Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 125 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actions | Bieri | I 63 Action/Bieri: must be experienced by me than accomplished by me. >Subject, >Subjectivity, >Intentionality, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Knowledge, cf. >Consciousness. |
Bieri I Peter Bieri Was macht Bewusstsein zu einem Rätsel? In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Bieri III P. Bieri Analytische Philosophie des Geistes Weinheim 2007 |
| Artificial Consciousness | Birnbacher | Metzinger II 719 Consciousness/Machine/Birnbacher: why should one not "be able to say" that a machine has consciousness? >Consciousness, >cf. >Artificial Intelligence, >Strong Artificial Intelligence, >Artificial General Intelligence, >Human Level AI. That a chair "thinks" would simply be empty due to a lack of empirical criteria. >Criterion/Birnbacher. II 720 Concept/Wittgenstein/Birnbacher: Wittgenstein attributes the attribution criteria of a thing, to the concept of the thing, therefore he has an extended concept of the term. >Attribution. For example, the concept of pain is characterized not only by what pain in itself is, but also by its specific function in our lives. >Pain, >Language game, >Language community. Consciousness/Machine/Wittgenstein/Birnbacher: it follows that for Wittgenstein an artificial consciousness is logically impossible, since in our linguistic usage we only attribute it to humans. We would have no conditions according to which we would describe the behavior of machines as conscious. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 360) Truth/Assertiveness/Consciousness/Machine/Wittgenstein/Birnbacher: The conditions of truth may be fulfilled, but the conditions of assertiveness may never be fulfilled. >Truth conditions, >Assertability conditions, >Assertability. I.e. even if it were true that the machine had consciousness, it would be conceptually impossible for us to claim it, because our concept of consciousness would not fit on it. Cf. >Machine Learning. The factually valid criteria are made for the factually applicable and not for any conceivable application situations. >Zombies, >Intentionality, >Thinking. II 722 Consciousness/Machine/Nomological Impossibility/Julian Huxley: in a BBC broadcast: "real" emotions and intentions are only possible in biotic matter. Also Paul Ziff, end of the 50s. II 724 Zombie/Robot/"Imitation Man"/Birnbacher: current discussion (early nineties): Phenomena of consciousness occur when a certain threshold of activation rate is exceeded. An "imitation man" might not feel anything, but he might think, mean, or expect something. (Intention). He could also think of himself, without actual self-consciousness. II 725 Consciousness/Man/Birnbacher: the nomological conditions for human consciousness are not only necessary, but also sufficient. I.e. they force consciousness in humans! >Sufficiency, >Conditions, >Necessity. II 726 Criteria/Consciousness/Human/Wittgenstein: behaviour as a criterion for attributing consciousness. >Behavior. Consciousness/Machine/Birnbacher: behaviour cannot be a criterion for attributing consciousness to machines. Here neurophysiological criteria are important, which Wittgenstein attributes to the symptoms. >Symptoms. Consciousness/Behaviour/Animals/Rollin/BirnbacherVsWittgenstein: even in animals, behaviour is an unreliable criterion for consciousness! For example, cows eat immediately after an operation. Reason: their food is so low in nutrients that they would be weakened too much if they took long breaks. Longer periods of fasting are possible in humans. >Consciousness, >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Speaking, >Robots. |
Birn I D. Birnbacher Analytische Einführung in die Ethik Berlin 2013 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Artificial Intelligence | Chalmers | I 185 Artificial Intelligence/Chalmers: Suppose we had an artificial system that rationally reflects what it perceives. Would this system have a concept of consciousness? It would certainly have a concept of the self, it could differ from the rest of the world, and have a more direct access to its own cognitive contents than to that of others. So it would have a certain kind of self-awareness. This system will not say about itself, that it would have no idea how it is to see a red triangle. Nor does it need access to its elements on a deeper level (Hofstadter 1979 1, Winograd 1972 2). N.B.: such a system would have a similar attitude to its inner life as we do to ours. Cf. >Artificial consciousness, >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Knowing how. I 186 Behavioral explanation/Chalmers: to explain the behavior of such systems, we never need to attribute consciousness. Perhaps such systems have consciousness, or not, but the explanation of their behavior is independent of this. >Behavior, >Explanation. I 313 Artificial Intelligence/VsArtificial Intelligence/Chalmers: DreyfusVsArtificial Intelligence: (Dreyfus 1972 7): Machines cannot achieve the flexible and creative behavior of humans. LucasVsArtificial Intelligence/PenroseVsArtificial Intelligence/Chalmers: (Lucas 1961 3, Penrose, 1989 4): Computers can never reach the mathematical understanding of humans because they are limited by Goedel's Theorem in a way in which humans are not. Chalmers: these are external objections. The internal objections are more interesting: VsArtificial intelligence: internal argument: conscious machines cannot develop a mind. >Mind/Chalmers. SearleVsArtificial Intelligence: > Chinese Room Argument. (Searle 1980 5). According to that, a computer is at best a simulation of consciousness, a zombie. >Chinese Room, >Zombies, >Intentionality/Searle. Artificial Intelligence/ChalmersVsSearle/ChalmersVsPenrose/ChalmersVsDreyfus: it is not obvious that certain physical structures in the computer lead to consciousness, the same applies to the structures in the brain. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 314 Definition Strong Artificial Intelligence/Searle/Chalmers: Thesis: There is a non-empty class of computations so that the implementation of each operation from this class is sufficient for a mind and especially for conscious experiences. This is only true with natural necessity, because it is logically possible that any compuation can do without consciousness, but this also applies to brains. >Strong Artificial Intelligence. I 315 Implementation/Chalmers: this term is needed as a bridge for the connection between abstract computations and concrete physical systems in the world. We also sometimes say that our brain implements calculations. Cf. >Thinking/World, >World, >Reality, >Computation, >Computer Model. Implementation/Searle: (Searle 1990b 6): Thesis is an observational-relativistic term. If you want, you can consider every system as implementing, for example: a wall. ChalmersVsSearle: one has to specify the implementation, then this problem is avoided. I 318 For example, a combinatorial state machine has quite different implementation conditions than a finite state machine. The causal interaction between the elements is differently fine-grained. >Fine-grained/coarse-grained. In addition, combinatorial automats can reflect various other automats, like... I 319 ...Turing-machines and cellular automats, as opposed to finite or infinite state automats. >Turing-machine, >Vending machine/Dennett. ChalmersVsSearle: each system implements one or the other computation. Only not every type (e.g., a combinational state machine) is implemented by each system. Observational relativity remains, but it does not threaten the possibility of artificial intelligence. I 320 This does not say much about the nature of the causal relations. >Observation, >Observer relativity. 1. D. R. Hofstadter Gödel, Escher Bach, New York 1979 2. T. Winograd, Understanding Natural Language, New York 1972 3. J. R. Lucas, Minds, machines and Gödel, Philosophy 36, 1961, p. 112-27. 4. R. Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind, Oxford 1989 5. J. R. Searle, Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 1980: pp. 417 -24 6. J. R. Searle, Is the brain an digital computer? Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical association, 1990, 64: pp. 21-37 7. H. Dreyfus, What Computers Can't Do. New York 1972. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Attribution | Chisholm | I 15/16 Chisholm: Direct Attribution/Direct Ascription: self-ascription, only security, basis of any reference - indirect attribution: to someone or something else. >Self-ascription. I 50 Chisholm: direct attribution: instead of self-attribution (exception E.g. Mach) - P1 self-identity from direct attribution - P2 what is being attributed is a property - D1 Meaning: direct attribution - indirect attribution: to someone else, derived from direct attribution. - basic concept: the property of being-F so that x attributes it directly to y - ((s) from this should follow: x = y). >Self-identification. I 51 Any kind of reference can be understood with the help of self-ascription - 1) The meaning person must be able to turn themselves into an object, 2) He must understand propositions and facts - direct attribution (self-attribution) original form of all attributions. >Reference. I 133 But not yet self-awareness: this also requires the knowledge that it is the subject itself to which the properties are attributed. >Awareness, >Self-consciousness. I 53 Indirect Attribution/Chisholm: about identifying relations: there is a certain Rel R which is so that you are the thing to which I stand in R - (irreversible) - in that, I directly attribute a specific two-sided property to myself: that the thing to which I stand in R, is a thing that is F (E.g. wears a hat) - but this second part does not need to be right. Confusion/Forgery/Chisholm: attributes properties to one of which it is thought that they belong to the other. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Body | Barthes | Röttger-Denker I 35 Body/Barthes: These are the preferred places where the body writes itself: Haiku, Bunraku, also the Japanese food sequence, which abolishes the Kantian conceptions of space and time. Likewise the "Kreisleriana" by Schumann. >Writing. I 35 Text/Body: Geno-Text: the text body: the spots, scratches, splashes on the images of Cy Twombly. I 39 Body/Barthes: according to his own words, the body becomes more and more important to him; it is the "man's word." His companions: "Roughness of the Voice," "Geno-Text," "signifiance." I 46 Body/Barthes: The body is identical with itself, the entity that laughs at the ego. >I, Ego, Self, >Self, >Self-identification, >Self-reference. I 48 Body/Barthes: Voice, Geno-Text E.g. Panzéras E.g. Pheno-Text: Dietrich Fischer Dieskau. Roughness of the voice: Geno singing. "The roughness is the body in the singing voice, in the writing hand, in the executive body part." Significance/Music: Friction of music with something that is language and not the message. Music: Articulation is an enemy of "Prononciation." Panzéra's voice expresses "the truth" of language, not its functionality. Space of pleasure. Articulation: Pheno-singing. Fisher Dieskau. Everything in the service of communication, representation, expression, what shapes the cultural values. ("Subjectivity"). >Subjectivity, >Objectivity. |
Barthes I R. Barthes Mythologies: The Complete Edition, in a New Translation New York 2013 Röttger I Gabriele Röttger-Denker Roland Barthes zur Einführung Hamburg 1997 |
| Cogito | Anscombe | Frank I 96 Cogito/Descartes/Anscombe: the existence of the ego is an existence in the thinking of the thought expressed by "I ...". "I" cannot be an empty name. >I, Ego, Self, >Self-identification, >Thinking. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Cogito | Nozick | II 87 cogito/Descartes/LichtenbergVsDescartes: has not established that "he thinks," but only that "it thinks". >Skepticism/Descartes, >Doubts, >I think. Problem/Nozick: What is my knowledge that I am? >Knowledge, >Self-knowledge, >Self-consciousness, >Self-identification, >Consciousness. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Concepts | Evans | McDowell I 73 Concept/term / Evans: a term is activated only in the judgment, not in the perception or experience. By the judgment a new type of content comes into play. >Perception, >Language use, >Content, >Judgments. Frank I 569/70 Idea/concept/Evans: the two can not be equated, otherwise there is no possibility of deception. - But they can not be separated either: otherwise the appropriateness of the idea can not be justified. >Idea, >Imagination, >Correctness. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Consciousness | Chalmers | I XI Definition The Easy Problem/Consciousness/Chalmers: “easy” problems of consciousness: How does the brain process environmental stimulation? I XII How does it integrate information? How do we produce reports on internal states? I XIII If you only work on the "easy” problem, you get one sort of theory; if you believe, that there is a further “hard” problem, then you get another. Cf. >Computer model, >Computation, >Thinking, >World/thinking, >Stimuli, >Stimulus meaning, >Information, >Cognition, >Cognitive psychology. I XII Definition The Hard Problem of Consciousness/Chalmers: Why is all this processing (of stimulation, of information) accompanied by an experienced inner life? Thesis: The standard methods of neuroscience and cognitive science do not work in addressing them. I 4 Central is experience, but it is not definition. It is fruitless to define conscious experience in terms of more primitive notions. >Experience. I 5 When I am talking about it here, I mean only the subjective quality of experience. ((s) And this is not to be confused with self-experience). Cf. >Knowing how, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Self-consciousness. I 26 Consciousness/Chalmers: also this term has two aspects: A) psychological (behavior explaining, functional) - concerns reports and introspective accessibility to information. (From now on called "consciousness"). >Awareness/Chalmers, >Behavior, >Explanation, >Introspection. B) phenomenal (>Qualia/Chalmers, see also more authors on qualities). Psychological Consciousness/Chalmers: psychological consciousness is introspection, alertness, ability to reflect the content of mental states, self-awareness. >Content, >Mental states. 71 Consciousness/Chalmers: as almost the only phenomenon, conscious experience does not logically supervene on something else. Otherwise, virtually all natural phenomena are globally logically supervenient to facts about atoms, electromagnetic fields, etc. But that does not mean that all higher-level properties are based on micro-physical laws. >Supervenience. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Consciousness | Damasio | Churchland II 486 Consciousness/Representation/Antonio Damasio Thesis: The body representation provides the framework for self-representation, which in turn is the starting point for modality-specific consciousness as well as for other consciousness. >Representation, >Body, >Consciousness, >Self-consciousness, >Perception, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Knowing how, >Experiencing, >World/thinking, >Sensation, >Sensory impressions. |
Damasio I Antonio R. Damasio Descartes ’ Irrtum: Fühlen, Denken und das menschliche Gehirn München 2004 Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Consciousness | Millikan | 91 Consciousness/tradition: we experience our consciousness directly. MillikanVsTradition: What kind of experience of intentionality is this? What kind of force should this argument have? >Self-identification, >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Intentionality. The force should be epistemic and rational. Uncorrectability/MillikanVsTradition: the experience of consciousness (experience of intentionality) should have something infallible. We should also have an immediate understanding then. It should also assume the existence of intentionality and consciousness, otherwise the experience could not be "in" it. Consciousness/Tradition: tradition assumes that consciousness is transparent. And therefore it cannot consist solely of external relations to the external world, and even if these are necessary. MillikanVsVs: Suppose we reject this epistemically rationalist image, that is, we deny that there is "epistemically given". Then we could admit that people are sometimes aware of their thoughts. But we could maintain that this awareness is partly an external relation. The "inside" of this feeling (awareness)... >Awareness. I 92 ...does not guarantee that it is the inside of a true awareness relation. Consciousness/Millikan: self awareness of consciousness is not an immediate object. There is nothing transparent in consciousness. N.B./Millikan: that is disturbing because it follows - negative thesis: that it is possible that we do not know what we think! ((s) DavidsonVsHume: dito). That is, from the act of consciousness itself nothing is guaranteed. Rationalism/rationalisticiIntentionality/consciousness/MillikanVsRationalism/Millikan: the traditional rationalist view of consciousness and intentionality leads to a cul-de-sac one after another. >Rationalism. I 246 Consciousness/classical realism/Millikan: an act of becoming aware of an object is momentary and never has any relation to past or future consciousness acts. Problem: how should a thing then be identified as the one from earlier. From this, classical realism makes a mystery. Object/thing/classical realism: an object must then have no permanent existence. >Realism. Perception/Plato/Descartes/Locke/Millikan: Thesis: Nothing can be identified by perception alone, Recognition: is an act of pure thought in the reunion in the volatile flow of the things given to the senses. >Perception. Sense/Plato/Descartes/Locke: consisted then in the fact to direct the mind somehow to eternal objects. Thinking/Plato/Descartes/Locke: then one could only have thoughts of eternal objects, or of the eternal nature of volatile objects. Solution/Millikan: qualities and species were assumed as the eternal objects of which one could directly think. >Thinking/World, >Plato, >Descartes, >Locke. I 247 Problem: How should one explain that eternal objects (properties) are related to temporal states? How could involvement in the world be essential to it. Then one had to assume that there are properties and types that are not exemplified. Cf. >Temporal identity. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Consciousness | Pauen | Pauen I 20 Consciousness/Pauen: can be considered as a property. A property of conditions that can also occur without exemplifying this property. >Exemplification, >States, >Properties, cf. >Identity theory, >Thinking, >Brain, >Brain states. I 21 Problem: there is nothing that could be "something like" consciousness, so that you always have to rely on the property itself, if you want to define it. >Definitions, >Definability, >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Similarity, >Method, >Intentionality. I 213 Perception/self-consciousness/Computer/Pauen: a computer that wanted to perceive itself might try to scan its parts - even if it had consciousness, it could not (using his only sense organs) in this way notice his own consciousness. >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Artificial consciousness, >Thinking, >World/thinking, >Perception, >Knowledge. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Content | Peacocke | I 144 Content/Peacocke: evidence-based approach: about constitutive role: "The person with these conscious states" = I. >Belief content, >Thought, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Constitutive role, >Roles, >Conceptual role, >Empirical content, >I, Ego, Self, >I think, >cogito, >Thinking, >Person. I 187 Description/Thought Content/Peacocke: Triple from way of givenness, object, point in time: no solution: a thought component could remain the same, while the object changes. >Descriptions, >Localization, >Identification, >Individuation, >Way of givenness. As with descriptive thoughts: it is possible that the content remains the same, while the "reference" changes. >Reference, cf. >Demonstratives, >Index Words, >Indexicality, >Objects of Belief, >Objects of Thought. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| de re | Perry | Frank I 412 f de re/trivial theory: de re is usually explained by de dicto. >de dicto, >Explanations. Frank I 414 Localization/localizing opinions/re/erry: it's not surprising that de re doesn't help with localization: De re-propositions do not remain indexical. >Localization, >Propositions, >Indexicality, >Index words. Propositions that are partly individuated by objects remain just as insensitive to the essence of localizing opinions as those that are entirely individuated by concepts. >Individuation, >Terms, >Objects. The decisive change in my situation is concealed: I notice that the untidy customer was not only for the customer with the torn package, but for me. ((s) Two different descriptions without "I" are not sufficient). >Sugar trail example, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. John Perry (1979): The Problem of the Essential Indexicals, in : Nous 13 (1979), 3-21 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| de se | De se: belief de se is an attitude that one has towards oneself. Problem - self-identification is not completely safe from error. See also de re, de dicto. |
