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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ontology | Sellars | I XLIV Ontology/Sellars: at the end there is an ontology in which there are only processes. Absolute processes: where we are not anymore talking about objects. ("It is raining"), the word "it" here represents no object. >Process, >Process ontology. Strawson had also contemplated this, and dropped it for the reason, among others, that there are not always objectless processes such as lightning or bangs, to be identified without reference to other objects. >Reference/Strawson, >Ontology/Strawson. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Ontology | Strawson | Sellars I XLIV Ontology/Sellars: at the end there is an ontology in which there are only processes. Absolute processes: objects are no longer is mentioned. ("It is raining"), the word "it" here represents no object. >Process ontology. Strawson had also considered this idea, and dropped it for the reason, among others, that objectless processes such as lightning or bangs, cannot always be identified directly without the reference to other objects. >Identification/Strawson, >Particulars/Strawson. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Process/Flux | Process/Flux, philosophy: is a process of change that is restricted by natural law or by human planning or technical devices. It is the antonym to object. See also flux, change, movement, condition, process ontology, events, programs, mereology. |
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| Process/Flux | Simons | I 124f Flux/Heraclitus/ChisholmVsQuine: Quine needs spatial and temporal extension on the same level Chi: not every sum of flux stages is a flux process. We have to say what conditions a sum must satisfy to be a flow process. >Mereological sum. Problem: that in turn presupposes continuants: shore, observers, absolute space or an introduction of "is co-fluvial with". >Continuants. This could only be explained circularly by "is the same river as". Thus, the four-dimensionalism has not eliminated all singular or general terms that denote continuants. SimonsVsQuine: one does not bath in a flux stage but in the whole flux. Error: it is wrong trying to change the subject to leave the predicate unchanged. I125 Time-stage/flux-stages/SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: stages can be misleading: e.g. a Philip stage is not drunk, but the whole man. One does not bath in a flux stadium. A consequent description in four-dimensionalism is only achieved by higher beings. For us, this is not decidable. Terminology: process ontology equals four-dimensionalism here. Simons: this is not impossible, only the language is different. >Four-dimensionalism. I 127 SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: four-dimensionalism is a convenient representation of the Minkowski-space, but representation is not an ontological argument. >Minkowski-space. I 126 Process/Geach/Simons: a process has all its properties timeless, that means, what has different properties, are the temporal parts and not the whole process. Hence, there is no change, e.g. like the poker which is hot on one end and cold at the other. >Timelessness. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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