Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Connectionism | Pinker | I 128 ff - 145 Neural Networks/Pinker: Learning/Problem: there are incorrect reinforcements with "XOR" (exclusive or; Sheffer stroke). Solution: we have to interpose internal >representation. I 142 Neural nets/Rumelhart: neural nets return all errors. "Hidden levels": several statements that can be true or wrong can be assembled into a complex logical function, the values then vary continuously. The system can place the correct emphasis itself if input and output are given - as long as similar inputs lead to similar outputs, no additional training is required. >Homunculi. I 144f Connectionism/Rumelhart: the mind is a large neural network. - Rats have only fewer nets. PinkerVsConnectionism: networks alone are not sufficient for handling symbols - the networks have to be structured in programs. - Even past tense overstretches a network. Precursors: "association of ideas": Locke/Hume/Berkeley/Hartley/Mill >Association/Hume. 1) contiguity (context): frequently experienced ideas are associated in the mind 2) Similarity: similar ideas activate each other. >Similarity/Locke. I 146 Computer variant: is a statistical calculation with multiple levels. I 147 VsConnectionism: units with the same representations are indistinguishable. - The individual should not be construed as the smallest subclass. I 151 Connectionism cannot explain compositionality of representation. >Compositionality. I 158ff Recursion/Recursive/Neural Networks/Memory/Pinker: recursion solution for the problem of an infinite number of possible thoughts: Separation of short/long-term memory. The whole sentence is not comprehended at once, but words are processed individually in loops. >Recursion/Pinker. I 159 Networks themselves have to been as recursive processor: for thoughts to be well-formed. I 166 Neural Networks/Pinker: the networks do not reach down to the rules - they only interpolate between examples that have been put in. >VsConnectionism. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Discoveries | Waismann | Friedrich Waismann Suchen und Finden in der Mathematik 1938 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 87 Is every discovery the result of a search? It seemed absurd to say: 88 For example, "Descartes had for a long time the intention of discovering analytical geometry." E.g. to discover the pathogen of malaria is however something, which one can try a long time. Again the question: how can one discover something, after which one has not searched? Sheffer, for example, discovered the possibility of constructing negation and disjunction with a single basic concept, the one of incompatibility. >Sheffer stroke. He has then discovered a new system, more precisely, he has looked into a new structure in the old system. His view is crucial: as long as he does not see the system, he does not have it. Frege would not have it for example, if he had accidentally written in the form of the new system. Von Sheffer, on the other hand, would also be said to have discovered the new system if he had not introduced a new own sign. (Scheffer stroke: instead of "~ (...) v ~ (...).) |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Grammar | Wittgenstein | II 35 Application/use/grammar/convention/Wittgenstein: grammar does not say anything about application - as well as convention - presupposes applications. - E.g. That red differs from blue in a different way than red and chalk, because not formal, is not verified experimentally. >Conventions, >Properties, >Use. II 38 Grammar/Wittgenstein: in it there are no gaps - it is always complete - in it no discoveries are made - E.g. Sheffer stroke: was not a discovery, but a new space was found. >Sheffer stroke II 115 Grammar/Wittgenstein: we cannot describe it - because for this we would have to use the language again - grammar cannot cause that we say something that is not true - it is not determined by facts. >Facts. II 229 Grammar/Wittgenstein: of a grammatical rule, we cannot say that it corresponds to a fact or that contradicts it - the rules of grammar are independent of the facts. II 230 Example of the term "The primary color No. 7" has no meaning - wrong: to believe that this would correspond to a fact of nature - the term has no parallels to E.g. "There is no two-meter man that would fit the standard sizes" - N.B.: on contrast, we could well ask why we do not have a 7th primary color if the grammar of "color" is arbitrary - that 7 colors cannot be arranged in a polyhedron, is not a natural fact. >Colour. II 436 Mathematics/grammar/Wittgenstein/(s): important for him is always the method or process. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Logic | Quine | II 47ff Bivalence: Problem: Sorites. II 53 Bivalence is still a basic feature of our scientific world. - In the liberal sense there is no problem - Frege: each general term is true or not - all terms are vague by ostension. >Sorites. II 168 Logic, old: deals with properties - new: with relations - Quine: feels implications. II 169 Logic, old: failed with relative terms: drawing figures/drawing circles (Carroll) - new: no problem with that: implication lies precisely in the relative term. II 173 Existence: "all x are y" controversy: does this imply the existence of "x"? medieval logic: yes - Modern Times: No (thus gains in symmetry and simplicity). --- VII (e) 82 Logic/Quine: triple: propositions - classes - relations - logical terms: we only need three "ε" ("element of") - Sheffer stroke