Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Entry
Reference
Aboutness Strawson I 185
Object/Activity /about/represent/stand for/singular term/predicate/StrawsonVsGeach: "about" can not be used to distinguish between singular term and predicate. E.g. Raleigh smokes can be regarded as a sentence on smoking.
It also "stands for" specifies no singular term - Both singular term and predicate term can stand for something.
VsGeach: Geach is forced to say that "smoking" stands for something because for him predicative expressions stand for properties.
>Predication/Geach, >Predicate/Geach, >Singular terms, >Predicates, >Levels/order.
>Properties/Geach, >Intentionality.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Ambiguity Quine I 231
Ambiguity: The name Paul is not ambiguous. It is not a general term but a singular term with dissemination. Ambiguity Action/Habit: are ice skaters, delivery (action, object).
I 232
Truth is not ambiguous but general. A true confession is as true as math. Law: There is a difference between laws and confessions! Also, "existence" is not ambiguous.
I 233
Circumstances/Quine: circumstances are important for ambiguities.
I 236
Ambiguities: "a" (can be "any"). "Nothing" and "nobody" are undetermined singular terms (E.g. Polyphemus).
I 244
An ambiguous scope cannot be decided by parentheses. Undetermined singular terms are: a, any, every member - "not a"/"not every" - "I think one is so that ..." / "one is so that I think ... ".
IX 184
"Systematic (or type-wise) ambiguity/Russell: a solution for the problem are relations: the type is only fixed when we state the type of things from the left end of the range and from the right end of the range. There is one problem however: the two-dimensionality can add up to growths: E.g. type of a relation of things of type m to things of type n: (m, n). The type of a class of such relations should be called ((m, n)), then [((m,n))] is the type of a relation of such classes to such classes. Orders were obviously even worse.
IX 194
Systematic Ambiguity/theoretical terms/Quine: (context: polyvalent logic, 2nd order logic) Systematic ambiguity suppresses the indices and allows to stick to the simple quantifier logic. A formula like "∃y∀x(xεy)", which is treated as a type-wise ambiguous, can simply be equated with the scheme ∃yn + 1 ∀xn (xn ∃yn + 1), where "n" is a schematic letter for any index. Its universality is the schematic universality that it stands for any of a number of formulas: ∃y1 "x0 (x0 ε Y1), ∃y2 "x1(x1 ε y2). It does not stand for the universality that consist in the fact that it is quantified undivided over an exhaustive universal class. A formula is meaningless if it cannot be equipped with indices that comply with the theoretical terms. Problem: then also the conjunction of two meaningful formulas can become meaningless. Systematic ambiguity/theoretical terms: we can always reduce multiple variable types to a single one if we only take on suitable predicates. "Universal variables" that we restrict to the appropriate predicate are: "Tnx" expresses that x is of type n. The old formulae: "∀xnFxn" and "∃xnFxn". New is: "x(Tnx > Fx)", e.g.(Tnx u Fx).
>Indeterminacy/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Atomism Sellars I 33
Standard Conditions: assuming them leads out of the logical atomism. >Circumstances/Sellars.
It is not enough that the conditions are appropriate, the subject must know that they are.
>Conditions, >Standard conditions, >Ideal observer, >Observation, >Idealization.
Circumstances: to determine them it is necessary to know something about the objects: how they are under different circumstances.
---
I 34
Logical atomism: VsSellars: it could reply that Sellars 1) overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sense content.
>Logical space.
2) the concepts of the sense contents have the kind of logical independence from one another which is characteristic of traditional empiricism.
>Independence, >Empiricism.
3) concepts for theoretical entities such as molecules have the kind of interdependence which Sellars may have rightly attributed to the concepts of physical facts, but: the theoretical concepts have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space.
>Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Unobservables.
Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of ​​a more fundamental logical space than that of the physical objects in space and time.
>Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Localization, >Objects.
Logical atomism: statements only occur truth-functionally in statements.
>Truth functions.
---
I 70
Atomism/SellarsVsAtomism/SellarsVsWittgenstein: analysis does not stand for definition of terms, but for the exploration of the logical structure of discourse - which does not follow a simple pattern. >Analysis/Sellars.

cf.
Def truth-functional/Tugendhat: depends on other sentences, not on situations.
Def truth-functional/Read: directly dependent only on the occurring concepts.
---
II 314
SellarsVsWittgenstein/Paradox: to say of a particular atomic fact that it was represented by a certain elementary statement, we have to use a statement in which the elementary statement occurs, but this is not truth-functional. We have to say something like: (1) S (in L) represents aRb.
>Complex, >Relation, >Atomism/Wittgenstein, >Atomism.
This representation relationship cannot be expressed through a statement. Wittgenstein dito.
---
II 321
If only simple non-linguistic objects could be represented, if complex objects were facts, that would lead to the well-known antinomy that there would have to be atomic facts which would be prerequisites for the fact that language can depict the world, but for which no example can be given if the speaker demands one. Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus).
>Facts, >States of affairs.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Behavior Locke Avramides I 139
Behavior/thought/speech/Locke: Thesis: behavior is only contingently linked with thoughts. - AvramidesVs: Problem: when we assume that, what has behavior to do with spirit. - (Vs "objective spirit"). >Objective spirit, >Objective mind.
When words stand for ideas, the behavior is irrelevant.
>Idea/Locke.
Physicalism: holds behavior for equally unimportant as idealism.
>Physicalism, >Idealism.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding


Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Clauses Frege Dummett III 7
Subsentence/indirect speech/question: in the subsentence, singular terms do not stand for the object, but for its sense - this is the only case in which a (sub-)sentence stands for the proposition. Tradition: subsentences are not truth-functional. FregeVs. >Singular terms, >Objects, >Sense, >Thought, >Truth functions, >Propositions, >That-clauses.

