Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 175 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Absolutism Kekes Gaus I 133
Absolutism/Kekes/Gaus: Absolutists believe that the diversity of values is apparent, not real. They concede that there are many values, but they think that there is a universal and objective standard that can be appealed to in evaluating their respective importance. This standard may be a highest value, the summum bonum; other values can be ranked on the basis of their contribution to its realization. The highest value may be happiness, duty, God's will, a life of virtue, and so forth. Absolutism often has a rationalistic basis. For the most frequently offered reason in favour of the universality and objectivity of the standard that absolutists regard as the highest is that it reflects the moral order of reality.
VsAbsolutism: It is a considerable embarrassment to absolutists that the candidates for universal and objective standards are also diverse, and thus face the same problems as the values whose diversity is supposed to be diminished by them.
AbsolutismVsVs: Absolutists acknowledge this, and explain it in terms of human shortcomings
that prevent people from recognizing the one and true standard.
>Conservatism/Kekes, >Values/Conservatism.

Kekes, John 2004. „Conservtive Theories“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Apologies Social Psychology Parisi I 138
Apologies/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: Some common elements include an admission of wrongdoing and/or an acknowledgment of the rule that was violated, expression of responsibility, expression of regret or remorse, a promise to forbear, and an offer to repair (Dhami, 2012(1); O'Hara and Yarn, 2002(2)). Responsibility: Empirically, taking responsibility for one's actions, offering to repair damage, and promising to forebear in the future have been shown to be essential elements (Scher and Darley, 1997)(3).
Punishment/blame: Apologies that contain none of these characteristics lead to increased blame and punishment.
Future behavior: A wrongdoer whose apology omits an expression of responsibility is perceived to be more likely to cause harm in the future (Robbennolt, 2003)(4).
Moral character: In some circumstances, a wrongdoer who issues an apology is viewed more favorably, serving to reduce the inference of negative moral character (Gold and Weiner, 2000(5); Ohbuchi, Kameda, and Agarie, 1989)(6). As a result of an apology, people perceive the wrongdoer as less likely to offend in the future (Etienne and Robbennolt, 2007(7);Gold and Weiner, 2000(5)).
Court proceedings: In another study, judges who evaluated a hypothetical about a defendant who threatened a fellow judge imposed a lower sentence when the defendant apologized at the sentencing hearing, compared to when he did not (Rachlinski, Guthrie, and Wistrich, 2013)(8). Judges who evaluated a hypothetical robbery case imposed a lower sentence when the defendant apologized (Rachlinski et al., 2013)(8). These effects were small but reliable.
Settlement: (...) there is experimental evidence that a defendant who apologizes to the plaintiff can increase the likelihood of out-of-court settlement by making the plaintiff more amenable to coming to the negotiation table, and by lowering the dollar amount that the plaintiff would be willing to accept in settlement (Robbennolt, 2006)(9).
Parisi I 139
Punishment: (...) motorists who apologize to a police omcer issuing a traffc ticket might incur a lower fine (Day and Ross, 2011)(10) but motorists who apologize to an administrative law judge in court might find themselves incurring a higher fine (Rachlinski et al., 2013)(8). >Attractiveness/Social Psychology, >Punishment/Social Psychology.

1. Dhami, M. K. (2012). "Offer and Acceptance of Apology in Victim-Offender Mediation." Critical Criminology 20(1): 45-60. doi:10.1007/s10612-011-9149-5.
2. O'Hara, E. and D. Yarn (2002). "On Apology and Consilience." Washington Law Review 77:
1121.
3. Scher, S. J. andJ. M. Darley (1997). "How Effective Are the Things People Say to Apologize? Effects of the Realization ofthe Apology Speech Act." Journal of Psycholinguistic Research
26(1): 127-140.
4. Robbennolt, J. K. (2003). "Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination." Michigan Law Review doi:10.2307/3595367.
5. Gold, G. J. and B. Weiner (2000). "Remorse, Confession, Group Identity, and Expectancies
About Repeating a Transgression." Basic and Applied Social Psychology 22(4): 291-300.
6. Ohbuchi, K., M. Kameda, and N. Agarie (1989). "Apology as Aggression Control: Its Role in
Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm." Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy doi:10.1037/0022-3514.56.2.219.
7. Etienne, M. and J. K. Robbennolt (2007). "Apologies and Plea Bargaining." Marquette Law Review 91:295.
8. Rachlinski, J. J., C. Guthrie, and A. J. Wistrich (2013). "Contrition in the Courtroom: Do
Apologies Affect Adjudication?" Cornell Law Review 98(5): 13-90.
9. Robbennolt, J. K. (2006). "Apologies and Settlement Levers." Journal of Empirical Legal studies 3(2): 333-373.
10. Day, M. V. and M. Ross (2011). "The Value of Remorse: How Drivers' Responses to Police
Predict Fines for Speeding." Law and Human Behavior 3 5(3): 221-234. doi:10.1007/
s10979-010-9234-4.

Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press


Parisi I
Francesco Parisi (Ed)
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Art Phenomenology Gadamer I 89
Art/Phenomenology/Gadamer: Basically, it is only thanks to the phenomenological criticism of 19th century psychology and epistemology that we owe the liberation from the concepts that prevented an adequate understanding of aesthetic being. [Phenomenological criticism] has shown that all attempts go astray to think of the aesthetic mode of being from a perspective of the experience of reality and to understand it as a modification thereof(1). All these concepts, such as imitation, appearance, de-realization (German: "Entwirklichung"), illusion, magic, dream, presuppose the reference to an actual being, from which the aesthetic being is distinguished. Now, however, the phenomenological decline in aesthetic experience teaches us that it does not come from such a reference at all, but rather sees the actual truth in what it experiences. This corresponds to the fact that the aesthetic experience cannot, in essence, be disappointed by an actual experience of reality. Cf. >Aesthetics/Schiller, >Aesthetics/Gadamer, >Truth of Art/Gadamer.

1. Cf. E. Fink, Vergegenwärtigung und Bild, Jb. f. Philos. u. phän. Forsch. Bd. XI, 1930.


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Atomism Sellars I 33
Standard Conditions: assuming them leads out of the logical atomism. >Circumstances/Sellars.
It is not enough that the conditions are appropriate, the subject must know that they are.
>Conditions, >Standard conditions, >Ideal observer, >Observation, >Idealization.
Circumstances: to determine them it is necessary to know something about the objects: how they are under different circumstances.
---
I 34
Logical atomism: VsSellars: it could reply that Sellars 1) overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sense content.
>Logical space.
2) the concepts of the sense contents have the kind of logical independence from one another which is characteristic of traditional empiricism.
>Independence, >Empiricism.
3) concepts for theoretical entities such as molecules have the kind of interdependence which Sellars may have rightly attributed to the concepts of physical facts, but: the theoretical concepts have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space.
>Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Unobservables.
Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of ​​a more fundamental logical space than that of the physical objects in space and time.
>Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Localization, >Objects.
Logical atomism: statements only occur truth-functionally in statements.
>Truth functions.
---
I 70
Atomism/SellarsVsAtomism/SellarsVsWittgenstein: analysis does not stand for definition of terms, but for the exploration of the logical structure of discourse - which does not follow a simple pattern. >Analysis/Sellars.

cf.
Def truth-functional/Tugendhat: depends on other sentences, not on situations.
Def truth-functional/Read: directly dependent only on the occurring concepts.
---
II 314
SellarsVsWittgenstein/Paradox: to say of a particular atomic fact that it was represented by a certain elementary statement, we have to use a statement in which the elementary statement occurs, but this is not truth-functional. We have to say something like: (1) S (in L) represents aRb.
>Complex, >Relation, >Atomism/Wittgenstein, >Atomism.
This representation relationship cannot be expressed through a statement. Wittgenstein dito.
---
II 321
If only simple non-linguistic objects could be represented, if complex objects were facts, that would lead to the well-known antinomy that there would have to be atomic facts which would be prerequisites for the fact that language can depict the world, but for which no example can be given if the speaker demands one. Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus).
>Facts, >States of affairs.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Autonomy Dworkin Gaus I 103
Autonomy/Dworkin, Gerald/Gaus: (...) to Gerald Dworkin, ‘[w]hat makes an individual the particular person he is is his life plan, his projects. In pursuing autonomy, one shapes one’s life, one constructs its meaning. The autonomous person gives meaning to his life’ (1988(1): 31). Gaus: Such visions of autonomy retain much of the structure of nineteenth-century self-realization perfectionism, while making less of the idea of a rich development of one’s capacities. The notion of a coherent plan of life was central to nineteenth-century self-realization theory (Gaus, 1983a(2): 34–44); the idea of a project or a plan points to a coherent and integrated set of ends. To the extent that a conception of personal autonomy presupposes a certain rational structure of ends, or a
Gaus I 104
rationally constructed plan, it invites the elitist and paternalist objections raised against nineteenthcentury liberal perfectionism. VsDworkin, Gerald: These problems are mitigated by conceptions of autonomy according to which ‘the fundamental idea in autonomy is that of authoring one’s own world without being subject to the will of others’ (Young, 1986(3): 19).
>Autonomy/Gaus, >Individual/Mill, >Liberalism/Gaus.

1. Dworkin, Gerald (1988) The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Gaus, Gerald F. (1983a) The Modern Liberal Theory of Man. New York: St Martin’s.
3. Young, Robert (1986) Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom. London: Croom-Helm.

Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.

Dworkin I
Ronald Dworkin
Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge, MA 1978


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Autonomy Gaus Gaus I 103
Autonomy/Gaus: The mass of society, according to Mill(1), is a ‘collective mediocrity’: they tend to conform and are not interested in new ideas. >Individuals/Mill, >Perfectionism/Gaus.
Paternalism: (...) following from this, such perfectionist theories raise the spectre of widespread paternalism. Although Mill argued for a strongly anti-paternalistic morality, it seems that the ideal is so specific and demanding as to open the gates to interferences with liberty, seeking to prod the mediocre mass towards a richer personality. It also becomes less than obvious why they should be granted liberty equal to that of the perfecting elite.
VsVs: Many have argued that a defence of freedom based on personal autonomy is not subject to these objections (...).
Joseph Raz: According to Joseph Raz, whereas Mill’s ideal of ‘[s]elf-realization consists in the development to their fullest extent of all, or all the valuable capacities a person possesses … [t]he autonomous person is one who makes his own life and he may choose the path of self-realization or reject it’ (1986(2): 325). The basic thought is that, according to the ideal of autonomy, it is not crucial that a person decides to develop her capacities, but that she decides whether to develop her capacities and, more generally, how to live her life.
Varieties of autonomy: The ideal of personal autonomy fractures into a variety of more specific doctrines (Lindley, 1986(3)). Personal autonomy has been understood in terms of project pursuit, self-rule, self-creation and critical reflection on one’s projects and values, or consistency between first- and second-order volitions (on this last, see Gill, 2001(4): 20ff ).
Steven Wall: According to Steven Wall, for example, ‘autonomous people need
(a) the capacity to choose projects and sustain commitments,
(b) the independence necessary to chart their own course though life and to develop their own understanding of what is valuable and worth doing,
(c) the self-consciousness and vigor to take control of their affairs’ (1998(5): 132; see also Raz, 1986(2)).
>Autonomy/Dworkin, Gerald, >Autonomy/Young, Robert.
Gaus I 104
Young, Robert: An autonomous person employs her critical faculties to evaluate and choose her aims and projects in such a way that they are truly hers, rather than simply imposed by, or unreflectively taken over from, others.(6) Gaus: This conception of autonomy is thus a much more open-ended, and so less controversial, ideal than the ideals of either self-realization or project pursuit. Autonomy does not tell us what to choose; it only insists on the value of a chosen life. The worry, though, is that nobody really creates himself. Our personalities and choices are deeply influenced by our natural talents and propensities, our culture and our upbringing. What options we consider attractive are strongly affected by our upbringing and culture.
>Autonomy/Mill, >Autonomy/Benn, >Autonomy/Young.

1. Mill, John Stuart (1963a) On Liberty. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, vol. XVIII, 213–301.
2. Raz, Joseph (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon.
3. Lindley, Richard (1986) Autonomy. London: Macmillan.
4. Gill, Emily R. (2001) Becoming Free: Autonomy and Diversity in the Liberal State. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
5. Wall, Steven (1998) Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Young, Robert (1986) Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom. London: Croom-Helm.

Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.

Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004

Autonomy Mill Gaus I 104
Autonomy/Mill/Gaus: Robert Young(1): An autonomous person employs her critical faculties to evaluate and choose her aims and projects in such a way that they are truly hers, rather than simply imposed by, or unreflectively taken over from, others. Gaus: This conception of autonomy is thus a much more open-ended, and so less controversial, ideal than the ideals of either self-realization or project pursuit. Autonomy does not tell us what to choose; it only insists on the value of a chosen life.
Problem: the worry, though, is that nobody really creates himself. Our personalities and choices are deeply influenced by our natural talents and propensities, our culture and our upbringing. What options we consider attractive are strongly affected by our upbringing and culture.
Mill: As John Stuart Mill pointed out, it is ‘mere accident’ that decides the traditions into which one is inducted: ‘the same causes which make him a Churchman in London, would have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian [or, we might add, a Maoist] in Pekin’ (1963a(2): ch. 2, para. 4). >Autonomy/Benn.

1. Young, Robert (1986) Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom. London: Croom-Helm.
2. Mill, John Stuart (1963a) On Liberty. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, vol. XVIII, 213–301.

Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.

Mill I
John St. Mill
A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843
German Edition:
Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Mill II
J. St. Mill
Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Autonomy Raz Gaus I 103
Autonomy/Raz/Gaus: According to Joseph Raz, whereas Mill’s ideal of ‘[s]elf-realization consists in the development to their fullest extent of all, or all the valuable capacities a person possesses … [t]he autonomous person is one who makes his own life and he may choose the path of self-realization or reject it’ (1986(1): 325). The basic thought is that, according to the ideal of autonomy, it is not crucial that a person decides to develop her capacities, but that she decides whether to develop her capacities and, more generally, how to live her life. Varieties of autonomy: The ideal of personal autonomy fractures into a variety of more specific doctrines (Lindley, 1986(2)). Personal autonomy has been understood in terms of project pursuit, self-rule, self-creation and critical reflection on one’s projects and values, or consistency between first- and second-order volitions (on this last, see Gill, 2001(3): 20ff ).
Steven Wall: According to Steven Wall, for example, ‘autonomous people need
(a) the capacity to choose projects and sustain commitments,
(b) the independence necessary to chart their own course though life and to develop their own understanding of what is valuable and worth doing,
(c) the self-consciousness and vigor to take control of their affairs’ (1998(4): 132; see also Raz, 1986(1)).
>Autonomy/Gerald Dworkin, >Autonomy/Robert Young.
Gaus I 104
Autonomy/liberalism/Gaus: The theory of personal autonomy, interpreted widely to include Millian self-development,( >Individual/Mill, >Autonomy/Mill, >Perfectionism/Gaus) is not simply a view of the good life that has been held by liberals, or even a view of the good life that justifies liberal political institutions. It is a distinctively liberal conception of the good life: the good life is a freely chosen life, and so the good life is a free life. Raz: It is, as Raz (1986)(1) says, a morality of freedom; it puts a certain conception of a free life at the centre of morality.
Gaus: This is not to say that the autonomist project succeeds; (...) freedom qua autonomy seems to teeter on the verge of justifying elitism and paternalism, and so invites the sort of critique famously advanced by Berlin in ‘Two concepts of liberty’.
>Autonomy/Gaus.

1. Raz, Joseph (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon.
2. Lindley, Richard (1986) Autonomy. London: Macmillan.
3. Gill, Emily R. (2001) Becoming Free: Autonomy and Diversity in the Liberal State. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
4. Young, Robert (1986) Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom. London: Croom-Helm.

Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Autonomy Young Gaus I 103
Autonomy/Young, Robert/Gaus: The notion of a coherent plan of life was central to nineteenth-century self-realization theory (Gaus, 1983a(1): 34–44); the idea of a project or a plan points to a coherent and integrated set of ends. To the extent that a conception of personal autonomy presupposes a certain rational structure of ends, or a
Gaus I 104
rationally constructed plan, it invites the elitist and paternalist objections raised against nineteenthcentury liberal perfectionism. VsDworkin, Gerald: These problems are mitigated by conceptions of autonomy according to which ‘the fundamental idea in autonomy is that of authoring one’s own world without being subject to the will of others’ (Young, 1986(2): 19).
Young: An autonomous person employs her critical faculties to evaluate and choose her aims and projects in such a way that they are truly hers, rather than simply imposed by, or unreflectively taken over from, others. Autonomy is thus understood as ‘an ideal of self-creation … Autonomy is opposed to a life of coerced choices. It contrasts with a life of no choices, or of drifting through life without ever exercising one’s capacity to choose’ (Raz, 1986(3): 370, 371). This conception of autonomy is thus a much more open-ended, and so less controversial, ideal than the ideals of either self-realization or project pursuit.
>Autonomy/Gaus.

1. Gaus, Gerald F. (1983a) The Modern Liberal Theory of Man. New York: St Martin’s.
2. Young, Robert (1986) Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom. London: Croom-Helm.
3. Raz, Joseph (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon.

Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Beliefs Loar Schiffer I 19
Belief/Loar: a belief is understood as a function that depicts propositions on internal physical states. >Brain/Brain state, >Mental states, >Physical/psychic, >Propositions, >Materialism.
These internal physical states have functional roles that are specified by these propositions.
>Functional role.
Schiffer I 286f
Belief/SchifferVsLoar: Problem: his realization of a theory of beliefs/desires (as a function of propositions on physical states), whose functional roles are defined by the theory. Problem: to find a theory that correlates each proposition with a single functional role rather than many roles.
>Mapping.
Schiffer: this will not work, therefore the Quine-Field argument is done in.

Quine-Field Argument/Schiffer:
. . .
Schiffer I 109
Def Conceptual Role/Field: (Field 1977)(1): the subjectively induced conditional probability function of an actor. Two mental representations s1 and s2 have the same conceptual role for one person iff. their (the person's) subjective conditional probability function is such that for each mental representation s the subjective probability of s1 given s is the same as that of s2 given s. SchifferVs: that never happens.
Field ditto - E.g. blind persons certainly have different conceptual roles of flounders - then there will be no correlation to the belief objects either.

1. Hartry Field (1977).Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role. Journal of Philosophy 74 (7):378-409

. . .
Schiffer I 286f
Belief/Beliefs/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine, beliefs are never true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. >Beliefs/Quine, >Intentionality/Brentano.
But:
QuineVsBrentano: ~ the canonical scheme includes no propositional attitudes, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms.
>Propositional attitudes.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

Loar II
Brian Loar
"Two Theories of Meaning"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976


Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Bourgeois/Citizen Marx Mause I 49
Bourgeois/citoyen/MarxVsHegel/Marx: The "political state" (Marx 1956b, p. 351), which historically helped the "bourgeois society" (1) to assert it, is the mere guarantor of this atomistic society of the selfish bourgeois pursuing its private interests, whose rights it protects in the form of liberal fundamental and human rights (2). In this way it preserves the bourgeois way of existence of (...) a human being alienated from his "species-being" (3), isolated individual, who sees in his peers not the communitarian opportunity for realization, but the barrier of his freedom. The citoyen is nothing more than the idealized projection of this alienated species-being, and the state, which according to this idealization presents itself as the Republican realizing space of this citoyen, actually proves to be an instrument for stabilizing bourgeois society and the competition of its members. Under the historical conditions of bourgeois society, therefore, the citoyen always remains subordinate to the bourgeois, and likewise the relationship between politics and economy appears in the form of a purpose-means reversal.
Republicanism/MarxVsRousseau, MarxVsHegel: The republican goal planned by Rousseau and Hegel is therefore not achievable for Marx within the limits of the existing economic system.
>Bourgeois/citizen//Hegel.
>Bourgeois/citizen/Rousseau.

1. K. Marx, Zur Judenfrage. In Marx Engels Werke, Bd.  1 (MEW 1), Hrsg. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Berlin 1956, S. 354-356,366-370.
2. Ibid. p. 361-367
3. Ibid. p. 366,370.

Marx I
Karl Marx
Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Capabilities Nussbaum Brocker I 895
Capabilities/Nussbaum: Nussbaum wants central human capabilities to be understood as specific political goals in the context of political order. As political goals, they stand beyond particular metaphysical justifications and can therefore be regarded as the basis of basic constitutional principles. In this way, capabilities can become the object of an "overarching consensus". ...the state is indeed obliged to enable each individual to exercise the basic capabilities, but the actual realization is left to each individual.
Brocker I 896
Nussbaum basically focuses on the question of possibilities/skills instead of actual satisfaction.(1)
Brocker I 901
Capabilities Approach/Nussbaum: its task is twofold: 1. to enable comparability of the quality of life of different people in different contexts;
2. to establish an overarching normative basis that allows core areas of human functioning to be determined and thus certain capabilities that must be guaranteed for every citizen in every nation in political contexts.(2)
For problem see >Universalism/Nussbaum.
VsNussbaum: Question: Doesn't Nussbaum introduce here an implicit reference to "human nature" that pushes her into the risky direction of metaphysical realism?
>Human nature.
NussbaumVsVs: Nussbaum does not assume a neutral observer who judges the facts of human life from an external perspective. Rather, she pleads for an internal reconstruction of knowledge about ourselves: We can only understand and comprehend ourselves from ourselves and against the background of shared experiences (cf. Pauer-Studer 1999, 10 f.).(3)
Brocker I 902
It is crucial that the liberal basic principle of "each person as an end", aggravated by the "principle of each person's capability"(4), is recognised. The recognition of this principle is reflected in the fact that it is not certain lifestyles that are to be defined, but rather abilities and spheres of action that are to be guaranteed in order to allow people the free choice of how they perceive these possibilities. Functional abilities of the human being: See >Functions/Nussbaum.
Brocker I 903
Nussbaum understands the capabilities approach as a theory of basic conditions, not as a full theory of justice. A complete theory would require a more clearly marked approach to determining the threshold level of capabilities.(5) >Justice theory, cf. >J. Rawls.
Three categories of abilities/Nussbaum:
a) basic capabilities, b) internal capabilities,
c) combined capabilities. (Interaction with external conditions).(6)
Cf. >Rights/Nussbaum.

1. Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development. The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge 2000, p, 12.
2. Ibid. p.71
3. H. Pauer-Studer 1999, »Einleitung«, in: Martha C. Nussbaum, Gerechtigkeit oder das gute Leben, Frankfurt/M. 1999, 7-23., p.10f 4. Nussbaum ibid. p.74
5. ibid. p. 12
6. ibid. p.84
Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Capabilities Sen Brocker I 890
Skills/Sen: in order to revive a qualitatively oriented economic science, the distinction between "capabilities" and "functionings" must be introduced. Functions/Sen: The term 'functions' [...] reflects the various things a person likes to do or likes to be. The desirable functions may range from elementary conditions such as adequate nutrition or freedom from avoidable diseases to very complex activities or personal states such as being able to participate in community life and having self-respect. A person's 'chances of realization' refer to the possible connections of the functions he or she is able to perform.
I 891
Def Realization Chances/Sen: (=abilities): are thus expressions of freedom: namely the [...] [essential] freedom to realize alternative combinations of functions (or, expressed less formally, the freedom to realize different lifestyles).(1) For Sen, the idea of "essential freedom" includes in particular the "procedural freedom" to define the concrete freedoms and opportunities that a community seeks to grant its members. (cf. (2))
>Freedom/Sen.
I 892
Sen: the political dispute over the respective situation-appropriate definition of basic economic needs must not be avoided, but should be sought, because it creates the epistemic and political conditions necessary for their realization.(3)
1. Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen. Wege zu Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität in der Marktwirtschaft, München 2000, p. 95
2. B. Giovanola »Personhood and Human Richness. Good and Well-Being in the Capability Approach and Beyond«, in: Review of Social Economy 63/2, 2005, 249-267.
3. Sen 2000, p. 182
Claus Dierksmeier, „Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen (1999)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

EconSen I
Amartya Sen
Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Carnap-Sentence Lewis I (b) 29
Carnap Sentence/Carnap conditional/Lewis: states that in case of realization of the theory T the theoretical terms name the elements of a realization of T: (Note: Carnap has cases in mind where the A terms belong to an observation language). E.g. T(x)>T(t) - Ramsey sentence: has the same content as the theory in traditional terminology. ---
Schwarz I 220
Theory/Lewis/Schwarz: in order to refute the Carnap conditional one would have to find that there are things that fulfil the theory, but that these are not electrons - this cannot turn out to be true - e.g. that it was not Homer who wrote the Odyssey, but another Greek man of the same name - ((s) yes, but not: "not the author of the Iliad") - no discovery about DNA, causal chains, prototypes or usage may rebut the Carnap conditional - but Carnap conditional is not suitable for definitions, because it specifies only sufficient conditions. Cf. >Ramsey sentence.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Causal Relation Schiffer I 102
Causal relation/Schiffer/(s): Problem: There is no physical relation that connects general terms with the corresponding entities. >General terms, >Correspondence.
Otherwise: it would have to be a functional relation (multiple realization): problem: it should take "true of" or "refers" as basic concepts.
>Basic concepts/Schiffer.
A causal theory (for a theory of mental representations) (e.g. reliability theory) needs no semantic terms (true of, referenced) as basic concepts.
>Reliability theory.
Instead: substitutional quantification or translation of M-sentences into the metalanguage of the theory.
>Substitutional quantification, >Metalanguage.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Change Aristotle Bubner I, 169
Change/Aristotle: comprehending it represents the central problem to which theoretical and practical philosophy are devoted.
Good/Aristotle: at first, it seems as if it could only be considered as a goal in the sense of a causa finalis.
>Action/Aristotle, >Practise/Aristotle, >Good/Aristotle.
But, moreover, it still claims the position in the concept of the supreme being, to which metaphysics looks.
>Metaphysics/Aristotle.
The argumentation which leads to the rational doctrine of God also proceeds from a general theory of motion.
What is required is the connection between all real things, insofar as it is to be seen as moving.
From the naturalistic point of view, God thus becomes a theoretical requirement.
I 170
Chorismos ("Separation")/Plato: leaves a gap between the eternal ideas and the changing world of the senses.
Kinesis/Aristotle: bridges this gap. (comes from Heraclitus).
Problem: How is the determination of the changeable possible at all?
      Solution: Aristotle: by the four causes
Shape, material, whence of the movement, whereto of the movement.
This makes the fiction of a "second world" (of ideas) superfluous.

Movement/Aristotle: problem: overall context. The movement cannot have emerged from itself, it must be eternal. (To escape regress).
      But this must now be followed by a principle that is more than a mere ability: a necessity.
From something that could also be different we do not gain any theoretical certainty.

Good/Aristotle: it is hidden in the special nature of a world principle, which cannot fail to provide a foundation for the overall context of the moving reality.
I 172
This all-bearing principle can exist only in a continuous realization without alternative, or in actuality (energeia). Energeia/Aristotle: Reality, always completed, has no shortcomings. It occupies the highest rank.
Dynamis/Aristotle: Possibility
Ousia/Aristotle: the underlying something of the interrelationship between reality and possibility.
For-the-Sake-of-Which/Aristotle: from the outset behind the term "good". It can only be applied about something or for something.
       For something: endeavored or entelechy created in nature.
I 173
       About something: not the goal of an endeavor, but the vanishing point of a system of reality considered as meaningful: "love".

Citizenship Marshall Gaus I 218
Citizenship/welfare state/T.H. Marshall/Moon: T. H. Marshall (1977)(1) offers a classical account of the welfare state as the necessary result of the universal extension of citizenship. He traces the emergence of universal citizenship by observing three successive phases, the first involving the general extension of civil rights, the second the universalization of the suffrage, and the third the growth of the welfare state and the creation of the 'social rights of citizenship'.* >Welfare state, >Civil rights, >Citizens, >Bourgeois/Citizen.
Gaus I 219
David Harris: In some solidaristic accounts, the emphasis on work invokes an older language of duties. In Harris's account, for example, the duties correlative to our welfare rights are 'strict obligations' and may be enforced by 'coercion' (1987(2): 161).
Marshall: In this, [Harris] echoes Marshall, who looked beyond the social rights of citizenship to consider the duties of the enriched and inclusive model of citizenship he advocated, including 'the
duty to work', which he thought was of 'paramount importance'.

* Like so much of social science, Marshall's account is blind to issues of gender, as he depicts these phases as a historical succession, the completion or virtual completion of one laying the basis for the realization of the next. His stages describe the gradual extension of the rights associated with citizenship for men, but they ignore the experience of women (and, I might add, other non-class-based exclusions), who often were able to claim various welfare rights (e.g. widows' pensions) before they were entitled to political or even full civil rights.

1. Marshall, T. H. (1977 119501) 'Citizenship and social class'. In his Class, Citizenship, and Social Development. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
2. Harris, David (1987) Justifying State Welfare. Oxford: Blackwell.

Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Citizenship Welfare Economics Gaus I 216
Citizenship/Welfare economics/Moon: Because concepts of positive rights and equal opportunity are not well defined outside of specific social contexts, they are often combined with arguments appealing to ideals of citizenship and social solidarity. The basic argument is that the welfare state should guarantee the inclusion of all citizens as full members of a democratic society, which
requires that an extensive range of social rights be provided. The reasoning is fairly straightforward: just as citizens must have civil and political rights, they must be guaranteed certain social rights if they are to be full members of a society, and specifically if they are to participate in democratic politics.
The key premise in this argument is that citizenship must be universal. All who are capable of intentional or responsible action must be full citizens. The only legitimate basis for exclusion is incapacity for responsible action.
T. H. Marshall: T. H. Marshall (1977)(1) offers a classical account of the welfare state as the necessary result of the universal extension of citizenship. He traces the emergence of universal citizenship by observing three successive phases, the first involving the general extension of civil rights, the second the universalization of the suffrage, and the third the growth of the welfare state and the creation of the 'social rights of citizenship'. *
Individualism: There are a number of variants of this argument, but a common theme is a deep suspicion of the market and at least certain forms of individualism.
Efficiency/solidarity: Whereas arguments from efficiency take the market as a baseline, and justify social policies on the ground that they can correct market failures, arguments from solidarity begin with something close to the opposite assumption - projecting an ideal in which all activities are organized through collective associations, in which individuals are oriented principally towards common needs and aspirations.
Social order: Richard Titmuss (1972)(2) extols the 'gift relationship', and David Harris (1987)(3) speaks of the family as a model for social life. More concretely, Claus Offe (1984)(4) and Gosta Esping-Andersen (1985)(5) once expressed the hope that the growth of collective consumption and other forms of decommodification will eventually displace capitalism, leading to a socialist order of society.
>Society/David Harris.

* Like so much of social science, Marshall's account is blind to issues of gender, as he depicts these phases as a historical succession, the completion or virtual completion of one laying the basis for the realization of the next. His stages describe the gradual extension of the rights associated with citizenship for men, but they ignore the experience of women (and, I might add, other non-class-based exclusions), who often were able to claim various welfare rights (e.g. widows' pensions) before they were entitled to political or even full civil rights.

1. Marshall, T. H. (1977 119501) 'Citizenship and social class'. In his Class, Citizenship, and Social Development. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
2. Titmuss, Richard (1972) The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. New York: Random House.
3. Harris, David (1987) Justifying State Welfare. Oxford: Blackwell.
4. Offe, Claus (1984) Contradictions of the Welfare State. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
5. Esping-Andersen, Gosta (1985) Politics against Markets. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Climate Change Singer I 217
Climate Change/Ethics/P. Singer: what we do to strangers in other communities far away today is much more serious than what we could have done to them if we had the habit of sending a group of fighters to their village.
I 218
We can only combat climate change with global measures. What should the ethics on the basis of which we coordinate our actions look like? Natural Resources/Locke/P. Singer: from Locke's point of view, they can be exploited as long as there is enough and of the same quality for everyone.
P. Singer: But we have now discovered that the absorption capacity of the atmosphere for greenhouse gases is limited.
>J. Locke.
I 220
Equal distribution: what can it look like? Principles/Nozick/P. Singer: Nozick makes a sensible distinction between "historical" and "time slices" principles.(1) :
Def Historical principle/Nozick: to understand whether a given distribution of goods is fair or unfair, we have to ask how the distribution came about. We need to know its story. Are the parties entitled to ownership on the basis of originally justified acquisition?
>Public Goods, >Property.
Def two-sided principles/Nozick: consider only the current situations and do not ask about the realization.
See also Responsibility/Singer.
I 224
Equal burden sharing/pollution/Singer, P: at a UN conference in 2009, Rwandan President Paul Kagame argued for equal per capita burden sharing in the elimination of environmental damage, as all people use the atmosphere to the same extent. Everything else is counterproductive. Sri Lanka made a similar proposal. Singer: this is the application of a time slice principle: Rwanda and Sri Lanka - like other developing countries - do well with it, because they consume less. It is better for them to forego the right to compensation towards industrialised countries.
I 231
Climate change/responsibility/individual/Singer, P.: what can I do as an individual? If I change my own behaviour, I can reduce the emission of greenhouse gases astonishingly far. However, this makes no measurable difference on a global scale. But if everyone did it, the effect would be measurable. Then it seems obvious that it is wrong for me personally not to abide by it. >Responsibility.
I 232
Question: How about if I orientate my behaviour towards that of other individuals and behave badly, as long as not too many others behave badly as well? Consequentialism: on this question, there is a difference between consequentialists and non-consequentialists.
>Consequentialism.
Rule-Utilitarianism: would say: the best rule for the individual is not to commit any violation or to accept any damage to the community, even if it is not immediately measurable.
Utilitarianism/David Lyons: (D. Lyons 1965.(3)): Thesis: In such cases, Rule-Utilitarianism coincides with Action-Utilitarianism. Both welcome and reject the same solutions.
>Utilitarianism.
R. M. Hare: claims the same with reference to Kant's appeal to the idea of a universal right (>Categorical imperative) and argues that this principle leads to Utilitarianism.(3)
I 233
Brad Hooker: (B. Hooker,2000(4))): Hooker argues for a version of rule utilitarianism that prevents rules from becoming too complicated. He believes that we are acting wrongly when we break a rule that is part of a set of rules that, if internalised by an overwhelming majority of the population, would have the best consequences. If the rules became too complex, people would find it hard to internalize them. The cost of educating people would be too high. See also Responsibility/Parfit, Responsibility/Ethics//Glover, J.,
>Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies.


1. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York, 1974
2. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, Oxford, 1965.
3. R. M. Hare,"Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?" Utilitas 5 (1993), pp. 1-16.
4. B. Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World. Oxford, 2000.

SingerP I
Peter Singer
Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011

SingerP II
P. Singer
The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015

Cognition Maturana I 67
Def Cognitive Area/Maturana: entire interaction area of the body - can be extended indefinitely when new forms of interaction are created, it is enlarged with instruments. >Actions, >Domains/Maturana.
I 78
Described things lie exclusively in the cognitive area - i.e. it is not part of the area that is to describe - (level) >Description levels.
I 81
Cognition/Maturana: generation of a closed interaction area, not comprehension of an independent outside world. >Outer world, >Exterior/interior.
Conclusion: Conclusions are necessary function results from the self-referential circular organization. - They are history-independent, because time itself is only part of the cognitive area of the ((s) second) observer.
>Observation/Maturana, >Circularity, >Self-reference, >Time.
I 146
Cognition/Maturana: Isolation of an area and call for appropriate behavior - only criterion: this appropriate behavior - it must be explained when cognition must be explained. >Explanation/Maturana.
I 200
Cognition/Maturana: condition of realization (of the structural coupling) - not unveiling a reality, representation or description of "something". >Structural coupling, >Reality, >Representation.
I 202
Cognitive Area/Maturana: with humans: language - humans exist in the range of objects that produce themselves through language actions - objects: do not exist outside language >Language, >Objects, >Domains/Maturana.

Maturana I
Umberto Maturana
Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000

Coincidence Field II 50
Def Orthographic Coincidence/Predicate/Single-Digit/Multi-Digit/Belief/Field: E.g. All the different attributions, e.g. "X believes Russell was bald", "X believes Russell was bald or snow is white", etc. should be regarded as primitive single-digit predicates. - Then we could drop all two-digit predicates, such as "X believes that p", entirely. >Beliefs.
Orthographic coincidence: then the fact that the expression "believes that" occurs in both (supposedly) single-digit predicates would be irrelevant, a mere orthographic coincidence.
Similarly, the fact that both contain "Russell was bald".
FieldVs: this cannot be taken seriously, but suppose it were serious: then it would follow that there do not have to be any physical relations between people and propositions.
Then, since we did not speak of a psychological relation, it is clear that there is no realization in which a physical relation would be needed. ((s) Then there must be an infinite number of primitive predicates with complex structure.)
Solution/Field: to avoid the "orthographic coincidence" "X believes that p0" should be considered as functionally definable for certain sentences p0, in the manner in which it is correct for "X is in pain."
Conclusion: then we need physical properties and possible worlds.
>Properties, >Possible worlds, cf. >Physicalism.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Concepts Kant Term/Kant: "intuitions without concepts are blind." (KrV B 75)
---
Strawson V 22
Terms/Kant: not any arbitrary amount of terms is sufficient for us - there must be terms of persistent objects and re-identifiable objects in the room.
V 23
The distinctions must be created in the terms themselves, because there is no "pure perception of a reference system".
V 122
Terms/Kant/Strawson: objects can only be changed in the context of a recognition - respective restrictions must somehow be reflected in the terms. - But it is not about a specific link but about the existence of any such links.
V 123
Terms for objects are always summaries of causal law.
V 128
Terms/StrawsonVsKant: terms are not yet socially characterized by him. ---
Tugendhat I 191
Term/Kant: a term is a general idea, mediate. Intuition/Kant: immediately.
Tugendhat: ambiguous: Imagined or subjective imagined - Kant per the latter.
Objective meaning: "nota communis" common feature -> = species/Husserl.
---
Bubner I 105
Knowledge/judgment/Kant: knowledge is formulated in judgments which always presuppose concepts. Concept/Kant: in terms, must be done transcendentally, then the realization of knowledge must be guaranteed by judgments.
>Judgment/Kant, >Knowledge/Kant.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Contract Theory Sandel Brocker I 675
Contract Theory/Sandel: for the political philosophy of modern times from Hobbes to Kant, the idea of contracts is so attractive not least because, according to its model, the establishment of states and legal systems can be thought of as an act of a free agreement of previously unattached individuals with different interests and life plans. The formal nature of the procedure and the free consent of all parties is crucial. SandelVsRawls: Rawls is not, however, concerned with justifying the establishment of a state and legal order in general, but with justifying certain substantive principles of justice.
Problem: Rawls then has to justify certain principles in content with a purely formal criterion. He succeeds only by dropping the idea of justification by negotiation in favor of a derivation of principles from his implicit subjectivity theory (see Subjectivity/Sandel). See Veil of Ignorance/Sandel.
The "conclusion of a contract" is therefore not based on a free agreement but - in the Kantian sense of the word - on the realization that implies such a conceived practical subjectivity in terms of principles of justice from the outset. (1)

1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 130, 132.

Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Correspondence Theory Dummett I 24ff
Dummett/Frege: Context principle VsCorrespondence theory - context principle VsCoherence theory: Meaning is not given. - These theories ask wrongly about the proposition instead of the sentence. >Propositions, >Sentences, >Context.
I 24ff
To understand the proposition we must know what the sentence means. Therefore, the followers of the correspondence theory and the coherence theory consider the meaning of the sentences as something that is given before the realization of what they makes them true. Then almost everything could be regarded as something that makes the sentence true, it just depends on what the sentence means.
I 26ff
Correspondence Theory/Coherence Theory: meaning before truth. Davidson: truth before meaning (the truth conditions are defined later by the theory). >Meaning theory, >Truth conditions.
Dummett: both together.

II 89ff
Correspondence Principle /Dummett: If a sentence is true, there must be something because of which it is true - ( truth-maker principle). >Truthmakers.
II 90
Correspondence Principle: is only used when we already know the truth conditions; this requires deciding which sentences can be simply true. >Bare truth.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Correspondence Theory James Diaz-Bone I 88
PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: Conformity in James, the dichotomy true/false is softened. (> realization,> adjustment). ---
Horwich I 22
Correspondence/accordance/pragmatism/James: only here does he begin to distinguish himself from "intellectualism": Accordance/James: accordance means first "to copy", but e.g. our word for clock is not a copy, but a symbol, which can replace a representation image very well.
Symbol/James: for many things there are no "copies" at all, only symbols: e.g. "past", "force", "spontaneity", etc.
Correspondence: can only mean proper guidance here. Namely, practically as well as intellectually.
Horwich I 23
It leads to consistency, stability and fluid human communication. (1)

1. William James (1907) "Pragmatisms Conception of Truth“ (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 4 p. 141-55 and 396-406) in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994


James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Culture Shift Habermas IV 576
Change of values/culture shift/culture change/cultural change/change in values/value change/Inglehart/Habermas: In the developed societies of the West, conflicts have developed in recent decades that deviate in several respects from the welfare state pattern of the institutionalized distribution conflict. Lately it is more about the implementation of reformed lifestyles, about questions of the grammar of life forms. An example of this is: the term Silent Revolution/Ronald Inglehart: (1).
IV 577
New are the problems of quality of life, equality, individual self-realization, participation and human rights. (2) This new policy finds stronger support in the new middle class, in the younger generation and in the groups with qualified school education. Habermas: these phenomena fit the thesis of internal colonization See Terminology/Habermas.

1. R. Inglehart, Wertwandel und politisches Verhalten, in: J. Matthes, (Hrsg.) Sozialer Wandel in Europa, Frankfurt, NY 1979.
2. K.Hildebrandt, R.J. Dalton, Die neue Politik, in: PVS, Jg. 19,1977, S. 230ff. S.H. Barnes, M. Kaase et al., Political Action, Beverly Hills/London 1979.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Dependence Dependence: Question whether statements, phenomena, beliefs, attitudes, actions are influenced causally or otherwise by other statements, beliefs, events, actions etc. and whether this influence is indispensable for their realization. See also counterfactuals, absoluteness.

Dialogue Gadamer I 308
Dialogue/Understanding/Gadamer: Just as in conversation the other person, after having determined his or her position and horizon, becomes understandable in his or her opinions without the need to get along with that person, so for the one who thinks historically, the tradition becomes understandable in its sense without one nevertheless understanding with it and in it. In both cases the person who understands has, as it were, withdrawn from the situation of understanding. He or she is not to be found. By including the other's point of view in what he or she claims to tell you from the outset, you put your own point of view in a safe inaccessibility. Cf. >I-You-Relationship/Gadamer.
I 372
Dialectic: Dialectic as the art of questioning only proves its worth in the fact that the one who knows how to ask is able to capture his or her questioning, and that means: the direction into the open. The art of questioning is the art of asking further questions, i.e. it is the art of thinking. It is called dialectic, because it is the art of having a real conversation. >Openness.
I 373
The maieutic productivity of the Socratic dialogue, its midwifery of the word, may well address the human persons who are the partners in the conversation, but it only adheres to the opinions they express and whose immanent factual consistency is developed in the conversation. Logos: What emerges in its truth is the logos, which is neither mine nor yours, and which therefore surpasses the subjective meaning of the interlocutors in a way
I 374
that the person leading the conversation always remains the unknowing person. >Logos.
I 375
Hegel: But the originality of the conversation as the reference of question and answer is even more evident in such an extreme case as Hegelian dialectic as a philosophical method. To unfold the totality of thought determinations, as it was the concern of Hegel's logic, is, as it were, the attempt in the great monologue of the modern "method" to embrace the continuum of meaning, the particular realization of which is provided by the conversation of the speakers. >Logic/Hegel.
When Hegel sets himself the task of liquefying and putting a spirit in (sic) the abstract determinations of thought, this means melting logic back into the consummative form of language, the concept back into the meaning of the word that asks and answers - a reminder, still in failure, of what dialectic actually was and is. Hegel's Dialectic is a monologue of thought that seeks to achieve in advance what gradually matures in each real conversation.
I 387
[In a conversation] the partners (...) are far less the leaders than the led. Nobody knows in advance what will "come out" of a conversation. The understanding or its failure is like an event that has happened to us.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Dilthey Gadamer Gadamer I 246
Dilthey/Gadamer: In speculative idealism the concept of the given, of positivity, had been subjected to a fundamental critique. In the end Dilthey tried to refer to this for his life-philosophical tendency. He writes(1): "How does Fichte describe the beginning of a new? Because he starts from the
Gadamer I 247
intellectual view of the I, but does not understand it as a substance, a being, a given, but rather precisely through this view, i.e. this strained deepening of the I in itself as life, activity, energy, and accordingly understands energy concepts such as opposition, etc. realization in it." >Philosophy of life, >Given, >Criticism.
Gadamer: Likewise, Dilthey finally recognized in Hegel's concept of the spirit the vitality of a genuine historical concept.(2)
>Spirit/Hegel.
Nietzsche/Bergson/Simmel: Some of his contemporaries worked in the same direction, as we pointed out in the analysis of the concept of experience: Nietzsche and Bergson, these late descendants of the romantic criticism of the thought form of mechanics, and Georg Simmel.
Dilthey/Heidegger/Gadamer: But what radical demand for thinking lies in the inappropriateness of the concept of substance for historical being and historical recognition was only brought to general awareness by Heidegger(3). Only through him was Dilthey's philosophical intention released. With his work he tied in with the research of intentionality in Husserl's phenomenology, which was the decisive breakthrough in that it was not at all the extreme Platonism that Dilthey saw in it(4).
Intentionality/Objectivity/Husserl/Gadamer: Rather, the more one gains insight into the slow growth of Husserl's thoughts through the progression of the great Husserl edition, the clearer it becomes that with the theme of intentionality an increasingly radicalizing critique of the "objectivism" of previous philosophy - also of Dilthey(5) - began, which was to culminate in the claim of philosophy: "that intentional phenomenology for the first time made the mind as a spirit a field of systematic experience and science and
Gadamer I 248
thus achieved the total conversion of the task of knowledge."(6) >Spirit/Husserl.
>Entries for Dilthey as an author.

1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften, V Il, 333.
2. Ges. Schriften Vll, 148.
3. Heidegger already spoke to me in 1923 with admiration about the late writings of Georg Simmel. That this was not only a general recognition of the philosophical personality of Simmel, but also indicates the impulses Heidegger had received in terms of content, becomes clear to everyone who reads the first of the four "Metaphysical Chapters", which summarized under the title "Philosophy of Life" what the doomed Georg Simmel had in mind as a philosophical task. There it says, roughly, that "life is really past and future"; there "the transcendence of life is described as the true absolute", and the essay concludes: "I am well aware of the logical difficulties that stand in the way of the conceptual expression of this way of looking at life. I have tried to formulate them, in the full presence of the logical danger, since, after all, the layer has possibly been reached here where logical difficulties do not easily call for silence - because it is the one from which the metaphysical root of logic first nourishes itself. «
4. Cf. Natorp's criticism of Husserl's ideas (1914) (Logos 1917) and Husserl himself in a private letter to Natorp on June 29th, 1918: "whereby I may also note that I have already overcome the stage of static Platonism for more than a decade and have put the idea of transcendental genesis as the main theme of phenomenology". The note by O. Beckers goes into the same direction in the Husserlfestschrift p. 39.
5. Husserliana VI, 344.
6. Husserliana VI, 346.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Dualism Pauen Pauen I 35
Dualism/Pauen: two types of states that can also occur independently - interactionist dualism: mutual influence: Descartes. >Dualism/Descartes, >Eccles/Popper, >Property dualism: certain neural processes have not only their physical characteristics but additionally also mental characteristics that are theoretically independent of the neural - Typical theory: computer analogy.
>Computation), >Martians, >Computer model.
I 60
Consciousness as an autonomous property. >Consciousness, cf. >Monism.
I 38
Dualism/Pauen: 1. explanation for the uniformity of our experiences in light of the diversity of physical realizations >Multiple realization.
Integration performance of the free mind.
>Mind, >Thinking.
2. Explanation of >Free will.
I 39
3. Pro dualism: VsMonism: Problem of qualitative varied experience by uniform activity of nerve cells.
I 56
VsDualism: Dualism has no concrete research subject.
I 44
Descartes/Pauen: the distinction of substances can be justified by the imaginability of such a distinction. >R. Descartes, >res extensa, >res cogitans.
The argument still plays an important role today: - Kripke uses it as the basis for its objection VsIdentifikation of mental and neural processes.
>Identity Theory.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Duty Jonas Brocker I 608
Duties/Generational Justice/Responsibility/Jonas: Why should the living today be responsible for the future of humanity? According to Jonas, there is no duty towards individual future generations to guarantee their existence: the sought-after and "necessary" new ethic of the future is outside the individual legal obligation field, because there can be no reciprocity with individual future generations, since they do not yet exist (1). Solution/Jonas: there is a commitment to humanity as a whole, a duty to preserve humanity. This should be thought in the form of a categorical imperative, as "an unconditional duty of humanity to exist" (2). See Ethics/Jonas.
Brocker I 615
Intuitionism/Jonas/Brocker: Jonas argues intuitively: the infant serves him as an example of the "self affirmation of being" (3). The sight of a helpless infant is sufficient to convey directly the realization of a duty to care for it. For Jonas, this is an "ontic paradigm": the coincidence of existence and value. (4) See Being/Jonas, Ethics/Jonas, Existence/Jonas.
Brocker I 616
WernerVsJonas: the example of the infant is not culturally invariant. (5) Example: In Sparta, an infant did not trigger a general sense of responsibility. Problem/BrockerVsJonas: Future generations, not yet born, just cannot appeal to our commitment in the same way as the infant in Jonas' example.
VsJonas: Ultimately, according to Jonas, even a person who remains childless violates universal duties, since he/she does not guarantee the preservation of humanity.
VsJonas: where would the limit be drawn if one wanted to determine the value of a good to be preserved? In insects? With bacteria? In cancer cells?


