Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identity | Field | II 114 Self-identity/Identity/Field: true identity is only self-identity. - It is not enough when the extensions of the other predicates (other than "is identical to") are up for grabs. Less than true identity: E.g. congruence: is an equivalence relation for which substitutivity applies. >Schmidentity, >Identity/Kripke. Identity/Quine: it is not easy to say which facts about us make it, that "is identical to" and "rabbit" stands for rabbits - and not "belong together" or "are of the same". >Identity/Quine. And by analogy for temporary stages. Inflationism: can in turn accept facts. - (FieldVsinflationism). >Inflationism, >Facts, >Nonfactualism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Identity | Kripke | I 53 Identity: identity is given by arbitrary criteria (only math is required). Identity is not for objects or people. >Criteria. Identity over time: is it still the same object if several parts of a table have been replaced? There is a certain vagueness. Where the identity relation is vague, it might appear intransitive. I 62 A kind of "counterpart" concept could be useful here. (However, without Lewis worlds that are like foreign countries, etc.) You could say that strict identities only apply to individual things (molecules) and the counterpart relation to those individual things that are composed of them, the tables. I 116 Our concept of identity, which we are using here, deals with identity criteria of individual objects in concepts of other individual objects, and not in concepts of qualities. Identity: through the use of descriptions one can make contingent identity statements. >Counterparts, >Counterpart relation, >Counterpart theory, >Possible world/Kripke, >Possible world/Lewis, >Identity across worlds. I 63f Kripke (VsTradition): molecular motion: is necessarily identical with heat. We have discovered it, but it could not be otherwise. Physical truths are necessary: e.g. heat equals molecular motion - but there is no analogy to mind-brain identities. >Identity theory/Kripke. I 117 Ruth Barcan Markus: thesis: identities between names are necessary ("mere tag"). QuineVsMarkus: we could label the planet Venus with the proper name "Hesperus" on a beautiful evening. We could label the same planet again on a day before sunrise, this time with the proper name "Phosphorus". If we discover that it was the same planet twice, our discovery is an empirical one. And not because the proper names have been descriptions. I 120f Designation does not create identity: the same epistemic situation, Phospherus/Hesperus named as different celestial bodies is quite possible and therefore contingent, but does not affect the actual identity. We use them as names in all possible worlds. >Possible world, >Naming/Kripke. I 124 Identity: a mathematician writes that x = y are only identical if they are names for the same object. Kripke: those are not names at all, but rather variables. >Names/Kripke, >Variables. I 125 Definition "Schmidentity": this artificial relation can only exist between an object and itself. Kripke: it is quite okay and useful. I 175 Does the mere creation of molecular motion still leaves the additional task for God to turn this motion into heat? This feeling is actually based on an illusion, what God really has to do is to turn this molecular motion into something that is perceived as heat. >Sensation/Kripke, >Pain/Kripke, >Contingency/Kripke. --- Frank I 114 Identity/Kripke: if an identity statement is true, it is always necessarily true. E.g. heat/motion of molecules, Cicero/Tullius, Water/H20 - these are compatible with the fact that they are truths a posteriori. But according to Leibniz it is not conceivable that one occurs without the other. Frank I 125 Identity/body/Kripke: "A" is the (rigid) name for the body of Descartes - it survived the body, i.e.: M (Descartes unequal A). This is not a modal fallacy, because A is rigid. Analogue: a statue is dissimilar to molecule collection. >Rigidity/Kripke. Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), pp. 253-355. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kripke, S. A. | Verschiedene Vs Kripke, S. A. | Wolf II 232 Identity/Schmidentity/VsKripke: some have claimed that identity cannot be the relation that exists between each thing and itself and only there, because that could not explain the nontriviality of identity statements. Kripke: "Test": if a hypothetical language contains this relation and the same problems are generated, this is not a refutation of the fact that "identical with" in English stands for the same relation. Stalnaker I 175 VsCausal Theory/Name/VsKripke/Stalnaker: was criticized for its vagueness. One would still have to specify the type of causal connection, Kripke: Thesis: he did not provide a reductionist analysis of the reference, but only an alternative picture. I 176 Kripke/Stalnaker: actually articulates only the naive answer, without the details. VsMill's Semantics/: I will examine an argument for the impossibility of a semantics that picks out the reference without intermediate meaning, that separates the two questions and examines where it has weaknesses. VsMill/VsKripke/Stalnaker: an argument VsMill claims that not every well-defined language can be the language of a community. E.g. like this: Language/VsMill/VsKripke: if the semantics are correct, the speakers need to know what they are saying. It may be that in individual cases they use words they do not understand themselves, but 1. a) if you do not know what you are saying, you cannot mean what you are saying, and b) if you present correctly what people say in a community, you have to say that people generally mean what they say. I 177 2. it could be that we can determine a semantic value without knowing what the value is, even that nobody knows what the value is. |
K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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