Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Consciousness Rosenthal Chalmers I 230
Consciousness/Rosenthal: (Rosenthal 1996)(1): Thesis: For a state to be conscious, it must be the object of thought of a higher-level thought. These second level thoughts are usually not conscious, so we do not notice them. ChalmersVs: considerations from the position of the third person speak against it, and second level thoughts do not seem to appear relevant to a cognitive system. They would usually be redundant (for example, if they were needed for every detail in the field of vision).
>Thinking, >Cognition, >Thoughts.
Experiences/Rosenthal: experiences are states of which we have a consciousness.
>Experiences.
ChalmersVs: it is not certain that most of our experiences are the object of our thoughts.
>Perception, >World/Thinking.

1. David M. Rosenthal (1996). "A theory of consciousness". In: Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press (1997).

Rosenthal I
David M. Rosenthal
"Multiple drafts and the facts of matter"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Dennett, D. Rosenthal Vs Dennett, D. Pauen I 140
RosenthalVsDennett: Dennett's insistence on revisibility is perfectly compatible with the attribution of mental states.

Rosenthal I
David M. Rosenthal
"Multiple drafts and the facts of matter"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Functionalism Verschiedene Vs Functionalism Münch III 338
Functionalism/Holenstein: its obvious limit refers to the phenomenal qualities. Phenomena are functionally not identifiable. It can be decided whether the property of a thing that two persons assign the adjective "red" to is functionally equivalent for them. However, it is undecidable whether both perceive the same color.
Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992
James I 102
VsFunctionalism,VsPragmatism: The concept of utility is circular and empty. "Everything that is useful for a system" can be understood arbitrarily. VsPragmatism: that James confuses truth with probation: it can never be established whether an observation is correctly translated. (Basic sentence problem, also Quine).
Schwarz I 155
VsRoll/VsLewis: a special feature of our mental states is their familiarity. We do not identify them through causal roles. LewisVsVs: integrates introspection into the causal role without further ado. The causal role of conscious experiences includes the fact that (under appropriate circumstances) they produce opinions about their own existence. (1966a(1), 103).


1. David Lewis [1966a]: “An Argument for the Identity Theory”. Journal of Philosophy, 63: 17–25. Mit Erg¨anzungen in David M. Rosenthal (Hg.), Materialism and the Mind-Body
Problem, Engelwood Cliffs: Prentica-Hall, 1971





Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Introspection Verschiedene Vs Introspection Metz II 413
Introspection/Güzeldere: it is a mistake to want to look into a person's head in order to find out the content of their introspective awareness. E.g. Armstrong's truck driver: if he had information about his intrinsic brain characteristics, he would not be enlightened about his situation.
All this has a lot to do with intrinsic brain traits, but none of it has to include one's own awareness.
Metz II 425
Irrefutable Fact/Consciousness/Rosenthal/Dennett: there is simply no "irrefutable fact" as to whether the initial stimulus will ever become conscious. Introspection cannot decide this.
Tetens IV 49
Perception/Introspection/Tetens: in order to know that I am perceiving, I do not have to separately "inspect my inner being" first.





Tetens I
H. Tetens
Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994

W VII
H. Tetens
Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Ment. State = Percept. Pro Metzinger II 397
Conscious mental states: "perception-like": Locke, Armstrong, Churchland, Lycan - "thought-like": Rosenthal, Carruthers, Dennett, Descartes.

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996
Ment. State = Percept. Versus PdG II 397
Conscious mental states: "perception-like": Locke, Armstrong, Churchland, Lycan - "thought-like": Rosenthal, Carruthers, Dennett, Descartes

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Higher Order Thought Rosenthal, D.M. Metzinger II 394
Gedanken höherer Ordnung/GhO/Rosenthal: These ein mentaler Zustand wird genau dadurch zu einem bewußten Zustand, daß er zum Inhalt eines höherstufigen Gedankens wird, nämlich des seinerseits bewußten Gedankens, daß ich mich in diesem Zustand befinde.

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996
Rosenthal, D.M.