1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 84
2. Ibid. p. 80
3. Ibid. p. 234-242.
4. Ibid. p. 235.
5. Micha H. Werner, „Dimensionen der Verantwortung. Ein Werkstattbericht zur Zukunftsethik von Hans Jonas“. In: Dietrich Böhler (Hg.) ethik für die Zukunft. Im Diskurs mit Hans Jonas, München, 1994, p. 303-338.

Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Ecology Naess Singer I 251
Ecology/Naess, Arne/Singer, P.: (A. Naess (1973)(1): Def Shallow Ecology/Naess: is limited to the traditional framework of ethics: this is about not polluting water, for example, in order to have enough drinking water and to avoid pollution, so that one can continue to enjoy nature. On the other hand,
Def Deep Ecology/Naess: wants to preserve the biosphere for its own sake, regardless of the potential benefit to mankind.
Deep Ecology/Naess/Singer, P.: thus takes as its subject matter larger units than the individual: species, ecosystems and even the biosphere as a whole.
Deep Ecology(2): (A. Naess and G. Sessions (1984)(2)
Principles:
1. The wellbeing and development of human and non-human life on earth have a value in itself (intrinsic, inherent value), regardless of the non-human world's use for human purposes.
2. Wealth and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are values in themselves.
3. People do not have the right to diminish the wealth and diversity of the world, except when it comes to vital interests.
Singer I 252
Biosphere/Naess/Sessions/Singer, P.: Sessions and Naess use the term "Biosphere" in a broad sense, so that rivers, landscapes and ecosystems are also included. P. SingerVsNaess: (see also SingerVsSessions): the ethics of deep ecology does not provide satisfactory answers to the value of the life of individuals. Maybe that is the wrong question. Ecology is more about systems than individual organisms. Therefore, ecological ethics should be related to species and ecosystems.
Singer I 253
So there is a kind of Holism behind it. This is shown by Lawrence Johnson (L. Johnson, A Morally Deep World, Cambridge, 1993). Johnson's thesis: The interests of species are different from the sum of individual interests and exist simultaneously together with individual interests within our moral considerations. >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research

1. A. Naess (1973). „The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement“, Inquiry 16 , pp. 95-100
2. A. Naess and George Sessions (1984). „Basic Principles of Deep Ecology“, Ecophilosophy, 6

Naess I
Arne Naess
Can Knowledge Be Reached? Inquiry 1961, S. 219-227
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977


SingerP I
Peter Singer
Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011

SingerP II
P. Singer
The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015
Egalitarianism Miller Gaus I 417
Egalitarianism/Miller/Weinstein: Miller would resist being characterized as an egalitarian liberal; he would view this label as conflating 'simple' distributive equality with the 'complex' market socialist equality he favours.* The former stipulates that people should be equal with regard to some X and thus limits debates about equality to disputes about 'equality of what?
Walzer: Following Michael Walzer, complex equality is not about distributing some X. Rather it is a 'social ideal' about how we should treat each other as equals.
Miller: But Miller remains an egalitarian liberal nevertheless: 'An egalitarian society must be one which recognizes a number of distinct goods', ensuring that each 'is distributed according to its own proper criterion [desert, need and equality]'. As long as no distributive sphere dominates others, complex equality is secured. The real 'enemy of equality is dominance' which must be politically regulated (1995(1): 203). And dominance is nefarious because it is so harmful to individual self-development.
Cf. >Self-realization/Hobhouse.
Tradition: Miller readily concedes that his political theory draws on two political traditions: 'distributive equality from the tradition of liberalism, social equality from social democracy and socialism' (1999: 244). Consequently, Miller is a true heir to the new liberals. Equally for them, no justice principle is sovereign. Equality and need temper desert qua individual choice and responsibility, allowing all citizens real equal opportunity to develop their talents according to their own lights.
MillerVsDworkin/MillerVsSen: (...) Dworkin's and Sen's versions are egalitarian in what Miller pejoratively labels the 'simple' sense. Whereas Dworkin prefers equalizing resources, Sen prefers equalizing capabilities.
>Life/Dworkin.

* For Miller, there is 'no profound antagonism between meritocracy' and a suitably regulated market because the more egalitarian a market economy is, the more likely it allocates rewards according to merit (1999(2): 179). Also see Miller's defence of market socialism in Market, State and Community (1989)(3) and Cohen (1995(4): ch. I l) for a critical response.

1. Miller, David (1995) 'Complex equality'. In David Miller and Michael Walzer, eds, Pluralism, Justice and Equality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 197-225.
2. Miller, David (1999) Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
3. Miller, David (1989) Market, State and Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Cohen, G. A. (1995) Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Environmental Protection Economic Theories Mause I 403/404
Environmental protection/economic policy/economic theory: From an economic point of view, the environmental problems that still exist (...) do not lead to the demand for maximum environmental protection. From an economic point of view (...) the natural environment as such has no intrinsic value, but rather requires a reference to satisfaction of individual needs related to the use of environmental goods. Accordingly, the task of environmental policy is seen as supplying environmental goods for such uses that increase social welfare. From this allocation-theoretical perspective, it is not the minimization of environmental damage, but the realization of an optimal level of environmental protection with consideration of all advantages and disadvantages of environmental protection measures that represents the fundamental objective of an economically expedient environmental policy (Feess und Seeliger 2013, p. 1f.(1); Endres 2000, p. 26 ff.(2)).
>Social Good.

>Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies.

1. Feess, Eberhard, und Andreas Seeliger, Umweltökonomie und Umweltpolitik, 4.ed. München 2013
2. Endres, Alfred, Umweltökonomie, 3. ed. Stuttgart: 2000.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Epistemology Hume I 17f
Knowledge/Hume/Deleuze: knowledge consists of the exceeding of the actual. In the judgment we go beyond the facts. >Knowledge/Hume.
I 160
Realization: realization exists only extensively, progressively from part to part, not intensely: a) between facts or
b) between ideas. >Facts,
Certainty/Hume: not by reason but by general ideas.
>Ideas >Certainty, >Mathematics.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Epistemology McGinn I 11f
McGinn thesis: confusion sets in not because philosophical questions refer to highly problematic, strange beings or facts, but because our cognitive faculties are subject to certain limits. Transcendental Naturalism/"principle of cognitive specificity"/McGinn: indispensable background principle: every knowing being of earthly nature (not of divine nature) shows strong and weak areas of cognitive faculties that depend in the end on their biological equipment.
I 121f
That means that there is probably no such thing as "general intelligence". >Intelligence.
Accordingly, systematic failure in one field does not depend on the objects.
Most things which we can understand have no semantic properties.
The problem of knowledge is reminiscent of the problem of freedom of will, which also has a kind of stimulus independence. Decisions come about of their own accord, they are not mere effects.
I 153
A priori knowledge/McGinn: is not derived from a causal input-output ratio and ignores the perception systems. And not because the stimuli are weak. >a priori/McGinn.
At the same time, it is the realization of the solipsist, which is provided to each mind with sufficient inner strength.
I 178
Freedom of will/knowledge/McGinn: related problems: cracks and discontinuities, fragmentary data build an extensive knowledge system, the input values do not determine in any case the final state. >Free will/McGinn.
I 222
Knowledge pluralism: suggests that it is not true that human reason contained nothing that would be capable of solving philosophical problems. Secrets are secrets only for a particular ability. Maybe there are certain abilities that are philosophically more gifted than our conscious reason.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

Equal Opportunities Nussbaum Mause I 200f
Equal Opportunities/Sen/Nussbaum: The concept of realization opportunities, also called "capability-approach", which is significantly connected with the names Amartya Sen (1985)(1) and Martha Nussbaum (1999)(2), brings the question of the social conditions necessary to lead a good and fulfilled life to the fore. The approach of realising opportunities aims not only to guarantee equal opportunities, but also to actively support the individual in making the individual's life plan a reality. >Justice, >Equality.
Life/Capability Approach: a fulfilled life depends on the relationship between what a person does or is and what he/she is able to do.
>Life management.
Functionings: are states that are appreciated by a person.
Capabilities: objective possibilities, that can realize the chosen ways of life.
>Capabilities.

1. Amartya Sen, Commodities and capabilities. New Delhi Oxford 1985.
2. Martha Nussbaum, Gerechtigkeit oder Das gute Leben. Frankfurt a. M. 1999

Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Equal Opportunities Sen Mause I 200f
Equal Opportunities/Sen/Nussbaum: The concept of realization opportunities, also called "capability-approach", which is significantly connected with the names Amartya Sen (1985)(1) and Martha Nussbaum (1999)(2), brings the question of the social conditions necessary to lead a good and fulfilled life to the fore. The approach of realising opportunities aims not only to guarantee equal opportunities, but also to actively support the individual in making the individual's life plan a reality. Life/Capability Approach: a fulfilled life depends on the relationship between what a person does or is and what he/she is able to do.
Functionings: are states that are appreciated by a person.
Capabilities: objective possibilities, that can realize the chosen ways of life.
>Capabilities.

1. Amartya Sen, Commodities and capabilities. New Delhi Oxford 1985.
2. Martha Nussbaum, Gerechtigkeit oder Das gute Leben. Frankfurt a. M. 1999

EconSen I
Amartya Sen
Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Erlebniskunst Gadamer I 100
Erlebniskunst/Aesthetics/Art Experience/Aesthetic Experience/Gadamer: Initial problem: for Valéry(1), each encounter with the work has the rank and right of a new production. Gadamer: Problem: this seems to me an untenable hermeneutic nihilism. For now he transfers to the reader and interpreter the power of absolute creation, which he himself does not want to perform.
>Hermeneutics, >Experience, >Aesthetics, >Aesthetic Experience.
Aesthetic Experience/Gadamer: The same aporia results if one starts from the concept of aesthetic experience instead of the concept of genius.
I 101
Lukacs(2): ascribes a Heraclitic structure to the aesthetic sphere and thus says: the unity of the aesthetic object is not a real given one. The work of art is only an empty form, the mere node in the possible majority of aesthetic experiences in which the aesthetic object alone is present. As can be seen, absolute discontinuity, i.e. the disintegration of the unity of the aesthetic object into the multiplicity of experiences, is the necessary consequence of the aesthetics of experience.
Oskar Becker: Taking up the idea of Lukacs, Oskar Becker literally formulated: "Viewed temporally, the work is only a moment (i.e. now), it is "now" this work and it is "now" already no longer this work".(3)
>Art works.
Gadamer: That is indeed consistent. The foundation of aesthetics in experience leads to absolute punctuality, which suspends the unity of the work of art just as much as the identity of the artist with himself/herself and the identity of the understanding or enjoying person.(4)
KierkegaardVsErlebniskunst/Gadamer: It seems to me that Kierkegaard already proved the untenability of this position by recognizing the destructive consequences of subjectivism and being the first to describe the self-destruction of aesthetic immediacy. His doctrine of the aesthetic stage of existence is conceived from the standpoint of the ethicist, who has absorbed the sanctity and untenability of existence in pure immediacy and discontinuity.
I 102
Gadamer: The realization of the "frailty of beauty and the adventurousness of the Artist" is (...) in truth a constitution of being that is not distinguished outside the "hermeneutic phenomenology" of existence, but rather formulates the task, in view of such discontinuity of aesthetic being and aesthetic experience, of proving the hermeneutic continuity that constitutes our being.
>Aesthetic Experience/Gadamer.
>See more entries for Erlebniskunst.


1. P. Valéry, Variété Ill, Commentaires de Charmes: »Mes vers ont le sens qu'on leur prete«.
2. G. Lukács, „Die Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung in der Ästhetik“, In: „Logos“, Bd. Vll., 1917/18.
3. Oskar Becker, Die Hinfälligkeit des Schönen und die Abenteuerlichkeit des Künstlers, Husserl-Festschrift, 1928, S. 51. Jetzt in O. Becker, Dasein und Dawesen. Pfullingen 1963, S. 11-401.
4. Schon bei K. Ph. Moritz, Von der bildenden Nachahmung des Schönen, 1788, S. 26
lesen wir: »Das Werk hat seinen höchsten Zweck in seiner Entstehung, in seinem Werden
schon erreicht. «

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Ethics Harman Wright I 224
Ethics/Explanation/Harman: e.g. instead of moral judgment without assessment, we take psychological characteristics and education. We look at characteristics of the assessor, not of the action. >Judgments, >Actions, >Education.
Wright I 244
SturgeonVsHarman: e.g. that our belief that Hitler was morally corrupt is based on things that he did precisely because he was morally corrupt, so his depravity is part of the explanation of our belief that he actually was. >Explanations, >Causal explanation, >Circularity.
I.e. we must be prepared for this kind of explanation simply because of the realization that moral discourses are at least minimally capable of truth and that thus the missing analogies (to science) will appear elsewhere.
<Discourses, >Morality, >Discourse theory, >Analogies,
>Minimalism, >Capacity for Truth.

Harman I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995

Harman II
Gilbert Harman
"Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994


WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Ethics of Conviction Weber Habermas III 232
Ethic of conviction/Weber/Habermas: The autonomisation of law and moral leads to formal law and to profane ethics of conviction and responsibility. Of course, this autonomization is still in the making even within religious systems of interpretation. This leads to the dichotomization between a search for salvation, which is oriented towards inner salvation goods and means of salvation, and the realization of an outer, objectified world. Weber shows how ethics of conviction approaches develop from this religiousness of conviction. (1) >Ethics, >Morality, >Law, >Society, >Modernity, >Modernization.
The ethics of conviction is universalistic and guided by principles. It removes the distinction between internal and external morals. This corresponds to a radical break with the traditionalism of legal tradition.(2)
>Principles, >Tradition.
Norms that refer to magic etc. are devalued. Norms are now regarded as mere conventions that are accessible to a hypothetical view and can be set positively.
III 233
Norms, procedures and matters become the subject of rational discussion and profane decision making. This leads to the most important characteristics of rules of law: - Any right can become a statute
- The law as a whole consists of a system of abstract rules, the administration of justice consists in the application of these rules to individual cases.
- Civil servants are not personal rulers. The administration is also bound by rules of law and is conducted in accordance with principles that can be specified and are not disapproved of.
- The people who obey the rule constituted by law are citizens and not subjects. They obey the law, not the officials.
- Any measure of interference with freedom or property must be justified. (3)
>Norms.
Habermas III 314
Problem: the moral-practical rationality of ethics of conviction cannot itself be institutionalized in the society whose start it makes possible. Rather, it is replaced by a utilitarianism that owes its existence to an empirical reinterpretation of moral, namely the pseudomoral appreciation of procedural rationality, and no longer has an internal relationship to the moral sphere of value. >Purpose rationality.
Solution/Weber: Competition with scientifically rationalized patterns of interpretation and life orders determines the fate of religion
Habermas III 315
and ultimately shifts it into the irrational.(4) >Religion.
Habermas III 318
Ethics of Conviction/Weber/Habermas: According to Weber, ethics of conviction is characterized by the following attitude: "The Christian does right and places success in God's hands." (5) Habermas: Weber thus enters into a philosophical discussion that was able to work out the stubbornness of moral-practical questions, the logic of the justification of norms of action, after morality and law had separated themselves from the terminology of religious (and metaphysical) world views.


1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I. 1963, p. 541.
2. Ibid. p. 543.
3. R. Bendix, Max Weber. Das Werk, München 1964, p. 320. 4. M. Weber (1963) p. 253
5. M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I Tübingen, 1963, p.552.

Weber I
M. Weber
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930
German Edition:
Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Events Gärdenfors I 65
Event/Semantic Domain/Language Acquisition/Semantics/Gärdenfors: Thesis: I am modeling events with two vectors: a force vector, which typically represents an action, and a result vector that describes a change of a physical movement or an object. ---
I 159
Events/Gärdenfors: there are principally three different approaches: (i) Metaphysical analyzes describing the ontology of events
(ii) Cognitive models that represent how humans (or animals) represent events mentally. See Langacker (1987, sec. 3.3)(1), Givón (2001)(2), Croft & Wood (2000) (3), Langacker, (2008, chap. 3) (4); Croft, (2012a, sec. 1.4)(5).
---
I 160
(iii) Linguistic studies describing the expressions with which events are constructed. E.g.
[[ACT ‹Manner› ] CAUSE [BECOME (Y ‹BROKEN› ]]].

Vectors/event/Gärdenfors: with vectors we can represent changes of objects and distinguish events from their linguistic expressions:
Definition State/Gärdenfors: is a set of points in a conceptual space.
Definition Change/Gärdenfors: a change of a state is represented by a vector.
Definition Path/Gärdenfors: is a continuous sequence of changes. (That is, there are no jumps).
---
I 161
Vectors: not all belong to the acting ones: e.g. opposing forces. Acting/Agent: is not necessarily part of the event.
Gärdenfors: this is about mental representation, not about a scientific representation of what is happening in an event, e.g. physically.
---
I 162
Vectors: an event contains at least two vectors and one object. 1. Result vector: represents the change, 2. Force vector: causes the change. ---
I 164
Event/intransitive/Gärdenfors: Problem: in intransitive constructions (e.g. "Susanna goes") the acting and the changed object (patiens) are identical. Then the conceptual space of the agent and of the object (patiens) coincide. ---
I 165
Partial events/decomposition/parts/Gärdenfors: two ways can be selected when dividing into sub-events: 1. Events can be divided as simultaneously occurring or parallel partial events in the dimensions of the object space (patient space).
2. They can be represented successively by parts of paths.
Agent/Patient/semantic roles/Gärdenfors: both can be represented as points in the category space. The domains of the space then define the properties of both.
---
I 166
Patient/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: can be animated or inanimated, concrete or abstract. It has its own patient space with domains for properties. In contrast to the object categories, the properties usually contain the localization. Agent: has accordingly its agent space, which has at least one force domain.
Dowty (1991): presents prototypical agents and prototypic patients. It is also about volitional involvement in an event.(6)
---
I 171
Event/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: there are three approaches for dealing with events in linguistics: 1. Localist Approach: (Jackendoff, 1976, 1983, 1990)(7)(8)(9): Thesis: all verbs can be constructed as verbs of movement and localization.
GärdenforsVsJackendoff: in his approach...
---
I 172
...force vectors cannot be represented appropriately. 2. Approach on aspects: (e.g. Vendler, 1957)(10): distinguishes between states, activities, achievements and accomplishments. See also Jackendoff, 1991, sec. 8.3; Levin & Rappaport Hovav, 2005, p. 90).
---
I 174
3. Causal Approach: e.g. Croft (2012a, 2012b)(13)(14) three-dimensional representation of causal and aspectual structures of events. Gärdenfors: that comes closest to my own approach. A geometric model is designed here. ---
I 175
The vectors in such models are not in a vacuum, but are always in relation to a domain and its information, e.g. temperature. GärdenforsVsCroft: his approach does not support force vectors.


1. Langacker, R. W. (1987). Foundations of cognitive grammar (Vol. 1). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
2. Givón, T. (2001). Syntax (Vol. 1). Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins.
3. Croft, W., & Wood, E. J. (2000). Construal operations in linguistics and artificial intelligence. In L. Albertazzi (Ed.), Meaning and cognition: A multidisciplinary approach (pp. 51–78). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
4. Langacker, R. W. (2008). Cognitive grammar: A basic introduction. Oxford.
5. Croft, W. (2012a). Verbs: Aspect and argument structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. Dowty, D. (1991). Thematic proto-roles and argument selection. Language, 67, 547–619.
7. Jackendoff, R. (1976). Toward an explanatory semantic representation. Linguistic Inquiry, 7, 89–150.
8. Jackendoff, R. (1983). Semantics and cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
9. Jackendoff, R. (1990). Semantic structures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
10. Vendler, Z. (1957). Verbs and times. Philosophical Review, 56, 97 – 121.
11. Jackendoff, R. (1991). Parts and boundaries. Cognition, 41, 9–45.
12. Levin, B., & Rappaport Hovav, M. (2005). Argument realization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. Croft, W. (2012a). Verbs: Aspect and argument structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14. Croft, W. (2012b). Dimensional models of event structure and verbal semantics. Theoretical Linguistics, 38, 195–203.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Expressions Saussure Lyons I 68
Element of expression/Lyons: (= Phonemes) its only function (if considered detached from substantial realization) is combinatorial function.
Lyons I 69
1. combinatorial function: (combination) their ability to group together to make words and phrases recognizable.. 2. Contrastive Function: (contrast): mutual distinction.
Saussure: Thesis: The elements of expression (in general, all linguistic units) are essentially negative (each element is in contrast (opposition) to every other element that can occur in the same position in words.
>Phonemes, >Words, >Word meaning, >Syntax, >Grammar, >Meaning, >Semantics.
F. de Saussure
I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius)

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977

Lyons I
John Lyons
Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995
Fear Eysenck Corr I 355
Fear/emotion/Eysenck/CorrVsEysenck(1): where does fear come from? More technically, where is fear generated in the brain, and how is this fear-system related to conditioning? Eysenck seemed just to assume that emotion arose spontaneously; but this simply will not do. In addition, if there is a fear generating system, then maybe that is where we should look for the genesis of clinical neurosis. >Conditioning/Eysenck. Another clue to the potential importance of an innate fear system was the debate between Eysenck’s and Spence’s laboratories where, in the latter, it was found that conditioning was related to anxiety not (low) Extraversion. This debate was finally resolved by the realization that it is anxiety related to conditioning in laboratories that is more threatening (as in the case of Spence’s; Spence 1964)(2).
A greater problem: Emotion was never satisfactorily explained in Eysenck’s theory: it was seen, at varying times, as a cause (e.g., in Spence’s conditioning studies), as an outcome (e.g., in neurosis), and as a regulatory set point mechanism (e.g., in arousal and hedonic tone relations). In Eysenck’s theory, it remained something of an unruly, even delinquent, construct. >Conditioning/Eysenck, >Conditioning/Gray.


1. Corr, P. J. 2008a. Reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST): Introduction, in P. J. Corr (ed). The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, pp. 1–43. Cambridge University Press
2. Spence, K. W. 1964. Anxiety (drive) level and performance in eyelid conditioning, Psychological Bulletin 61: 129–39



Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Forecasts Storch Norgaard I 119
Prediction/Real Forecasts/von Storch: Real forecasts are also hardly possible: even if we are able to prepare a successful forecast for the coming ten or thirty years, we cannot claim the ‘success’ of our prediction scheme, because a single success may also have taken place by coincidence. Most outlooks of possible future climatic developments take the form of conditional predictions—assumed developments of greenhouse gas emissions/concentrations and other factors are used as external drivers in climate models (e.g. von Storch 2007)(1). As such they are scenarios, namely possible future developments, and not predictions, namely most probable developments (cf. the discussion in Bray and von Storch 2009)(2).
Scenarios/von Storch: Such scenarios are often falsely labeled as ‘predictions’ in the media, and even by some research institutions. They are prepared with quasi‐realistic climate models (e.g. Müller and von Storch 2004)(3), often abbreviated by GCM (which historically stands for General Circulation Models and not for Global Climate Models).
Indirect evidence is used for improving the
Norgaard I 120
estimate of such uncertain quantities (…). Because of the long waiting time for getting a new realization of the climate system, climate science must rely on historical ‘instrumental’ data, data which have been measured for often quite different purposes, under different conditions, with different instruments and standards. Alternatively, proxy data may be used, for instance data on tree growth or ice accumulation, which may have ‘recorded’ aspects of the geophysical environment. The ‘instrumental’ data usually suffer from ‘inhomogeneities’ (e.g. Jones 1995(4); Karl et al. 1993(5)). >Proxy-Data/von Storch, >Homogenization/von Storch. Inhomogeneities/Measurements/von Storch: Indeed, it may be a good rule of thumb that almost all time series, extending across several decades of years, suffer from some inhomogeneities—the more easily detectable inhomogeneities are ‘abrupt’. An example is the effect of continuous urbanization, which can be separated from the natural variability only within large error bars (Lennartz and Bunde 2009)(6). Cf. >Homogenization/von Storch.



1. von Storch, H. 2007. Climate change scenarios—purpose and construction. In H. von Storch, R. S. J. Tol, and G. Flöser (eds.), Environmental Crises: Science and Policy.
2. Bray, D. and von Storch, H. 2009. ‘Prediction’ or ‘projection’? The nomenclature of climate science. Sci. Comm. 30: 534–43, doi:10. 1177/1075547009333698.
3. Müller, P., and von Storch, H. 2004. Computer Modelling in Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences—Building Knowledge. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
4. Jones, P. D. 1995. The instrumental data record: Its accuracy and use in attempts to identify the ‘CO2 Signal’. Pp. 53–76 in H. von Storch and A. Navarra (eds.), Analysis of Climate Variability: Applications of Statistical Techniques. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
5. Karl, T. R., Quayle, R. G., and Groisman, P. Y. 1993. Detecting climate variations and change: New challenges for observing and data management systems. J. Climate 6: 1481–94.
6. Lennartz, S., and Bunde, A. 2009. Trend evaluation in records with long‐term memory: application to global warming. Geophys. Res. Lett. 36, L16706.


Hans von Storch, Armin Bunde, and Nico Stehr, „Methodical Challenges of the Physics of Climate”, in: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


Norgaard I
Richard Norgaard
John S. Dryzek
The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Functional Role Schiffer I 21
Functional Property/Schiffer: the concept of the functional property is derived from the notion of a functional role. Def functional role/Schiffer: simply any property 2nd order, of a state-type 2nd order. Its possession means that the possession of this state-type is causal or counterfactual to other state-types, namely, to output, input, distal objects and their properties.
1. A given physical state-type has an indeterminate number of functional roles.
2. Two different physical state-types may have the same functional role.
Def functional property/Schiffer: each functional role uniquely determines a functional property-If F is an f role, then the functional property is expressed by the open sentence:
x is a token of a state-type which has F.
((s) The functional property is a token of the physical state-type which has this and the role.
In short: property = to be token of the type with the role.)
Schiffer: Type here is always "physically").
>Type/Token.
Properties belong to tokens - roles belong to types.
E.g. the neural state-type H (hunger) has different functional roles in different people, because it is not triggered for all by pizza smell (various inputs.)
>Input/output.
I 23
Then you can correlate propositions with functional roles and a belief-property with a functional property. - For every proposition p, there is a functional role F so that a belief that p = to be a state token of the state-type that has the role F. >Propositions.
I 26
The criterion that a state-token n is a belief that p that n is a token of a state-type which has the functional role, which is correlated with the definition of Bel T p.
I 29
Verbs for propositional attitudes get their meaning through their functional role. ((s) e.g. "believes..."). >Propositional attitudes.
I 30
Folk Psychology: 3 types of generalization: 1. functional roles for influencing beliefs among themselves
2. input conditions for perception (cannot be part of the common knowledge)
3. output conditions for actions.
Problem: E.g. blind people can have our belief, but not our folk psychology.
>Generalization.
I 33f
SchifferVsFolk Psychology: problem: the theory will often provide the same functional role for different beliefs (belief) simultaneously. >Folk psychology.
SchifferVsLoar: according to him from Bel T follows # (that snow is = Bel T#(that grass is green) - then both have the same T-correlated functional role.
>Brian Loar.
I 276
N.b.: although the uniqueness condition is a very weak condition. - It is not sufficient for: that one is in a particular belief-state that is linked to them: E.g. "if p is true, one believes that p."
N.B.: "p" occurs inside and outside of the belief context - therefore, the theory will say something unique about p.
Problem: in the uniqueness condition the variables for propositions only occur within belief contexts.
>Uniqueness condition.
Then all beliefs of the same logical form have the same functional role.
I 34
All that does not differentiate the belief that dinosaurs are extinct, from that, that fleas are mortal. ((s) Related problem: equivalence in the disquotation scheme: "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green.)
>Equivalence, >Disquotation scheme.
Problem: there is a lack of input: "rules that do not relate to perception".
I 35
Twin Earth/SchifferVsFolk Psychology: folk psychology must be false because in the twin earth, a different belief has the same functional role. >Twin earth.
E.g. Ralph believes there are cats - twin earth-Ralph believes - "there are cats" (but there are twin earth cats).
Therefore twin earth-Ralph does not believe that there are cats - i.e. so two different beliefs but same functional role.
Twin earth-Ralph is in the same neural state-type N - the specification of belief might require reference to cats, but the counterfactual nature of the condition would ensure that N is satisfied for twin earth-Ralph.
N.B.: that does not follow from a truth about functional roles in general, but with respect to the theory T* (folk psychology).
Outside the folk psychology: "every token of "cat" is triggered by the sight of a cat".
Wrong solution: platitude: "typically triggered by cats". Thhis cannot be a necessary condition - in addition there are twin earth-examples, where typical belief is unreliable for one's own truth. VsDescription: no solution: "The thing in front of me".
>Acquaintance.

I 38 f
Tyler Burge: no functional role can determine what one believes (this is not about the twin earth, but wrongly used terms).
I 286f
Belief/SchifferVsLoar: problem: his realization of a theory of belief/desires - (as a function of propositions on physical states) whose functional roles are determined by the theory. Problem: to find a theory that correlates each proposition with a single functional role instead of a lot of roles.
Schiffer: thesis: that will not work, therefore the Quine/Field argument is settled.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Functionalism Pauen Pauen I 67
Multiple realizability: a variety of neural activity can cause one and the same mental state. (E.g. Split Brain: takeover by other areas). This is a problem for the identity theory and materialism.
>Identity theory, >Materialism, >Brain states.
I 130
Def Semantic functionalism/Lewis/Pauen: semantic functionalism reverts exclusively to everyday language behavioural vocabulary. >Everyday language, >Everyday psychology, >Explanation, >Behavior.
I 132
Functionalism/Lewis/Pauen: Vs multiple realization (if the roles are determined accurately enough.) - That distinguishes him from most other functionalists. >D. Lewis.
I 135f
Psycho-functionalism/Pauen: responds to the shortcomings of everyday language in determining mental states. - The functional description can be pushed to an individual neuron. Representative: Dennett.
Dennett: VsEveryday psychology: Problem: how to recognize simulation.
>Simulation, >D. Dennett, >Psycho-functionalism.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Functions Lyons I 84
Def Functional load/Linguistics/Lyons: For example, many words can be distinguished by the opposition of /p/ and /b/. Therefore, the contrast between these two elements has a high functional load. If only a few words are distinguished by an opposition e.g. wreath and wreathe the functional load is low.
Position: depending on the position in the word, the functional load of a certain given contrast can be different. For example, two elements can often contrast at the beginning but rarely at the end of a word.
I 85
Importance: of contrast: also depends on whether the words themselves appear in the same context and can contrast or not. Functional load = 0: For example, if A and B are two word classes with complementary distribution and each element of class A differs in its realization from an element of B only in that it has /a/ where the corresponding word of class B has /b/, then the functional load of the contrast between /a/ and /b/ = 0.
Functional load: must therefore be calculated for words that have the same or overlapping distribution. Furthermore, not only the grammar (distribution) must be taken into account, but also the quantity of the actual statements made.
Importance: of a contrast: also depends on the absolute frequency of occurrence. This shows how difficult it is to accurately measure the functional load.
Cf. >Relevance.
I 86
However, it should have an importance for us both in synchronic and in diachronic description. >Synchronic, >Diachronic.
I 235
Function/Grammar/Tradition/Lyons: old: it is said that "in Vancouver" and "there" have the same function. Function/Tradition: e.g. noun, verb, adverb etc.
>Distribution/Lyons, >Grammar, cf. >Generative grammar, >Universal grammar, >Transformational grammar, >Categorial grammar.
New: in modern grammar we speak of distribution instead of function.
Endocentric/exocentric/Tradition/Lyons: the tradition did not make this distinction.
Distribution/Lyons: of course the distribution of the constituents never exactly matches the distribution of the whole construction, but that does not matter. It is only a matter of statements whose acceptability is explained by the grammatical description of the language.
I 236
Same distribution/Lyons: when we say that two nouns have exactly the same distribution, we mean that they have the same classification at the lowest level that the grammar reaches. So if it's only about nouns, they (and thus all nominal sentences) have the same distribution! ((s) Each sentence can be grammatically added at one point, because it is independent. Or each noun can be grammatically replaced by another (not in content).
Level/Distribution: at a lower level two nouns may have different distribution e.g. one is "animate" the other "inanimate".
Endocentric/exocentric: this classification therefore depends on the depth of the subclassification.

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977

Lyons I
John Lyons
Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Functions Sen Brocker I 890
Functions/Sen: The term 'functions' [...] reflects the various things a person likes to do or likes to be. The desirable functions may range from elementary conditions such as adequate nutrition or freedom from avoidable diseases to very complex activities or personal states such as being able to participate in community life and having self-respect. A person's 'chances of realization' refer to the possible connections of the functions he or she is able to perform. >Capabilitites/Sen.

Claus Dierksmeier, „Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen (1999)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

EconSen I
Amartya Sen
Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Gender Roles Beauvoir Brocker I 294
Gender Roles/Beauvoir: thesis: outrageous, bourgeois society structures itself along the seperation between private and public and prescribes gender-separated life plans for women and men with the options of familyisation and individualisation.
I 295
Woman: Thesis: The woman functions as one and the other of the man. As the contrast set by him, she embodies nature in relation to his reason, an original genrefulness in relation to his individuality, immanence in relation to his transcendence, in short: she is object for him as the subject.
I 296
Thesis: Being a woman is not based on nature in the sense of an essential nature, but being a woman is socially constructed. Quote: "One is not born a woman, one becomes it[on le devient]". (1) Kuster: This quotation is often mispresented: "One is not born a woman, one is made a woman". This is misleading because the text continues: "No biological, psychological or economic purpose determines the form that the female person takes in society"(2).
Kuster: So there are no natural and social determinants, therefore no internal constraints or external circumstances that impose certain patterns of behaviour and existence with unavoidable necessity on women. Becoming a woman is not a passive process, but an active one.
I 297
Since human existence (...) basically means being able to place oneself in a relationship to one's own nature, the starting position of women is determined to a greater extent by their biology, but nevertheless not already determined.
Brocker I 301
Immanence/Femininity/Beauvoir: immanence (See Immanence/Beauvoir) is the forced experience of women. Their possibilities of a free realization of their existence are significantly limited by the social expectations of a female subject. Contradiction: It is almost impossible for them "to take on their being as autonomous individuals and their female fate at the same time" (3). See also Self-consciousness/Beauvoir.
Brocker I 303
Relationship/Woman/Man/Beauvoir: the peculiarity of this relationship is that there is no struggle for recognition between them. The woman remains "the unessential that never becomes the essential, [...] the absolute other without reciprocity" (4). With a woman, a man fulfils a dream for himself, or rather a deep wish: she offers him an alternative form of recognition, one that is not won in battle and therefore does not have to be asserted incessantly. See Emancipation/Beauvoir.
1. Simone de Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe, Paris 1949. Dt.: Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht. Sitte und Sexus der Frau, Reinbek 2005 (zuerst 1951), S. 334.
2. Ibid:
3. Ibid p. 329.
4. Ibid p. 192
Friederike Kuster, „Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht (1949)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Generalization Freeden Gaus I 5
Generalization/individuals/generality/political theory/Freeden: (... ) the increasing democratization of politics has shifted the emphasis of scholarship from ‘great men and women’ philosophers to the moral claims any individual and all individuals may direct at their societies and the benefits they ought to derive from social life. Just as historians now seldom tell the story of kings and queens but have developed a keen interest in popular history, so political theorists have refocused around individual selfdevelopment, participation, citizenship, and civic virtue (Young, 1986(1): 479, 484–5), notions close to the concerns of contemporary liberal theory (...). One manifestation of this has been the recent fascination of philosophers with questions of justice. >Self-realization, >Participation.
Although justice is a systemic property of a wellorganized society, it has been reformulated, primarily by John Rawls (1971)(2), as establishing the correct manner of attaining fairness for individuals, through devices that ensure that ordinary persons themselves decide reasonably on the rules of justice that ought to apply to them.
>Justice, >Justice/Rawls, >J. Rawls.
Deontology/method: Consequently, the deontology of rights and duties has been predominantly assigned to individuals, and Anglo-American political philosophy has been resistant to the impingement of groups and communities on its fundamental epistemology – an inclination towards atomism that is itself ideological as well as methodological.
>Deontology.
Universality/generality: Moreover, that approach is predicated on the assumption that the rationally exercised faculties of individuals will in crucial instances converge on common ground rather than diverge in a range of acceptable, rational and good solutions radiating out from a common core, as John Stuart Mill had indicated.
>Generality.

1.Young, Robert (1986) Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom. London: Croom-Helm.
2. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Freeden, M. 2004. „Ideology, Political Theory and Political Philosophy“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Geometry Inhetveen Thiel I 287
Geometry/Protogeometry/Inhetveen/Thiel: Often, an "operational" model of geometry is mentioned, whereby it must be taken into account that the properties thus acquired can only be realized if they are idealized. (> Accuracy). ---
I 288
There is an attempt of a "protogeometry": "a circular-free method of size comparison" (Inhetveen) In order to satisfy the circular freedom, we have to deal without the need for recourse to geometrical "devices" in the production of forms on bodies.
---
I 289
The simplest operation with two bodies K1 and K2 is to bring them into contact with each other. The relation of the touch is symmetrical. Two bodies each have at least one possible contact point.
Further bodies K3 and K4 can then always be constructed, so that K3 contacts K1 at the point where K2 previously did this. "Imitation", "Replace". Inhetveen has called this the "weak transitivity". The subjungat requires three rather than two antecedents.
Definition "weaker"/Thiel: weaker means in mathematics less prerequisite.
---
I 289/290
We extend our regulations to the touching of two bodies, not only at individual points, but in all parts of a given surface part. The bodies (Definition) "fit" then in these pieces. These formulas are statements about bodies, but they are not sentences about bodies that we have before us in our body world. In this way, we make statements about the production targets we are pursuing. Inhetveen describes it as "aphairetic" (from drawing, taking away) criteria for the quality of a technical realization. They lie protogeometrically before the theory of geometric forms.
---
I 290/291
Now there are the terms of the "fitting" as well as derived from that one of the original and imprint. Fit: "protogeometrically congruent". For technical purposes, however, one would not only like to be able to shape bodies in such a way that they fit one another, but also fit a third one. Or that each of them fits the other.
Definition weak transitivity of the fitting: every body must match a copy of itself (since it cannot be brought to itself in a situation of fitting).
Definition "copy stable": the definition says nothing about how a body is made to fit with any copy, and in fact it can happen in different ways .... + ... I 291
---
I 293
Folding axes, rotational symmetry, mirror symmetry are derived protogeometrically. Terms: "flat", "technical line" (=edge), "complementary", "supplementary wedges", "tipping", "edge". (...)
The methods are considered. The transition from protogeometry to geometry takes place in two abstraction steps. We do not look at the methods and consider the results in geometry.
---
I 299
No reference is made to tools. By the way, there are devices that are more effective than compasses and rulers: two "right-angle hooks" cannot only achieve all constructions that can be executed with compasses and rulers, but also those which lead analytically to equations of third and fourth degrees. The angle bisector can be constructed by means of a copy.
((s)Fitting/((s): Equality in forms does not lead to fit: E.g. plugs fit on sockets, but not sockets on sockets and not plugs on plugs.)
---
I 300
Protogeometry defined, geometry proves. (> Proof). If geometry is to be the theory of constructible forms, then we have to take into account this independence (which can be described as "quantity invariance" (> measure)) and do so with the, in constructive science theory, so-called
Form principle: If two additional points P', Q' are obtained by a construction extending from two points P, Q, then each figure obtained by means of a sequence K1... Kn of construction steps from P' zbd Q' is geometrically indistinguishable from the figure to which the same construction steps of P and Q lead.
---
I 301
A whole series of important statements of classical geometry can only be proved by using this principle. For example, the squareness of the fourth angle in the Thales' theorem can be assured in a purely protogeometric manner just as little as the uniqueness of the parallels to a given straight line through a point outside. Only the Euclidean geometry knows forms in the explained sense in such a way that figures are equal in form if they cannot be distinguished and no application of the same consequences of further steps of construction makes them distinguishable.

Inhet I
Rüdiger Inhetveen
Logik: Eine dialog-orientierte Einführung Leipzig 2003


T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Geometry Thiel I 287
Geometry/Protogeometry/Inhetveen/Thiel: There is often talk of an "operative" model of geometry, whereby it must be borne in mind that the properties captured in this way can only be realized if they are idealized. >Accuracy.
I 288
There is the attempt of a "protogeometry" "circle-free method of size comparison" (Inhetveen) In order to satisfy the requirement of freedom from circles, we have to do without any geometric "devices" when producing shapes on bodies.
I 289
The simplest operation with two bodies K1 and K2 is to bring them into contact with each other. The relation of touching is symmetrical. Two bodies each have at least one possible point of contact.
Then further bodies K3 and K4 can always be constructed, so that K3 touches K1 at the point where K2 used to do so. "Imitation" "Replace". Inhetveen has called this "weak transitivity" because the subject requires three antecedents instead of two.
I 289
Def "Weaker"/Thiel: means less demanding in mathematics.
I 289/290
We extend our determinations to touching two bodies not only at individual points, but at all points of a given surface piece. The body definitions then "fit" together in these pieces. These formulas are statements about bodies, but they are not sentences about bodies that we have in front of us in our body world. We thus make statements about the manufacturing goals we pursue. Inhetveen describes them as "aphaetic" criteria for the quality of a technical realization. They lie protogeometrically before the theory of geometric forms.
I 290/291
Now there are the terms of "fitting" as well as the original and impression derived from them. Fitting: "protogeometrically congruent". For technical purposes, however, one would not only like to be able to shape bodies in such a way that they fit, but also to fit a third person. Or that each of them also fits on the other.
Def Weak transitivity of fitting: each body must fit to a copy of itself (since it cannot be brought to itself in a situation of fitting).
Def "impression stable": the definition says nothing about how a body is brought to fit with any copy, and in fact this can happen in different ways...+...I 291
I 293
Folding axes, rotational symmetry, mirror symmetry are derived protogeometrically. Terms: "flat", "technical straight line" (= edge), "complementary", "supplementary wedges", "tilting", "edge". (...) The procedures are considered, the transition from protogeometry to geometry takes place in two abstraction steps. We ignore the methods and consider the results in the geometry.
I 299
No reference is made to tools at any point. By the way, there are devices that are more effective than compasses and rulers: two "right-angle hooks" can achieve not only all constructions that can be done with compasses and rulers, but also those that lead analytically described to third-degree and fourth-degree equations. The bisector can be constructed using a copy.
I 300
Protogeometry defined, geometry proven. >Proof.
If geometry is to be the theory of constructible forms, then we have to consider this independence (describable as "size invariance" (>measurements)) and do this with what is known as the
Form principle: if two further places P', Q' are obtained by a construction starting from two further places P,Q, each figure obtained by a sequence K1...Kn from construction steps of P' zbd Q' is geometrically indistinguishable from the figure to which the same construction steps starting from P and Q lead.
I 301
A whole series of important statements of classical geometry can only be proved by using this principle. For example, the perpendicularity of the fourth angle in the theorem of thalas cannot be determined purely protogeometrically, nor can the uniqueness of the parallels to a given straight line be determined by a point outside. >Measurement.
Only Euclidean geometry knows forms in the explained sense, in such a way that figures are identical in form if they cannot be distinguished and no application of the same consequences of further construction steps makes them distinguishable.

T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995

Goals Maturana I 177
Intention/purpose/aim/goal/Maturana: these terms have nothing to do with the realization of a living system! The history of the interactions is the story of the interference effects, ie the history of interactions in its niche. - The niche is constantly changing. >Purposes, >Niche, >Life, >Systems, >Intentionality.

Maturana I
Umberto Maturana
Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000

Good Jonas Brocker I 615
Good/The Good/Jonas: Jonas thesis: Good is anchored in being, it is not the result of human settlement, convention or contract. Thus, according to Jonas, it receives its higher consecration. It calls the subject directly to its realization. (1) See Being/Jonas, Teleology/Jonas, Ethics/Jonas. Context: According to Jonas, the duty of mankind to avoid the total destruction of itself and all life can therefore be read directly from nature.

1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 161

Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Hegel Gadamer I 349
Hegel/Dialectics/Gadamer: The criticism that has been made against [the] philosophy of absolute reason from the most diverse positions by Hegel's critics cannot assert itself before the consequence of total dialectical self-mediation, as Hegel described it in particular in his phenomenology, the science of appearing knowledge. Cf. >Reflection/Hegel.
VsHegel/Gadamer: That the other must be experienced not as the other of myself, embraced by pure self-consciousness, but as the other, as "you", this prototype of all objections to the infinity of Hegelian dialectic, does not seriously affect him.
See as an example: >Recognition/Hegel.
HegelVsVs/Gadamer: The polemic against the absolute thinker is itself without position. The Archimedean point of unhinging Hegelian philosophy can never be found in reflection.
>Absoluteness/Hegel.
This is what makes the formal quality of the philosophy of reflection that there can be no position that is not included in the reflective movement of the consciousness coming to itself. The insistence on immediacy - be it that of bodily nature, be it that of the "you" making demands, be it that of the impenetrable reality of historical coincidence or that of the reality of the conditions of production - has always disproved itself, insofar as it is itself not an immediate behaviour but a reflective action.
I 375
Hegel/Dialectics/Gadamer: But the originality of the conversation as the reference of question and answer still shows itself even in such an extreme case as Hegelian dialectic as a philosophical method. To unfold the totality of thought determinations, as it was the concern of Hegel's logic, is, as it were, the attempt in the great monologue of the modern "method" to embrace the continuum of meaning, the particular realization of which is provided by the conversation of the speakers. When Hegel sets himself the task of liquefying and putting spirit in (sic) the abstract determinations of thought, this means melting logic back into the consummative form of language, the concept back into the meaning of the word that asks and answers - a reminder, still in failure, of what dialectic actually was and is. Hegel's Dialectic is a monologue of thought that seeks to achieve in advance what gradually matures in each real conversation. >Dialektics, >Dialektics/Hegel, >G.W.F. Hegel.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

History Hegel Bubner I 17
History/Hegel: There is nothing reasonable to be done with the immense manifoldness (logic) if were not connected to realization by the bond of interest. >Knowledge/Hegel, >Reality, >World/Hegel.
Bubner: his final concept, however, cannot be justified historically, but only systematically. Since history progresses, we cannot observe it altogether from any point. The right to do so must come from elsewhere.
The scheme old/new is to be used again and again.
>Progress/Hegel, >History/Hegel, >World History/Hegel, >World Spirit/Hegel.


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
I, Ego, Self Mead Habermas IV 66
I/Self/Mead/Habermas: the transition from symbolically mediated to normatively regulated interaction not only enables a change to modally differentiated communication. It does not only mean the formation of a social world, but also the symbolic structuring of motives for action. From the perspective of socialization, this side of the socialization process presents itself as the formation of an identity. Mead: treats identity formation as a relationship between the "Me" and the "I".
Me: the perspective from which the child, taking the expectations of the generalized other in the opposite, builds up a system of inner behavioral controls. Thus, on the path of internalizing social roles, a super-ego structure is formed.
I/Mead: we react to this as I. (1)
Habermas IV 67
I/Mead: Mead understands the "I" as the generalized ability to find creative solutions for situations where something like the self-realization of the person is at stake.(2) Habermas: according to this, the "I" is both the motor and governor of an individualization that can only be achieved through socialization.
>Socialization.
Habermas IV 94
I/Mead/Habermas: "The separation of "I" and "Me" is not fiction, they are not identical, since the I is never completely calculable. The "Me" calls for an "I" when we fulfil obligations...but the I is always a little different from what the situation itself demands (...) Together they form a personality as it appears in the social experience (...) The self is essentially a social process consisting of these two different phases. Without these two phases there would be no conscious responsibility and also no new experiences". (3) >Self.