Frege II 54
Description/Subordinate Clause: the discoverer of the planetary orbits = object: Kepler. (Meaning (reference): has no truth value. The meaning of the subordinate clause is not a complete thought (it cannot be the main clause).
II 62
Subordinate Clause/Subsentence/Meaning/Truth Value/tr.val./Frege: e.g. Bebel beleived that the return of Alsace-Lorraine will appease the feeling of vengeance of France. Here, two ideas are implicit: 1) That Bebel believes that. 2) That it is wrong. The first meaning: is a thought. The second meaning: is a truth value. Therefore, the subordinate clause is actually to be taken twice. Since the truth value is not the whole meaning, we cannot just replace it. Similar: e.g. knowledge, recognition, "it is known".
II 63
Subordinate Clauses/Subordinate Clause/Frege: e.g. false belief implies two meanings: a thought and a truth value. Propositional attitudes are similar. >Propositional attitudes.
IV 69
Description/Subordinate Clause/Subsentence/Name/Frege: e.g. "The negation of the idea that 3 is greater than 5". Here, this term refers to a specific individual thing. This individual thing is a thought. The definite article turns the whole expression into a single name, a representative of a proper name. >Proper names.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Concepts Geach I 26ff
Concept/Frege/Geach: the meaning of "people" is not "many people", but the concept.
I 220
Concept/GeachVsFrege: Frege: "The concept horse is not a concept" - i.e. it must be an object: this is a fallacy! - Not objects are realized, but concepts. - (The former is not falsehood, but nonsense). >Description level, >Level/Order, >Senseless, >Object.
>Correct: E.g. "The concept human being is realized" is divided into "human being" and "the concept ... is realized" - the latter = "something is a...".
What cannot be divided like this, is meaningless: E.g. "the concept human being is timeless".
I 226
Concept/Frege/Geach: Frege has a purely extensional view - therefore he deals not with the "sense of the name", but the reference of the predicate. ((s) reference/(s): set of designated objects = extension.)
>Extension.
But:
Extension/Frege/Geach: = object
Concept/Frege: not an object!
Reason: the concept is unsaturated, the object is saturated.
>Saturated/unsaturated/Frege.
"Red" does not stand for a concept, otherwise the concept would be a name.
>Name/Frege.
I 228f
Concept/Geach: "The concept horse" is not a concept, because otherwise concepts would have names - (...+...) - Nor is a concept a logical unit. - No more than e.g. "Napoleon was a great general and the conqueror of Napoleon was a great general". - E.g. "A man is wise" is not an instance of "___ is wise" ("a man" is not a name), but of a derived predicate "a ... is wise". Sentence/Geach: sentences from which "the concept of human being" cannot be eliminated are pointless! - E.g. "The concept human being is an abstract entity". - Sentences about concepts need a quantifier.
>Quantifier, >Quantification, >Sentence/Geach.
I 230
Concept/Geach: a concept cannot have a proper name. - Instead, we refer the concept with the predicate. >Predicate/Geach, >Predicate/Frege.
VsFrege: he uses pseudo-proper names for concepts: "The extension of the concept x cut the throat of x'." Pseudo-name: "the concept x cut x".
>Names/Geach.
Geach: correct: the name of the extension is "the range of x for x cut the throat of x'."
I 234
Concept/Object/Quine: the distinction between concept and object is unnecessary! >Concept/Quine, >Object/Quine.
GeachVsQuine: it is necessary! - Quine's disguised distinction between class and element corresponds to it.
>Element relation/Quine, >Class/Quine.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Content Frege Berka I 85
Content/Frege: content is the function of an argument. A concept is formed in the following way: the subject is the argument and the predicate is the function. >Subject, >Predicate, >Function.
Berka I 86
Not every content can be assessed: e.g. the idea/concept of a house. >Judgment, >Imagination, >Negation.
Berka I 87
Affirmation/Frege: affirmation refers to the whole of content and judgment.
Berka I 88
Against: negation/denial: negation is part of the content, not of the judgment.
Berka I 87
Def Conceptual Content/Frege/(s): conceptual content is common to passive and active. ((s) From which the same set of conclusions can be drawn.) This has nothing to do with the distinction function/argument.
Berka I 96
Content Identity/Frege: content identity differs from the contingency (implication) in that it refers to names, not to contents. Two names have the same content. >Proper names. Problem: characters can sometimes stand for themselves, sometimes they stand for a content. E.g. in geometry, the same point can have different meanings. Therefore, you must use two different names first to show this later. Different names are not a mere formality.
Spelling: with a triple bar ≡. This refers to conceptual content. Also content identity needs its own character, because the same content can be determined differently.(1)

1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964

Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47
Content/Frege: content is intension, a way of givenness. >Intensions, >Way of givenness.
II 57ff
Content/sentence/Frege: content can be true or false.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

SL I
R. Stuhlmann Laeisz
Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002

Stuhlmann II
R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz
Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995
Denotation Russell Hintikka I 165
On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for real constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of the substitutability of the identity (SI) in intensional contexts.
>Substitution, >Identity/Frege, >Opacity, >Intensionality, >Intension.
Informative identity/Frege: that identity can sometimes be informative at all is related to this.
((s) Explanation: uninfromative identity. a0a - informative identity: a=b; the same object under a different description.)
EG/existential generalization/Russell: it, too, can fail in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms).
>Existential generalization, >Nonexistence.
HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather avoids the problems with denotating terms.
The present King/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France.
HintikkaVsRussell: but there are other problems. (See below: because of the ambiguity of the cross-world identification).
>Cross world identification.
Hintikka I 173
Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: N.B.: a brilliant feature of Russell's theory of the denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers who denote! >Quantifiers.
Theory of Description/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") Thesis: contains the reduction of descriptions on objects of acquaintance.
>Theory of descriptions/Russell.
I 174
Hintikka: this connection is astonishing. It also appears to be circular, only to admit objects of acquaintance. Solution: we must see what successfully denotating phrases actually denote: they denote objects of acquaintance.
>Acquaintance.
Ambiguity/uniqueness/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization.
E.g. Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: that only objects of acquaintance are allowed, shows its own example: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is actually a primary event, i.e. his example (2).
"Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "whether" instead of "did not know".
Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed in the way that George wanted to know from the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott.
I 175
That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (at a distance) and asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell choose an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not normally deal with individuals of flesh and blood, whose identity is known to us, rather than merely with perceptual objects?
Knowledge who/knowledge what/perception object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely in the case of perception objects, it seems as if the kind of uniqueness that we need for a knowledge-who does not exist.
>Ambiguity.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Description Theory Cresswell II 47
Definition Description theory/Cresswell: (here): the description theory asserts that a name is synonymous with an equivalent specific description. This still allows for a wide range of interpretation. >Descriptions, >Names, >Synonymy.
For example, "the planet called phosphorus" is such a description. - Vs: "Phosphorus" is the planet called Phosphorus" is not a necessary truth. ((s) de re).
II 150
Discription Theory/Loar/Bach/Cresswell: Loar (1976(1), 370-373) and Bach (1981)(2) defend the kind of description theory, which makes "Phosphorus" to something, which means something like "is called "Phosphorus".
II 150
VsDescription theory/Cresswell: the description theory is circular, because the use of a name to refer to someone is involved. - (Also Kripke 1972(3), 283, 286.) LoarVsVs: (1976(1) p.371): it is not at all that we are referring to something, by saying, "the referent of this expression "..." The reference is rather intrinsic.
Cresswell ditto.
>Reference, >Intrinsicness.
II 153
Description theory/de re/Cresswell: Example (Partee) Loar believes that semantics is a branch of psychology, while Thomason believes that it is a branch of mathematics - that cannot be de re, because then both cannot be right. >de re, >de dicto.
Solution: Description theory: Loar believes that the thing that is called "semantics" is a branch of psychology, while Thomason believes it is a branch of mathematics. - "It" then does not stand for a thing, but for the property of being called "semantics".
>Semantics, >Properties.

1.Loar, B. The semantics of singular terms. Philos Stud 30, 353–377 (1976). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00372537
2.Bach, Emmon. 1981. On Time, Tense, and Aspects: An Essay in English Metaphysics. inPeter Cole (ed.), Radical Pragmatics , New York: Academic Press, 63-8
3. Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann
(eds.) (1972), 253-355

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Equal Sign Quine IX 9
Equal Sign/Quine: "=" is a two-digit predicate. >Predicates/Quine.
IX 10
Sign/Sign Set/Quine: each theory has introduced a basic vocabulary of primitive predicates, perhaps by definition. Mostly there are only finally many, then we do not need to add the equal sign "=". Because we can then define it with the help of the others. ((s) "primitive" does not mean "one-digit").
Equal Sign/Quine: suppose the only basic predicate of a theory is "φ". Then we can define "=" by the following explanation of "x = y":

(1) ∀z[(φxz ‹› φyz) u (φzx ‹› φzy)].

