.‘s /ba/ and /pa/ Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
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| Chomsky, N. | Putnam Vs Chomsky, N. | Chomsky I 293 PutnamVsChomsky: Putnam assumes for phonetics in the universal grammar, that it only has a single list of sounds. This did not require a sophisticated explanatory hypothesis. Only "memory span and powers of recollection". "No upright behaviorist would deny that these are innate properties." ChomskyVsPutnam: but there have been set up very strong empirical hypotheses about the selection of the universal distinctive features, none of which seems to be explained on the basis of restrictions of memory. Chomsky I 298 PutnamVsChomsky: Thesis: instead of an innate schematism, "general multipurpose strategies" could be assumed. This innate base would have to be the same for the acquisition of any knowledge, so that there is nothing special about language acquisition. Chomsky I 299 ChomskyVsPutnam: with that he is no longer entitled to assume something is innate. Furthermore, it only shifts the problem. PutnamVsChomsky: the evaluation functions proposed in the universal grammar "the kind of facts is constituted which tries to explain the theory of learning, but not the required explanation itself". ChomskyVsPutnam: E.g. no one would say that the genetic basis for the development of arms instead of wings was "the kind of fact that attempts to explain the theory of learning". Rather, they are the basis for an explanation of other facts of human behavior. Whether the evaluation function is learned or is the basis of learning, is an empirical question. PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered by routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not very impressive. ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact that refers to competence and not to performance (actual practice). What the grammar explains is why e.g. in "criticism of students" "student" can be understood as subject or object, whereas e.g. "grain" in "the growing of the grain" can only be subject. The question of routine does not matter here. Chomsky I 300 Innate Ideas/ChomskyVsPutnam: the innate representation of universal grammar indeed solves the problem of learning (at least partly) if it is really true that this is the basis for language acquisition, which may very well be the case! Putnam III 87 Putnam/Chomsky: Putnam proposes: correctness in linguistics is what the currently available data best explain about the behavior of the speaker under a current interest. What is true today, will be false tomorrow. PutnamVsChomsky: I never said that what is right today, will be wrong tomorrow. Putnam: Chomsky's hidden main theses: 1) the we are free to choose our interests at will, 2) that interests themselves are not subject to normative criticism. E.g. Hans' heart attack lies in the defiance of medical recommendations. Other explanation: high blood pressure. It may be, in fact, that on one day one fact is more in the interests of the speaker, and the next day another one. III 88 PutnamVsChomsky: 1) we cannot just pick and choose our interests. 2) It sometimes happens that the relevance of a particular interest is disputed. How can it be, however, that some interests are more reasonable than others? Reasonableness is supposed to depend on different conditions in different contexts. There is no general answer. III 88/89 The assertion that a concept is interest relative does not come out at the same as the thesis, all interests are equally reasonable. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
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