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| de se | Cresswell | II 121 De se/Lewis: is an attitude that someone has to himself. II 123 De se/Indirect speech/Kaplan/Cresswell: (Kaplan 1978)(1) E.g. "his pants are on fire" - "My God, that’s me". Not sufficient: a description that singles out Kaplan for Kaplan, - because that is compatible with it that he does not know that he himself is Kaplan. Sufficient: "...he himself ...". Analog: time: de nunc: statement on the date at which it is located - "it is now four o’clock". Differently: "Zeus says" four o’clock"" - this could be a timetable information. >He/He himself, >Quasi-indicator, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Self-ascription. II 124 Solution/Cresswell: triple: of world time, person. >Centered world, >Possible worlds, >Person, >Time. 1. Kaplan, D. (1978). "Dthat". In P. Cole (ed) Syntax and Semantics 9: Pragmatics. New York: Academic Press. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Demonstration | Ryle | I 267 Ostension/pointing/Ryle: I can point to all sorts of things with my finger, and other people can point to my finger, but this finger cannot point to itself. Nor can a bullet be its own goal, although everything can possibly be thrown at it. >Pointing, >Ostension, >Self-identification, >Self-reference, >Definition, >Meaning(Intending), >Intention, >Intentionality. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Demonstratives | Shoemaker | Frank I 47f This/demonstrative: the use rules do not determine by themselves what the reference in every possible use case is. - It is determined by the speaker’s intention. >Index words, >Indexicality, >Speaker intention, >Speaker meaning, >Circumstances, >Context/Context dependence, >Language rules. I/Shoemaker: is no more a demonstrative such as a name or a hidden description. - ((s) No body is identified). >I, Ego, Self, >Self-identification, >Body. Sydney Shoemaker (I968): Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, in: Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), 555-578 |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Doubts | Anscombe | Frank I 19 Doubt/Descartes/Anscombe: For example, when Descartes doubts whether he is Descartes, he does not question the certainty of his "Cartesian cogito"! >cogito. E.g. Mach, who does not recognize himself in the bus window: ("what a shabby school master"): he does not doubt that it is he who has been mistaken. >Self-identification. G. Elizabeth M.Anscombe (1975a): The First Person, in: Samuel Guttenplan (ed.) (I975): Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974, Oxford 1975,45-65 |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Experience | Evans | McDowell I 73 Experience/Evans: experience is not conceptual. But it has representative content. McDowellVsEvans: experience is conceptual. Definition experience/Evans: a state of an information system is only an experience if it is the input of a thinking, conceptual and logically information system. >Information system/Evans. E.g. animals probably have a feeling for pain, but no a concept of pain. Pain/McDowell: pain is not conceptual, it is inner experience. Experience/McDowell/Evans: in both of us the experience in the Kantian sense is limited, by the connection to the spontaneity (conceptuality). Experience/Evans: although it is not conceptually in Evans (and therefore, according to Kant, it must be blind), he wants to protect it by asserting a "content". That is, an objective property of reality must be present to the subject. Namely, as an apparent view of the world. McDowellVsEvans: without concepts, that does not make any sense. Evans: on the other hand, he makes the demand that perception objects must be supported by an "accompanying theory". McDowell: that is precisely the >spontaneity. --- McDowell I 80/81 ff Experience/Evans: its richness of detail cannot be grasped with terms! For example, there are much more color shades that can be experienced than concepts which are available for these color shades. ((s) The notion of difference is sufficient when samples are present.) McDowell I 91 EvansVsDavidson: (different horn of the dilemma): experience is probably outer conceptual, but still subject to rational control by the outside world. --- Frank I 524f Experience/Evans: experience is different from self-attribution: it is not clearly true/false. I 526 Judgment: although judgments are based on experience (non-conceptual), they are not about the state of information - the "inner state" deos not become the object. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| He/ He himself | He, he himself, he*, philosophy: this is about the question of how far pronouns like "he" can be made clear so that any confusion in the use of language is impossible. E.g. "He believes he is fat" may refer to one or two people. See also indexicality, index words, individuation, identification, self-reference, ascription, self-ascription, privileged access, self-identification. |
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| He/ He himself | Castaneda | Frank I 180f he * / himself / Castaneda: not representative of a description: "the editor knows that he* is a millionaire". -This is probably referring to himself, but not as editor. -There are always different descriptions and self-identifications possible. - "he*" is by no analysis eliminatable. - Instead we use an unanalyzed basic concept: "the unique way of referring to X as Z". >Quasi-indicator, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Self-awareness. Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 I 207 Token(sw) of ’he* "("himself", etc) can not be replaced for their user - e.g. "Alexander believed that he* knew he* was once convinced that he* was a god.". |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| He/ He himself | Geach | Frank I 16ff Geach: "Himself" solution for problem "Philips worst enemy". Geach: e.g. "believes of himself to be quite cunning": must be a unique predicate that can be assigned to everyone. >Identification, >Reference, >Self-identification, >Index words, >Indexicality, >Quasi-indicator. Geach I 117 He/Geach: does not refer. Error: in the Middle Ages it was converted into arelative clause and then one asked for reference. >Relative clause, >Medieval philosophy. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Brandom | I 645 I/You/Brandom: is systematically, not anaphorically linked - one often takes the place of the other. I 646 "It" cannot always be used symmetrically: E.g. Hegel understood Kant's argument, but he has not refuted it - but it is not the actual tokening he has refuted - he has never heard of this tokening. I 766f I/Brandom: is not replaceable, because with any other expression [t] circumstances are conceivable that t has a certain proposition, and not me - e.g. >sugar trail example. I 767 Difference "I will" - "t should" - N.B.: I/Brandom: cannot only be used to assign a definition. I 770 Anscombe: no room for the question who is the one that I know this from (namely me). I 779 No one else can utter the phrase "I'm being threatened by a bear", but everyone can understand it., >Reference, >Self-reference, >Self-knowledge, >Individuation, >Self-identification, >Self-ascription, >Self. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| I, Ego, Self | Brentano | Chisholm II 272 I/Brentano: the predication, "I" can astonishingly not to be thought of vividly. >Self-perception, >Self-identification. Chisholm II = Klaus Hedwig Brentano und Kopernikus in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| I, Ego, Self | Geach | Frank I 503 I/GeachVsDescartes: instead of "I get into a terrible mess!" I can also say: "This is really a terrible confusion". Strawson: also "there is pain" instead of "I am in pain". EvansVsGeach/EvansVsStrawson: for reference, it is necessary to get one's audience into something. >Reference, >Relations, >Pain, >Situation, >Description, >Self-identification, >Gareth Evans, >R. Descartes, >Dualism. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Habermas | IV 159 I/Habermas: For categorization as a person, it is not enough that a person can say "I", but how they do it. The expression "I" not only has the deictic meaning of the reference to an object, it also indicates the pragmatic attitude or perspective from which the speaker expresses himself/herself. In the communicative role of the speaker, someone addresses at least one listener. >Person, >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. The interpersonal relationship linked to the perspective of the first, second and third person updates an underlying relationship of belonging to a social group. Only here do we come across the pronominal sense of the expression "I". >Communication/Habermas, >Intersubjectivity, >Communication/Habermas, >Intersubjectivity, >First Person. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| I, Ego, Self | Heidegger | Frank I 566f I/Heidegger: the question "What am I?" is answered by itself: "I am the author of this question" Gabriel Marcel ditto - Kaplan ditto - EvansVs: that I am a physical entity, is not as safe as I think (Evans like Descartes, DescartesVsHeidegger) - Heidegger’s principle does not show the incoherence of the idea that I am different from my body - it can also not demonstrate that x in any instantiation is physical or not. >Body, >Identity/Evans, >Self-Consciousness/Evans, Subject. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Nagel | Frank I 506ff I/Nagel: identification of an objective person as myself; adds no fact to the world - therefore, such identity statements are not understandable for us! >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Facts, >Nonfactualism. E.g. whether I imagine that my house burns down and I am present or not makes no difference to what one imagines as being the case. EvansVs: an identity statement does not need to make a difference for a spatiotemporal map of the world, but for the manner in which the immediate environment is considered. >Identity, >Statement, >Reality, >Mapping. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 Nagel III 31 I/objectivism/Nagel: there is a problem of a liberal realist worldview, everyone must admit to themselves that they are a person in a center-less world who is no one else but themselves. Cf. >Centererd worlds. III 33 Distinction I/person/Nagel: allows to ask: how can I be this specific person? - What kind of fact is that? >Person. Problem in the center-less world. Solution: "objective self" which we identify with the "I" - the "self" has the ability to form an idea about the person in the world. - In doing so, it refrains from the standpoint of "I am". - The real self excludes the contingent person Thomas Nagel and his perspective as content in its worldview. >Self. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Shoemaker | Frank I 50ff ShoemakerVsHume: 1st shows no more than that, as I find myself, I can not know - the second premise is false: although there is no index-free description, that does not prove that I would need such. >Self-identification. For identification the possibility of errors is necessary - but this is not given in the case of the self. >Incorrigibility. Anyway there is regress in self-identification. Hume did not deny self-consciousness. >Self-consciousness. Self-consciousness/Shoemaker: no kind of perception! (Rorty ditto). Pain: no (private) object, a person is not pain, and it is not painful, but one feels pain. >Pain. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Stalnaker | I 20/21 I/objective self/Nagel/Stalnaker: when someone says "I’m RS" it seems that the person represents a fact... I 21 ...and it is an objective fact, whether this is true or false - no matter what the speaker thinks. Problem: our concept of an objective world seems to leave no room for such a fact. A complete description of the world as it is in itself will not pick out any particular person as me - it does not tell me who I am! Cf. >Two omniscient Gods/Lewis, >self-identification. Semantic diagnosis: the semantic diagnosis attempts a representation of index words or self-localization. >Index words, >Indexicality, >He/He himself, cf. >Quasi-indicator, >Identity/Nagel. NagelVsSemantic Diagnosis: the semantic diagnosis does not yet get to the heart of the matter. StalnakerVsVs: simply >homophonic truth condition. Problem: what is the content? The content (information) in indexical expressions is not transported by the truth conditions. The speaker might not have known the date and place and yet have believed what he/she said - the listener might have believed that as well, and yet both have understood the expression. Thomas Nagel: this is VsOntological self-objectification in any way. >Objectivity/Nagel. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| I, Ego, Self | Strawson | I 123 Doctrine of non-possessing/I/self/consciousness/Strawson: (probably not Wittgenstein's position/StrawsonVs) Representative of this doctrine: "OP" (our philosopher). Descartes: thesis: the uniqueness of a body should be sufficient to evoke the idea that the experience is attributed to it. Strason: it was just unfortunatly expressed in terms of possessing. Our PhilosopherVsDescartes: then it would be inadmissible, to assume an "ego" additionally, whose sole function of this is "possessing". Difference: body has experience causally, contingently. I 124 "Ego" has them necessarily, conceptually (wrong). Solution/Our Philosopher: only things whose possession is logically transferable, can ever be possessed - experiences are then no ownership of the subject. StrawsonVsOur Philosopher: is using himself the false possession term. I 125 Actually our experience in this particular sense are our own, and only identifiable by that. StrawsonVsDescartes/VsOur Philosopher: there are not two uses of "I". >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. I 126 From particular experience of the subject arises not the necessity of a self-concept. Cf. >Self-consciousness/Strawson, >self-identification/Strawson, >self-ascription/Strawson. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| I, Ego, Self | Wittgenstein | Frank I 38ff I/Wittgenstein: Object-use by means of external characteristics: To erroneously believe a bump on the forehead - subject-use: immediately, no criteria, no self-identification no error possible. - Genitive subjectivus: Statement of the person, not about people - no characterization, no error. >Incorrigibility, >self-identification. Frank I 43 I/Wittgenstein: "I have a toothache" and "He has a toothache" are not values of a common propositional function. - "I have a toothache" denotes no owner. Sydney Shoemaker (I968): Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, in: Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), 555-578 --- Hintikka I 99 Nature/property/possession/Wittgenstein: de facto, but not essential relationship. The relation of possession is not part of the essence of objects. One of these objects is also the empirical ego. In this sense, Wittgenstein says: "The solipsism coincides with pure realism". >Solipsism. --- Wittgenstein II 226 I/WittgensteinVsDescartes "I" has no outstanding position among the words - it is simply used in the language practice. >Use, >Practise, >Language. --- Wittgenstein IV 91 I/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 5631 there is no sense in which in the philosophy can be talked non-psychologically about the ego - the philosophical ego is not the human - not the body - 5.64 it shrinks to a point - to this point reality is coordinated - the subject is the limit of the world - with that it can be shown that solipsism is correct. - But it is not impossible to say it. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Identification | Peacocke | I 173 Demonstratives/Identification/Evans/Peacocke: Liberal theory/Peacocke: general capacity for localization. Evans: plus current localization. >Identification/Evans, >Spatial localization. Peacocke: then it is not possible that a lost person can have thoughts about seen objects. >Thoughts, >Thinking, >Knowledge, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. Cognitive Map/Memory images/Recognition/Peacocke: not causal but really demonstrative. >Recognition, >Memory. I 172 E.g. a lost person is thinking: here is a glass. Peacocke: that is still a statement about a place in the public space. >Space, >Predication, >Attribution. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Identity | Anscombe | Frank I 78 Identity/I/Time/Memory/Locke: Question: How can it be guaranteed that the self who did something some time ago is identical with the self that remembers this act? >Personal identity. Anscombe/Schaede: Anscombe unthinkingly shares the traditional view that the time fell apart into discrete moments, which must first and foremost be related to one another. Then the corresponding successive consciousness moments would have to be synthesized. >Time, >Temporal identity, cf. >Zeno. But only if this theory is shared, problems arise with the temporal identity of "I". Frank I 93 I/Self/Memory/Identity/Anscombe: a repeated thought of "I" in conjunction with the same self would have to include a re-identification. But that is not at all part of the role of "I". On the other hand, it was part of the role of "A". >Logic/Anscombe. Frank I 104 I/Identity/Anscombe: when I ask: what carries out my actions? Then the answer is "this object here", "this thing here" but that is not an assertion of identity. The sentences about my actions are verified by my body. But observation does not show me which body is precisely this one. >Self-identification, >Observation, >Actions. G. Elizabeth M.Anscombe (1975a): The First Person, in: Samuel Guttenplan (ed.) (I975): Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974, Oxford 1975,45-65 |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Identity | Shoemaker | Frank I, 70f Temporal identity/Shoemaker: with Butler: there are no criteria for temporal identity. >Temporal identity, >Criteria. Solution: functionalism: only when the I is identified previously. >Functionalism. Shoemaker: This is not a problem because experience is marked by an internal perspective. >Self-identification, >Perspective, >Consciousness, >Self-consciousness. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 |
