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The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Civilization | Habermas | III 216 Marxism/Habermas: Hegel has become effective through an uncritical appropriation of the dialectical conceptual apparatus; the unity of theoretical and practical reason is built into the basic concepts of critique of political economy in such a way that the normative foundations of Marxian theory III 217 have been darkened until today. >Pure Reason, >Practical Reason, >Marxism, >G.W.F. Hegel. In Marxism this ambiguity was partly circumvented, partly concealed, but not actually eliminated: circumvented by the division of Marx' social theory into social research and ethical socialism (M. Adler); and concealed both by an orthodox connection to Hegel (Lukács, Korsch) and by an assimilation to the more naturalistic development theories of the 19th century (Engels, Kautsky). These theories form the bridge over which the topic of rationalization, which was initially dealt with in historical philosophy, was transferred to sociology.(1) >Sociology, >G. Lukács. 1.J. Habermas Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus, Frankfurt, 1976. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Epistemology | Dilthey | Gadamer I 222 Epistemology/Dilthey/Gadamer: The tension between the aesthetic-hermeneutic and the historical-philosophical motif in the historical school reaches its peak with Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey's rank is based on his real recognition of the epistemological problem that the historical view of the world implies in relation to idealism. Gadamer I 223 The root of the ambivalence (...) lies in the already marked intermediate position of the historical school between philosophy and experience. It is not dissolved by Dilthey's attempt at an epistemological foundation, but finds its own culmination. Dilthey's effort to establish a philosophical foundation for the humanities seeks to draw the epistemological consequences from what Ranke and Droysen tried to claim with respect to German idealism. Dilthey himself was fully aware of this. DiltheyVsHistorism: [Dilthey] saw the weakness of the historical school in the lack of consistency of its reflections: "Instead of going back to the epistemological presuppositions of the historical school and those of idealism from Kant to Hegel and thus recognizing the incompatibility of these presuppositions, they connected these points of view uncritically"(1). Thus he was able to set himself the goal of building a new epistemologically sustainable foundation between historical experience and the idealistic heritage of the historical school. This is the purpose of his intention to supplement Kant's critique of pure reason with a critique of historical reason. >Historical Reason/Dilthey. Gadamer I 226 In some ways [the task of epistemology] is easier. It does not need to ask why it is possible that our concepts are in agreement with it. For the historical world, the knowledge of which is at issue here, has always been a world formed and shaped by the human spirit. For this reason Dilthey thinks that generally valid synthetic judgments of history are not a problem here at all(2) and refers to Vico for this. We recall that Vico, in response to the Cartesian doubt and the certainty of mathematical knowledge of nature which he had established, asserted the epistemological primacy of the man-made world of history. Dilthey repeats the same argument. He writes: "The first condition for the possibility of the science of history is that I, myself, am a historical being, that he who studies history is the same who makes history"(3). Gadamer: It is the sameness of subject and object that makes historical recognition possible. >Experience/Dilthey. Gadamer I 228 (...) the problem of history is not how to experience and recognize interrelation, but how to recognize such interrelations that nobody has experienced as such. After all, there can be no doubt how Dilthey sees the clarification of this problem from the phenomenon of understanding. Understanding is understanding of expression. In expression, the expressed is there in a different way than Gadamer I 229 cause in effect. It is present in the expression itself and is understood when the expression is understood. Gadamer I 234 Dilthey himself has pointed out that we only recognize historically because we ourselves are historical. That should be an epistemological relief. Gadamer I 235 GadamerVsDilthey: But can it be? Is Vico's often mentioned formula correct at all? Doesn't it transfer an experience of the human artistic spirit to the historical world, in which one cannot speak at all of "making", i.e. of planning and execution in view of the course of events? Where is the epistemological relief to come from here? Isn't it in fact a complication? Must not the historical conditionality of consciousness represent an insurmountable barrier to its completion in historical knowledge? >Historical Consciousness/Dilthey, >Spirit/Dilthey, >Philosophy/Dilthey, >Epistemology/Gadamer. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften Vll, 281. 2. Ges. Schriften Vll, 278. 3. a.a.O. (GadamerVsDilthey: Aber wer macht eigentlich die Geschichte?) |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Geometry | Kant | Genz II 19 Kant/Geometry/Genz: Kant did not yet know that the angular sum of the triangle on a spherical surface is > 180°. (Only Gauss, a few decades later, thought it possible, but his experiment did not show it; the curvature is too small.). Genz II 20 N.B.: non-Euclidean geometry becomes empirical science, not a priori. >a priori, >Euclid/Kant. --- Thiel I 281 Space/Geometry/Thiel: the meaning change of the terms "space" and "geometry" is more confusing. Kant is always the guardian of the conservative Euclidists. Space/Kant: plural of space only in the sense of parts of the same space. Non-Euclidean Geometry/Kant/Thiel: little is known that Kant 20 years before the "Critique of Pure Reason" (From the true estimate of the living forces) considered other approaches possible: That the physical bodies act differently to one another according to the Newtonian law of gravitation, that the space has a different dimension number than 3 ... I 282 "... a science of these possible types of space would be the highest geometry ... such spaces cannot possibly be related to those of a very different nature, they would have to be other worlds." The possibility of coexistence is denied, but the possibility of existence is acknowledged. That this no longer occurs in the "Critique of Pure Reason" lies in the fact that Kant now wants to find the conditions of the possibility of life-world and scientific experience, and, of course, the unity of real experience excludes the coexistence of different "possible types of space." I 283 The question of "true" geometry in Hilbert's sense has no meaning at all, since the axioms are propositional schemata, and schemata cannot be true or false. >Axioms. I 284 In the 20th century, there was an attempt to fill the geometry conception with new content. (Relatively banal: the proof of the uselessness of Euclidean geometry by the fact that in cosmic sizes, the angular sum is greater than 180° in the case of measured light rays which are used as straight lines). |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Ideas | Kant | Strawson V 190 Dynamic idea/Kant: E.g. un-caused cause - Ideal of pure reason. V 191 Ideas of Reason/Kant: are projection of goals, wise author, final unit - prerequisite of knowledge, not knowledge. --- Vaihinger I 269 Ideas/Kant/Vaihinger: are "regulative principles of pure reason" - neither inside nor outside the experience - they are "just rules" for the mind - they show it imaginary points of reference. Vaihinger I 273 Ideas (e.g. God) are not inscrutable - because they are in the nature of reason. Vaihinger I 275 Idea/Kant/Vaihinger: not merely deception - but expedient - proof of expediency: the deduction. Vaihinger I 280 Causality/Idea/God/Kant/Vaihinger: I only take the idea of such a (highest) being as a basis, to consider the phenomena to be systematically linked to each other according to the analogy of a causal determination. >Apprehension/Kant. Vaihinger I 281 Rational idea/Kant/Vaihinger: rational ideas are not hypotheses - otherwise I would pledge myself thereby already to know about the nature of a cause of the world and another world, than I could really proof. Ideas/Kant: reason terms without object. Vaihinger I 301 Ideas/Kant/Vaihinger: E.g. people - e.g. God - (mere ideas) - (s.o.) things in themselves - freedom. >God/Kant, >Freedom/Kant. --- Vendler I 251 Regulative ideas/Kant: (E.g. language and thought themselves) can never lead to synthetic propositions a priori. --- Adorno XIII 66 Ideas/Kant/Adorno: Ideas such as God, freedom, and immortality are not only regulative ideas to which our thinking is directed, but terms which are necessary because, without them, something like proper action cannot be conceived. >Regulative ideas. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Language | Flusser | I 129 Language/Flusser: Only after the above analysis (see Texts/Flusser, Imagination/Flusser, Code/Flusser) does it become clear that the spoken language is not the meaning of alphabetical texts, but rather the code with which alphabetical texts mean images. E.g. Fig. I 107 in addition spoken language: "two people and a dog go for a walk at noon." This shows that the spoken language forms a "pretext" for the alphabetical text. >Speaking, >Writing. Two conclusions: 1. discussing images is a completely different form of communication from their description. The relationship between alphabetical and linguistic code is much more complicated than one would think. Cf. >Media. The abyss between text and image is skipped by beginning to think "conceptually". >Concepts/Flusser. For Kant, the abyss yawns where he opposes "pure reason" to "practical reason". >Pure Reason, >Practical Reason. I 130 "Reading" comes from "picking". Imagination comes from "touching", this is a composing. Concept is a fragmentation ("rationalization"). >Synthesis, >Analysis, >Rationality, >Rationalism. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