For obviously "x= x" proves to be a simple example of a valid formula schema of quantifier logic.
The same applies to all special cases of "(x = y u F) > Fy", as far as they are statements which contain no further predicate except "φ".
This is seen in the following way: first, look at all results in which the statements made by "Fx" and "Fy" differ only in one place.
The immediate context of this single occurrence must then be either "φxv" and "φyv" or "φvx" and "φvy", where "v" denotes any variable, (perhaps either x or y).
IX 23
Individuals/Elemental Relation/Extensionality Axiom/Quine: Suggestion: "x ε y", if x is an individual, be true or false, depending on, b x = y or x unequal to y. Thus, the problem of applying the extensionality axiom to individuals disappears.
"ε" of individuals has the property of "=". (Elemental relationship of individuals: equality! ("is element of", "is contained": becomes the equal sign before individuals).
IX 26
Until then, the equal sign is only defined between class abstraction terms. Between variables we need further tools ...+....
X 88
Logical Truth/Structure/Definition/Quine: our definition of logical truth inevitably referred to the grammatical structure. Problem: this view is called into question when we introduce identity (identity predicate "=", equal sign).
Identity/logical truth/Quine: the traceability of logical truth to grammatical structure is questioned when identity is introduced, because e.g. "x = x" or "x = y" may not be a logical truth, because not everything can be used. ((s) >Intension: because of it, not all theorems of identity are logical truths.
Quine: it is about the fact that in one logical truth one predicate must be replaced by another, but the equal sign as a predicate cannot be replaced by another predicate.
Identity/Logic/Quine: Truths of Identity Theory
Example "x = x", "Ey((x = y)" or "~(x = y . ~(y = x))" ((s) symmetry of identity)
are not suitable as logical truths according to our definitions of logical truth.
>Logical Truth/Quine.
Reason: they can be wrong if "=" is replaced by other predicates.
Consequence: So should we not count identity to logic, but to mathematics? Together with ">" and "ε"? >Semantic Ascent.
III 268
Two different names can stand for the same object, if the equal sign is inbetween, the equation is true. It is not claimed that the names are the same!
III 271
Equal Sign/Quine: "=" is a common relative term. The equal sign is necessary because two variables can refer to the same or to different objects.
From a logical point of view, the use of the equal sign between variables is fundamental, not that between singular terms.
III 293
Equality Sign/expressiveness/stronger/weaker/Quine: we also gain expressiveness by making the equality sign obsolete ((s) when we introduce classes). Instead of "x = y" we say that x and y belong to exactly the same classes. I.e. (a)(x ε a. bik. y ε a)
Identity/Quantities/Quine: the identity of classes can be explained in a way in reverse: "a = b" means that a and b have exactly the same elements. Then the equal sign is simply a convenient shortcut.
Description/Equal Sign/Quine: if we have the equal sign, we can afford the luxury of introducing descriptions without having to calculate them as primitive basic concepts. Because with the equal sign we can eliminate a description from every sentence.
>Descriptions/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Facts Geach I 21
Facts/GeachVsRoss: even if we assume that when "p" and "q" stand for true propositions, and such sentences as "the fact that p" have any entities called "facts" as their correspondence, even then there is no entity corresponding to the "fact that not p"! >Proposition, >Sentence, >Nonexistence.
Geach: the opposite of a fact is not itself a fact.
GeachVsRoss: this is anachronistic in that he attributes "facts" to Aristotle at all. "ta pragmata" cannot be translated as "facts", although it is often translated in this way. But the present context does not even contain any word for facts.
I 21
Facts/Geach: facts spread across Europe like syphilis at the end of the 19th century, especially in the field of journalism.
I 22
In a logic textbook by Wisdom it says: "in this book we will use facts approximately as they are used in the 'Strand Magazine'". Geach: the use of the term "facts" is always a sign that things are not yet properly analyzed logically.
Their construction always provides a pair of assertions: Example
(7) Smith was surprised that Brown's wife had left him. This splits into two allegations:
(8) Smith was surprised to hear that Brown's wife had left him.
(9) Brown's wife left him.
(s) 1. From what or whom does he know, 2. (still necessary: whether it was also "a fact").
Geach: this appeals only to assertion formulas and does not contribute to analyzing a sentence of "the fact" that it contains as a conjunction.
For there would be one (7) corresponding sentence in the form of a conjunction:
(10) Smith heard with surprise that Brown's wife had left him and Brown's wife had left him.
then that is the assertion of
(11) If it is not the case that Smith was surprised, then Smith had a tacit agreement with her lover.
but that would turn out to be equivalent to:
(12) If it is not the case that both (Smith heard with surprise that Brown's wife had left him) and (Brown's wife had left him), then Smith had a tacit agreement with her lover.
But that is blatantly wrong.
See also >Facts/Chalmers (positive and negative facts).
I 21ff
Facts/Geach: A wrong attempt was made to reduce hypothetical statements to categorical statements - e.g. the fact of the thunder now and the fact of the lightning after.
I 259
Conjunction/Sentence/Frege: "p u q" is a phrase that is different from "p" and "q" individually - Mill: ditto: otherwise "a group of horses" would be "a kind of horse". - But not: e.g. "Jim is convinced and his wife is unfaithful". Solution: "the fact that ..." is always to split as a pair of statements.
>Conjunction, >Statement.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Features Lyons I 81
Def marked/feature/linguistics/Lyons: "("positive"): For example, the plural form is often marked by an s, i.e. the s is a positive sign for the plural, while the singular is not marked by a sign but "unmarked, "neutral"). Def unmarked/without feature/linguistics/Lyons: For example, lack of a feature ("neutral") singular form due to absence of the s, while the plural ("positive") is marked by an s (order/distinction).
>Order, >Distinctions.
Lyons: marked/unmarked: one could also say presence contrasts with absence.
General/N.B.: often the unmarked form is of more general significance than the marked one.
More general, the members of the pair do not have to be characterized by the presence or absence of a feature:
Example "dog"/"bitch": "dog" contains male and female form.
This leads to a characteristic form of error: in pleonasm, either a tautology "female bitch" or a contradiction results: "male bitch".
I 82
Marked/unmarked: the difference takes place on the paradigmatic level. >Terminology/Lyons.
I 167
Grammatical features/subclasses/Lyons: the previous subclasses can then be subdivided finer, i.e. hierarchically:
Na > {Na1, Na2} etc.
Problem/Lyon(s): due to the hierarchical order there is not always a unique ((s) "way back") within the structure.
I 167
Problem/Lyons: 1. this leads to a large number of incoherent word lists and to many multiple occurrences of a word in several lists.
>Lists.
2. It complicates the formulation of grammatical rules.
>Grammar, >Rules.
I 168
Chomsky: in reality this subcategorization of the vocabulary is not strictly hierarchical, but leads to overlapping e.g. proper names {John, Egypt}, inanimate {book, Egypt} etc. Problem/Chomsky: if the subcategorization is expressed by substitution rules, one of the two distinctions must be superior, the other cannot be represented naturally anymore. For example, if first the division into proper names and appellatives (e.g. book, human) is made and then a division into "human"/"non-human", then the only way to establish a rule is by referring this rule to both completely incoherent classes, namely "proper name-human" and "appellative-non-human". Since the lexicon does not contain a list of "human nouns".
>Lexicon/Lyons.
Chomsky: this gets worse and worse with increasing refinement.
Solution/Chomsky: a grammar must not consist exclusively of substitution rules.
Chomsky/Lyons: we will not discuss his solution here, since we assume a very simple system.
Def Grammatical Feature/Lyons: for nouns. For example, "concrete", "animate", "human", whereby "concrete" must be independent of "animate"/"inanimate".
This feaeture is used for classification or "indexing".
I 169
E.g. Boy: [Appellative,],[Human],[Masculine].
Notation: square brackets.
Lexical substitution rules/replacement: are then formulated in such a way that one can select a word according to features.