1.G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969, S. 217
2.Ibid p. 248
3. Ibid. p. 221

Mead I
George Herbert Mead
Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967
German Edition:
Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Ideas Plato Gadamer I 434
Ideas/Plato/Gadamer: The idea, the true being of the thing, is not recognisable in any other way than in going through (...) mediations. But is there a realization of the idea itself as this particular and individual? >Mediation.
Is not the essence of things a whole in the same way that language is a whole?
Recognition: Just as in the unity of speech the individual words only gain their meaning and relative unambiguity, so too, true cognition of the essence can only be achieved in the whole of the relational structure of ideas.
Knowledge/Whole/Parmenides: This is the thesis of the Platonic "Parmenides". From this, however, the question arises: in order to define even a single idea, i.e. to be able to distinguish in what it is from everything else that is, does one not have to know the whole?
Gadamer: One can hardly escape this consequence if, like Plato, one conceives the cosmos of ideas as the true structure of being.
Speusippos: In fact, it is reported by the Platonist Speusipp, Plato's successor in the leadership of the Academy, that he drew this conclusion. We know from him that he particularly cultivated the search for the common (homoia), going far beyond what was generalization in the sense of the logic of the genus, by using analogy, i.e. the proportional equivalent, as a research method.
>Analogies/Speusippus.


Bubner I 27
Ideas/The Republic/Plato/Bubner: it is no accident that the theory of ideas is developed in The Republic (>philosopher king). Problematic: that also the practical good should belong to the ideas.
Bubner I 28
Definition Ideas/Plato: The reasons of being of everything real.
Bubner I 51
Being/Parmenides: had forbidden to attribute a being to non-being. >Existence/Parmenides, >Appearance/Parmenides, >Existence predicate/Parmenides.
Being/Appearance/PlatoVsParmenides: the solution of the problem of being has to be re-established, in memory of the linguistic nature of the concept.
Only in language can the concept of being express what it means, and also the concept of being is only meaningful in propositions.
Ideas/Plato: now only one step is needed to introduce the community of ideas among themselves: the presocratic ontology provides, as a matter of course, the concepts of being, rest, and movement.
Each determination is now itself and not another. Thus, determinateness implies negation.
Here the dialectics finds its highest field of activity as the doctrine of the relations between one and many.
Cf. >Ontology/Plato, >Unity and multiplicity.


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Identity Mead Habermas IV 66
Identity/Mead/Habermas: the transition from symbolically mediated to normatively regulated interaction does not only enable a change to modally differentiated communication. It means not only the construction of a social world, but also the symbolic structuring of motives for action. From the perspective of socialization, this side of the socialization process presents itself as the formation of an identity. Mead: treats identity formation as a relationship between the "Me" and the "I".
Me: the perspective from which the child, taking the expectations of the generalized other in the opposite, builds up a system of inner behavioral controls. Thus, on the path of internalizing social roles, a super-ego structure is formed.
I/Mead: we react to this as I. (1)
Habermas IV 67
I/Mead: Mead understands the "I" as the generalized ability to find creative solutions for situations where something like the self-realization of the person is at stake. (2) Habermas: according to this, the "I" is both the motor and governor of an individualization that can only be achieved through socialization.
>I,Ego,Self, >Individuation, >Identity/Henrich, >Socialization.

1. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969, p. 217
2. Ebenda S. 248

Mead I
George Herbert Mead
Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967
German Edition:
Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Identity Theory Vollmer I 271
Identity Theory/Vollmer: no evidence of neurophysiology will ever be sufficient to prove the identity theory. >Proofs, >Provability.
Reason: explanation: which can be explained by the assumption of an entity, always can be explained by the adoption of two entities.
>Theories, >Hypotheses, >Premises, >Explanation, >Causal explanation.
II 90
Identity/identity theory/Vollmer: ((s) here: identity of the mind with a physical realization): not all properties must match. - E.g the optical and haptic impression of an apple are not identical. ((s)Vs: these are extrinsic properties.)
>Properties, >Qualities, >Sensory impressions.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

Ideology Freeden Gaus I 6
Ideology/Freeden: [for Marx and Engels(1)](...) abstract philosophy was nothing more than ideology, because both were the inverted mental reflection of a distorted and alienated reality. Today: differently. Ideologies are usefully comprehended not as defective philosophies, but rather as ubiquitous and patterned forms of thinking about politics. They are clusters of ideas, beliefs, opinions, values, and attitudes usually held by identifiable groups, that provide directives, even plans, of action for public policy-making in an endeavour to uphold, justify, change or criticize the social and political arrangements of a state or other political community. This tells us something about their functions and about the necessary services they perform for such a community. To begin with, it is unimaginable to conceive of a society that does not engage in such patterned thought, that does not have distinguishable and recurrent ways of thinking, say, about who should be rewarded in that society and for what, about the limits to the exercise of political power, about the value of national symbols, or about its expectations of government.
Freeden: Ideologies, let it be emphasized, are evident in the entire field of thinking about political ends and principles, and virtually all members of a society have political views and values they promote and defend.
Analytical philosophy: By contrast, analytical political philosophy sites itself at a particular end of each of these spectrums.
Language: ideologies (...) compete deliberately or unintentionally over the control of political language, by means of which they attempt to wield the political power necessary to realizing their functions. Ultimately, they aim to give precise definition to the essentially contested meanings of the major political concepts. So whereas a political philosopher such as Rawls contends that many hard decisions may seem to have no clear answer (1993: 57)(2), the morphology
Gaus I 7
of concepts suggests that, to the contrary, they may have many clear answers. Social groups/ideological families: (...) provide their followers with a social and political identity and operate as one of the major factors in the realization of political goals.
1) (...) there is no necessary configuration of ideologies in these forms; they may well be the product of contingent historical forces that appear and vanish over time. On the other hand, some of the ideological families may reflect fundamental human understandings of the social order and its relation to human drives and hopes.
2) (...) any one of these ideologies is host to loose and fluid positions. There is no obvious thing called socialism, but there certainly are socialisms: Marxist, evolutionary, or guild socialisms are examples.
3) (...) ideologies are not mutually exclusive.
4) (...) a fragmentation of ideologies has accompanied the great families and has become more marked in recent decades. Alongside the full ideologies, with their total if not totalitarian solutions to social issues, there exist thin ideologies that address areas of ideological contestation, but otherwise rely on other ideologies to fill the gaps with which they do not primarily concern themselves. Nationalism is one such instance, containing no substantive theory of distributive justice (...).
Gaus I 8
Political theory: the painstaking and critical investigation of ideologies is the only area of analysis in which political ideas can receive appropriate consideration as a direct branch of the study of politics, rather than of philosophy or history. Only then can questions such as the following be addressed: what are the social and political functions of political ideas; (...). Method: All these can only be undertaken if we also consider immorality, inconsistency and bad arguments as suitable subject-matter for analysis within the sphere of political practice. >Power/Freeden.
Gaus I 10
Language: The comparative study of ideologies has to address [the] problems of translation, when differences are often masked by ostensible similarities of language, while similarities are disguised by disparate ways of expression.
Gaus I 11
(...) ideologies are not merely directed at groups, they always are group products. As in Karl Mannheim’s famous (1936)(3) account,ideologies are Weltanschauungen or world views of people who share common understandings of the world, perhaps because of joint socio-economic roots, or because they have assimilated a particular set of cultural values.

1. Marx, K. and F. Engels 1974. The German Ideology, ed. C. J. Arthur. London: Lawrence and Wishart. p.47
2. Rawls, J. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 57
3. Mannheim, K. 1936. Ideology and Utopia. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.


Freeden, M. 2004. „Ideology, Political Theory and Political Philosophy“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Imitation Girard Krastev I 11
Imitation/Girard/Krastev: (...) Girard argued (...) that imitation’s centrality to the human condition has been misleadingly and dangerously neglected by historians and social scientists. >Historiography, >History, >Psychology.
He devoted his career to studying how imitation can breed psychological trauma and social conflict. This happens, he claimed, when the model imitated becomes an obstacle to the self-esteem and self-realization of the imitator.(1)
Cf. >Imitation/Psychology.
The form of imitation most likely to generate resentment and conflict, according to Girard, is the imitation of desires. We imitate not just means but also ends, not just technical instruments but also targets, objectives, goals and ways of life. This, in our opinion, is the inherently stressful and contentious form of emulation that has helped trigger the current sweeping anti-liberal revolt. According to Girard, human beings want something not because it is inherently appealing or desirable, but only because somebody else wants it, an observation that makes the ideal of human autonomy seem illusory.
>Autonomy.
Imitating the goals of others is also associated, Girard argues, with rivalry, resentment, and threats to personal identity.
>Goals, >Resentment.
Politics/post-communist world/Krastev: Girard’s insight into the persistent tendency of imitation to breed resentment, while based almost exclusively on the analysis of literary texts, is nevertheless highly pertinent to understanding why a contagious uprising against liberal democracy began in the post-communist world.
Cf. >Dostoevsky/Girard.

1. René Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); Battling to the End: Conversations with Benoît Chantre (Michigan State University Press, 2009).


Krastev I
Ivan Krastev
Stephen Holmes
The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019
Individuals Bradley Rawls I 110
Individuum/Bradley: Bradley's thesis: The individual is a pure abstraction. (1) Rawls: here, Bradley can be interpreted without major distortions in such a way that the duties and tasks presuppose a moral conception of institutions, and therefore the content of equitable institutions must be determined before demands can be made on individuals.
>Institutions, >Abstraction, >Society, >Duty.

1.F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, 2nd Edition, Oxford, 1927, pp. 163-189.


Gaus I 415
Individuals/Bradley/Weinstein: (...) English idealists like F. H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet were as much indebted to Hegel for their social ontology and moral and political theory as for their conception of history (...). >G.W.F. Hegel.
Bradley argues that individuals are socially constituted, making morality fundamentally social in the sense that acting morally requires acting for others rather than simply leaving them alone. Hence, in so far as good is self-realization, acting morally means promoting everyone's self-realization, not merely one's own.
>Socialization, >Morality, >Actions.
Being so interdependently constituted, we best promote our own self-realization by simultaneously promoting our fellow citizens' and they best promote theirs by promoting ours (Bradley, 1988(1): 116).
BradleyVsUtilitarianism/BradleyVsKantianism: Moreover, because our identities are socially encumbered, rationalistic moral theories like utilitarianism and Kantianism are misconceived and self-defeating.
>Utilitarism.
Socialization/Bradley: Both theories share the misguided pre-Hegelian delusion that we can somehow detach ourselves from our social milieu when determining how to act. Acting morally primarily entails embracing one's socially constituted identity and fulfilling 'one's station and its duties'. Nonetheless, fulfilling the duties of one's station isn't the whole of morality since the kind of society in which one lives also matters. Conventional morality must not be taken uncritically.
>Liberty/Bosanquet.

1. Bradley, F. H. (1988 [1927]) Ethical Studies (1876). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications

Brad I
F. H. Bradley
Essays on Truth and Reality (1914) Ithaca 2009


Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Individuals Mill Gaus I 102
Individual/Mill/Gaus: (...) a great deal of liberal philosophy has been built on a particular view of human excellence. What might be called a perfectionist theory of the good life, or one devoted to self-realization as the end, can be found in Mill, T. H. Green, Bernard Bosanquet, L. T. Hobhouse, John Dewey and even, I would venture, in the third part of John Rawls’s Theory of Justice(1) - the most distinctly ‘comprehensive’ element of the book (Gaus, 1983a)(2). The crux of this theory is presented in the third chapter of On Liberty(3), ‘Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well-Being’, where human nature is compared to ‘a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces that make it a living thing’ (Mill, 1963a(3): ch. 3).
Mill closely ties individuality to this growth or development of human nature: ‘Individuality is the same thing with development’ (1963a(3): ch. 3). Mill believes that reason reveals our nature and its needs; human nature possesses impulses or energies that try to manifest themselves. Not only do we naturally possess different capacities, but these capacities are sources of energy that seek to express themselves. Consequently, to block a person from developing her capacities is to de-energize her - to make her passive and lethargic (1963a(3): ch. 3; Gaus, 1983a(2): ch. 4). >Liberalism/Gaus, >Liberalism/Waldron, >Liberalism/Mill, >Liberalism/Kymlicka, >Autonomy/Gaus; cf. >Communitarianism.

1. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
2. Gaus, Gerald F. (1983a) The Modern Liberal Theory of Man. New York: St Martin’s.
3. Mill, John Stuart (1963a) On Liberty. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, vol. XVIII, 213–301.

Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.

Mill I
John St. Mill
A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843
German Edition:
Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Mill II
J. St. Mill
Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Individuation Honneth Brocker I 799
Individuation/Honneth: Only under the conditions of modern societies does the claim to social appreciation detach itself from traditional notions of "honour", in which it was still associated with legal privileges and enshrined in the status of an entire class, i.e. collectively. (1) Only then can solidarity be constituted as an independent sphere of recognition and be combined with the claim to individual self-realization. >Recognition.
Problem: since this form is about the recognition of personal differences, it requires a social medium that "must be able to express differences in characteristics between human subjects in a general, namely intersubjectively binding manner".(2)
>Intersubjectivity, >Society, >Community.
Solidarity/Honneth: therefore presupposes the value horizon of the cultural self-understanding of a certain society, which can assume the function of a "symbolically articulated, but always open[n] and porous orientation framework" (3) of acts of recognition, which in this sphere have a fundamentally "evaluative" and "ethical" character, in contrast to the "moral" character of legal relations.
>Ethics, >Morals, >Values, >Horizon.

1. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 199f
2. Ibid. p. 197
3. Ibid. p. 139-141
Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Honn I
A. Honneth
Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010

Honn II
Axel Honneth
Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Infinity Leibniz Holz 63
Finite/infinite/Leibniz: the set of possible objects of experience must be assumed to be infinite, because otherwise there ought to be a cause for reason why these should not be infinite, and there can be no such thing.
>Possibility/Leibniz, >Possible world/Leibniz.
I 64
Language/infinite/finite/statement/fact/Leibniz: so there must be an infinite set of facts and correspondingly an infinite set of statements! (Factual truths). A finite mind, however, is incapable of reducing it to a finite set of identical sentences. See the discussion on Researchgate: >"Are there infinitely many possible sentences?"
One never possesses a (full) proof, although there is always a reason for the truth! This reason can be fully understood by God alone.
I 73/74
Infinity/construction/Leibniz: Leibniz makes the general connexion in an infinite set construible for the finite mind as the mathematically infinite, as a boundary concept in an infinitesimal method of construction. Limit/knowledge/Leibniz/Holz: every finite mind has only the knowledge of a limited section, but also the realization that a boundary exists, and with it a world which extends beyond this limit.
Holz: the ability to exceed is an a priori determination of "boundaries".
I 155
cf. Helmuth Plessner: "Material a priori": the boundary is a material determinant moment of every finite being.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Infinity Quine V 165
Infinity/material/Quine: if you need an infinite number of characters (e.g. for natural numbers) you cannot say, a sign is a physical object, because then you will soon come to an end. Also forms are not used as classes of inscriptions. These are again physical realizations of forms.
IX 64
Infinity/Quine: is only necessary for induction - x = {y}, y = {z}, z = {w} ... ad infinitum - this is the case if {,,,x}.
XIII 96
Infinite Numbers/Quine: For example, suppose we randomly assign items to any class, the only limitation is that no object can belong to more than one class. Problem: then there will not be enough items for all classes! A class for which there is no correlate will be the class of all objects that do not belong to their correlated classes. Because its correlate should belong to it, iff it does not belong to it.
Cantor: proved in 1890 that the classes of items of any kind exceed the number of items.
XIII 97
The reason for this has to do with the paradoxes, if the relation, which is mentioned there, is specified correctly. It turns out that there are infinitely many different infinities.
For example, there are more classes of integers than there are integers.
But since there are infinitely many integers, the infinity of infinitely many classes of integers must be of a higher kind.
For example, there are also more classes of classes of integers than there are classes of integers. This is an even higher infinity. This can be continued infinitely many times.
The argument here depended on the class of non-elements of their own correlated classes (nonmembers of own correlated classes).
Russell's Antinomy/Quine: depended on the class of nonelements of selves.
Cantor's Paradox/Quine: if one takes the correlation as self-correlation, Cantor's paradox amounts to Russell's Paradox. That is how Russell came up with it.
Cantor/Theorem/Quine: his theorem itself is not a paradox.
Russell's Antinomy/Solution/Quine: is prevented by excluding a special case from Cantor's theorem that leads to it. (See Paradoxes)
Cantor Theorem/Corollar/unspecifiable classes/Quine: the existence of unspecifiable classes follows as a corollar from Cantor's theorem. I.e. classes for which we cannot specify the containment condition. There is no other identifying move either.
For example, the infinite totality of grammatically constructible expressions in a language. According to Cantor's theorem, the class of such expressions already exceeds the expressions themselves.
Classes/larger/smaller/criterion/Quine: our criterion for larger and smaller classes here was correlation.
Def greater/classes/quantities/Quine: one class is larger than another if not each of its elements can be paired with an element of the other class.
XIII 98
Problem: according to this criterion, no class can be larger than one of its real subclasses (subsets). For example, the class of positive integers is not larger than the class of even numbers. Because we can always form pairs between their elements. This simply shows that infinite sets behave unusually. Infinite/larger/smaller/class/quantities/Quine: should we change our criterion because of this? We have the choice:
a) We can say that an infinite class need not be larger than its real subclasses, or
b) change the criterion and say that a class is always larger than its real parts, only that they can sometimes be exhausted by correlation with elements of a smaller class.
Pro a): is simpler and standard. This was also Dedekind's definition of infinity.
Infinite/false: a student once wrote that an infinite class would be "one that is a real part of itself". This is not true, but it is a class that is not larger than a (some) real part of itself. For example the positive integers are not more numerous than the even numbers. E.g. also not more numerous than the multiples of 3 (after the same consideration). And they are also not less numerous than the rational numbers!
Solution: any fraction (ratio) can be expressed by x/y, where x and y are positive integers, and this pair can be uniquely represented by a positive integer 2x times 3y.
Conversely, we get the fraction by seeing how often this integer is divisible by 2 or by 3.
Infinite/Quine: before we learned from Cantor that there are different infinities, we would not have been surprised that there are not more fractions than integers.
XIII 99
But now we are surprised! Unspecifiable: since there are more real numbers than there are expressions (names), there are unspecifiable real numbers.
Names/Expressions/Quine: there are no more names (expressions) than there are positive integers.
Solution: simply arrange the names (expressions alphabetically within each length). Then you can number them with positive integers.
Real Numbers/Cantor/Quine: Cantor showed that there are as many real numbers as there are classes of positive integers. We have seen above (see decimals and dimidials above) that the real numbers between 0 and 1 are in correlation with the infinite class of positive integers.
>Numbers/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Information Dennett I 268
Information/code/Dennett: the fact that a one-dimensional code can represent a three-dimensional structure is a gain of information. Actually, "value" is added! (Contribution to the functioning). >Functions, >Functional explanation, >Code.
II 35
Information/action/virus/Dennett: The virus must "make sure" of the proliferation of its information. in order to achieve its objectives, it produces an enzyme which is shown a "password", and then it leaves the other molecules "untouched".
II 94f
Information/Life/Dennett: long before there were nervous systems in organisms, they used a primitive. postal service: the circulation and metabolism for transmitting information. Information processing/DennettVsFunctionalism: one thing was always clear: as soon as there are transducers and effectors in an information system, its "media neutrality" or multiple realization disappears. (VsPutnam, VsTuring).
Embodied Information/Dennett: evolution causes information to become physical in every part of every living creature. E.g. the baleen of the whale embodies information about the food. E.g. The bird's wings contain information about the medium air. E.g. The skin of the chameleon carries information about the environment.
This information need not go to the brain as copies.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Information Maturana I 86f
Information/Maturana: it is false to say that the nervous system encoded information on the environment and represents it in the functional organization. Correct: there are processes (not descriptions) that are encoded. - They can be decoded only by the actual realization. - The code is not isomorphic with a description.
>Code, >Description/Maturana, >Processes, >Representation, >Nervous System.
Information applies only to the cognitive domain: it refers to the degree of uncertainty in the behavior of the observer within defined alternatives.
>Behavior, >Observation, >Operation/Maturana.

Maturana I
Umberto Maturana
Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000

Institutions Rawls I 55
Def Institution/Institutions/Rawls: an institution is a public regulatory system that defines administrative bodies and roles together with their rights and obligations, powers of attorney and inviolabilities, etc. The rules include certain penalties and defensive measures, etc. As examples of institutions or, more generally, social practices, we can consider games and rituals, court proceedings and parliaments, markets and property systems. An institution can be considered in two different ways: a) as an abstract control system
b) as realization in thinking and acting of certain persons at certain times and places.
When it comes to finding out whether an institution is in law or not, it is best to look at the concrete action.
I 56
We assume that those who act within an institution are aware of the rules and results of their practice and assume that other participants have this awareness as well. Although not always true, this is a plausible generalization. There is then a common basis for determining common expectations. For contract theory, it is important to assume that the principles are public and known. >Principle/Rawls.
Rules/strategies: we need to distinguish between the rules of an institution and the strategies that the institution may use to achieve its objectives(1).
Strategies: Strategies based on mutual assumptions about each other are not part of the institution. Rather, they belong to the theory of the institution, e. g. Parliament.
Theory: adopts the valid rules as given and analyzes the way power is distributed in the system...
I 57
...and how the parties involved use their opportunities. Behavior: the behaviour of individuals should be coordinated as far as possible so that the results are the best from the point of view of social justice, even if the individuals may not be aware of them.
J. Bentham: sees this as an artificial identification of interests(2).
>J. Bentham.
Adam Smith: understands this as the work of the Invisible Hand(3).
>A. Smith.
We must distinguish the institution from the rules and these rules from the social system, because each of them can be unfair without the others being unfair. Inequalities can also only arise from the combination of these elements.
I 58
Rituals/Rawls: however, are not called unfair. Formal law/Rawls: let us assume that there is a valid system of rules that are reliably applied by the institution, even if we ourselves do not accept the rules. Then we can speak of a formal right. The law and the institution are then inseparable from each other.
>Law.

1. See also J. R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge, 1969, pp.33-42.
2. See E. Halévy, La Formation du radicalisme philosophique, vol. 1, Paris 1901, pp.2-24.
3. See A. Smith The Wealth of the Nations, (Ed. Edwin Cannan) New York, 1937.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Intentionality Searle Davidson II 112
SearleVsDavidson: Davidson suggests to distinguish two types of intentions: a) "prior intentions" and
b) "intentions in action".
Intentional acts only occur when the first, causes the second.
---
Dennett I 281
SearleVsDennett: "as-if intentionality". (see below) ---
Dennett II 67
Definition derived intentionality/Searle: definition derived intentionality is a limited form, that some of our art products have: e.g. words, sentences, books, maps, pictures, computer programs, etc. Their intentionality is only a loan from our mind. E.g. a shopping list, whether written or memorized, likewise, mental pictures, something internal - these things are still an art product. ---
Searle I 67
Intentionality is biological, teleological: SearleVs: in case of confusion: words like "horse or cow" would be necessary. Intentionality is normative: truth, consistency, rationality are intrinsic. The Darwinian evolution is in contrast not normative.
I 178
Fulfilment conditions: intentional states represent their fulfilment conditions only under certain aspects that are important for the person concerned. >Satisfaction conditions/Searle, >Aspect/Searle.
I 266f
Intentional phenomena: regulating consequences: are genuine causal phenomena. Functional explanations: are only bare physical facts, causality only arises through interest-based descriptions here. Rules are no cause of action. >Rule following.
Objects of intentionality need not to exist: hope, belief, fear, wishes - there is no record of them, one just has them.
>Object/Searle.
---
II 208
Intentionality/fulfilment conditions/Searle: the mind gives the production of sounds intentionality, so that it gives the fulfilment conditions of the mental state to the production -> speech act. - Double level of intentionality: a) mental state
b) level of intention.
---
III 156
As-if intentionality/Searle: the as-if intentionality explains nothing, if there is no real intentionality. It has no causal power. SearleVsDennett: it is as empty as its "intentional attitude". >Intentionality/Dennett.
---
Graeser I 124
Intentionality/speech acts/Searle: action intentions have fulfilment conditions that are represented by them and by representing their fulfilment conditions, intended actions are ipso facto intentional. Derived intentionality: physical realizations of speech acts are not intrinsically intentional as the propositional attitudes themselves. >Speech act.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Intentions Maturana I 176/77
Intention/purpose/goal/Maturana: these terms have nothing to do with the realization of a living system! The history of interactions is the story of the interference effects, i.e. the history of interactions in its niche - the niche is constantly changing. >Purposes, >Goals, >Niche, >Life, >Systems.

Maturana I
Umberto Maturana
Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000

Inverted Spectra Shoemaker Stalnaker I 19
Qualia/exchanged spectra/Shoemaker/Stalnaker: Shoemaker tried to reconcile the visibility of reversed spectra with a functionalist and materialist theory of the mind. >Functionalism, >Materialism.
StalnakerVsShoemaker : per old-fashioned view that comparisons of the qualitative character of experience are possible.
Cf. >Hetero-phenomenology.
Stalnaker I 233f
Inverted spectra/Shoemaker/Paradox/Stalnaker: E.g., four people, partly differently wired/without backup system. Paradox: it follows that in a person two qualia would be the same and different at the same time.
>Qualia.
Solution/Stalnaker:we need two different identity criteria.
>Criteria, >Identity, >Identity criterion, >Identity conditions.
Functional Theory: provides intrapersonal criteria.
>Personal identity.
Identity of the physical realization: provides criteria for interpersonal identity.
Problem : the two equivalence relations can not go together.
I 236
The addition of the back-up system changes the qualitative character because it changes the memory mechanisms. >Memory.
Problem: subsequent changes in the system, but also unrealized possibilities change the qualitative character.
>Qualities.
I 237/8
The paradox can be solved by the asymmetry. - But only if we allow that intentionality plays a role in the individuation of qualia. >Intentionality, >Individuation.

Shoemaker I
S. Shoemaker
Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003


Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Isomorphism Waismann I 53
Isomorphism/Mathematics/general public/generalization/axioms/Hilbert/Waismann: New: in modern mathematics one came to the realization that geometrical sentences can be applied to a completely different field.
For example, all the theorems that are about the straight lines of our space can be interpreted as being about all the points of a four-dimensional space. The two thought systems are completely isomorphic (built the same).
The sensuous appearance thus plays no role for the validity of the sentences. One is now consciously dispensing with saying what a straight line is.
>Geometry, >Space.
I 54
Point, line, plane, are understood to mean any things for which the axioms set forth are true. Hilbert gives an example: the numerical distribution of deviations in the cultivation of Drosophila (flies) coincide with the linear Euclidean axioms of congruence and the geometric concept "between". So simple and so accurate as you would not have dreamed of.
>Analogies, >Proofs, >Provability.
I 55
The last step: also the signs of the logic calculus are content-wise undefined. (connection signs). >Logical constants, >Equal sign, Connectives, >Identity.
Problem: consistency must first be defined e.g.:
Def consistent: is a formula system, if, in it, 1 unequal 1 does never occur.
>Consistency.
Metamathematics is then content-related, with the main goal of consistency.
Hilbert: The axioms and provable propositions are representations of the thoughts which constituted the usual method of the previous mathematics, but they are not themselves the truths in the absolute sense.
>Truth/Waismann, >Truth/Hilbert, >Axioms/Hilbert.

Waismann I
F. Waismann
Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996

Waismann II
F. Waismann
Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976

Judgments Chalmers I 173
Phenomenal Judgments/Chalmers: phenomenal judgements are the core of the relationships between cognition and consciousness. These are verbal expressions of assertions about consciousness. >Phenomena, >Cognition, >Consciousness.
I 174
Judgment/Chalmers: judgements can be taken as what I and my zombie twin have in common. >Zombies.
Semantic content/Chalmers: semantic content, on the other hand, is formed partly by conscious experiences themselves (e.g., beliefs about sensations of red). The judgments of the zombies have only the same form as my reports, they have no content.
>Experience.
I 175
I can only refer to the judgments of the zombies in a deflationist manner ((s) quoting into it). >Deflationism.
Content/Chalmers: content can be attributed only by phenomenal beliefs, but it is unclear what role consciousness plays in this.
>Content, >Semantic content.
Phenomenal Judgments/Chalmers:
1st level: concerns the objects of experience. This is about awareness.
>Awareness/Chalmers.
I 176
2nd level: Judgments on conscious experiences. E.g. I note that I have an experience of something red. Such judgments can also be about kinds of experiences. 3rd level: on conscious experiences as a type of experience. E.g. about the fact that we have conscious experiences at all and how this can be explained.
I 177
Problem: Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, but judgments have to be explained because they are in the field of psychology. Paradoxically, consciousness is ultimately irrelevant to the explanation of phenomenal judgments. (Avshalom Elitzur (1989)(1), Roger Shepard (Psychologist, 1993)(2).
I 288
Judgement/phenomenal judgement/Qualia/Chalmers: a complete theory of the mind must provide (a) a nonreductive explanation of consciousness, and (b) a reductive explanation,...
I 289
...why we judge that we are conscious. >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Reduction/Chalmers.
Even if consciousness itself is not part of the explanation of phenomenal judgments, the roots of consciousness will be.
I 290
Consciousness system: has itself no access to information such as "This pattern has a wavelength of 500 nanometers" nor "There is now a 50 Hertz vibration in the brain". The system only has access to the localization in the information space. Thus the system finds itself in a place of this space. Later it can find names like "red", "green" etc. for it. Also the differences can only be expressed with such names of Qualia. >Qualia, >Color words.
I 292
A conscious experience is a realization of an information state, a phenomenal judgment is explained by a different realization of the same information state. If we then postulate a phenomenal aspect of information, we have everything we needed to make sure our judgments are correct.
1. A. Elitzur, Consciousness and the incompleteness of the physical explanation of behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10, 1989,: pp. 1-20.
2. R. N. Shepard, On the physical baisis, ölinguistic representation and conscious experiences of colors. In: G. Harman (Ed) Conceptions of the human Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller, Hillsdale NJ 1993.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Language Gadamer I 383
Language/Gadamer: Gadamer Thesis: The fusion of horizons, which happens in understanding, is the actual achievement of language. >Horizon/Gadamer.
I 388
Understanding: Understanding a language is not really understanding in itself and does not include a process of interpretation, but an execution of life. One understands a language by living in it - a sentence that, as is well known, applies not only to living languages but even to dead languages.
I 408
Language as form: (...) it is undeniable (...) that linguistics and philosophy of language work under the premise that the form of language is their sole subject. But is the concept of form even relevant here? The language that is alive in speech, that encompasses understanding everything,
I 409
also that of the interpreter of texts, is so much involved in the execution of thought or interpretation that we have too little in our hands if we want to disregard what languages pass on to us in terms of content and only think of language as form. The language unconsciousness has not ceased to be the actual mode of being of speaking. Ancient Philosophy/Gadamer: It had no word for what we call language.
I 421
Ideal Language/GadamerVsLeibniz: [With the rational construction] of an artificial language (...) one moves (...), it seems to me, in a direction that leads away from the essence of language. Linguisticality is so completely in line with the thinking of things that it is an abstraction to think the system of truths as a given system of possibilities of being, to which a sign could be assigned, which a subject reaching for these signs uses.
The linguistic word is not a sign that one reaches for, but it is also not a sign that one makes or gives to another, not a being thing that one takes up and loads with the ideality of meaning in order to make another being visible. This is wrong on both sides.
Meaning: Rather, the ideality of meaning lies in the word itself. It has always been meaning. But, on the other hand, this does not mean that the word precedes all experience of being and externally adds to an already made experience by making it subservient to itself. The experience is not at first wordless and is then made an object of reflection by naming it, for instance in the way of subsumption under the generality of the word. Rather, it belongs to experience itself that it seeks and finds the words that express it.
I 449
Language/Gadamer: Language [has] its actual being only in conversation, that is, in the exercise of communication (...). This is not to be understood as if the purpose of language is indicated. >Communication/Gadamer.
I 453
In linguistic events (...) not only the insistent finds its place, but also the change of things. (...) in language the world presents itself. The linguistic experience of the world is "absolute". It transcends all relativities of existence, because it comprises all being-for-itself
I 454
in whatever relationships (relativities) it manifests itself in. The linguistic nature of our experience of the world is prior to everything that is recognized and addressed as being. The basic reference of language and world does therefore not mean that the world becomes the object of language.
I 461
Language/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: "Centre of the language": (...) we are guided by the hermeneutical phenomenon. But its all-determining reason is the finiteness of our historical experience. In order to do justice to it, we took up the trace of language, in which the structure of being is not simply reproduced, but in whose paths the order and structure of our experience itself is first and forever changing. Language is the trace of finiteness, not because there is the diversity of human language construction, but because every language is constantly being formed and developed, the more it expresses its experience of the world. We have questioned important turning points in Western thought about language, and this questioning has taught us that, in a much more radical sense than Christian thought about what is finite, what happens in language corresponds to the finiteness of man.
Cf. >Language/Christianity. It is the centre of language from which our entire experience of the world, and especially hermeneutical experience, unfolds.
>Experience/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer, >Word/Gadamer.
I 462
"Centre of language"/Gadamer: Each word makes the whole of the language it belongs to sound and the whole of the world view it is based on appear. Every word, therefore, as the event of its moment, also makes the unsaid, to which it refers to in responding and waving, be present.
I 465
The important thing is that something happens here. Neither is the interpreter's consciousness mastering that what reaches it as the Word of Tradition, nor can what happens be adequately described as the progressive realization of what is, so that an infinite intellect would contain all that which could ever speak from the whole of Tradition. But the actual event is only made possible by this, namely that the word that has come to us as tradition and which we have to listen to, really strikes us as if it were addressing us and meant
I 466
ourselves. Object/Gadamer: (...) on the part of the "object" this event means the coming into play, the playing out of the content of the tradition in its respective new possibilities of meaning and resonance, newly acquired by the other recipient.
>Object/Gadamer.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Language McGinn I 186
Language: from our ability to learn the native language very quickly, does not follow that we even remotely understand the principles of learning ability. Reason: as in other areas, the language ability is probably designed modular. There is no reason to believe that our reasoning ability is able to see through the operation of these modules.
I 187
There is no reason to believe that we even possess a second-level cognition, which grasps the first level performance.
I 232
Gene/McGinn: must include a marking of human grammar, so as to generate an innate language ability. (> Chomsky). Whether linguistics could read this genetic information one day, depends on whether the reason is able to give an account of what represents the genes already, and that is not necessarily true.
It could be that the grammatical encryption does not happen de dicto, but only de re.
But probably de dicto if the physical realization of the same grammatical properties may vary in different organisms.
---
II 53
McGinn pro Chomsky: pro innate language modules. >Chomsky.
II 71
Our language is useless when it comes to see the world as it is, as the eye cannot speak. E.g. functional analysis: what makes the kidney efficient as a filter system, it makes it as inefficient as the pumping system at the same time. >Functionalism, >Functional explanation.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

Law Weber Habermas III 231
Law/Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization the cognitive independence of law and moral, i.e. the replacement of moral-practical insights of ethical and legal doctrines, principles, maxims and decision rules of world views in which they were initially embedded. Cosmological, religious and metaphysical worldviews are structured in such a way that the internal difference between theoretical and practical reason cannot yet come into effect. >Morality, >Ethics, >Worldviews, >Rationalization, >Rationality.
Habermas III 232
The autonomisation of law and moral leads to formal law and to profane ethics of conviction and responsibility. >Ethics of conviction, >Responsibility.
Of course, this autonomization is still in the making even within religious systems of interpretation. This leads to the dichotomization between a search for salvation, which is oriented towards inner salvation goods and means of salvation, and the realization of an outer, objectified world. Weber shows how ethics of conviction approaches develop from this religiousness of conviction. (1)
>Religion.
Habermas III 278
Law/Weber/Habermas: for the emergence of modern law, Weber must postulate a process that is assumed in parallel, even if not simultaneously by him for the rationalization of worldviews. >World View/Weber. The availability of post-traditional legal concepts is not yet identical with the enforcement of a modern legal system. Only on the basis of rational natural law can legal matters be reconstructed in basic concepts of formal law in such a way that legal institutions can be created that formally satisfy universalist principles. These must regulate private commercial transactions between the owners of goods and the complementary activities of the public administration.
HabermasVsWeber: this does not show the parallelism of these two processes clearly enough.
Habermas III 332
Law/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Weber's theoretical position of law in his theory of rationalization is ambiguous in that it simultaneously permits the institutionalization of procedural rational economic and administrative action and also seems to make the detachment of subsystems from their moral-practical foundations possible. Cf. >Natural Justice.
The dialectical explanation of the conflicting developments of the development of science and religion cannot be applied to the development of law, since it appears from the outset in a secularized form.
Habermas: Weber reinterprets modern law in such a way that it is separated from the evaluative value sphere.
Habermas III 346
HabermasVsWeber: Weber empirically reinterprets the problem of legitimacy and decouples the political system from forms of moral-practical rationality; he also cuts the formation of political will back to processes of power acquisition and power competition. >Legitimacy, >Justification, >Ultimate justification.
Law/Weber: as far as the normative agreement is based on tradition, Weber speaks of conventional community action. To the extent that this is replaced by success-oriented, purpose-oriented action, the problem arises as to how these new scopes can in turn be legitimate, i.e. normatively bindingly ordered. Rational social action takes the place of conventional community action.
>Purpose rationality, >Conventions, >Community.
Habermas III 347
Only the procedure of coming into being justifies the assumption that a normative agreement is rationally motivated. Only within normatively defined limits may legal entities act rationally without regard to conventions. HabermasVsWeber: Weber fluctuates here between discursive agreement and arbitrary statute.
Habermas III 351
Modern civil private law/Weber/Habermas: is characterised by three formal features: positivity, legalism and formality. Def positivity/Habermas: positively set law is not generated by interpretation of recognized and sacred traditions, it rather expresses the will of a sovereign
Habermas III 352
legislator, which uses legal organisational means to regulate social offences conventionally. Def Legalism/Habermas: legal entities are not subject to any moral motives other than general legal obedience. It protects their private inclinations within sanctioned boundaries. Not only bad convictions, but also actions that deviate from the norm are sanctioned, assuming accountability.
Def Formality/Law/Habermas: Modern law defines areas of legitimate arbitrariness of private individuals. The arbitrary freedom of legal entities in a morally neutralized area of private actions with legal consequences is assumed. Private law transactions can therefore be regulated negatively by restricting authorisations that are recognised in principle (instead of a positive regulation of concrete obligations and material bids). Anything that is not prohibited by law is permitted in this area.
Habermas: the system functionality corresponding to these characteristics results from legal structures in which procedural rational action can become general. It does not explain how these legal structures themselves are possible.
Habermas III 353
Rather, the form of modern law is explained by the post-traditional structures of consciousness it embodies. HabermasVsWeber: Weber would have to understand the modern legal system as an order of life, which is assigned to the moral-practical way of life. But Weber's attempt to view the rationalization of law exclusively from the point of view of rationality of purpose contradicts this.
Habermas: only at a post-conventional level does the idea of the fundamental critiqueability and need for justification of legal norms emerge.
Habermas III 354
Modern Law/Weber/Habermas: separates morality and legality. This requires practical justification. The moral-free sphere of law refers to a moral based on principles. The achievement of making something positive is to shift justification problems, i.e. to relieve the technical handling of the law of justification problems, but not to eliminate these justification problems. This justification, which has become structurally necessary, is expressed in the catalogue of fundamental rights contained in the civil constitutions alongside the principle of popular sovereignty.
Habermas III 357
Modern Law/Weber: For Weber, modern law in the positivist sense is to be understood as the law that is set by decision and completely detached from rational agreement, from concepts of justification, no matter how formal they may be. ((s) > Carl Schmitt's Decisionism/Weber). WeberVsNatural justice: Thesis: There can be no purely formal natural justice.
Being-Should/Weber: The supposed to be valid is considered to be identical with that which in fact exists everywhere on average; the 'norms' obtained by logical processing of concepts of legal or ethical, belong in the same sense as the 'natural laws' to those generally binding rules which 'God himself cannot change' and against which a legal system must not attempt to rebel.
(2)
>Natural Justice.
Habermas III 358
HabermasVsWeber: Weber confuses the formal characteristics of a post-traditional level of justification with particular material values. Nor does he sufficiently distinguish between structural and content-related aspects in rational natural justice and can therefore equate "nature" and "reason" with value contents, from which modern law, in the strict sense, is detached as an instrument for asserting any values and interests. >Foundation/Weber.
Habermas III 362
Procedural legitimacy/procedural rationality/law/HabermasVsWeber: as soon as the rationalization of law is reinterpreted as a question of the procedural rational organization of procedural rational management and administration, questions of the institutional embodiment of moral-practical rationality cannot only be pushed aside, but downright turned into its opposite: These now appear as a source of irrationality, at least of "motives that weaken the formal rationalism of law".(3) Habermas: Weber confuses the recourse to the establishment of legal rule with a reference to particular values.

Habermas IV 122
Law/Weber/Habermas: Question: How can a contract bind the parties if the sacred basis of the law has been removed? Solution/Hobbes/Weber/Habermas: the standard answer since Hobbes and up to Max Weber is that modern law is compulsory law. The internalization of moral corresponds to a complementary transformation of the law into an externally imposed, state-authorized power based on the state sanction apparatus. The quasi automatic enforceability of the fulfilment of legal claims
Habermas IV 123
is to guarantee obedience. >Obedience.
DurkheimVsHobbes/DurkheimVsWeber/Habermas: Durkheim is not satisfied with that. Obedience must also have a moral core. The legal system is in fact part of a political order with which it would fall if it could not claim legitimacy.
>E. Durkheim.

1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I. 1963, p. 541.
2.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Ed. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 638
3.Ibid p. 654

Weber I
M. Weber
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930
German Edition:
Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Learning Maturana I 63
Learning/Maturana: historical transformation of an organism through experience. - It serves the basal circularity >Recursion.
New behavior evolves. - For an observer, behavior by incorporating a representation seems justified that modifies behavior by memory.
>Memory, >Behavior, >Observation.
But the system operates in the present - advantageousness can only be determined a posteriori.
>Systems.
I 70
Allowes purely consensual (cultural) evolution without evolution of the nervous system. >Nervous system.
I 73
Learning/Maturana: behavioral change must be accompanied by other changes. >Change.
I 74
Not accumulation of representations but continuous transformation of behavior. >Representation.
I 119
Learning/instinctive behavior/Maturana. initially indistinguishable, because they are determined in the concrete realization by the structures of the nervous system - Learning: acquired ontogenetically - instinct: acquired evolutionary.
I 119
Learning/Maturana: does not change the structure. - Acquisition of representations: only metaphorically (it would presuppose an instructive system). - A learning system has no trivial experiences (interactions), because all interactions lead to structural changes.
I 280
Learning/Maturana: described in brackets: pure epigenetic process (development of the individual) - no directed process of adaptation to a reality. >Adaption, >Reality, >Objectivity/Maturana.

Maturana I
Umberto Maturana
Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000

Liability Calabresi Parisi I 19
Liability rules/property rules/Calabresi/Melamid/Miceli: The classic paper by Calabresi and Melamed (1972)(1) addresses the manner in which rights or entitlements, once assigned, are legally protected and transferred.
Parisi I 20
They distinguished between ... Property rules: ... under which an entitlement can only be transferred if the holder of the entitlement consents; and ...
Liability rules: ..., under which a party seeking to acquire an entitlement can do so without the holder’s consent provided that he or she is willing to pay compensation for the holder’s loss.* Property rules: Property rules therefore form the basis for market (voluntary) exchange, while... Liability rules: ... liability rules form the basis for legal (forced) exchange.
Markets: Because market exchange is consensual, it ensures a mutual benefit, or the realization of gains from trade.
Law/property rules: : The role of the law in such transactions is limited to the enforcement of property rights and contractual exchange of entitlements. In other words, law is complementary to markets in promoting the efficient allocation of resources.
Law/liability rules: In the case of liability rules, on the other hand, the law takes the primary role of forcing an exchange of the entitlement on terms dictated by the court. Here, the law is a substitute for market exchange in organizing the transfer of entitlements because bargaining costs preclude voluntary transfers.
Externalities/liability: The choice between market and legal exchange depends on the trade-off between the transaction costs associated with bargaining over the price, and errors by the court in setting the price. >Coase Theorem/Miceli.
Property rule/Miceli: (...) suppose that farmers situated along a railroad track have the legal right to be free from crop damages caused by sparks, and that right is protected by a property rule. The railroad would then have to secure the agreement of all farmers in order to run trains along a given route, a prospect that would likely prevent any trains from ever running due to high bargaining costs.
Liability rule: If the farmers’ rights were instead protected by a liability rule that only required the railroad to compensate farmers for any damages but did not allow the farmers to prevent trains from running, the railroad would internalize the harm through the assessment of liability for damages, and it would run the efficient number of trains.
Legal problem: This arrangement, however, places a heavy burden on the court to measure the damages suffered by victims accurately. If it underestimates the damages, the railroad will run too many trains, and if it overestimates damages, the railroad will run too few.

* Calabresi and Melamed also discuss a third rule, called an inalienability rule, which prohibits the exchange of an entitlement under any circumstances, including consensual exchange. Examples include constitutional protections of certain fundamental rights, like speech and religion, as well as laws prohibiting the sale of organs, children, and cultural artifacts.


1. Calabresi, Guido and A. Douglas Melamed (1972). “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.” Harvard Law Review 85: 1089–1128.


Miceli, Thomas J. „Economic Models of Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press.


Parisi I
Francesco Parisi (Ed)
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Liability Melamed Parisi I 19
Liability rules/property rules/Calabresi/Melamid/Miceli: The classic paper by Calabresi and Melamed (1972)(1) addresses the manner in which rights or entitlements, once assigned, are legally protected and transferred.
Parisi I 20
They distinguished between ... Property rules: ... under which an entitlement can only be transferred if the holder of the entitlement consents; and ...
Liability rules: ..., under which a party seeking to acquire an entitlement can do so without the holder’s consent provided that he or she is willing to pay compensation for the holder’s loss.* Property rules: Property rules therefore form the basis for market (voluntary) exchange, while... Liability rules: ... liability rules form the basis for legal (forced) exchange.
Markets: Because market exchange is consensual, it ensures a mutual benefit, or the realization of gains from trade.
Law/property rules: : The role of the law in such transactions is limited to the enforcement of property rights and contractual exchange of entitlements. In other words, law is complementary to markets in promoting the efficient allocation of resources.
Law/liability rules: In the case of liability rules, on the other hand, the law takes the primary role of forcing an exchange of the entitlement on terms dictated by the court. Here, the law is a substitute for market exchange in organizing the transfer of entitlements because bargaining costs preclude voluntary transfers.
Externalities/liability: The choice between market and legal exchange depends on the trade-off between the transaction costs associated with bargaining over the price, and errors by the court in setting the price. >Coase Theorem/Miceli.
Property rule/Miceli: (...) suppose that farmers situated along a railroad track have the legal right to be free from crop damages caused by sparks, and that right is protected by a property rule. The railroad would then have to secure the agreement of all farmers in order to run trains along a given route, a prospect that would likely prevent any trains from ever running due to high bargaining costs.
Liability rule: If the farmers’ rights were instead protected by a liability rule that only required the railroad to compensate farmers for any damages but did not allow the farmers to prevent trains from running, the railroad would internalize the harm through the assessment of liability for damages, and it would run the efficient number of trains.
Legal problem: This arrangement, however, places a heavy burden on the court to measure the damages suffered by victims accurately. If it underestimates the damages, the railroad will run too many trains, and if it overestimates damages, the railroad will run too few.

* Calabresi and Melamed also discuss a third rule, called an inalienability rule, which prohibits the exchange of an entitlement under any circumstances, including consensual exchange. Examples include constitutional protections of certain fundamental rights, like speech and religion, as well as laws prohibiting the sale of organs, children, and cultural artifacts.


1. Calabresi, Guido and A. Douglas Melamed (1972). “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.” Harvard Law Review 85: 1089–1128.


Miceli, Thomas J. „Economic Models of Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press.


