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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identity | Stalnaker | I 14 Vague identity/Stalnaker: vague identity can at most occur with vague terms in identity-statements. >Vagueness. Solution/counterpart theory/Stalnaker: if cross-wordly-relation between classes of deputies ((s) counterparts) exists and not between individuals themselves, then the relation must not be the one of identity, and this other relation may be vague.) >Counterparts, >Counterpart theory, >Cross world identity, >Possible worlds. I 126 Contingent Identity/Stalnaker: it is of course not the case that the actualism requires contingent identity, the above examples can be explained away. >Actualism. One cannot simply reject the possibility on the basis of semantics and logic of identity. Necessary identity: that means, that the thesis that all identity is necessary is a metaphysical thesis. >Identity/Kripke. I 131 Identity/necessary/contingent/Stalnaker: according to the modal quantifier theory all identity is necessary. We do not want this, e.g. a thing can have more counterparts in another possible world. I 132 Solution: there are different ways of picking. I 133 Vague identity/Stalnaker/Nathan SalmonVsVague Identity: (Salmon 1981(1), 243) according to Salmon identity cannot be vague: e.g. suppose there is a pair of entities x and y so that it is vague if they are one and the same thing - then this pair is certainly not the same pair like the pair, in which this is definitely true that x is the same thing as itself - but it is not vague, if the two pairs are identical or differentiated. I 134 Vague identity/identity statement/vague objects/Stalnaker: e.g. M is a specific piece of land within the indeterminate Mt Rainier. a) Mt. Rainier is an indefinite object: then it is wrong to say that M = Mt. Rainier. b ) If it is about a statement instead of an object: then it is indeterminate. I 135f Vague identity/Stalnaker: e.g. there are two fish restaurants called Bookbinder's. Only one can be the same as the original. Endurantism: Problem: "B0": (the original) is then an ambiguous term. Perdurantism: here it is clear. >Perdurantism, cf. >Endurantism. I 138 Vague identity/SalmonVsVague identity/uncertainty/Stalnaker: Salmon's argument shows that if we manage to pick out two entities a and b that there then has to be a fact, whether the two are one thing or two different things (Stalnaker pro Salmon, Nathan). Conversely: if it is undetermined whether a = b, then it is uncertain what "a" refers to or what "b" refers to. But this does not give us a reason to suppose that facts together with terms have to decide this. Salmon just shows that when facts and terms do not decide that it is then indeterminate. I 140 StalnakerVsSalmon: Salmon's vagueness is a vagueness of reference. I 139 Identity/indefinite/Kripke: (1971(2), 50-1) e.g. would the table T be the same in the actual world if in the past the constituting molecules were spread a little differently? Here, the answer can be vague. I 148 Identity/one-digit predicates/Stalnaker: one cannot generally treat sentences as predications. >Predication, >Sentences. E.g. x^(Hx u Gx) is an instance of the form Fs, but "(Hs and Gs)" is not. Therefore, our identity-scheme is more limited than Leibniz' law is normally formulated. >Leibniz Principle. I 154f Definition essential identity/Stalnaker: all things x and y, which are identical, are essentially identical, i.e. identical in all possible worlds, in which this thing exists ((s) that means, the existence is made a prerequisite, not the identity for the existence.) ((s) necessary identity/Stalnaker/(s): here the situation is reversed: if x and y are necessarily identical, they must exist in all possible worlds - or if a thing does not exist in a possible world, it may, in the possible worlds in which it exists, not be necessarily identical). Necessary identity/logical form: x^(x = y)> N(x = y) fails in the standard semantics and in counterpart theory, because a thing can exist contingently and include self-identity existence. Counterpart theory. Two different things may be identical, without being essentially identical, e.g. two possible worlds a and b, each possible for the respective other, and two distinct things have the same counterpart in b, namely 3. Then the pair satisfies the identity-relation in b, but because 1 exists in the world a and is from 2 different, the pair does not satisfy N(Ex> x = y) in b. >Cross world identity. 1. Salmon, Wesley C. 1981. Rational prediction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (2):115-125 2. Kripke, Saul S. Identity and NEcessity. In Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York: New York University Press. pp. 135-164 (1971). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Modal Logic | Stalnaker | I 144 Quantified Modal Logic/Stalnaker: quantified modal logic arises not simply from the joining of modal predicate logic and extensional quantifier theory. >Quantifier theory, >Quantifiers, >Quantification. Problem: the increase in expressiveness allows Leibniz’s Law and the existential generalization appear doubtful. >Existential generalization. Problems: first, there is a problem in the status of sentences and second there is a problem in the relation between domains of individuals. >Domains, >Sentences. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Validity | Quine | VII (f) 116 Validity/Quine: even validity and extension of predicates can be eliminated in favor of truth value tables - validity in the quantifier theory can be eliminated by proof theory. --- VII (i) 161 Validity/Quine: sentences that are valid for a universe, are also valid for a small universe - except for an empty universe. - Therefore, laws for large universes also should consider possible smaller universes. - Test, whether theorems are also valid for empty universes: put all universal quantifiers as true and all existential quantifiers as false. --- X 77 Validity/valid/Quine: There are two definitions of validity, a) (so far) as a property of schemes that refer to insertion. b) uses the set theory: therefore two auxiliary terms: 1. Auxiliary term "set-theoretic analogue": a logical scheme, open sentence of set theory: instead of predications "Fx", "Fy", "Gx" etc., so we write "X ε a" y ε α "x ε β" etc. the values of the variable "α", "β" etc. are amounts. Two-digit predicate letters. For "Hxy" we use ordered pairs Existential quantification: E.g. (Ex)(Fx.Gx): Set-theoretic analogue: the open sentence "Ex(x ε α. x ε β)". N.B.: This sentence talks about quantities and allows quantification about them. E.g. "(α)". Schematic letters "F" etc. on the other hand, only predicates represent and are not variables that take values. >Schematic letters, >Quantification. Set-theoretic analogue/s.a.: while the scheme is only the logical form of sentences, the set-theoretic analogue is actually a sentence of this form. 2. Auxiliary term for the new definition of validity: model. >Models. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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