Lexicon/Lyons: new: we have to abandon the set of rules of the form
Na > {boy,...}
but the more general form remains valid:

X > x I x e X
New: X is now the word class that satisfies characterization by features.
>Word classes.
Lists: Lists of class compositions e.g.[Appellative],[Human],[Masculine] there is no list (order).
Grammar/Semantics/Congruence/Lyons: the expressions used for the features e.g. "proper name", "appellative" were called grammatically.
I 170
We have not yet departed from the principle that such expressions, when they stand for word classes, are terms for distributional categories. N.B.: this leads us to semantics!
>Semantics.
Classification: because of features such as "animated", etc., this often contradicts the meaning of words.
>Classification.
VsContent Grammar/Lyons: this is the reason why most authors have withdrawn from "content grammar".
In a language description, the lexicon must contain both grammatical and semantic information for each word.
Lyon's thesis: There is often congruence between semantic and grammatical classification. There the grammatical information can be partly taken from the meaning of the word.
>Congruence/Lyons, >Grammar/Lyons.
I 171
Neutral/Grammar/Lyons: sometimes has to be distinguished from "inanimate": e.g. "The child ate its dinner".

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977

Lyons I
John Lyons
Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Functions Russell I XII / XIII
Function/Russell/Gödel: Axiom: functions can only occur "through their values", i.e. they are extensional. >Extensionality, >Extension.
I 58
Function/Russell: presupposes values, but values do not presuppose a function - ((s) In order for 16 to be a square number, there must be a natural number 16 first, etc.)
I 69
Function/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell: no object, since ambiguous - "values ​​of j z^" are assigned to the j and not to the z.
I 72
Def A-Functions/Principia Mathematica/Russell: functions that make sense for a given argument a - ((s) E.g. reversal of function: for example, y = x² can give the value y = 4 for x = 2). - A-function: now we can conversely search for functions that give the value 4 E.g. root of - 16, 2² and any number of others - E.g. "A satisfies all functions that belong to the selection in question": we replace a by a variable and get an a-function. However, and according to the circle fault principle, it may not be an element of this selection, since it refers to the totality of this selection - the selection consists of all those functions that satisfy f(jz^) - then the function is (j). ({f(jz^)) implies jx} where x is the argument - such that there are other a-functions for any possible selection of a-functions that are outside of the selection - ((s) > "Everythingl he said").
I 107
Derived function/notation/Principia Mathematica/Russell: (derived from a predicative function). "f{z^(q,z)}" - defined as follows: if a function f(y ! z^) is given, our derived function must be: "there is a predicative function, which is formally equivalent to j z^ and satisfies f" - always extensional.
I 119
Function/Truth/Principia Mathematica/Russell: a function that is always true, can still be false for the argument (ix)( j x) - if this object does not exist.
I 119
Function/Waverley/Identity/Equivalence/Principia Mathematica/Russell: the functions x = Scott and x = author of Waverley are formally equivalent - but not identical, because George IV did not want to know if Scott = Scott.
I 144
Varying function/variable function/variability/Principia Mathematica/Russell: old: only transition from e.g. "Socrates is mortal" to "Socrates is wise" (from f ! x to f ! y) (sic) - new: (Second Edition): now the transition to "Plato is mortal" is also possible - (from j ! a to y ! a) - "notation: Greek letters: stand for individuals, Latin ones for predicates -> E.g. "Napoleon had all the properties of a great emperor" - Function as variable.

1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Heterology Geach I 84
Heterological/Heterology/Geach: E.g. ""is an obscene term" is heterological" - should have the same meaning (same meaning, synonym) as ""is an obscene expression" is not an obscene expression" (correct). - Problem: this definition ""is heterological" is heterologous" would be synonym with ""is heterological "is not heterological" - contradiction. ---
I 88f
Grellings Paradox/(s): a general term "is not applicable to itself" is not applicable to itself. Namely-rider/Ryle:
(1) "heterological" lacks the property for which it stands, namely the absence of the property for which it stands, namely ... recourse. - Ryle: no property is ever mentioned.
Geach: correct:
(2) "... lacks the property for which "heterological" stands.
(1) is an extension of "heterological", and just true of those words, of which (2) is not true Grelling's paradox. (1) is not at all ambiguous - otherwise it would always have to refer to the same property in all events of (1), e.g. "French"....
Solution/Geach: "the property for which it stands" never denotes any specifiable property. - Various heterological epithets stand for different properties.
>Paradox.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Identification Tugendhat I 395
Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: uses identification in the narrow sense. >Frederick Strawson. Tugendhat: my own notion "specification" (which of all objects is meant) is superior to this concept.
>Specification.
"picking out" (to pick put) is Strawson's expression - (assumed from Searle) - (Quine: "to specify").
I 400ff
Identification/Identification/Tugendhat: space-time-location: this is an object - Specification: reference, stand for (another term) (in front of background of all other objects). >Reference, >Background.
I 415
Identification/particular/TugendhatVsStrawson: space-time-relation not only anchored perceptively but also system of possible perception stand points - thus a system of demonstrative specification (in front of background). >Space, >Spacetime.
I 417
Trough space-time description the perceptible object is specified as more perceptible - an essentially perceptibable cannot be the previous object who it is. Reference: is then to specify a verification situation.
>Verification.
I 422
Distinguishing objects only from variable usage situations of perception predicates.
I 426
Particular/Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: "here", "now" suffice as object to make space-time locations existent. >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Indexicality.
Space-time-locations are the most elementary objects - but there must also be something - at least hypothetically, then the corresponding question of verification provides, for which object the singular term stands.
>Singular terms, >Objects.
Top-down: the use of all singular terms refers to demonstrative expressions - bottom-up: if the verification situation for the applicability of the predicate is described by demonstratives.
I 436
Localization/identification/Tugendhat: only by several speakers - not zero point, but set of surrounding objects. - The subjective zero point may be the own position. >Subjectivity.
I 462
Identification/Tugendhat: spatial and temporal relation between objects insufficient - an infinite number of space-time locations, finitely many objects - presupposing space-time system - reference to space-time-points cannot fail. Talk of existence without location is pointless. - Identification only by simultaneous reference to all other (possible) objects. - Therefore existence sentences are general.
>Existence, >Existence statements.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Identity Wessel I 220
Identity/Wessel: identity statement: Abbreviation of a statement about the importance of equality of two terms: mutual meaning inclusion - ta tb = definition (ta > tb) and (tb> ta) - but that is only correct for individual subject termini. >Singular terms, >Statements, >Levels/order, >Description levels.
I 220f
Identity/Hegel: a = a: E.g. Socrates is Socrates: demands that Socrates does not undergo any changes in time. >G.W.F. Hegel.
WesselVsHegel: confusion of word and object - identity and difference two-digit predicates (relation) - not one-digit predicate. - x = y is existentially charged.
I 221
Identity/WesselVsLeibniz: suggests an incorrect comparison of separate objects. >Identity/Leibniz, >Leibniz Principle.
I 227
Identity/logic/Wessel: x = x: existentially charged: only true if one thing x exists - not logically true, not a tautology, empirical fact. >Identity/Russell.
I 335
Definition identity/Wessel: i1 = i2 = definition S(i1, ti2). (s) S: the fact that i1 is designated by the name i2? - That a is designated with the name b? b stands for a? Def diversity/Wessel: -i (i1 = i2) = def E(i1) u E(i2) ~ u (i1 = i2)
((s),Tthere are two expressions i1 and i2, which do not stand for the same object.).
Identity/Wessel: we use the axiom: l- i1 = i2> ti 1 ti2.
((s) if the objects are identical, it follows that the corresponding expressions are equivalent in meaning.)
I 379f
Identity/Science Logic/Wessel: 1) at any time is the object a identical with the object b in any spatial order with respect to any method for determining the order
2) always, if one of a and b exists, the other also exists - structure must take into account the relations of objects - there is nothing in nature that justifies the preference for one or another relation (not a fact).
Identity in time/Science Logic/Wessel: if t2 after t1, one can no longer speak of identity - T1 and t2 are then only representative of the same class of objects a, if the objects were defined using time.
>Temporal identity.