| Marxism | Habermas | III 216 Marxism/Habermas: Hegel has become effective through an uncritical appropriation of the dialectical conceptual apparatus; the unity of theoretical and practical reason is built into the basic concepts of critique of political economy in such a way that the normative foundations of Marxian theory... III 217 ...have been darkened until today. >Pure Reason, >Practical Reason, >Ethics, >Theory of Knowledge, >G.W.F. Hegel. In Marxism this ambiguity was partly circumvented, partly concealed, but not actually eliminated: circumvented by the division of Marx' social theory into social research and ethical socialism (M. Adler); and concealed both by an orthodox connection to Hegel (Lukács, Korsch) and by an assimilation to the more naturalistic development theories of the 19th century (Engels, Kautsky). These theories form the bridge over which the topic of rationalization, which was initially dealt with in historical philosophy, was transferred to sociology.(1) >Sociology. IV 222 Lifeworld/Marxism/Habermas: the Marxist critique of bourgeois society starts with the circumstances of production because it accepts the rationalization of the lifeworld, but wants to explain the deformations of the rationalized lifeworld from conditions of material reproduction. >Lifeworld/Habermas. This approach requires a theory that operates on a broader basic conceptual basis than that of the "lifeworld". It must neither identify the environment with society as a whole nor reduce it to systemic contexts. >Society, >Systems, >Systems theory. IV 399 Marxism/VsCapitalism/Habermas: The starting point of all criticism of capitalism was the question of whether the conversion of prebourgeois normatively organized labor relations to the medium of money (see Money/Habermas, Money/Parsons), whether thus the monetization of the labor force IV 400 means an intervention in living conditions and areas of interaction which themselves are not integrated in the form of media and cannot be detached painlessly, i.e. without social-pathological effects, from structures of communication-oriented action. IV 504 Marxism/HabermasVsMarxism/Habermas: Marx's approach demands an economically abridged interpretation of the developed capitalist societies. For these, Marx rightly claimed an evolutionary primacy of the economy. However, this primacy must not tempt us to tailor the complementary relationship between the economy and the state apparatus to a trivial superstructure-based concept. Solution/Habermas: in contrast to the monism of value theory, we have to reckon with two control media and four channels through which two complementary subsystems subject the lifeworld to their imperatives. The reification effects can result equally from the bureaucratization and monetization of public and private spheres of life. IV 505 The economicist approach fails in view of the pacification of the class conflict and the long-term success that reformism has achieved in European countries since the Second World War in the broad sense of a social-democratic program. >Interventionism/Habermas. 1. J. Habermas Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus, Frankfurt, 1976. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Mathematics | Kant | Thiel I 27 Mathematics/Kant/Thiel: Kant was not an expert mathematician. Approach to a novel philosophy of mathematics: doctrine of the "schema": is a procedure, to give a concept its image. The rule character of this method is that the "imagination" refers to the operativism, "Synthetic function" refers to constructivism. Thiel I 28 In the "Critique of Pure Reason", Kant calls the "construction of concepts" an "intuitive use of reason" and later he calls it a "mathematical". Thiel I 38 Mathematics/Kant/Thiel: Kant asks whether philosophy (in particular metaphysics) by appropriating the mathematical method could result in similar statements. His answer: clearly not. Kant: Metaphysics is a knowledge of reason from concepts. >Metaphysics/Kant, >Knowledge/Kant. Mathematics is knowledge of reason from the construction of concepts. Kant: Undoubtedly, our knowledge is expanded by mathematical knowledge; it is not empty, not merely analytical, it must be "synthetic." Pure opinion: this encompasses empirical opinions, which is not sensation, but the form of the connection to perception and thus the order form of what is "given" to us. Thiel I 39 There can be no empirical opinions which have not been inserted into the necessary forms of sensibility. E.g. (grains) We can imagine gray and not gray elephants, but not spatial and non-spatial ones. Then spatiality and temporality have "reality" or objective validity. Kant: Reality obeys the same laws as the subject of mathematics. "All views are extensive quantities." Hence also the objects of mathematics. >Space, >Space/Kant. Thiel I 47 Mathematics/Kant/Thiel: today, we are not much more advanced than Kant in terms of the problem of application, although his system shows its limitations. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Metaphysics | Bubner | I 19 Metaphysics/Bubner: its climax in Hegel (after Kant's rejection) proclaimed the resumption of the ancient project. Renewal of metaphysics. Provocation: that it is not opposed to science, but as a necessary perfection. --- I 134 Metaphysics/Heidegger: Where does it come from? (HeideggerVsMetaphysics). BubnerVsHeidegger: the question contradicts a philosophia perennis, which manages the eternal questions. Where does the need to deal with so obviously empty questions like those about being come from? Metaphysics/Bubner: 1. Thesis: it was by no means an eternal companion of mankind, but has developed as a task of philosophy in the face of special experiences. The oldest documents of philosophy, on the one hand, are so profound, on the other, so unspecific that the metaphysics label does not fit. Metaphysics/Ancient: first mentioned by Plato. The pre-Socratics, in his opinion, fail before the task of real understanding. So metaphysics arises. Metaphysics/Bubner: Crisis in Descartes and Kant. --- I 136 Skepticism/antiquity/Bubner: originally meant only accurate examination and judgment abstention (> Epoché)! Metaphysics/Bubner: as the supreme knowledge of the powers of pure reason, it cannot proceed otherwise than dogmatically. Thus skepticism is the natural enemy of metaphysics. --- I 144 Metaphysics/Bubner: 3. Thesis: The Transcendental Revolution of Kant does not arise from a genius idea, but from the experience of the failure of metaphysics in its history so far. It serves the elimination of this lack and the insight into the efficiency of reason itself. --- I 149 Metaphysics/Bubner: 4. Thesis: also the beginning of metaphysics is lead by an experience that brings the new discipline on the way. This is certainly not an experience with metaphysics, but an original experience, which involves knowledge when it is in pursuit of its intention diagnosing its lacks. Thus, metaphysics realizes a primal interest of all knowledge. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Problems | Kant | Gadamer I 382 Problem/Kant/Gadamer: Gadamer: Problems are (...) not real questions that arise and thus receive the preliminary drawing of their answers from their genesis of meaning, but are alternatives of meaning that can only be left standing and can therefore only be treated dialectically. >Problem/Aristotle, >Problem/Gadamer. This dialectical meaning of "problem" does not actually have its place in philosophy, but in rhetoric. It is part of his concept that it does not allow an unambiguous decision for reasons. Kant: For this reason, for Kant the use of the problem term is limited to the dialectics of pure reason. Problems are "tasks that spring entirely from its womb", thus, as it were, products of reason itself, for whose complete dissolution it can simply not hope(1). Gadamer: It is significant that in the 19th century, with the collapse of the immediate tradition of philosophical questioning and the emergence of historism, the concept of problem rises to universal validity - a sign that the direct relationship to the factual questions of philosophy no longer exists. Cf. >History of Problems/Neo-Kantianism. 1.Kant, Kr. d. r. V, A 321ff. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Reason | Dilthey | Gadamer I 223 Reason/Dilthey/Gadamer: [Dilthey intended] to supplement Kant's critique of pure reason with a critique of historical reason. This task alone shows the turning away from speculative idealism. It establishes an analogy that is to be understood quite literally. Dilthey wants to say: historical reason needs justification just as much as pure reason. The epoch-making result of the Critique of Pure Reason was not only that metaphysics as a pure science of reason was destroyed by the world, soul and God, but that at the same time a field was established within which the use of a priori concepts is justified and makes knowledge possible. Gadamer: This critique of Pure Reason not only destroyed the dreams of a spirit-reader, it also answered the question of how pure natural science is possible. In the meantime, speculative idealism had taken the world of history into the self-explication of reason, and moreover, especially through Hegel, had achieved ingenious achievements in the historical field. With this, the claim of the pure science of reason has been in principle extended to the Gadamer I 224 