| Imagination | Evans | Evans I 313 Reference/Significance/General Term/EvansVsDescription Theory: we constantly use general terms, of which we have only the darkest idea of the conditions of fulfilment. e.g. chlorine, microbiology etc. But it is wrong to say that we say nothing when we utter sentences containing these general terms. I 314 Evans: For example, to express the idea that there are people with eleven fingers, general terms are sufficient. If the psychological state (mental state) includes an object, a general term will appear in its specification. This could be linked to the concession that there are certain objects to which one could refer more directly: the theory must even accept this, because otherwise it could not allow what appears to be possible: reference in a symmetrical or cyclical universe. EvansVsDescription theory: This idea of psychological attitudes directed towards objects obviously owes a lot to the feeling that there must be something we can say about what is meant, even if no suitable object can be found. >Reference, >Non-existence, >Meaning, >Objects of thought, >Meaning (intending). Frank I 515 Imagination/Evans: regardless of the ways to gain knowledge on the subject. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Imagination | Williams | Frank I 550 Imagination/Williams: (Williams 1973b)(1): E.g. "I am in the West Indies" - "someone is in the West Indies" Evans: there is a difference whether we take an internal perspective or not - but it does not follow that there is such a gap in apparent memories. >Localization, >Consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Knowledge. 1. Bernard Williams (1973). Problems of the Self. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (3):551-551 Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EconWilliams I Walter E. Williams Race & Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination? (Hoover Institution Press Publication) Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2011 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Incorrigibility | Evans | Frank I 504ff Incorrigibility/Evans: the thesis of Incorrigibility is idealistic, when it proceeds from the self-construction of the world by us. On the other hand the ability to identify ourselves as an objective person, is not to be exploited in a verificationist manner. >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. I 515 Immunity/Evans: Immunity against misidentification is a direct result of demonstrative identification - but it’s not about "identification". >First Person. Error: to believe that immunity was not extended to physical features. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Incorrigibility | Peacocke | I 140 Certainty/Peacocke/(s): demonstrative way of givenness: guarantees that the object has properties that are determined by the perception (not that he has certain properties for sure). - In any case that these properties do not depend on other beliefs. >Certainty, >Properties, >Observation, >Way of givenness, >Pointing, cf. >Ostensive definition. I 140 f Infallibility/incorrigibility/immunity to error/perception: visual condition: E.g. "This man is bald": infallible in reference of "this man". >Reference, >Appearance, cf. >Appearance/Sellars, Peacocke: this is no identification, not of identity with something dependent, which is just not given - "There is (in this perception situation) no one, so he would be bald, but not this man" presented by the perception at this location. - It cannot be that the way of givenness refers to "this box" while this box is not the thing which is cubical. >Reference. Hallucination: also in this case the thought "Dummett amuses himself" is a thought about Dummett! >Hallucination. I 175 Immunity/infallibility/tradition/Evans: the judgement, to be the judgment of a specific content, can be constituted that this judgement responds to this condition. >Judgments. I/Evans: The reference may fail. >I, Ego, Self, >Self-identification, >Self-reference, cf. >Quasi-indicator. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Index Words | Chalmers | I 84/85 Index words/Supervenience/Chalmers: Reference based on index words takes place on the basis of both: physical facts and "indexical facts" about localization and conceptual use. >Language use, >Identification, >Individuation, >Reference, >Indexicality, >Context. I 85 Reductive explanation/perspective/indexicality/problem: how do I explain that I am that particular person? And without tautologies? That the index word is true does not seem to be an objective fact about the world, but about the world as I find it, and that it needs an explanation is something I feel. (See Nagel 1986)(1). >Self-identification, >First person, cf. >Incorrigibility. Yet it is no obscure fact why it is true when David Chalmers says "I am David Chalmers". However, the failure of a reductive explanation for index words has to be distinguished from that in the case of consciousness. >Reduction, >Explanation, >Consciousness/Chalmers. 1. Th. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, New York 1986 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Index Words | Evans | Frank I 485 f Here/Evans: "Here" is no intension. >Intensions. "Here"-thoughts have no particular manner of presentation, but as many of them as there are places. >Indexicality, >Demonstratives. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Index Words | Perry | Frank I 22 PerryVsFrege: "today" is not a completing or "saturating" sense, absolutely no sense, but a reference object - meaning remains, reference varies. >Indexicality, >Meaning, >Reference, >Sense, >Contextuality. Frank I 393f Index words/Perry: without pointing component. Demonstratives: with pointing component. >Demonstratives. Meaning of index-words: their role - similar to the method for the determination of the object. >Roles, >Verification, >Identification, >Individuation. I 394f Today/Meaning: constant, truth value with index word "today it's nice" is not constant, so the meaning is changing - if understanding is knowing the truth value. >Truth value, >Understanding, cf. >Truth conditions, >Understanding/Dummett. Perry: the role (determination process) changes, the meaning is constant. - Then the meaning cannot be a part of the thought. >Meaning, >Thoughts. What the speaker believes is irrelevant to the meaning of the index word. >Beliefs, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 --- I 419 Index words/Perry: true-false exam does not help. - E.g. Two lost wanderers: that the Mt. Tallac is higher than Jack's Peak, is affirmed by all. ((s) This presupposes that the two do not stand side by side in sight.) Perry:There is no mountain, everyone believes it is Mt. Tallac, no customer from which all believe that he has made the mess (sugar trail). No Professor, who does not feel guilty (because he does not know what time it is). What people have in common here is not what they believe. >Wanderers example, >Sugar trail example. I 394 ff Sense/Perry: is oft of understood as a term. - Then question: is the meaning of index words to be equated with an individual-concept or a general term? >Singular terms, >General terms. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Index Words | Searle | II 285 Index words/I/Frege: "I" calls for a public and a private sense, e.g. tomorrow, when we talk of today, we have to say "yesterday". SearleVsFrege: that seems to be indexically de re. SearleVsFrege: Frege did not notice the self-referentiality of these expressions (unlike e.g. >Morning Star/Evening Star), >I, Ego, Self, >Indexicality, >Self-identification, >Self-reference. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Individuation | Brentano | Chisholm I 34 Individuation/I/Self/Idea/I/Intention/Brentano: in the self-evident mental states presented by us, we never capture any individualizing properties. I 35 All my properties, which I can readily grasp, are such that they can at least be theoretically immediately exemplified in different things. (BrentanoVsDescartes). >Self-identification. |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Individuation | Chisholm | I 34 Individuation/identification/Brentano: in self-evident mental states we never grasp any individuating properties. >Identification, >Mental states, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Self-ascription. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Individuation | Mead | Habermas IV 93 Individuation/MeadVsDurkheim/Mead/Habermas: Mead thesis: the process of socialization is also a process of individuation. Mead justifies this with the diversity of position-bound perspectives that speakers and listeners take up. As a principle of individuation, Mead does not cite the body, but a perspective structure that is set with the communicative roles of the first, second and third person. "Me" stands for the view that ego offers an alter in an interaction when this ego makes a speech act offer. This view gains ego from himself in that he himself takes over alters perspective in speech acts. Habermas IV 94 N.B.: the actor is forced by the mere structure of linguistic intersubjectivity to be himself also in norm-compliant behavior. In communicative action, however it is guided by norms, nobody can be relieved of initiative in a very fundamental sense, nobody can hand over the initiative: "The "I" provides the feeling of freedom, the initiative".(1) >I, Ego, Self. >Self-identification, >Perspective. 1. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, ed. Ch. W. Morris, Chicago 1934, German Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft, Frankfurt, 1969, S. 221. |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Individuation | Nozick | II 71ff I/Self/Individuation/Nozick: E.g. three completely bandaged persons with amnesia: X will die, Y will live, Z has 50/50 chance: they have to be moved into separate rooms: "the one who now hears my voice": this is not sufficient: Localization: (due to possible blindness), life history (for amnesia), physical description (ditto). Name: is insufficient: E.g. Oedipus. Originator of the tokens: is not sufficient: oral cavity + vocal chords ditto - Consciousness: is not sufficient: God covers the same description. >Identification, >Self-identification, >Localization, >Self-knowledge, >Self, >Person, >Action, >Memory, >Loss of memory, >Names. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Information | Evans | I 327 Prevailing information/Kaplan/Evans: not "liveliness" is decisive for prevailing information (VsLocke) but the amount of information and also its eight. Identification: in the end, you may not have any false information about one of two twins, but a wrong opinion on when you first met the twin. Cf. >Meaning (Intending)/Evans. --- Frank I 488 Information/Evans: Contact: one can have "information that ..", without being of the opinion that .. - Information can be non-conceptual: non-conceptual content of perception. Frank I 495 Information/I/Evans: the information state does not have the perception of the blue necktie as its object but the necktie itself. Problem: What kind of object is related to information about "I"? - Evans: it refers to bodies of flesh and blood. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Intensions | Anscombe | Frank I 96 I/Intension/Self/Logic/Anscombe: here the "way of givenness" is unimportant. >Way of givenness. 97 The logician understands that "I" in my mouth is just another name for "E.A.". His rule: if x makes assertions with "I" as subject, then they are true if and only if the predicates of x are true. >Predication. AnscombeVsLogic/AnscombeVsKripke: for this reason, he makes the transition from "I" to "Descartes". >I, Ego, Self, >Saul Kripke. But this is too superficial: if you are a speaker who says "I", you cannot find out what it is that says "I". For example, we do not look from which device the sound comes. >Self-identification, >Self-reference, >Reference. Thus, we must require our logicians to assume a "guaranteed" reference of "I". I 98 Problem: with a guaranteed reference there is no difference between "I" and "A". >Logic/Anscombe. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Interpretation | Evans | II 210 Interpretative semantics/interpretational semantics/Evans: these kinds of semantics would have to assume an entity for each type of semantic expression. They would have to provide a set, a truth value, a function of sets on truth values, etc., which could be attributed to the occurrences of this kind, namely under an arbitrary kind of interpretation. Then we could conceive the specification of the nature of the attribution as a specification of the fundamental being that one word has in common with others. II 213 Instead of a single unsorted area, it will be appropriate to divide the area into fundamental types of objects: places, times, material objects, living objects, events ... then we can understand e.g. "a set of pairs of living objects and times" as a verb. >Verbs, >Semantic categories, >Semantic value. --- Frank I 553 Evans: we must not let ourselves be dragged to a purely linguistic or communication-related interpretation level. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Introspection | Danto | I 259f Introspection/Strawson/Danto: we only know how much we weigh or what the temperature is by means of instruments. The mind is even more deceptive: memory deceives us, we repress our feelings and are capable of self-deception. >P.F. Strawson, >Self-knowledge, >Delusion, >Illusion. I 256 Introspection: For example, one can have pain on amputated limbs. There is no reason why an inner sense should be more authoritative than an outer one. >Privileged access, >First person, >Pain. I 263f VsBehaviorism: if we defined expressions like anger or love absolutely and totally in terms of behavior, then there would be no difference between these expressions and those we use to describe people: blonde, fat, tall etc. Now we do not apply these terms to ourselves on the same basis. Cf. >Behaviorism. I 264 In how we ascribe such expressions to ourselves and to others, there really are differences, whereas there are no such differences in terms of temperature or weight. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Introspection | Lewis | Frank I 61f Introspection/Lewis: necessarily infallible! - Shoemaker: consciousness of desires and beliefs is not physical. V 312 Rationality/Lewis: "rational action" is not so rational at all, all in all, there is more to it: e.g. self-knowledge, and the will to learn from experience. If the introspection convinces the actor that the data is his own, then nothing will persuade him to distrust them. Partial rationality: if we take out self-knowledge, then a moderate >Newcomb paradox can emerge. E.M.Forster: "How can I say what I think before I see what I say? Thought Experiment/Self-identification/Lewis: No effort of thought experiments can provide as much self-knowledge as the real object. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Introspection | Searle | I 117 Introspection/Searle: The model of face perception works on the assumption that there is a distinction between what is seen and what is seen. In introspection, there is no distinction to be made. >Consciousness, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. I 126 SearleVsIntrospection: introspection requires separation between act and object. I 168 Introspection/Searle: introspection is without problems, but it is not a specific skill. Wittgenstein: introspection is expressive and therefore not right or wrong. SearleVs: introspection does exist. Incorrigibility is pointless in relation to consciousness. Consciousness/Searle: consciousness has nothing to do with incorrigibility and introspection. Self-deception presupposes Cartesian dualism. >Dualism, >cartesianism, >incorrigibility. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Introspection | Sellars | Rorty I 242/43 Introspection/Sellars/Rorty: theory of immediate knowledge: introspection is an acquired skill, but it can then turn out that the subjects exactly recognize in themselves what the experimenter wants. That we can teach others to recognize thoughts, nostalgia, blood pressure or alpha rhythms in themselves, is simply a function of the use of compounds within the organism as scientific instruments. Training does not guarantee that nothing treacherous is underway. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Priviledged access, >First Person, >Incorrigibility. Rorty I 269 Sellars: Myth of the given: at the introspection there is no presence of non-physical entities in front of a non-physical observer. However, this also averts the loss of "scientific objectivity". >Myth of the given, >Objectivity. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Knowledge | Dennett | II 140 Knowledge/information/mirror/Dennett: I can not learn through a mirror what I look like if I do not also use other methods to identify the face as my own. >Method, >Self-identification, >Self-ascription, >Beginning. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Knowledge | Evans | Frank I 547 Knowledge/Evans: it is not sufficient that a true belief is causally dependent on the facts that make it true. - ((s) Additional identification is needed.) Evans: remembering is therefore no way to have knowledge of a subject such that the question of the identity of that object remains open. Therefore there is no gap between the knowledge that someone saw a burning tree and the knowledge that it was the person herself who saw it. >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Knowledge | Hintikka | II 17 Def Knowledge/Hintikka: knowledge is that what enables the knowing person to concentrate on the subset W1 of the set of all worlds W. >Possible worlds. W1: W1 is then relative not only to the knowing person b, but also relative to the scenario w0 ε W. Def b knows that S iff. S is true in all epistemic b alternatives. Reflexivity/transitivity/knowledge/Hintikka: we must assume here: if b can exclude all scenarios in W-W1, he/she can in fact exclude the assertion that he/she is not in such a position. II 29 Knowledge/game theory/Hintikka: typical example for the acquisition of knowledge: cheating husbands or wise men. This is about the fact that the decisions of the players depend on the respective level of knowledge, and of what one expects the other knows. >Game theory. Game Theory/game-theoretical/Hintikka: "Inquirer": the inquirer asks questions. Nature/oracle/opponent: the nature or opponent is the source of information. Answer: an answer can be used by the inquirer as a premise to derive a conclusion: C. This can only be about the question "C or not C". Premise/T: the premise can be a fixed initial premise (the "theoretical premise"). Final Rules: final rules can be limited to those that fulfill the subformula principle. Question Game: we call this an "interrogative game". Advantage: the game theory allows us to investigate cognitive strategies, not just static cognitive situations. Nature: the "oracle" can literally be nature. The answers can be given by scientific experiments. II 30 Restrictions: restrictions arise from the logical form, in particular the logical complexity, e.g. the prefix structure of the quantifiers for possible answers. E.g. Sensory Perception/perception/Hintikka: perception can only answer yes-no questions. This corresponds to atomic sentences for logicians. Experiment: an experiment, on the other hand, can provide responses that encode functional dependencies ((s) represent). Prefix/logical form/experiment/Hintikka: the answer to an experiment must have a structure with a prefix "∀∃": „(x)(∃y)“. This can be extended: ∀∃∀ ... Science Theory/Hintikka: this structure is extremely important for the philosophy of the sciences. II 31 Knowledge/logical form/Hintikka: it is very important that we have different kinds of knowledge. For example, implicit knowledge must be treated in the model of a sub-oracle. >Knowledge, >Propositional knowledge, >Knowing how. Knowledge/Hintikka: but neither implicit nor active knowledge obeys the epistemic logic! Completedness: it is neither completed with respect to logical reasoning nor completed when the relation of the logical inference is restricted. Knowledge Logic/Hintikka: we need a different logic of knowledge than the epistemic logic. Definition Knowledge/game-theoretical/game theory/Hintikka: the knowledge of the inquirer consists of all the conclusions C, which he/she can find out in the questioning process. Definition Virtual Knowledge/game theory/Hintikka: ditto, except that the inquirer is not allowed to introduce additional individuals here. II 151 Knowledge-who/identity/psychology/psychiatry/Hintikka: there are interesting examples here. One must be able to recognize oneself as the same in different situations. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Map Example | Lewis | IV 144 Knowledge de dicto/Map-Example/Lewis: e.g. encyclopedia - applies to the world and provides knowledge about the world, not about the reader (de se). - E.g. Lingens with memory loss found himself in a library and reads his own story. (-> E.g. Lost wanderers). - Knowledge de dicto provides localization in the logical space but not in space-time - but you can close the gap. - E.g. Map: will only be used if the red dot "you are here" is removed. Explanation/(s):E.g., Two lost hikers meet. By chance they have the same hiking book. Then they will not find out their localization with the help of this book alone. Reason: In the printed book, the walkers are not identified, for example, as the one who came from the west and the one who came from the east. Solution: A modern navigation system registers the route and uses it to identify the user holding the device. >Propositional knowledge, >Non-propositional knowledge, >Self-identification, >Self-ascription. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Memory | Evans | Frank I 535 Memory/Evans: memory does not provide knowledge. (Ryle dito) - But memory shows other aspects of the "I". >Knowledge, >Aspects. Frank I 544 Quasi-memory/q-memory/Shoemaker: "Quasi-memory": "q-memory" - For example, if there are such false memories, then it makes sense to say "Someone stood before a burning tree, but was that I? " - EvansVs: even if this is possible, it does not follow that the normal judgments must be based on an identification. - It is not about decomposition: "someone stood .. I was the one". I 550 Q-memory: is in fact, from someone else. I 551 A) A subject q remembers an event whose witness it was not. B) Subsequently, the subject q remembers the fact of being a witness - appear/appearance/Evans: it is still correct to say that an apparant memory to have done something, is necessarily an apparent memory that one has done it oneself - (+) purely verbal move: does not show that it is possible for the subject to appear as if there was a tree, without it seeming to it as if there was the tree where it is. I 552 One must state a certain knowledge about the mental states of a subject, e.g. from five minutes ago - this kind of memory is neither a matter of the permanence of an opinion nor a shadow. - The original ability belongs to the equipment of every intelligent creature. I 547 Memory/Evans: e.g. brain transplantation, after which the subject asserts: "Something was F" - This is no judgment, no knowledge, but a mere presumption. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Memory | Parfit | Frank I 549 Memory/Parfit: That I had the experience, is not part of the experience, but it is automatically assumed - but I can only do this, because I have no q-memories. (Q-memories, quasi-memories, see Evans, Peacocke). >Experiences, >Memory/Evans, >Memory/Peacocke. EvansVsParfit: this one only assumes identification in the present tense. But I-notion spans the time. >Time, >Past, >Present, >Future. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Parf I D. Parfit Reasons and Persons Oxford 1986 Parf II Derekt Parfit On what matters Oxford 2011 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Mental States | Evans | Frank I 526 Mental state/inner state/knowledge/Evans: (...) the subject can easily acquire knowledge about its inner informational states: he/she must only re-apply the process of conceptualization. Frank I 527 But with the former, all knowledge, which does not belong to it, is excluded. The subject tries to determine, how it would judge, if it had no such accompanying information. The result will necessarily be closely linked to the content of the information state. But this condition has not become an object! There is no state of information that is related to the inner state as this internal state is related to that of the world. (> asymmetry, >analogies) (> mind/mind state). Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Now | Perry | Frank I 22 Now/PerryVsFrege: "today" is not a completing or "saturating" sense, absolutely no sense, but a reference object - meaning remains, reference varies. >Indexicality, >Index words, >Meaning, >Reference, >Sense, >Contextuality. Frank I 394f Today/Meaning: is constant; however, the truth value of index word "today it is beautiful": is not constant, so the meaning is changing. - If understanding is knowing the truth value. >Truth value, >Context, >Understanding, >Truth conditions, cf. >Understanding/Dummett. Perry: the role (the determination method) changes, the meaning remains constant. Then, the meaning cannot be a part of the thought. >Meaning, >Thoughts. What the speaker thinks is irrelevant to the meaning of the index word. >Beliefs, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Other Minds | Ryle | I 249 Other minds/Ryle: our self-talk is not something that is reserved for us. ((s) Explanation: we think about ourselves in a public language.) RyleVsPriviledged access. RyleVsAuthority of the First Person. RyleVsIncorrigibility. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Privileged access, >Introspection, >Incorrigibility, >Authority of the First Person, >Private language, >Beetle-example. >Privileged access/Wittgenstein >Introspection/Dennett. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Person | Anscombe | Frank I 76 Definition Person/Anscombe: a living human body. >Body, >Subject, >Self, >I, >Self-consciousness, >Self-identification. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Person | Habermas | IV 158 Person/Identification/Habermas: Persons cannot be identified under the same conditions as observable objects. In the case of persons, spatiotemporal identification is not sufficient. >Identification, >Individuation, >Individuals, cf. >Individuation/Strawson, >Person/Strawson, cf. >Continuants, >Personal identity. IV 159 While entities are generally determined by the fact that a speaker can make a statement of them, persons belong to the class of entities who can take on the role of a speaker themselves. For categorization as a person, it is not enough that a person can say "I", but how they do it. >I, Ego, Self, >Self-identification, >Self-reference, >Subjects. The expression "I" not only has the deictic meaning of the reference to an object, it also indicates the pragmatic attitude or perspective from which the speaker expresses himself/herself. >Reference, >Perspective. In the communicative role of the speaker, someone addresses at least one listener. >Speaking, >Communication. IV 160 The peculiarity of the person is explained by the fact that persons do not have to acquire the identity conditions first and even the criteria by which they can be identified under these conditions (...) until they can be identified at all as a person and, if necessary, as this particular person. >Person/Locke, >Person/Kant, >Person/Strawson. IV 161 Identity/Person/Habermas: since persons acquire their identity through linguistically mediated interaction, they fulfil the identity conditions for persons and the basic identity criteria for a certain person not only for others but also for themselves. They see themselves as people who have learned to participate in social interactions. Cf. >Identity/Henrich. The person can answer the question of what kind of person he/she is, not just one of all. Identity criteria/conditions of identity/Habermas: are only fulfilled by the person when he/she is able to attribute the corresponding predicates to himself/herself. >Identity criteria, >Identity conditions, >Criteria. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Phenomena | Stalnaker | I 269 Def phenomenal information/terminology/Lewis/Stalnaker: phenomenal information is - beyond physical information - an irreducible other type of information. The two are independent. Stalnaker: it is the kind of information that Jackson's color researcher Mary acquires. It is compatible with the modest view. >Colour researcher Mary, >Colours/Jackson, >Knowledge/Jackson, >Knowledge how. Lewis: thesis: Mary is not missing phenomenal information. I 271ff Phenomenal information/self/subjectivity/Stalnaker: e.g. Mary knows in her room, that the treasure lies at a huge military cemetery in the 143rd row in the southerly direction and in the 57th row in the westerly direction. Problem: they still do not know that the treasure is "here". Problem: even if she stands in front of it, then she may have miscounted. ((s) Then she does not know what proposition the sentence expresses.) In the room: she cannot be fooled. Objective content: objective content is already in the room and possible to learn. Subjective content: subjective content cannot be expressed as a timeless proposition with "here". >Localization, >Index words, >Indexicality. I 274 Phenomenal indistinguishability, is possible in relation to colors, but not in relation to possible worlds. >Indistinguishability, >Possible worlds. Phenomenal information/self-identification/Stalnaker: e.g. person with memory loss: Rudolf Lingens does not know whether he is Lingens or Gustav Lauben. >Self-identification. Error: it is false to assume that there will be a possible world, that is just like the actual world, except that the experiences of Lingens were reversed with those of Lauben. Even if such an interpersonal comparison between worlds is understandable, it would not be compatible with the fact that self-localization is an irreducible information. >Centered worlds. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Privileged Access | Ryle | Frank I 638 RyleVsAll other authors: VsPrivileged Access: privileged access is only a better position of the speaker - you cannot discover facts of a different type.(1) 1. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), pp. 101-111. RyleVsPriviledged access. RyleVsAuthority of the First Person. RyleVsIncorrigibility. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Privileged access, >Introspection, >Incorrigibility, >Authority of the First Person, >Private language, >Beetle-example. >Privileged access/Wittgenstein >Introspection/Dennett. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Privileged Access | Sellars | I 80 Consciousness/Sellars: To each of us belongs a stream of episodes that are not direct experiences themselves and to which we have privileged, but by no means immutable or infallible, access. They can occur without open language behavior. >Stream of consciousness/Husserl. The word ideas are not the thinking itself. Nor is the open speech behavior thinking itself. We do not need to have word ideas, we do not need to have an idea at all when we know what we are thinking. It is wrong to construct the privileged access according to the model of perception. I 95ff Privileged access/Sellars: self-ascription is due to observation by others. Only after that the speech of privileged access starts. >Self-knowledge, >Self-consciousness, >Self-identification, >Self-ascription, >Attribution, >Community, >Language community, >Psychological Nominalism, >Introspection. I 97 Private: there is no "absolute privacy". Open behavior is an indispensable part of the logic of these terms, such as the observable behavior of gases is evidence of molecular processes. Report: (still) requires privileged access. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Pronouns | Hintikka | II 117 I/Hintikka: Descartes' cogito directs our attention to the double life of the pronoun of the first person singular. "I" can depend on one of the two ways of identification (perspective/public). E.g. "I, Hintikka swear..." is not a tautology! >cogito, >First person, >Self-identification. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Propositions | Perry | Frank I 396 Meaning/idea/PerryVsFrege: We must separate sharply meaning and thoughts. >Thoughts, >Thoughts/Frege, >Sense. The thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content. >Thought content, cf. >Thought objects. The meaning corresponds to the role of words. >Conceptual role, >Words, >Word meaning. The same role creates another de re proposition in any context. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Context, >de re. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 --- I 409f Proposition/PerryVsTradition: what is missing, is not a conceptual component, but an indexical. >Indexicality, >Index words. New theory: a kind of proposition is individuated by an object and a part of the old proposition. VsTradition: limiting the substitutability in quotations with propositional attitudes is not explained. >Opacity, >Substitutability. Tradition: E.g. Dean/Franks neighbor (identical, one and the same person): no variable but term. Problem: "He" does not provide a concept but a variable. Cf. >He/He himself. Solution/Perry: "open proposition": with objects and a conceptual component: "de re". - Then the "dean himself" is included and not only the term "Dean". >de re. Then a substitution by "Frank's neighbor" is valid and a quantification meaningful. >Quantification. Vs: de re does not solve the problem of mess in the supermarket (sugar trail) - (because of "I"). >Sugar trail example. --- I 455f Proposition/extra sense//Perry: parabola E.g. early humans who can only eat carrots lying in front of them, are equipped with the ability to believe propositions (to collect and pick up carrots). - Nothing happens, because the propositions do not say to humans that they even appear in it. Solution/Castaneda: additional localization in space and time. >Extra-Sense/Castaneda. Vs: the king of France does not know that he is the King of France and whether the carrot is not in front of the editor of Soul. VsExtra-sense: an extra-sense does not help the thinker embedding himself into a network of mental states. People understand sentences but do not form beliefs. >Understanding, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. List of extra senses for everyone: too long. Extra-sense "i" for everyone: validity by decree: solves the carrots problem but maims the language. Rule: "I" stands for the user ": makes people to speak of themselves in the "third person": ""I" is doing this". Problem: for truth of such sentences one needs reference (reference), meaning ("user") is not enough. >Reference, >Sense. The same meaning cannot perform different references. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Psychology | Vygotsky | Deacon I 450 Psychology/Language/Wygotski/Deacon: In the 1930s, Wygotski put forward the theory that many psychic processes in humans can be understood as internalized versions of processes that are actually social. The use of the public language can then be perceived as a means of forming a certain distance from our subjective experiences. In this way, we include a speaker/listener relationship in our cognition and thus a virtual social distance that allows us to reflect on ourselves. So we can talk to ourselves as we talk to others. >Language, >Language use, >Language/Wittgenstein, >Use, >Description levels, >Reflection, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. Development/Wygotski: Wygotski sees our psychological development as a process,... I 451 ...by adapting to social norms in this way. >Norms, >Sozialisation. |
Vygotsky I L. S. Vygotsky Thought and Language Cambridge, MA 1986 Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Quasi-Indicator | Castaneda | Frank I 163 ff Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: is the fundamental role of the I only at the moment of the speech act - must refer to a antecedent: Peter believes that "he" ... >Anaphora, >I, Ego, Self/Castaneda. I 165 Thesis: "He*", etc. cannot be replaced by indicators, nor as variables or deputy singular terms or (descriptions). Thesis: (Conclusion of "He"): the reference of "I" is a logically irreducible category, which can only be represented equivalently by the impersonal and trans-situational quasi-indicator "he" - I 321 Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: contradicts the classical theory of propositions: that propositional attitudes are related to propositions. >Propositions, >Propositional attitudes. ChisholmVs/LewisVs: mental states are not primarily based on propositions, but a relation between subject and a property that is attributed directly. CastanedaVsChisholm: attribution theory does not explain sufficiently the explicit self-awareness. >Reference, >Self-reference, >Self-identification. Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 I 430ff Quasi-Indicator He/Castaneda/Perry: he* cannot be replaced by description or names that does not, in turn, contain a quasi-indicator. >Names, >Descriptions. PerryVsCastaneda: the other one can also think "he*, i.e. the other one..." I ~459ff Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: represents the indexical reference, it does not carry it out. Not entirely deputy, included in reference. >Indexicality, >Index Words, >Proxy, cf. >Placeholders. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Quasi-Indicator | Cresswell | II 182 He*/Castaneda: (Quasi-Indicator): is unanalyzable. >Reference, >I, Ego Self, >Self-identification, >Identification, >Self-reference, >Individuation, >Predication. >Hector-Neri Castaneda, >John Perry, >Sydney Shoemaker. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Recognition | Dennett | II 139 Thesis: there must be at least two systems that can recognize a face. II 140 E.g. A dog sees Odysseus sober on Monday, Wednesday and Friday, and drunk on the other days. It can draw several conclusions: 1) That there are drunken and sober people 2) That a man can be drunk on one day, and sober on the other, 3) that Odysseus is such a person . The conclusions 2 and 3 are not possible to learn logically from the course of events alone. In addition, it needs a (error-prone , but -perceived by him as reliable) source of identification ( Millikan). Accordingly, a mirror cannot tell me what I look like, as long as I don t have another method to identify the face to be seen there as my own. >Identification, >Self-identification. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Reductionism | Damasio | Churchland II 486 KantVsReductionism: The self will never be investigated, it is only to be thought of in the highly abstract conceptualization of "transcendental apperception." >Apperception. DamasioVsKant: we have a much safer foundation in our body with its skin, bones, muscles, joints, internal organs, etc. >Representation, >Body, >Consciousness, >Self-consciousness, >Perception, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Knowing how, >Experiencing, >World/thinking, >Sensation, >Sensory impressions. |
Damasio I Antonio R. Damasio Descartes ’ Irrtum: Fühlen, Denken und das menschliche Gehirn München 2004 Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Reference | Evans | I 314ff To mean/reference/divine standpoint/Wittgenstein/Evans: for example, someone is in love with one of two identical twins - God, if he could look into his/her head, could not tell with which of them the person is in love, if the person itself does not know in a moment. ((s) Because no additional information could be found in the mental state and in the twin.)- Evans: the (description-) theory of the mind cannot explain why erroneous descriptions cannot give the impetus. I 325 Reference/Evans: Reference is also possible if the description is not fulfilled, but not designation. I 328 Reference/Names/Evans: in general, we refer to the thing that is the source of the prevailing information. I 333ff Reference/Evans: reference is defined by information sets, not by fitting. --- Frank I 22 Evans: between Frege and Perry: saves Fregean sense, but meaning = reference! I 24ff Meaning unequal Reference/Evans: e.g. "today": the meaning remains, the speaker changes. > "Fido"-Fido-Theory/Evans: equals the meaning and the reference: > I/Evans. Frank I 503 EvansVsGeach/EvansVsStrawson: one aspect of the reference is to make your audience do something. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Representation | Castaneda | Frank I ~ 459ff VsRepräsentation/I/CastanedaVsPerry: "I" is no representation. - Then there is no (changing) sense. - Instead: each of the tokens is a design (guise). >Guise theory. No semantic or psychological mediators. >Reference, >Sense, >Unambiguity, >Identification, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Self-reference. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 |
| Robots | Birnbacher | Metzinger II 724 Zombie/Robot/"Imitation Man"/Birnbacher: current discussion (early nineties): Phenomena of consciousness occur when a certain threshold of the activation rate is exceeded. An "imitation man" might not feel anything, but he might think, mean, or expect something. (Intention). He could also think of himself, without actual self-consciousness. >Zombies. II 725 Consciousness/Human/Birnbacher: the nomological conditions for human consciousness are not only necessary, but also sufficient. I.e. they force consciousness in humans! >Sufficiency, >Conditions, >Necessity, >Consciousness, >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. Cf. >Robot rights. |