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

Indirect Speech Frege Dummett III 7
Indirect speech/subordinate clause/Frege: here the singular term does not stand for the subject matter, but for its meaning. This is the only case where a clause stands for the proposition. Tradition: subordinate clauses are not truth-functional. FregeVs. >Fregean sense, >Singular terms, >Objects, >Sense, >Thought, >Clauses, >Truth functions, >Propositions, >That-clauses.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Intentionality Brentano Pauen I 22
Intentionality/Brentano/Pauen: this is not about ordinary language "intention"; but the necessary being "about" something. >Aboutness.
I 23
Intentionality is inappropriate as an indication of the mental, since not all states of consciousness are intentional by character - E.g. pain. >Pain. ---
Field II 69
Intentionality/Believe/Brentano/Lewis/Field: David Lewis compares the problem with the following about numbers. E.g. "Many apparent physical properties seem to combine physical and non-physical things - called numbers". For example, what kind of physical relation can a 7-gram heavy stone have to the number 7?". (Similar to Churchland 1979(1), Dennett 1982(2), Stalnaker 1984(3)).
FieldVs: the comparison does not contribute much.
Nominalism: is here a solution: literally there are no numbers, and then also no relations (Field 1980). This allows the use of numbers as a useful fiction. >Nominalism, >Fictions.
FieldVs: so viewed, there is no pressure to solve Brentano's problem.
Field II 71
Intentionality/Believe/Brentano/Horwich/FieldVsHorwich: (Horwich (1998)(4) shows how one can still miss the problem: thesis: according to him "means" and "believes" stand for real relations between people and propositions. Horwich: but there is no reason to suppose that a physical access receives this relational status:
Definition fallacy of the constitution/Horwich/Field: the (false) assumption that what constitutes relational facts would itself be relational.
Field II 72
Intentionality/Brentano's Problem/Field: his problem is reformulated in our context: how could the having of truth conditions (in representations) be explained naturalistic?
II 259
Reference/indeterminacy/FieldVsBrentano: if reference is indeterminate, we can only accept one naturalistic response, not one of Brentano's of an irreducible mental connection.
1. Paul Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Cambridge 1979
2. D. Dennett, "Beyond Belief" in: A: Woodfield (ed.), Truth and Object, Clarendon Press, 1-95
3. R. Stalnaker, Inquiry, Cambridge 1984
1. P. Horwich, Meaning, Oxford 1989
---
Prior I 123
Intentionality/Brentano: is a unique logical category. Similar to a relation, without being a real relation.

Brent I
F. Brentano
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014


Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Language and Thought Piaget Upton I 75
Language and thought/Piaget/Upton: Piaget claimed that, although language and thought are closely related, language depends on thought for its development. Language is not possible until children are capable of symbolic thought; they must understand that one thing can stand for another before they can use words to represent objects, events and relationships. Rationale: fundamental principles of thought (e.g. understanding concepts) are displayed well before language; and the simultaneous emergence of language and other processes (…) are suggesting that language is just one of a number of outcomes of fundamental changes in cognitive ability.
>Symbolic play/Piaget.
VsPiaget
> href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details-psychology.php?id=2349205&a=$a&first_name=Lev%20S.&author=Vygotsky&concept=Language%20and%20Thought">Language and thought/Vygotsky.

Piag I
J. Piaget
The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969


Upton I
Penney Upton
Developmental Psychology 2011
Language Use Tugendhat I 209
Language use: So far the speech of the use is still quite indeterminate. Question: With reference to what is the use of linguistic expressions regulated, if they are no longer objects? Nearest answer: circumstances. >Circumstances, >Words.
I 225
Use/Tugendhat: >"stand for": one must find an expression which stands for an object. - So you explain the rules of use of the singular term. >Singular terms.
Problem: the rules of use for the singular term presuppose the predicates and vice versa.
>Rules, >Predicates.
I 226
Usage Rule/Tugendhat: If the circumstances are completely unsuitable for explanation, must we not also abandon the rule of use? This is a mistake: usage is about function, not about circumstances! >Use theory.
I 279
Usage: the usage theory of meaning always refers to propositions (propositions or states of affairs), not to material objects. ((s) Most authors Vs: the theory of use refers to words, not to propositions.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 43. "One can, for a large class of cases of the use of the word "meaning" - though not for all cases of its use - explain this word thus: "The meaning of a word is its use in language."").
>Meaning, >Sentence meaning, >Word meaning.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Liberalism Sandel Brocker I 668
Liberalism/Communitarianism/Sandel: Sandels Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, together with Alasdair MacIntyres After Virtue and Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice, are considered the main work of communitarianism. Sandel, however, is more concerned with a differentiation from John Rawl's liberalism (and his main work Theory of Justice (1975)(1)). SandelVsLiberalism, SandelVsRawls.
Def Liberalismus/Rawls/Rothhaar: Rawls's liberalism is usually characterized in that it postulates a priority of the "right" over the "good", whereby these terms stand for two different possibilities to justify ethical and legal norms at all.
A.
Teleology: ethical theories aimed at the good or a successful life (eudaimonia),
Brocker I 669
are usually called teleological. >Eudemonia.
Norms/values: are justified here by the fact that a good or successful life is realized through them.
B.
Law/Rightfulness/Ethics/Liberalism: ethical theories, on the other hand that are aimed at the right, are characterized by the fact that norms are to be founded here independently of any idea of a good life. The concept of "right" only makes sense as a counter-concept to a teleological theory of normativity and can only occur where teleological theories have already become questionable.
HobbesVsTeleology: Hobbes rejects the idea of a "highest good" himself.
>Order/Hobbes.
Other (liberal) approaches assume a plurality of conceptions of a good life.
Norms: are usually defined in such theories of the right in relation to the generalizability of rules of action or to the concept of freedom.
>Norms.
State/Liberalism: such theories normally confer on the state the role of guaranteeing, through a legal system, the freedom it needs to pursue its respective notions of good.
Liberalism/Rawls: this is about the priority of the right over the good in a twofold sense: a) at the level of justification, b) at the level of the state and society itself.
SandelVsLiberalism/SandelVsRawls: Sandel criticizes above all the priority of rights at the level of justification: he criticizes the "claim that the principles of justice (...) do not depend on a particular conception of good living (...) to justify them. (2)
>The Good, >Life, cf. >Utilitarianism.
Brocker I 676
SandelVsLiberalism: liberalism demands that the state and politics be shaped in such a way, i.e. that the subjects leave behind those moments of communality that constitute their identity ((s) and quasi reinvent it). Sandel: this must almost inevitably lead to an unpleasure in democracy. (3) >Democracy.