and universal quantifier. --- VII (f) 119 ff Class logic/Quine: emerges from quantifier logic if we bind scheme letters (predicate letters) "F" etc. - ((s) 2nd order Logic ). --- IX 8 Logic/Quine: main task: to prove the validity of schemes - 2nd order logic: this is about the validity of the formula schemes of quantifier logic - E.g. substitutability of bi-subjunction: "x1 ..." xn[((AB) and CA) > CB]. --- X 110 Logic/Quine: if you determine the totality of logical truths, you have established the logic. X 110 Different logic/Quine: there is no differing procedure of taking evidence, but rejection of part of the logic as untrue. X 111 "Everything could be different"/translation/different logic/interchanging/and/or/key position/ Gavagai/Quine: assuming a heterodox logic, in which the laws of the adjunction now apply to the conjunction, and vice versa - there is a mere change of phonetics or the designation. - ((s) If he says adjunction, he uses our conjunction.) - Quine: we force our logic on him by translating his different way of expressing himself. It is pointless to ask which one is the right conjunction. - There is also no essence of the conjunction beyond the sounds and signs and the laws for its use. >Gavagai/Quine, >Connectives/Quine, >Schmatic Letters/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Logical Constants | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 139 Logical Constants/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the structural elements, often referred to as logical constants, and which are the main tool for creating complex sentences from simple ones, are not necessarily needed. I 140 Logical Constants/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: were there is composition, there are argument and function, these are already all logical constants. >Compositionality. Tractatus: 5,441 "Here it becomes clear that "logical objects" and "logical constants" (in the sense of Russell and Frege) do not exist. For: "all results of truth operations with truth functions are identical, which are one and the same truth function of elementary propositions. II 79 Sheffer Stroke/notation/Wittgenstein: makes the internal relation visible. - WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing style does not make clear that p v q follows from p.q. >Sheffer stroke. VI 95/96 Logical Constants/Elementary Proposition/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/Schulte: new: priority of a sentence-system compared to single sentences - formerly VsLogical constants - (do not connect any objects, this is still true for Wittgenstein) - but wrong: that the rules have anything to do with the internal structure of sentences. New: they form part of a broader syntax. V 70 WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.4 "logical objects" or "logical constants" in Russell's sense do not exist. IV 71 Logical Constants/Tractatus: 5.441 this disappearance of the apparent logical constant also occurs when "~(Ex) . ~fx" says the same as "(x).fx" or "(Ex).fx.x =a" the same as "fa". IV 79 Logic/Symbol/Sign/Sentence/Tractatus: 5.515 Our symbols must show that what is indicated by "v" "u", etc. (logical constants) must be propositions. (Logical Form). >Propositions, >Symbols. IV 80 "p" and "q" requires even the "v","~" etc.! If the sign "p" in "p v q" does not represent a complex sign, then it cannot make sense on its own. But if "p v p" makes no sense, then "p v q" cannot make sense either. >Sense, >senseless. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Systems | Waismann | Friedrich Waismann Suchen und Finden in der Mathematik 1938 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 89 System/Aspects/Provability/Waismann: One could also have proved the equivalences in Russell's system ~p ⇔ ~p v ~p p v q ⇔ ~(~p v ~p ) v~(~q v ~q) but would one have expressed with this Sheffer's discovery? Not at all! One could speak of the discovery of a new aspect. >Sheffer stroke. Again the question: could one look for this aspect? No. That something can be seen in this way can only be seen when it is seen. That one aspect is possible is only seen when it is there. You can simply underline the newly discovered, so you give a new sign. The formulas with the underlining do something different than those without underlining, they make the new structure visible. E.g. Suppose there is a tribe of people somewhere who owns our decimal system, and calculates exactly as we do, but infinite decimal fractions remain unknown to them. People stop the division, e.g. at the 5th digit. 1/3 = 0.333333. 90 The periodicity would not be noticeable to them, they would not have to think that this always goes on like this. After the discovery of the infinite decimal fractions one "sees" the calculation differently! This is the discovery that one sees the infinite possibility of progressing into the calculation. The emphasis on the return of the rest is the expression that he has discovered the induction. We must not forget that the division with underlining is a different type of calculation. E.g. (5 + 3)² = 5² +2 x 5 x 3 + 3². According to one calculation this is at the same time a proof for (7 +8)²= 7² + 2 x 7 x 8 + 8², but not according to the other calculation! We would sometimes have to underline the different digits, sometimes underline them twice. 91 For example, is the x times x not the same as x²? It is a new system. >Calculus. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
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