Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Correspondence Theory | Field | I 229 Correspondence Theory/Truth/Field: correspondence theory needs an additional concept of the truth theoretical content of psychological states. - And it is used in a way that it cannot occur in the disquotation scheme. >Psychological states, >Tarski-scheme, >Disquotationalism. I 250 Correspondence Theory/FieldVsCorrespondence Theory: even for an inconsistent theory it is consistent when the the correspondence theory is assumed that it is true, because the logical words in it could have been used differently. >Logical constants, >Language use. Therefore, the truth of the correspondence theory should not be applied to disquotational truth, because it is a logical concept itself and the instances of disquotation scheme must be regarded as logical truths. II 199 Correspondence Theory/ontological commitment/Quine/Field: the ontological commitment seems to exclude the correspondence theory. >Ontological commitment. FieldVsQuine: despite the uncertainty we should allow correspondence. - >Partial denotation. IV 416 VsCorrespondence: which one is the right one? Field: which one is relevant may depend on epistemic values, but not on which values are "correct. Field pro "epistemic relativism". IV 419 RelativismVsSkepticism: the question of the "real" justification does not make sense. >Relativism, >Skepticism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| First Person | Davidson | Frank I 654f Meaning/Putnam/Davidson: Meaning comes partly from the learning situation ("natural history"). - Twin earth: has identical psychological states, but different beliefs, reference and meaning Twin Earth/Davidson: The twin earth is no threat to the authority of the first person. Knowing/"to know the meaning"/Davidson: is not an internal state (but probably a psychological state), not what we identify when we ascribe beliefs. Authority of the 1st person: can easily be applied to externally identifiable states. >Twin earth. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Functionalism | Fodor | Dennett I 292 ff Fodor/Dennett: the necessity of an organism to work smoothly at any stage imposes iron restrictions on its subsequent properties. --- Fodor IV 127 Functionalist: the causal role distinguishes desires and beliefs ((s) internal in the mind). SemanticsVsFunctionalism: the relationship between mind/world is determining. >World/Thinking, >Causal roles. IV 127 Semantic properties/Fodor/Lepore: functionalism: the semantic properties are derived from the functional (causal) role. So beliefs and desires are distinguished by the causal role. On the other hand: semantics: the semantic properties are derived from the relation of mind/world. --- Frank I 61 ~ FodorVsFunctionalism: functionalism does not grasp the qualia, nothing would be a token of the general type of pain, even if it were linked typically with all other psychological states. Argument of the missing qualia: the organism could behave without them jsut the same. Shoemaker: failure of qualia is unthinkable because of networking. >Qualia, >Qualia/Chalmers. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Gain and Loss | Zerbe | Parisi I 359 Gains and Losses/law/Zerbe: Law becomes relevant in determining the base for deciding what is a gain or a loss. Gains and losses are psychological states that are in part determined by law. Gains are normally defined from a position that recognizes legal rights; gains occur when a new right (or good) is obtained. Gains are measured by the WTP for them and costs, measured by the WTA, that is the compensation required to accept the loss. This is based on the assumption that law is the determinant of a psychological reference point from which one experiences a gain or loss. Where the right is divisible, such as in deciding how to divide a piece of property, it is BCA efficient for the right to go to the person to whom it would go if transactions costs were zero (Posner, 1972(1), p.18) That is, as long as person A has a WTP that exceeds person B’s WTA, the right would go to A and vice versa. In dividing a piece of land, then, some might go to A and some to B determined by their respective WTP and WTA. This would in general leave some of the land unclaimed, as neither individual’s WTP would exceed the other’s WTA. The allocation of this remainder would then be determined by auction—by the WTP, as any additional land would be a gain for either party, which gain is to be measured by the WTP. >Willingness to pay/Tversky/Kahneman. 1. Posner, Richard (1972). “A Theory of Negligence.” Journal of Legal Studies 29. Richard O. Zerbe. “Cost-Benefit Analysis in Legal Decision-making.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Mental States | Cresswell | II 160 Psychological States/Putnam/Cresswell: (Putnam, 1975, 138f)(1) Thesis: psychological states are public in the sense that different people can be in the same state. >Internal states, >Psychological state, >Mental state, >Brain/brain state. 