Parisi I
Francesco Parisi (Ed)
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Liberalism Constant Mause I 43
Liberalism/B. Constant: Constant speaks of the fact that the normative asymmetry that shaped the understanding of freedom in the ancient tradition - the primacy of public freedom in the polis as the realization space of good living - is reversed in favor of the private freedom of individuals.(1) >Freedom, >Liberty, >Polis.


1. B.Constant, Über die Freiheit der Alten im Vergleich zu der der Heutigen, 1819.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Liberalism Raz Gaus I 416
Liberalism/Raz/Weinstein: Contemporary political theory's historical myopia has consequently made Joseph Raz's perfectionist liberalism seem more anomalous than, in fact, it is. Though Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift are correct in concluding that Raz 'transcends' the rivalry between liberalism and communitarianism, they overemphasize his originality (1996(1): 250). Perfectionist liberalism: Raz's perfectionist liberalism is refurbished new liberalism but with some differences. For instance, Raz distinguishes autonomy, a seminal value requiring serious political attention, from self- realization, which he holds is merely one variety of autonomy. >Self-realization/Hobhouse.
Self-realization/Raz: Whereas a self-realizing person develops all of his capacities to their full potential, an autonomous person merely develops 'a conception of himself, and his actions are sensitive to his past'. In 'embracing goals and commitments, in coming to care about one thing or another', such persons 'give shape' to their lives, though not necessarily according to a unified plan as with Hobhouse (Raz, 1986(2): 375, 387) (...).
Value pluralism: Moreover for Raz unlike new liberals, autonomy entails value pluralism because goods and virtues are incommensurable, often forcing us to trade them off, 'relinquishing one good for the sake of another' (1986(2): And, tragically, we have to make trade-offs because (though Raz fails to argue why) the menu of goods and virtues available to us is largely socially determined (1986(2): 366, 398-9) (...).
Goals/Raz: Notwithstanding these differences, for Raz autonomous agents nevertheless 'identify' with their choices and remain 'loyal' to them, just like new liberal self-realizing agents. Second, in shaping their lives, autonomous agents, like self-realizing agents, don 't arbitrarily recreate themselves in spite of their social circumstances.
RazVsNietzsche: Brute Nietzschean self-creation is impossible, for we are all born into communities presupposing our values. At best, acting autonomously transforms slightly, or reconfirms these
values selectively (1986(2): 382, 387—8).
>Perfectionism/Raz.

1. Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift (1996) Liberals and Communitarians. Oxford: Blackwell.
2. Raz, Joseph (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Liberty Bosanquet Gaus I 415
Liberty/Bosanquet/Weinstein: Bosanquet's The Philosophical Theory of the State (1899)(1) takes up politically where Bradley's Ethical Studies (1876)(2) leaves off morally. >Individuals/Bradley.
Bosanquet agrees with Bradley that, in so far as our identities are socially constituted, others are not merely external constraints on our self-realization.
Societies: Societies are free according to how well they manipulate social relations so that everyone flourishes.
HigherlLiberty: For Bosanquet, and new liberals, freedom consists in being empowered by meaningful opportunities ('positive or political liberty') as well as being left alone ('negative or juristic liberty'). Thus, "'higher" liberty is also the "larger" liberty, presenting ... the more extensive choice to self-determination' (Bosanquet, 2001(1): 147). In addition, for Bosanquet, higher freedom also entails mastering oneself in the sense of giving 'effect to the self as a whole, or remov[ing] its contradictions and so mak[ing] it most fully what it is able to be' (2001(1): 149—50).*
Positive liberty: Moreover, being positively free entails juridical security: Our 'liberty may be identified with such a system Lof rightsl considered as the condition and guarantee of our becoming the best that we have it in us to be' (2001(1): 139).
Rights/Bosanquet: Self-realization is most effectively promoted indirectly by a system of
strong, though not indefeasible, rights. As with liberal utilitarianism, rights function as ready-made
decision procedures. Like habitual bodily activities such as walking, acting justly by respecting others' rights usually demands 'no effort of attention', enabling citizens to devote themselves to 'problems which demand intenser efforts' (2001(1): 201-2). And whenever citizens lose their justice habit, liberal states swiftly re-educate them through punishment. While states can never make citizens just, they can encourage just behaviour by maintaining a system of rights. By hindering 'hindrances of the good life', they warrant our loyalty (2001(1): 21).

* Bosanquet's theory of freedom anticipates MacCallum's (1972)(3) celebrated analysis of the overinflated distinction between negative and positive freedom. See Bosanquet (2001(1): 148).

1. Bosanquet, Bernard (2001 [1899]) The Philosophical Theory of the State, eds Gerald F. Gaus and William Sweet. South Bend, IL: St Augustine's.
2. Bradley, F. H. (1988 [1927]) Ethical Studies (1876). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. MacCallum, Gerald C. (1972) 'Negative and positive freedom'. In Peter Laslett, W. G. Runciman and Quentin Skinner, eds, Philosophy, Politics and Society, fourth series. Oxford: Blackwell, 174-93.

Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Limits Leibniz Holz I 73/74
Infinite/construction/Leibniz: Leibniz makes the general connexion in an infinite set construible for the finite mind as the mathematically infinite, as a boundary concept in an infinitesimal method of construction. Litmit/Leibniz/Holz: every finite mind has only the knowledge of a limited section, but with this also the realization that a boundary exists, and with it a world which extends beyond this limit.
Holz: the ability to exceed is an a priori determination of "boundaries".
>Infinity/Leibniz.
I 155
Helmuth Plessner: "Material a priori": the boundary is a material determinant moment of every finite being.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz I
Hans Heinz Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994
Logic Nagel I 61
That "and" has become the word for the conjunction by contingent circumstances has no consequences on the status of the true statement that p is implied by p and q. What a set of sentences means depends on conventions. What follows from a set of premises does not depend on them (formal). >Convention, >Logical constants, >Logical truth, >Meaning/Nagel.
I 85
Logic/Nagel: logical judgments are based on our comprehension, but they are not a judgment about our ability of comprehension. >Judgments, >Recognition.
I 94
Logical skepticism/NagelVsSkepticism/Nagel: we can never reach a point where there are two possibilities that are compatible with all evidence. I cannot imagine that I am in a similar realization situation where 2 + 2 = 5, but my brain would be confused, because I could not imagine that 2 + 2 = 5. The logical skeptic offers no level of reason. There is no point that allows reviewing the logic without presupposing it.
Not everything can be revised. - Something has to be maintained in order to check that the revision is justified.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982

Map Example Bateson I 245
Topographic Map/Map/Territory/Korzybski/Bateson: Korzybski (A. Korzybski, Science and Sanity, NY, 1941) distinguishes map and territory. This generally stands for the realization that a communication of any kind does not consist of the objects it designates. >Description.
That plays a role in the use of the sign. Without this distinction, deception or e.g. threat would be impossible.
>Use, >Signs, >Levels/order, >Description Levels.

Bt I
G. Bateson
Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology, San Francisco 1972
German Edition:
Ökologie des Geistes. Anthropologische, psychologische, biologische und epistemologische Perspektiven Frankfurt 1985

Meaning Change Lewis IV 94
Change of concept/change of meaning/meaning/Theory/change of theory/Lewis: Thesis: we should say that the >theoretical terms maintain the meaning they had at their first >introduction.
IV 95
This only works if we allow the theoretical terms to designate the components of the very next realization of T, of T itself. - Because after a correction of T, no matter how small, we will believe that the original version of T is unrealized. - Because meaning is not in the mind, we need to consider the introduction. - Therefore the historian of science knows more about the importance of electron than as the physicist.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Metaphysics Rorty III 127 ff
Metaphysicisit: E.g. Hegel: despite historical realization of the truth still approaching something fixed. III Introduction Metaphysics: questions about the unchanging, possibly hidden things that underlie the phenomena. Typical: Socrates’ questions. ("Immanent nature"). (HeideggerVs). In this respect, coupled with common sense! He gives no redescription, but analyzes old descriptions with the help of other old descriptions. The metaphysicist calls everything else "relativistic". He assumes that our tradition cannot provide problems that it is unable to solve.
Metaphysics: thinks that there is a connection between redescription and power, and the right redescription could liberate us.
IV (c) 77ff
Metaphysics/Heidegger/Rorty: Heidegger thought he might escape metaphysics - (the idea of ​​a single truth) - by understanding being and truth historically. >Being/Heidegger, >Truth/Heidegger.

VI 154ff
Metaphysics: wants to see our desire to be friendly supported by an argument that contains a self-description. It is supposed to throw a highlight on a thing common to all humans Transcendence: the assumption that there is something with which we may not be connected. RortyVs: it does not exist! Our beliefs themselves are secular objects in constant causal interaction with others.
Rorty: the fact that we keep open whether we describe the world differently later has nothing to do with transcendence.
VI 480
Transcendence/DavidsonVsKant/Rorty: not needed

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Midlife Crisis Levinson Upton I 145
Midlife Crisis/Levinson/Upton: the transition from ages 40—45 is an especially significant time of life - a time of midlife crisis when a person questions his or her entire life structure, raising unsettling questions about where they have been and where they are heading. Levinson based his theory on a series of in-depth interviews and characterized 80 per cent of the men he studied as experiencing intense inner struggles and disturbing realizations in their early forties. Women: women, however, experience significant crisis during the transition at age 30, as well as in the transition to middle age. Levinson (1986(1), 1996(2)). >Stages of Development/Levinson, >Method/Levinson.
VsLevinson see >Midlife Crisis/Psychological theories.
Upton I 147
Women: In the 1980s, Levinson interviewed 45 women of the same age (Levinson, 1996)(2). The sample comprised equal numbers of women who were either homemakers, college instructors or businesswomen. He found that, in general, women go through the same type of life cycles that men do. However, they were less likely to enter adulthood with specific goals and, as a result, were less likely to define success in terms of key career events. Rather than focusing on external events, women usually sought changes in personal identity in midlife.

1. Levinson, DJ (1986) The Seasons of a Man’s Life. New York: Alfred Knopf.
2. Levinson, DJ (1996) The Seasons of a Woman’s Life. New York Alfred Knopf.


Upton I
Penney Upton
Developmental Psychology 2011
Mind Body Problem Maturana I 289
Mind-body problem/domains/Maturana: physicality (corporeality) and behavior are two non-overlapping domains. - They are coupled in their realization, however, because a living system operates as structurally determined. >Operation/Maturana.
Physiology: disassembled into parts - in contrast: behavior: interactions (as wholes).
>Behavior.
Separate domains: solutions for mind-body problem: language depends on physicality, but does not act in its field. - This solves the problem of consciousness, self, soul.
>Consciousness, >Self, >Soul.
Mind-body: recursive coupling of the areas of behavior and physiology.
>Recursion, >Mind, >Body, cf. >Materialism, >Identity theory.

Maturana I
Umberto Maturana
Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000

Mind Body Problem Searle I 120
Mind Body Problem/Nagel: we have currently no conceptual means to even just imagine a solution because causal explanations of natural science have a certain necessity that is missing here. >Mind/Body problem/Nagel.
SearleVsNagel: science cannot explain why two bodies attract each other. >Explanations.
I 146f
Mind Body Problem/Searle: causality alone is important: micro (physis) causes macro (mind) (from bottom to top). SearleVsSupervenience: supervenience is superfluous. Stability is causally supervenient on molecular structure, but this does not mean that it is epiphenomenal. >Epiphenomenalism, >supervenience.
---
II 328f
Mind Body Problem/Searle: mental states are both caused by the activities of the brain and realized in the structure of the brain (such as water/molecular structure). There may be a causing and a realization of the same stuff, provided it is done on different levels. >Mental states/Searle, >Brain states/Searle, >Identity theory.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Morals Weber Habermas III 231
Moral/Weber/Habermas: the cognitive independence of law and morality, i.e. the replacement of moral-practical insights of ethical and legal doctrines, principles, maxims and decision rules of worldviews in which they were initially embedded, is what Weber calls rationalization. >Rationalization, >Worldviews, >Society, >Culture, >Cultural Transmission, >Rationality.
Cosmological, religious and metaphysical worldviews are structured in such a way that the internal difference between theoretical and practical reason cannot yet come into effect.
Habermas III 232
The autonomisation of law and morality leads to formal law and to profane ethics of conviction and responsibility. Of course, this autonomization is still in the making even within religious systems of interpretation. This leads to the dichotomization between a search for salvation, which is oriented towards inner salvation goods and means of salvation, and the realization of an outer, objectified world. Weber shows how ethics of conviction approaches develop from this religiousness of conviction.(1) >Law, >Ethics of conviction, >Ethics.

1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I. 1963, p. 541.

Weber I
M. Weber
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930
German Edition:
Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Morphemes Black II 51
Morpheme/Black: today's linguistics is little interested in words and more in morphemes. - That leads to the realization of linguistic units that are normally not considered as words. E.g.-ness,-ing. >Words, >Linguistics.

Black I
Max Black
"Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979

Black II
M. Black
The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978
German Edition:
Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973

Black III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Black IV
Max Black
"The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Neo-Kantianism Habermas III 221
Neo-Kantianism/Habermas: Max Weber stands in the tradition of Neo-Kantianism. (1) In the theory of humanities and cultural studies, Windelband and Rickert hold positions similar to Dilthey and other philosophers of the Historical School. >M. Weber, >W. Dilthey, cf. >Historicism.
For the examination of evolutionary approaches in the social sciences, however, Neo-Kantianism has gained a special significance beyond its dualistic philosophy of science, because of his value theory.
>Value theory.
On a methodological level it emphasizes the distinction between being and should, between factual findings and value judgements, and in practical philosophy resolutely opposes all varieties of ethical naturalism.
>Facts, >Norms.
III 263
Neo-Kantianism: Thesis: Processes of value realization can be viewed simultaneously from outside and inside, understood as empirical processes and as objectivation of knowledge, and thus aspects of reality and validity can be connected. ((s) See is-ought problem, Naturalistic Fallacy).

1. Th.Burger, Max Weber’s Theory of Concept Formation, Durham 1976; R.H, Howe, Max Weber’s Elective Affinities, AJS, 84, 1978, 366ff; M. Baker, Kant as a Problem for Weber, Brit. J. Soc. 31, 1980,224ff.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Oikos Luhmann Mause I 30
Oikos/Luhmann: The polis is about the realization of the 'good life', the oikos is about the economic security of survival (Luhmann: Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt 1997, pp. 932- 933.) The oikos is the sphere of material production, of poiesis (the production of goods).
In Hellenism, the political form of organization of the empire is interpreted as the 'house' (oikos) of the ruler.
>Polis/Luhmann.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992
German Edition:
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Openness Gadamer I 368
Openness/Question/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: We ask (...) about the logical structure of openness that characterizes the hermeneutic consciousness and remember the importance of this in the analysis of the hermeneutical situation the concept of the question. >Question.
The realization that the thing is different and not as one first believed, obviously presupposes the passage through the question, whether it is one way or another.
The openness that lies in the nature of experience is, logically, precisely this openness of the one way or the other. It has the structure of the question.
I 369
Dialectic: (...) the full extent of dialectic [is] the questioning and answering, or better, the passage of all knowledge through the question. To ask questions means to put them into the open. The openness of the questioned consists in the non-fixedness of the answer. Every question completes its meaning only in the passage through such a limbo, in which it becomes an open question. Every genuine question demands this openness. If it lacks this openness, it is basically an illusory question that has no real sense of questioning. Meaning: (...) the openness of the question [is] not a boundless one. Rather, it includes the certain delimitation by the horizon of the question. A question that lacks the same is void. It only becomes a question when the fluid indeterminacy of the direction in which it points is placed in the specific of one way or another.
>Question/Gadamer, >Dialogue/Gadamer, >I-You-Relationship/Gadamer.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Order Hobbes Habermas IV 314
Order/Hobbes/Habermas: as later Utilitarianism, so Hobbes also proceeds from isolated subjects endowed with the capacity for pupose-rational action. Rational skills should serve passions that dictate the purposes of action. The pursuit of one's own interests leads to a struggle for security and scarce goods. If one only considers the natural equipment of interested and purpose-oriented individuals, social relationships cannot take the form of peaceful competition.
Habermas IV 315
The actions of other individuals can only be understood as a means or condition for the realization of their own purposes. Therefore, all artificial regulations are governed by the natural maxim that everyone seeks to exert influence on everyone and to gain generalised influence, i.e. power. See >Order/Parsons. Solution/Hobbes: a contract of power with the unconditional subjugation of everyone to the absolute power of one. However, this presupposes a situation in which the subjects acting in a rational manner are already prepared to fulfil the conditions necessary for the conclusion of a contract.(1)
ParsonsVsHobbes.
1.Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 93f.


Höffe I 228
Order/State/Society/Hobbes/Höffe: Hobbes formulates the characteristic challenge of his epoch as a generally valid basic problem: "Why at all and in what form do we need an institutional political order, why a state with powers of coercion? Since the answer also comes from general principles, from real principles, especially from the idea of the state of nature, both Hobbes' question and his proposed solution transcend the historical context, i.e., once again, the British Civil War and the early bourgeois market society. ((as) But, because of problems: see >Absolutism/Hobbes.) Cf. >State/Hobbes, >Governance/Hobbes.

Hobbes I
Thomas Hobbes
Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Order Parsons Habermas IV 306
Order/Parsons/Talcott ParsonsVsHobbes/Habermas: the question of how social order is possible cannot be solved under empirical conditions. (The Hobbesian problem). Problem: rationalistic and empirical concepts of action cannot grasp the autonomy of action any more than materialistic and idealistic concepts of order can grasp the legitimacy of a context of action based on interests.
Solution/Parsons: Parsons develops a voluntaristic concept of action and a normativistic concept of order.
Habermas IV 310
Order/Parsons: cannot be stabilized by interests alone. Thesis: Orders that are deprived of their normative force lead to anomic states.(1)
Habermas IV 315
The Hobbesian Problemsee Order/Hobbes. If one starts from the concept of purpose-rational action, the actions of others are possible means for one's own purposes. Then it follows from the postulate of rationality that everyone should try to rule over each other. Then power becomes the central concept of the analysis of order. A purely utilitarian society would then be chaotic and unstable. (2)
Solution/Hobbes: a contract of power with the unconditional subjugation of everyone to the absolute power of one. However, this presupposes a situation in which the subjects acting in a purposive-rational manner are already prepared to fulfil the conditions necessary for the conclusion of a contract. (3)
ParsonsVsHobbes: A. The model of purpose-rational action cannot explain how actors can make an agreement that is reasonable,
Habermas IV 316
i.e. so that the interests of all are taken into account. Solution/Parsons: The concept of purposive rationality must be extended. This leads to a distinction between technical and practical concepts of rationality.
>Order/Locke. Conclusion: commitments must be based on a normative consensus,
Habermas IV 317
which alone cannot result from rational considerations. B. Parson's thesis: (like Weber and Durkheim): Hobbes' artificial coercive order cannot be made permanent and is therefore not suitable as a model for an explanation of how social order is possible.
Habermas IV 318
Problem: there is a lack of standardization and value orientation. Parsons/Habermas: Parsons constructs a symmetrical relationship between two contrary but equally wrong positions:
1) Sociological materialism reduces norms to externally imposed regulations and ignores the fact that the institutionalisation of expectations of behaviour is based on the orientation of the actor and binds it normatively and not merely de facto.
Habermas IV 319
Sociological idealism underestimates the coercion that emanates from the non-normative components of the action situation, from the material substrate of the lifeworld in general. >Idealism, >Materialism.
Solution/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons develops an institutional concept that follows the New Kantian model of value realization, i.e. Weber's concept of an order integrating values and interests.(3)
>Institutions.

1.Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 404.
2. Ibid. p. 93f
3. Ibid. p. 732.

ParCh I
Ch. Parsons
Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014

ParTa I
T. Parsons
The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967

ParTe I
Ter. Parsons
Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Overlapping Consensus Rawls Gaus I 93
Overlapping Consensus/Diversity/individualism/Rawls/Waldron: what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. (Rawls 1980(1): 518–19). >Justice/Rawls, >Principles/Rawls.
Gaus I 94
Ethical and religious heterogeneity were no longer to be regarded as a feature that societies governed by justice might or might not have, or might have at one period but not at another. It was to be seen instead as a permanent feature of the societies, one that could not be expected soon to pass away. >Society/Walzer.
RawlsVsRawls: By the beginning of the 1990s Rawls had become convinced that his approach in A Theory of Justice(2) was disqualified generally on this ground.
>Individualism/Rawls.
Diversity/inhomogeneity/society/Rawls: ‘[H]ow is it possible,’ Rawls asked, ‘for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ (1993(3): 4). In the introduction to Political Liberalism, he argued that this could no longer be achieved by convincing everyone of the ethical and philosophical premises on which a comprehensive liberal theory of justice might be founded. Instead Rawlsian justice would now have to be presented as something that could command support from a variety of ethical perspectives.
Question: how many of the substantive principles and doctrines of A Theory of Justice would survive this new approach?
Rawls described (...) diversity as a social fact - a permanent feature of modern society. Human life engages multiple values and it is natural that people will disagree about how to balance or prioritize them.
Gaus I 95
Waldron: The key (...) is to insist that an acceptable theory of justice, T, must be such that, among whatever reasons there are for rejecting T or disagreeing with T, none turn on T’s commitment to a particular conception of value or other comprehensive philosophical conception. >Individualism/Rawls, >Rawls/Waldron.
Problems: (...) there are further questions about how [a] threshold test should be understood. One possibility is that T represents an acceptable modus vivendi for the adherents of the various comprehensive conceptions {C1, C2, …, Cn }. Like a treaty that puts an end to conflict between previously hostile powers, T may be presented as the best that C1 can hope for in the way of a theory of justice given that it has to coexist with C2, …, Cn, and the best that C2 can hope for given that it has to coexist with C1 , C3 ,…, Cn , and so on. Rawls, however, regards this as unsatisfactory as a basis for a conception of justice. It leaves T vulnerable to demographic changes or other changes in the balance of power between rival comprehensive conceptions, a vulnerability that is quite at odds with the steadfast moral force that we usually associate with justice (1993(3): 148).
Solution/Rawls: Instead Rawls develops the idea that T should represent an overlapping moral consensus among {C1 , C2 , … , Cn }. By this he means that T could be made acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C1 , and acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C2, and so on.
Diversity/Toleration//Locke/Kant/Rawls/Waldron: Thus, for example, the proposition that religious toleration is required as a matter of justice may be affirmed by Christians on Lockean grounds having to do with each person’s individualized responsibility to God for his own religious beliefs, by secular Lockeans on the grounds of unamenability of belief to coercion, by Kantians on the grounds of the high ethical
Gaus I 96
importance accorded to autonomy, by followers of John Stuart Mill on the basis of the importance of individuality and the free interplay of ideas, and so on. >Toleration/Locke.
Waldron: Whether this actually works is an issue we considered when we discussed Ackerman’s approach to neutrality. >Neutrality/Waldron.
Overlapping consensus/WaldronVsRawls: The idea of overlapping consensus assumes that there can be many routes to the same destination. Geographically the metaphor is plausible enough, but when the destination is a set of moral principles, and ‘routes’ is read as reasons for the acceptance of those principles, then the matter is less clear. Unlike legal rules, moral propositions are not just formulas. A principle is perhaps best understood as a normative proposition together with the reasons that are properly adduced in its support. On either of these accounts, the principle of toleration arrived at by the Christian route is different from the principle of toleration arrived at by Mill’s route. And this is a difference that may matter, for a theory of justice is not only supposed to provide a set of slogans for a society; it is also supposed to guide the members of that society through the disputes that may break out concerning how these slogans are to be understood and applied.
>Justice/Liberalism, >Liberalism/Waldron.
WaldronVsRawls: Social justice, after all, raises concerns that can hardly be dealt with by the strategy of vagueness or evasion associated with overlapping consensus – putting about a set of anodyne formulas that can mean all things to all people.
Cf. >Abortion/Rawls.

1. Rawls, John (1980) ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’. Journal of Philosophy, 77 (9): 515–72.
2. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
3. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Pain Lewis Frank I 129
Martians’ pain/LewisVsQuine/Vsnaturalised epistemology - physicalist vocabulary needs not to be true.
Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical
Review 83 (1974), 435-450
---
Lewis I 39f
Pain/Lewis: a theory of mind should not exclude the possibility of shifted pain (same conditions, contrasting effect) and Martian pain: other states, same impact) - but there should be a simple sense of pain, where we can have all the pain - Shifted pain/Martians’ pain: show that causal role, pain and physical realization are only linked contingently. ---
I (c) 41
Problem: how can we characterize pain a priori by causal role, despite the acknowledgment of this fact? - Identity theory solves the problem for Shifted Pain, but fails on Martians’ Pain. - Behaviorism: here the situation is reversed.
I (c) 42
Pain/Lewis: if a particular neural state preferably causes pain, then this state is pain - but the concept of pain is not the concept of this neural state. - The concept of ...- is an intentional functor. - The two concepts could have applied to something different if the causal role was different - Pain would have been something else. - It could have been that the owner of the role does not own it and some non-owner owns it. - Lewis/Armstrong: pain is non-rigid - yet no coincidence of two states (pain plus neuronal state) but one single state.
I (b) 33 ff
Pains are so defined by what the majority usually ... ---
I (c) 40
Shifted pain: same states - different impacts. From this we learn that pain is merely linked contingently with its causal role.
I (c) 42
Martians’ pain: other states (than ours) - Same effect. From this we learn that pain is linked merely contingently with its physical realization. But the concept of pain is not the concept of this neural state! (> concepts,> identity).
I (c) 42
The concept of .. is an intentional functor. The two concepts could have applied to something different if the causal role was different. Lewis/Armstrong: The concept of pain is a non-rigid designator!
I (c) 52
Identity pain/neural state: contingent! LL. But I do not say that we have two states. If the person feels pain, it is pain, no matter what kind of causal role or physical condition the state has. Otherwise it is not pain.
---
Schwarz I 146
Pain/Lewis/Schwarz: state with such and such causal role- ((s) then biochemical state (type) with the same causal role: Therefore, identification through precisely this role - (s) Vs (s): then circular:> theory of reference.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Perfection Condorcet Habermas III 211
Perfection/Condorcet/Habermas: Condorcet reinterprets the concept of perfection according to the pattern of scientific progress. Perfection no longer means, as in the Aristotelian tradition, the realization of a telos inherent in the nature of things, but a process of perfection that is directed but not teleologically limited in advance. Perfection is interpreted as progress.(1) >Progress, >Teleology.

1. Condorcet, Entwurf einer historischen Darstellung der Fortschritte des menschlichen Geistes, hrsg. von W. Alff, Frankfurt, 1963,S. 29

Condo I
N. de Condorcet
Tableau historique des progrès de l’ esprit humain Paris 2004


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Perfectionism Gaus Gaus I 102
Perfectionism/Gaus: [The] perfectionist theory of the good life - the good life involves the perfection of human beings in society - has wide appeal in contemporary political
Gaus I 103
theory. It was at the heart of William Galston’s earlier (1980(1); 1991(2)) work and has been employed by Douglas B. Rasmuessen and Douglas J. Den Uyl (1991)(3) as a foundation for a defence of classical liberalism. Although readers are often confused by Ayn Rand’s description of her position as ‘egoism’, some idea of human perfection also seems foundational to Randian-inspired liberalism (Machan, 1989(4); Smith, 1995(5) 62ff). Such perfectionist accounts of the good life are distinctly liberal in two ways. First, and most obviously, they provide the grounds for an argument for liberty. People need room to grow, room to find out which ways of living suit their unique natures and which do not. >Individuals/Mill, >Liberalism/Gaus, >Liberalism/Waldron. As Mill puts it, people need freedom to engage in ‘experiments in living’. The lack of freedom will constrain growth, thus blocking human impulses and producing passive personalities. Second, such theories tend to place the individual and her choices at the centre of ethical life: liberalism is understood as a theory of ethical individualism. This is not to say that such theories see development as asocial; indeed, they often put stress on the way social life is necessary for complete development (Gaus, 1983a(6), chs 2 and 3; Kymlicka, 1991(7)). Still, it is the individual and her self-realization or flourishing that has ultimate value, and individuals are not so deeply embedded in society as to make their choices a reflection of social history or culture (Sher, 1997(8): ch. 7). >Mill/Gaus.
Individuals/Mill: The mass of society, according to Mill, is a ‘collective mediocrity’: they tend to conform and are not interested in new ideas. The few who do think and invent are ‘the salt of the earth: without them, human life would become a stagnant pool’ (1963a(9): ch. 3, para. 10).
Paternalism: (...) following from this, such perfectionist theories raise the spectre of widespread paternalism. Although Mill argued for a strongly anti-paternalistic morality, it seems that the ideal is so specific and demanding as to open the gates to interferences with liberty, seeking to prod the mediocre mass towards a richer personality. It also becomes less than obvious why they should be granted liberty equal to that of the perfecting elite. >Autonomy/Gaus.

1. Galston, William (1980) Justice and the Human Good. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
2. Galston, William (1991) Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Douglas J. Den Uyl (1992) Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
4. Machan, Tibor (1989) Individuals and Their Rights. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
5. Smith, Tara (1995) Moral Rights and Political Freedom. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
6. Gaus, Gerald F. (1983a) The Modern Liberal Theory of Man. New York: St Martin’s.
7. Kymlicka, Will (1991) Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon.
8. Sher, George (1997) Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9.Mill, John Stuart (1963a) On Liberty. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, vol. XVIII, 213–301.

Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.

Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004

Perfectionism Raz Gaus I 416
Perfectionsm/Raz/Weinstein: For Raz following the new liberals, rights equalize opportunities for acting autonomously. Rights are necessary though insufficient conditions for achieving autonomy. Furthermore, these conditions must be redistributively robust if citizens are to enjoy meaningful opportunities to make the best of themselves. Cf. >Self-realization/Hobhouse.
Hence, as with new liberals (and liberal utilitarians), rights indirectly promote good. Governments can't make citizens good but governments should indirectly encourage them to make themselves good by providing appropriate opportunities. Hence, politics can, and should be, perfectionist:
‚The autonomy principle permits and even requires governments to create morally valuable opportunities, and to eliminate repugnant ones. Does not that show that it is incompatible with (Mill's) harm principle? ...
Perfectionist goals need not be pursued by the use of coercion. A government that subsidizes certain activities, rewards their pursuit, and advertises their availability encourages those activities without using coercion.‘ (1986(1): 417)
Weinstein: In other words, we are duty bound to provide fellow citizens with the conditions of autonomy as long as we don't harm them. Coercing citizens into leading valuable lives harms them whereas providing valuable options for all harms no one.

1. Raz, Joseph (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Philosophy McGinn I 11
Philosophy/McGinn: Thesis: Philosophical problems are not strange beings, but limits of our cognition - Def Transcendental Naturalism/McGinn: Transcendental Naturalism: Thesis: our faculty of knowledge hinders the realization of the true nature of the objective world - but from this nothing follows for the ontology. >Terminology/McGinn, >Ontology.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

Phonemes Lyons I 27
Consonant Shift/Rasmus Rask/Lyons: between Indo-European languages: Example f where Latin or Greek had p, e.g. p instead of b, e.g. th instead of t.
I 66
Loud/Language/Realization/Arbitrariness/Lyons: as long as the differences remain, nothing changes if a language would be realized phonetically or graphically differently. N.B.: any word that is differentiated under the normal conventions of English will also be differentiated under the new conventions. The language itself is not affected by the change of substantial realisation.
>Distinctions, >Ordering, >Classification, >Word classes.
I 67
Phoneme/Sound/Writing/Language/Lyons: the phonic substance has priority. There are limits to the pronunciation and audibility of certain sound groups. >Terminology/Lyons.
I 102
Sound/Linguistics/Lyons: is ambiguous: a) As physically different, without knowing which language they belong to. (phonetic, phonetics)
>Phonetics.
b) functionally differentiating within a language. (functional meaning). This is about the purpose of communication. (phonology, phonological).
>Phonology, >Function/Lyons.
This also leads to the distinction between speech sound and phoneme.
Def Phonology/Linguistics/Lyons: concerns the functional side of sound differentiations (purpose of communication, sound differences within a language, not physically understood).
Def Phonetics/Linguistics/Lyons: here it concerns purely physically detectable or producible differences of sounds, independently of a language. Independent of possible communication.
Def Speech sound/linguistics/Lyons: is any phonetically (physically) unique sound unit. There are practically infinitely many different speech sounds.
I 103
There are "wide" and "narrow" transcriptions here and intermediate stages. E.g. English: brighter and darker L-sound: bright. in front of vowels: Example "leaf"
Dark: at the end and in front of consonants: Example "field".
Def Phoneme/Linguistics/Lyons: is the sound, if it is used functionally (not purely physically) to distinguish between different words.
>Description levels.
I 104
Def Allophone/Linguistics/Lyons: phonetically distinguishable sound pairs as position variants of the same phoneme. Sound: Unit of phonetic (physical) description. (phonetics).
Phoneme: Unit of the phonological ((s) meaning-differentiating) description. (phonology).
Phonetics: there are acoustic, auditory and articulatory phonetics.
I 120
Syntagmatic/Phoneme/Lyons: "horizontal" dimension.
I 121
Between phonemes it describes the combinability. This is the set of possible words that goes beyond the "real" words.
I 124
Phonemes/Distinction/Feature/Linguistics/Lyons: a) articulatory features: (labial, velar, dental, voiced, nasal) here it is a question of presence or absence (0, 1). b) Distinctive features: this is about the difference they make by distinguishing different words from each other. Not all distinguishable features lead to a distinction between words. ((s) Some words can be pronounced differently).
Correspondingly, there are "functional" and "non-functional" values.
I 126
Advantage: in this way we can simplify restrictions in the distribution of certain phoneme classes. For example, there are many English words that start with /sp/, /sk/ or /St/, but none that begin with /sb/, /sg/ or /sd/. Certainly this is not a coincidental coincidence of the combinatorial properties of /p/, /k/ and /t/ on the one hand and /b/, /g/ and /d/ on the other. Here we do not have to describe six independent facts, but only one: "In the context of /s-/ the distinction voice/voiceless is not functional". >Function/Lyons.

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977

Lyons I
John Lyons
Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Physical/Psychic Chalmers I 42
Psychological/Physical/Law/Law-like/Chalmers: Thesis: It is natural to assume that my principles of coherence between consciousness and awareness that is, that consciousness is always accompanied by awareness, and vice versa, are the same in all human organisms, and are therefore a law-like correlation. >Awareness/Chalmers, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Experience, >Knowing how.
We can argue that this coherence is a natural law. That is, that it applies to all systems. ((s) If a system has any kind of consciousness at all).
Chalmers: this also applies to the remarkable correlation between the structure of consciousness and the structure of awareness. It is too specific to be a coincidence.
I 243
Chalmer's thesis: for every system the structure of consciousness ((s) phenomenal) is mirrored and reversed by the structure of consciousness somewhere (awareness, psychologically). Then we can say that consciousness arises from the functional organization of a system that is necessary for awareness. Then the structure of consciousness is determined by the structure of attention (psychological awareness).
This, of course, is not a fundamental psychophysical law. This would have to link more basic structures than something like "consciousness".
I 244
Can we rule out that there must be some additional X-factor, so we can talk about consciousness?
I 245
Solution/Chalmers: if we accept consciousness as an additional non-physical fact - in addition to the physical - as well as independent psychophysical laws, an "X-factor", no matter how it is structured, becomes superflous. >Independence.
I 246
Best explanation/simplicity/Chalmers: my approach is the simplest and therefore a conclusion on the best explanation as it is often practiced in physical theories. >Best explanation, >Simplicity.
I 276
Psychological/physical/Chalmers: how simple can the organization of a system with conscious experiences become before experience disappears?
I 277
We will need a lot of psycho-physical laws.
I 284
Physical/psychological/Information/Chalmers: whenever we receive a phenomenal information, we will also find this information physically realized:
I 285
We do not know exactly how the phenomenal information is encoded, so we do not know exactly how the information space is physically realized, but we know that it has to be realized. The physical information does not have to be realized locally. Cf. >Brain/Deacon.
Psychological/phenomenal/Chalmers: it is natural to suppose that this double live of information spaces corresponds to a duality on a deeper level.
We might even assume that this double realization is the key to a fundamental link between physical processes...
I 286
...and conscious experiences. We need a kind of construct here and information seems to be as suitable as anything. Thesis: It could be that principles of the double realization of information can be developed into a system of fundamental laws for a combination of the physical and the phenomenal domain.
Cf. >Theory of multiple designs.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Picture (Image) Cresswell II 132
Image/Representation/Photo/Photography/Counterfeiting/Cresswell: E.g. an old photograph of Wellington was causally caused by how things were in Wellington at this time. Question: "What is it a picture of?": Here one can specify the causal history.
Counterfeiting: Solution: the counterfeit shows how the world should be, so that the picture is a picture of it.
Realization of an image: the set of possible worlds, in which that happens what the image shows.
Problem: E.g. House: is it empty or full of people?
False: to say that it is "either full or empty". - Solution: possible worlds which are as the picture shows. - ((s) Then the house can accommodate every number of people.)
II 185
Image/Representation/Howell/Cresswell: Thesis: one cannot simply say that an image represents something, but only that a subject understands the image at t in such a way that it represents that - more precisely, a 5-digit operator (time, person, circumstances, representation). Elliott Sober: Thesis: pictorial representation is not so different from linguistic representation, as is often assumed.
>Representation, >Circumstances, >Situations, >Perception, >Time.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Political Science Honneth Brocker I 789
Political Theory/Honneth/Sigwart: in political theory, Honneth's social theory is close to republican positions and to the concerns of "perfectionist liberalism". >Perfectionism.
HonnethVsLiberalism: the pronounced liberalism ("the official current of modern liberalism"(Honneth (1)) understands the basic principles of freedom and self-realization firmly as principles mediated intersubjectively and to be realized in concrete political institutions. On the other hand Honneth:... See Liberalism. See Recognition/Honneth.

1. Axel Honneth, Das Ich im Wir. Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie, Berlin 2010, p. 40

Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Honn I
A. Honneth
Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010

Honn II
Axel Honneth
Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Possibility Leibniz Holz I 102
Def reality/Leibniz: reality corresponds to the active moment of the force. An effective one. Definition possibility/Leibniz: possibility corresponds to the passive moment, one that did not come to the utterance.
To be distinguished from this is:
Def ability/Leibniz: (potentia, puissance): this is a positive equipment of the substance with the specific content of the tendency to achieve its realization.
I 103
The action itself and the ability for it are merely different states of one and the same moment of existence. The active force provides the transition. This requires only the removal of an inhibition. The mere ability is the endurance of an inhibition. But this is only possible if the ability itself exists as active striving. Suffering is therefore a moment of action itself in the mode of inhibition.
>Reality/Leibniz, >Existence/Leibniz, >Necessity/Leibniz.

Perfection/Leibniz: therefore, it also makes sense to say that perfection is gradual. Depending on how much factual possibilities are achieved.
Possibility/Leibniz: is not realized. It is the opposite of reality.
Possibility/Megaricans/Megara/Holz: Megaricans let the possible coincide with the impossible: because it is not realized.
I 104
That which is not real is impossible! Holz: this is correct as long as one abstains from time.
Thus, one can regard Leibniz's force as a mediation between possibility and reality.
I 106
Possibility/Leibniz: Possibility is always equipped with the active force to strive for reality. Otherwise nothing would exist. One cannot say with reason "certain possibilities" would have the tendency, "others" would not have it. Force/Leibniz: is the act of ability endowed with striving.
Reality/Leibniz: there are (infinitely many) gradations between possibility and reality.
>Possible world/Leibniz.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz I
Hans Heinz Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994
Power Parsons Habermas IV 400
Power/System Theory/Parsons/Habermas: within Parsons system theory, power is understood as a communication medium (the other three communication media in Parsons are money, influence and value retention). >Money/Parsons, Communication Media/Parsons.
As a control medium, power represents the symbolic embodiment of value without itself having an intrinsic value. Power consists neither in effective performance nor in the use of physical force. Like money, the power medium reflects the structure of claim and redemption.
Habermas IV 401
Claims: the nominal claims for readiness to follow up on binding decisions defined by the code can be settled in real values and covered by special reserves. According to Parsons, the "utility value" of the realization of collective goals corresponds to the "exchange value" of power. The disposition via coercive means is used as cover. (1) Code: is structured similarly in the case of power as in the medium of money: rulers and subjects of power belong to the same collective. After all, power interests are defined by mobilising performance potential for the achievement of collectively desired goals. The generalized value here is efficiency (in money it is benefit). The power code schematizes possible expressions as consent to or rejection of imperatives.
Habermas IV 402
Value: the amount of value corresponding to the claim to readiness to comply is not as manipulable as the exchange value in the case of money. This is because there is no sign system available in the power medium as in the case of the money medium. Symbols of power such as uniforms, emblems or official seals are not comparable to the system of prices from a syntactic point of view. This leads to the problem of measurability. Power can be sold, but is not circulable like money. However, power can only take the form of a medium because it is not attached to certain rulers or contexts. However, power binds itself more symbiotically to persons and institutions than money does.
Habermas IV 403
Power must be demonstrated from time to time, as it is not covered like a deposit in a bank. Overall, power cannot be calculated as well as money. Power/Money/Luhmann: in terms of system characteristics, the two media money and power behave partly in the opposite direction: while financing money, e.g. granting credit, usually increases the inherent complexity of the economic system, the complexity of the system is reduced in the event of an increase in power.(2)
Habermas IV 404
Unlike money, power not only needs cover (through coercive means) and legal standardization (in the form of incumbency), but it also needs legitimation. >Legitimation, >Legitimacy

1.T Parsons, Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process, in: T. Parsons, Social Theory and Modern Society, NY 1967, S. 264ff
2.N. Luhmann, Zur Theorie symbolische generalisierter Kommunikationsmedien, in. ZfS 1974, S 236ff.

ParCh I
Ch. Parsons
Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014

ParTa I
T. Parsons
The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967

ParTe I
Ter. Parsons
Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Practise Lukács Habermas III 486
Practice/Philosophy/Lukács/HabermasVsLukács/Habermas: Marx had set the slogan of the "practicalisation of philosophy" and adopted the perspective of the young Hegelian "philosophy of action". Lukács now commits the decisive mistake, admittedly suggested by Marx, of again theoretically catching up with this "practicalisation" and presenting it as a revolutionary realization of philosophy. That is why he has to put more credit on theory than even metaphysics had claimed for itself. Too much is expected of philosophy. >Metaphysics, >Theory, >Philosophy.
Lukács must claim a knowledge that is incompatible with Max Weber's insight into the decay of objective reason.
>M. Weber.
Habermas III 488
WellmerVsLukács: Lukács' attempt at a philosophical reconstruction of Marxism was tantamount to a return to objective idealism in some central points.(1) >Idealism.

1.A.Wellmer, Die sprachanalytische Wende der Kritischen Theorie, 1977, in: Jaeggi, Honneth (Hg), Theorien des Historischen Materialismus, Frankfurt 1977.


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Pragmatism James Diaz-Bone I 68
Pragmatism/James: the term pragmatism is used for the first time by James 1898. He, however, refers to Peirce, 1878. Signs/Peirce/VsKant: VsConstruction of the transcendental subject: Pragmatism is the method that enables successful linguistic and intellectual communication and clear ideas. For Peirce every thought is a sign.
I 70
Pragmatism/Peirce: pragmatism is a voluntary action theory. Definition Voluntarism: Will as the basic principle of being.
I 76
Pragmatism: pragmatism is like a corridor in the middle of many rooms, it belongs to all who use it. Concept/Pragmatism: He considers all concepts hypotheses. Use is always a personal decision.
I 78
We do not live to think, but we think to live. 79
Science/James: Science, comon sense and individual consciousness have one thing in common: they should increase the human adaptability.
I 88
PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: Conformity in James, the dichotomy true/false is softened. (> Realization, >adjustment).
I 102
VsPragmatism: that James confuses truth with certainty: it can never be ascertained whether an observation is properly translated. (> Basic sentence problem).


James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Principles Genz II 29
Irrevocability/principle/Genz: evolution explains why some principles seem irrevocable to us without being so.
II 118
Understanding/principle/principles/Genz: a deeper understanding is achieved if one can show that a theory can be derived from principles. >Understanding, >Theories, >Derivation,
>Derivability.
Theory of Relativity/Einstein/Genz: Einstein has done this for the three theories of relativity.
>Relativity theory.
II 181
Principles/Genz: natural laws or laws of nature can be traced back to principles. >Natural laws.
II 182
Principle/principles/explanation/Genz: final objective: is the explanation by principles. God is not a mathematician - but sticks to principles.
Principle/Genz: for example, it could be that a successful physical theory defines a measured value which is clearly defined by the theory, but from its definition it follows that it cannot be calculated.
>Measurements, >Definitions.
II 228
Principle/laws/science/physics/mathematics/relativity theory/Genz: the relativity theories can be founded retrospectively by principles. Einstein himself found it. The most important principle of the general theory of relativity: Definition equivalence principle/Genz: the equivalence principle says that there is an indistinguishability of gravity and acceleration.
>Equivalence principle.
II 229
1. Principle for the derivation of the Special Theory of Relativity: light is - unlike sound - no vibration of a medium, resulting in the principle of the independence of the speed of light from the movement of the source (based on the physics of electricity and magnetism). 2. Principle for the derivation of special relativity: the laws of nature shall apply to all observers who move in the same direction with constant and equal speed. (Can be traced back to Galileo).
>Special Relativity.
II 231
Principles/universe/nature/Euan Squires/Genz: thesis: in the universe, principles apply that can be seen and formulated without mathematics. Mathematical laws of nature: are then nothing else but formalizations of these principles by more precise means.
Explanation: however, it is the principles themselves that enable explanation and understanding.
>Explanations.
Description/measure/measurement/Relativity Theory/Squires/Genz: the General Relativity Theory declares it indispensable that we can describe the universe independently of the choice of variables for space and time. Here mathematics is even excluded!
Principles/Elementary Particle Theory/Particle Theory/Standard Model/Genz: the standard model follows from the principle that observers can choose their conventions independently of each other without changing the laws at different locations and at different times: the same natural laws should apply everywhere.
Framework: in which this demand is formulated: is the relativistic quantum field theory. However, this is mathematical in itself.
>Reference systems.
II 232
Principles/Genz: thesis: the laws of nature follow from simple, non-mathematical principles. For example, the Dirac equation has been found mathematically, but it is a realization of laws whose form is determined by non-mathematical principles such as symmetry. Mathematics/Genz: mathematics is like a servant here who separates equations that do not satisfy the principles.
Principle/Genz: what principles allow seems to be realized, no matter whether it is mathematically simple or not.
For example Hadrons: that Hadrons meet the requirements of group SU (3) seemed to follow first from a mathematical principle. Today it is known that hadrons are made up of quarks.
II 233
Principle/Genz: for the purpose of application, it may be necessary to formulate a principle mathematically. For understanding, however, we need the non-mathematical principles. Progress/Genz: one can even say that in physics they are accompanied by the substitution of mathematical principles with non-mathematical principles.
For example Plato tried to explain the structure of the cosmos with five regular bodies. Kepler recorded this, and later they were replaced by the assumption of random initial conditions.
For example, spectrum of the hydrogen atom: was calculated exactly by a formula. Later this was understood by Bohr's atomic model.
II 234
Principle/Newton/force/Genz: for example, the force exerted by one body on another is proportional to the reciprocal of the square of the distance between the bodies. That is mathematical. Newton himself could not base this assumption on principles. Only Einstein was able to do that.
Principles of quantum mechanics: see >Quantum mechanics/Genz.

Gz I
H. Genz
Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999

Gz II
Henning Genz
Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002

Principles Nozick II 10
Principle/Nozick: to show that principles explain a p, involves that they contain it. But that does not prove that p. >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Involvement, >Inclusion,
>Proofs, >Provability.
II 128
Richness/principle/existence/Nozick: thesis: "All possibilities are realized." - This follows from the assumption of the egalitarian theory that the options "something"/"nothing" are equal. >Ultimate justification/Nozick.
This requires infinitely separate possible worlds because options can be contradictory. - Then you need no explanation why something is or is not, because everything is (somewhere) realized. - Then there is no fact "X instead of Y".
>Possible worlds, >Totality.
II 130
Nothing: one of the unrealized possibilities is also that there is nothing - but that is one among many, not the inegalitary situation that there would be "exclusively nothing". >Nothing, cf. >Impossible World.
II 347
Consciousness/explanation/evolution theory/Nozick: consciousness allows other types of behavior: - to be guided by principles. >Consciousness, >Behavior.