1. John Rawls, (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
2. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. x.
3. Vgl. M. Sandel Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, London/Cambridge 1996.

Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Logical Proper Names Prior I 150f
Logical Proper Names/Prior: Logical proper names make complex predicates superfluous. N and M are l.E. if and only if any propositions in which they are both used (not only mentioned) express a relation between the objects to which they refer, and whose relation has a converse, so if φ and ψ are converses, [φMN] and [ψNM] are logically equivalent.
>Predicates, >Equivalence, >Mention,
>Use, >Mention/Use.
An expression N is then a logical proper name (Russell's proper name, "this" etc.) only if [(δφ)N] is indistinguishable in meaning from [δ(φN)]. (Parenthesis)Prior: the latter contributes to the fact that one could say that logical proper names are always arguments of sentence-forming functions and never functions of such functions.
>Functions.
In general: a context of a context of a real "argument" x is a context of x.
For example, "I think this is a human" is synonymous(!) with "This is a thought of mine, to be human".
>Synonymy, >Context, >Levels/order, >Description levels.
I 149
Bound Variables/Prior: stand for logical proper names - "For an x: 1. x φt , 2. Not other than x φt and 3. It is not the case that x ψt". >Variables, >Bound variables.
I 152
Logical Proper Names/Prior: if expressions like "the φ-er" can be used as Russell's logical proper name, then without doubt all names can be used that way! >Logical proper names/Russell.
But Peirce and Russell believe that this is not the case, real relations are expressed.
>Relations/Russell, >B. Russell, >Ch. S. Peirce.
I 155
Names/Relation/Logical Proper Names/Prior: if "Y" is a logical proper name, the following forms are equivalent: (A) X says that Y is bald
(B) X says that Y is bald
(C) Y is considered bald by YX.
Problem: what are names in this sense anyway?
>Proper names.
Prior Thesis: There is a close relationship between names and the term "to be about something".
>"About", >Predication, >Attribution.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Mathematics Benacerraf Field I 20
Mathematics/Identification/Interpretation/Benacerraf: (1965)(1) Thesis: There is an abundance of arbitrariness in the identification of mathematical objects with other mathematical objects. >Numbers, >Sets, >Arbitrariness, >Equations, >Identification.
E.g. numbers: numbers can be identified with quantities, but with which?
Real numbers: for them, however, there is no uniform set theoretical explanation. You can identify them with Dedekind's cuts, with Cauchy's episodes,...
I 21
...with ordered pairs, with the tensor product of two vector spaces, or with tangent vectors at one point of a manifold. >Real numbers.
Facts: there does not seem to be a fact that decides which identification to choose.
>Nonfactualism.
Field: the problem goes even deeper: it is then arbitrary what one chooses as fundamental objects, e.g. amounts?
Field I 21
Basis/Mathematics/Benacerraf: one can assume functions as fundamental and define sets as specific functions, or relations as basic building blocks and sets as a relation of additivity 1. (adicity).
I 23
Mathematics/Indeterminateness/Arbitrariness/Crispin Wright: (1983)(2): Benacerraf's Paper creates no special problem for mathematics: Benacerraf: "Nothing in our use of numerical singular terms is sufficient to specify which, if any amounts are they.
>Singular terms, >Reference.
WrightVsBenacerraf: this also applies to the singular terms, which stand for the quantities themselves! And according to Quine also for the singular terms, which stand for rabbits!
FieldVsWright: this misses Benacerraf's argument. It is more against an anti-platonic argument: that we should be skeptical about numbers, because if we assume that they do not exist, then it seems impossible to explain how we have to refer to them or how we have beliefs about them.
According to Benacerraf's argument, our practice is sufficient to ensure that the entities to which we apply the word "number" forms a  sequence of distinct objects under the relation we call "<". (less-than relation). But that's all. Perhaps, however, our use does not even determine this.
>Mathematical entities.
Perhaps they only form a sequence that fulfills our best axiomatic theory of the first level of  sequences. That is, everything determined by the use would then be a non-standard model of such a theory. And that would also apply to sets.
>Numbers, >Sets.

1. Benacerraf, P. What Numbers Could Not Be, The Philosophical Review 74, 1965, S. 47–73.
2. Benacerraf, P in: Paul Benacerraf/Hilary Putnam (eds.) Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings. Cambridge University Press: New York, 2. ed. 1983.

Bena I
P. Benacerraf
Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984


Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Objects (Material Things) Strawson I 177f
Thing/Job/language/Strawson: 1. grammatical criterion: List 1: Language functions: Differences: A-expressions/B-expressions: refer/describe, designate/to state something about him, etc.
I 178
List 2: Differentiation of linguistic components: singular term/predicative term, referring term/predicate term, subject/predicate, etc.
I 180
List 3: Distinguishes between constituents of statements or between things: things, to which one refers/predicted thing, etc.... nothing can occur on both sides: the act of self-relating cannot be identical with the act of predicting, but some possible in both roles) list 3 presupposes distinction thing/role.
I 182
List 4: (corresponds to Frege): Object/term: combines roll and thing - no object can ever be predicted. >Object/Frege, >Concept/Frege.
List 3: aligns the terms of List 2 (cf. >Particularisation/Ramsey).
I 185
Thing/activity/"about"/represent/singular Term/predicate/StrawsonVsGeach: "about" cannot be used to distinguish between singular term and predicate. >Predication/Geach, >Predicate/Geach, >Singular Terms, >Predicates, >Intentionality, >Levels/Order.

E.g. "Raleigh smokes" can be seen as a statement about smoking - also "stands for" specifies no singular term.
Both singular term and predicative term can stand for something.
VsGeach: he is compelled to say that "smokes" stands for something, because predicative expressions stand for properties according to him.
>Properties/Geach.
Terminology/Strawson:
A-expressions: are substantive
B-expressions: are predicative.