1. Putnam, H. (1975). The Meaning of Meaning. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193 |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Physical/Psychic | Nagel | Frank I 42 physically / mentally / body / Nagel: my physical states are only derived, namely, only by virtue of their relationship to psychological states of mine - consequence: the subject of psychological states can not be my body! (ShoemakerVs). >Sydney Shoemaker. P * -predicates: for Nagel are more than for Strawson: the person knows that she is in the appropriate state. >Terminology/Strawson, >Body, >Subject. Sydney Shoemaker (I968): Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, in: Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), 555-578 |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Representation | Sterelny | I 363 Def Representation/Sterelny: an organism represents (and does not simply react to a single feature) if it can track this feature with more than one class of proximal stimuli. >Stimuli, >Behavior, >Proximal theory. I 365 Representation/Sterelny: Representation is more than registration. E.g. chimpanzees adapt to the psychological states (aggressiveness) of other chimpanzees. However, it is still one thing to track mental states, another to represent them. >Mental states, >Internal states. I 366 E.g., 1. A bonobo interprets the actions a, b, c.. as being of the same type, 2. they are produced by the same mental state Q (perhaps anger). 3. a, b, c, have no single sensory stimulus in common. 4. completeness I 367 Deception/error/correction: Stability: can then consist of the variety of observable stimuli. >Deceptions. On the other hand: reaction bandwidth is also important. I 368 Representation/Sterelny: Thesis: Representation develops in information-permeable environments. >Information/Sterelny. |
Sterelny I Kim Sterelny "Primate Worlds", in: The Evolution of Cognition, C. Heyes/L. Huber (Eds.) Cambridge/MA 2000 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Sterelny II Kim Sterelny Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival of the Fittest Cambridge/UK 2007 |
| Roles | Peacocke | I 109ff Constitutive role: 1st sortal, 2nd psychic state, 3rd relation between 1 and 2. >Sortals, >Psychological states, >Roles, >Constitutive role. Evidence: Sensitivity for evidence is dependend on terms developed for them. >Concepts, >Language use, >Reference. Of two descriptions the constitutive role is the uninformative one. >Description. Constitutive role: "the person who has these perceptions" explains immunity to misidentification. >Incorrigibility, >Cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception. Constitutive role of" now": "the time when this attitude (belief, idea, etc.) occurred". >Localisation. Instead of trivial identity "I am I ": Constitutive role: "I am the person with these states". >Predication. I 122 Constitutive role/I/Peacocke: the constitutive role brings just the difference to the trivial identity: "I am the person with these states" instead of "I am I". >Identity, >Self-identification. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Self- Consciousness | Armstrong | Frank I 62 Selfconsciousness/ArmstrongVsShoemaker: self-consciousness is a perception of our own mind. NagelVsArmstrong: psychological states are not perceived, but "directly experienced". ShoemakerVsArmstrong: self consciousness is no perception, it can not be seen from reflection that it is me. >Self-Identification, >Perception, >Self-Knowledge/Psychological theories. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Supervenience | Davidson | Glüer II 142ff Supervenience/Davidson/Glüer: no difference in the one set without any difference in the other. Glüer: the mental should not be a mere epiphenomenon of the physical. All mental events are physical, but not reversed. (S1) There can be no two events, which are the same in all physical aspects but differ in a mental aspect. - or: (S2) An object cannot change in a mental aspect without changing at the same time in a physical aspect. Problem: Individuation of objects - Davidson: beliefs are not supervenient in relation to neuronal states, because they get partly individuated externalistically with respect to objects - E.g. twin earth: Brain states identical/mental states are different. >Twin earth, >Mental states, >Brain states. Glüer II 144 Davidson: a further conception of supervenience: "that does not mean that mental states are not supervenient in relation to physical states, for somewhere there must be a physical difference when psychological states are different." (Here, for example, water/twin earth - thus externalistic) - "worldwide supervenience". >Externalism. (S3) A predicate P is supervenient in relation to a set of predicates S if and only if P does not distinguish entities that also cannot be distinguished by S. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Twin Earth | Davidson | Twin earth: brain state identical, mental state different. >Mental state, >Brain state. Davidson I (b) 29 Twin Earth/Davidson: before the difference comes out, he believes to have water in front of him, the other twin earth water, but no one knows what he believes because he cannot claim to believe anything else than the other - no psychological difference. Putnam: therefore, external-subjective factors are responsible for the "object of thought" - DavidsonVsPutnam: he does not know what he believes, but he still knows what he thinks: that would only follow if the object what is used to identify my thoughts would be something for which I should be able to do a differentiation. I do not run the risk of holding water for twin earth water because I do not know what that is. - I also do not think to see water, and I am right because it is possibly not water, but twin earth water. I know that I think that because I know that I believe that the substance has the same structure as the one I have learned the word of - even if the twins are interchanged in sleep, no one is mistaken about what he thinks himself Conclusion: subjective states do not arise from brain states - but from external differences (water/twin earth water). >Externalism. I (b) 30 Twin earth: Belief content is not known to the subject - distinction is not necessary, not possible at all. - No opposite is conscious - subjective states have no consequence of brain states. Fallacy/Deception: The possibility of an error is only then intelligible if a special psychological relation to the object of the "thought-content" is assumed, which should serve for identification. >Deceptions, >Identification, >Objects of belief. I (b) 31 Belief/knowledge/thinking/twin earth/Davidson: Conclusion: propositional attitudes are truly psychological states - you always know what you think. There is always an advantage in favor of the thinker himself in the question of what is going on in consciousness. >Content. I (b) 32 Belief/thinking/knowledge/propositional attitudes/content/twin earth/Davidson: Object, not of thinking, (twin earth water), but the object, which regularly indicates the state of consciousness (from learning history). Frank I 658 Twin Earth/Davidson: Everyone says the truth because the words mean different things - narrow (inner) states are equal - but they believe different things: A believes that water is in front of him, B, twin earth water (but calls it water) - Putnam (among others): no one knows what he thinks - DavidsonVs: the speaker is certainly right, because he has learned the word in his environment. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Austin, John L. | Searle Vs Austin, John L. | SearleVs Traditional Speech act analysis. (SearleVsAustin,SearleVsHare) Thesis: "Good", "true" mean the same in different acts. Ignored by the traditional speech act theory) good/true/speech act theory/tradition: Hare: E.g. "Good" is used to recommend something. Strawson: "True" is used to confirm or acknowledge statements. Austin: "Knowledge" is used to provide guarantees. (SearleVs). In principle: "the word W is used to perform the speech act A". >Speech act theory. IV 17 illocutionary act/Austin: five categories: verdictive, expositive, exercitive, conductive, commissive) speech acts/SearleVsAustin: Distinction between illocutionary role and expression with propositional content: R(p). The various acts performed in different continua! There are at least 12 important dimensions. IV 18 1. Differences in joke (purpose) of the act. (However, not to every act a purpose has to belong). IV 19 The illocutionary joke is part of the role, but both are not the same. E.g. a request may have the same joke as a command. 2. Differences in orientation (word to the world or vice versa). Either, the world needs to match the words, or vice versa. IV 20 Example by Elizabeth Anscombe: Shopping list with goods, the same list is created by the store detective. IV 21 3. Differences in the expressed psychological states E.g. to hint, to regret, to swear, to threaten. (Even if the acts are insincere). Def sincerity condition/Searle: You cannot say, "I realize that p but I do not believe that p." "I promise that p but I do not intend that p" The mental state is the sincerity condition of the act. IV 22 These three dimensions: joke, orientation, sincerity condition are the most important. 4. Differences in the strength with which the illocutionary joke is raised. E.g. "I suggest", "I swear" 5. Differences in the position of speaker and listener E.g. the soldier will make not aware the general of the messy room. IV 23 6. Differences of in which the utterance relates to what is in the interest of speaker and listener. E.g. whining, congratulating 7. Difference in relation to the rest of the discourse E.g. to contradict, to reply, to conclude. 