historical knowledge. It was part of the Encyclopedia of the Spirit. But in the eyes of the historical school, the speculative philosophy of history was as blatant dogmatism as rational metaphysics had been. Cf. >Kant/Gadamer, >Epistemology/Gadamer. Gadamer I 225 Hegel: By teaching reason in everything, even in history, Hegel had been the last and most universal representative of the ancient Logos philosophy. Problem: Now, in view of the criticism of a priori philosophy of history, one saw oneself once again caught in the spell of Kantian criticism, whose problem now also arose for the historical world, after the claim of a pure construction of reason of world history was rejected and historical knowledge was also limited to experience. If history, as little as nature, is thought of as a manifestation of the spirit, then it is just as much a problem in what way the human spirit should recognize history as the knowledge of nature had become a problem for it through the constructions of the mathematical method. Dilthey: So Dilthey had to look for an answer to the question of how pure natural science is possible, as well as Kant's answer to the question of how historical experience can become science. In a clear analogy to Kant's question, he therefore asked about the categories of the historical world that the humanities are capable of carrying. He does not forget, that experience here is something fundamentally different than in the field of knowledge of nature. Neo-Kantianism: The categorical analysis [of the] "object of knowledge" was in the eyes of of Neo-Kantianism the positive achievement of transcendental philosophy(1). DiltheyVsNew Kantianism: [Dilthey] felt that New Kantian criticism itself was dogmatic, and he was just as right as when he called English empiricism dogmatic. For what supports the construction of the historical world are not facts taken from experience, which then come under a value reference; rather, their basis is the inner historicity that is suitable for experience itself. It is a life-historical process and has its model case not in the determination of facts, but Gadamer I 226 in that peculiar fusion of memory and expectation into a whole which we call experience and which one acquires by having experiences. Thus it is in particular the suffering and the teaching which, through the painful experience of reality, is given to the person who matures through insight, which preformed the way of recognition for the historical sciences. They only think further, what is already thought in life experience. 1. Cf. H. Rickerts gleichnamiges Buch: Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Freiburg 1892. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Reason | Kant | Bubner I 142 Reason/Kant/Bubner: no one but the reason can say what reason really is - reason is bothered by the questions it cannot reject, nor answer. --- Kant I 105 Reason/unit/Kant: the law of reason to seek unity is necessary because we would not have any reason without it and therefore no sufficient feature of empirical truth. - Thus we have not only punctual correspondence, but systematic coherence. Kant assumed reason in nature. >Nature/Kant. I 113 Reason/Kant: reason in itself, is not something objective, even ideas of purposes are not. - We project reasonable causes into the object. - However: this projection is necessary, but it is only a projection that justifies no real science. Reason: Def Pure Reason/Kant: pure reason unifies ideas in an intuition by categories. Def Pure logic: unifies different ideas in a judgment. >Judgments/Kant. I 87 Def Reason/Kant: the capability of concepts. Also the pure reason can be a source of knowledge, for "philosophical" knowledge, and formal-logical. Term/Kant: "nothing but the synthesis is possible intuitions that are not given a priori ". Philosophical propositions are therefore always general principles for possible empirical intuition connections, for example, the principle of causality. >Concepts/Kant, >Categories/Kant. I 93 "Inside" acts of reason/Kant: "inner sense, of which time is the shape". - The images, which prescribe the objective units of things, are images of I of itself in time. - The unity of consciousness of the object is then also the unity of the thing. -> Schematism: recognizes categories as useful as illustrative determinations. I 99 Reason/Kant: term - Power of judgment: judgment - Reason: End. All three are forming the reason in a broader sense. --- Münch III 327 Def Reason/Kant: the capability of rules. They are separated from intuition for Kant. Holenstein: modern: intelligence. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 --- Strawson V 24 Reason/Kant: general functions also without sensuality - pure reason terms: = categories. >Categories/Kant. V 25 Schematism: transition to categories-in-use. - Only time without space. Transcendental deduction: each category must have a use in experience. StrawsonVsKant: that is logically flawed. >Experience/Kant, >Time/Kant. --- Bubner I 103 Kant/new: mind action consists in judging, a table of pure mind functions, which, however, are indeterminate with respect to all objects. The performance of union results from the act. It is not triggered from the outside! > Synthesis/Kant. --- Adorno XIII 105 Mind/Kant/Adorno: as far as reason is concerned, which refers to the possibility of recognizing the content, the material, Kant speaks of reason. Mind activity/Kant: is the activity of reason, which refers to a material which belongs to the senses ir azus and which unifies them and deals with its synthesis. Reason/Kant: here, this activity should be no longer bound to such a material but should be free of it. In the cognitive or noological meaning, reason gives us at least the regulative, in the sense of which our experience of the sensual is to proceed. Reason in this concise sense would be the ability to recognize ideas. Reason/Kant/Adorno: in a third sense, reason gives in perfect freedom its objects to itself. This is the practical use of reason. Paradoxically, we are here, according to Kant... Adorno XIII 106 ...not bound to the topic. Practical reason/Kant/Adorno: our reason or we act practically, insofar as we act purely according to reason and according to its purposes, without letting these purposes be given to us. Purpose/Kant/Adorno: Thus, we must only allow them to be given to ourselves by our own principle, the innermost principle of subjectivity itself. >Subjectivity/Kant. Reason/Kant/Adorno: is then an absolute activity of the mind in contrast to one limited by materials. In this way it becomes a higher and, to a certain extent, a counter-instance of the reason. Adorno XIII 110 Mind/Kant/Adorno: the reason activity which refers to the order functions which we are exercising against a material which comes to us from the outside and which is chaotic, unstructured and in itself quite undetermined according to Kant. Reason/Kant: once again reflects on the mind, on the use which the mind makes of itself and judges according to it, decides whether, in the sense of the purposes which it Adorno XIII 111 gives to itself, is a more highly developed one. Adorno XIII 112 Reason/Hegel/Adorno: in Hegel and already in Kant, there are reminiscences of the reification of reason in the sense that the common human should not think too much. Adorno XIII 113 Reason/Horkheimer/Adorno: Problem: reason should be the principle of freedom, but at the same time also a law and in this respect something badly repressive. In its concept, however, the relation of freedom and coercion has not actually been articulated. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Thing in itself | Gadamer | I 451 Thing in itself/being by itself/Gadamer: As a linguistically composed world, every (...) world is of itself open to every possible insight and thus to every expansion of its own world view and accordingly accessible to others. "Perceived": (...) this makes the use of the term "world in itself" problematic. The yardstick for the progressive expansion of one's own world view is not formed by the "world in itself" situated outside of all linguistically. Rather, the infinite perfectibility of human experience of the world means that, whatever language one uses, one never arrives at anything other than an ever more extended aspect, a "view" of the world. Phenomenologically speaking, the "thing in itself" consists in nothing other than the continuity with which the perspectival shadows of the perception of the thing merge into one another, as Husserl has shown (1). Gadamer: Whoever contrasts "the thing in itself" with these must either think theologically - then to "thing in itself" is not for him, but for God alone - or he will think luciferically, as one who wants to prove his own divinity to himself by having the whole world obey him - then to him the thing in itself is a limitation of the omnipotence of his imagination. I 453 In linguistic events (...) not only the insistent finds its place, but also the change of things. (...) in language the world represents itself. The linguistic experience of the world is "absolute". It transcends all relativities of being, because it encompasses all things in themselves, I 454 in which relations (relativities) it always appears. The linguistic nature of our experience of the world is prior to everything that is recognized and addressed as being. The basic reference of language and world does not therefore mean that the world becomes the object of language. Rather, what is the object of knowledge and statement is always already enclosed by the world horizon of language. The linguistic nature of human experience of the world as such does not mean the objectification of the world. What is in itself, is independent of one's own will and choice. But by recognizing it as it is in itself, it is made available