I 203
Thing/property/singular Term/predicate/is/Strawson: if "Socrates is ..." with a description by "is" in the sense of "is identical to" is connected. Then "Socrates is ..." can be understood as B-expression (predicate).
>equal sign instead of copula.
>"Is".
Problem: what things should be introduced by "is a philosopher"?
>Introduction/Strawson.
I 207ff
Thing/predicate/singular term/introducing/Strawson: the reason for the distinction between A (Noun-) and B-expressions (predicate) is distinguishing between different things: between particular and universal, not between object and term or singular term and predicate.
I 210
StrawsonVsTradition: already presupposes the distinction - external reason: might the tense function be the verb - Vs: this could also be expressed with two nouns and arrow notation. Socrates (Wisdom), then arrow either above Socrates or Wisdom, depending on whether Socrates died or became stupid. >Predication, >Ascription.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Objects of Belief Hintikka II 45
(A) Objects of Knowledge/objects of belief/Frege/Hintikka: Frege was concerned about which objects we must adopt in order to understand the logical behavior of the language when it comes to knowledge.
Solution/Frege/Hintikka: (see below: Frege's objects of knowledge are the Fregean senses, reified, >intensional objects).
Hintikka: I am concerned first with the individuals we are talking about in epistemic contexts, and secondly, I am concerned about whether we can call them "objects of knowledge".
Semantics of possible worlds/HintikkaVsFrege: we can opppose Frege's approach with the semantics of possible worlds (Hintikka pro semantics of possible worlds).
II 46
Idea: the application of knowledge leads to the elimination of possible worlds (alternatives). Possible Worlds/Hintikka: the expression is misleading because it is too global.
>Possible worlds.
Def Scenario/Hintikka: everything that is compatible with the knowledge of a knowing person b is a scenario. We can also call it b's worlds of knowledge.
Set of all worlds/Hintikka: the set of all worlds can be called illegitimate.
Objects of Knowledge/Hintikka: objects of knowledge can be objects, persons, artefacts, etc.
Reference/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumes a completely referential language. I.e. all our expressions stand for any entities (Frege's thesis). These can be taken as Frege's objects of knowledge.
Identity/substitutability/substitutability in identity/terminology/Frege/Hintikka: substitutability in identity is the thesis of the substitutability of the identity ((s) only applies restrictedly in intensional (opaque) contexts).
>Opacity.
II 47
(...) E.g. (1) ... Ramses knew that the morning star = the morning star
From this, one cannot infer that Ramses knew that morning star = evening star (although morning star = evening star).
II 48
Context/Frege/Hintikka: Frege distinguishes two types of context: Direct context/Frege/Hintikka: the direct context is extensional and transparent.
Indirect context/Frege/Hintikka: the indirect context is intensional and opaque. For example, contexts with "believes" (belief contexts). ((s) Terminology: "extensional", "opaque" etc. are not words used by Frege).
Frege/Hintikka: according to his picture:
(4) Expression > Meaning > Reference.
((s) I.e. according to Frege, the intension determines the extension.)
Intensional Contexts/Frege/Hintikka: here the picture is modified:
(5) expression (>) meaning (> reference).
II 49
(B) Objects of Knowledge/Possible Worlds Approach/HintikkaVsFrege:
Idea: knowledge leads us to create an intentional context that compels us to consider certain possibilities. This is what we call possible world.
New: we do not consider new entities (intensional entities) next to the referents, but we consider the same referents in different worlds.
Morning Star/evening star/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: solution: "morning star" and "evening star" now take out the same object, namely the planet in the actual world.
>Possible worlds, >Possible world semantics.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Part-of-Relation Gärdenfors I 34
Part-whole-relation/meronomic relations/Gärdenfors: such relations are not only found in the conceptual space of form - they can also occur in other domains: e.g. chord, family, limerick, etc. Semantic roles: for meronomic structures: are often nouns. The corresponding objects often have diverse properties.
On the other hand:
Dimensional conceptual space: e.g. color/color space: here the individual localizations stand for a single property.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Possible World Semantics Field II 41
Property/denotation/possible world/possible world semantics/Field: E.g. "Russell is bald" is true in every world w where Russell exists (denoted by "Russell" in the actual world) and where Russell is bald (i.e. has the property for which "bald" stands in the actual world). N.B.: "stand for": we must now understand it like this: a predicate does not stand for a set (its extension), but for a property that exists in the actual world.
>Actual world, >Actuality, >Actualism, >Cross world identity, >Modal proprties.
Problem: the relation between predicates and properties.
>Predicates, >Properties.
Problem: Properties determine extensions of the predicates, but are not determined by them.
>Extensions.
Solution: within the possible world semantics: causal theory of the reference.
Problem: we are not coming into contact with all extensions of "bald" Solution: property instead of extension - or the extension is determined by a property.
Then what is associated with the predicate is not its extension, but a property. - The relation can be causal or non-causal.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Predicates Frege II 47
Frege: e.g. a sentence about a unicorn is a sentence without truth value; predicates cannot be assigned or denied. (>Nonexistence - thought: is the same whether the expression has a reference ("meaning") or not.
Berka I 87
Predicate/Frege: one could live with a single predicate, "is a fact". Then there is no question of subject/predicate.(1)
1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964

Brandom I 943
Frege: (great discovery): there must be complex predicates in this sense: so that the inferential role of sentences, e.g. "anyone who admires someone who admires themselves", can be recognized. (x)(y)[Rxy > Rxx]. (Can also occur in a language without quantification)- Strawson: this is the second distinguishing feature of singular terms and predicates: terms can be quantified. Singulär terms, >Quantification.