8. Differences in propositional content, resulting from the indicators of the illocutionary role E.g. report or forecasts IV 24 9. Differences between those acts that must always be speech acts, and those that can be carried out differently. E.g. you need not to say anything to classify something, or to diagnose 10. Differences between those acts, for which the extra-linguistic institutions are needed, and those for which they are not necessary E.g. wedding, blessing, excommunication IV 25 11. Differences between acts where the illocutionary verb has a performative use and those where this is not the case E.g. performative use: to state, to promise, to command no performative: "I hereby boast", "hereby I threaten". 12. differences in style E.g. announcing, entrustment. IV 27 SearleVsAustin: the list does not refer to acts but to verbs. One must distinguish between verb and act! E.g. one can proclaim commands, promises, reports but that is something else, as to command, to announce or to report. A proclamation is never merely a proclamation, it also needs to be a determination, a command or the like. IV 30 Searle: E.g.iIf I make you chairman, I do not advocate that you chairman IV 36 Def Declaration/Searle: the successful performance guarantees that the propositional content of the world corresponds. (Later terminology: "institutional facts) Orientation: by the success of the declaration word and world match to each other () No sincerity. Overlapping with assertive:... The referee's decisions. SearleVsAustin: Vs Distinction constative/performative. VII 86 Cavell: "Must we mean what we say?" defends Austin and adds: The deviation can be "really or allegedly" present. Austin: it is neither true nor false that I write this article voluntarily, because if there is no deviation, the concept of free will is not applicable. SearleVsAustin: that's amazing. VII 88 SearleVsAustin: Five theses to see Austin in a different light: 1. Austin exemplifies an analysis pattern that is common today as it is also used at Ryles' analysis of "voluntarily". Ryle thesis of "voluntary" and "involuntary" can be applied only to acts, "you should not have done." Again, it is absurd to use it in an ordinary use. VII 89 Neither true nor false: Wittgenstein: e.g. that I "know that I am in pain" E.g. that Moore knows he has two hands. etc. (> certainty). Austin: E.g. it is neither true nor false, that I went out of free will to the session. VII 90 The use of "voluntary" required certain conditions are not met here. Words in which they are not met, we can call "A-words", the conditions "A-Conditions". We can create a list. 2. the conditions that are exemplified by the slogan "No modification without deviation", penetrate the whole language and are not limited to certain words. E.g. The President is sober today. Hans breathes. etc. VII 91 3. Negation/Searle: the negation of an A-word is not in turn an A-word! E.g. I bought my car not voluntarily, I was forced to. I did not volunteer, I was dragged here. He does not know whether the object in front of him is a tree. Considerable asymmetry between A-words and their opposite or negation. VII 92 SearleVsAustin: according to him, in both cases a deviation is required. 4. A deviation is generally a reason to believe that the claim that is made by the statement to the contrary is true, or could have been, or at least could have been held by someone as true. An A-condition is simply a reason to believe that the remark could have been false. SearleVsAustin: his presentation is misleading because it suggests that any deviation justifies a modification. E.g. if I buy a car while strumming with bare toes on a guitar, which is indeed a different way to buy a car, but it does not justify the remark "He bought his car voluntarily." VII 93 SearleVsAustin: we can come to any list of A-words, because if word requires a deviation, will depend on the rest of the sentence and on the context. Then Austin's thesis is not about words but about propositions. VII 94 Standard situation/circumstances/SearleVsAustin: notice that there is a standard situation, is to suggest that this fact is remarkable and that there is reason to believe that it could also be a non-standard situation. VII 95 SearleVsAustin: his thesis even is not on propositions: to make an assertion means to specify that something is the case. If the possibility that the situation does not exist, is excluded, it is meaningless. Austin's slogan should be formulated to: "No comment, which is not remarkable" or "No assertion that is not worth to be claimed". VII 96 SearleVsAustin: this one has seen it wrong. This is connected with the concept of intention: Intention/Searle: Thesis: the oddity or deviation which is a condition for the utterance "X was deliberately done" represents, at the same time provides a reason for the truth of the statement by "X was not done intentionally". assertion condition/utterance condition: it is the utterance condition of an assertion precisely because it is one reason for the truth of the other. SearleVsAustin: the data must be explained in terms of the applicability of certain terms. So my view is simple and plausible. (VII 98): In Austin's slogan "No modification without deviation" it is not about the applicability of these terms, but rather about conditions for putting up claims