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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aesthetics | Hegel | Gadamer I 65 Aesthetics/Hegel/GadamerVsHegel/Gadamer: As is well known, the perhoresis of the dogmatic schematism of the Hegel school in the middle of the 19th century led to the demand for a renewal of critique under the slogan "Back to Kant". The same applies to aesthetics. As great as the evaluation of art for a history of world views was, which Hegel gave in his aesthetics - the method of such an a priori construction of history, which was used in the Hegel school (Rosenkranz, Schasler and others), was quickly discredited. The demand for a return to Kant, however, which was raised against it, could not really mean a return and regaining the horizon that surrounded Kant's criticisms. Rather, the phenomenon of art and the concept of genius remained at the centre of aesthetics, and the problem of natural beauty, including the concept of taste, remained on the margins. >Natural Beauty/Hegel, >Aesthetics/Kant, >Genius/Kant, >Taste/Kant. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Analogies | Kant | Strawson V 102 Analogies of Experience/Kant: We do not find them in the axioms of intuition. "Experiences are only possible with the idea of a necessary connection of perceptions". - Transcendental Aesthetic/Kant: Principles of sensibility a priori. Transcendental Analytic: comprises the deduction of the categories, the schematism and the principles. Strawson V 104 Analogy: Shows how the order of the perceptions must be represented with the terms - Kant brilliantly reduces it on temporal relations - 1. between the objects 2. between the experiences. Strawson V 105 1. Analogy/Kant: the quantum of substance in nature can be neither reduced nor increased. >Substance. V 106 Time/Kant: All determination of time presupposes something permanent. Only space is persistent. Strawson V 107 StrawsonVsKant: That is not a reason for the objective order to be spatial. Strawson V 108 StrawsonVsKant: There is no need for a conservation principle! Only a re-identification principle for loci (objects). - Nowadays: We see that something burns while no substance remains. Strawson V 112 2./3. Analogy/Kant: Question: Could perceptions also have occurred reversely? a) Events: No time indifference b) Object: time difference Strawson V 115 2. Analogy: The order of the sequence is not only necessary, but also specific, bound by our apprehensions. Causality: If the order is necessary, the change itself is necessary. StrawsonvsKant: He unconsciously uses two terms of necessity here: conceptual/causal Strawson V 116/117 3. Analogy/Kant: the interaction of simultaneously existing objects corresponds to a time indifference of perceptions. Strawson: unlike causality. >Causality/Kant, >Perception/Kant, >Principles/Kant, >Experience/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Reason | Kant | Bubner I 142 Reason/Kant/Bubner: no one but the reason can say what reason really is - reason is bothered by the questions it cannot reject, nor answer. --- Kant I 105 Reason/unit/Kant: the law of reason to seek unity is necessary because we would not have any reason without it and therefore no sufficient feature of empirical truth. - Thus we have not only punctual correspondence, but systematic coherence. Kant assumed reason in nature. >Nature/Kant. I 113 Reason/Kant: reason in itself, is not something objective, even ideas of purposes are not. - We project reasonable causes into the object. - However: this projection is necessary, but it is only a projection that justifies no real science. Reason: Def Pure Reason/Kant: pure reason unifies ideas in an intuition by categories. Def Pure logic: unifies different ideas in a judgment. >Judgments/Kant. I 87 Def Reason/Kant: the capability of concepts. Also the pure reason can be a source of knowledge, for "philosophical" knowledge, and formal-logical. Term/Kant: "nothing but the synthesis is possible intuitions that are not given a priori ". Philosophical propositions are therefore always general principles for possible empirical intuition connections, for example, the principle of causality. >Concepts/Kant, >Categories/Kant. I 93 "Inside" acts of reason/Kant: "inner sense, of which time is the shape". - The images, which prescribe the objective units of things, are images of I of itself in time. - The unity of consciousness of the object is then also the unity of the thing. -> Schematism: recognizes categories as useful as illustrative determinations. I 99 Reason/Kant: term - Power of judgment: judgment - Reason: End. All three are forming the reason in a broader sense. --- Münch III 327 Def Reason/Kant: the capability of rules. They are separated from intuition for Kant. Holenstein: modern: intelligence. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 --- Strawson V 24 Reason/Kant: general functions also without sensuality - pure reason terms: = categories. >Categories/Kant. V 25 Schematism: transition to categories-in-use. - Only time without space. Transcendental deduction: each category must have a use in experience. StrawsonVsKant: that is logically flawed. >Experience/Kant, >Time/Kant. --- Bubner I 103 Kant/new: mind action consists in judging, a table of pure mind functions, which, however, are indeterminate with respect to all objects. The performance of union results from the act. It is not triggered from the outside! > Synthesis/Kant. --- Adorno XIII 105 Mind/Kant/Adorno: as far as reason is concerned, which refers to the possibility of recognizing the content, the material, Kant speaks of reason. Mind activity/Kant: is the activity of reason, which refers to a material which belongs to the senses ir azus and which unifies them and deals with its synthesis. Reason/Kant: here, this activity should be no longer bound to such a material but should be free of it. In the cognitive or noological meaning, reason gives us at least the regulative, in the sense of which our experience of the sensual is to proceed. Reason in this concise sense would be the ability to recognize ideas. Reason/Kant/Adorno: in a third sense, reason gives in perfect freedom its objects to itself. This is the practical use of reason. Paradoxically, we are here, according to Kant... Adorno XIII 106 ...not bound to the topic. Practical reason/Kant/Adorno: our reason or we act practically, insofar as we act purely according to reason and according to its purposes, without letting these purposes be given to us. Purpose/Kant/Adorno: Thus, we must only allow them to be given to ourselves by our own principle, the innermost principle of subjectivity itself. >Subjectivity/Kant. Reason/Kant/Adorno: is then an absolute activity of the mind in contrast to one limited by materials. In this way it becomes a higher and, to a certain extent, a counter-instance of the reason. Adorno XIII 110 Mind/Kant/Adorno: the reason activity which refers to the order functions which we are exercising against a material which comes to us from the outside and which is chaotic, unstructured and in itself quite undetermined according to Kant. Reason/Kant: once again reflects on the mind, on the use which the mind makes of itself and judges according to it, decides whether, in the sense of the purposes which it Adorno XIII 111 gives to itself, is a more highly developed one. Adorno XIII 112 Reason/Hegel/Adorno: in Hegel and already in Kant, there are reminiscences of the reification of reason in the sense that the common human should not think too much. Adorno XIII 113 Reason/Horkheimer/Adorno: Problem: reason should be the principle of freedom, but at the same time also a law and in this respect something badly repressive. In its concept, however, the relation of freedom and coercion has not actually been articulated. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Symbols | Kant | Gadamer I 80 Symbols/Kant/Gadamer: It is precisely the indeterminacy of its meaning that allows the word and concept of the symbolic to rise victoriously when the rationalist aesthetics of the Age of Enlightenment succumbed to critical philosophy and the aesthetics of genius. >Genius/Gadamer. What became decisive was that Kant, in §59, gave the Critique of Judgement a logical analysis of the concept of the symbol, which puts precisely this point in the brightest light. Symbolic representation is set off by him against the schematic one. It is representation (and not mere designation as in so-called "logical symbolism"), only that the symbolic representation does not directly represent a concept (as Kant's philosophy of transcendental schematism does), but indirectly, "whereby the expression is not the actual scheme for the concept, but merely a Gadamer I 81 symbol for reflection." Gadamer: Kant thus does justice to the theological truth that has given itself its scholastic form in the thought of the Analogia entis, and keeps human concepts away from God. Kant: "Beauty is the symbol of the moral good": in this just as careful as concise formula, Kant united the demand for full freedom of reflection of the aesthetic power of judgement with its humane meaning - a thought that became of the greatest historical impact. Schiller was his successor here (1). If he based the idea of an aesthetic education of the human race on the analogy of beauty and morality formulated by Kant, he could follow an explicit reference of Kant: "Taste makes a transition possible - a transition from the stimulus of the senses to the habitual moral interest without a too violent leap"(2). 1.Schiller says for example in "Grace and Dignity" that the beautiful object can become symbol of an idea (Werke ed. Güntter u. Witkowski, 1910ff., Teil 17, S. 322). 2. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft3, S. 260. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Chomsky, N. | Harman Vs Chomsky, N. | I 306 Competence/Performance/ChomskyVsHarman: competence as "knowledge that language is described by the rules of grammar". And that "grammar specifies this competence". ChomskyVsHarman: I have not only never asserted this, but also repeatedly rejected it publicly. It would be absurd if the speaker had to know the rules explicitly. Knowledge/Language/Harman: a) knowing that b) knowing how. Since language is obviously not "knowing that", it must be "knowing how". The speaker knows "how he has to understand other speakers." Analogous to the ability of the cyclist. I 307 ChomskyVsHarman: he uses "competence" very different than me. I see no relation to the "ability of the cyclist", not a "set of habits," or something like that. I 308 HarmanVsChomsky: the internalized system (that limits the choice of grammars) must be represented in a more fundamental language, and the child must have understood the latter already, before it can apply this schematism a) this leads to a circle: If you said that