---
Singer I 220
Principles/Responsibility/Nozick/P. Singer: Nozick makes a sensible distinction between "historical" and "time slices" principles. (R. Nozick 1974)(1): Def historical principle/Nozick: in order to understand whether a given distribution of goods is fair or unfair, we have to ask how the distribution came about. We need to know its history.
Are the parties entitled to ownership as a result of originally justified acquisition?
Def time-slice principles/Nozick: consider only the current situations and do not ask about their realization.
>Time-slice.

1. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York, 1974

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994


SingerP I
Peter Singer
Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011

SingerP II
P. Singer
The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015
Principles Rawls I 4
Principles/Society/Rawls:
1. Everyone accepts and knows that the other members of society accept the same principles of justice.
2. The basic social institutions fulfill these principles in general and are known for doing so.
I 7
Principles/Rawls: we are only interested in general principles of the justice of society as a whole, not in such special or private communities or for cross-national institutions.
I 10/11
Principles/Justice/Rawls: Principles must be defined at the beginning. Our point of departure, the situation of equality, which should follow an election, corresponds to the natural state of the traditional theories of the social contract, but it is neither a concrete historical situation nor a primitive culture.
>Social contract, >Natural state, >Equality.
It is a purely hypothetical situation which should lead to a certain realization of justice.
>Justice/Rawls.
I 41
Principles/MillVsIntuitionism/Mill/Rawls: Mill argued that the principle of usefulness could be the only supreme principle, since otherwise there could be no arbitrator between competing criteria(1). >J.St. Mill, >Competition, >Interests, >Utility principle, >Utilitarianism.
Principles/Sidgwick: the principle of usefulness is the only one that can play this role(2).
>H. Sidgwick.
Rawls: that is what made the classical doctrine so attractive: that it tries to solve the problem of priorities and avoids intuitionism.
>Intuitionism/Economics, >Priorities, >Preferences.
RawlsVsMill/RawlsVsSidgwick/RawlsVsUtilitarism: we need to realize that there may be no way to dissolve the plurality of the different principles.
>VsUtilitarianism.
I 43
Principles/Rawls: I suggest that even in the "lexical order" (the piecemeal processing of principles according to an external order) the principle of equal distribution of rights should be treated as a priority rather than the regulation of economic or social inequalities.
I 61
Principles/justice/Rawls: provisional wording: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others.
2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they
(a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and
(b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone.
The two principles are applied in chronological order. This means that abandoning the first principle cannot be offset by greater social or economic benefits.
I 62
Deviations from equal distribution of social rights or economic benefits can only be justified by the fact that this is to everyone's advantage. ((s) This is a reference to utilitarianism.
I 63
The chronological order of compliance also excludes that fundamental freedoms can be exchanged for economic benefits.
I 64
Similarly, the chronological order of the principles means that people can only ever be talked about in the form of social role holders.
I 83
Principles/Rawls: Redrafting of the Second Principle: Social and economic inequality must be arranged in such a way that (a) it provides the greatest benefit for the worst-off people and
(b) it is linked to administrative bodies and positions which are open to all under conditions of fair equal opportunities.
I 89
I assume that the two parts of the principle are arranged lexically.
I 116
Principles/Rawls: there is nothing inconsistent about the fact that fairness makes unconditional principles possible. It is sufficient to show that, in the initial situation (of a society to be established), the parties agree to principles that define the natural obligations that then apply without fail. ((s)VsRawls: Contradiction: Rawls himself says that the natural duties, for example not to be cruel, are not subject to agreements. (See Rawls I 114).
I 250
Principles/Rawls: reformulation in the light of the consideration of contingent individual and historical inequalities: First principle: Every person must have an equal right to the most comprehensive system of equal fundamental rights that is compatible with an equal system of freedom for all.
Priority rule: the principles of justice are built in lexical order and therefore freedom can only be restricted for the benefit of freedom. There are two cases here: a) a less comprehensive freedom must increase the freedom of the total system of freedom shared by all, b) a restricted freedom must be acceptable to those affected by it.
I 253
Principles/Categorical imperative/Kant/Rawls: in the sense of Kant, these principles are also categorical imperatives. They do not require any particular social conditions or individual goals. Only an interest in primary public goods (e. g. freedom) is assumed. The preference for these in turn is derived from the most general assumptions about rationality and the conditions of human life.
I 302
Principles/Rawls: final version for Institutions/Rawls: the two principles of justice (see above) plus priority rules: 1. Priority rule: the principles of justice must be dealt with in lexical order, so that freedom may only be restricted in favour of greater freedom. Two cases are possible: a) Restricted freedom must strengthen the overall system of freedoms that benefit all. b) Freedom that is not equal must be accepted by those who enjoy fewer freedoms.
2. Priority rule: (Justice precedes efficiency and prosperity): The second principle of justice is lexical superior to the principle of efficiency and the one of maximizing benefits,...
I 303
.... fair equal opportunities are superior to the difference principle. Two cases are possible: a) Opportunity inequality must increase the chances of the disadvantaged.
b) An extreme savings rate must reduce the burdens on those affected.
>Equal opportunities.
General conception: all primary social goods (freedoms, rights, income, prosperity, conditions for self-esteem, etc.) shall be distributed equally, except where an unequal distribution of some or all of these goods is to the benefit of the least favoured.
I 446
Principles/Rawls: while the principles of justice are those chosen in the initial position, the principles of rational decision or rationality are not chosen at all. This leads to the distinction between right and good. >Society/Rawls.

1. Mill, A System of Logic, bk. VI, ch. XII, sec. 7 and Utilitarianism, ch. V, paers. 26-31.
2. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, bk. IV ch. II and III.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Progress Adorno I Grenz 110
Progress/Time nucleus/Difference/History/Adorno/Grenz: the dynamics of progress in the techniques of reigning nature is preserved in every product of human labor. This is the concrete historical character of the self-realization of mankind: the time nucleus in the being. >History/Adorno, >Historiography, >Time.
Through it, the category of possibility also gains its own. Its truth or its character as a criterion is their difference from itself: it as non-appearing.
>Dialectic/Adorno, >Truth/Adorno, >Truth content/Adorno, >Criteria.
Grenz I 111
Nothing/Adorno/Grenz: But the certain nothing that it brings forth is not something. It is of a different quality than what it analyzes. >Nothingness.
I Grenz 165
Progress/Adorno/Grenz: all the achievements of humans (...) are nothing in the sense of an emphatic concept of anthropogenesis, because, as Adorno argues, from the barbaric processes in the concentration camps, under the prerequisite of the theory of the retroactive force of history and knowledge - they have not appeared.
I Grenz 77
Novelty/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno sees the new as a synthesis from the existing and its negativity. >Negation/Adorno.

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974


A X
Friedemann Grenz
Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984
Qualia Block Chalmers I 250
Qualia/absent qualia/Block/BlockVsChalmers/BlockVsInvariance Principle/Chalmers: (Block 1978)(1): Block thesis: in the case of identical biochemical realization in a non-human system, the Qualia, which accompany the conscious experience in humans, must be missing. E.g. suppose the corresponding organization had been realized in a country, instead of in an organism: This country can certainly have no conscious experiences.
Invariance principle/Chalmers: it follows from this that, in the case of an identical biochemical organization, conscious experiences are possible in a system.


1. Ned Block 1978. Troubles with functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Block II
Ned Block
"On a confusion about a function of consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Qualia Stalnaker I 222
Qualia/functionalism/Stalnaker: functionalism will explain qualia with a relational structure. >Functionalism.
Problem: if we could have a permutation so that the relational general structure remained - then no functionalist theory could be right.
>Inverted spectra, >Permutation.
I 223
Vs: this can be disputed:the relations are more complex, for example, there are relations of colors among each other - that would mean denying symmetry. >Colour.
Inverted spectra/Stalnaker: bad solution: a bad solution would be to introduce additional characteristics, e.g. blue is cool - we only need the possibility of symmetry for some creatures.
>Symmetries.
Functionalism: functionalism identifies qualia intra-personnally through distinguishability.
Shoemaker: Shoemaker wants to reconcile interpersonal comparisons with qualia.
>Sydney Shoemaker.
Interpersonal/Wittgenstein: interpersonal arises from the possibility to change intra-personnally.
Bad solution/swapped spectra: It is not a good solution to introduce additional characteristics like red is hot, blue is cool etc.
>Metaphors.
Stalnaker: I follow Shoemaker and put aside such objections. We need only the possibility of symmetry for some creatures.
Qualia/Functionalism/Stalnaker: since functionalism identifies qualia intrapersonally via distinguishing capacities, one should expect it to accept the Frege/Schlick view, i.e., that there is no interpersonal counterpart to it.
>Moritz Schlick.
Shoemaker: That would be too simple. Thesis: Shoemaker wants to reconcile interpersonal comparisons of qualia with a functionalist approach.
While we cannot define certain qualitative states in functionalist terms, we can define classes of qualitative states.
Classes of qualitative states: We functionally define identity conditions for elements of this class, then we can define relations of phenomenal (qualitative) sameness and dissimilarity.
>Identity conditions.
Thus we obtain equivalence classes of physical states. Equivalent states will be those which are realizations of the same qualitative state. Then the qualitative states are identified with their physical realizations.
>Equivalence classes.
ShoemakerVsFrege/Stalnaker: the main reason he resists the Frege/Schlick view is...
I 224
...the view that one cannot deny the coherence of the hypothesis that there can be intrapersonally interchanged spectra. And he believes that from there there is an argument for interpersonal swapped spectra that cannot be resisted.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Quantum Mechanics Genz II 118
Quantum Mechanics/Genz: quantum mechanics denies the simultaneous possibility of these three principles:
1. location,
2. possibility of independent coincidences in separate areas and 3. induction.
II 235
Observation/principle/formula/equation/Genz: at the beginning of quantum mechanics there were two purely mathematical observations which could not be traced back to any principle: 1. Planck's formula for heat radiation and
2. the formula for the hydrogen spectrum.
Justification: justification consisted solely of delivering correct results.
Quantum Mechanics/principles/Genz:
1. principle of quantum mechanics: the first principle is entanglement. Thesis: nearly everything is interwoven with anything. Even more profoundly: there are no localizable quantum states.
II 236
Remote effect/QWM/message/information/Genz: due to the "remote effect" (from the interconnection) no messages can be transmitted. 2. Principle of quantum mechanics: no message can be transmitted instantaneously.
The two principles together are very close to a contradiction. It follows from this that both together are very powerful.
>Stronger/weaker.
Derivation/principle/Genz: so far, it has not been possible to derive quantum mechanics as the only possible realization of its two principles.
>Derivation,
>Derivability.
II 238
John Bell/quantum mechanics/Genz: John Bell has shown that quantum mechanics does not allow a choice of the frequencies that result in what is observed. The relative frequencies come out wrong. The predictions of quantum mechanics contradict what Bell derived from principles. Quantum mechanics, however, is the best confirmed theory that exists.
>Bell's inequation.
II 241
Effects/transmission/transfer of effects/energy/quantum mechanics/Genz: a special feature of the transfer of effects in quantum mechanics, through which no messages (information) can be transmitted, is that no energy is transmitted. >Information, >Energy.
II 245
Effect/non-locality/Genz: in quantum mechanics, effects (no messages) can be transmitted instantaneously.
II 246
Principles/quantum mechanics/Genz: quantum mechanics can be derived entirely from principles that contradict everyday experience. So far, we only know which principles cannot exist together.
II 286
Quantum Mechanics/classical physics/Genz: it is mainly the variables describing the states that are different: In quantum mechanics it is the: wave function
In classical physics it is: places and velocities.
This is not about deterministic or non-deterministic.
>Determinism, >Wave function.

Gz I
H. Genz
Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999

Gz II
Henning Genz
Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002

Questions Gadamer I 304
Question/Gadamer: The first thing that understanding begins with is (...) that something appeals to us. This is the highest of all hermeneutical conditions. We now know what is demanded by it: a fundamental suspension of one's own prejudices. All suspension of judgements, however, and therefore even more so that of prejudices, has, logically seen, the structure of the question. The essence of the question is the disclosure and keeping open of possibilities. If a >prejudice becomes questionable (...) this does not mean that it is simply set aside and the other is directly brought to the fore in its place.
GadamerVsHistorism/VsObjectivism: This is rather the naivety of historical >objectivism: to assume such a relinquishment of itself. In truth, one's own prejudice is actually brought into play by the fact that it is itself at stake. Only by playing itself off it is able to experience the other person's claim to truth at all and enables him or her to play him- or herself off. Cf. >Historism, >Understanding/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer.
Historism/Gadamer: The naivety of the so-called historism consists in the fact that it withdraws itself from such a reflection and forgets its own historicity in trusting in the methodology of its procedure.
I 368
Question/Gadamer: It is obvious that in all experience the structure of the question is presupposed. One does not experience without the activity of questioning. The realization that the thing is different and not as one first believed, obviously presupposes the passage through the question, whether it is the case or not. The openness that lies in the nature of experience is, logically speaking, precisely this openness of one way or another. It has the structure of the question. And just as the dialectical negativity of experience found its perfection in the idea of a completed experience, in which we are aware of our finiteness and limitedness as a whole, so the logical form of the question and the negativity inherent in it finds its completion in a radical negativity, the knowledge of not-knowing. It is the famous Socratic docta ignorantia that opens up the true superiority of questioning in the extreme negativity of aporia. Meaning: The essence of the question is that it has meaning. But meaning is a sense of direction. The sense of the question is therefore the direction in which the answer alone can take place if it wants to be a meaningful answer. The question puts the respondent in a certain respect. The emergence of a question, as it were, breaks up the being of the respondent. The logos that unfolds this broken being is in this respect always already the answer.
Socrates/Plato: One of the greatest insights that the Platonic Socrates account gives us is that asking questions is - quite contrary to the general opinion - more difficult than answering them.
I 369
In order to be able to ask, one must want to know, i.e., but know that one does not know. The openness of the questioned person consists in the fact that the answer is not fixed. Every question completes its meaning only when it passes through such limbo, when it becomes an open question. Every real question requires this openness. If it lacks the same, it is basically an illusionary question that has no real meaning. But the openness of the question is not a boundless one. Rather, it includes a certain boundary through the horizon of the question. A question that lacks the same question is void. It only becomes an emergent question when the fluid indeterminacy of the direction in which it points is placed in the specific of one way or another.
Wrong question: We call a question a wrong question that does not reach the open, but rather distorts the same by holding on to wrong premises. As a question, it feigns openness and decisiveness. But where the questionable is not - or not correctly - set off against the preconditions that are really fixed, there it is not really brought into the open and therefore nothing can be decided.
I 370
Crooked question: We do not call it wrong, but crooked, because there is a question behind it, i.e. an open question is meant - but it is not in the direction that the question has taken. The crookedness of a question consists in the fact that the question does not really follow a direction and therefore does not allow an answer. Similarly, we say of assertions that are not entirely wrong, but also not right, that they are crooked.
I 372
Idea: Every idea has the structure of the question. The idea of the question, however, is already a dive into the levelled width of the widespread opinion. (>Doxa/Plato). We also say of the question that it arises or poses itself - much rather than that we rise or ask it. Experience: We have already seen that the negativity of experience logically implies the question. In fact, it is the impulse that is represented by the one who does not fit into the pre-opinion through which we experience. Questioning is therefore also more a suffering than an action. The question suggests itself. It can no longer be evaded and we can no longer remain with the usual opinion. See >Question and Answer/Collingwood.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Racism Gould I 170
Racism/science/history/Gould: in the second half of the 19th century, the theory of phylogeny being repeated by ontogenesis was the best guide for biologists to divide living beings into higher and lower forms. According to this theory, the children repeated in the growth earlier developmental stages: embryos have gill slits, like a fish, later a three-chambered heart like a reptile, and later the tail of a mammal. > Recapitulation Theory. One variant of this thinking is Louis Agassiz' "triple parallelism", unity of paleontology, comparative anatomy, and embryology. They referred to actual precursors of primitive organisms. (1) ((s) Gould, however, does not call Agassiz at any point racist. He, on the other hand, describes him as an opponent of racial discrimination.)
In this context, the physician John Langdon-Down had (2) the idea of his misleading realization in 1866: some of the Caucasian idiots must represent a standstill in development. He also spoke of an "Ethiopian variant", "copies of white Negroes" or a "Malaysian variant".
I 169
Gould: this is an interesting episode in the history of scientific racism. For Down, the terms "mongoloid" and "idiot" were purely scientific. According to him there were three levels: 1. idiot: an "idiot" could never master the spoken language. 2. Imbecile: an "imbecile" could speak but not write. 3. Debile: there is a considerable scientific discussion on the "debile" or "moron" (Greek: foolish).(3) >Evolution, >Explanation.



1. L. Agassiz (1862). Contributions to the natural history of United States. Vol. 4. Boston.
2. J. H. L. Langdon-Down, Observations on an ethnic classification of idiots. In: Clinical Lecture Reports, London Hospital. 3, 1866, S. 259–62.)
3. Langdon-Down ibid.

Gould I
Stephen Jay Gould
The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980
German Edition:
Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009

Gould II
Stephen Jay Gould
Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983
German Edition:
Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991

Gould III
Stephen Jay Gould
Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996
German Edition:
Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004

Gould IV
Stephen Jay Gould
The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985
German Edition:
Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989

Radical Interpretation Avramides I 90
Radical interpretation/Davidson/Avramides: the redical intepretation is proceeding gradually, but from the beginning one needs assumptions about beliefs and about the meaning of utterances. >Propositional attitudes, >Utterance meaning.
I 93
Radical interpretation/asymmetry/Avramides: from the perspective of radical interpretation, there is no asymmetry between the psychological and the semantic side. >Terminology/Avramides.
I 93
Grice/Avramides: Grice is trying to understand meaning ((s) the concept of meaning). Radical interpretation: is trying to understand the speaker.
Grice was not interested in the realization of communication in the beginning.
>Communication.
I 96
Radical interpretation/Avramides: from this point of view there is an epistemic symmetry between the semantic and the psychological - unlike Grice's theory of meaning. Symmetry/asymmetry: >Terminology/Avramides.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Rational Choice Rawls I 411
Rational decision/Rawls: the relevant characteristics of a person's situation are identified by the principles of rational decision, most strongly by those that have a short-term impact. Principles of rational decision: 1. the principle of efficient means.
I 412
We choose those who achieve the goal in the best way, especially with the least effort. 2. Principle: the one of several possible plans is preferable, which allows for further goals in addition to the achievable goals(1).
>Planning/Rawls, >Principles/Rawls.
3. Principle of greater probability (likelihood): from two similar plans we should choose the one with the greater chance of realization.
I 413
These assumptions apply to short-term plans. What about long-term plans? It looks as if extremely long-term decisions, such as career choice for example, are culture-dependent. However, the fact that we all have to make such decisions is culturally independent. >Decisions, >Decision theory, >Cultural relativism.

1. See R. B. Perry General Theory of Value (New York, 1926), pp. 645-649.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Rationality Habermas III 25
Rationality/Habermas: has less to do with acquisition than with the use of knowledge. Knowledge can be criticized as unreliable.
III 26
This is where the ability to justify comes into play. For example, actions which the actor himself/herself considers to be hopeless cannot be justified. >Justification, >Reasons, >Contradictions, >Knowledge.
III 30
Rationality/Realism/Phenomenology/Habermas: two approaches differ in the way propositional knowledge is used: a) The "realistic" position is based on the ontological premise of the world as the epitome of what is the case, in order to clarify on this basis the conditions of rational behaviour. The realist can limit himself/herself to the conditions for objectives and their realization.
b) The "phenomenological" position reflects on the fact that the rational actors themselves must presuppose an objective world.
>Propositional knowledge.
III 31
It makes the ontological preconditions a problem and asks about the conditions under which the unity of an objective world is constituted for the members of a communication community. It must be regarded by the subjects as one and the same world in order to gain objectivity. >Lifeworld, >Rationality/Pollner.
III 33
The concept of cognitive-instrumental rationality, derived from the realistic approach, can be added to the broader phenomenological concept of rationality. There are relationships between the ability of decentral perception and manipulation of things and events on the one hand and the ability of intersubjective communication on the other. (See also Cooperation/Piaget), >Cooperation.
III 36
Action/Rationality/Habermas: Actors behave rationally as long as they use predicates in such a way that other members of their lifeworld would recognize their own reactions to similar situations under these descriptions. >Descriptions, >Predication, >Attribution, cf. >Score keeping.
III 44
Those who use their own symbolic means of expression dogmatically behave irrationally. Cf. >Language use.
IV 132
Rationality/Habermas: we can trace the conditions of rationality back to conditions for a communicatively achieved, justified consensus. Linguistic communication, which is designed for communication and does not merely serve to influence one another, fulfils the prerequisites for rational expressions or for the rationality of subjects capable of speaking and acting. The potential for rationalization (...) can be released (...) to the extent that the language fulfils functions of communication (and) coordination of action (...) and thus becomes a medium through which cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization take place. >Language/Habermas.

Rorty I I 92
RortyVsHabermas: his own attempt to put communicative reason in the place of "subject-centered reason", is in itself a step towards the replacement of the "what" by a "how". >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas,
>Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas,
>Communicative rationality/Habermas, >RortyVsHabermas.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Rawls Waldron Gaus I 93
Rawls/Waldron: When it was first published in 1971, John Rawls’s book A Theory of Justice seemed to present itself as a set of more or less universal claims: it was supposed to tell us what justice was and what it required in any society which faced what Rawls called ‘the circumstances of justice’ – moderate scarcity, mutual disinterest of individuals in one another’s ends, and so on (1971(1): 126). Under these circumstances, Rawls seemed to be implying, it was appropriate for people to use the idea of the ‘Original Position’ – decision behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ – as a way of figuring out appropriate principles of justice. And he argued that anyone selecting principles from that perspective would adopt strong principles of equal basic liberty, equal opportunity, and a social framework oriented to the well-being of members of the worst-off group. He seemed prepared to argue for these conclusions and defend them against rival conceptions (like Nozick, 1974)(2) as a conception which could command the support of anyone interested in the subject. Later development: Through the 1980s, however, Rawls began to offer a more modest characterization than he had in 1971: „(...) what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. (1980(3): 518–19)
>Society/Walzer, >Universalism/Rawls, >Individualism/Rawls, >Justice/Rawls.

1. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
2. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia Oxford: Blackwell.
3. Rawls, John (1980) ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’. Journal of Philosophy, 77 (9): 515–72.

Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Realism Millikan I 11
Realism/Millikan: I remain close to Aristotelian realism. Cf. >Nature/Aristotle.
I 13
Realism/Millikan: correctly understood, realism does not demand that the world has to be "properly divided". Identity/Millikan: Realism must be able to explain only objective identity (sameness). This is something other than a "preferred classification" of nature.
>Terminology/Millikan, >Identity/Millikan.
MillikanVsHolism: It is about understanding without holism and without the myth of what is given, how we test our apparent abilities, to recognize things, and our apparent meanings.
I 245
Classical Realism/Thinking/Millikan: for classical realism thinking was about a thing, to bring (thesis) this thing or its nature before the conscious mind. Plato/Aristotle/Husserl: the nature of the thing alone enters the mind.
Early Russell/Moore/Phenomenalism: the thing alone comes before the mind, (without a "nature").
Locke/Hume: Thesis: instead of the thing we have to do with a representation that embodies its nature by being a copy of it.
>Locke, >Hume.
Descartes/Whitehead: a way or aspect of the thing embodies its nature.
>Descartes.
Knowledge/Thinking/Realism/Millikan: so we know ipso facto what we think.
The following four things are not distinguished from classical realism:
1. it seems to you that you think of something
2. to really think
3. it seems to you that you know what you think
4. to really know what you think.

I 248
Realism/Thinking/judgment/nature/thing/existence/Millikan: a solution: if it is rather nature than the object that comes before the mind, then the accidental object is not necessary for nature, it does not have to exist. Then the realization that the object really exists, corresponds rather to a judgment than to contemplation about its nature. Existence: that the thing existed became something additional that was added.
Ontology/Millikan: Problem: that something "should exist in addition to its pre-existing nature".
Thinking/Classical Realism/Millikan: applying a term was then equated with judging that a thing exists. So thinking-of = Identify.
>Identifcation.
I 249
Identification/Realism/Millikan: identification takes place only in a moment and involves only one encounter with the object. Then this is a kind of aesthetic experience, in which the consciousness bathes in a dwelling of the thing. Why should that be good?

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Reality Leibniz Holz I 61
Reality/Leibniz: what is possible to think of is reasonable and could be, purely logical, possible as well. >Possibilty/Leibniz, >Existence/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz.
I 125
Perfection/existence/Leibniz: e.g. suppose A, B, C, D are equal, but D is incompatible with A and B, the others are all compatible with each other except D, then it follows that A, B, and C exist if D is excluded. This is the principle of composibility.
>Principles/Leibniz.
Reality/Leibniz: reality always has the highest degree of factual content (realization): "perfectio".
Best world/best of all possible worlds/Leibniz: that is the meaning of the thesis that we live in the best of the worlds: it is simply the realization of most possibilities, which results from the fact that all possibilities are realized which do not mutually prevent each other.
To this extent, this world is by no means accidently the same as it is.
Translating this into theology, it means that God has created the world neccessarily according to his own rationality because it is the optimization of the processes caused by this rationality.
>Possible world/Leibniz.
VoltaireVsLeibniz: "Candide". Vs "Best of the Worlds". Ironization of Leibnizian Theory.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz I
Hans Heinz Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994
Recognition Hegel Gadamer I 349
Recognition/Hegel/Gadamer: (...) the dialectical course of the "phenomenology of the spirit" [is] perhaps determined by nothing as decisively as by the problem of the recognition of the "you". To name but a few mile stones in this story: according to Hegel, one's own self-consciousness reaches the truth of one's self-consciousness only through fighting for recognition in the other. The direct relationship between man and woman is the natural recognition of mutual recognition (p. 325)(1). Furthermore, conscience is the spiritual element of recognition, and only through confession and forgiveness can mutual recognition, in which the spirit is absolute, be achieved. >I-Thou relationship, >Subject-Object problem, >Intersubjectivity,
>Subject/Hegel, >Self-consciousness/Hegel.
Gadamer: It cannot be denied that the interjections of Feuerbach and Kierkegaard are already thought out in these figures of the spirit described by Hegel.

1. A precise interpretation of the dialectics of recognition (Phänomenologie des Geistes IV, A. Selbständigkeit und Unselbständigkeit des Selbstbewusstseins. Herrschaft und Knechtschaft) I have meanwhile published in "Hegels Dialektik. Sechs hermeneutische Studien, Tübingen 1980 (Vol. 3 of the Ges. Werke), Chapter III.


Bubner I 184
Recognition/Hegel: in the middle between a life saturated with reality and a transparent method lies the "Idea of Recognition", which in its turn disintegrates in the "Idea of Truth" and the "Idea of the Good". Here, however, there is only the second step, instead of the usual three steps of Hegelian dialectic, because of the elementary subject/object relationship.
The subjective, theoretical concept of the good, in knowledge, is faced with the "Idea of the Good" in practical action.


Brocker I 793
Recognition/Hegel/HonnethVsHegel/Honneth: Hegel's criticism of Hobbes (see >Hobbes/Hegel, >Intersubjectivity/Hegel) lacks the final step: Hegel criticizes Hobbes' individualistic view of individuals struggling for scarce resources that neglects the simultaneous struggle for intersubjective recognition. Hegel, however, fails to take the decisive step: Hegel's claim to self-realization, which goes beyond the sphere of law, refers to the "moral relationship of the state"(1) as the place of its realization. But this step usually remains stuck in an external representation of the "institutional transformation of the law from an informal to a state-organized relationship (...)".(2)
Brocker I 794
HonnethVsHegel: his interpretation thus lacks the theoretical component of recognition. According to Honneth, the reason for this is Hegel's turn to questions of consciousness theory. Since his real philosophy in Jena, at the latest, Hegel's concept of the state has therefore followed the philosophical logic of consciousness, which increasingly comes to the fore in later writings. >State/Hegel.


1. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) S. 94
2. Ebenda S. 92f.

Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018



Höffe I 329
Recognition/Phenomenology/Hegel/Höffe: In competition with his or her peers, the human does not first depend on self-assertion, but already on the constitution of a self. Hegel expands the often merely social, legal, or state theoretical debate on three further topics:
a) confrontation of humans with themselves,
b) confrontation with nature
c) and the three dimensions belonging to the concept of work.
Höffe I 330
Self-consciousness: Self-consciousness appears at first as a simple striving for self-preservation, but encounters the competing striving of another (...) and, since one self-preservation contradicts the other, leads to a "fight to life and death. The core of this struggle for recognition consists in a "self-knowledge in the other".
a) personal: One recognizes oneself first and only in a second person.
b) apersonal: Self-knowledge is not achieved by social recognition alone. It also requires the examination of the pre- and extra-personal world, which is mediated through work, i.e. economic action.
Social Dimension/Höffe: Mutual recognition, which only succeeds after painful experiences, has an invaluable advantage as soon as it takes on a legal character. (...) the legal mutual recognition does not suffer from scarcity. The status of a legal entity and a citizen is not a scarce commodity; it can be granted to anyone.

1. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018

Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Reduction Lewis I (b) 31
Reduction/Lewis: weak reducing premise: Thesis: there is a theory of an n-tuple of traditional terms or theoretical terms that is realized by another theory - Strong reduction premise: there is a single n-tuple that is the only realization of theory T. - This implies a theoretical equation, but there are no stipulations, only deductive reasoning. Cf. >reductionism.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Reduction Schiffer I 158
Reduction/Schiffer: ... no more should be required than that theoretical terms are physically realized. >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities.
But realization does not imply reducibility.
Schiffer pro Brentano: in favour of irreducibility of the intentional vocabulary.
>Intentionality, >Intentions.
I 159
Eliminativism/Churchland: is quite different: intentional vocabulary is not reducible - but folk psychology (functional theory) will turn out to be wrong. >Folk psychology.
SchifferVsChurchland: why should irreducibility imply unrealizability?
>Patricia Churchland, >Paul Churchland.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Regulatory Economics Political Philosophy Mause I 378f
Regulatory Economics/Political Theory: Economically oriented political science is primarily interested in interventions that are not justified by dysfunctionalities, but it is about the realization of overarching social, i.e. public welfare-oriented goals. >Community welfare, >Markets, >Regulatory economics.
Mause I 379
Regulation/Regulatory Economics/Political theory: based on Theodore J. Lowi's distinction between four policy areas a) distributive, b) redistributive, c) regulative, c) constitutive policies (1), state regulation is discussed by these authors: competition law: (Windhoff-Héritier 1987, p. 40) (2), regulatory state: (Majone 1994) (3), regulatory governance: (Eckert 2011 (4); Levi-Faur 2007 (5) regulatory capitalism: (Braithwaite 2008; Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005) (6). >Politics/Lowi.

1. Theodore J. Lowi, 1972. Four systems of policy, politics, and choice. Public Administration Review 32 (4): 298– 310.
2. Windhoff-Héritier, Adrienne, Policy Analyse – Eine Einführung. Frankfurt/ New York 1987
3. Majone, Giandomenico. 1994. The rise of the regulatory state in Europe. West European Politics 17( 3): 77– 101.
4. Eckert, Sandra. 2011. European regulatory governance. In Handbook on the politics of regulation, Hrsg. David Levi-Faur, 513– 524. Cheltenham:
5. Levi-Faur, David, Regulatory governance. In Europeanization. New research agendas, Hrsg. Paolo Graziano und Maarten P. Vink, 102– 114. Basingstoke 2007.
6. Braithwaite, John, Regulatory capitalism. How it works, ideas for making it work better. Cheltenham 2008.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Reliability Theory Schiffer I 83
SchifferVsReliability: (as the key to representation, e.g. fuel gauge: there are false truth conditional functions possible: E-functions that do not ascribe situations but false words: E.g. "snow is white"/"Coal is white" (for mentalese). - Even under "optimal conditions". - Then it is uncertain whether the reliability has come about on the wrong way. >Fuel gauge example, >Mentalese/Language of thought.
I 83ff
Arthritis/reliability/mentalese/relation theory/SchifferVsFodor: ... + ... - Alfred thinks in his idiolect that he has arthritis in his thigh. Supposing there is a second function g that assigns a condition to arthrite that we connect with shmarthritis (rheumatic-like).
Then: you cannot determine if Alfred is more reliable according to f (attribution of truth conditions) or g (attribution of false words).
Condition (c): an M-function f is the truth conditional function for x' lingua mentis M iff the head-reliability and world-head reliability of x (thinking in M) with respect to f is greater than with respect to any other M-function. This is neither sufficient nor necessary.
We do not know by which attribution function the speaker proceeds.
Cf. >Quaddition.
I 87
Quaddition/reliability/relation theory/belief/Schiffer: if Ralph does not understand anything about mathematics: there is no difference between two attribution functions a) correct addition,
b) quaddition.
Because they provide the same values for manageable numbers - and are not discernible for inconceivably large numbers because they are incomprehensible.
>Reliability theory.
I 104
SchifferVsReliability Theory: the functional relation that is correlated by the reliability theory with "true of" has, as one of its realizations. >arthritis/"shmarthritis".
Solution: there must be an "designated role".
I 104
Reliability Theory/Schiffer: Solution: adequacy by disquotation schema. - The probability that an M-function f* exists is high, given that x s believes and f*(s) e.g. is about the stock market. ((s), i.e. we assume that the people usually believe and know something true what they are talking about.)
I 105
Hartry Field: if there is a functional theory for mentalese, then the reliability theory is indispensable.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Responsibility Nozick Singer I 220
Principles/Responsibility/Nozick/P. Singer: Nozick makes a sensible distinction between "historical" and "time slices" principles. (R. Nozick 1974)(1): Def historical principle/Nozick: in order to understand whether a given distribution of goods is fair or unfair, we have to ask how the distribution came about. We need to know its history.
Are the parties entitled to ownership as a result of originally justified acquisition?
Def time-slice principles/Nozick: consider only the current situations and do not ask about their realization.
>Time-slices, >Principles.

1. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York, 1974

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994


SingerP I
Peter Singer
Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011

SingerP II
P. Singer
The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015
Rules Searle III 42
Regulative rules/Searle: these rules regulate pre-existing activities. Constitutive rules: constitutive rules create the possibility of activities, e.g. chess rules.
III 39
Constitutive rules/Searle: are there any constitutive rules for cocktail parties and wars? What makes something a constitutive rule?
III 54
Constitutive rules/Searle: X counts as Y in K: e.g. X (piece of wood) counts as Y (chair) in the convention (context) K, after which sitting on it has become established. The term Y must assign a new status to the object, which it does not already have because it suffices for the term X. The object must be assigned a new status by the term Y.
III 55
The physical properties alone are not enough. The formula "X counts in Y as K" is needed. This formula can become a constitutive rule.
V 59
Def semantic structure: a language can be understood as a convention-based realization of a series of groups of underlying constitutive rules.
V 64
Rules/Searle: rules represent obligations. Unequal conventions play a role in the context of translation. Convention/translation/Searle: saying "je promets" in French and "I promise" in English is a convention.
Rules/Searle: the things specified by rules are not natural products. Pain can be created without rules.

I 217
Searle: the rules do not interpret themselves, they really need a background to work. Background: is not a rule system.
>Terminology/Searle.
I 269
Rules: people drive right because they follow a rule, but they do not drive for that reason alone. You also do not speak just because you want to follow the rules of language. These rules are often practically inaccessible to consciousness, although they have to be, in principle, if they really exist.

IV 252
Rules/Searle: example promise: Rule I: "I promise to perform the action" may only be spoken if the listener would prefer the action to be performed.
Rule II: may only be pronounced if it is not clear from the outset that the action will be performed anyway.
Rule III: the speaker must have the intention to.
Rule IV: with the statement, the obligation to perform the act is deemed to have been accepted.

VsSearle: the concept of a semantic rule ("rules of language") has so far proven to be so recalcitrant that some have concluded that there are no such rules at all.
>Speech act theory/Searle.
IV 253
Semantic rules/language rules/Searle: semantic rules or language rules are rules for linguistic action on closer inspection. >Semantic rules, cf. >Meaning postulates.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Science Husserl I 112
Science/Husserl: science transforms the open horizon into an idealized form. The idea of a perfect representation in absolute generality leads to the idea of the ideal realization of the thing in the ideal possible experience. >Idealization, >Horizon/Husserl, >Generalization.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991
II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992
Self-Realization
Self-Realization Hobhouse Gaus I 415
Self-realization/Hobhouse/Weinstein: New liberals joined Bosanquet in combining a moralized theory of freedom and strong rights with a communitarian social ontology. >Liberty/Bosanquet. For Green, Ritchie, Hobhouse and Hobson, moral self-realization was unconditionally good. Realizing oneself morally meant being fully free by being both 'out- ward[ly]' and 'inward[ly]' free (Green, 1986(1): 234—5). It meant having the enabling 'positive power or capacity of doing ... something worth doing' and actually 'doing ... something worth doing' (1986(1): 199).
Self-realization/Hobhouse: As Hobhouse put it, self-realization consists in 'social' as well as 'moral'
freedom. Whereas the former concerns external harmony between citizens or 'freedom of man in society', the latter is 'proportionate to the [self'sl] internal harmony' (Hobhouse, 1949(2): 51, 57).*
Self-realization/liberalism: For new liberals as well, rights indirectly promoted everyone's self-realization by enabling each to flourish. And to the extent that each flourished morally, each, in turn, promoted common good by respecting the rights of others. Thus, for Hobhouse, common good was 'the foundation of all personal rights' (1968(3): 198).
In Green's words, rights realize our moral capacity negatively by 'securing the treatment of one man by another as equally free with himself, but they do not realise positively, because their possession does not imply that the individual makes a common good his own' (1986(1): 26).
New Liberalism: However, new liberals favoured a more robust threshold of equalizing opportunity rights. Although they concurred with Bosanquet that possessing property was a potent means of 'self-utterance' and therefore crucial to successfully externalizing and realizing ourselves, they also stipulated that private property was legitimate only in so far as it did not
Gaus I 416
subvert equal opportunity. Hobson: In Hobson's words, 'A man is not really free for purposes of self-development who is not adequately provided' with equal and easy access to land, a home, capital and credit. Hobson concludes that although liberalism is not state socialism, it nevertheless implies considerably 'increased public ownership and control of industry' (1974(4): xii).ll New liberals, then, transformed English liberalism by making social welfare, and the state's role in promoting it, pivotal. They crafted welfare liberalism into a sophisticated theoretical alternative.**

* Also see Ritchie (1895(5): 430). Ritchie's new liberalism eclectically blends utilitarianism, neo-Hegelianism and Darwinism. >Individualism/Ritchie.

** Idealists, like Jones and >Collingwood, similarly favoured vigorously expanding equal opportunities through government.

1. Green, T. H. (1986 [1895]) Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Essays, eds Paul Harris and John Morrow. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 194-212.
2. Hobhouse, L. T. (1949 [1922]) The Elements of Social Justice. London: Allen and Unwin.
3. Hobhouse, L. T. (1968 [1911]) Social Evolution and Political Thought. Port Washington: Kennikat.
4. Hobson, J. A. (1974 [1909]) The Crisis of Liberalism. Brighton: Barnes and Noble.
5. Ritchie, D. G. (1895) 'Free-will and responsibility'. International Journal of Ethics, 5: 409-31.

Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Self-Respect Honneth Brocker I 797
Def Self-Respect/Honneth: the ability to understand oneself as a person "who shares with all other members of his/her community the qualities that enable them to participate in a discursive formation of will". (1) See Recognition/Honneth, Socialisation/Honneth.
Brocker I 798
Self-respect/Honneth: the demand for self-realization refers to the sphere of social esteem or solidarity, in which the development of "self-respect", i.e. a positive relationship of individuals with their
Brocker I 799
"character" traits and abilities, as far as they differ from those of other individuals. (2) Like the sphere of law (see Law/Honneth), the sphere of recognition also depends on historical prerequisites. Only under the conditions of modern societies does the claim to social esteem detach itself from traditional notions of "honour", in which it was still associated with legal privileges and enshrined in the status of an entire state, i.e. collectively. (3) Only then can solidarity be constituted as an independent sphere of recognition and be combined with the claim to individual self-realization. See Individuation/Honneth.

1. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 195
2. Ibid. p. 180-184
3. Ibid. p. 199f
Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Honn I
A. Honneth
Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010

Honn II
Axel Honneth
Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Sequences Lyons I 78
Def sequential/Linguistics/Lyons: means a fixed order of words. This is not syntagmatic! Syntagmatically compatible words can be in variable order, e.g. Latin. General:
Logical form: Differentiation between syntagmatic/sequential (or non-sequential):
Suppose there are two groups of units, X and Y,

X = {a, b}, Y = {p, q}

Italic/spelling : a realizes a, etc.
X, Y: are variable quantities that stand for the realization of the units, Suppose these substantial units cannot occur simultaneously (they can be consonants or vowels), but are arranged sequentially among themselves. Then there are three relevant options
(I): linear order fixed: Example X must occur before Y. I.e. ab, aq, bp, bq are possible, but not pa, qa, pb and qb.
(II): "free": "free" in so far as XY and YX can occur, but XY = YX! ((s), i.e. the sequence is irrelevant. This is different than when it makes a difference, but both forms are allowed). (i.e. non-sequential, but syntagmatic).
(III): fixed or free in another sense: it does not matter, because XY is not equal to YX.
I 80
(= sequential-syntagmatic).

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977

Lyons I
John Lyons
Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Signs Quine V 160
Sign/Interpretation/Quine: must not simply be reinterpreted, otherwise each string can have any meaning - N.B.: but terms can very well be reinterpreted. ((s) not signs). >Interpretation, >Meaning.

VII (c) 53
Meaning/Sign/Quine: it is unsatisfactory to say that a significant sequence is simply a series of phonemes that are uttered by a speaker of a chosen population. We do not only want the expressed sequences, but also those that may yet be expressed.
IV 396
Sign/Locke: ...but for two reasons we also need signs, which in turn stand for ideas: for the exchange of our thoughts and for their recording. These are the words. Behind them stand the ideas, as it were, as guarantors of meaning. Without them, words would merely be sounds. Words: are representatives of ideas.
IV 397
QuineVsLocke: one should stick to what is true for everyone when openly observed. Language is also not something private, but something social.
IV 398
Language: is a social skill acquired through the observation of social use. The externalisation of empiricism leads to a behavioural approach to meaning. (Behaviorism).

V 165
Infinite/Name/Signs/Quine: Problem: which signs should we use when we need infinitely many as insertions for the number variables? One cannot say that every sign is a physical object, because then they run out soon. Wrong solution: to say that these signs are forms (as classes of inscriptions). Because these are again physical realizations of forms and there is not enough of them.
Form/Quine: (to denote infinitely many natural numbers) here also not in the sense of analytical geometry, so that a form would become a class of classes of pairs of real numbers, because it does not help to explain the numbers by means of number signs, which are themselves explained by means of real numbers.
>Infinity, >Numbers, >Denotation.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Skepticism Davidson I (d) 67
Skepticism/Davidson: As a minimum assumption one can assume that we are at least right with regard to our own person. Such a realization, however, is logically independent of what we believe about the world outside. So it cannot provide a foundation for the science and beliefs of the healthy human understanding. >Beliefs/Davidson.
Rorty VI 166
Skepticism: the skeptic says: from the fact that we must think of the world in a certain way does not follow that it is indeed so. He encounters all claims with the question "How do you know that?" DavidsonVsSkepticism: that can be pathologized and omitted (like FregeVsSkepticism): the skeptic is not curable, because even in his/her next utterance he/she cannot assume that his/her words still mean the same as before.
Skeptics: Why should not necessary assumptions be objectively wrong? It is common to all skeptical arguments that the skeptic understands the truth as a relation of correspondence between the world and belief, knowing that this can never be verified.
DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: The "problem of the outside world" and the "other minds" rests on a false distinction between the "phenomenological content of experience" (tradition) and the intentional states that one attributes to a person on the basis of their causal interactions with the environment. >Other minds.

Davidson I (c) 53/4
"Everything different"/Skepticism/Stroud: it could be that everything is different than we imagine it to be - Quine: that would be a distinction without differentiation: since the observation sentences are holophrastically conditioned for stimuli, the relationships to the evidence remain unchanged - Preserve the structure and you will preserve everything. ((s) Then yesterday everything was already different.)
I (e) 94
Causal theory of meaning/VsDescartes: in basic cases, words act necessarily from the kinds of objects causing them. Then there is no room for Cartesian doubt.
I (e) 95
DavidsonVsSkepticism: cannot be formulated because the senses do not play a role in the explanation of believing, meaning (to mean) and knowledge - as far as the content of the causal relations between the propositional attitudes and the world is independent. Of course, senses play a causal role in knowledge and language learning. >Language acquisition, >Cognition.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Skepticism Nagel I 19
Subjectivism/Skepticism: says that there is no ability of such universal applicability and validity within us tp verify and substantiate our judgments.
I 22ff
Skepticism/Relativism: Reason cannot be criticized without using reason at any other point to formulate this criticism. >Reason, >Circular reasoning.
I 31
Skepticism: a skepticism generated by reasoning can not be total. >Justification.
I 31 ff
Skepticism: in order to criticize it, one should not understand it as a widely applicable trivial empty phrase, but as something concrete, in order to turn the tables. This allows the conflict betw the inner content of the thoughts and the relativizing external view to be openly recognized. >Perspective, >Propositional content, >Thoughts, >Content.
Subjectivism aims at a phenomenological reduction of thought to get out of them. This cannot succeed. Attempts to relativize the objectivity of a conceptual scheme fail for the same reason.
E.g. I cannot say "I believe that p, but this is merely a psychological fact that affects me. As for the truth, I do not settle".
I 89
NagelVsDescartes: demon: the idea of ​​confused thoughts also contains the disentangled ones.
I 92
NagelVsSkepticism: may not use arguments at all - a false calculation cannot be made right by saying that a demon had confused it.
I 94
Logical skepticism/NagelVsSkepticism/Nagel: we can never reach a point where there are two possibilities that are compatible with all evidence. I cannot imagine that I am in a similar realization situation where 2 + 2 = 5, but my brain would be confused, because I could not imagine that 2 + 2 = 5. The logical skeptic offers no level of reason. - There is no point that allows reviewing the logic without presupposing it. - Not everything can be revised. - Something has to be maintained in order to check that the revision is justified.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982

Social Movements Habermas Gaus I 271
Social movements/Habermas/West: (...) the expansion of state and capitalist systems increasingly organizes human life according to the instrumental logic of money and power, overwhelming any possibility of communicatively achieved consensus and reducing the lifeworld to a lifeless shell. New social movements [NSMs] are understood in these terms as an embryonic counterattack from the life- world against the colonizing force of instrumentally rationalized systems (Habermas, 1981(1); 1987(2): 391—6).
Lifeworld: The new conflicts are displaced from economic and state systems to the lifeworld or, more precisely, the 'seam' between system and lifeworld: 'the new conflicts arise in areas of cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization the new conflicts are not sparked by problems of distribution, but concern the grammar of forms of life'. NSMs respond to the disruption and 'colonization' of the lifeworld in either 'defensive' or 'offensive' ways according to whether it is a question of 'how to defend or reinstate endangered life styles, or how
to put reformed life styles into practice' (1981(1): 32).
Feminism: However, the women's movement is‘the only movement that follows the tradition of bourgeois-socialist liberation movements. The struggle against patriarchal oppression and for the realization of a promise that is deeply rooted in the acknowledged universalist foundations of morality and legality lends feminism the impetus of an offensive movement, whereas all other movements are more defensive in character. (1981(1): 34)
Enviroment/peace: Environmental and peace movements - usual paradigms of new social movements - represent a more 'defensive' reaction, albeit one 'which already operates on the basis of a rationalized lifeworld and tries out new forms of co-operation and community' (1981(1): 35). Cf. >Postindustrial Society/Touraine.


1. Habermas, Jürgen (1981) 'New social movements'. Telos, 49: 33_7.
2. Habermas, Jürgen (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. Il, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, trans. T. McCarthy. Cambridge: Polity.