Birn I D. Birnbacher Analytische Einführung in die Ethik Berlin 2013 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Roles | Peacocke | I 109ff Constitutive role: 1st sortal, 2nd psychic state, 3rd relation between 1 and 2. >Sortals, >Psychological states, >Roles, >Constitutive role. Evidence: Sensitivity for evidence is dependend on terms developed for them. >Concepts, >Language use, >Reference. Of two descriptions the constitutive role is the uninformative one. >Description. Constitutive role: "the person who has these perceptions" explains immunity to misidentification. >Incorrigibility, >Cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception. Constitutive role of" now": "the time when this attitude (belief, idea, etc.) occurred". >Localisation. Instead of trivial identity "I am I ": Constitutive role: "I am the person with these states". >Predication. I 122 Constitutive role/I/Peacocke: the constitutive role brings just the difference to the trivial identity: "I am the person with these states" instead of "I am I". >Identity, >Self-identification. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Self | Nozick | II 61 Identity/time/self/I/Nozick: because it is highly conceptual, a scheme appears to be necessary. >Identity conditions, cf. >Qua objects. This scheme should choose between near and immediate successors, etc. >Next successor/Nozick, >Similarity metrics, >Similarity. But I do not need the scheme to find out my goals, but to find out whose goals are mine. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. Problem: who applies actually the scheme? II 78 Definition I/self/some authors: to be an I or to be self, means to have the ability of reflexive self-reference. >I, Ego, >Self, >I/Nozick. NozickVs: 1. This ability must just have existed sometime 2. beings: from the fact that I have this ability, it does not follow that it is essential. In addition: the reflexive self-reference gives me access to the self, but that does not guarantee that it is part of my nature as self. >Self-reference. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Self- Ascription | Evans | Frank I 524 Mental self-ascription/Evans: if one ascribes an opinion to oneself, then the view is, so to speak, and often literally is, directed outwards - to the world - we can do without the "inner view". - Mental Self-Ascription is not infallible. >Incorrigibility. I 530 Evans: self-ascription of experience does not require any special skill of an inner sense. - No disposition for cases of correct judgments, that guaranteed infallibility. Information stance: with content: e.g., "as if a thousand tiny needles .." / without content: e.g., "pain", "itching". Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Ascription | Geach | I 128 Belief about oneself/Geach: must be analyzed as a complex predicate. E.g. "Phillip thinks of Philip to be worst enemy of Philip.." is only unambiguous if "he himself" is inserted. >He/He himself, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Attribution, >Predication, >Self-reference, >Quasi-indicator. Geach: truth here is not depending on empiricism but on meanings. - "He himself" cannot be expressed in schemes such as "p>q". "Taking himself for being dead": is formally not true, because of the meanings of the subexpressions. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Self- Ascription | Ryle | Frank I 650 Self-Ascription/Ryle: self-ascription is like foreign attribution. We observe ourselves as we observes others (WittgensteinVs - DavidsonVs). First, I usually know what I think before I pronounce it. Second, I may be wrong - but still there are the same criteria as for foreign attribution.(1) 1. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987), 441-4 58. RyleVsPriviledged access. RyleVsAuthority of the First Person. RyleVsIncorrigibility. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Privileged access, >Introspection, >Incorrigibility, >Authority of the First Person, >Private language, >Beetle-example. >Privileged access/Wittgenstein >Introspection/Dennett. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Consciousness | Anscombe | Frank I 81 I/body/Anscombe: only in particular I sentences it applies that their description coincides with the description of events: e.g. "I jump", "I stand", etc. coming from this: Self-consciousness/Anscombe: self-consciousness can be determined externally! For example, Henry James: a novel character ("the poor Baldy") has lost his self-consciousness, but not his consciousness in a fall from the coach. Constitutively for James and Anscombe then for an externally observable or writable... Frank I 82 ...self-consciousness, the concept of an immediate, concept of actions without a subject, etc., which can be referred to as subjectless but to acting and suffering "things". Reason: this should avoid two things: 1. as a speaker of "I" to claim a body, 2. to identify a thing that is different from the body, but which then has to be related to the body. >Body, >Self-identification. SchaedeVsAnscombe: it remains unclear what this is about. What is a "subjectless act"? Frank I 92 Self-consiousness/Anscombe: self-consciousness can be explained as "awareness that this and that belongs to oneself". Caution: "he himself" is very different from "from oneself". >Reference, >Self-reference. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Consciousness | Armstrong | Frank I 62 Selfconsciousness/ArmstrongVsShoemaker: self-consciousness is a perception of our own mind. NagelVsArmstrong: psychological states are not perceived, but "directly experienced". ShoemakerVsArmstrong: self consciousness is no perception, it can not be seen from reflection that it is me. >Self-Identification, >Perception, >Self-Knowledge/Psychological theories. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Consciousness | Evans | Frank I 508/9 Self-identification/selfconsciousness/Evans: Self-identification is not determined by a knowledge of one s own mental states. I 560 Self-consciousness/Evans: Self-consciousnes is no mode of thinking. - There is always a gap between understanding "... is F" and "I am F". >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Self-ascription. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Consciousness | Maturana | I 70 Self-consciousness/I-conscoiusness/Maturana: is no neurophysiological phenomenon, just focus on yourself. >Consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. Therefore it is an epiphenomenon. >Epiphenomenon. It is not explanable by physiological factors such as excitation, inhibition, network structures, coding etc. I 205 Self-consciousness/Maturana: is outside of the physical! It belongs to the range of interactions as a way of co-existence. >Operation/Maturana, >Body. I 276 It is found only in the language - Condition: distinction of oneself from others who could be oneself. >Language, >Intersubjectivity. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Self- Consciousness | Nozick | II 81f Self - Knowledge / Nozick: not by terms: shifts the problem "who is I". Not by acquaintance (as with object) >Acquaintance. Not by dispositions: circular: like-acquired dispositions? >Dispositions. Solution: reflexive self-knowledge as to be unexplained basic concept. >Reflexivity, >Self-identification, >Self, >Consciousness. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Self- Consciousness | Shoemaker | Frank I 37f Self-consciousness/Shoemaker: selfconsciousness is immune to misidentification. >Inverted spectra, >Qualia, >Incorrigibility, >Misidentification, >Immunity. Shoemaker per Qualia: Functioal state identity theory. (VsBlock). >Qualia/Block, >Qualia/Shoemaker. Self-reference does not imply self-identification. >Self-reference. Frank I 65 Self-consciousness/Shoemaker: radically different from the consciousness of perception. I cannot learn from from any object, not even learn from the mirror, that I myself am displayed unless I had known previously. >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Self, >I, Ego, Self, >Perception, cf. >He/He himself, >Quasi-indicator. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Consciousness | Strawson | Frank I 41ff Self-consciousness/Strawson: M-predicates: do not presuppose consciousness to which they are attributed P-predicates: (psychological): imply that the person to whom they are attributed, knows this. Def P*-predicates/Shoemaker: it is impossible that any other subject, except me, can have certain properties. >Terminology/Strawson. Sydney Shoemaker (I968): Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, in: Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), 555-578 --- Strawson I 130 I/self-consciousness/Strawson: previously only: all my experiences are specifically related to the body M, this one is distinguished by that. - But the same goes for all other bodies in each case. Problem: what does the word "mine" has to do in it? >Identification, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Identification/Strawson, >Particulars/Strawson. I 131 Uniqueness of the body is no guarantee of Cartesian soul. Solution: we must recognize the concept of the person as a primitive (but not fundamental) concept. >Body. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Identification | Anscombe | Frank I 103 Memory loss/self-identification/I/Anscombe: someone who has lost his memory has not forgotten the use of "I". >Memory loss, >Self-consciousness, >I, >Pronouns, >Language use. Frank I 108 Self-consciousness/Self-Identity/Henry James/Anscombe: E.g. the story of the "poor Baldy" who fell out of the coach and lost his self-consciousness: he asks himself, "Who fell from the carriage? Poor Baldy." G. Elizabeth M.Anscombe (1975a): The First Person, in: Samuel Guttenplan (ed.) (I975): Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974, Oxford 1975,45-65 |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Identification | Burge | Frank I 696 Self-Identification/Burge: here you individuate your thoughts in such a way that you know them as tokens and as types of thoughts. We know which thoughts we think. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. Twin Earth: Problem: But how can we individualize our own thoughts if we have not yet distinguished the right empirical conditions from the wrong empirical conditions? It is clear that we must presuppose the conditions for the thinking of a certain thought in the thinking of that thought! Some of them can only be recognized empirically. Example: to think of something as water, one must have a causal relationship to water. >Twin earth. Example: but to think that water is a liquid, we do not need that relationship! Here the (complex) conditions only have to be assumed. Frank I 697 Self-Identification/Burge: Knowledge of one's own thoughts is second level thinking. But the first thought is not merely an object; self-identification takes place in the same act. Therefore the conditions are the same for both. Again, one does not need to know the enabling conditions! It is enough to know that they are fulfilled. Both empirical and reflective thoughts presuppose conditions that determine their content. In both cases some of them can only be recognized empirically. Why does it not follow that one cannot know that one thinks that "this and that" is the case unless one undertakes an empirical investigation that shows that the conditions that "this and that" is the case are fulfilled? The answer is entangled, it has to do with the fact that you have to "start somewhere". Frank I 700 Self-Identification/perceptional knowledge/Burge: so far we have highlighted the similarities. But there are also differences: Self-Identification: here the demand for a distinction of twin-earth-thoughts is even more absurd than with perceptual thoughts. Frank I 702 Self-Identification/Burge: differs in these two aspects a) and b) from perceptual knowledge: if you are wrong about self-identification, it shows that there is something wrong with you (as opposed to wrong perception). Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663 |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Identification | Castaneda | Frank I 190 Self-Identification/I/Self/Hume/Kant: you cannot perceive yourself as the object that implements the experience - instead you identify an object in the experience with a thing that is not part of the experience, and it is this thing to which the person concerned refers with "I" - Castaneda pro. >I, Ego, Self/Castaneda, >Self-knowledge, >Self, >Person, >I, Ego, Self. I 190 I/Self/Identification/Carl Ginet/Castaneda: ingenious analysis, seems to preserve the directly relating role of 'he*": E.g. for every sentence of the form" X believes that he* is H" there is a translation without "he*": Proposal: "X considers the proposition to be true that X would express if X said "I am H". CastanedaVsGinet: 1) the mere utterance of "I am H" does not guarantee that any proposition is expressed at all 2) circular: then you also have to analyze "what it usually means". I 202 Self-Identification/Castaneda: you should not and cannot identify yourself with every description - otherwise the heaviest man in Europe would know that he is without ever stepping on a scale - therefore, "he*" must not be used as an independent symbol. I 220 Self-Identification/Castaneda: in order for X to refer to Y as Z, X must not only identify Y with Z, but also represent Z as Z (representation) - accumulation of references - "boxes in boxes" - box: fragment of the world as person understands it. >Possible worlds, >Cross-world identity, >Centered worlds. de dicto/Castaneda: pictures of representations: boxes in boxes. de Re/Castaneda: simply the references of the speaker - also on non-existent things. >de re, >de dicto, >Reference. Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Identification | Chisholm | I 37 Self-identification/Mach: E.g. "What a run-down a schoolmaster comes here." It was he himself, who saw himself in the mirror. I 40 Self-identification/Self/Chisholm: "he himself" only shifts the problem - differences: "There exists an x such that x thinks that x is wise, and he is x" - "There exists an x such that x thinks that x is wise and x is x"? - No clear formulation: the property of taking oneself to be wise - ChisholmVs: impossible proposition. I 41 Chisholm: "... that he is x" always implies that x is x, but not vice versa that x is he! >Identification, >Individuation. >Self-knowledge, >Self-ascription. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Self- Identification | Evans | Frank I 504ff Incorrigibility/Evans: the view is idealistic if it assumes the self-construction of the world through us. On the other hand, the possibility of identifying ourselves as objective persons cannot be exploited verificationistically. >Incorrigibility. I 515 Immunity/Evans: immunity against misidentification is a direct result of demonstrative identification. - But it is not about "identification". - Erorr: to believe that immunity does not extend to physical characteristics. I 518 Self-identification/Evans: logical form: structure: if we consider [I am F] as if it were based on [b is F] and [I am b], then we get into trouble. I 545 Identification/self-identification/I/Evans: identification is based on localization in space. I 557ff Self-identification/SI/Evans: you cannot identify yourself as a "bearer of pain" (circular). - Pain must first be learned through your own experience. - ((s) Correspondingly with other physical experiences: body does not identify the self/I.) Evans: The idea that I associate with my name does not allow self-identification. Self-Identification: is mixed and not decomposable (in physical/mental components). - Otherwise it is circular. It is not absurd that one cannot identify oneself. >Self-knowledge, >Self-ascription. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Identification | Nagel | Frank I 572f Self-identification/Nagel: how is it possible to identify oneself with a material thing (a body). >I, Ego, Self, >Self. Evans: here the localization is not enough. >Localization. In addition: physical perception and knowledge of your own body. - To have pain is immune to misidentification, but not without thought. ((s) so the subject is required.) >Pain. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Identification | Rorty | Frank I 580 Incorrigibility/Rorty: incorrigibility is the only consistent feature of the mind - but no ontological-dualistic thesis follows from it. - This is compatible with the >Eliminative materialism. >Incorrigibility. Self-identification/Armstrong: based on logical concepts. RortyVs: but not in the sense of "implies its own truth." Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Identification | Sartre | Frank I 572f Self-identification/Stout: is quite different from the way it is experienced by another subject - mind and body are inseparable. Sartre: (as Nagel): the problem stems only from the fact that I am not looking to connect with my body, but with the body of the other. The chemical description is not for me. ((s) I did not experience it.) So my body does not appear to me in the world. ((s) Not like a piece in the world). Evans per. >Self/Sartre, >Consciousness/Sartre, >Self-knowledge. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Sart I J.-P. Sartre Being and Nothingness 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Identification | Strawson | Frank I 521 I/Self-Identification/Strawson: question: "Why are states of consciousness at all attributed to any subject and why are they attributed to exactly the same thing as certain physical properties? >Particulars/Strawson, >I, Ego, Self/Strawson, >Space/Strawson, >Body. EvansVsStrawson: "natural little theory of our world": 1st "I take this to be true and am on place p, so this applies to p" 2nd conversely, "if this does not apply to p, I can not perceive it" 3rd "before I was at p, so now I still have to be at p". Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Reference | Castaneda | Frank I 216 Self-reference/Castaneda: Self-reference is a real event in the world. - So real content and, therefore, self-reference "as Z" is possible. But thinking, "that Z.." is not enough representation. - It must be supplied. >Representation, >Representation/Castaneda, >I, Ego, Self/Castaneda, cf. >Qua-Objects, >Self-Identification. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Reference | Proust | I 243 Self-reference/animal/representation/Proust: large primates can refer to themselves when they have been teached the use of symbols, chimpanzees and orang utans - but not gorillas - can also recognize themselves in the mirror. But it does not follow that they have a sense of personal identity. >Identity, >Personal identity, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Self, >Person, >Personality. |
Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Self-Determination | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 259 Self-determination/Political Philosophy/Kukathas: in the nineteenth century, nationalism was allied with Gaus I 260 liberalism as the principle of nationality was invoked as a principle of freedom - and against alien rule. >Nationalism, >Liberalism. Mazzini: the liberalism of Mazzini, for example, advocated the unification of Italy as a national republic from which French, Austrian and Papal power was expelled. Mill: John Stuart Mill saw a common nationality as a prerequisite for (liberal) representative government. >J. St. Mill. Liberalism/non-liberalism: in this light, national self-determination might seem unproblematic, as an ideal both liberals and non-liberals alike might readily accept: liberals because they favour self-determination, and non- liberals because they favour national community. Yet matters are not so straightforward. In the first instance, what is always, and inescapably, controversial is the issue of who is the 'self' that is entitled to self-determination. Even if people within a boundary are entitled to govern themselves, how is the boundary to be drawn: who is to be included and who is to be excluded (Barry, 1991(1); 2001(2): 137)? Culture/group membership: theorists such as Raz and Margalit (1990)(3) look to resolve the problem by tying group membership to culture, suggesting that 'encompassing groups' have a number of characteristics that give them a unity which enables them to mount claims to self-hood and therefore self-determination. Central to such groups is a common culture, but no less impor- tant is the fact that people within them recognize each other as members and regard their membership as important for their own self-identification. It is also important to recognize, however, that the right of self-determination can be enjoyed only by a group that is a majority in a territory (1990(3): 441). VsIndividualism: what Raz and Margalit reject, as an undesirable illusion, is the individualist principle of consent: 'It is undesirable since the more important human groupings need to be based on shared history, and on criteria of nonvoluntaristic (or at least not wholly contractarian) membership to have the value they have' (1990(3): 456). Consent/KukathasVsRaz/KukathasVsMargalit: yet it is difficult to see how consent can fail to play a significant role in any account of self- determination if self-determination is to mean some- thing more than the determination of the lives of some by the will of others. And many other theories of self-determination give a substantial role to consent as central to any account of political legitimacy. >Consent. Beran: among the most sustained defences of the importance of consent is that offered in the writings of Harry Beran, particularly in his defence of the right of secession s central to the legitimacy of the liberal state (Beran, 1984(4); 1987(5); but see also Green, 1988(6); and Simmons, 2001(7)) (...). >Political Secession. 1. Barry, Brian (1991) 'Self-government revisited'. Democracy and Power. Oxford: Clarendon, 156-86. 2. Barry, Brian (2001) Cultuæ and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Oxford: Polity. 3.Raz and Margalit 1990 4. Beran, Harry (1984) 'A liberal theory of secession'. Political Studies, 32:21-31. 5. Beran, Harry (1987) The Consent Theory of Political Obligation. London: Croom Helm. 6. Green, Leslie (1988) The Authority of the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 7. Simmons, A. John (2001) Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Sense | Evans | Frank I 485f Sense/Evans: Evans is in favour of these views: pro Frege, pro Oxford (everyday language) - while he ist against these views: VsPerry, VsCastaneda. Fregean sense/Evans: should be regarded as a way of thinking instead of a way of givenness. >Way of givenness, >Fregean sense. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Sensory Impressions | Hume | I 20 Impression/Hume: an impression forms the mind in different ways to build the subject. Interior impression: is self-perception. HumeVsRepresentation: the association conditions cannot represent. Rationalism/Deleuze: rationalism had abandoned this insight. (But Hume is not entirely VsRepresentation.) >Mind/Hume, cf. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Self-consciousness, >Rationalism. I 106 Impression/sensation/Hume: an impression represents nothing, because nothing precedes it. >Representation, >Sensation. I 141 Sensation/impression/Hume: problem: a sensation cannot explain why this impression and not another was selected. ((s) Because nature (or the perceptual world) is not just opposed to the subject and imposes itself, but is partly constituted by the subject.) I 142 Solution: progress: searches the inventory and selects in a constitutive manner. I 147 There are two ways: The first way directs the mind to pleasure/displeasure. The second way directs the mind to the idea of the object, which it constituted itself. >Idea/Hume. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Skepticism | Hintikka | II 117 Cogito/skepticism/Hintikka: the convincing force of the perspective (subject-centered) identification cannot be transferred to the public case. ((s) That is, Descartes is only aware of himself and cannot prove his existence to others). Self Awareness/Hintikka: but he did achieve self awareness. False: even from Descartes' own mouth, "I think, so Descartes exists" would be a bad joke. >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Awareness. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Solipsism | Evans | Frank I 533/534 Solipsism/Evans: Solipsism tries to take advantage of an asymmetry: "I am the object that, if it is in pain, has to expect something bad ((s) intensified: if someone ...).. E.g. red and green object, solipsist: "I can make a statement about the difference between a fact that concerns me and a fact which concerns another person because of the difference in the way they appear to ME. EvansVsSolipsism: it is a mistake to try and derive something informative from this asymmetry about his use of the word "I". Fra I 535 In the relativation on the solipsist only tautologies arise. E.g. "I am the person in such a way that if their legs are bent, this will be felt. Or: "...if he moves, changes of such and such nature are observed." The solipsist does not need not be a dualist. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Subjects | Anscombe | Frank I 80 Subject/Grammar/Anscombe: the subject position does not necessarily have to be occupied by a referencing expression: e.g. "it rains". What does follow from this? >Grammar, >Reference. Frank I 81 That the sentence "I am E. Anscombe" is not an identity sentence from the mouth of E. Anscombe! It is only connected with the identity sentence "This thing here is E.A.". >Predication, >Self-identification. Also "I am this thing here" is not an identity sentence, but all are true sentences, because I can verify my thoughts as examples of the reflected consciousness of the states, actions, and movements "of this body here." The ideas are to be related to this thing here. What ideas? Why not my ideas? This cannot be because the reflexive pronoun would raise the question of a referent and would thus embarrass Anscombe (""I" does not refer"). |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Subjects | Shoemaker | Frank I 20 Subject/Shoemaker: subject-use of "I" is fundamental for object-use. >Language use, >Object, >Predication, >Self-identification, >Self-reference, >Intersubjectivity. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Substitution | Castaneda | Frank I 194 Substitutability /Substitution / I / Castaneda: Statements like "I m Privatus" have a non-replaceable use of "I" included for the user - "Himself" ("he *") can not be replaced for the user: i.e. "self" can be no other. >Self-identification, >Indexicality, >Index Words. Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Sugar Trail Example | Perry | Frank I 417f Supermarket-Example/Perry: (Sugar trail, "Mess in the supermarket" - someone notes that it was he himself who has made a mess). Opinion context: the reader, now. Judgement context: the man at the supermarket. Problem: the mere fact that I considered the proposition that I make a mess at any time for true, does not explain why I stopped. - The reader feels the same way and does not stop the cart. N.B.: for me opinion context and judgement context coincide - but it is not a solution, because self-identification cannot do without a sentence with "I". I 421f Wanderer/supermarket/Perry: Solution: distinction opinion state/opinion: E.g. opinion state: "The event will begin" - "it begins now" - "it has begun" - opinion: all the time I believe that it starts at 12:00. Opinion state: for all the same (with index word). Opinion: different: not the same relation to the same subject. VsTradition: if it were different, we would all have to expect a common believed proposition if all are in the same opinion state. Normally one will adjust his opinion states when one goes from one context to the other to preserve his opinions. See also sugar trail at the grocery store (>Supermarket-example) . (Frank I 402ff). >Two omniscient Gods. See also >Identification, >Individuation, >Propositions, >Propositional knowledge, Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >essential Indexicals. John Perry (1979): The Problem of the Essential Indexicals, in : Nous 13 (1979), 3-21 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Terminology | Evans | Frank I 492ff Generality Constraint/Evans: the ability to think presupposes: a) a is F, b is F, etc. but also a is F, a is G, etc. - Non-fundamental notions are not connectable with all terms: e.g. this hallucinated necktie was made in Italy. (s) Generality Constraint: regulates the basic interconnectivity of terms, empirically, not logically.) VsEvans: the generality constraint does not really show the adequacy of the terms regarding "I"-imagination. Dilemma: a) I-imagination/DescartesVsEvans: is only about bodies, b) LockeVsEvans: is only about humans, not about the person. VsEvans: he presupposes unity instead of proving it. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Thinking | Burge | Frank I 691f Thinking/externalism/Burge: what thoughts you can have depends on how you relate to your surroundings - a person does not need to explore his/her surroundings to know what his/her thoughts are. >Circumstances, >Individuation. Internalism/DescartesVsBurge: the possibility of deception is supposed to prove that we can doubt the world while knowing our thoughts authoritatively - i.e. supposedly independencies from the world. Solution: ArnauldVsDescartes: Self-identification is not sufficient to know that mental events are independent of objects. The cogito does not provide knowledge about the (indexical, external) individuation conditions. >Externalism, >Thoughts, >Objects of thought, >Self-identification. Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663 |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Thinking | Castaneda | Frank I 171ff Pure Thought/Pure Thinking/Castaneda/Pape: there is no pure self-conscious thinking, I always think of myself as having a certain localizable experience content as identical. (> Hume: "I" is applicable only on perceptions). >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Self, >I, Ego, Self, >I, Ego, Self/Hume, >Sensualism. Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 I 385f Thinking/World/Castaneda: if the thought content is purely universal and abstract thinking, how can we get in touch with something special? - Chisholm allowed not only that singular terms are only composed of expressions that denote pure universals, he goes so far as to eliminate singular terms entirely analytically, by free variables with the performative role to express self-ascription. >Self-attribution, >Attribution, >Attribution/Chisholm, >Person/Chisholm, >Singular terms. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Thoughts | Evans | Frank I 487 Thoughts/EvansVsRussell/EvansVsHume: (with Davidson): it may be that you simply think you have a thought - even about yourself. Cf. >Incorrigibility, >First Person. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Thoughts | Russell | Frank I 487 Russell/Evans: Cartesians: Thought: we only have a thought if the object really exists. >Cartesianism, >Nonexistence, >Truth value. I 487ff Thoughts/EvansVsRussell/EvansVsHume: (with Davidson): it may be that you simply think you have a thought - even about yourself. >Belief/Davidson, >Self-identification. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 Russell IV 87/88 Idea/concept/Russell: ambiguous: in a certain sense we can say that blackness "is in our consciousness" as an idea is, so to speak, an object of thought. Russell: Blackness must be an object here so that two people can think of it, or that we can think of it again. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mental objects. Universals/Russell: therefore universals are not mere thoughts but objects of the act of thinking. >Universals. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Truthmakers | Evans | Frank I 554f Brains in a vat/BIV/Evans: in the situation of the brains in a vat there are no truth-makers - if the subject learns the truth, it would have to hold itself for "nowhere located". Senseless/meaningless: to identify himself: "I am a brain". - The body or localization is crucial. Contrary to this: e.g. brain transplant: here there is a history: the brain would be experienced as "somewhere". ((s) Cf. >Identity/Parfit). Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Twin Earth | Burge | Frank I 669 Twin Earth/Burge: further thought experiments (without language): e.g. aluminium/twin earth-aluminium: someone who grows up in an environment without aluminium cannot have "aluminium thoughts". The linguistic habits of the social community are obviously irrelevant! >Use, >Reference. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 Frank I 689 Twin Earth/Burge: the change from earth to twin earth leads after a certain time (learning situation) to a change in the primary belief and this in turn leads to a change in the reflexive belief. Frank I 694 Twin Earth/Burge: if you were to secretly move back and forth between earth and twin earth, you would certainly not notice any difference in any feature of the world or in your own consciousness. N.B.: but this does not yet capture the idea that the two lives are the same in terms of experience and feeling! The thoughts would not change at the moment of change. (Learning situation "natural learning history", Putnam ditto). Fra I 695 A secret change between earth and twin earth - that is "the classic Californian fantasy story". If the change would be constantly to and fro, one could not give any information about the native earth. The person would find no differences in their thoughts, in the way things "feel". Burge: I believe that there are general principles for the changes, but that they do not provide any clear-cut cases. But now the original idea is that at least some aspects of one's mental life are fixed by the chemical composition of the body. ("pure phenomenal sensations"). If you do not like the term, you can replace it with something that results from abstraction from the inability to discriminate, by abstraction from their inability to distinguish mental events under the changing conditions. Problem: the person has different thoughts but cannot distinguish them: VsAuthority! Twin Earth/Burge: the person exposed to the changes would have different thoughts but would not be able to compare the situations and determine when and where the differences occurred. Error: to conclude that the person could not know what thoughts he or she has, unless they were being empirically investigated. Fra I 696 But it would be absurd to have to proceed empirically to know what thoughts we are thinking. Frank I 707 Self-Identification/twin earth/Burge: For example, my knowledge that I am thinking that mercury is a metal depends on the ability to think - not to explicate - the thought. I am a competent user of the word in my environment. This does not require that I can distinguish my environment from a twin environment! Meaning and reference are anchored in my environment rather than in an environment where the meaning of the word form would be different. >Meaning. Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663 |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Twin Earth | Evans | Frank I 572 I/self/Twin Earth/Evans: the example shows that it is plausible to assume that the subject in part may claim to be right, therefore, to beconsidered a subject, because it has a conception of the role the known objects played in his past. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Two Omniscient Gods | Castaneda | Frank I 356 f Two omniscient gods/Example/ Lewis: omniscient: only through knowledge of all propositions. - But incapable of self-ascribtion of the decisive properties, since properties (attributes) are not propositional. >Propositions, >Attributes, >Self-identification. CatanedaVsLewis: his notion of the unique counterpart fits more to the part-subject areas of private objects. The overlapping structure would be a total world, and each extension would be "my World" for every person in the world. Therefore, Lewis' example of the two Gods is not evident, even not if we equate propositions with sets of possible worlds. >Possible Worlds, >Possible Worlds/Lewis, cf. >Possible Worlds/Cresswell. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Two Omniscient Gods | Lewis | IV 139 Two Omniscient Gods/2 Gods/Lewis: the example is to show that objects of attitudes should not be identified with propositions as sets of possible worlds. E.g. both know exactly the world they inhabit - i.e. they know every true proposition - but do not know who they are themselves. Solution: self-attribution of a property, not a proposition - (spatial (not logical) localization is not propositional knowledge). >Localization, >Propositional knowledge. LewisVsCastaneda: Solution: de se: we just need to find a case where the editor of soul knows which world is his without knowing if he is among the millionaires - de se: self-identification, self-localization. de dicto: self-localization in logical space (which proposition one believes). >de re, >de dicto, >de se. IV 141 Two omniscient gods/Lewis: E.g. assuming a variant with two pairs of two gods in two possible worlds W and V, who swapped places - Assuming God 1 knows that the proposition "I’m on the highest" is true in W - and he knows that he lives in W! - It does not follow that he knows that he is on the highest! - Because if he had been on the coldest, the same sentence would have expressed a different proposition, one that is true in V and wrong in W - one of which he knew that it is false. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Two Omniscient Gods | Perry | Frank I 404f Lewis: Two omniscient Gods/Gods-Example/example of the Gods/wanderer-example: E.g. Perry: two lost wanderers need more than just the same travel guide to even detect differences with the situation and each other. - They would call all the same sentences as true. See also sugar trail at the grocery store. >Supermarket-example . (Frank I 402ff). >Two omniscient Gods. See also >Identification, >Individuation, >Propositions, >Propositional knowledge, Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >essential Indexicals. John Perry (1979): The Problem of the Essential Indexicals, in : Nous 13 (1979), 3-21 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Verification | Anscombe | Frank I 107 I/Identity/Verification/Anscombe: E.g. "I am standing" is verified by my standing body. E.g. Nothing verifies however in a comparable way "I see a variety of colors"! Anscombe: one could say: "the thought"! But the question is, what it means for the thought to be verified like this? >Thoughts. The Cartesian thoughts all have the same character, that in their descriptions they are little different from the descriptions of the events and the persons on whom they could be verified. >R. Descartes. Even if there are such processes, then the thoughts are not thoughts of such processes, such as the thought of standing. >I, >Self-consciousness, >Self-identity, >Self-identification. G. Elizabeth M.Anscombe (1975a): The First Person, in: Samuel Guttenplan (ed.) (I975): Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974, Oxford 1975,45-65 |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Way of Givenness | Evans | Frank I 485f Here/Evans: "here" is no intension. - "Here"-thoughts are no particular manner of presentation, but represent as many places as there are. >Intensions, >Index words. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| World | Evans | Frank I 521 EvansVsStrawson: "natural little theory of our world": 1st I take this to be true and am at the point p, so this applies to p 2nd conversely, if this does not apply to p, I can not perceive it 3rd I was at p before, so now I cannot be at p anymore". >Certainty, >Knowledge. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anscombe, E. | Evans Vs Anscombe, E. | Frank I 510 Identity/Temporal/Anscombe: it is impossible for the subject to identify different things by the many "I" identifications, which it makes over time. An "unnoticed substitution" cannot possibly take place. Anscombe: Problem: this "logical guarantee" arouses her suspicions. EvansVsAnscombe: this "logical guarantee" only came about because of the way she describes the situation: namely, by the description that one and the same subject has thoughts at different times. (Description). Evans: it is simply a tautology that self-identification undoubtedly is identifications of the same self. I 512 I/Self-consciousness/Evans: Even under memory loss a subject can still think of itself! It may wonder why it does not receive information in the ordinary way. It would only be wrong to conclude from this that self-consciousness could be explained without reference to the different ways that the subjects have to gain knowledge about themselves. If a subject is supposed to think self-consciously about itself, then it must be essentially disposed to allow such a thinking to be determined by information that can be available to it in any of the relevant ways. EvansVsAnscombe: however, it does not necessarily have to dispose of actually accessible information in order to know that there is only one object to which it is so dispositionally referred. Fra I 513 Anscombe: an anesthetized person, according to her, has no reason to use a demonstrative expression that refers to himself, because he is given no object for this. I 563 Problem/Anscombe/(s): "The murderer of Laius intends to refer to the murderer of Laius" satisfies the same form. I.e. the special thing about "I" (first person pronoun) is not captured! (Oedipus would not agree with this attribution, or rather it would not be self-attribution of him. EvansVsAnscombe: this is not right, it is easily possible to attribute the intention of self-attribution to a subject, in the sense of intention to fulfill the single-digit term of expression "x refers to x" is identical with the intention to fulfill the single-digit term "x refers to me". Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Anscombe, E. | Chisholm Vs Anscombe, E. | I 40 I/Self/Identity/Proposition/Other philosophers: four recent attempts: 1) Anscombe: "I am this thing here" is a real proposition, but not a proposition of identity. It means: This thing here is the thing, the person of whose action this idea of an action is an idea, of whose movements this notion of movement is a notion, etc. I 42 ChisholmVsAnscombe: She tries to explain her use of "I" by the demonstrative "this". It is clear that she cannot explain my use of "I" with this. Therefore, she has no theory for indirect I 73 I/Anscombe: "I am this one" is a real proposition, but not a proposition of identity. Instead, it means: this thing here is the thing of whose action this idea of an action is an idea. ChisholmVsAnscombe: she tries to explain her use of "I" through the use of "this", I 74 but it is clear that she cannot explain my use of "I" with it. Peacocke I 150 Guaranteed reference/Peacocke: this idea can be found in connection with demonstrative thoughts. It now appears that neither the field of the identificationally basic nor that of the constitutive identificationally basic types exactly matches the class of guaranteed referring types. Def Guaranteed reference/Peacocke: E.g. whenever someone suspects themselves to be thinking a thought with a certain way of givenness, then there is indeed such a way of givenness and it refers. In this sense, some identificationally basic cases have no guaranteed reference. E.g. unrealized hallucination. Guaranteed reference is not sufficient for identificational basality (independence from identification): guaranteed reference: E.g. "my paternal grandfather" has a guaranteed reference for a normal human. E.g. a way of givenness of form "the oldest now living person and otherwise I." In both cases, reference is even guaranteed a priori! But from inference, not from identification. But these examples are not identification ally basic, nor is it sufficient for identification independence that a way of givenness type m is guaranteed to apply to an object, so that the subject then believes that it is a way of givenness type m! Not sufficient: as ability to recognize also passes the test ((s) but is dependent on identification). E.g. If someone hallucinates that Dummett is standing in front of them, this is still a thought about Dummett. Which object the thought picks out does not depend on the object meeting a certain description. Rather, it depends on certain complex relations with the thinker. Demonstrative thoughts/Peacocke: not all of these relations are independent from identification, and that needs to be explained by the theory of dG. Identificationally basic/Peacocke: does not imply that any substantial identity was definitely true in the case of an i.g. way of givenness. I 151 It is only about a way of knowledge that is not based on other beliefs. I/Guaranteed reference/Anscombe: (The First Person, p.57): "I" is an expression X which has a guaranteed reference in the following sense: not only that there is such a thing X, but also that what I suppose to be X actually is X."... the person of whose movements these movement ideas are ideas..." Self-identification/PeacockeVsAnscombe: you can identify someone else falsely with these conditions! E.g. Anscombe would allow the bishop to see a woman disguised as a bishop in the mirror, and falsely sees her as himself. (ChisholmVsAnscombe: she shows how she identifies herself, but not how I identify myself). |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Descartes, R. | Evans Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 497 EvansVsDescartes/EvansVsHume/EvansVsLocke/EvansVsKant: the "I" of mental self-attribution refers neither to a Cartesian "Ego" now to a Lockean person, nor to a Humean bundle of perceptions, nor to a Kantian I, but rather to an object of flesh and blood! Consequence: the background element of self-identification must be the localization in space and time. I 517 EvansVsDescartes: strongest antidote: the fact that these ways to acquire knowledge about ourselves must be incoporated in the information component of a functional characterization of our "I" ideas. I 522 Body Awareness/Descartes: not a way to achieve knowledge about oneself, but only about something that one has. EvansVsDescartes: It’s hard to make sense from this. (s) This is not an argument. Descartes: I have to admit defeat when Descartes says that this was a way to gain knowledge about myself, but one that uses my identification! Evans: I have to admit that. I 523 EvansVsDescartes: our "I" notions are notions of bearers of physical no less than mental properties. I 562 EvansVsDescartes: the use of "I" simply bridges the gap between the mental and the physical and is not more closely connected to one aspect than to the other. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Descartes, R. | Wittgenstein Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 514 I/Body/Descartes: our I-thoughts leave the possibility open that we might be nothing more but mind. I/WittgensteinVsDescartes: a) Object use: E.g. "My arm is broken", "I have a bump on my forehead", b) subject use: E.g. "I hear so and so" meaningless: to ask. "Are you sure that you are in pain?" (> Certainty). But: the statement, "I am in pain" is no more a statement about a particular person, as a groan. But the reference is clear, it refers to the speaker. Frank I 523 WittgensteinVsDescartes/oral/Evans: when someone says "I think it will rain soon, therefore I am" then I do not understand him. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 --- Wittgenstein II 226 I/WittgensteinVsDescartes: the word "I" is one of several symbols with practical use, and if it was not necessary for language practice, you could drop it. It does not take any prominent position among the other words. Unless we begin to use it as Descartes did. I have just tried to demonstrate convincingly the opposite of Descartes' emphasis on the 'I'. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Evans, G. | Verschiedene Vs Evans, G. | Frank I 571 Background/VsEvans: Question: is the following not unnecessarily involved? 1. a knowledge of what it means that any item is F, and 2. a knowledge of what it means that any object is a. The second would be a piece of knowledge of exactly the same kind as the first. So you may not have to assume that there are singular thoughts that somehow more closely contain the exercise of this knowledge and consequently you need not to have a notion of basic identification! EvansVsVs: a knowledge of what it means that something is F is a knowledge of how it is that any element of the objective order is F, and correspondingly for a. I.e. even if one were to drop the idea of basic identification, the overall picture of "I" thinking, "here" thinking and "this" thinking would be fundamentally similar: the role that the notion of the basic level played in this book would instead have been taken over by the notion of the objective or impersonal conception of the world, whereby the mastery of such thinking would be dependent upon an understanding of how it relates to the objectively viewed world. But it is not easy to tell exactly what that means: what it means to know exactly that any element is or is here or I am any element of the objective order! It is not clear what we want at all with this demand, if we do not assume that the subject formulates the truth of such statements Fra I 572 and can make decisions under favorable circumstances. It also seems that we could not make such an assumption at all: (Section 6.3 (not in this file): "Reference system": Reference System/Evans: such a thinking mode will not be able to reach a higher degree of impersonality. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Frege, G. | Evans Vs Frege, G. | Frank I 485 I/Here/Now/This/Index Words/Evans: are closely related. One and the same explanation pattern applies with three properties: 1) Criteria-free identification: in a certain sense there is even no identification at all! But this can be understood a a "broader sense of identification". Problem: possible misunderstanding: identification criterion of singular term is the Fregean sense. A "criteria-less sense" would then appear as a conceptual contradiction. Solution/Evans: Fregean sense: should be understood as the particular way to think of an object designated by an expression. 2) Limited Accessibility: "I" is not accessible to anyone at any time. Fra I 486 You have to be at the place in question in order to truthfully say "here". The behavior of "I", "this", etc. corresponds to this. I/Thoughts/Understanding/EvansVsFrege: it’s probably impossible for me to "grasp" other people’s "I" thoughts, but that does not mean it is impossible to understand them! Communication/Evans: It is not absolutely necessary to think the thoughts of others in exactly the same form as they do themselves in order to understand them. Limited Accessibility/VsEvans: Question: Is it not possible to have "here" thoughts, no matter where you are? EvansVsVs: misunderstanding: Fregean thoughts are carriers of un-relativized, absolute truth values. Thus it is impossible that one and the same idea is sometimes true and sometimes wrong. It is therefore wrong to speak of a way of givenness expressed by "here" (s) "Here" is not an intention, "here" no intention Kaplan: "I": "rigid intension") Evans: There are as many kinds of the givenness of "here" as there are places. Difference: type/token. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Frege, G. | Kaplan Vs Frege, G. | Frank I 484 Singular Term/Frege: is not limited to standing for an object, but always has a special way of being given. ("sense", intension). Index words/indexical/Perry/VsFrege/KaplanVsFrege: this model is tailored to descriptions and names and fails with references to the first person. EvansVsPerry/EvansVsKaplan: 1. there is no reason to suggest that Frege said that the object of a singular term is always given by the fact that a certain description applies to it, 2. the peculiarities of the indexical reference are to be uncovered precisely by a theory of the non-descriptive ways of the given connected with it. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Hume, D. | Evans Vs Hume, D. | Frank I 531 EvansVsHume: We have discarded the background for the perception metaphor on which Hume founds his argument. We have nothing that could be construed as a "stumbling" over perceptions. The internal states are indeed no "objects". E.g. What we become aware of when we see the tree is nothing but the tree itself. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Idealism | Evans Vs Idealism | Frank I 504 EvansVsIdealism: our conception of ourselves is not idealistic: we can understand statements about ourselves that we cannot decide or or even justify! ((s) "objective", given to ourselves "objectively"). E.g. "I was nursed" E.g. "I was unhappy on my first birthday" E.g. "I rolled around last night in my sleep" E.g. "I was dragged through the streets of Chicago being unconscious" E.g. "I’m going to die" That means that our thoughts about ourselves obey the generality clause. ((s) we can identify ourselves like other objects and apply properties to ourselves in a second step which we could attribute to other objects, or to decide which properties we can not attribute to ourselves in contrast to some objects outside of us). I 505 EvansVsIdealism/EvansVsIncorrigibility: we can still be wrong here: gap between evidence and conclusion remains. Common misunderstanding: The fact that I can identify myself with an objectively considered person leads to a misleadingly ideal verificationist interpretation of the fact. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Nagel, Th. | Evans Vs Nagel, Th. | Frank I 507 Self-Identification/Understanding/EvansVsNagel: I have already explained implicitly what it means to understand such an identity statement (generality clause). Persons are distinguished from others like ordinary material objects from other material objects. An identity statement does not necessarily make a difference for a spatiotemporal map of the world, but for the way in which the immediate environment is considered. EvansVsNagel: he looked for an impact at the wrong place. It is true that we cannot determine in a non-indexical identity statement whether it is true or not. But why should we assume that everything that is true could be represented in this way? Objectivity/Self-Identification/Nagel: a proposition like [I am t] is not objectively true from the standpoint of eternity. Evans: pro! Such a proposition can indeed only be made by the person himself. ((s) And he does not exist in eternity). But EvansVsNagel: that does not mean that we do not understand what it means that we are identical with the same spatio-temporal objects. Fra I 507/508 Otherwise our thinking about ourselves could not be subject to the generality clause. Evans: We would have to assume then that we had an idealistic conception of the self. Or demand just like Anscombe "I" refers to nothing. I/Self-Identification/Objectivity/EvansVsNagel: conversely, one could say just like our thoughts about ourselves demand that this connection with the world that is considered to be "objective" is understood, our "objective" thinking about the world also requires that this connection is understandable. Because nobody can be attributed an "objective" model of the world if he does not understand that he designs a model of the world in which he lives! Therefore, I believe that Nagel’s "gap" between the objective and the subjective only seems to exist. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Nagel, Th. | Stalnaker Vs Nagel, Th. | I 20 Objective Self/Nagel/Stalnaker: Nagel begins with the expression of a general sense of confusion about one's place in an impersonal world. I: if somebody says "I am RS" it seems that the person expresses a fact. I 21 Important argument: it is an objective fact whether such a statement is true or false, regardless of what the speaker thinks. Problem: our concept of the objective world seems to leave no place for such a fact! A full representation of the world as it is in itself will not pick out any particular person as me. (single out). It will not tell me who I am. Semantic diagnosis: attempts a representation of index words or self-localization as a solution. NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: that does not get to the heart of the matter. StalnakerVsNagel: a particular variant can solve our particular problem here but many others remain with regard to the relation between a person and the world they inhabited, namely what exactly the subjective facts about the experience tell us how the world in itself is Self-identification/Self-localisation/belief/Stalnaker: nothing could be easier: if EA says on June 5, 1953 "I am a philosopher" then that is true iff EA is a philosopher on June 5, 1953. Problem: what is the content of the statement? Content/truth conditions/tr.cond./Self-identification/I/Stalnaker: the content, the information is not recognized through tr.cond. if the tr.cond. are made timeless and impersonal. ((s) The truth conditions for self-identification or self-localization are not homophonic! That means they are not the repetition of "I'm sick" but they need to be complemented by place, date and information about the person so that they are timeless and capable of truth. Problem/Stalnaker: the speaker could have believed what he said, without even knowing the date and place at all or his audience could understand the statement without knowing the date, etc.. Solution: semantic diagnosis needs a representation of subjective or contextual content. Nagel: is in any case certain that he rejects the reverse solution: an ontological perspective that objectifies the self-.properties. Stalnaker: that would be something like the assertion that each of us has a certain irreducible self-property with which he is known. ((s) >bug example, Wittgenstein dito), tentatively I suppose that that could be exemplified in the objectification of the phenomenal character of experience. I 253 Self/Thomas Nagel/Stalnaker: Nagel finds it surprising that he of all people must be from all Thomas Nagel. Self/subjective/objective/Stalnaker: general problem: to accommodate the position of a person in a non-centered idea of an objective world. It is not clear how to represent this relation. Self/I/Nagel/Stalnaker: e.g. "I am TN". Problem: it is not clear why our world has space for such facts. Dilemma: a) such facts must exist because otherwise things would be incomplete b) they cannot exist because the way things are they do not contain such facts. (Nagel 1986, 57). Self/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: unsatisfactory: NagelVsOntological solution: wants to enrich the objective, centerless world in a wrong way. Nagel: center position thesis: There is an objective self. StalnakerVsNagel: this is difficult to grasp and neither necessary nor helpful. I 254 Semantic diagnosis/StalnakerVsNagel: has more potential than Nagel assumes. My plan is: 1. semantic diagnosis 2. sketch of a metaphysical solution 3. objective self is a mistake 4. general problem of subjective viewpoints 5. context-dependent or subjective information - simple solution for qualitative experiences. Self/subjective/objective/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: (in Stalnaker's version): This does not include that "I am TN" is supposedly without content. StalnakerVsNagel: the identity of the first person is not "automatically and therefore uninteresting". semantic diagnosis: starts with the tr.cond. WB: "I am F" expressed by XY is true iff XY is F. What information is transmitted with it? I 255 Content/information/self/identity/Stalnaker: a solution: if the following is true: Belief/conviction/Stalnaker: are sets of non-centered poss.w. Content/self-ascription/Stalnaker: is then a set of centered poss.w. E.g. I am TN is true iff it is expressed by TN, Content: is represented by the set of centered poss.w. that have TN as their marked object. Content/conviction/Lewis/Stalnaker: with Lewis belief contents can also be regarded as properties. (Lewis 1979). I 257 Semantic diagnosis/NagelVsSemantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: "It does not make the problem go away". Stalnaker: What is the problem then? Problem/Nagel: an appropriate solution would have to bring the subjective and objective concepts into harmony. I 258 StalnakerVsNagel: for that you would have to better articulate the problem's sources than Nagel does. Analogy. E.g. suppose a far too simple skeptic says: "Knowledge implies truth so you can only know necessary truths". Vs: which is a confusion of different ranges of modality. VsVs: the skeptic might then reply "This diagnosis is not satisfactory because it does not make the problem go away". Problem/Stalnaker: general: a problem may turn out to be more sophisticated, but even then it can only be a linguistic trick. Illusion/explanation/problem/Stalnaker: it is not enough to realize that an illusion is at the root of the problem. Some illusions are persistent, we feel their existence even after they are explained. But that again does not imply that it is a problem. I 259 Why-questions/Stalnaker: e.g. "Why should it be possible that..." (e.g. that physical brain states cause qualia). Such questions only make sense if it is more likely that the underlying is not possible. I 260 Self-deception/memory loss/self/error/Stalnaker: e.g. suppose TN is mistaken about who he is, then he does not know that TN itself has the property to be TN even though he knows that TN has the self-property of TN! (He does not know that he himself is TN.) He does not know that he has the property which he calls "to be me". ((s) "to be me" is to refer here only to TN not to any speaker). objective/non-centered world/self/Stalnaker: this is a fact about the objective, non-centered world and if he knows it he knows who he is. Thus the representative of the ontological perspective says. Ontological perspective/StalnakerVsNagel/StalnakerVsVs: the strategy is interesting: first, the self is objectified - by transforming self-localizing properties into characteristics of the non-centered world. Then you try to keep the essential subjective character by the subjective ability of detecting. I 263 Nagel: thesis: because the objective representation has a subject there is also its possible presence in the world and that allows me to bring together the subjective and objective view. StalnakerVsNagel: I do not see how that is concluded from it. Why should from the fact that I can think of a possible situation be concluded that I could be in it? Fiction: here there are both, participating narrator and the narrator from outside, omniscient or not. I 264 Semantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: may be sufficient for normal self-localization. But Nagel wants more: a philosophical thought. StalnakerVsNagel: I do not think there is more to a philosophical thought here than to the normal. Perhaps there is a different attitude (approach) but that requires no difference in the content! Subjective content/Stalnaker: (as it is identified by the semantic diagnosis) seems to be a plausible candidate to me. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Nozick, R. | Peacocke Vs Nozick, R. | I 133 Way of Givenness/Object/Peacocke: I have separated the theory of the way of givenness of an object from the theory about the nature of objects. This is in contrast to the approach of Robert Nozick: Philosophical Explanations, 1981, p 87th I 133/134 I/NozickVsPeacocke: Thesis: the I is designed and synthesized around the act of reflexive self-reference. This is the only way to explain why we when reflexively referring to ourselves, know that it is we ourselves who we refer to. Declaration/Peacocke: Nozick refers here to the fact that an epistemic fact can only be explained by appealing to a certain approach to nature of this object, and not to the way of givenness how we perceive the object. Or how the subject is reflected upon. Object/Intension/Explanation/Peacocke: Question: It is for every person a) a conditional that they know or is it b) a conditional which is only a consequence of its knowledge? The first case would be: a) I know: when I say "I", then the utterance of "I" refers to me b) When I say "I", then: I know that the utterance of "I" refers to me Peacocke: ad b): is not a real date that requires an explanation. It is not always true! E.g. I am in the same room with my twin brother and for one of us the vocal cords do not work without both of us knowing for whom... ad a): this seems to be based on two different beliefs: I 135 1) the originator of the statement u of 'I' = myself 2) Every utterance of "I" refers to its originator. Nozick/Problem: E.g. Oedipus: he knows: The originator of the utterance u of "the murderer of Laius" = I and he also knows: Every utterance of "the murderer of Laius" refers to the murderer of Laius. but he does not believe in the identity of "the murderer..." = I. So he is not in the position to judge: The originator of the utterance u of "the murderer of Laius" refers to me. I/PeacockVsNozick: so we have the contrast between first person and third person cases without having a theory of the "synthesized self" (Nozick), if we can explain the availability and the content of the premises in the first-person case without this theory. Nozick: what is it like for me to know that it was I who produced a particular statement? Peacocke: but that involves two different interpretations: 1) What is it like to know that and not only to believe it? This is no more problematic than the question whether it was I who blew out the candle. 2) What is the content of the thought: "I have made this statement"? I 136 This is again about evidence*: that "the person with such and such states" made the statement. Nozick: it is not sufficient that I know a token of the utterance "I made this statement" and speak German! Peacocke: it can be compared with the time problem: The time of the utterance of u "now" = now Every utterance of "now" refers to the time of the utterance PeacockeVsNozick: it does not seem that we need a theory of time, as "synthesized around acts of reference" in any (every?) language. Nozick's theory cannot explain what it claims to be explaining: because a his subject matter concerns that which can be known, while his theory is not a theory of ways of givenness. We cannot simply think of any object without thinking about it a certain way. Nozick's synthesized selves are simply construed as objects, though. Peacocke: can we reformulate Nozick's theory as approach to ways of givenness? Is "the originator of this statement" to be thought somehow in a first person way? (reflexive self-reference). 1) What is this act like in a complex way of givenness. It cannot be perceptual. Because that could be an informative (!) self-identification ((s) empirically, after confusion with the twin brother, and then not necessarily). Instead: Action-based: "the act, which was brought about by the attempt to speak". That is not informative indeed. But that brings Nozick's theory close to our theory of the constitutive role. I 137 Because such attempts are among the conscious states of the subject. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Possible Worlds | Stalnaker Vs Possible Worlds | I 49 Possible world/poss.w./knowledge/mathematics/StalnakerVsLewis/Stalnaker: I am inclined to say that the poss.w.-theory makes assumptions about the nature of their properties that are - unlike the corresponding assumptions of mathematical platonism - incompatible with the representation of the connection between the knowledge subjects and their objects in the case of poss.w.. poss.w./MR/VsModal realism/knowledge/verificationism/StalnakerVsLewis: the modal realist cannot cite any verificationist principles for what he calls his knowledge. Conclusion: problem: the MR cannot on the one hand say that poss.w. things are of the same kind as the actual world (contingent physical objects) and say on the other hand that poss.w. are things of which we know by the same kind like of numbers, sets, functions. ((s) Namely no real existing things.). I 53 StalnakerVsLewis: he contradicts himself because his other thesis about poss.w. about which we can have substantial beliefs contradicts his definition of content (see above). I 58 Contradiction/Lewis: there is no object howsoever fantastic about which one could tell the truth by contradicting oneself. Footnote: Takashi YagisawaVsLewis: why not? What should you expect otherwise? Impossible things are impossible. II 20 Belief ascription/solution/Stalnaker: I always wonder how the poss.w. would be according to what the believer believes. E.g. Pierre: for him there are two cities (Londres and London) E.g. Lingens in the library: for him there are two men, one named "Lingens" about which the other reads something. Relations theory/RelTh/Stalnaker: this can reconcile with the assumption that propositions are the belief objects. (Team: Stalnaker pro Relations theory? (1999)) Index/belief/Stalnaker: nevertheless I believe that convictions have an irreducible indexical element. Solution/Lewis: sets of centered poss.w. as belief objects. StalnakerVsLewis: although I have accepted that such poss.w. then include a representation of the mental state of the believer. But that is not what it is about! It is not sufficient that poss.w. that are compatible with one's convictions then include a person who has these convictions (> e.g. Lingens), the believer must identify himself with the person who has this thought! Proposition/identification/self-identification/Stalnaker: I am not suggesting that this identification is fulfilled by the belief in a proposition. I now think that this is not at all about some kind of cognitive performance. Indexical conviction/Stalnaker: (E.g. Perry: memory loss, library, e.g. Lewis: 2 gods (2 omniscient gods, e.g. Castaneda: memory loss): indexical unknowing. Stalnaker: thesis: people do not differ in what they believe. II 21 E.g. O'Leary knows that he is in the basement and that Daniels is in the kitchen. And Daniels knows the same thing: that he is in the kitchen and O'Leary in the basement. Everyone knows who and where he is and who and where the other is. The poss.w. that are compatible with the convictions of the two are the same. They argue about nothing. Yet there is an obvious difference in their doxastic situation: O'Leary identifies himself with the one in the basement and Daniels identifies himself as one who is in the kitchen. poss.w. semantics/StalnakerVsPossible worlds semantics/Stalnaker: this difference in the belief states of the two is not reflected by a set of poss.w. as belief state. Solution/Lewis: self-ascription of properties, or - equivalently - sets of centered poss.w.. StalnakerVsLewis: I do not want that. StalnakerVsLewis: problem: it is wrong to treat the difference in perspective as a dispute (disagreement). The two argue about nothing. Problem: it is not sure if one can express their agreement with the fact that the set of their uncentered poss.w. is the same. Because E.g. Heimson/Perry/Stalnaker: (Heimson believes "I am David Hume") all his impersonal beliefs about Hume are correct. Suppose they are the same convictions as the convictions of Hume about Hume. Stalnaker: nevertheless it would be wrong to say that they argue about nothing. ((s) unlike O'Leary and Daniels). II 134 Localization/space/time/self-localization/logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: set of poss.w. from which one selects one. Self-localization/physical: in space and time. We usually know where we are. ((s) but we never know all poss.w. in which we could be localized, we cannot distinguish all poss.w. because we do not know everything). Gods example/Stalnaker: the two know exactly where they are in the logical space. II 135 But they do not know where within this poss.w. they are. LewisVsTradition: the doctrine of the proposition is focused only on one of the two types of localized belief. Generalization: is what we need and for that the transition from propositions to properties (as belief objects) serves. II 144 Gods example/Stalnaker: this is also a case of unknowing, which of two indistinguishable poss.w. is actual. One is actually the actual world while the other exactly the sam, with the exception that the god who sits in the actual world on the highest mountain is this time sitting on the coldest mountain and in fact with all the properties that the god on the highest mountain actually has. ((s) two individuals change places but keep all the properties. This is only possible if localization is not a property) Omniscience/Stalnaker: then you have to say, the two gods are not really omniscient regarding propositions, but rather omniscient in relation to purely qualitative criteria. LewisVsStalnaker: Lewis rejects this explanation for two reasons: 1. because he represents the counterpart theory (c.th.) that makes the cross world identity superfluous or meaningless. 2. even without counterpart it would not work because Assuming that the two gods of world W have traded places in world V assuming the god on the highest knows that his world is W, not V. Assuming he is omniscient with respect to all propositions not only the qualitative propositions. II 145 V: the world V cannot be relevant because he knows that he does not live there. Problem: there are still two mountains in a poss.w. W where he after all what he knows can live. StalnakerVsLewis: that does not answer the question: you cannot simply stipulate that the God in W knows something and not V. Because after the explanation we proposed that leads to the fact that he knows on which mountain he lives. Lewis/Stalnaker: his explanation is plausible if one conceives it as a metaphor for a location in the logical space: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: assume that a map of the logical space divided into large regions match the poss.w. and in smaller subdivisions represent the locations within poss.w.. Important argument: then we can tell someone in which large region he is without telling him exactly where he is located in it. Modal Realism/MR/logical space/Stalnaker: for him this image might be appropriate. Actualism/logical space/localization/Stalnaker: for the actualism this image is misleading: to know in which country you are is different to know where in the country you are but it is not so clear that there is a difference between the fact that one knows anything about in which poss.w. one is and knowing which poss.w. is the actual. Lewis also admits this. Stalnaker: my approach seems to be really close to the one of Lewis, but no. Centered poss.w.: one should perhaps instead of indistinguishable poss.w. speak of centered worlds (after Quine). These are then distinguishable. Indistinguishability/poss.w./Stalnaker: distinct but indistinguishable poss.w. would then be the same worlds but with different centers. Attitude/properties/propositions/centered world/Lewis: to treat objects of attitudes as sets of centered poss.w. makes them to properties instead of propositions. Centered poss.w./Stalnaker: I agree that possible situations normally, perhaps even essential, are centered in the sense of a representation of a particular mental state. II 146 StalnakerVsLewis: but this makes the approach (gods example) more complicated when it comes to the relations between different mental states. E.g. to compare past with current states is then more difficult, or relations between the convictions of different people. Information/communication/Stalnaker: we need then additional explanation about how information is exchanged. Two examples: E.g. O'Leary is freed from his trunk and wonders at around nine: a) "What time was it when I wondered what time it was?" Stalnaker: that is the same question like the one he asked then. When he learns that it was three o'clock, his doubt has been eliminated. Solution: the doubt is eliminated since all possible situations (poss.w.) in which a thought occurs at two different times are involved. The centers of these situations have moved in the sense that it is now nine o'clock and O'Leary no longer in the trunk but it may be that the first occurrence of the then thought is what O'Leary is now thinking about. Important argument: this moving of the center does not require that the poss.w. that the propositions characterize are changed. b) "What time was it when I wondered if it was three or four?". (If he wondered twice) Indistinguishability: even if the two incidents were indistinguishable for O'Leary, it may still be that it was the first time which O'Leary remembers at around nine o'clock. StalnakerVsLewis: his approach is more complicated. According to his approach we have to say at three o'clock, O'Leary wonders about his current temporal localization in the actual world (act.wrld.) instead of wondering in what poss.w. he is. Versus: at nine, things are quite different: now he wonders if he lives in a poss.w. in which a particular thought occurred at three or four. This is unnecessarily complicated. E.g. Lingens, still in the library, meets Ortcutt and asks him "Do you know who I am?" – "You are my cousin, Rudolf Lingens!". Stalnaker: that seems to be a simple and successful communication. Information was requested and given. The question was answered. II 147 Proposition/Stalnaker: (Propositions as belief objects) Ortcutt's answer expresses a proposition that distinguishes between possible situations and eliminates Lingen's doubt. StalnakerVsLewis: according to his approach (self-ascription of properties), it is again more complicated: Lingens: asks if he correctly ascribes himself a certain set of properties i. Ortcutt: answers by ascribing himself a completely different set of properties. Lingens: has to conclude then subsequently himself the answer. So all the answers are always indirect in communication. ((s) also StalnakerVsChisholm, implicit). Communication/Lewis/Chisholm/StalnakerVsLewis/StalnakerVsChsholm: everyone then always speaks only about himself. Solution/Stalnaker: Lewis would otherwise have to distinguish between attitudes and speech acts and say that speech acts have propositions as object and attitudes properties as an object. Problem/StalnakerVsLewis: Lewis cannot say by intuition that the content of Ortcutt's answer is the information that eliminates Lingen's doubt. That is also a problem for Perry's approach. (> StalnakerVsPerry) |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Shoemaker, S. | Evans Vs Shoemaker, S. | Frank I 540 Memory/Evans: There is also memory activity on a non-conceptual level: that of the information system (perception state). E.g. It seems that something was the case in this or that way. These are no freely floating images whose reference to the past is read into them by the subject. I 542 ShoemakerVsEvans: the impression that memory-based judgments about oneself are free of identification is based on a linguistic triviality: we would not say of a person whose information comes from someone else "he remembers". EvansVsShoemaker: but it is not true that the freedom of identification is a mere illusion: EvansVsStrawson: rather, he exposes himself to the accusation. Fra I 543 Of taking advantage of the linguistic phenomenon, when he tries to prove the freedom of identification in question looking at the extraordinary utterance "I remember clearly that this memory took place, but did it take place in me?". Memory/Shoemaker: Memory-based judgments depend on identification and are therefore not immune to misidentification: E.g. we can imagine that the apparent memories of a person were in reality causally derived from other people (false memory). E.g. complete duplicate of a person (clone). (s) too absurd to be a convincing example. Fra I 544 Shoemaker: "Quasi Memory": "Q memory". E.g. if there are such false memories, then it seems to make sense to say "someone stood before a burning tree, but was it me?" EvansVsShoemaker: even if this is possible, it does not follow that normal judgments must be based on an identification! It’s not about distinction: "someone stood ... I was the one". Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Solipsism | Evans Vs Solipsism | Frank I 533/534 Solipsism/Evans: Solipsism tries to take advantage of an asymmetry: "I am the object that, if it is in pain, has to expect something bad ((s) intensified: if someone ...).. E.g. red and green object, solipsist: "I can make a statement about the difference between a fact that concerns me and a fact which concerns another person because of the difference in the way they appear to ME. EvansVsSolipsism: it is a mistake to try and derive something informative from this asymmetry about his use of the word "I". Fra I 535 In the relativation on the solipsist only tautologies arise. E.g. "I am the person in such a way that if their legs are bent, this will be felt. Or: "...if he moves, changes of such and such nature are observed." The solipsist does not need not be a dualist. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Wittgenstein | Evans Vs Wittgenstein | Frank I 504 EvansVsIdealism: our conception of ourselves is not idealistic: we can understand statements about ourselves that we cannot decide or even justify! ((s) "objective", given to ourselves "objectively"). Example "I have been breastfed". Example "I was unhappy on my first birthday" Example "I rolled around in my sleep last night" Example "I was dragged unconscious through the streets of Chicago" Example "I'm going to die" I.e. our thoughts about ourselves obey the generality clause. EvansVsWittgenstein: This idea is diametrically opposed to an idea by Wittgenstein: by asking us to consider psychological statements in the first person (Evans), because this enhances their similarity to the act of moaning in pain, i.e. exactly considering them to be unstructured responses to situations. Wittgenstein: was well aware that this would enable him not to think about certain issues. Frank I 515 Immunity/EvansVsWittgenstein: his E.g. "The wind tousles my hair" is precisely what leads to the widespread misconception Frank I 516 That immunity does not stretch to the self-attribution of physical phenomena. This is certainly the case. There is a way of knowing that the property of ξ’s hair of being tousled by the wind is currently instantiated. It does not make sense to ask: "The wind tousles someone’s hair, but is it mine?" ((s) Perhaps in this case it is?). EvansVsWittgenstein: does not acknowledge this fact sufficiently. Wittgenstein: the object use requires us to recognize a certain person (ourselves)) therefore, the possibility of error is "envisaged". EvansVsWittgenstein: 1) this can simply not be used correctly to weed out a category of statements that are identified only. Frank I 517 By means of the predicate contained therein, irrespective of the question of how to recognize that the predicate is instantiated. 2) The immunity against misidentification in this absolute sense cannot be invoked for mental self-attribution! E.g. "I see this and that" in cases where I have reason to believe that my tactile information could be misleading. E.g. "I feel a piece of cloth and see a number of outstretched hands in the mirror. Here it makes sense to say "Someone is touching the piece of cloth, but is it me"(Mental predicate) But what does that tell us? 3) Important: The influence of the relevant information on "I" thoughts is not based on a consideration or an identification, but is simply constitutive for the fact that we have an "I" image. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 Wright I 257 Quietism/Truth/Wright: (pro Wittgenstein): it is a metaphysical hypostasis of concepts such as truth and assertion if their applicability is enshrined as a substantial part of a realistic view of its content. Discourses as different as science and film critics, however, are simple tries to determine what is true and do not need any metaphysical relining. But that’s not the end of the matter, of course there are relevant differences between language games. Wright: The realism/Anti-realism debate still remains and the problem of cognitive coercion. I 258 EvansVsWittgenstein: Considerations to follow the rules are themselves only metaphysical defeatism. (More quietist than Wittgenstein himself). |
Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Frege Sense/Meaning | Pro | Frank I 484 Evans: "Oxford Neo-Fregeans" (together mt McDowell and Peacocke) - VsCastaneda - Thesis: Frege s distinction sense / meaning is essential for any philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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