generally. Negation/SearleVsAustin: then the negations of the above, are not neither true nor false, but simply false! E.g. I did not go voluntarily to the meeting (I was dragged). etc. VII 98 Example The ability to remember ones name is one of the basic conditions ... |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Behaviorism | Putnam Vs Behaviorism | Lanz I 289 Functionalism/PutnamVsBehaviorism: > |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Burge, T. | Stalnaker Vs Burge, T. | II 171 Positive assertion/VsExternalism/VsBurge/VsAnti-Individualism/Stalnaker: how can you define an individualistic analogous to a relational term? II 187 Negative approach/Revisionism/VsExternalism/VsAnti-Individualism/VsBurge/Individualism/Stalnaker: the negative approach has different descriptions: (>terminology): methodological solipsism: Putnam 1975, Fodor 1981a Individualism: Burge, also Fodor 1987 Principle of autonomy: Stich 1983. Thesis: all states and properties that are attributed and described in psychology should be intrinsic states. Behavior explanation: should only deal with properties that are relevant to the causal powers of the subjects. Indistinguishability/theory: things that are indistinguishable in terms of causal powers should not be included in the explanation. II 188 Def Individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically. Important argument: thus it is then not excluded that mental states are individuated because of relational properties. Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomical when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence StalnakerVsFodor: a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers. But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal forces. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis. Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger thesis. StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of strong with the weak thesis. Stalnaker: to eliminate that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content, you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. Example Fodor: Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with the example of a causally irrelevant relational property: E.g. h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with the head up, II 189 t-particle: we call this the same particle if the coin shows the tail. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this differentiation to explain the particle's behavior. StalnakerVsFodor: But from this it does not follow that psychological states have to be purely internal (intrinsic). II 193 Mental state/psychological/internal/head/StalnakerVsBurge: e.g. O’Leary believes that there is water in the basement. Is this state in his head? Of course! ((s) Against: Putnam: refers to the meaning of words such as basements and water). Stalnaker: and in the sense like a mosquito bite on his nose is on his nose. II 194 Narrow content/Stalnaker: is accepted as what is completely internal. Psychology: various authors: say that narrow content is necessary for every psychological explanation. They agree with Burge that normal content is often not narrow. Anti-Individualism/Burge/StalnakerVsBurge: seems to conflict with the everyday understanding that I, when I instead of talking about the world talk about how me things appear that I am then talking about myself. Narrow content/StalnakerVsBurge: it is less clear than it seems what narrow content is at all and II 195 I believed that there is such a great conflict between the individualist and anti-individualist. Narrow content/Stalnaker: 1. in which sense is narrow content at all narrow and in which sense is it in the mind purely internal? 2. Which role shall narrow content play at the explanation of mental phenomena? How is the ascription of narrow content referred to the one of wide content? 3. Do we need narrow content at all for the behavior explanation? Or rather the access that we have to the content of our own thoughts? |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Fodor, J. | Stalnaker Vs Fodor, J. | II 176 Def narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: is a generalization of Kaplan's character in the sense that the context considers any for the speaker external fact that is relevant to the determination of the wide content. Extensional identity criterion/narrow content/Fodor: (1987, 30 – 48)(1): C: be the condition that is fulfilled by the twin-me on twin-earth, C’: by myself in the actual world. Since there is no miracle it must be true that when an organism shares the neurophysiological constitution of my twin and fulfills C it follows that his thoughts and my twin also share the truth conditions (tr.c.). So the extensional identity criterion is that two thought contents (mental content) are the same iff they cause the same mapping of thoughts and context on truth conditions. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: that tells us less than it appears about the mapping that is used here. Nor how the relevant function is determined by what is going on in the mind of the believer. II 177 StalnakerVsFodor: we consider the following parody of his argument: e.g. I have the property of being exactly three miles from a burning stable - my twin is located on twin earth at exactly the same place, but, however, has the property of being exactly three miles from a snowy henhouse. C: then there surely is a property for my twin due to which he is three miles from the henhouse while this property does not exist for me. We call this condition C. C’: is then the property that makes up for me that I am three miles from the burning stable which does not exist for my twin. Since there is no miracle, we know at least this much: both, my twin and I, would in our respective world be three miles from a snowy henhouse when condition C ruled and both three miles from a burning stable if C' ruled. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: which determines no function at all that makes the condition C' to the property to be three miles from a snowy henhouse and at the same time condition C to the property to be three miles from a burning stable - a function that allegedly makes the contribution of the location of the subject to a specific relational property. StalnakerVsFodor: there are such functions and there is no need to identify one of them with the contribution of my intrinsic localization with the special relational property. My twin cannot sensibly say: "I did my part, as I - if condition C had ruled, .... Each localization is in the way that for any external conditions if those conditions rule something in this localizations is three miles away from a burning stable. narrow content/Stalnaker: question: does my cousin have the same narrow content as my conviction that salt is soluble in water but not in something else? StalnakerVsFodor: his theory gives no indication as to how an answer to this question was to be found! Note: however for me it is not about an uncertainty at all, this is also true for wide content but that we do not know at all how to identify narrow content. II 180 Belief/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: his image of faith is decisively motivated by his approach that there is an internal language (Mentalese) which is saved in the internal Belief/Fodor: are saved inner propositions. ((s) not propositions). They are convictions by virtue of their internal functional role. They are also identifiable independent of the environment of the subject. Semantic properties/Fodor: however partly depend on what happens in the environment around it but the way how they depend on it is determined by purely internal states of the subject! StalnakerVsFodor: here strong empirical presuppositions are in play. Def narrow content/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: function of context (in a very wide sense) on truth conditional content. StalnakerVsFodor: this is attractive for his intentions but it does not explain how it ever comes to that. And how to identify any narrow content. Narrow content/Stalnaker: is there any way at all to identify narrow content that is not based on Mentalese? Yes, by Dennett (…+…) II 188 Def individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically. Important argument: thus it is not excluded that mental states are individuated due to relational properties. Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomically when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence StalnakerVsFodor: a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers. But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal powers. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis. Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger. StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of the strong with the weak thesis. Stalnaker: to exclude that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. E.g. Fodor: Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with an example of a causal irrelevant relational property: e.g. h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with heads up, II 189 t-particle: we call that way the same particle if the coin shows tails. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this distinction to explain the behavior of the particle. StalnakerVsFodor: but from this it does not follow that psychological states must be purely internal (intrinsic). (1) Fodor, J. A. (1987): Explorations in cognitive science, No. 2.Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. British Psychological Society; The MIT Press. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Folk Psychology | Kaplan Vs Folk Psychology | Davidson I 31 Many philosophers have come to the conclusion that beliefs and other propositional attitudes are not so subjectively as has been adopted. Fodor: (attributes to the psychologist the method of "methodological solipsism" (> Methodological solipsism/Carnap): the psychologist should study "truly psychological states" whose identity could be determined solely by what is "in the head". (Similar proposals by Daniel Dennett and David Kaplan). |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Identity Theory | Searle Vs Identity Theory | I 52 SearleVsIdentity theory: a) common sense puts the identity theory in the following dilemma: Assuming that the theory is actually empirically true: then there must be logically independent from each other features of each concerned phenomen that clearly characterize this same phenomenon in two different ways: as that is identified on the left side of the identity statement, on the other hand, as it is identified on the right side (Stevenson 1960)(1). Then there must be two features: pain features and neurophysiological characteristics. We understand such a statement because we understand as follows: one and the same event has been identified with the help of two types of properties. Dilemma: either the pain features are subjective, mental, introspective features - if they are this, then we have not really gotten rid of the mind. We will still have to deal with a variety of dualism. Otherwise, if we understand the word "pain" in a way that it does not describe a subjective mental feature, then the meaning of the word remains completely mysterious and unexplained. I 53 As with behaviorism the mind is skipped here again. Either the identity-theoretical materialism merges the mind, or it does not ignore it; if it ignores it, it is wrong; if it does not ignore it, it is not materialism. Smart wanted to describe the so-called mental features in a "Topic-neutral" vocabulary that left the fact of its mindness unmentioned (Smart 1959)(2). SearleVsSmart: but that one can talk about a phenomenon without mentioning it's essential characteristics, does not mean that this phenomenon exists, or does not have these essential characteristics. Technical objection VsIdentitätstheorie: it is unlikely that there is a for each type of mental state one and only one type of neurophysiological state. Yet it seems too much to ask for that anyone who believes that Denver is the capital of Colorado has a neurophysiologically seen identical configuration in his brain. (Putnam 1967(3) and Block and Fodor 1972(4)). I 54 We do not rule out the possibility that in another species pain is perhaps identical to any other types of neurophysiological configuration. In short, it seems too much to ask for that each type of mental state is identical to a type of neurophysiological state. 3. Technical objection derives from Leibniz law. LeibnizVsIdentity theory: if two events are identical if they share all their properties, then mental states cannot be identical with physical states clearly, the mental states have certain characteristics, do not have the physical states. E.g. my pain is in the toe, while my corresponding neurophysiological state ranges from the toe to the brain. So where is the pain really? The identity theorists had not such a big problem with this. They stated that the analysis unit is in reality the experience of pain and that this experience (together with the experience of the whole body image) presumably takes place in the central nervous system. Searle: so you're right. 4. more radical technical objection: Kripke (1971)(5): Modal argumentation: if it were really true that pain with C fiber stimulation is identical then it would have to be a necessary truth. 1. J. T. Stevenson, Sensations and Brain Processes: A Reply to J. J. C. Smart, Philosophical Review 69, 505-510 2. J. J. C. Smart, Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68, 1959: pp.141-56 3. H. Putnam, “The Mental Life of Some Machines” in: H. Castaneda (Ed) Intentionality, Minds, and Perception, Detroit MI 1967 4. N. Block and J. Fodor, What psychological states are not; Philosophical Review 81, 1972 5. S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Reprint: Cambridge 1980 |
Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Psychologism | Fodor Vs Psychologism | Davidson I 31 Many philosophers have come to the conclusion that beliefs and other propositional stances are not quite as subjective, as has been assumed. Fodor: submits to the psychologists the process of "methodological solipsism" (Carnap): the psychologist should deal with "truly psychological states" whose identity be determined exclusively by what is "in the head". (There are similar proposals by Daniel Dennett and David Kaplan). |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Stich, St. | Stalnaker Vs Stich, St. | II 189 Def principle of autonomy/principle of autonomy/Stich/Stalnaker: thesis: psychological states should be those that supervene on current internal (intrinsic) physical states of the organism. StalnakerVsStich: that is a strong thesis (see above). But even with Stich a causal language creeps in: historical or environmentally relevant facts are irrelevant unless they affect the current physical states. Replacement argument/replacement argument/Stich: e.g. suppose someone had made an exact copy of me. Psychology/Stich: should explain