West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Software Agents Minsky I 169
Software-agents/exploitation/Minsky: How could any specialist cooperate when it doesn't understand how the others work? We manage to do our worldly work despite that same predicament; we deal with people and machines without knowing how their insides work. It's just the same inside the head; each part of the mind exploits the rest, not knowing how the other parts work but only what they seem to do. Suppose [an agent called] Thirst knows that water can be found in cups — but does not know how to find or reach for a cup; these are things only [agents called] Find and Get can do. Then Thirst must have some way to exploit the abilities of those other agents.
Problem: most of [the] subagents cannot communicate directly with one another. >Society of Minds/Minsky.
No higher-level agency could ever achieve a complex goal if it had to be concerned with every small detail of what each nerve and muscle does. Unless most of its work were done by other agencies, no part of a society could do anything significant.
I 200
Software-Agents/Minsky: What happens when a single agent sends messages to several different agencies? In many cases, such a message will have a different effect on each of those other agencies. Polyneme: (…) I'll call such an agent a polyneme. For example, your word-agent for the word apple must be a polyneme because it sets your agencies for color, shape, and size into unrelated states that represent the independent properties of being red, round, and apple-sized. But how could the same message come to have such diverse effects on so many agencies, with each effect so specifically appropriate to the idea of apple? There is only one explanation: Each of those other agencies must already have learned its own response to that same signal. Because polynemes, like politicians, mean different things to different listeners, each listener must learn its own, different way to react to that message.
I 201
To understand a polyneme, each agency must learn its own specific and appropriate response. Each agency must have its private dictionary or memory bank to tell it how to respond to every polyneme. >Frames/Minsky, >Terminology/Minsky.
Realization/recognizers: When we see an apple, how do we know it as an apple? We can use AND-agents to do many kinds of recognition, but the idea also has serious limitations.
I 202
Relevance: There are important variations on the theme of weighing evidence. Our first idea was just to count the bits of evidence in favor of an object's being a chair. Problem: But not all bits of evidence are equally valuable, so we can improve our scheme by giving different weights to different kinds of evidence.
Solution:
Evidence/Rosenblatt: In 1959, Frank Rosenblatt invented an ingenious evidence-weighing machine called a Perceptron. It was equipped with a procedure that automatically learned which weights to use from being told by a teacher which of the distinctions it made were unacceptable.
Problem: MinskyVsRosenblatt/PapertVsRosenblatt: in the book Perceptrons, Seymour Papert and I proved mathematically that no feature-weighing machine can distinguish between the two kinds of patterns [one with connected, the other with disconnected lines]. ((s) > http://aurellem.org/society-of-mind/som-19.7.html, 27.04.2020).
I 203
Relevance: If we changed the values of those evidence weights, this would produce new recognizer-agents. For example, with a negative weight for back, the new agent would reject chairs but would accept benches, stools, or tables. >Neural Networks, >Frame Theories, >Artificial Neural Networks.

Minsky I
Marvin Minsky
The Society of Mind New York 1985

Minsky II
Marvin Minsky
Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003

Space Flusser I 121
Room/Picture/Flusser: Relations in the picture: relation of the type "top"/"bottom" are absolute relations, they also mean "sublime" and "correct".
If you relativize them and say "above" and "to the right of", the information contained in the image is lost.
The sun in Fig. I 114 is not above the dog, but at the top of the picture! And since it is there, it is "higher", "more sublime", "more glorious", etc. than the dog. Sun and dog stand in an absolute relationship, preformed by the picture, they are each in their "right place".
The circling time arranges the elements in the picture "justly", "correctly", i.e. in sublime and infamous, correct and awkwardly ruling and subjugated places of the picture. In the picture H O H, the O occupies a central, dominant position. This is no longer noticeable in the equation 2H+O=H2O.
>Images, >Coding.
I 217
Space/Flusser: Spatial experience: The image of the experience of time must be spatial. For techno-imagination it is impossible to imagine time without space and vice versa. >Techno-image/Flusser, >Terminology/Flusser.
I 218
An object is closer the more it touches me. This scale does not have to be less accurate than the conventional linear scale. >Perspective.
I 219
However, there must be new ways of measuring that are already indicated. e.g. the so called "proxemics": since all scales start with me, they cannot be infinite, they have to enter all "notches" from "here" to "future". >Measurements, >Future, >Time.
I 220
Since all standards apply only to my "interest in the world ", they can no longer separate space and time. They cannot be "four-dimensional", because this is a conceptual abstraction of images. >Interest, >Society, >Community.
I can transcend the world's limitations regarding "here now" by involving other people.
It is not space travel and nuclear research that broaden the world of technology imagined, but rather commitment to others and the expansion of interests.
>Image/Flusser.

I 221
When space becomes measurable through interest, it becomes "ethical" again, as in the magical level of consciousness. Proximity becomes "sublime", the fly in my vicinity is more annoying than Chinese-Russian border disputes. But: the realization of the technical image world (techno image, >Image/Flusser)) view is the end of humanism and appalling: In such a context, the phrase "love thy neighbour" means closeness and not closeness to people.
>Humanism.

Fl I
V. Flusser
Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996

Stages of Development Levinson Upton I 145
Stages of development/Levinson/Upton: According to Levinson (1986(1). 1996(2)), the lifespan can be divided into four seasons: pre-adulthood, early adulthood, middle adulthood and late adulthood- Each season or era lasts 20-25 years and has a distinct character. Thus, the transition between eras requires a basic change in the character of a person’s life. This transition may take between three and six years to complete. Within the broad eras are periods of development, each of which is characterized by a set of tasks.
(…) in the early adult transition period the two primary tasks are to move out of the pre-adult world and to make a preliminary step into the adult world. A major theme throughout the various periods is the existence of ‘the dream’ - a vision of life’s goals. Levinson proposed that adults go through a repeated process of building a life structure, then assessing and altering it during transition periods.
Levinson Thesis: the transition from ages 40-45 is an especially significant time of life - a time of midlife crisis when a person questions his or her entire life structure, raising unsettling questions about where they have been and where they are heading. Levinson based his theory on a series of in-depth interviews and characterized 80 per cent of the men he studied as experiencing intense inner struggles and disturbing realizations in their early forties.
Women: women, however, experience significant crisis during the transition at age 30, as well as in the transition to middle age. >Stages of development/Erikson, >Method/Levinson, >Midlife Crisis/Levinson.
Upton I 147
Levinson thesis: according to Levinson, an individual’s life structure is shaped by the social and physical environment. Many individuals’ life structures primarily involve family and work, although other variables such as religion, race and economic status may also be important.

1. Levinson, DJ (1986) The Seasons of a Man’s Life. New York: Alfred Knopf.
2. Levinson, DJ (1996) The Seasons of a Woman’s Life. New York Alfred Knopf.


Upton I
Penney Upton
Developmental Psychology 2011
State (Polity) Hegel Mause I 47
State/society/Hegel: Hegel reconstructs the relationship between the social order of the market and the political order of the constitutional-monarchical state within the framework of a theory of modern "morality" (1), which he describes on the basis of the three institutionalized spheres of socialization and action of "family", "bourgeois society" and "state"(2).
I 48
Bourgeois society/Hegel: Hegel describes this as the "state of need and understanding"(3), which he distinguishes from the "state" as the "reality of the moral idea"(4), that is, from the "state" of the third section of morality.(5) HegelVsRousseau: Hegel reconstructs the monarchical-constitutional state as a supraindividual moral communication and meaning context and thus reconstructs the Republican primacy of politics over the economy.
MarxVsHegel, State/Marx.


Brocker I 794
State/Hegel/HonnethVsHegel/Honneth: instead of understanding the moral sphere of the state as an intersubjective relationship of reciprocal acts of recognition, Hegel treats the state in his later writings as if it were always an existing entity before all interaction. >Intersubjectivity/Hegel.
Consequently, it is only the vertically conceived relationships that the individuals maintain "to the higher authority of the state" as "the embodiment of the mental", "which in its approach suddenly assume the role that certain, highly demanding forms of mutual recognition should have played in a concept of moral recognition theory".(6)
Solution/HonnethVsHegel: this results in the task of replacing Hegel's speculative categories with concepts of empirical science and thus making them
Brocker I 795
"empirically controllable". (7)
1. G. W. F. Hegel Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Werke 7, Hrsg. Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, p. 292.
2. Ibid. p. 307.
3. Ibid. p. 340
4. Ibid. p. 389
5. Cf. K. Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, Hamburg 1986, S 261-264. 6. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 98
7. Ibid. p. 150
Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


Höffe I 331
State/Hegel/Höffe: Hegel develops his system of political thought, the philosophy of law and state, against the background of his now expanded philosophical system(1). HegelVsKant: Against the - allegedly threatening in Kant - the danger of a purely through thought
Höffe I 332
conceived construction of normative claims, the subject area of the philosophy of law and state is considerably expanded. Instead of being content with a normative theory, an a priori theory of law and justice, Hegel also focuses on motivational, social, and above all institutional factors (...). Philosophical Philosophy of Law/Hegel: "(...) the idea of the law, (...) the concept of the law and its realization becomes the object"(2).
State: (...) [is the] "moral universe," [which] is to be understood as something reasonable.
Freedom: The guiding principle in legal and state theory is free will. From it Hegel wants to show how, under the condition of modernity, an epoch of alienation, he gradually attains his full, alienation-absorbing reality.
>Freedom/Hegel, >Morals/Hegel, >Customs/Morality/Hegel.
Höffe I 336
The culmination of morality, its synthesis, at the same time the summit of Hegel's entire philosophy of law, is the state as a "mediated by itself", which is now far more than just a state of necessity and understanding. As a community in the literal sense it is the public institution responsible for the common good, the "reality of the moral idea". Because in it freedom attains its perfect form, it is not "something arbitrary" but "supreme duty," i.e. again a categorical imperative, for man to be a member of a State. [This is a] modern, namely no longer eudaimony-based, but freedom-based way (...).
Only in the living together of free and equal people can [the human] complete both his/her rational nature and his/her nature based on right and justice.
>Society/Hegel.
Höffe I 337
From abstract law to morality, the "idea of free will in and for itself" finally develops into the unity and truth of both moments. In it, in morality, Hegel in turn advances from the natural spirit, the "family," through the stage of separation, the "bourgeois society," to objective freedom, the "State. Within the section "the State," however, there is surprisingly, instead of a further stage, now a regression. For the opposition to free will, the full legal relations and the moral whole, is achieved already at the first stage, the "internal constitutional law". On the second stage, however, the "external constitutional law," the moral whole is exposed to chance. And the last stage is determined ambivalently with respect to free will.

1. G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820
2. Ibid. § 1


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018

Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018

Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Structuralism Foucault II 9ff
Structuralism/Foucault: that certain problems can be found elsewhere, for example ethnology, linguistics, economics, can be called structuralism. But they have not been imported from one area to the other, but have their origin in the field of history itself. Old view: the subject had a donor function. Their correlative: the continuous history as a guarantee that everything that has escaped the subject can be restored to it. Time is understood as totalization, and the revolutions are always only ideational realizations.
What is now mourned is not so much the disappearance of history but its form. One even realizes that Marx or Nietzsche do not guarantee the security of what was entrusted to them.
FoucaultVsAnthropologism: it is not about idealtypes, worldviews, cultural totals, epochs, which are respectively related to humans. (II 28).
II 9ff
Archeology/Foucault: this book does not ask for the structure, but rather for the field in which the questions of human being, the consciousness, the origin and the subject manifest, cross and specify themselves. But no doubt one would not be wrong to say that the problem of structure also arises here. >Archeology/Foucault.
II 283f
Structuralism/Foucault: I did not want to lead the undertaking beyond its legitimate boundaries. In "the order of things" I have not used the term structure a single time. Structuralism: Thought image: our play of displacement and underestimation turns obliquely to all those forms of structuralism, which must be tolerated.

Foucault I
M. Foucault
Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970
German Edition:
Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994

Foucault II
Michel Foucault
l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969
German Edition:
Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981

Superintelligence Tallinn Brockman I 97
Superintelligence/Tallinn: Thesis: the central point of the AI risk is that superintelligent AI is an environmental risk. (…) the universe was not made for us; instead, we are fine-tuned by evolution to a very narrow range of environmental parameters. Any disturbance, even temporary, of this precarious equilibrium and we die in a matter of minutes. Silicon-based intelligence does not share such concerns about the environment. That’s why it’s much cheaper to explore space using machine probes rather than “cans of meat.” Moreover, Earth’s current environment is almost certainly suboptimal for what a superintelligent AI will greatly care about: efficient computation. Hence, we might find our planet suddenly going from anthropogenic global warming to machinogenic global cooling.
One big challenge that AI safety research needs to deal with is how to constrain a potentially superintelligent AI - an AI with a much larger footprint than our own - from rendering our environment uninhabitable for biological life-forms. It’s hard to overemphasize how tiny and parochial the future of our planet is, compared with the full potential of humanity. On astronomical timescales, our planet will be gone soon (unless we tame the sun, also a distinct possibility) and almost all the resources - atoms and free energy - to sustain civilization in the long run are in deep space.
>Artificial Intelligence, >Artificial General Intelligence, >Strong Artificial Intelligence.
“Pareto-topia”/Eric Drexler: the idea that AI, if done right, can bring about a future in which everyone’s lives are hugely improved, a future where there are no losers. A key realization here is that what chiefly prevents humanity from achieving its full potential might be our instinctive sense that we’re in a zero-sum game—a game in which players are supposed to eke out small wins at the expense of others. ((s) No source indicated for “pareto-topia”; cf. (1)).

1. https://www.effectivealtruism.org/articles/ea-global-2018-paretotopian-goal-alignment/

Tallinn, J. “Dissident Messages” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.


Brockman I
John Brockman
Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019
Supervised Learning AI Research Norvig I 694
Supervised Learning/AI Research/Norvig/Russell: In unsupervised learning the agent learns patterns in the input even though no explicit feedback is supplied. The most common unsupervised learning task is clustering: detecting
Norvig I 695
potentially useful clusters of input examples. Def Supervised learning: In supervised learning the agent observes some example input–output pairs and learns a function that maps from input to output.
In semi-supervised learning we are given a few labeled examples and must make what we can of a large collection of unlabeled examples. Even the labels themselves may not be the oracular truths that we hope for. Imagine that you are trying to build a system to guess a person’s age from a photo. You gather some labeled examples by snapping pictures of people and asking their age. That’s supervised learning. But in reality some of the people lied about their age. It’s not just that there is random noise in the data; rather the inaccuracies are systematic, and to uncover them is an unsupervised learning problem involving images, self-reported ages, and true (unknown) ages. Thus, both noise and lack of labels create a continuum between supervised and unsupervised learning.

The task of supervised learning is this:
Given a training set of N example input–output pairs
(x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . (xN, yN) ,
where each yj was generated by an unknown function y = f(x),
discover a function h that approximates the true function f.

Norvig I 696
Classification: When the output y is one of a finite set of values (such as sunny, cloudy or rainy), the learning problem is called classification, and is called Boolean or binary classification if there are only two values. Regression: When y is a number (such as tomorrow’s temperature), the learning problem is called regression.
Hypotheses: In general, there is a tradeoff between complex hypotheses that fit the training data well and simpler hypotheses that may generalize better. >Representation/Norvig, >Knowledge/AI Research, >Learning/AI Research.
Norvig I 697
Realization: We say that a learning problem is realizable if the hypothesis space contains the true function. Unfortunately, we cannot always tell whether a given learning problem is realizable, because the true function is not known. There is a tradeoff between the expressiveness of a hypothesis space and the complexity of finding a good hypothesis within that space.
Norvig I 759
History: Cross-validation was first introduced by Larson (1931)(1), and in a form close to what we show by Stone (1974)(2) and Golub et al. (1979)(3). The regularization procedure is due to Tikhonov (1963)(4). Guyon and Elisseeff (2003)(5) introduce a journal issue devoted to the problem of feature selection. Banko and Brill (2001)(6) and Halevy et al. (2009)(7) discuss the advantages of using large amounts of data. It was Robert Mercer, a speech researcher who said in 1985 “There is no data like more data.” (Lyman and Varian, 2003)(8)o estimate that about 5 exabytes (5 × 1018 bytes) of data was produced in 2002, and that the rate of production is doubling every 3 years. Theoretical analysis of learning algorithms began with the work of Gold (1967)(9) on identification in the limit. This approach was motivated in part by models of scientific discovery from the philosophy of science (Popper, 1962)(10), but has been applied mainly to the problem of learning grammars from example sentences (Osherson et al., 1986)(11).

1. Larson, S. C. (1931). The shrinkage of the coefficient of multiple correlation. J. Educational Psychology, 22, 45–-55.
2. Stone, M. (1974). Cross-validatory choice and assessment of statostical predictions. J. Royal Statistical Society, 36 (111-133).
3. Golub, G., Heath, M., and Wahba, G. (1979). Generalized cross-validation as a method for choosing a good ridge parameter. Technometrics, 21 (2).
4. Tikhonov, A. N. (1963). Solution of incorrectly formulated problems and the regularization method.
Soviet Math. Dokl., 5, 1035-1038.
5. Guyon, I. and Elisseeff, A. (2003). An introduction to variable and feature selection. JMLR, pp. 1157-
1182.
6. Banko, M. and Brill, E. (2001). Scaling to very very large corpora for natural language disambiguation. In ACL-01, pp. 26-33. 7. Halevy, A., Norvig, P., and Pereira, F. (2009). The unreasonable effectiveness of data. IEEE Intelligent
Systems, March/April, 8-12.
8. Lyman, P. and Varian, H. R. (2003). How much information? www.sims.berkeley. edu/how-much-info-2003.
9. Gold, E. M. (1967). Language identification in the limit. Information and Control, 10, 447-474.
10. Popper, K. R. (1962). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Basic Books.
11. Osherson, D. N., Stob, M., and Weinstein, S. (1986). Systems That Learn: An Introduction to
Learning Theory for Cognitive and Computer Scientists. MIT Press.


Norvig I
Peter Norvig
Stuart J. Russell
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Synonymy Habermas IV 28
Synonymy/Habermas: an identical meaning (no longer just a coincident meaning) exists when ego knows how alter should react to a significant gesture. It is not enough to expect that alter will react in a certain way. >Understanding, >Agreement, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas,
>Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas,
>Communicative rationality/Habermas
This is achieved in the different development stages of the interaction:
a) First, the interaction participants learn to internalize an excerpt from the objective sense structure to such an extent that both can combine identical interpretations with the same gesture.
b) Then they learn what it means to use a gesture with communicative intent and to enter into a reciprocal speaker/listener relationship.
c) Thirdly, the attribution of an identical and no longer only congruent meaning of gestures is added.
IV 32
Meaning Identity/Habermas: this cannot mean the same thing as the identity of an object that can be identified under different descriptions. This already requires an understanding of singular terms. >Description dependency.
In contrast to this:
Symbolic meanings constitute or create identity in a similar way to rules that create unity in the diversity of its exemplary embodiments, its various realizations or fulfilments. Meaning identity is explained by conventional regulation. >Symbols/Habermas.
IV 33
Equality/Rule Following/Wittgenstein/Habermas: according to Wittgenstein, the equality of meaning is connected to the following of a rule, namely the identical rule by all communication participants. >Rule following/Wittgenstein, >Rule following.
However, keeping the rule the same is not empirical, but is based on intersubjective validity, i.e. on the fact that a) subjects can deviate from their rule-guided behaviour and b) can criticise their deviating behaviour as a rule violation. (1)
>Rules/Habermas.

1.Vgl. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, Schrifen Bd I, (1960) S. 382.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Temperament Psychological Theories Corr I 177
Temperament/psychological theories/Rothbart: The Eastern European temperament tradition has its roots in Pavlov’s (1951–52)(1) observations of individual differences in his dogs’ behaviour in the laboratory. Pavlov linked temperamental differences among the animals (which he argued would generalize to humans) to qualities of the central nervous system, including strength of neural activation. Subsequent work by Nebylitsyn (1972)(2) and others adapted these ideas to the study of individual differences in human adults and, although Eastern European methods changed considerably, contemporary research remains heavily influenced by Pavlov’s work (for a discussion see Strelau and Kaczmarek 2004)(3). In contrast to Eastern European research, early studies of temperament in the West were more focused on identifying regularities in the structure of individual differences through the use of psychometric techniques. For example, in 1908 Heymans and Wiersma asked 3,000 physicians to observe a family (parents and children) and to fill out a temperament/personality questionnaire on each family member. >Personality, >Personality traits, >Extraversion, >Introversion.
Corr I 178
More recently, (…) a resurgence of interest in temperament has stemmed at least in part from the realization that the parent-child influence is bidirectional, not only from parent to child but also from child to parent. Children bring much to interactions with their families (Bell 1968)(4), and a large part of what they bring is related to temperament. Temperament research has also been linked to recent advances in neuroscience, with individual differences in temperament providing links to genes and neural networks, as well as to social interaction.
>Interaction, >Behavior, >Social behavior.
Corr I 179
Temperament/Thomas and Chess: (Thomas and Chess 1977)(5): A content analysis of interview information on the first twenty-two infants yielded nine dimensions of temperamental variability: Activity Level, Rhythmicity, Approach-Withdrawal, Adaptability, Threshold, Intensity, Mood, Distractibility and Attention Span-Persistence. The goals of the New York Longitudinal Study (NYLS) were chiefly clinical, and no attempt was made to conceptually distinguish these dimensions from one another. As a result of more recent research, however, major revisions to the NYLS list have been proposed (Rothbart and Bates 2006)(6). See >Temperament/Rothbart, >M.K. Rothbart.
1. Pavlov, I. P. 1951–52. Complete works, 2nd edn. Moscow: SSSR Academy of Sciences
2. Nebylitsyn, V. D. 1972. Fundamental properties of the human nervous system. New York: Plenum
3. Strelau, J. and Kaczmarek, M. 2004. Warsaw studies on sensation seeking, in R. M. Stelmack (ed.), On the psychobiology of personality: essays in honor of Marvin Zuckerman, pp. 29–45. New York: Elsevier
4. Bell, R. Q. 1968. A reinterpretation of the direction of effects in studies of socialization, Psychological Review 75: 81–95
5. Thomas, A. and Chess, S. 1977. Temperament and development. New York: Brunner/Mazel
6. Rothbart, M. K., and Bates, J. E. 2006. Temperament in children’s development, in W. Damon and R. Lerner (Series eds.) and N. Eisenberg (Vol. ed.), Handbook of child psychology, vol. III, Social, emotional, and personality development, 6th edn, pp. 99–166. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley


Mary K. Rothbart, Brad E. Sheese and Elisabeth D. Conradt, “Childhood temperament” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Terminology Dennett Fodor IV 139
Def Interpretation Theory/Dennett: thesis: beliefs, desires, etc. are not real (ontologically), but only epistemically useful concepts.
Dennett I 520
"Tower of Generation and Testing"/Evolution/Consciousness/Dennett: for a summarizing realization the price of idealization has to be paid. On higher floors we become more efficient in finding new tracks. The ground floor contains the
Def Darwinian creatures: (hard wired) that fly out of the test.
On the first floor:
Baldwin effect: "Plasticity of the phenotype": at birth not completely like the ancestors.
Second floor:
Def Skinnerian creatures: try blind, reinforcement, next time the creature chooses the right one.
Third floor:
Def Popperian creatures: have an inner, selected environment, they act foresighted the first time, not coincidentally.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Terminology Lyons I 66
Spelling/Lyons: /1/: Elements of the expression level [t]: phonetic transcription (phonetic spelling)
I 84
Def Functional load/Linguistics/Lyons: For example, many words can be distinguished by the opposition of /p/ and /b/. Therefore, the contrast between these two elements has a high functional load. If only a few words are distinguished by an opposition e.g. wreath and wreathe the functional load is low.
Position: depending on the position in the word, the functional load of a certain given contrast can be different. For example, two elements could often contrast at the beginning but rarely at the end of a word.
I 85
Importance: of contrast: also depends on whether the words themselves appear in the same context and can contrast or not. Functional load = 0: For example, if A and B are two word classes with complementary distribution and each element of class A differs in its realization from an element of B only in that it has /a/ where the corresponding word of class B has /b/, then the functional load of the contrast between /a/ and /b/ is = 0.
Functional load: must therefore be calculated for words that have the same or overlapping distribution. Furthermore, not only the grammar (distribution) must be taken into account, but also the quantity of the actual statements made.
Importance: of a contrast: also depends on the absolute frequency of occurrence. This shows how difficult it is to accurately measure the functional load.
I 86
However, it should have an importance for us both in synchronic and in diachronic description.
I 92
Principle of least effort/information/linguistics/Lyons: = tendency to maximize the performance of the system so that the syntagmatic length of words and expressions approaches the theoretical ideal. (>Shortening the chains). On the other hand: Principle 2:
Principle: the desire to be understood counteracts the shortening tendency.
I 93
"Homeostatic balance": should prevail between these two principles. (Zipf's law).
I 142
Def Generative/Linguistics/Grammar/Lyons: any linguistic description that can describe actual utterances as elements of a larger class of potential utterances is called generative.
I 235
Def Endocentric/Grammar/Lyons: a construction is endocentric if its distribution (distribution, occurrence in possible contexts) is identical to that of one or more of its constituents, otherwise exocentric. Def Exocentric: a construction is exocentric if its distribution (distribution, occurrence in possible contexts) is different from that of its constituents.
Endocentric: Example "poor John" has the same distribution as his constituent John. ((s) if that John is meant! Vs(s): it's not about that, but simply about John standing grammatically in the same place as poor John ("poor" is irrelevant).
For each sentence in which John appears, a sentence can be found in which poor John is in the same position.
Exocentric: Example "in Vancouver": does not have the same distribution as its constituents "in" and "Vancouver".
Distribution: is equal in the case of e.g. wage and poor John.
Distribution: is different in the case of e.g. "in Vancouver" and "Vancouver". The distribution of "in Vancouver" corresponds approximately to that of "there". This corresponds to the traditional expression of function.
I 236
Nesting/Grammar/Linguistics/Lyons: (concerns endocentric constructions (see Terminology/Lyons). a) Coordinating endocentric construction: e.g. bread and cheese, e.g. coffee or tea.
b) Subordinating endocentric construction: (the constituents still have the same distribution) e.g. poor Hans, e.g. very clever, e.g. the girl one floor higher, e.g. the man in the bus.
Def Carrier element/carrier/head/subordinating construction/terminology/Lyons: is the constituent whose distribution is the same as that of the entire construction (i.e. endocentric).
I 237
Def Determination element/modifier/subordinating construction/Lyons: is the constituent whose distribution is not identical to that of the whole construction Example(s) "poorer" in "poor Hans". Nesting/Lyons: the determining element (modifier) can be repeatedly nested in subordinating constructions, for example the man on the roof of the bus:
Carrier: Man
Determination element: on the roof of the bus (exocentric adverbial expression with preposition on and nominal expression the roof of the bus)
Roof of the bus: endocentric,
Carrier: the roof
Destination element: "of the bus".
Endocentric/exocentric/Lyons: goes back to Bloomfield.
I 244
Def Regimen/Grammar/Lyons: (in contrast to congruence): the verb "reigns" the case of the object, Latin: here the preposition also reigns over certain case-dependent nouns, pronouns or nominal expressions. Example ad urbem, ab urbe. Regimen: between words of different categories.
Congruence: between words of the same category.
I 270
Def Clause/Terminology/Linguistics/Lyons: Subset Def Phrase/Terminology/Linguistics/Lyons: word complex.

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977

Lyons I
John Lyons
Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Terminology McGinn I 22
Definition B-term/McGinn: one for which the question is how its former use was possible. Definition DIME/terminology/McGinn: domesticated irreducible mystic elimination -
D: the idea that one must domesticate the term B. - The term presents his subject misleading and exaggerates the ontological peculiarity.
I: theory: the term would be irreducible.
I 35
M: stands for Magic - accepts the facts of the concept at face value.
I 36
E: Elimination: the B-concepts would not be applicable to the world.
I 37
Thesis: the Transcendental Naturalism presents (TN) a neglected alternative to domesticated irreducible mystic elimination.
I 65
VsDomesticated irreducible mystic elimination: is imprinted on the problem without solving it.
I 39
Definiton CAIM/McGinn: combinatorial atomism with lawlike mappings. - According to that a crowd of basic elements obeys given linking principles - E.g. physics, mathematics and linguistics have CAlM (combinatorial atomism with lawlike mappings) character. - New things are explained with linking rules. - McGinn: an indispensable, but unsuitable realization process.
I 45
Problem: the contents of the modules (subjects) cannot be applied.
I 68
Consciousness is not to be explored by CAlM.
I 110
FIN-features (fruitfulness, invulnerability, normativity)/terminology/McGinn: fertility, invulnarability, normativity. Connection with semantics, but not with behavior, brain state, etc.
I 166
Transcendental Naturalism asserts that the relationship between consciousness and the brain did exist, but did not correspond to our thinking in form.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

Terminology Searle I 43/44
"Topic-neutral" (smart): "topic-neutral" is not nomological. SearleVsTopic Neutral: e.g. digestion needs no additional state to be described separately.

I 198 ff
Background/Searle: in the background are the skills and knowledge that can make the consciousness work (e.g. understanding an image: is someone moving uphill/downhill?). The same real meaning determines in different backgrounds different satisfaction conditions. Background: the background itself is not an intention, "assume" has no explicit propositional content and no explicit belief (e.g. objects are fixed). Network: is additional knowledge (cannot interpret itself). The network is intentional but it is no ability (it exists even during sleep), e.g. "Bush is president".
I 217
Searle: the rules do not interpret themselves, they really need a background to work. Background: is not a rule system.

III 194
Background/Searle: Moore's hands belong to the background. They are not in a safe deposit box. The background helps us to determine the truth conditions of our utterances.
II 115
Perceptual experiences and memories are causally self-referential.
III 42
Regulative rules/Searle: these rules regulate pre-existing activities. Constitutive rules: constitutive rules create the possibility of activities, e.g. chess rules.
III 39
Constitutive rules/Searle: are there any constitutive rules for cocktail parties and wars? What makes something a constitutive rule?
V 59
Def semantic structure: a language can be understood as a convention-based realization of a series of groups of underlying constitutive rules.
IV 253
Semantic rules/language rules/Searle: semantic rules or language rules are rules for linguistic action on closer inspection.
VII 436
Sentence meaning/Searle: the sentence meaning consists in the speech act potential.
II 25
Sincerity condition: the sincerity condition is internal to the speech acts.
III 44ff
Institutional facts/Searle: e.g. money, elections, universities, chess, etc. First, there must be something physical. Fact/Searle: a fact is something outside the statement that makes it true, like a condition.

III 212
Fact/Searle: a fact is a general name for the conditions how sentences relate to ... something.
II 32
Belief/Searle: spirit on world orientation. Intentional states/Searle: intentional states are both caused and realized in the structure of the brain.


Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Theories Lewis I (b) 31
Theory/Lewis: has more theorems than follow logically from its postulate (the definition of the theoretical terms) - namely the claim that the theoretical entities are the only ones to implement the theory.
I (b) 22
Theoretical identifications are not determined, they rather follow from the theories that they make possible.
I (b) 21f
Theory: theoretical terms: can be functionally defined, with recourse to causal roles. >Theoretical term/Lewis, >Causal role/Lewis.
Theory: In our present case, the theoretical terms are to name components of the near-implementation. (The closest implementation of the theory). We should only use the escape route of treating theoretical terms like failed descriptions when the story comes close to realization. (closest possible worlds).
>Similarity metrics/Lewis.
I (b) 27
We know very well that scientific theories are often almost implemented and rarely implemented.
I (b) 31
Theory: If I am right, theoretical terms can be eliminated. We can always replace them with their definientia. This does not mean that theories are fictions or their entities are unreal. On The Contrary! Because we understand the A terms and the theoretical terms can be defined with their help, theories have a meaning without compromising. And then their entities actually exist. >Terminology/Lewis.
I (b) 32
These theoretical identifications are no stipulations. They are deductive conclusions. And in this way we will conclude one day that the mental states G1, G2,... are the neural states N1, N2,....
---
IV 93
Theory/Unambiguousness/Implementation/Lewis: a theory which claims to explain everything (e.g. a machine) cannot have a second implementation - ((s) > functionalism).

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Theories Nozick II 121
Inegalitarian Theory/Nozick: an inegalitarian theory assumes that a state is privileged as a "natural". This needs no explanation and also does not allow one. - Other situations are then differences that need to be explained. E.g. For Newton rest or uniformity of movement was the natural state.
For Aristotle: rest. - inegalitarian theory does not answer,
1. Why this state is the natural.
2. Why exactly these forces are making a difference.
To accept something as a natural state is also to ascribe a specific content to him.
II 122
R. Harris: the thesis that something remains the same, does not need to be explained. >Regularity, >Explanations, >Constancy.
NozickVs: but we have to explain why a thing for the purposes of this principle counts as the same and not in other contexts.
Existence: the question concerning it, is typical inegalitary.
Punchline: here we presuppose the nothing as their natural state.
Cf. >Existence/Leibniz.
II 126
1. We do not know what the natural state is. 2. We do not know whether there is a fundamental natural state at all. That means whether the correct fundamental theory is inegalitary.
Each inegalitarian theory leaves a bare fact as inexplicable back, a "natural state".
II 127
Egalitarian Theory/Nozick: needs to see much more possible states as in need of explanation. - But it asks no longer the question "Why X instead of Y?" - But always "Why X?".
II 127
Egalitarian Theory/existence/nothing/Nozick: "principle of indifference" (from probability theory). - For them, there are many ways, how things could be, but only one possibility how nothing exists. - Punchline: then is the chance that something exists much greater than that nothing exists. Vs: one has to make an appropriate division into states that are to be treated as equally likely. - Many ways how things exists can be summarized as one.
Extreme case: only two ways: something exists or does not exist.
II 128
Under the worst assumption if we assume a division, there is a 50%-chance that something exists. - Because all other divisions have to be at least three partitions then, the chance that something exists rises for the next alternative already to two-thirds. - At the end almost 1. - Problem: the probability theory is still assuming the non-existence as the natural state - because it assumes that if something exists, then randomly - The natural state of a way is the non-realization. Solution:> richness.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Truth Vico Pfotenhauer IV 61
Truth/Vico: Thesis: verum et factum convertuntur - the truth is convertible with the thought, i. e. synonymous. See K. Löwith(1). History/Vico/Understanding/Kant/Pfotenhauer: Kant took up this idea of Vico in a modified form. He assumed that practical action was possible as a reasonable activity.
>Reason/Kant, >I. Kant, >History, >Understanding.
This could become visible in opposition to the contingency of the mere factual event. The condition is that this practical action is subject to reason as a normative, value-setting force.
History/HegelVsKant/Hegel: Hegel, on the other hand, wanted the principle of practical philosophy as a binding statement about the actual direction of history to be understood. The events in history would therefore be interpreted as progressive self-realization of the human species under the sign of spiritual spontaneity.
>G.W.F. Hegel.
Pfotenhauer IV 62
Understanding/Vico/Dilthey: Dilthey wanted to adhere to Vico's principle of the general comprehensibility of historical phenomena. This should be asserted against the positivist indifference that was determined to look at history and nature in the same way. (DiltheyVsComte). >W. Dilthey, >A. Comte.
Dilthey's thesis: Dilthey proposed to interpret the event from the point of view of the objectives of interested, value-oriented subjects. (M. Riedel(2)).

1. K. Löwith, Vico's Principle: verum et factum convertuntur. In: Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophical-Historical Class, Heidelberg 1968.
2. M. Riedel, Verstehen oder Erklären? Stuttgart 1978, p. 19ff.

Vico I
Giambattista Vico
Prinzipien einer neuen Wissenschaft über die gemeinsame Natur der Völker Hamburg 2009


Pfot I
Helmut Pfotenhauer
Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985
Turing-Machine Putnam III 15
Turing Machine/Putnam: a Turing machine can only calculate recursive functions. New: there is proof of the possibility of a physical analog computer that can calculate non-recursive functions. There is no reason why the real numbers, representing the states of nature should be "recursive".
>Recursion.
​​III 18
Behavioral interpretation: the Turing machine does not explain performance but competence. >Performance, >Competence.
---
IV 153
Turing machine/Putnam: there is no "sequence of states," that the Turing machine must go through in order to be in a certain single state - or it goes through them, but it does not have to determine them. Analog error of tradition: it is wrong to assume that in order to know something we would have to know certain assumptions.
Logically the Turing machine has only finitely many states.
Technical: technically there are infinitely many (some may be partially broken, and yet provide values).
N.B.: the error is not in the sentence "I am in state A", because the state is identical to the command to print it. Analogy: pain but no fever.
The functional organization can be described without taking into account the technical realization.
>Description levels, >Function/Putnam, >Functional explanation, >Syntax.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Type /Token Identity Field II 57
Psychology/type-identity/Field: type-identity needs a relation: "two inner occurrences c and d within an organism are of the same type if and only if there is a physical relation R between them, to an appropriate component of the single realization of f in X. t and c in R is to d." N.B.: this relation must not be specified.
Psychology/Field: psychology does not need a notion of type-identity between events in different organisms within an organism.
>Type/Token, >Relations, >Behavior, >Behaviorism, >Explanations, >Observation, >Theories, >Generalization.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Type /Token Identity Pauen Pauen I 107
Type identity/Pauen: Feigl, Place, Smart: empirically determined, as between H20 and each water, clouds, ice. Not necessary because empirical. (KripkeVs). Feigl: "dual access". Token identity: >Anomalous monism, functionalism.
>Functionalism. - >Anomalous monism, >Supervenience/Davidson.

Aspect dualism (actual monism);
>Monism.
All authors agree: Thesis: each mental process is identical with a neural process. - Therefore it must be possible in principle to investigate conditions of the first person from the perspective of the third person.
>Identity theory, >First Person, >Mental states,
>Brain states.
I 116
Type-identity/VsType identity/Pauen: 1. It has been previously empirically impossible to determine exactly describable types of neuronal processes - 2 even in stable psychophysical correlations would an identification not make sense - why should the uniform activity of unconscious neurons be identical with consciousness? >Consciousness.
I 118
Token-identity/Pauen: weaker version of the identity theory: it is sufficient that every mental state has some physical realization - it is no longer required, that there is a certain type of neural states, which is identical with the type of pain. Subspecies: "Anomalous monism". >functionalism, >Anomalous monism, >Token physicalism.
I 158
Type-identity/Pauen: today attractive again - ontological thrift - they must not insist that we mean functional relationships "in reality" when we speak of mental processes - therefore the mental state also has causality. >Type-/Token-identity, >Causality.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Ultimate Justification Leibniz Holz I 50
Definition evidence/certainty/a priori/Leibniz: the certainty (the necessity of identical propositions A = B) is based neither on empiricism nor on deduction, but on an a priori insight.
I 50
Rationalism/HolzVsLeibniz: Problem for a philosophy that understands itself "scientifically": this "immediate insight" of so-called final foundations leads to another epistemological level. Danger of irrationalistic change.
I 51
Thus the certainty of the axioms is no longer assured. Leibniz, however, insists on proofing them from the "evidence of identity" (with itself). Final justification/proof/axioms/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: here the validity of the identity theorem (A = B or A = A) is taken as an empirical value. It is not a matter of the fact that the predicates are inherent in the subject. This assumption can no longer be deduced in itself.
Evidence is not a logical category.
Thus, the validity of the identity theorem must not be justified purely logically. It has a pre-predicative origin.
Logic/Husserl: Husserl has strongly rejected the abstinence of logic from its cognitive content. >Content/Husserl.
I 52
Final justification/proof/axiom/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: Finally, we need a different type of proposition than the open or virtually identical.
I 75
Reason/Leibniz: reason can only be found by traversing the whole series rerum. It is not, however, to be found outside the series rerum, but completely within, but not at the beginning, but as the series as a whole! >Reason/Leibniz.
Difference: while the infinite mind must stand outside the whole (as an imitator) (perhaps also an "unmoved mover", etc.), the reason (as totality of the series) must be within the series.
Reason/Leibniz: the universal ultimate reason (the totality of the series of things, the world, ultima ratio) is also necessary for the finite mind because otherwise there would be nothing at all
I 83
Final Justification/LeibnizVsKant: the final justification does not take part in the subject-philosophical radicalism. Like Spinoza before him and Hegel after him, he had wanted to find from the, since Descartes' indispensable subject reflexion, a non-subjective reason of being, expressed in the truths of reason. Two principles are sufficient:
1. Principle of contradiction
2. The principle of sufficient reason. (Can be traced back to the principle of contradiction).
Moreover, since the principle of identity is viewed from sensory perception, we can attribute to the principles of the things themselves (that is, their ontic reality) the reason (their logic) presupposed in our thinking.
>Principles/Leibniz.
HolzVsLeibniz/HolzVsHegel: This is just as illogical as the system by Hegel.
I 84
In the universe and its parts, logic is thus suppressed and embodied. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: therefore, all relations between realities, phenomenal and metaphysical ones, can be expressed in logical form.
Final justification/LeibnizVsKant: the world does not appear logical because the subject conceives it in the logic form of its thinking, but the logic form of thinking is compelling because the world is shown as a logically constituted.
Leibniz: the world does not show itself to the subject as a world but as an additive series, as an aggregate.
I 123
Final justification/existence/Leibniz: to justify why there is anything at all means, therefore, to indicate in the essence of possibilities the principle which counteracts the minimization of the tendencies of realization. Now it turns out that the two principles:
1. Identity principle (Everything is identical with itself)
2. Variety principle ("various things are perceived by me) are logical, but not ontological sufficient, to justify the existence of the world at all.
One can in this way deduce from the individual something different and a certain connection, and therefore explain why there is something definite (and not something else in its place).
I 124
But it remains unfounded why there is anything at all. The missing ontological intermediate member is found by Leibniz in a third axiom, which he counts to the absolute first truths:
Thesis: Everything possible strives for existence and therefore exists, if not something else, which also strives for existence and prevents it from being incompatible with the first.
According to Leibniz, this is provable under the assumption of the truth of fact that we perceive something at all.
>Possibility/Leibniz, >Possible world/Leibniz, >Existence/Leibniz, >Order/Leibniz.
In addition, we make the experience of change that something begins to exist that was not there before. (But was previously possible).
A priori, however, no reason can be given for why something is strives more than another, so the reason must therefore be sought in the system of co-ordination (of mutual inhibitions).
From this, it follows that there always exists the connection of the things in which there exists the most.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz I
Hans Heinz Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994
Unconscious Foucault I 453f
The unconscious/Foucault: has a certain formal structure, or rather: it is such a structure. ---
II 283
The unconscious/Foucault: is not the implicit edge of consciousness. But this realization will now be irrelevant. >Consciousness.

Foucault I
M. Foucault
Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970
German Edition:
Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994

Foucault II
Michel Foucault
l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969
German Edition:
Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981

Understanding Vico Pfotenhauer IV 61
Truth/Vico: Thesis: verum et factum convertuntur - the truth is convertible with the thought, i. e. synonymous. See K. Löwith(1). History/Vico/Understanding/Kant/Pfotenhauer: Kant took up this idea of Vico in a modified form. He assumed that practical action was possible as a reasonable activity.
>Reason/Kant, >I. Kant.
This could become visible in opposition to the contingency of the mere factual event. The condition is that this practical action is subject to reason as a normative, value-setting force.
History/HegelVsKant/Hegel: Hegel, on the other hand, wanted the principle of practical philosophy as a binding statement about the actual direction of history to be understood. The events in history would therefore be interpreted as progressive self-realization of the human species under the sign of spiritual spontaneity.
>G.W.F. Hegel.
Pfotenhauer IV 62
Understanding/Vico/Dilthey: Dilthey wanted to adhere to Vico's principle of the general comprehensibility of historical phenomena. This should be asserted against the positivist indifference that was determined to look at history and nature in the same way. (DiltheyVsComte). >W. Dilthey, >A. Comte.
Dilthey's thesis: Dilthey proposed to interpret the event from the point of view of the objectives of interested, value-oriented subjects. (M. Riedel(2)).

1. K. Löwith, Vico's Principle: verum et factum convertuntur. In: Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophical-Historical Class, Heidelberg 1968.
2. M. Riedel, Verstehen oder Erklären? Stuttgart 1978, p. 19ff.

Vico I
Giambattista Vico
Prinzipien einer neuen Wissenschaft über die gemeinsame Natur der Völker Hamburg 2009


Pfot I
Helmut Pfotenhauer
Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985
Universalism Rawls Gaus I 93
Universalism/Rawls/Waldron: : „(...) what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. (Rawls 1980(1): 518–19). Waldron: that amounted to a withdrawal from moral universalism in one direction: Rawlsian justice was not a theory for all societies, but a theory for societies like the United States.
Gaus I 94
Ethical and religious heterogeneity were no longer to be regarded as a feature that societies governed by justice might or might not have, or might have at one period but not at another. It was to be seen instead as a permanent feature of the societies, one that could not be expected soon to pass away. >Society/Walzer. RawlsVsRawls: By the beginning of the 1990s Rawls had become convinced that his approach in A Theory of Justice(2) was disqualified generally on this ground. >Individualism/Rawls.


(1) Rawls, John (1980) ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’. Journal of Philosophy, 77 (9): 515–72.
(2) Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.


Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Utilitarianism Political Philosophy Gaus I 414
Utilitarianism/Political Philosophy/Weinstein: Contemporary English utilitarians have championed liberal utilitarianism with increasing subtlety and sophistication. Rule utilitarianism: Rule utilitarians stress utilitarianism's compatibility with accepted moral rules and intuitions (Hare, 1981(1); Harsanyi, 1985(2); Hooker, 2000(3)), whereas ...
Liberal utilitarianism: ... liberal utilitarians marry utilitarianism with strong liberal rights (Gray, 1983(4); Riley, 1988(5)).
All such accounts nevertheless constitute different versions of what is now commonly known as indirect utilitarianism.
Indirect utilitarianism: For indirect utilitarians, according to James Griffin, the principle of
utility serves as a 'criterion' for assessing classes of actions. By contrast, established moral rules and/or basic liberal rights function as sources of direct obligation (or 'decision procedures') for guiding individual actions (Griffin, 1994(6): 179). Actions are morally wrong if they violate these decision procedures. Indirect utilitarians hold that respecting such decision procedures will best maximize general utility overall, though not necessarily in short-term individual cases. In other words, sometimes acting rightly is doing wrong. But why should I act rightly if acting rightly happens not to be for the utilitarian best in a given situation? Why should I be a mindless, rule-worshipping sucker?*
Fundamental rights/equal rights/Liberal utilitarianism: (...) for liberal utilitarianism, fundamental rights function as critical decision procedures, making it more juridical than rule utilitarianism. Rights indirectly steer our actions along inviolable channels of acceptable behaviour that purportedly generate overall general utility. But liberal utilitarianism is not simply a more juridical version of indirect utilitarianism.
VsLiberal unitiltarianism: Contemporary liberal utilitarianism is often criticized in the same way as Mill's contemporary opponents assailed him for trying to reconcile the irreconcilable. For instance, John Gray (1989(7): 218—24) has recanted his earlier enthusiasm for liberal utilitarianism, agreeing with liberal utilitarianism's critics that it futilely seeks to join multiple ultimate normative criteria, namely utility and indefeasible moral rights.
Gray: For Gray, either maximizing utility logically trumps rights, or rights (in so far as they possess authentic moral weight) trump maximizing utility. Liberal utilitarianism fails logically because it pulls in opposite normative directions, instructing us to maximize utility when doing so violates rights and to respect rights when doing so fails to maximize utility. We sometimes must choose between our liberalism and our utilitarianism.
Egalitarian utilitarianism: Egalitarian liberals, in contrast to utilitarians, feature equality over utility as their overriding normative concern. Still, utilitarians are not indifferent to equality and distributive justice. As we have just seen, indirect utilitarians take these values seriously, though not so seriously that they trump maximizing utility as the ultimate normative standard. Utilitarians also prize equality in the sense that impartiality is constitutive of the principle of is counted for utility. Each person's 'happiness exactly as much as another's' (Mill, 1969(8): 257).**
>J. St. Mill, >Egalitarianism.
For egalitarian liberals, however, equality plays a more commanding role because many of them favour internalist arguments for equality.*** And because equality matters for them up front, they also tend to be more preoccupied with questions about equality of what rather than why.
Cf. >Individuals/Bradley, >Liberty/Bosanquet, >Self-realization/Hobhouse.
Gaus I 415
New Liberalism: (...) new liberals favoured a more robust threshold of equalizing opportunity rights. Although they concurred with >Bosanquet that possessing property was a potent means of 'self-utterance' and therefore crucial to successfully externalizing and realizing ourselves, they also stipulated that private property was legitimate only in so far as it did not
Gaus I 416
subvert equal opportunity. >Equal opportunities.
Hobson: In Hobson's words, 'A man is not really free for purposes of self-development who is not adequately provided' with equal and easy access to land, a home, capital and credit. Hobson concludes that although liberalism is not state socialism, it nevertheless implies considerably 'increased public ownership and control of industry' (1974(9): xii).ll New liberals, then,
transformed English liberalism by making social welfare, and the state's role in promoting it, pivotal. They crafted welfare liberalism into a sophisticated theoretical alternative.****
>Liberalism, >Idealism.