in the very way that one can count on it, i.e. that one can classify it to its own purposes. As can be seen, this concept of the thing in itself is only seemingly the equivalent of the Greek concept of kath' hauto. The latter, first of all, means the ontological difference of what a being is according to its substance and its essence, from what can be and what is changing in it. What belongs to the permanent essence of a being is certainly also knowable in an excellent sense, i.e., it has always been previously assigned to the human spirit. What is "in itself" in the sense of modern science has nothing to do with this ontological difference between the essential and the inessential, but is determined as a secure knowledge that allows the mastery of matter. The assured facts are like the object and resistance with which one must reckon. What in itself is, therefore, as Max Scheler showed in particular, is relative in a certain way of knowing and wanting (3). I 456 Natural Sciences/Recognition/Thing in itself/Gadamer: As a science the one as well as the other [physics or biology] has pre-designed its subject area, the knowledge of which means its mastery. Linguistically composed world: A completely different situation is found, however, where the world relationship of humans as a whole, as it is situated in the linguistic execution, is meant. The world, which appears and is written linguistically, is not in the same sense in itself and not in the same sense relative, as the object of science. It is not in itself, if it does not have the character of the representational at all. As the comprehensive whole that it is, it is never given in experience. But as the world that it is, it is not relative to a particular language either. 1. Husserl, Ideen 1, § 41. 2. It is therefore a mere misunderstanding to invoke the thing in itself of the world against idealism, be it transcendental or the philosophy of language. In doing so, one misjudges the methodological meaning of idealism, whose metaphysical form may be considered overcome since Kant (see Kant's refutation of idealism (in the Critique of Pure Reason, B 274ff). 3. GadamerVsScheler: This remains correct, even if Scheler misunderstands the sense of transcendental idealism as generational idealism, and understands the "thing in itself" as opposition to the subjective production of the object. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Thing in itself | Husserl | Gadamer I 451 Thing in itself/Husserl/Gadamer: Phenomenologically speaking, the "thing in itself" consists in nothing other than the continuity with which the perspective shadows of the perception of things are intertwined, as Husserl has shown(1). Gadamer: Whoever contrasts "the being for itself" with these must either think theologically - in which case, the "being for itself" is not for him or her, but for God alone - or this person will think luciferically, as one who wants to prove his or her own divinity to him- or herself by having the whole world obey him or her - in which case, to this person, to be by oneself, is a limitation of the omnipotence of his or her imagination. >Imagination/Kant. 1. Husserl, Ideen 1, § 41. 2. It is therefore a mere misunderstanding to invoke the view of the world against idealism, be it transcendental or the philosophy of language. In doing so, one misjudges the methodological meaning of idealism, whose metaphysical form can be considered as overcome since Kant (see Kant's refutation of idealism (in the Critique of Pure Reason, B 274ff). |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Time | Kant | Danto I 123 Time/Kant/Danto: there is no experience of time. - It would have to take place in the time. >Circular reasoning. --- Adorno XIII 99 Space/time/Kant/Adorno: space and time are not concepts in Kant, but forms, that is, they are extraordinarily formal and abstract determinations. They refer to something which is not thinking, for space and time are supposed to be pure forms or pure intuition, but also to something which does not claim itself to be experience. Pure intuition: would be a kind of a priori experience. Problem: the differentiation of form and content, of reason and experience cannot be carried out as absolutely pure, as posited in the approach of the Critique of Pure Reason. >Space/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Leibniz, G.W. | Kant Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Descartes I 139 Descartes/Holz: Hegel pro: Move back of thinking from the world to God himself. God is ambiguous according to him. Spinoza: continues radically Descartes but drops the substance of the manifold. Leibniz: comes back to pluralism (dialectic unity/plurality) - KantVsLeibniz: Only "logic of illusion": (per Descartes, but mediated by Hume’s skepticism) Hegel: ties back to Leibniz’s dialectic. Descartes I 142 KantVsLeibniz: This is only a "logic of illusion". Kant I 34 Critique of Pure