the behavior that I do not have in common with my copy. Identical behavior must be irrelevant to psychology. nonautonomous description/principle of autonomy/Stich: e.g. nonautonomous: a robot is described as just successfully completing its millionth workpiece. Problem: a copy of this robot could break beforehand. Therefore, the description is "conceptually hybrid" (mixed of autonomous and historical). autonomous: would the description "successfully produce a workpiece" and purely historical II 190 to have "previously already produced 999,999 other workpieces". Problem/Stich: if we are looking for a generalization for the declaration of robot behavior it would be perverse to describe it (simultaneously autonomous and historical) with hybrid concepts. StalnakerVsStich: plus we have to assume in addition that the historical properties are causally irrelevant. Fatigue would not be a perverse explanation that the robot gives up the ghost. Substitution argument/Stich/Stalnaker: his argument requires the replacement with exact replicas, not identical robots. Generalization/StalnakerVsStich: a generalization is not immediately refuted by exceptions. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Tugendhat, E. | Davidson Vs Tugendhat, E. | Frank I 668 Twin Earth/Davidson: does not depend on the idea that social language use dictates what speakers mean and of course not, what their narrow psychological states are. Meaning/DavidsonVsTugendhat: is partially determined by the circumstances. TugendhatVsDavidson. Twin Earth/Stereotype: "Water" is not only applied to substances with the same molecular structure, but also to substances that are sufficiently similar. (Stereotype), E.g. odorless, colorless, etc. Rigid Designator/Davidson: this remark shows that it is possible that I do not recognize a rigid designator when I see one!. Facts/Twin Earth/Davidson: the special fact does not depend on such cases, and also not on how we analyze or should analyze them. It depends instead simply on how the basic connection between words and things is made. Frank I 669 Otherwise we would have no way of knowing what others mean. Meaning/Davidson: we can easily learn the meaning of "Moon" without ever having seen the moon! Davidson thesis: all thinking and every language has a foundation in such direct historical connections (> Putnam, Kripke, baptism/not only for the name, but for all the words). Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Woodfield, A. | Davidson Vs Woodfield, A. | Frank I 672 DavidsonVsPutnam: I doubt his assumption (1) that ordinary propositional attitudes are not in the head. And that the authority could not be applied apply to it because of that. This does not follow from the external individuation. E.g. Sunburn/Davidson: It is just as absurd to say that external cause leads to the fact that meanings are not in the head as to believe that, because sunburn is caused by the sun it is not a condition of my skin. E.g. Suppose it could be that someone else suffered an indistinguishable burning of the skin by some other cause (> "tie identical"/> Sellars). Nevertheless, only one of us has real sunburn, the other doesn’t. This is enough to show that a recognition of externalism does not discredit an identity theory of the mental with the physical. Andrew WoodfieldVs: "No de re state about an object outside the brain can possibly be identical to a state of this brain, since no brain state presupposes the existence of an external object." ((s) You can hallucinate everything). Concept/DavidsonVsWoodfield: individual states and events as such do not require anything conceptually! Some of their descriptions, however, do so very much!" E.g. my grandfather did not presuppose me, but if someone is described as my grandfather. I 673 Then there must be other people apart from my grandfather, including myself. I 674 DavidsonVsPutnam/DavidsonVsWoodfield: Both are wrong to assert that it is "absurd" to think that two physically identical people might differ in their ordinary psychological states. They can. (Twin earth) Twin earth/Putnam: (somewhere): psychological states identical DavidsonVsPutnam: not the identical (anomalous monism). This weakens the threat to first person authority, which then no longer simply arises from the fact that the contents are individuated externally. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Propos. Attitude | Schiffer, St. | Avra I 24 Propositional Attitudes/Schiffer: ("Meaning", early): Thesis: Psychological states such as beliefs and desires should not be analyzed as attitudes towards sentences. But this does not mean that Grice's approach is wrong - at most that the meaning of the speaker is not logically superior to the meaning of the utterance. Schi XV Propositional Attitude/Schiffer: late: thesis cannot be reduced or explained! I 184 Propositional Attitudes/truth/truth conditions/Schifer: Thesis: Verbs for propositional attitudes cannot be attributed to suitable semantic values. |
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