the child mastered the "more fundamental language" "directly", without having learned it, then why do you not also say that it mastered the actual language "directly" without learning it. Or: b) Regress: If, however, you said that it has to learn the more fundamental language first, then the question is how this fundamental language is learned itself. ChomskyVsHarman: even if you assume that the schematism must be represented at an "innate language", it does not follow what Harman sees: the child may need to master the "more fundamental language", but it does not have to "speak and understand" it. We just have to assume that it can make use of it. ad a): the assumption that the child masters its native language without learning it is wrong. It is not born with perfect knowledge of German. On the other hand, nothing speaks against the assumption that it is born with perfect knowledge of a universal grammar. HarmanVsChomsky: in a model, conclusions from the given data on a grammar can only be made, if detailed information on a theory of performance is included in the model. Chomsky: interesting, but not necessary. I 310 Empiricism/Theory/HarmanVsChomsky: calls Chomsky’s strategy "inventive empiricism", a doctrine that uses "induction principles". Such "inventive empiricism" is certainly not to be refuted, "no matter how the linguistic data look". ChomskyVsHarman: empiricism is not so important. I’m interested in the question of whether there are "ideas and principles of various kinds" which "determine the form of the knowledge acquired in a largely defined and highly organized manner" (rationalist variant) or whether on the other hand "the structure of the appropriation mechanism is limited to simple and peripheral processing mechanisms..." (empiricist variant). It is historically justified and makes heuristic sense to distinguish that. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Chomsky, N. | Putnam Vs Chomsky, N. | Chomsky I 293 PutnamVsChomsky: Putnam assumes for phonetics in the universal grammar, that it only has a single list of sounds. This did not require a sophisticated explanatory hypothesis. Only "memory span and powers of recollection". "No upright behaviorist would deny that these are innate properties." ChomskyVsPutnam: but there have been set up very strong empirical hypotheses about the selection of the universal distinctive features, none of which seems to be explained on the basis of restrictions of memory. Chomsky I 298 PutnamVsChomsky: Thesis: instead of an innate schematism, "general multipurpose strategies" could be assumed. This innate base would have to be the same for the acquisition of any knowledge, so that there is nothing special about language acquisition. Chomsky I 299 ChomskyVsPutnam: with that he is no longer entitled to assume something is innate. Furthermore, it only shifts the problem. PutnamVsChomsky: the evaluation functions proposed in the universal grammar "the kind of facts is constituted which tries to explain the theory of learning, but not the required explanation itself". ChomskyVsPutnam: E.g. no one would say that the genetic basis for the development of arms instead of wings was "the kind of fact that attempts to explain the theory of learning". Rather, they are the basis for an explanation of other facts of human behavior. Whether the evaluation function is learned or is the basis of learning, is an empirical question. PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered by routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not very impressive. ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact that refers to competence and not to performance (actual practice). What the grammar explains is why e.g. in "criticism of students" "student" can be understood as subject or object, whereas e.g. "grain" in "the growing of the grain" can only be subject. The question of routine does not matter here. Chomsky I 300 Innate Ideas/ChomskyVsPutnam: the innate representation of universal grammar indeed solves the problem of learning (at least partly) if it is really true that this is the basis for language acquisition, which may very well be the case! Putnam III 87 Putnam/Chomsky: Putnam proposes: correctness in linguistics is what the currently available data best explain about the behavior of the speaker under a current interest. What is true today, will be false tomorrow. PutnamVsChomsky: I never said that what is right today, will be wrong tomorrow. Putnam: Chomsky's hidden main theses: 1) the we are free to choose our interests at will, 2) that interests themselves are not subject to normative criticism. E.g. Hans' heart attack lies in the defiance of medical recommendations. Other explanation: high blood pressure. It may be, in fact, that on one day one fact is more in the interests of the speaker, and the next day another one. III 88 PutnamVsChomsky: 1) we cannot just pick and choose our interests. 2) It sometimes happens that the relevance of a particular interest is disputed. How can it be, however, that some interests are more reasonable than others? Reasonableness is supposed to depend on different conditions in different contexts. There is no general answer. III 88/89 The assertion that a concept is interest relative does not come out at the same as the thesis, all interests are equally reasonable. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
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