Reason: VsLeibniz, VsWolff: Against "school philosophy". Starting point: Freedom notion of academic philosophy: contradiction: freedom (as soul and God) ought to be unthinkable, although they were made the subject of metaphysical teachings. I 85 Room/Leibniz: (according to Kant): Is only by virtue of the mutual relationship of the things in it. KantVsLeibniz: counterexample: Mismatch between left and right hands or mirror image. An inversion will not restore the identity. Strawson V 227 Body/idealism/realism/Kant: we do not have an external scale or an external system, in which concepts, we can give an esoteric (obvious for the initiated) meaning of the question if such objects really exist. V 228 KantVsLeibniz: Vs pre-established harmony: we have no knowledge of the "real causes" of our perceptions. But we need it in order to decide whether those objects, which create our perceptions, really exist. V 228 Terms/sense principle/Kant: Only when concepts are applied to objects of possible experience they really hold a meaning. V 229 Due to the transcendental idealism we are now, however, obligated to create the objects,which exist in themselves, independently in the design of objects in general obligation objects as they exist in themselves, independently of our perception. But: V 230 KantVsMetaphysics/KantVsLeibniz: these alleged truths about objects independent of time and space. ("intelligible" objects). Kant: that is only consistent with the assumption that one speaks not of objects themselves, but of concepts. I 234 Justification/Vollmer: is not even necessary. What should make us look for a justification? Kant/early/precritical: Newton’s theory cannot be proven logically. The KantVsLeibniz and KantVsWolff had realized this. But Newton’s theory can also not be empirically verified. This, Kant had learned from Hume. This is then in contradiction to the assumed "absolute truth" and "logical provability" of Newtonian theory. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Locke, J. | Leibniz Vs Locke, J. | I 34/35 LeibnizVsLocke: Innate ideas are an ontological problem. I 44 Innate Ideas [Eingeborene Ideen]/LeibnizVsLocke: Their origin does not lie in the sensory perception, but in the reflection. Reflection: Nothing else than the attentiveness for what is in us. The reflection finds that there is much innate in our mind because we are self innate. e.g. being, unity, substance,duration, change, activity, perception, lust, and many other objects. I 45 They are the condition for the objective being to be determined as such (ens qua ens). They are given to us together with the being, and are a formal determination of the being. It is not established how those innate ideas behave when meeting the "initial truths" [erste Wahrheiten], the latter which are derived from sensory perceptions. I 46 Ideas/Perception/LeibnizVsLocke: these "ideas" (expansion, duration, appearance, etc.) come from the mind, not from the perception! They are the "ideas of the pure reason". However, they are connected to the exterior world; as such, they can be defined and proved. I 86 World/Totality/Leibniz: The construction of totality corresponds to calculus. Maximum: the infinite quantity of different substantialities.(World) Minimum: Representation of the whole in the individual.(Representation). I 87 LeibnizVsLocke: The connection of the indefinite quantity of predicates and the idea of the infinite as unity: this is the complete opposite of a pure addition of various things. As such, the idea of infinity is excluded from the realm of quantity! There is no "infinite number". There also is no infinite line. I 96 Miracle/Mysticism/LeibnizVsLocke: You should not seek refuge in miracles (God) or accept unexplainable forces. Vollmer I 17 Leibniz/Vollmer: 1704. New treatise on human reason. LeibnizVsLocke: Vs wax tablet, Vstabula rasa. Even though there might be nothing written on the wax tablet, it has nevertheless a certain structure right from the beginning, particularly a certain surface. It depends on the type and the number of the sensory organs which signals are processed as sensory perceptions. A propos: "There is nothing in the mind which was not first in some manner in the senses." ["Es gibt nichts im Verstand, was nicht vorher in den Sinnen war"]: Leibniz: Except the mind itself! Like Aristotle: Thesis: The mind has particular characteristics right from the beginning. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Neo-Kantianism | Heidegger Vs Neo-Kantianism | Habermas I 172 Heidegger / Kant: Critique of Pure Reason is not primarily epistemology but "apriorische Sachlogik des Seinsgebiet Natur«. Kantianism: Sciences go back to floating cognitive performance. HeideggerVsNeukantianism: "Studies are ways of being of existence." (»Wissenschaften sind Seinsweisen des Daseins«.) |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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