* For critics of contemporary indirect utilitarianism, rule-worshipping suckers are irrational because rule utilitarianism is not merely paradoxical, but illogical. Acting rightly can never sometimes entail doing wrong as if acting and doing mean different things. Rule utilitarians have responded by distinguishing between idealistic rule utilitarianism, actual state rule utilitarianism and conditional rule utilitarianism. Ideal rule utilitarianism holds that actions are right if they comport with rules whose general acceptance would promote utility. Actual state rule utilitariamsm adds the condition that these rules must, in fact, be generally accepted. Conditional rule utilitarianism is weaker still as it further stipulates that actions are right if they conform to rules that always maximize utility.

** Mill continues, 'The equal claim of everybody to happiness . involves an equal claim to all the means to happiness (1969(8): 257). In a revealing footnote about Spencer, Mill adds that 'perfect impartiality between persons' supposes that 'equal amounts of happmess are equally desirable, whether felt by the same or by different persons'. These egalitarian implications of impartiality are not identical and entail vastly different redistributive strategies.

*** For Gerald Gaus (2000(10): 136-45), utilitarian arguments for equality are external because they endorse equal treatment for the sake of advancing some external value, namely happiness. Arguments from fundamental human equality justify equal treatment on the basis of some (internal) attribute according to which people are purportedly equal in fact.

**** Idealists, like Jones and Collingwood, similarly favoured vigorously expanding equal opportunities through government.

1. Hare, R. M. (1981) Moral Thinking. Oxford: Oxford mversity Press.
2. Harsanyi, John (1985) 'Rule utilitarianism, equality and justice'. Social Philosophy and Policy, 2: 115-27.
3. Hooker, Brad (2000) Ideal code, Real World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Gray, John (1983) Mill on Liberty: A Defence. London: Routledge.
5. Riley, Jonathan (1988) Liberal Utilitarianism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Griffin, James (1994) 'The distinction between a criterion and a decision procedure', Utilitas, 6: 177-82.
7. Gray, John (1983) Mill on Liberty: A Defence. London: Routledge.
8. Mill, J. S. (1969) Utilitarianism. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of J. S. Mill, vol. 10. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
9. Hobson, J. A. (1974 119091) The Crisis of Liberalism. Brighton: Barnes and Noble.
10. Gaus, Gerald (2000) Political Concepts and Political Theories. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Utilitarianism Sen Brocker I 885
Utilitarianism/SenVsUtilitarianism/Sen: Against utilitarian theories of freedom, which determine the value of freedom entirely over its benefit, he points out: "Although freedom is not enough for itself, it pleases by itself. Freedom is on the one hand related to goals and the benefits to be achieved through their realization - but on the other hand it is not part of it. Respect for freedom as an end in itself must be distinguished from its value as a means to certain goods which can only be attained through it. The intrinsic and the instrumental appreciation of freedom are two different things. >Freedom/Sen.

Claus Dierksmeier, „Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen (1999)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

EconSen I
Amartya Sen
Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Veil of Ignorance Sandel Brocker I 672
Veil of Ignorance/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: Rawl's "Veil of Ignorance" in an assumed >initial state of a society to be built, in which people do not know what role they will later play, is an attempt to reconstruct Kant's transcendental subject without metaphysical assumptions. See Veil of Ignorance/Rawls. SandelVsRawls: Problem: How do the conditions of the original state come about if they are not the result of transcendental philosophical reflection on the non-empirical conditions of the possibility of freedom, as in Kant?
Rawls: assumes a "mutual disinterest" of people in their original state.
Sandel: Question: What is the criterion for "plausibility" or "reasonability" that underlies this construction of an initial state? (1) See Beginning/Sandel, Intersubjectivity/Sandel.
Brocker I 675
SandelVsRawls: behind the veil of ignorance there is no negotiation at all, since the subjects assumed by Rawls have no different interests at all. The "conclusion of a contract" is therefore not based on a free agreement but - in the Kantian sense of the word - on the realization that implies such a conceived practical subjectivity in terms of principles of justice from the outset. (2) See Contract Theory/Sandel.
1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 48.
2. Ibid. p. 130, 132.
Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Western Rationalism Habermas III 278
Western Rationalism/Habermas: we must separate the development of modern structures of consciousness in the dimensions of right and morality from the process of value realization. Because the problems of dynamics cannot be explained by a self-logic of world view development and the differentiation of value spheres. We need an analysis of the interests of the supporting classes, social movements, conflicts etc. to explain why - only on the Judeo-Christian line of tradition
III 279
the rationalization that is internal to all worldviews has been fulfilled - the conditions for the institutionalisation of universalist legal and moral structures were only fulfilled in the West
- only here typically occurring system problems were solved in such a way that the form of social integration characteristic of capitalist societies (with a methodical way of life and modern legal relations) has developed.
>Rationality, >Rationalization, >Procedural rationality, >Law, >Morality,
>Society, >Capitalism/Habermas, >Christianity, >Judaism.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Western Rationalism Weber Habermas III 262
Western Rationalism/Weber/Habermas: Weber regards the differentiation of cultural value spheres as the key to explaining occidental rationalism. He in turn understands this as the result of an internal history, namely the rationalization of worldviews. This is only to be understood against the background of the Neo-Kantian value philosophy. We must explain the sociological concept of the order of life with the help of the philosophical concept of value realization. For the sociologist, the spheres of being and of should penetrate each other peculiarly, since actors orient themselves in their actions towards values. Cf. >Naturalistic fallacy, >Rationalization, >Worldviews.
Habermas III 263
Neo-Kantianism: Thesis: Processes of value realization can be viewed simultaneously from outside and inside, understood as empirical processes and as objectivation of knowledge, and thus aspects of reality and validity can be connected. >Validity, >Validity claims, >Neo-Kantianism, >External/Internal, >Reality

Weber I
M. Weber
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930
German Edition:
Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Words Ancient Philosophy Gadamer I 409
Word/Ancient Philosophy/Gadamer: (...) Greek philosophy [started] with the realization that the word is only a name, i.e. that it does not represent the true being. This is precisely the intrusion of philosophical questions into the initially undisputed bias of the name.
Belief in words and doubt about words describe the problem situation in which the thinking of the Greek Enlightenment saw the relationship between word and thing. Through them, the model of the name becomes a counter-image. The name that you give, that you can change, motivates doubt about the truth of the word. Can one speak of the truth of names? But is it not necessary to speak of the truth of words, that is, to demand the unity of word and thing? And did not the most profound of all early thinkers, Heraclitus, not discover the profundity of the play on words? This is the background on which Plato's "Kratylos" rises, the basic script of Greek thought about language, which contains the whole range of problems (...).(1) >Word/Plato, >Names/Plato, >Language/Plato.


1. Their presentation in Hermann Steinthal, Die Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Logik, 1864, is still of great value (in the meantime, here is a book by K. Gaiser functioning as a representative: "Name und Sache in Platons Kratylos". (Treatise of the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences, Philos.-histor. Class Abh. 3, year 1974) Heidelberg 1974)


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Words Gadamer I 431
Word/Gadamer: Word of God: The risen and the preached Christ are one and the same. Modern Protestant theology in particular has developed the eschatological character of belief based on this dialectical relationship. >Word of God/Gadamer.
Human Word/Unity/Multiplicity/Gadamer: Conversely, in the human word the dialectical relation of the multiplicity of words to the unity of the word in its new light is revealed.
Plato had recognized that the human word has the character of speech, i.e. that it expresses the unity of an opinion through the order of a multiplicity of words, and had developed this structure of the logos in a dialectical way. Aristotle then pointed out the logical structures that make up the sentence or judgement or the sentence context or the conclusion. But the situation is not yet exhausted. The unity of the word, which is interpreted in the multiplicity of words, also makes something visible that does not fit into the essential structure of logic and brings out the character of the events in language: the process of concept formation.
>Concept/Gadamer.
I 461
Word/Gadamer: The word is not simply, as medieval thinking thought, the perfection of the species. If being is represented in the thinking spirit, then this is not the representation of a given order of being, whose true conditions are before the eyes of an infinite spirit (the Creator Spirit). Cf. >Creation Myth/Gadamer.
The word, however, is also not an instrument that, like the language of mathematics, is capable of constructing an objectified universe of being that is made available through calculation. (Cf. >Sign/Plato).
No more than an infinite spirit can an infinite will surpass the experience of being adequate to our finiteness. It is the center of language alone that, in relation to the whole of being, conveys the finite-historical essence of the human with him- or herself and with the world.
>Language/Gadamer, >Unity and Multiplicity/Plato.
I 462
"Centre of language"/Gadamer: Each word makes the whole of the language it belongs to sound and the whole of the world view it is based on appear. Every word therefore, as the event of its moment, also lets the unsaid be there, to which it refers in responding and waving.
I 465
The important thing is that something happens here. Neither does the interpreter's consciousness master what reaches it as the Word of Tradition, nor can what happens be adequately described as the progressive realization of what is, so that an infinite intellect would contain all that which could ever speak from the whole of tradition. But the actual event is only made possible by this, namely that the word that has come to us as tradition and to which we have to listen, really meets us, as if it addressed us and meant
I 466
ourselves. Object/Gadamer: (...) on the part of the "object" this event means the coming into play, the playing out of the content of the tradition in its new possibilities of meaning and resonance, each newly expanded by the other recipient.
>Hearing/Gadamer.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977


The author or concept searched is found in the following 35 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Armstrong, D. Wright Vs Armstrong, D. I 153
VsBasis Equations/WrightVsLewis/WrightVsArmstrong/WrightVsCounterfactual Conditionals: counterfactual conditionals have hardly been conspicuously successful in the history of philosophy. Problem: the following sentence can always be nullified if it is possible that the realization of Q could causally interfere with a fact that actually exerts influence on the truth value of P itself:
P then and only if (would it be the case that Q), it would be the case that R
(P = statement, Q = "light on", R = reaction).
Example Johnston: a chameleon sits in the dark on a green billiard table. Then the creation of "standard" conditions can cause a change, which we can see from the skin color of the chameleon.
But if the truth conditions were correctly captured by the subjunctive conditional, then we would have to say, "The chameleon is green until the lights go on".
I 154
Conditional fallacy: here the class of judgments in which we are interested participates in the causal order. It cannot therefore apply a priori that the truth conditions for P are captured by the statement to be analysed.
Vs: when we consider a counterfactual conditional sentence, we certainly only have to consider relevant, not absurd possible situations!
VsVs: but that is so, in the case of the e.g. chameleon. The objection misses the point: the kind of equivalence we are interested in must be valid a priori.
I 155
It must be possible to know a priori that the implementation of antecedence will not materially affect those relationships that may affect the actual truth values of the analysandum. But how could one know this without collateral empirical information about the peculiarity of the world one actually finds oneself in?
Thus: a priori correct subjunctive conditional markings of the conditions of truth (in the discourse that interests us) are not to be obtained. The basic equation is to be rejected.
Instead:
"Provisional Equations"/Wright: the problem with the e.g. chameleon could not have happened if we had determined that its color is at stake under standard conditions that a standard observer has to check. Changing the truth values should not be a problem if it is the truth value of P under C conditions (no other circumstances) that S is to judge under C conditions.
Provisional Equation:
If CS, then (It would be the case that P then and only if S would judge that P).
So we do not concentrate on bi-conditionals with conditional parts to the right, but on conditionals with bi-conditional consequences.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Block, Ned Shoemaker Vs Block, Ned Block I 188
Block: And if there are no homunculi, they cannot be identical with a qualitative structure. ShoemakerVsBlock: asserts that the
Def "argument of the missing qualia" is logically impossible.
That means it is logically impossible that two systems are in the same functional state but one has a qualitative state, the other, however, does not! (I 218) (BlockVs).
ShoemakerVsBlock: the problems with brains in the tank can be avoided if we introduce the concept of a "paradigm embodied person". Thus, a functioning sensory apparatus and a will control over movement is assumed.
Then you can extend it to the functional character of non-paradigmatic:
a physical structure that is not part of a paradigm embodied person, then passes as a realization of mental states, if it can be included without changing its internal structure and the types of relations between their states into a larger physical system, namely the body of the embodied paradigmatic person.

Frank I 61
FodorVsFunctionalism/BlockVsFunctionalis/Frank: the so combined F. does not capture the Qualia, that is the actual mental states. E.g. inverted spectra: functionalism then no longer explains this consciousness experiences.
((s) For him, the inverted spectrum would be identical to the non-exchange?).
Fodor/Block: nothing would be a token of the general type of state of pain, even if it was linked to all other mental states at all typical ways for pain.
Fra I 62
"absent qualia argument"/argument of the missing qualia/Block/Fodor: even more fatal: the organism could behave exactly like that without qualia. ShoemakerVsBlock: defends the compatibility of the concession of qualia with functionalism.
Qualia are intuitive for the consciousness, given without a transmission of a perception and their becoming a feeling is a completely adequate identification of their existence.

Shoemaker I
S. Shoemaker
Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Block II
Ned Block
"On a confusion about a function of consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Carnap, R. Lewis Vs Carnap, R. Field II 196
Theoretical Terms/TT/Ramsey sentence/Carnap/Lewis/Field: (Carnap 1956, Kap.26, Lewis 1979b,1972). Theoretical Term/Introduction/Content/Ramsey sentence/Carnap: if a new TT was introduced by a theory Θ(T), then the content of the theory is equal to the content of the Ramsey sentence (Ex)Θ(x).
Only realization: In a special case in which (E!x)Θ(x) is, we can say that T denotes the only object that fulfills Θ(x).
multiple realization: Problem: what does the theoretical term denote here? (>Functionalism/Lewis, >Turing machine).
It seems to need to denote something, if this were not possible we cannot explain why Θ(T) is true (and this must be according Carnap's thesis that it "has the content" of(Ex)Θ(x).)
Solution/Carnap: if Θ (x) is realized multiple times, then T denotes one random object which fulfills Θ(x).
LewisVsCarnap: This is not plausible because it is not explained how it is possible for a user of T to take a particular object instead of another one.
Field II 197
Content/TT/Ramsey sentence/Lewis/Field: Lewis felt obliged (probably reluctantly) to not take the content of the Ramsey sentence Ex Θ (x), but the modified sentence of Ramsey: (E! x) Θ (x) ((s) which only presumes one object). I.e. the theory is wrong if Θ(x) is realized multiple times, so that T can be seen as without denotations. Then there is no ambiguity.
LewisVs: (1970b): This is costly: Then if somebody states Θ (T), then it is absolutely implausible that he thereby has asserted that nothing than T Θ (x) can be fulfilled.
LewisVs: (1972): even worse: it has been applied here on functionalism, which is after all based on multiple realization.
Multiple Realization/Functionalism/Field: Many authors actually want to accept mR in one and the same organism at the same time.
Partial Denotation/Lösung/Field: Lewis could simply say that (as Carnap says) the content of Θ (T) is simply the Ramsey sentence (Ex) Θ (x), and if Θ (x) is realized multiple ways, then T partially denotes each of the "Realisierer".
Lewis IV 88
Theoretical Terms/TT/Definition/Description/Lewis: After having defined the TT through descriptions, we can eliminated the latter with their help. This is how we obtain O sentences. Def Extended Postulation/Lewis: the postulate of T that we get by replacing the TT by descriptions (O sentence).
It says that the theory T is realized by the n tuple of the first, second...component of the only realization of T.
The extended postulate is equivalent in definition to the postulate.
It says that the theory is uniquely realized.
It is logically equivalent to a shorter O phrase, which says the same in a shorter form.
This is what we call the "sentence of the only realization of T":
IV 89
Ey1...yn (x) x1...xn (T[x1,,,xn] ↔ . y1 = x1 & ..& yn = xn LewisVsCarnap: then the postulate is true if and only if the theory is realized once.
Problem:
the expanded postulate is an O phrase that is stronger than the Ramsey phrase that merely says that there is at least one realization.
Nevertheless, if the definition sentences are part of T, then the extended postulate is a theorem of T.
Then the definitions give us theorems that could not have been derived without them.
This means that the definitions themselves, unlike the Carnap theorem, are not logically implied by the postulate.
Therefore, if we want to say that the definition sets of T are correct definitions, we must abandon the idea that the theorems are all and only the logical consequences of T's postulate. And we like to give that up.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Davidson, D. Dummett Vs Davidson, D. Dummett I 28ff
DavidsonVsTarski: ... one must have a previous understanding of the concept of truth. - But not of the conditions! Because this knowledge will be determined by the theory of truth!. Dummett: What has to be introduced, however, is the realization of the conceptual link between meaning and truth.
DummettVsDavidson: In Davidson much remains implicit, E.g. this same context, which is required of every speaker. Without the exact nature of this relation the description of the T-Theory is still not a sufficient explanation of the concept of meaning. Correspondence Th./Coherence Th.: meaning before truth - Davidson: truth before meaning (truth conditions defined later by theory) - Dummett both together!.
I 142
Since the vocabulary changes and can be used differently, Davidson no longer assumes the language of a particular individual to be the starting unit, but the disposition for language usage. DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevailing.
I 146
Davidson def idiolect (refined): Language, date, speaker, certain listener. If there was a language that was only spoken by one personn, we could still all learn it. DummettVsDavidson: but in this case remains unresolved: the relation between truth and meaning, more precisely, between truth conditions and use.
Dummett: every participant in the conversation has his own theory of what the words mean. And these theories coincide, or nearly so.
I 187
DummettVsDavidson, DummettVsQuine: It is not permissible to assume that meaning and understanding depend on the private and non-communicable knowledge of a theory. It is not natural to understand precisely the idiolect primarily as a tool of communication. It is then more likely trying to see an internal state of the person concerned as that which gives the expressions of idiolect their respective meanings.
I 149
E.g. What a chess move means is not derived from the knowledge of the rules by the players, but from the rules themselves. DummettVsDavidson: If the philosophy of language is described as actually a philosophy of action, not much is gained, there is nothing language-specific in the actions.

Avramides I 8
DummettVsDavidson: not truth conditions, but verification conditions. The theory of meaning must explain what someone knows who understands one language. (This is a practical ability).
I 9
This ability must be able to manifest itself, namely through the use of expressions of that language. DummettVsDavidson/Avramides: a realistically interpreted theory of truth cannot have a concept of meaning.
I 87
Dummett: talks about translating a class of sentences that contain a questionable word. DavidsonVsDummett: This class automatically expands to an entire language! (Holism). (s) So to speak this "class of relevant sentences" does not exist.
DavidsonVsDummett/Avramides: Davidson still believes that you need a body of connected sentences, he only differs with Dummett on how to identify it. There may be sentences that do not contain the word in question, but still shed light on it. It may also be important to know in what situations the word is uttered.
Solution: "Translation without end".

II 108
Truth Theory/M.Th./Dummett: There is certainly a wide field in non-classical logic for which is possible to construct a m.th that supplies trivial W sets. DummettVsDavidson: whenever this can be done, the situation is exactly reversed as required for Davidson’s m.th. A trivial axiom for any expression does not itself show the understanding, but pushes the whole task of explaining to the theory of meaning, which explains what it means to grasp the proposition expressed by the axiom.

Putnam I 148
Truth/Dummett: Neither Tarski’s theory of truth nor Davidson’s theory of meaning (assuming a spirit-independent world) have any relevance for the truth or falsity of these metaphysical views:. DummettVsDavidson: one has to wonder what this "knowing the theory of truth" as such consists in.
Some (naturalistic) PhilosophersVsDummett: the mind thinks up the statements consciously or unconsciously.
VsVs: but how does he think them, in words? Or in thought signs? Or is the mind to grasp directly without representations what it means that snow is white?.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Descartes, R. Husserl Vs Descartes, R. I 18
Descartes: philosophy as a rigorous science should be initiated only by evidence. Husserl: the question of the realization of absolute necessities is different: theory of experience that works on immediate consciousness experience (Vs philosophical presuppositions). This should be clarified through an exemplary viewing of essence.
I 55
HusserlVsDescartes: res cogitans cannot be separated from the body.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991
II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992
Epistemology Ryle Vs Epistemology I 53
RyleVsEpistemology: demands, often wrongly, that dispositions express themselves similarly. Since they have realized that "knowledge" and "belief" are dispositional, they think that consequently there would have to be intellectually uniform processes. E.g. Someone who believes that the earth was round, would have to recognize and judge this repeatedly from time to time.
I 174f
Success Words/Ryle: absurd, pointless to say: that someone finds a treasure in vain, unsuccessfully wins a race, solves a puzzle wrong, a proves sentence invalidly. For this inability is a logical inability, it says nothing about human abilities, but only that winning unsuccessfully is a contradictory expression.
RyleVsEpistemology: we will see later that the longing a guaranteed error-free observation is partly stirred by the fact that we do not recognize that observation is a success verb, so that a "faulty observation" is a contradictory expression like "contradictory evidence" or "unsuccessful healing"(correct would be: unsuccessful treatment), also "inconclusive observation" or futile observation are possible. Difference: whether it is a "search" word, or a "find" word.
I 177
Deception/Ryle: we call feigned motives frauds or hypocrites, feigned inclinations are called charlatans and incompetents. Synonymous with the difference of ability and inclination.
Knowledge/Belief/Ryle: epistemologists like to engage their readers in the distinction between knowledge and belief. Some say the difference is merely gradual, others that knowledge contains an introspective portion which belief lacks, or vice versa. (RyleVsEpistemology).
In part, their confusion is because they consider "knowledge" and "belief" incident names.
I 178
But even if they are recognized as a dispositional verbs, you also have to realize that they are dispositional verbs of entirely different kind. "Knowledge" is an ability word. The person can bring something in order or condition. "Belief", on the other hand, is a tendency verb and does not mean that something is ordered or produced.
I 395
VsEpistemology/Ryle: epistemologists like to compare theoretical constructions with an act of seeing through, or similar to the teaching of a theory. RyleVs: as if Euclid had been equipped beforehand for what he was equipped for after acquisition of the theory. Conversely, epistemologists describe what Euclid did in teaching his theories as something that would be a revival of the original theory work (but is not). They describe path usage as if it were path construction.
I 400 ff (+)
Epistemology/Mental Processes/Event/Mental State/RyleVsEpistemology: wrong question, pointless: have you made two or three premises between breakfast and lunch? Have drawn one conclusion during dessert or more? Absurd. How long does a conclusion take? Epistemology/Mental States/Assets/RyleVsEpistemology: a realization is not an episode in the life of an explorer. A special division ability or squaring ability would have been expected of epistemology.
It is certainly true, because tautological, that correct expressions have their meaning, but that does not entitle to ask where and when these meanings occur.
The mere fact that an expression exists to be understood by anyone, says that the meaning of an expression cannot be marked as if it were an event, or as if it belonged to an event. (...)
I 409
Processes end with judgments, they are not made of them.

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Equilibrium Theory Luhmann Vs Equilibrium Theory AU Kass 6
LuhmannVsEquilibrium Theories: they have the concept of disturbance (even as a basic concept) in
two directions, probability, artificiality of the equilibrium (17th century example a few French soldiers more and the Prussians already have to arm.)
Further development: dynamic equilibrium, alternative realizations in different areas, establishment on a new level. Progress, functional equivalents. Actually, equilibrium is a metaphor.
Equilibrium as a condition of stability. Structure preservation is tied to the equilibrium term.
Today questionable: 1. From the natural sciences: it is the imbalances which are stable!
2. Also in the economy! A precise vote is too unstable! Socialist systems keep goods scarce, capitalist systems keep buyers scarce. And that is stable!
Luhmann: but that becomes questionable if one uses equilibrium and imbalance as it were as a system term! Furthermore, disturbance has a different meaning today.
Disturbance/ST/Luhmann: can best be understood as follows: the system has certain (very limited) structures and possibilities.
A disturbance brings one or the other as current into the system. This can initiate a search or identification process. For example, fire or just burnt potatoes? However, the range is adjusted, so it is not assumed that the petrol has run out.
The search can be handled operationally in the system itself or communicatively. Information processing process instead of equilibrium process.
Disturbance: is only a disturbance within the system, not in the environment!

AU I
N. Luhmann
Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992
German Edition:
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Fodor, J. Searle Vs Fodor, J. FN
I 283
SearleVsFodor: another incredible view (but with different phil. roots) states that each of us has at his birth all the terms, that can be expressed by any words of any language. Then e.g. A Cro-Magnon-man would have terms that are expressed by the word "carburetor" or "cathode-ray". (Fodor 1975)(1)

III 139
Def background/Searle: Skills, like ability, dispositions, trends and causal structures in general. Ability/Searle: causal ability: E.g. when I say that I am able to speak German, I speak of a causal ability of my brain. There is no reason to identify them without knowing the details of their neurophysiological realization. (SearleVsFodor).
To enable: should therefore be a causal concept.
Intentional states/Searle: are not a problematic concept here.
III 142
Background: Nietzsche saw with horror that the background does not have to be as it is. Cf. >Background/Searle.

1. J. A. Fodor, The Language of Thought, New York 1975

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Frank, M. Pauen Vs Frank, M. Pauen I 249
I/Heidelberg School/Pauen: Dieter Henrich and Manfred Frank. It's not about the evidence that the "objects" cited by the traditional notion of I do not exist, but the fact that the traditional model itself is inadequate.
We are not entitled to a "fiction of the I"! However, it has proven indispensable in psychology.
I 250
Subjet/Object/Henrich/Frank/Pauen: both Vs this conception. And regardless of a determination with respect to dualism/monism. The assumption that self-awareness arises from the recognition of the identity of subject and object causes an insoluble problem:
This realization presupposes that the subject is already aware of the fact that it is the object of its own reflection.
The act of reflection presupposes the existence of that self-awareness which, according to the model, is supposed to be the result.
Henrich: it is indeed not necessary that it has in any way conceptual knowledge of itself or is able to give of a description of itself, but it must be able in any case to testify with certainty that it is familiar with itself in the sense of self-awareness.
To arrive at an identification with itself the subject already needs to know under which conditions it can attribute something which it encounters to itself. It can never gain this knowledge through self-relation before everything else (1970).
I 251
Subject/Object/Manfred Frank/Heidelberg School/Pauen: the arguments against the S/O model also speak against the attempt to justify self-awareness as a self-ascription of properties. But if I want to realize that it is me for whom these properties are true, I already need to have self-awareness myself.
Self-Awareness/Frank: can therefore not be explicated as relation of something to something else in general.
I 252
I.e. self-awareness cannot be explained as the knowledge of a state of affairs. Of course, the subject can acquire knowledge, and self-awareness can thus turn into self-knowledge.
Frank Thesis: there must be an upstream pre-reflexive awareness of the self.
1) This is not a form of knowledge.
2) No application of criteria.
3) "Immediate": it is not based on the relation of the subject to anything else.
I 253
VsFrank: 1) Question whether the model does not remain biased in the subject/object thinking. 2) Question whether the concept of "pre-reflexive" can ever be explained coherently.
3) Question to what extent the relation of the subject to itself should be distinguished from other common forms of knowledge.
Pre-Reflexive/Frank/Pauen: this relation of the subject with itself should exist solely in the intimacy with itself. Not content-wise. No knowledge. Thus it can be maintained even during change.
VsFrank: then we cannot speak of an "I" in the interesting sense at all.
TugenhatVsHenrich/Pauen: he recurs as explicitly as one could wish on the subject/object model. The subject is itself the object.

I 258
PauenVsTugendhat/PauenVsHenrich/PauenVsFrank/Pauen: The problem with all approaches is that a state of affairs is only a determined state of affairs when it is different from other states of affairs. The mere absence of doubt whether an object is ugly does not justify the reverse that the person simply considered it to be beautiful. If the doubt never occurs and the person falls otherwise does not make any judgments of taste, this rather suggests that they lack appropriate judgment!
A person can only attribute a state as their own if they are able to recognize foreign states.
I 262
PauenVsHeidelberger School: the "pre-reflexive self" is not a necessary condition: the necessary distinction between self and external perspective can be made without it. On the other hand there is no objection to attributing a pre-reflexive self to subjects that have the ability to self-ascription.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Frege, G. Shoemaker Vs Frege, G. Stalnaker I 222
Qualia/functionalism/Stalnaker: this one will explain it with a relational structure. We have distinctive skills and are disposed to make certain judgments about similarity and difference. That means that we can combine certain kinds of experiences with others.
Discernment: is the intrapersonal criterion for the identity of qualia.
Inverted spectra/inverted qualia//symmetry/Stalnaker: Assuming (as does the thesis of the inverted spectra) that the relational structure is symmetrical (in some way).
Suppose we could permute types of qualitative experiences systematically, so that all
I 223
judgments about equality and diversity survived and thus generally the whole relational structure. Functionalism: will then determine the functional identity (because of the symmetry), with a qualitative contrast (because qualia were depicted with other qualia, which are distinguishable from them).
Pointe: if that is correct then no functionalist description of qualia could be correct.
Vs: you can deny this
1. by denying the symmetry. One can say that even if there is a certain symmetry in the structure of color experiences - in the distinctive skills and judgments about equality and diversity - the whole relational structure is much more complex. There are interactions of colors with others who are not preserved during permutations. bad solution/inverted spectra: to introduce additional characteristics such as e.g. red is hot, blue is cool, etc.
Stalnaker: I follow Shoemaker and put those objections aside. We need only the possibility of symmetry for some creatures.
Qualia/functionalism/Stalnaker: since functionalism identifies qualia intra personnel through distinctive capabilities, you should expect that he accepts the Frege/Schlick-view that means that there is no intra personnel counterpart.
Shoemaker: that would be too simple. Thesis: He wants to reconcile intra personnel comparisons of qualia with a functionalist approach.
Although we cannot define certain qualitative states functionalistically but rather classes of qualitative states.
Classes of qualitative states: we define functionally the identity conditions for elements of this class, then we can define relations of phenomenal (qualitative) equality and diversity. Thus we get equivalence classes of physical states. Equivalent states will be those that are realizations of the same qualitative state. Then the qualitative states are identified with their physical realizations.
ShoemakerVsFrege/Stalnaker: the main reason why he resists the Frege/Schlick-view,
I 224
that he thinks that one cannot deny the coherence of the hypothesis that there may be intra personnel inverted spectra. And he believes that through this there is an argument for intra personnel exchanged spectra that you cannot resist.

Shoemaker I
S. Shoemaker
Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Functionalism Dennett Vs Functionalism II 87
Functionalism/Dennett: widely spread in everyday life. Basic idea: E.g. "noble is who does nobly", "Not what it is made of makes a mind (or a belief, a pain, a fear), but what it can do."  In common linguistic use of functionalism, such entities defined by their function allow multiple realizations. Why can an artificial mind not be made like an artificial heart with almost any material?
II 88
DennettVsFunctionalism: he deliberately abstracts from the inscrutable details of performance and focuses on the work that is actually done. But he simplifies too much.
II 95
Information Processing/DennettVsFunctionalism: one thing was always clear: as soon as there are transducers and effectors in an information system, its "media neutrality" or multiple realization disappears. (VsPutnam, VsTuring). E.g. To receive light something light-sensitive is needed. E.g. Controls for ships or factories are media-neutral, as long as they fulfill their task in the time available.
But to the nervous system applies that much less time is available. The realization of the nervous system is not a media-neutral.
And that is not because it would need to have a certain aura of a particular material or of living being, but because it originated in evolution as the central control system of living beings who’ve been abundantly equipped with very decentralized control systems.
The new systems had to be set up above them, but in very close collaboration with them. There was an astronomical number of conversion points.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Functionalism Field Vs Functionalism II 43
Belief/Functionalism/Stalnaker/Lewis/Field: the thesis that belief is a functional state. (Regardless of the physical realization). Important argument: this involves no relation to a sentence or sentence analogue in a system of internal representations.
II 44
Stalnaker: E.g. beings from other planets: ...Here we look at sensory inputs and assume that they are correlated with their survival. ...Then we manipulate the environment. Belief/Martians/Stalnaker: then we would not only attribute analogues of beliefs and desires, but them themselves. But we do not need to assume any language, not even Mentalese. (Stalnaker 1976, p. 82).
Representation/FieldVsStalnaker: that does not allow us to distinguish whether such a functional theory of belief requires a system of internal representations.
1) We have not observed the entire behavior.
2) Even if: an assertion about behavior is not simply an assertion about behavior, it is an assertion about how the behavior is caused.
FieldVsStalnaker: we need knowledge (or reasonable belief) about how behavior is produced in order to know (or believe) that a being has belief.
Functionalism/Inner State/Field: an assertion about internal states of an organism is an assertion about those and not reducible to behavior.
II 49
Functional Relation/Field: the functional relation psi is not itself a physical relation. FieldVsFunctionalism: Problem: even if we consider belief to be a functional relation, it does not solve Brentano’s problem, because here we would have to show that there could be physical relations between people and propositions.
The only thing functionalism says is trivial: that my relation to propositions may differ from that of dogs or of myself 20 years ago.
II 50
Def Orthographic Coincidence/Predicate/Single-Digit/Multi-Digit/Belief/Field: Thesis: all the various attributions E.g. "X believes Russell was bald", E.g. "X believes Russell was bald or snow is white", etc. should be regarded as primitive single-digit predicates. Then we could drop all two-digit predicates like E.g. "X believes that p" entirely.
Orthographic coincidence: then the fact that the expression "believes that" occurs in both (supposedly) single-digit predicates would be without meaning, a mere orthographic coincidence.
Likewise, the fact that both contain "Russell was bald".
FieldVs: that cannot be taken seriously. But suppose it was serious, what would follow?
FieldVsOrthographic coincidence: it would follow that there does not have to be a physical relationship between people and propositions. Because since we did not speak of a psychological relation, it is clear that there is no realization in which a physical relation would be needed.
((s) then there must be an infinite number of single-digit predicates that reflect the most complicated attitudes.)
Field: although the error is so crude, it occurred to me myself (in the first paragraph of this section) when I tried to explain that functionalism makes representations superfluous: I said:
"A state of an organism is a state of belief that p, if this state plays the right (appropriate) role in the psychology of the organism."
II 51
Vs: in order for this to make sense the letter "p" must be understood here as an abbreviation for a particular sentence, E.g. "Either Russell was bald or snow is white". Field: I’m not saying that it is meaningless. But "appropriate role" suggests that we can define this particular state in a directly functional way. And that in turn suggests that the procedure that we need for "pain" could also be applied to "Russell was bald or snow is white". ((s) and that it is only an orthographic coincidence that we are not doing it).
And that the corresponding simple expression represents a property.
Solution: in order to avoid the "orthographic coincidence","X believes that p0" should not be considered as functionally definable for certain sentences p0, in such a way as that which is right for "X is in pain". ((s) as a function, no (too) specific sentence should be assumed, but something more general).
Solution: It should be non-functionally defined from a relational predicate "X believes that p", which is functionally defined by (3).
N.B.: then we need physical properties and quantities of possible worlds.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Gadamer, G. Block Vs Gadamer, G. Avra I 149
Input/Output/BlockVsFunctionalism/BlockVsLewis: no matter how functionalism characterizes input and output, it leads into the dilemma of being either chauvinistic or liberal. ((s) liberal: attributing mind to too many systems (e.g. vending machines)/chauvinistic: too few: E.g.: deny animals mind).
I 150
Input/Output/BlockVsFunctionalism/VsLewis any physical characterization of inputs and outputs is inevitably chauvinist or liberal: E.g. assuming you were seriously injured and your only way to communicate with the outside world is through electroencephalogram patterns. If you find something exciting, it produces a pattern that the others interpret as a point, if it is a bit boring, a line. Now let us imagine, on the other hand, others communicate with you by creating electronic activity that leaves long or short afterimages in you. In this case, we could say that the brain itself has become a part of the inputs and outputs! (at the top we had determined variable realization as an essential progress, however). But: Block: if this point (of variable implementation) is correct VsMaterialism, it also applies to inputs and outputs, because the physical realization itself may be an essential part of the inputs and outputs. ((s) input output devices: receptors?). I.e. there is no physical characterization which refers on inputs and output of all and only mental systems. (Block 1980b, p.295). Conclusion/Block: any physical characterization of Inputs/Outputs is either chauvinistic or liberal.

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Block II
Ned Block
"On a confusion about a function of consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
Harman, G. Verschiedene Vs Harman, G. Wright I 244
Harman/Wright: expressed himself as if the citing of moral facts was not permissible at all. SturgeonVsHarman: For example, our everyday thinking copes very well with the fact that an uprising can be explained by social injustice.
For example, that our belief that Hitler was morally depraved is based on things he did precisely because he was morally depraved, so that his depravity is part of the explanation of our belief that he actually was depraved.
I 246
I.e. we must be prepared for this kind of explanation by the realization that moral discourses are at least minimally truthful and that the missing analogies (to natural science?) will appear elsewhere. For example, revolts as a result of social injustice: nobody doubts that!
There is a distinction between social injustice and the feeling of injustice.
There is also a distinction between injustice and its non-moral characteristics, which can be correctly stated in a demonstration of injustice.
I 247
So we are not linking any allegations. The use of other non-moral factors can also reinforce the moral demonstration.





WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Identity Theory Pauen Vs Identity Theory Pauen I 109
Identity Theory/Pauen: simple explanation of the origin of consciousness: simply as neuronal processes. E.g. Buddenbrooks is not just a novel, but also Mann's first work.
VsIdentity Theory/Pauen: this makes it counterintuitive how neuronal processes are supposed to explain the origin of the work.
I 110
Multiple RealizabilityVsIdentity Theory/Pauen: the identity theory cannot explain how different neural patterns can bring about the same state of consciousness. Explanation GapVsIdentity Theory/Pauen: ("Explanatory Gap Argument"): (Joseph Levine): in view of the multiple realization the two levels (mental, neuronal) gape but too far apart.
In addition, experience is considered with regard to the mental state.
Identity/Wittgenstein/Pauen: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say it of one thing is meaningless.
I 113
Identity/Pauen: identity assertions which go beyond the trivial, are always hypotheses.
I 77
Def Identity Theory/Pauen: first and third person are equal ranking, precursor: Spinoza, parallelism. Def Type Identity Theory: all mental states of a certain mental type are at the same time states of a particular neuronal type and vice versa.
Highlight: 50s, then decline.
VsTyp Identity: cannot explain multiple realizability.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Introspection Ryle Vs Introspection I 208f
Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: cannot be what the tradition expects from it, since its object is a myth - consciousness: what I can find out about me is of the same kind as what I can find out about others - The small differences do not favor self-knowledge (RyleVsNagel). >Priviledged Access, >Public language. ---
I 216
RyleVsTradition: we do not encounter any phenomena in the inner - there are no such events. ---
I 221
Introspection/Tradition/Ryle: an ideal of a true perception, attentive observation, only executed here and there. Whereas consciousness is an ongoing component of all mental processes. RyleVsIntrospection: assuming there are certain ghostly things that one could perceive, then this observer would always have to do two things at once: to stand up in time for the realization of the plan, he would also have to pay attention to the process of plan compliance. That would become fastly infinitely. (> Regress).
---
I 222
But if one admits that the number of perceivable inner things is limited, it follows that there must be imperceptible inner things. Non-introspective act, namely, the act of introspection, which already contains the greatest possible number of simultaneous attentions acts. This knowledge could not be based on introspection. But then the question arises whether it was ever based on it. Then one would have to postulate another form of privileged access. Scylla and Charybdis. >Mentalism.

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Kant Mackie Vs Kant Stegmüller IV 319
KantVsDeterminism: freedom is a prerequisite of our moral thinking. MackieVsKant: this yields the prerequisite of a metaphysical objectivism.
IV 320
VsDeterminism: undermines the possibility of moral judgement in general! One cannot have a conviction and at the same time assume that it is causally determined! VsVs: this reasoning is simply wrong: the determinacy does not undermine the correctness of the judgement!
Determinism/Stegmüller: today we know too little to decide whether it is true or false. But if it were true, would it undermine our moral thinking?
Terminology:
Def Incompatibility Thesis/morality/Stegmüller: if determinism were true, there would be no moral thinking. Responsibility, duty, benevolence etc. became meaningless.

Stegmüller IV 171
Mackie/VsKant: the categorical imperative is not of objective validity! There must be at least one premise that is not truth-apt, but expresses the fact that a decision has been made.
Stegmüller IV 323
Self/MackieVsKant: supposed to act on the basis of rational arguments. Problem: how is that possible if the self is not causally connected to its acts by its reasons for action? How can actions belong to the self and yet be only random events?
The theorist of incompatibility would have to construct an analogon to causality and deny its causal character at the same time.
metaphysical Self/Kant/Stegmüller: essential for Kant, because it is the addressee of the moral ought.
MackieVsKant: as a subjectivist he does not even need to introduce the metaphysical self.

Stegmüller IV 431
God/immortality/morality/MackieVsKant: (i) has an ambivalent position: on the one hand primacy of practical reason whose claims are to be adopted by theoretical reason. On the other hand he asks if our knowledge is truly broadened by that.
Kant: "Certainly, but only in a practical sense."
Mackie: this revokes everything. Two possible interpretations:
1. Kant wants to say that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul can be proven as facts,
2. not as facts, but as the necessary conditions for our consciousness as a rational being.
IV 432
MackieVsKant: greatest weakness: 1. the transition from "we should seek to promote the highest good" to "that must be still possible". Ought/Kant: elsewhere he had tried to show that the "Ought" presupposes a correspondent "Can." (Where?). But that had been about the obediance of the moral law.

MackieVsKant: the analogy to the summum bonum does not make sense. But that be granted.
2. then, the thesis that we should seek to promote the highest good includes that we can seek to promote it. To conclude therefrom the possibility of a full realization is ineligible.
Moral/MackieVsKant: Kant cannot even assert that the possible realization were a necessary condition for moral thinking.
IV 433
MackieVsKant: the tension between his theism on the one hand and his emphasis on the autonomy of morality on the other is irresolvable. KantVsPopular notion: neither our knowledge of God and his will nor this will itself are a rationale of the moral law, but only reason!
Therefore, "self-legislation" of practical reason.
MackieVsKant: yet, Kant speaks misleadingly of "laws of the Supreme Being". But God himself is just another rational being!
MackieVsKant: the correspondence of morality and happiness is still represented in an unconscious thinking in terms of reward and punishment.
The consistent recognition of the autonomy of morality should have brought him towards more of a Stoic conception: that morality requires no other happiness than the awareness of righteousness itself (possibly Hume, Marc Aurel, Adam Smith)..
Morality/God/Kant: Kant seems to have been aware of this difficulty. In his Metaphysics of Morals he anticipates the argument of conscience by J. H. Newman. Also, he oscillates between the idea of God as a purely intellectual construction (e.g. Adam Smith's ideal observer) and the assumption of a real existence.
V 437
MackieVsMoral proofs of God: there are better explanations for action than for the existence of a divine person. Practical decisions must be based on convictions about facts and not vice versa!
Whatever we are inclined to view as a rational act is no evidence of what is actually the case.
IV 438
MackieVsKant: problem with his moral argument: if a particular practical principle presupposes certain factual allegations, then the reason, as pure as it may be, cannot claim to have demonstrated the validity of this practical principle, if it did not prove the validity of the relevant factual allegations independently.
IV 461
Freedom/determinism/morality/Mackie/Stegmüller: other kinds of freedom are fully compatible with determinism (e.g. freedom of neurotic compulsion)!
IV 462
Will/Kant: (Metaphysics of Morals): "is a kind of causality of living beings, as long as they are reasonable, and freedom would be the property of this causality, since it can take effect independent of external determining causes." "external causes": reward, punishment, but also desires and inclinations!
Autonomy/Kant/Stegmüller: here, consistency with its own ideal of reason is an end in itself.
MackieVsKant: misapprehension: he probably even thought himself to have characterized the contra-causal free will, but in fact he distinguished between external causes and the autonomous efficacy of the will. And that is something completely different!
IV 463
autonomous activity: completely compatible with two assumptions: 1. that there are sufficient preliminary causes for the will to have a certain strength.
2. that, whatever such a will does, is dependent on the character of the person and his*her strength of will.
Will/capriciousness(Willkür)/Kant/Stegmüller: later he differentiates the two: the latter is the only one that posses contra-causal freedom; it is the free will in its usual sense.
Freedom/Kant: (late) he moves completely towards autonomy (autonomous legality of the will).
Vs: but that is not a solution to our problem.
Judgement/conviction/Kant/Stegmüller: (Metaphysics of Morals): it is not possible to render a judgement in the theoretical (speuculative) realm or to express a genuine conviction, while at the same time admitting to having been externally induced to do so.
IV 464
Judgement/conviction/MackieVsKant: whoever makes a rational judgement cannot interpret it in a way that it was reached incorrectly. However, there is no problem in seriously holding a rational conviction and at the same time acknowledging that it has been reached in an appropriate manner.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Kant Hegel Vs Kant Leibniz I 32
Hegel: we must not "let multiplicity disappear in unity". If deduction were only possible as reduction (as with Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought.
Kant: draws from this the consequence of founding the unity of the world in the priority of thought. Only then is unity transcendentally or subjective idealistically justified.
HegelVsKant: tries to renew the metaphysics of substance, which wants to explain the unity of being with the unity of the being: the self-development of the absolute mind in world history.
---
Rorty II 153
HegelVsKant/Rorty: both God and the moral law must be temporalized and historized to remain credible.
Rorty VI 195
HegelVsKant/Rorty: "transcendental idealism" is just another name for skepticism.
VI 203
HegelVsKant/Rorty: he is too much geared towards scientific research. ---
Vollmer I 220
Knowledge/Criterion/Realization/Vollmer: we need a criterion for when realization is valid. Such a criterion would itself be a piece of knowledge and would also need a criterion recourse. On the other hand, the criterion could not be a simple convention, since a convention cannot justify any recognition. If at all, then by further conventions. Regress.
This is approximately:
SchellingVsKant: we need a recognition of recognition. And that is circular.
HegelVsKant: Examination of recognition: cannot be carried out without recognizing. As if you wanted to learn to swim before you go into the water.
Vollmer: the argument was developed by Leonard Nelson and is therefore called "Double Nelson".

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Leibniz, G.W. Verschiedene Vs Leibniz, G.W. Metz II 70
Bieri: you could say VsLeibniz:   1. what is happening in the "factory" gets a cognitive content in that it is lawlike linked to events outside, it represents by virtue of this link,
  2. the fact that the events in question give the whole person an adequate behavior in a certain situation.
  But our problem is not meaning, not cognitive content, but content of experience.
Leibniz I 125
Perfection/Existence/Leibniz: for example, assuming that A,B,C,D are of equal rank, but D is incompatible with A and B, but the others are all compatible with each other except with D, then it follows that A,B and C exist to the exclusion of D. This is the principle of compressibility.
Reality/Leibniz: in each case the highest degree of factual content (realization): "perfectio".
Best world/best of all possible worlds/possible world/Leibniz: this is the meaning of the thesis that we live in the best of the worlds: it is simply the realization of most possibilities, which follows from the fact that all possibilities are realized which do not exactly hinder each other.
In this respect, it is not by chance that this world is the way it is.
Translated into theology this means that God necessarily created the world according to his own rationality, because it is the optimization of the processes conditioned by this rationality.
VoltaireVsLeibniz: "Candide". Vs "Best of the Worlds".
Kripke I 9
Leibniz' Principle of the Indistinguishability of the Identical/Kripke: always seemed evident to me. VsLeibniz: when some philosophers doubted it, it always turned out that areas were confused that do not express real properties in contexts, or it concerned the collapse of individuals, with which identity was confused between individuals.





Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984
Loar, B. Stalnaker Vs Loar, B. II 195
Narrow Content/Loar/Stalnaker: (Loar 1987, 1988): Loar has an ingenious thesis and good examples that allow us to better understand the internalism. StalnakerVsLoar: his defense of internalism is, however, not entirely convincing.
Stalnaker: I believe that something like Loar's narrow content will play a role in intentional explanation but that it will not be narrow content!

