Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Representation | Proust | I 225 Mental representation/Dretske/Proust: 1. Covariance between internal condition and external situation ("Indication"). 2. The internal indicator has the function of displaying the external situation. Then it represents it. 3. Representations can be true or false. I 227 Representation/Proust: the everyday understanding commits a petitio principii when it refers to a particular representation, which is to be based only on a difference between inside and outside or on spatial concepts. >Space/Proust, >Inside/Outside. Spatial concepts can only provide a solution when it comes to explaining the use of spatial relations to distinguish terms. >Concepts/Proust, >Concepts. I 229 Representation/Animal/Proust: we see that probably many animals have mental representations. I 230 These are also objective. Question: are these animals that are obviously capable of a kind of proto belief, also capable of real beliefs, or do they only have non-conceptual perception abilities? >Proto-thought, >Thinking without language, >Animals, >Animal language. |
Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Thinking | Dummett | I 93 ff DummettVsFrege: his theory of perception contradicts his thesis that every human can only grasp those thoughts which he understands as the sense of sentences. There are two interpretations. I 105 Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: not necessarily linguistic: Proto-thoughts (also animals) (associated with activity). - Proto-thoughts instead of Husserl's noema. I 137 f Thinking: Strongest interpretation: we can only think in language - Weakest interpretation: none of us can have a thought that we cannot express. Cf. >Psychological theories on language and thought, >Animal language. I 141 DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not >idiolect, but common language prevails. III (e) 209 Language/thinking/Wittgenstein/Dummett: the role of language as a vehicle of thought is subordinate to its role as a tool of communication. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Thoughts | Dummett | I 19 Frege: The thought not the same as sense of the sentence. - Creatures with identical thoughts without linguistic manifestation are possible. I 32 f Frege/thought: According to Frege the thought (the content of the act of thinking) is not part of the stream of consciousness. Frege: capturing the thought ismental act. - The thought is not content of consciousness - consciousness is subjective - the thought is objective. - WittgensteinVsFrege. Frege: Thoughts are objective, ideas are not. - If it were otherwise, we could never disagree. I 194 ff Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: Thoughts are not necessarily linguistic: Proto-thoughts (also animals) (associated with activities). >Animal language. - Proto-thoughts instead of Husserl's noema. I 120 A thought cannot be detected otherwise than as a complex. Evans: "generality condition": "This rose smells sweet" - no one who is unable to have other thoughts regarding this rose can have the thought or who does not understand what smelling sweet is. (Dummett pro). I 89 Grasp: does not determine the truth value, but the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dummett, M. | Putnam Vs Dummett, M. | VI 394 Understanding/truth conditions/WB/Dummett/Putnam: Dummett and I both agree that you cannot treat understanding as knowledge of the truth conditions. PutnamVsWittgenstein, DummettVsWittgenstein. Cf. >Understanding/Wittgenstein. Problem: then it gets incomprehensible when reversed, what this knowledge should be. Meaning/Meaning Theory/PutnamVsDummett: I do not think that a theory of understanding could be the entire meaning theory. VI 395 VsMetaphysical realism: thus, we can refute it with Dummett. (Through a theory of reference, not meaning theory). --- III 48/49 Proto-thoughts/PutnamVsDummett: terms for animals: dogs have just as little a preconception of meat, like gazelles have a preconception of running fast. ---- I (d) 124 Realism/anti-realism/PutnamVsDummett: Problem: We argue that the understanding of sentences would be knowing the truth conditions. But how can we say at all what this knowledge is? Putnam: We have seen that "mentalese" does not help. I (e) 151 Internal realism/PutnamVsDummett: related to Dummett, but: truth is not identified according to him with justification, but with an idealization of justification. Putnam: Truth should be a property of statements that cannot get lost contrarily to the justification. Justification is also gradual as opposed to the truth. The "ideal justification" corresponds to the "frictionless surfaces" of physics. It has "pure value". Internal realism/PutnamVsDummett: related to its anti-realism, but truth is not identified with justification but with an idealization of justification, Quine: the justification conditions change with our corpus of knowledge. I (e) 152 Truth is independent of justification here and now, but not of any justification. (> Assertibility). Like Quine: the conditions of justification change with the development of our corpus of knowledge. ---- I (f) 161 Truth/justification/PutnamVsDummett: to reject the divine point of view, does not mean to identify truth with rational acceptability as Dummett says that we should do it. Truth: cannot get lost. Justification: can very well do this. E.g. "The earth is a disk." E.g. also that it is a ball, is not a "gradual truth" but it is gradually justified. Truth/Putnam: an idealization of rational acceptability. (Under epistemically ideal conditions). I (f) 162 Truth/Putnam: 1. independent of the justification here and now, but not independent of any justification. 2. supposed to be stable and convergent. --- I (h) 214 Truth/Dummett: (1976, 1991) is justification. PutnamVsDummett: 1. this is misleading in many ways, it is likely that one cannot specify the conditions of the justification for the sentences of a natural language. (But Dummett believes that). 2. Dummett believes in a final verification, I only in an idealized one (based on the current evidence, so context-sensitive). Assertibility conditions/PutnamVsDummett: are not manageable for an arbitrary sentence. How do we learn them? By appropriating a practice. But this is not an algorithm (how reductionist philosophers believe). I (h) 215 The assertibility conditions cannot be formalized and therefore not the human rationality. ((s) They may well be independent of situations, but not of our entire practice.) |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
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