Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|
Consciousness | Rosenthal | Chalmers I 230 Consciousness/Rosenthal: (Rosenthal 1996)(1): Thesis: For a state to be conscious, it must be the object of thought of a higher-level thought. These second level thoughts are usually not conscious, so we do not notice them. ChalmersVs: considerations from the position of the third person speak against it, and second level thoughts do not seem to appear relevant to a cognitive system. They would usually be redundant (for example, if they were needed for every detail in the field of vision). >Thinking, >Cognition, >Thoughts. Experiences/Rosenthal: experiences are states of which we have a consciousness. >Experiences. ChalmersVs: it is not certain that most of our experiences are the object of our thoughts. >Perception, >World/Thinking. 1. David M. Rosenthal (1996). "A theory of consciousness". In: Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press (1997). |
Rosenthal I David M. Rosenthal "Multiple drafts and the facts of matter" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|
Dennett, D. | Rosenthal Vs Dennett, D. | Pauen I 140 RosenthalVsDennett: Dennett's insistence on revisibility is perfectly compatible with the attribution of mental states. |
Rosenthal I David M. Rosenthal "Multiple drafts and the facts of matter" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
Functionalism | Verschiedene Vs Functionalism | Münch III 338 Functionalism/Holenstein: its obvious limit refers to the phenomenal qualities. Phenomena are functionally not identifiable. It can be decided whether the property of a thing that two persons assign the adjective "red" to is functionally equivalent for them. However, it is undecidable whether both perceive the same color. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 James I 102 VsFunctionalism,VsPragmatism: The concept of utility is circular and empty. "Everything that is useful for a system" can be understood arbitrarily. VsPragmatism: that James confuses truth with probation: it can never be established whether an observation is correctly translated. (Basic sentence problem, also Quine). Schwarz I 155 VsRoll/VsLewis: a special feature of our mental states is their familiarity. We do not identify them through causal roles. LewisVsVs: integrates introspection into the causal role without further ado. The causal role of conscious experiences includes the fact that (under appropriate circumstances) they produce opinions about their own existence. (1966a(1), 103). 1. David Lewis [1966a]: “An Argument for the Identity Theory”. Journal of Philosophy, 63: 17–25. Mit Erg¨anzungen in David M. Rosenthal (Hg.), Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, Engelwood Cliffs: Prentica-Hall, 1971 |
Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
Introspection | Verschiedene Vs Introspection | Metz II 413 Introspection/Güzeldere: it is a mistake to want to look into a person's head in order to find out the content of their introspective awareness. E.g. Armstrong's truck driver: if he had information about his intrinsic brain characteristics, he would not be enlightened about his situation. All this has a lot to do with intrinsic brain traits, but none of it has to include one's own awareness. Metz II 425 Irrefutable Fact/Consciousness/Rosenthal/Dennett: there is simply no "irrefutable fact" as to whether the initial stimulus will ever become conscious. Introspection cannot decide this. Tetens IV 49 Perception/Introspection/Tetens: in order to know that I am perceiving, I do not have to separately "inspect my inner being" first. |
Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|
Ment. State = Percept. | Pro | Metzinger II 397 Conscious mental states: "perception-like": Locke, Armstrong, Churchland, Lycan - "thought-like": Rosenthal, Carruthers, Dennett, Descartes. |
Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
Ment. State = Percept. | Versus | PdG II 397 Conscious mental states: "perception-like": Locke, Armstrong, Churchland, Lycan - "thought-like": Rosenthal, Carruthers, Dennett, Descartes |
|
Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|
Higher Order Thought | Rosenthal, D.M. | Metzinger II 394 Gedanken höherer Ordnung/GhO/Rosenthal: These ein mentaler Zustand wird genau dadurch zu einem bewußten Zustand, daß er zum Inhalt eines höherstufigen Gedankens wird, nämlich des seinerseits bewußten Gedankens, daß ich mich in diesem Zustand befinde. |
Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
Rosenthal, D.M. | |||