II 203
Content/that-clause/Loar/Stalnaker: "loose connection": here there shall be a certain way how the world appears to the thinker and this be a purely internal characteristic of the thinker. Language/content/problem/Loar: our language is permeated by social and causal presuppositions so it can only inaccurately detect our internal content.
Stalnaker: pro, but I do not think that the belief states are themselves infected one whit less causally and socially!
II 204
"loose connection"/Loar: (e.g. Paul, arthrite) Problem: what things about the world of which Paul believes that he is in make Paul's convictions true? The ascription of "I have arthrite in the ankle" expresses something else than the ascription of "J’ai l’arthrite dans ma cheville".
StalnakerVsLoar: I also think that this is a mystery, but about ascription. I do not think that supports an internalism.
Truthmaker/conviction/possible World/poss.w./Stalnaker: are the facts about the world as it appears to Paul internal or facts on the language use in Paul's environment?
Ascription/to make true/Stalnaker: to answer the question, we need a theory on what makes belief ascriptions (ascriptions of content) true or false.
Solution/Stalnaker: we need a causal information-theoretical approach that uses counterfactual conditionals. And I do not see how this could go internalistic.
Counterfactual conditional/co.co./Stalnaker: (externalistic) one might assume that Paul would be in another state when the world would be different. Or Paul is in his internal state iff the world is actual in this certain way. ((s) But that excludes illusions).
externalistic: that would be non-internalistic because it is based on general causal regularities.
Problem/Stalnaker: the same problems arise that already appeared in Loar's belief ascription.

Content/Loar/Stalnaker: after Loar there are two dimensions, which are connected to a mental state:
a) a purely internal content – the way how the world appears to the thinker – with it behavior is actually explained.
II 205
b) a social content (to what the ascriptions refer). Stalnaker: it is not clear to me what role b) shall play.

Content/StalnakerVsLoar: thesis: if we describe it properly psychological and social content fall together.
Loar's examples do not show that psychological content is narrow.
Loar: thesis: there are phenomenological reasons why the way the world appears to the thinker must be an internal property of the thinker.

II 205
privileged access/Loar/Stalnaker: Loar's phenomenological argument for his internalism is the privileged access we have to ourselves. We know what our thoughts are about. LoarVsBurge/LoarVsExternalism: privileged access is incompatible with the anti-individualism. (Team: Loar per internalism, Loar per individualism).
II 206
Loar: thesis: it is hard to see how I could be wrong about my purely semantic judgment that my thought about Freud is about Freud - assuming Freud exists timelessly. StalnakerVsLoar: this is true but why is this in conflict with the externalism?
LoarVsExternalism/Stalnaker: Loar's arguments are based on observations of the externalist analysis of the reference relation.
logical form: (of the argument);: I do not judge that I stand in relation R to x ("R") be an externalist conception of this relation of aboutness or reference).
aboutness/"about"/Loar/Stalnaker: therefore "R" cannot be a correct analysis of the aboutness relation to which I have privileged access.
aboutness/"about"/Loar: it is implausible that I, to know that my thoughts are about Freud, need an opinion on a causal-historical relation to him. Such a relation has no one properly characterized yet.
StalnakerVsLoar: two things are wrong about this:
1. a philosophical analysis of a concept may be correct, even if a competent user of the concept does not know the analysis.
2. the externalism does not specify that the aboutness-relation is analyzable.
Burge: proposes no analysis
Kripke: (in his defense of the causal theory) does not assert that this is reductionist.
Loar/StalnakerVsLoar: he is right that my "pre-critical" perspective, "that my thought that my thought about Freud is a thought about Freud" does apparently not need an externalist concept. ((s) "drastic content". see below).

II 209
Context dependency/ascription/Loar/Stalnaker: Loar shows us, however, correctly that belief-ascriptions are context-dependent. And he is also right to accept realization conditions for it. Realization conditions/StalnakerVsLoar: but these give us no opportunity to come to purely internal properties of the believer
Def content/Stalnaker: (whether psychological or social) is a way to put us in touch with others and to our environment.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Materialism Functionalism Vs Materialism Danto2 I 272
FunctionalismVsMaterialism: functionalism has created serious problems for materialist theories of the mind. One cannot say that the mind is nothing other than the brain, and consequently nothing more than this material system, when the mind itself can be defined functionally, when something is given that supports all its features, but otherwise is different from the brain.   How can the mind be equated with the brain and with the computer, if on the other hand the computer and the brain cannot be equated with each other? Identity is transitive. That would not be fulfilled here.
Avra I 148
Holism/Avramides: therefore one sometimes says that behaviorism does not manage to find an access to the holism of the mental. Solution: Functionalism: was specially designed to take this holism into account.
FunctionalismVsMaterialism: has in relation to holism an advantage over the old materialism, which is sometimes called "central state materialism". (e.g. Smart 1969, Place 1969).
Def Central State Materialism/Avramides: (is a type of physicalism). Mental states and mental events can be reduced to physical states and events.
Problem: then certain beings cannot have a mind because of the certain form of their inner structure.
Solution: Functionalism: now allows "variable realization" of states of mind. Thus it identifies mentality not with a property of the 1st level, but with a property of the 2nd level (property of property). Property 2nd level of systems.
Functional property: is a property of a property. I.e. even beings without grey matter in their skulls can still be characterized as sensitive, cognitive beings. (Variable Realization).
Variable Realization/Functionalism: can assume variable realization, because it does not refer to certain structure or matter, but to inputs and outputs.
Thus he can avoid the problems of reductionism and Cartesianism. He still refers to behavior.
AvramidesVsFunctionalism: but it is still independent of "normal evidence" (normal behavior).
At first the attribution must not refer to the irreducible mental (otherwise circular). But this is not yet certain with the reference to input/output.
I 149
Solution/Lewis: his version of functionalism (1972,83a,83d)).
Mill, J. St. Strawson Vs Mill, J. St. IV 170
Definition Cause/Mill: "epitome of all conditions, positive and negative, taken together, unity of all contingencies of any kind, in whose realization the consequens follows inevitably". StrawsonVsMill: we have no prospect and also no interest to explore all that.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Physicalism Functionalism Vs Physicalism Block I 162
FunctionalismVsPhysicalism: Physicalism is wrong if functionalism is true. Reason: Turing machine: you can always find a physical realization that fulfills the function but deserves a different physical description.
Example: if pain is a functional state, it cannot be a brain state, because there are creatures without a brain that can realize the same Turing machine!
FunctionalismVsPhysicalismus/Block: the argument aims rather at the fact that it is incomprehensible how a physical property of first order could be common to all and only all possible physical realizations of a given Turing machine state.
I 162
According to that, physicalism is chauvinistic. The physicalist of all people excludes brainless creatures that still have a mind.
Block I 210
FunctionalismVsPhysicalismus: it is difficult to understand how there should be a single characterization of internal states of all possible organisms that are functionally equivalent to a human being.

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Block II
Ned Block
"On a confusion about a function of consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
Possible Worlds Verschiedene Vs Possible Worlds Schwarz I 41
Def Possible World/poss.w./Lewis: early: ways how things could be. Van InwagenVs: These are characteristics rather than concrete universes. (StalnakerVsLewis, RichardsVsLewis: ditto). Lewis: later: possible worlds correspond to ways how things could be.
Schwarz: but we do not necessarily have to introduce special entities for it. They could also be grammatical illusions. Even considering possible worlds as entities does not determine what kind of entities they are. E.g.:
Def Possible World/Stalnaker/Schwarz: the determination as (maximum) ways how things could be: then they are special properties or propositions. (Stalnaker 1976(1), Robert Adams, 1974(2)).
Def Possible World/Plantinga: (1974(3), Chapter 4) Maximum circumstances. According to this, a distinction must be made between the existence and existence of a state of affairs. Example: The state of affairs that donkeys could speak exists, but it does not exist. (Existence: Possibility - Existence: Reality? - rather reality (as another term): contains possibilities).
Schw I 42
Def Possible World/Decision Theory/Richard Jeffrey: (1965(4),196f): maximum consistent sentence sets. Since the phrase "donkeys can speak" is consistent, there is a maximum consistent set of sentences that contains it. We express this when we say that there is a possible world... Def Surrogate Four-Dimensionalism/Schwarz: These positions correspond to the facts of the philosophy of time (see above 22), which perceives other times as abstract entities of a different kind from the present.
LewisVs: other times are just as real.
Def Co-Existence/Lewis: two things are in the same world, iff there is a space-time path from one to the other. Consequence:
Possible Worlds/Lewis: are space-time isolated! So there is no causality between them. No event in one possible world causes another in another possible world.
This means further that possible worlds just were not created by us! We also cannot see, measure or visit them from here. (1986e(5),3,80f). Lewis does not care if you call your possible world concrete or abstract. This has no clear meaning (1986e(5),§1,7).
Real World/Lewis: what makes it different from the other possible worlds? Not its concreteness, but the fact that we live in it. Objectively, the real world is as little excellent as any other, or as the present.
"Actual"/Lewis: is an indexical expression like "here" or "now". Therefore, we cannot meaningfully ask whether we live in the real world or in a possible one. Likewise, we cannot ask whether we live in the present or perhaps in the future.
Reality/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis's analysis of "real" is also shared by opponents of modal realism:
Van InwagenVsModal Realism/InwagenVsLewis: "Concretism". Stalnaker: "extreme modal realism".
Lewis IV 85
Meaning/Reference/Theoretical Terms/TT/Lewis: if we have the denotation of theoretical terms, what about its meaning? But we already have it! Because we have specified its denotation in every possible world. Def Sense/Lewis: Denotation of an expression in each possible world.
I.e. in every possible world the theoretical terms must name the components of whatever the theory T realizes uniquely in this world. If there is no realization in the world, they do not name anything.
Def Sense/Lewis: therefore we can say, the sense is a function (of all or some) possible worlds on named entities.
VsPossible Worlds/VsPossible Worlds/Lewis: some call them occult,
VsVs: but they are not more occult than e.g. infinite amounts, which we can handle very well.


1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1976]: “Possible Worlds”. Nous, 10: 65–75
2. Robert M. Adams [1974]: “Theories of Actuality”. Noˆus, 8: 211–231
3. Alvin Plantinga [1974]: The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University P
4. Richard Jeffrey [1965]: The Logic of Decision. New York: McGraw-Hill
5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell





Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Principia Mathematica Gödel Vs Principia Mathematica Russell I XIV
Circular Error Principle/VsPrincipia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Gödel: thus seems to apply only to constructivist assumptions: when a term is understood as a symbol, together with a rule to translate sentences containing the symbol into sentences not containing it. Classes/concepts/Gödel: can also be understood as real objects, namely as "multiplicities of things" and concepts as properties or relations of things that exist independently of our definitions and constructions!
This is just as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies. They are also necessary for mathematics, as they are for physics. Concept/Terminology/Gödel: I will use "concept" from now on exclusively in this objective sense.
A formal difference between these two conceptions of concepts would be: that of two different definitions of the form α(x) = φ(x) it can be assumed that they define two different concepts α in the constructivist sense. (Nominalistic: since two such definitions give different translations for propositions containing α.)
For concepts (terms) this is by no means the case, because the same thing can be described in different ways.
For example, "Two is the term under which all pairs fall and nothing else. There is certainly more than one term in the constructivist sense that satisfies this condition, but there could be a common "form" or "nature" of all pairs.
All/Carnap: the proposal to understand "all" as a necessity would not help if "provability" were introduced in a constructivist manner (..+...).
Def Intensionality Axiom/Russell/Gödel: different terms belong to different definitions.
This axiom holds for terms in the circular error principle: constructivist sense.
Concepts/Russell/Gödel: (unequal terms!) should exist objectively. (So not constructed). (Realistic point of view).
When only talking about concepts, the question gets a completely different meaning: then there seems to be no objection to talking about all of them, nor to describing some of them with reference to all of them.
Properties/GödelVsRussell: one could surely speak of the totality of all properties (or all of a certain type) without this leading to an "absurdity"! ((s) > Example "All properties of a great commander".
Gödel: this simply makes it impossible to construe their meaning (i.e. as an assertion about sense perception or any other non-conceptual entities), which is not an objection to someone taking the realistic point of view.
Part/whole/Mereology/GödelVsRussell: neither is it contradictory that a part should be identical (not just the same) with the whole, as can be seen in the case of structures in the abstract sense. Example: the structure of the series of integers contains itself as a special part.
I XVI/XVII
Even within the realm of constructivist logic there are certain approximations to this self-reflectivity (self-reflexivity/today: self-similarity) of impredicative qualities, namely e.g. propositions, which as parts of their meaning do not contain themselves, but their own formal provability. There are also sentences that refer to a totality of sentences to which they themselves belong: Example: "Each sentence of a (given) language contains at least one relational word".
This makes it necessary to look for other solutions to the paradoxes, according to which the fallacy does not consist in the assumption of certain self-reflectivities of the basic terms, but in other assumptions about them!
The solution may have been found for the time being in simple type theory. Of course, all this refers only to concepts.
Classes: one should think that they are also not created by their definitions, but only described! Then the circular error principle does not apply again.
Zermelo splits classes into "levels", so that only sets of lower levels can be elements of sets of higher levels.
Reducibility Axiom/Russell/Gödel: (later dropped) is now taken by the class axiom (Zermelo's "axiom of choice"): that for each level, for any propositional function
φ(x)
the set of those x of this level exists for which φ(x) is true.
This seems to be implied by the concept of classes as multiplicities.
I XVIII
Extensionality/Classes: Russell: two reasons against the extensional view of classes: 1. the existence of the zero class, which cannot be well a collection, 2. the single classes, which should be identical with their only elements. GödelVsRussell: this could only prove that the zero classes and the single classes (as distinguished from their only element) are fictions to simplify the calculation, and do not prove that all classes are fictions!
Russell: tries to get by as far as possible without assuming the objective existence of classes. According to this, classes are only a facon de parler.
Gödel: but also "idealistic" propositions that contain universals could lead to the same paradoxes.
Russell: creates rules of translation according to which sentences containing class names or the term "class" are translated into sentences not containing them.
Class Name/Russell: eliminate by translation rules.
Classes/Principia Mathematica/Russell/Gödel: the Principia Mathematica can do without classes, but only if you assume the existence of a concept whenever you want to construct a class.
First, some of them, the basic predicates and relations like "red", "colder" must be apparently considered real objects. The higher terms then appear as something constructed (i.e. something that does not belong to the "inventory of the world").
I XIX
Ramsey: said that one can form propositions of infinite length and considers the difference finite/infinite as not so decisive. Gödel: Like physics, logic and mathematics are based on real content and cannot be "explained away".
Existence/Ontology/Gödel: it does not behave as if the universe of things is divided into orders and one is forbidden to speak of all orders, but on the contrary: it is possible to speak of all existing things. But classes and concepts are not among them.
But when they are introduced as a facon de parler, it turns out that the extension of symbolism opens the possibility of introducing them in a more comprehensive way, and so on, to infinity.
To maintain this scheme, however, one must presuppose arithmetics (or something equivalent), which only proves that not even this limited logic can be built on nothing.
I XX
Constructivist posture/constructivism/Russell/Gödel: was abandoned in the first edition, since the reducibility axiom for higher types makes it necessary that basic predicates of arbitrarily high type exist. From constructivism remains only
1. Classes as facon de parler
2. The definition of ~, v, etc. as valid for propositions containing quantifiers,
3. The stepwise construction of functions of orders higher than 1 (of course superfluous because of the R-Axiom)
4. the interpretation of definitions as mere typographical abbreviations (all incomplete symbols, not those that name an object described by the definition!).
Reducibility Axiom/GödelVsRussell: this last point is an illusion, because of the reducibility axiom there are always real objects in the form of basic predicates or combinations of such according to each defined symbol.
Constructivist posture/constructivism/Principia Mathematica/Gödel: is taken again in the second edition and the reducibility axiom is dropped. It is determined that all basic predicates belong to the lowest type.
Variables/Russell/Gödel: their purpose is to enable the assertions of more complicated truth functions of atomistic propositions. (i.e. that the higher types are only a facon de parler.).
The basis of the theory should therefore consist of truth functions of atomistic propositions.
This is not a problem if the number of individuals and basic predicates is finite.
Ramsey: Problem of the inability to form infinite propositions is a "mere secondary matter".
I XXI
Finite/infinite/Gödel: with this circumvention of the problem by disregarding the difference between finite and infinite a simpler and at the same time more far-reaching interpretation of set theory exists: Then Russell's Apercu that propositions about classes can be interpreted as propositions about their elements becomes literally true, provided n is the number of (finite) individuals in the world and provided we neglect the zero class. (..) + I XXI
Theory of integers: the second edition claims that it can be achieved. Problem: that in the definition "those cardinals belonging to each class that contains 0 and contains x + 1 if it contains x" the phrase "each class" must refer to a given order.
I XXII
Thus whole numbers of different orders are obtained, and complete induction can be applied to whole numbers of order n only for properties of n! (...) The question of the theory of integers based on ramified type theory is still unsolved.
I XXIII
Theory of Order/Gödel: is more fruitful if it is considered from a mathematical point of view, not a philosophical one, i.e. independent of the question of whether impredicative definitions are permissible. (...) impredicative totalities are assumed by a function of order α and ω .
Set/Class/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell/Type Theory/Gödel: the existence of a well-ordered set of the order type ω is sufficient for the theory of real numbers.
Def Continuum Hypothesis/Gödel: (generalized): no cardinal number exists between the power of any arbitrary set and the power of the set of its subsets.
Type Theory/VsType Theory/GödelVsRussell: mixed types (individuals together with predications about individuals etc.) obviously do not contradict the circular error principle at all!
I XXIV
Russell based his theory on quite different reasons, similar to those Frege had already adopted for the theory of simpler types for functions. Propositional functions/statement function/Russell/Gödel: always have something ambiguous because of the variables. (Frege: something unsaturated).
Propositional function/p.f./Russell/Gödel: is so to speak a fragment of a proposition. It is only possible to combine them if they "fit together" i.e. are of a suitable type.
GödelVsRussell: Concepts (terms) as real objects: then the theory of simple types is not plausible, because what one would expect (like "transitivity" or the number two) to be a concept would then seem to be something that stands behind all its different "realizations" on the different levels and therefore does not exist according to type theory.
I XXV
Paradoxes in the intensional form/Gödel: here type theory brings a new idea: namely to blame the paradoxes not on the axiom that every propositional function defines a concept or a class, but on the assumption that every concept results in a meaningful proposition if it is claimed for any object as an argument. The objection that any concept can be extended to all arguments by defining another one that gives a false proposition whenever the original one was meaningless can easily be invalidated by pointing out that the concept "meaningfully applicable" does not always have to be meaningfully applicable itself.


1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Göd II
Kurt Gödel
Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990
Putnam, H. Lewis Vs Putnam, H. I (b) 27
Failed descriptions are not senseless! (Putnam: the theoretical terms of a refuted theory are senseless.). Cf. >Sensible/senseless. LewisVsPutnam: they are not, if they resemble failed markings. "The Martian Moon" and "the Venus Moon" (in some normal way) do not name anything here in our real world; but they are not pointless because we know very well what they name in certain other possible worlds.
In our detective story a different story would then be realized. Yes, it even had a single realization: the story that arises when we fix or correct the small error. A single near-realization.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Putnam, H. Nozick Vs Putnam, H. II 339
Functionalism/NozickVsPutnam: f in addition we need the biological function of the physical states as realization of functional connections. Putnam: is right in that the defined material base is not important. But it does not follow that nothing is essential about the material basis! E.g. a marble rolling up and down in the head of a Martian would have the same functional connections as joke has for us. It does not follow that the Martian is in pain during this process! VsPutnam: two additional conditions: 1) the respective states under the functional isomorphism must have isomorphic internal structures themselves. 2) (which gives content to the first): these states have to play their role in a way that depends on its (isomorphic) internal structure. Mental State/Pain/Martian/Nozick: for the mental states to be the same as for us, the physical states must not only play the same role, but also be configured the same as ours (internally). (FN 47). If the internal configurations of the Martians are different from ours, although they should explain the same roles, then they are in other mental states. Nozick: nevertheless even Martians for whom all of this applies II 340 are still not in the same mental states if they do not have the same biological function as ours: to identify or bring about the abstract rational relations.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Putnam, H. Poundstone Vs Putnam, H. I 95
Quark/Poundstone: are quarks counterfactual? It is impossible to observe an isolated quark. They are what would make a proton split if it could be split, but it cannot be split.
I 96
Reason: the color intensity grows with increasing distance instead of diminishing. Endless energy demand. Even if it was possible to provide this energy, new particles would be produced instead of a quark.
PoundstoneVsPutnam: the answer to whether these assumptions are merely complications lies not in the skies, but in our minds.

I 319
Universe/Turtle/Poundstone: E.g. "The universe rests on the back of a turtle": is to say that the known universe rests on the back of an unknown turtle. We automatically determine the semantic content of "universe" such that it fits into the context of the sentence. Brains in the Vat/PoundstoneVsPutnam: we would do the same with a statement, "We are brains in a vat"! They could say: "I am that which "retort brain" means in the laboratory language". Within the retort language "laboratory language" would be a metaphysical expression without physical equivalent.

I 323
Thought Experiment/PoundstoneVsPutnam: possible or impossible physical realization is of importance in thought experiments! E.g. Twin Earth: a long chemical formula would correspond to a thick, sticky mass! Therefore no confusability with our water, other mental state!
The only other combination of hydrogen and oxygen (H2O2 hydrogen peroxide) is extremely unstable.
Planets with ammonia atmosphere would have to be much colder. When ammonia is liquid, mercury is solid. That would be a very different world.
((s) PoundstoneVsPutnam/(s): brings a holistic argument then).
I 324
PoundstoneVsPutnam: our brain is largely composed of water, i.e. we also have the meaning of water in our heads. The inhabitants of the Twin Earth would then have XYZ in their heads!
I 326
Twin Earth/Putnam: every experience is ambiguous. The counterparts have made identical experiences, their neuron currents or brain states may be identical, but there is more than one reality to match.
I 336
Model Theory/PoundstoneVsPutnam: a key which provides some kind of meaningful text at all will be the right one! Reason: the infinite number of theoretically possible keys.
I 339
Meaning/Translation/Coding/Cryptography/Poundstone: where is it? In the message, in the key? In the consciousness of those who understand the message? PoundstoneVsPutnam: only few would argue that the meaning is in the consciousness, after all, i.e. in the mind.
Extreme case: if the system puts out "iiii...", then the entire meaning lies in the key. Mostly, the meaning is divided between the text and the key.

Poundstone I
William Poundstone
Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988
German Edition:
Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995
Realism Millikan Vs Realism I 245
Classical Realism/thinking/Millikan: for classical realism thinking about a thing was to bring this thing or its nature before the conscious mind. Plato/Aristotle/Husserl: the nature of the thing alone occurs in the mind.
formerly Russell/Moore/phenomenalism: the thing alone comes before the mind, (without "nature").
Locke/Hume: Thesis: instead of the thing we are dealing with a representation that embodies its nature by copying it.
Descartes/Whitehead: a way or an aspect of the thing embodies its nature.
Knowledge/thinking/realism/Millikan: So we know ipso facto what we think.
The following four things are not distinguished by classical realism:
1. that it seems that one thinks something of something
2. really thinking
3. that it seems that one knows what one is thinking
4. really knowing what one thinks.
Identification/classical realism/Millikan: to identify the real value of one'S thoughts is then not the identification with something, or recognition, because one only has a single encounter with the thing.
Clear and precise/Realism: if a thought is clear, it is necessarily real and known about the nature of this thing, real or possible.
I 246
Consciousness/classical realism/Millikan: an act of becoming aware of an object happens in the moment and never has a reference to past or future acts of consciousness. Problem: how then a thing should be identified as the same as earlier. Classical realism makes a mystery of that.
Item/object/thing/classical realism: an object may then have no permanent existence.
Perception/Plato/Descartes/Locke/Millikan: Thesis: nothing can be identified by perception alone, recognition: is an act of pure thought in the re-encounter in the volatile flux of things that are given to the senses.
Sense/Platon/Descartes/Locke: to somehow direct the mind on eternal objects.
thinking/Plato/Descartes/Locke: Then one could only ever have thoughts of eternal objects, or of the eternal nature of volatile objects.
Solution: taking properties and kinds as the eternal objects one could think of directly.
I 247
Problem: how should one explain that eternal objects (properties) are related to temporal states? How could being involved in the world be essential to them? Then it had to be assumed that there are features and kinds that are not exemplified. Thing/nature/essence/classical realism/Millikan: because durable items could not appear before the (only momentarily conscious) mind, the thing and its nature had to be separated. (Nature is eternal and necessary, the thing transitory and accidental).
nature/classical realism was sometimes simplistically interpreted as a set of properties.
Problem: how can the nature of a transitory thing, its very own identity, be a set eternal characteristics?
Identity/MillikanVsRealism: how can the identity of a thing be something other than this thing again? But this has not troubled philosophers at that time.
Empiricism/EmpirismVsRealism/Hume/Millikan: revolutionary with Hume was that nothing should be in the mind which had not previously been in the senses. This means that the previous distinction between perception and thought coincided.
Problem: now is no longer how to construct the temporal from the eternal,
I 248
but how we should construct permanent objects from current objects. ((S) Hume/(S): Thesis: an object only exists in one moment and later again).This led to forms of nominalism and phenomenalism. Realism/thinking/judgment/nature/thing/existence/Millikan: a solution: if there is rather the nature than the object that comes before the mind, then the accidental object is not necessary for nature, it does not necessarily have to exist. Then the realization that there is really the object corresponds to a judgment rather than contemplation about its nature.
Existence: that the thing existed became something additional that was added.
Ontology/Millikan: Problem: that something should exist "in addition to its previously existing nature".
Thinking/Classic Realism/Millikan: applying a term was then equated to judging that a thing exists. So thinking-of = Identifying.
I 249
Identification/realism/Millikan: takes place only in a moment and involves only a single encounter with the object. Then this is a kind of aesthetic experience in which consciousness bathes in a becoming aware of the thing. What good would that do?
Identification/Millikan: which purpose does it serve normally? Thesis:
a) it supposed to help apply prior knowledge to a current case.
b) it should match up experiences that were mediated by a medium with experiences from another medium Ex seeing and language.
Identity/Relation/Millikan: then identification needs to be described as essentially relational! But classical realism is not able to.
Identification/classical realism/Millikan: assumes that the identification of the object is involved in thoinking of it. And since thinking of an object is a momentary act that has nothing to do with other acts, it is impossible to match the capturing of one aspect of an object and capturing a different aspect of that object! Ex knowing that Kant lived in Konigsberg has nothing to do with knowing that he was a philosopher.
I 250
Recognition/classical realism/Millikan: recognizing the object as the same is another achievement, it has nothing to do with the repeated thinking of the object. Intentionality/MillikanVsRealism/Millikan: Solution: there may be simple thoughts of complex objects. Also, my theory allows that one knows what one thinks while discovering the complexity of one's thoughts.
Intension/Millikan: my theory does not confuse intentionality with having differing intensions. That is, a term can transform with time, without losing track of the thing at issue. (Conceptual change, >meaning change).

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Shoemaker, S. Stalnaker Vs Shoemaker, S. I 19
Qualia/inverted spectra/Shoemaker/Stalnaker: tries to reconcile the recognition of inverted spectra with a functionalist and materialist theory of the mind. It is about the relation between consciousness and representation - between the intentional and the qualitative content of an experience.
StalnakerVsShoemaker: I defend the old-fashioned view that comparisons of the qualitative characteristics of the experience between persons are meaningless (meaningless) ((s) >Wittgenstein, bug example).
Qualia/Stalnaker: it is not about to eliminate them (to "quinete") but to accept them as plausible and understandable part of a purely relational structure.
Thesis: the comparability is possible because our concept of qualitative character is linked conceptually to the representational content.

I 235
Shoemaker's paradox/Stalnaker: is the whole story coherent? Could α and β so be "combined differently"? Solution/Stalnaker: the contradiction could be avoided in two ways: one could
a) to reject the identity statement 5
b) the identity statements 1-4.
Ad a): leads away from functionalism to a purely physicalist approach for qualia, subjective distinguishability is then no longer a criterion. Phenomenal experiences can systematically look the same, while they are not. This view would make a decision necessary, on which general level you wish to define physical types. And it is not clear on what basis one should decide this.
I 236
Problem: for that one would have to probably identify qualia with very fine-grained distinct physical properties. These may differ in details which are not perceptible to us. E.g. the physiological development of the brain during aging in a person would lead to other perceptions that would however subjectively remain the same perceptions of the person! ((s) distinction without difference).
Ad b): (to reject identity statements 1-4): that is Shoemaker's position.
Shoemaker: thesis: the addition of the backup system influences the qualitative character because it changes the memory mechanisms that are constitutive for the identity conditions for qualia. Then e.g. (see above) Alice's and Bertha's qualitative experiences differ.
Stalnaker: does this correspond to the common sense view?
StalnakerVsShoemaker: problem: subsequent changes in perception but also in the memory system of a person, but also counterfactual unrealized possibilities would change the qualitative character of the experiences of a person.
E.g. assume that Bertha has a flexible brain, when a part is damaged another part takes over the work.
Alice: her brain is less flexible, in case of damage to the qualitative character of her perceptions change.
StalnakerVsShoemaker: problem: even if the central realizations are the same and even if the damages never occur, it would seem that Shoemaker's response implies that the qualia would be different because of the different connections with potential alternative implementations of the experiences.
These differences may be purely intrapersonal: suppose Alice previously had an equally flexible brain like Bertha, but with age it lost its flexibility: Shoemaker seems to imply that the qualitative character of Alice's experiences of colors changes with changes in the potentiality of her brain, even if it is inaccessible to the introspection.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Soames, S. Schiffer Vs Soames, S. I 217
Compositional Semantics/Comp.sem./Understanding/Explanation/Scott Soames/Schiffer: (Soames 1987) Thesis: comp.sem. is not needed for explaining the language understanding, nevertheless natural languages have a comp.sem .: Language understanding/Soames: you should not look at the semantics to explain semantic competence.
Instead one needs comp.sem you. for the explanation of the representational character of the language. The central semantic fact about language is that it is needed to represent the world.
Propositions encode systematic information that characterize the world so and so. We need comp.sem. for the analysis of the principles of this encoding.
SchifferVsSoames: Instead, I have introduced the expression potential. One might assume that a finally formulated theory should be able to formulate theorems for the attribution of expression potential to each proposition of the language. But would that then not be a compositional theory?.
I 218
E.g. Harvey: here we did not need comp.sem. to assume that for each proposition of M (internal language) there is a realization of belief, that means (µ)(∑P)(If μ is a proposition of M and in the box, then Harvey believes that P).
(s) Although here no connection between μ and P is specified).
Schiffer: Now we could find a picture of formulas of M into German, which is a translation. But that provides no finite theory which would provide a theorem for every formula μ of M as
If μ is in the box, then Harvey thinks that snow is sometimes purple.
Propositional attitude/Meaning theory/Schiffer: Problem: it is not possible to find a finite theory which ascribes verbs for belief characteristics of this type.
Pointe: yet the terms in M have meaning! E.g. "Nemrac seveileb taht emos wons si elprup" would realize the corresponding belief in Harvey and thus also mean trivially.
SchifferVsCompositionality: when the word-meaning contributs to the proposition-meaning, then it is this. Then expressions in M have meaning. But these are not characteristics that can be attributed to a finite theory.
We could find only the property to attribute to each proposition of M a particular belief, but that cannot happen in a finite theory.
mental representation/Mentalese/Schiffer: the formulas in M are mental representations. They represent external conditions. Propositions of E, Harvey's spoken speech, received their representational character via the connection with mental representations. Therefore Mentalese needs no comp.sem.
SchifferVsSoames: So he is wrong and we need the comp.sem. not even for an illustration of how our propositions represent the world.
I 219
We had already achieved this result via the expresion potentials. Because: representational character: is indistinguishable from the expression potential.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Suppes, P. Fraassen Vs Suppes, P. I 65
Mathematics/Philosophy of Science/Suppes: Thesis: Philosophy of science should use mathematics and not meta-mathematics.
I 66
Theory/Suppes: the form of theories: he used the set theory. E.g. a system of mechanics is a mathematical structure, in which points are replaced by a set-theoretic predicate. Fraassen: two interesting questions:
1) How can classical mechanics have a model that covers all phenomena without mentioning electricity? (see above, charge affects mutual attraction).
Solution: the mathematical structure could go beyond mechanics.
2) Unintended realizations: could it not be that a system of mechanics is also one of the optics at the same time? Fraassen: probably not, but there may be other examples of this kind. E.g. same formula regulates diffusion of gases and heat transport.
Important argument: then it’s possible that the intended realization of the theory is not empirically adequate, but rather if the phenomena in their models are integrated in an unexpected way.
Intention/Intended/Unintended/Fraassen: then it looks as if the intention was part of the theory? No, this is not necessary: ​​unintended realizations disappear if we consider a larger observable part of the world. E.g. optics and mechanics of moving light sources together.
Theory/FraassenVsSuppes: his approach is still a bit too shallow.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Theism Mackie Vs Theism Stegmüller IV 466
Theodicy/popular version: (i) logical necessity: God cannot create e.g. quadrangular circles. Since evil is logically a part of the good, one cannot exist without the others. Vs: firstly: this is not a conclusion from the premise! further: a) The principle is not compellent.
1. if there were a common property that each and every thing possessed automatically, there would be no need for a predicate for it in any language.
2. It could be that this property would not be noticed by anyone!
However, one could not assert: if everything possessed this property, this property didn't exist at all.
b) The argument would explain at most the occurrence of very few evils. (As a side effect, not as e.g. planned genocide).
IV 467
Theodicy/popular version: (ii) frequently, the argument of "necessary means" is brought forward: The evil as a means for the good.
Ex. children must learn from mistakes.
StegmüllerVs: However, many children do not learn from the mistakes of the world, but perish from them!
Ex. pain as a warning function.
Stegmüller: all these truisms are irrelevant to the problem. They are relevant only for limited beings, but God is attributed omnipotence.
IV 468
(iii) principle of the organic whole: like an aesthetic principle: evil is part of the "organic whole". Such a world were even better than a purely good world. It were not static, but dynamic. Gradual overcoming of evil by the good. Def. evil of 1st order: suffering, pain, illness
Def. values of 1st order: joy, happiness
Def. values of 2nd order: moral values, responses to evil of 1st order: compassion, assistance, kindness, heroism.
Theism must then support the thesis that evils of 1st order are satisfactorily explained and justified by values of 2nd order.
Stegmüller IV 469
Theism/Mackie: Question: can the theist rightly claim that there is only absorbed evil in this world? Only then can he defend his position, otherwise there is unnecessary evils that God in his omnipotence could have avoided. VsTheism: 1. there is much more unabsorbed evils of 1st order (suffering, pain, etc.) as can fit in a valuable whole.
2. the game would be repeated at the next level!
The values of 2nd order are accompanied by evils of 2nd order: Ex. wickedness, callousness, gloating, cruelty, cowardice etc.
IV 470
Oly possibility: Values of 3rd order: only candidate: free will. It need not be such a value itself, but is logically necessary for realization.
IV 471
Theism/Theodicy/R. Gruner: the theist should not only concede the evils, but empasize them as particularly important. The most faithful people have always been those who were most convinced of the reality of evil.
Paradox: that faith depends precisely on that fact of which one claims it refuted it.
This position is taken in the dialogues of Hume of the Demea.
IV 479
Theodicy/free will: in defense of theism the concept of free will could be modified: freedom as a high value, such that God did not know at creation, how people would make use of it. Therefore God is not omniscient. Vs: 1. If God is not omniscient, he is no longer omnipotent, because a limitation of information is a limitation of power.
Vs: 2. God would have to be thought of in a timely manner. This renounces an essential element of monotheistic religion.
Vs 3. If God did not know what people would do, he still had to know what they could do!
IV 481
MackieVsTheism: canot be explained without contradiction, without changing major points. Hume: would say: our boundless ignorance prevents us from claiming to have conclusively refuted theism.
IV 516
MackieVsTheism: the competing naturalism always has the better arguments and lower improbability on its side.
IV 517
Religion/Theism/R. Robinson: Thesis: the main contradiction between religion and reason is that religion prefers the consolation of truth. God/Spinoza/Stegmüller: (relatively strong modification of the traditional concept of God): no creator God, but infinite. Metaphysical necessity is part of him and thus the universe itself.
Theodicy/Spinoza: Thesis: God knows no mercy! It is not a person, even not an infinite one, but a being who does not care about human concerns.
IV 518
Religion/theology/Mackie: the monotheistic religions rely on a for them indispensable assumption of existence that is probably wrong.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Williams, B. Nozick Vs Williams, B. II 29
Self/Person/Self-Identity/Identity/B.Williams: E.g. two stories that put together present us with a mystery: Case 1: a person enters a new body, or rather two persons exchange their bodies. Two persons, A and B enter a machine
A body person: (now connected to the body A): has all the memories, all the knowledge, values, behaviors, etc. of the (former, complete) person B. In the body A is now the "vector product" of this B material with the physical boundaries of body A.
Similarly, all the other way round for B. The situation is symmetrical.
II 29/30
If A were to decide (after substitutions) now, which severe pain should be inflicted by the two bodies, then A would select the A body for it! Because he believes that he himself inhabits the B body. Case 2: Imagine someone tells them that they are to endure terrible pain. That frightens them. Next, they get the information that they will undergo an enormous change in their psychological constitution, perhaps to the extent that they will have exactly the same character, the memories and behaviors of someone else, who is currently alive. That will scare them even more. They do not want to lose their identity and suffer pain afterwards.
Williams: question: why had person A not exactly the same concerns when she heard the first story, as in Case 2?
What makes the first story a story about the transfer of a person to a different body and not a story about something that happens to a person who remains who they are?
How can the difference consist in that in the first case, in addition to what happens to body A,
II 31
also A's memories and mind end or are newly created in body B? Problem: what happens anywhere else can have no effect on whether A continues to live in body A.
If this happens to a body, it is a psychological task and the acquisition of a new psyche.
Question: how can two tasks and the acquisition of new memories and values ​​result in the exchange of two bodies?
                 Body A / B Body
1) Situation acquires memories + character of B/acquires memories + character of A

2) Situation acquires memories + character of B/keeps memories + character or perhaps entirely new

Two principles should explain this:
Principle 1/Williams: If x at t1 is the same individual as y after t2, then this can only depend on facts about x, y and the relations between them. No facts about any other existing thing are relevant. That entails:
Principle 2/Williams: if y at t2 (is part of the same continuous particular like) x at t1, by virtue of a relation R to x at t1, then there could be another additional thing z at t2 that also (together with y) stands in R to x at t1. If this additional thing z at t2 exists, then neither z nor y would be identical to x.
If this z could potentially exist now, although it does currently not exist, then y at t2 is not identical with y at t1, at least not by virtue of relation R!
((s) If there is a relation R that allows identity at a later time, then several things can "benefit" from that and then the identity (which must be unique) would be destroyed. This is true even if the existence of a second thing is merely possible.)
II 32
Self/Identity/Person/Williams: Williams had formulated these two principles in three earlier publications to support his thesis: Physical identity is a necessary condition of personal identity.
Otherwise it would be possible to imagine that e.g. a person enters a machine, disappears and appears again in another machine at a distance without having crossed the space between them. Or:
E.g. There could be a third machine on the other side from which an also (qualitatively) different identical being emerges. Neither would be the original person who had entered the machine in the middle.
Now, if in this case of double materialization the original person is not identical with either of the two later persons, so not even in the first case, where only one person appears in a different place.
Williams: the mere possibility that someone appears intermittently in another place is sufficient to show that he himself cannot be the same person without doubling.
1) Principle: Identity of something cannot depend on whether there is another thing of some sort.
2) Principle: if it is possible that there was another thing that prevented identity, then there is no identity, even if this other thing did not exist!
((s) The first follows from the second here).
NozickVsWilliams: both principles are wrong.
1) (without personal identity): E.g. the Vienna Circle was expelled from Vienna by the Nazis, one member, Reichenbach, came to Istanbul. Suppose there were 20 members of the circle, three of which went to Istanbul and continued to meet. In 1943, they hear that the others are dead. Now they are the Vienna Circle which meets in Istanbul.
((s) ArmstrongVs/ChisholmVs: a local property is not a property.)
In 1945, they learn that 9 other members continued to meet in America and further developed the same philosophical program.
Nozick: then the group in America is the Vienna Circle, the one in Istanbul is just the offshoot.
Nozick: how is that possible? Either the group in Istanbul is the Vienna Circle or it is not. How can this be influenced by something that takes place elsewhere?
((s) Because subsets play a role here, which do not play a role, e.g. in personal identity. Analogue would have been to assume that some of the psychological characteristics are kept during the body changes).
II 33
Nozick: E.g. would it not be clear that if the 9 others had survived living underground in Vienna, this would show that the Istanbul group is not the Vienna Circle? So the First Principle (Williams) cannot be applied here: it is not plausible to say that if the group of three in Istanbul is the same entity as the original Vienna Circle, that this can only depend on relations between the two ...
Nozick: ...and not on whether anything else exists.
Def "Next Successor"/Closest Continuer/Nozick: Solution: The Istanbul group is the next successor. Namely so if no other group exists. But if the group in America exists, it is the next successor. Which one constitutes the Vienna Circle depends (unlike Williams) on the existence of other things.
Being something later means being the next successor. ((s) and being able to be called later then depends on the amount of shared properties). E.g. How many other groups of the Vienna Circle are there in exile? ("Scheme").
Identity in Time:/Nozick: it is no problem for something to replace its parts and to keep the identity.
E.g. Ship of Theseus/Nozick: 2nd ship made of collection of discarded parts from the old ship: two originals? (Was already known in this form in antiquity).
Next Successor: helps to structure the problem, but not solve it. Because the scheme does not say of itself, which dimension of weighted sum of dimensions determine the proximity. Two possibilities: a) spatio-temporal continuity b) continuity of the parts. If both are weighted equally, there is a stalemate.
II 34
Neither of them is the next successor. And therefore none is the original. But even if one originally existed without the other, it would be the original as next successor.
Perhaps the situation is not a stalemate, but an unclear weighting, the concepts may not be sharp enough to rank all possible combinations.
Personal Identity/Nozick: this is different, especially when it comes to ourselves: here we are not ready, that it is a question of decision of the stipulation.
Ship of Theseus/NozickVsWilliams: external facts about external things do matter: when we first hear the story, we are not in doubt, only once the variant with the second, reconstructed ship comes into play.
Next Successor/Nozick: necessary condition for identity: something at t2 is not the same entity as x at t1 if it is not x's next successor.
If two things are equally close, none of them is the next successor.
Something can be the next successor of x without being close enough to x to be x itself!
If the view of the next successor is correct, then our judgments about identity reflect weights of dimensions.
Form of thought: reversal: we can conversely use these judgments to discover these dimensions.
II 35
A property may be a factor for identity without being a necessary condition for it. Physical identity can also be an important factor. If something is the next successor, it does not mean that his properties are qualitatively the same as those of x, or are similar to them! Rather, they arise from the properties of x. They are definitely causally caused!
Spatio-Temporal Continuity/Nozick: cannot be explained merely as a film without gaps. Counter-example: The replacement with another thing would not destroy the continuity of the film!
Causal Relation/Next Successor: the causal relation does not need to involve temporal continuity! E.g. every single thing only possessed a flickering existence (like messages through the telephone). If this applies to all things, it is the best kind of continuity.
NozickVsWilliams: but if you find that some things are not subject to the flickering of their existence, then you will no longer talk of other things as the best realizations of continuously existing things. Dependency of identity on other things!
Theology/God/Identity/Nozick: Problem: if the causal component is required, and suppose God keeps everything in continuous existence, closing all causal connections in the process: how does God then distinguish the preservation of an old thing in continuity from the production of a new, qualitatively identical thing without interrupting a "movie"?
II 36
Temporal Continuity/NozickVsWilliams: how much temporal continuity is necessary for a continuous object depends on how closely things are continuously related elsewhere. Psychology/Continuity/Identity/Nozick: experiments with objects which emerge (again) more or less changed after a time behind a screen.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Wittgenstein Sellars Vs Wittgenstein II 318
Mapping/image/world/thinking/language/Sellars: question: is there no mapping relationship between language and the world, which is essential for meaning and truth? Def image/Tractatus: relation between facts about linguistic expressions on the one hand and facts about non-linguistic objects on the other hand.
II 319
Language/world/Sellars: Vs Temptation to imagine facts about non-linguistic objects as non-linguistic entities of a special kind: non-linguistic pseudo entities. We have seen, however, that "non-linguistic facts" in another sense are linguistic entities themselves.
Their connection with the non-linguistic order is rather something one has created, or must establish, as a relation. (But not redundancy).
Fact/statement/Sellars: one can say something "about a fact" in two different ways:
a) The statement includes a statement that expresses a true proposition. In this sense every truth function of a true statement is a statement "about a fact".
b) it contains a fact statement, that means the name of a fact instead of a statement.
K depicts y.
Here K is a complex natural language subject. This assumes the meta-linguistic status of facts. However, the form of:
that p depicts y:
II 321
Fact/object/statement/Sellars: here statements about complex objects would be statements "about facts" in the sense that they contained fact statements. "K" would therefore apparently refer to a complex natural language subject but in reality to the statement that describes its complexity! Statement/world/SellarsVsWittgenstein: Statements, according to which natural language objects are images of other natural objects, would only refer to seemingly natural language objects, but in reality to statements, including the assumed about the statement conception of norms and standards.
Another consequence would be that only simple non-linguistic objects could be depicted when complex objects were facts, which would lead to the well-known antinomy, that there must be atomic facts that would be the condition that language can depict the world, for which no example could be given if one asked a speaker to.
Solution/Sellars: Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus).
SellarsVsWittgenstein: weakened the momentum of the idea that language enables us to depict the world by connecting it too closely to the model
fact depicts fact.
There are in any case n-digit configurations of reference expressions.
Question: what of them leads them to the fact that they say of special reference objects that they are in this particular n-digit relation to each other? One is tempted to say: Convention.
II 322
Maps/Wittgenstein: Configurations are to be found in the map, but it is not necessary that e.g. spatial structures are reproduced through spatial configurations. ((s) E.g. contour lines) The only essential characteristic: that n-digit atomic facts are formed by n-digit configurations of proper names.
SellarsVsWittgenstein : The analogy may even be extended. Maps are only in a parasitic sense a logical picture. Wittgenstein himself emphasized that a logical picture can exist as such only in the domain of truth-operations.
E.g. map: the fact that a certain point is there is linked to the statement, for example, that Chicago is located between Los Angeles and New York.
Moreover, even if we would have a country map language of spatial relationships, and truth functions could be applied directly to them, only as a small part of a comprehensive Universe of discourse existed.
Problem: has the function of elementary statements generally something in common with that of cartographic configurations which is not expressed in the slogan that n-digit configurations of proper names represent n-digit configurations of objects?

II 323
Natural linguistic objects: (> Searles background): Solution: Natural linguistic objects are to be seen as linguistic counterparts of non-linguistic objects (not facts!).
II 324
One can speak of them as "proper names". That takes up Wittgenstein's understanding that elementary statements must be constructed as in a particular way occurring proper names. SellarsVsWittgenstein: in my view, however, is the way in which the "proper names" occur in the "image" not a conventional symbol of the way in which objects occur in the world! I believe instead that the position of proper names in an image is a projection of the position of objects in the world.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Functionalism Field, Hartry II 43
Belief / functionalism / Stalnaker / Lewis / Field: thesis: that belief is a functional state. (Regardless of the physical realization). N.B.: this involves no relation to a sentence or phrase analogue in a system of internal representations.
Orthograf. Happenst. Field, Hartry II 50
Def orthographic coincidence/orthographic/predicate/single/multiple/belief/Field: thesis: one should take all different attributions e.g. "X believes Russell was bald", "X believes Russell was bald or snow is white" etc. as primitive one-digit predicates. Then we could drop all two-digit predicates like "X believes p" completely!
Orthographic coincidence: then the fact that the expression "believes" occurs in both (supposedly) single-digit predicates would be a mere orthographic coincidence without meaning.
Likewise, the fact that both include "Russell was bald"!
FieldVs: you cannot take that seriously. But suppose it would be serious, what would follow from that?
FieldVsOrthographic Coincidence: it would follow that there must be no physical relation between people and propositions. For since we have not spoken of a psychological relation, it is clear that there is no realization at all in which a physical relation would be needed.
Reductionism Lewis, D. I 31 Reduction / Lewis. weak reduction premise: there is a theory which is realized by an n-tuple of traditional expressions or theoretical terms to another theory - strong red. pr.: there is a single n-tuple that is the only realization of T - implying a theoretical equation,that are no stipulations, but deductive conclusions.
Multiple Realisation Lewis, D. IV 89
Lewis: Thesis: I do not see why we could not live with multiple realizations of theories.
Antidualism Schiffer, St. I 20
Anti-dualism: (40 years ago): behaviorism: the mental properties are identical with dispositions.
  (20 years ago): physicalism: mental properties are physical properties, resp. mental Z types are physical Z-types (type-type identity thesis).
  VsType-type identity: problem of multiple realization:
I 21
We can not chauvinistically exclude machines.