EMD II 226ff
Predicate/Frege: Function: takes objects as arguments and provides truth values as a value.
Frege II 71
Predicate/Frege: e.g. "falling under the concept of human" - which means the same as "a human". ((s) Later authors: "is a human being". "Is" belongs to the predicate.
Tugendhat I 192
Predicate/Frege/Tugendhat: with Frege the predicate also stands for something, but something non-objective: the concept ("to stand for") - (VsObject Theory).
Tugendhat I 193
Predicate/Frege: the predicate has no reference - not because it were contradictory, but because of indeterminacy. >Reference, >Indeterminacy.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Predicates Geach I 110
Predicate/Geach: "predicables": spurious predicates are: e.g.m, "--- smoked a pipe" - "5 is dividable by 5 and by one", as well as for "3...". Predicate: real predicates are: e.g.,"Russell smoked a pipe" - the identity of predicates with reflexive pronouns is not assured.
I 216
Predicate/Geach: a predicate must never be confused with names. - The term does not denote the object. >Name/Geach, >Objects, >Denotation/Geach.
I 224
Predicates/Geach: more common property of sentences - but not an actual expression in the sentence. >Sentences/Geach, >Syntax/Geach.
I 224
"Stand for"/Geach: there is no difference whether I say a predicate "stands for" a property or it is its name. >Proxy.
I 224
Predicate/Geach: a predicate does not appear as an actual expression in the sentence. Geach: there is no identity criterion for predicates.
>Identity criterion.
One cannot know whether two predicates stand for the same property.
Equality of use is necessary condition for same reference. - ((s) That is, the extension but not the intension is equal.)
>Intension, >Extension, >Language use, >Speaker meaning.
GeachVsQuine: therefore one should not identify properties with classes.
>Properties/Quine.
I 239
Predicate/Terminology/Geach: I call predicates only like this if they are used as the principal functor in a proposition, otherwise "predicables". I-predicables/I-predicate/Geach/(s): those predicates in which regard the two objects are indistinguishable in a given theory.
If distinctions can be made in an extended theory, then the I-predicate does not change its meaning - E.g. "uniform" for (different but not at all differentiated) tokens of words, later the tokens are distinguished, but are still "uniform".
I 301
GeachVs two-name theory: error: that if two names denote the same thing, that they then allow the same predicates. >Denotation/Geach, for "two-name-theory" see >Designation/Geach.
I 301
Predicate/Geach: Predicates such as "become" can only be assigned to concrete terms.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Predicates Tugendhat I 172
Predicate/Tugenhat: VsObject theory: the predicate is not to stand for something - we need a different explanation.
I 208
Quasi-predicates/Tugendhat: assuming primitive language, expression of these predicates only in the presence of the object - no theory of use - concurrence of usage and explanation situation. >Terminology/Tugendhat.
I 209
Predicates/Tugendhat: real predicate must be situation independent (that is, especially independent from the circumstances) - situation independency by connection to singular term. >Circumstances, >Situations, >Singular terms.
I 295
Predicates/Tugendhat: not all are suitable to be reformulated inside the conjunction: E.g. Peter and Paul stand next to each other: that cannot be reformulated to Peter stands next to each other and Paul stands next to each other.
I 332
Predicate/Tugendhat: predicates are not about the rule of use ((s) use, meaning), but about the verification rule (s) Truth). >Verification, >Use, >Use theory.
I 335
The rule of use is not determined by the particular situation - 1. the manner of use of "F "in the special use "this is F" is already the general manner of use of "F" in any sentences "Fa"
2. with that, the word "true" is already explained: with a truth condition in which the word "applies" no longer exists: if one can use the sentence 'this is F' correctly in the situation, in which one can replace "this" for "a", "correct" according to the presupposed explanation of the verification-rule of "F".
I 332
Quasi-predicate/Tugendhat: E.g. in "this is red" "red" could still function as a quasi-predicate - so the essence cannot already lie in the external addition of "this is .. " - but only in the special manner of use (use) of "this"- Predicates: are needed instead of quasi-predicate because we cannot only connect the classification term "F" with other complementary expressions to say something else than "this is F ', but to say the same thing from a different situation.
>Terminology/Tugendhat, >Contextuality, >Generality, >Generalization.
I 483
Attributes/Tugendhat: predicates refer to attributes - not to objects. >Attributes, >Objects.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Properties Field I 176
Properties/Field: we need to reduce properties! Instead: predicates - predicates do not imply use of quantification over properties. >Predicates, Cf. >Schematic letters/Quine, >Prediates/Quine.

II 54
Properties/propositions/Field: Example two predicates like "x has a temperature of 210" and "x has a average molecular energy ..." can stand for the same property, although they have different meanings. - Properties are quite different from meanings (propositions). >Meaning, >Propositions, >Reference.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Propositional Logic Propositional Logic: analyzes the relationship of whole statements, e.g. A v B, where A and B stand for complete sentences. - Difference: predicate logic: this is fine-grained and represents the attribution of predicates.

Proxy Field II 41
Property/denotation/possible world/Field: E.g. "Russell is bald" is true in any possible world w, where Russell exists (denoted by "Russell" in the actual world) and is bald (i.e. has the property for which "bald" stands in the actual world). N.B.: "stand for": we must now understand them in that way that a predicate does not stand for a set (its extension), but for a property that exists in the actual world.
>Denotation, >Extensions, >Predicates, >Properties.
Problem: the relation between predicates and properties.
Problem: properties determine extensions of the predicates, but are not determined by them.
Solution: within the possible world semantics: Causal theory of the reference. >Causal theory of the reference.
Problem: we are not coming into contact with all extensions of "bald". - Then what is associated with the predicate is not its extension, but a property.
The relation can be causal or non-causal.
>possible world-semantics,> cross-world identity.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Proxy Geach I 199f
Variable/description/proxy/GeachVsCarnap: in his rules for descriptions E.g. "" ____ (ix) (.. x ..) ____ "etc. the strokes do not act, as Carnap believes as vacancies (proxy) but as variables. >Descriptions/Carnap.
Variables/Carnap/Geach: Carnap thinks, if he renames them, he could prevent his problems with variables.
I 224
"stand for"/Geach: there is no difference whether I say, a predicate "stands for" a proposition or was its name. >Name/Geach, >Naming, >Reference, >Meaning, >Variables.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Proxy Grover, D. L. Horwich I 326/327
Stand for/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/(s): to stand for something is not the same as referring/reference. Reference: a proxy does not refer to the original! E.g. "you" is not used to refer to "Mary", but to Mary!
E.g. >pronoun of laziness/Geach: the pronoun of laziness stands for its antecedent. E.g. Jane will go when they can afford it. But the grammatical category must not be changed. E.g. John visited us. It was a surprise.
>Prosentential theory.
Grover, D. L.

Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992

Kamp/Grover/Belnap
D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)

See external reference in the individual contributions.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Proxy Simons I 191
Proxy/to stand for/vouch for/existence of/Chisholm/Simons: only mereologically constant objects can stand for others. >Mereology.
Sum/Simons: without mereological constancy, there would be nothing to prevent sums from being variable.
>Mereological sum.
Total: a total has its parts necessarily - or any other sum, e.g. Tib + Tail but not Tibbles.
>Tibbles-exaple, >Totality, >Wholes.
Vs: sum of variable parts: e.g. the tail may again consist of different atoms.
>Parts.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

Proxy Tugendhat I 366
Proxy/Tugendhat: predicates are no substitute: characterization function: >characterizing. Singular term are substitutes.
I 407
Stand for/Tugendhat/(s): to stand for is distinguished from reference. >Predicates, >Singular terms, >Reference.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Proxy Function Quine VI 43
Proxy Function/Quine: is every explicit and reversibly unambiguous transformation f - E.g. if Px originally meant that x was a P, we therefore re-interpret Px so that it means that x is now f of a P -according for multi-digit predicates - the predicates then apply to the correlates fx instead to x - all sentences stay as they are - observation sentences remain correlated to the same stimuli - but the objects of the theory have changed dramatically - ((s) Example: There is a Gödel number of x.) >Predicates/Quine, >Observation Sentences/Quine
VI 45
Ontology/Loewenheim/Proxy Function/Quine: the different ontologies resulting from both are unambiguously correlatable - and as a whole empirically indistinguishable. - E.g. Tabhita: is only Geach’s cat or cosmos minus cat - distinction: is relativistic: by the role that one plays relatively around the other - even the link to trained stimuli remains intact - the nodes where we assume the objects are neutral. >Ontology/Quine
Lauener XI 145
Definition proxy function/Proxy Function/Quine/Lauener: a function that assigns to each object of the original theory such a one from the new theory. - E.g. The Goedel number of - to reduce one theory to another. Proxy Function/(s): maintains number of digits of the predicates (fulfillment of n-tuples of arguments by n-tuples of values). - Thus it averts the trivialization of a reduction to a theory of natural numbers (> Loewenheim).
XII 72
Proxy Function/PF/Reduction/Quine: must not be reversibly unambiguous. E.g. irreversible proxy function which reduces a theory of expressions and fractions: Expressions by Goedel numbers, fractions with diagonal process. Then the same number can stand for a fraction or an expression. - That is ok, because fractures and expressions are so different that the question of identity does not arise, therefore, the original theory does not benefit from the differences. -> multi-sort logic - if, in contrast, all elements of the initial theory are distinguishable. (E.g. pure arithmetic of rational or real numbers) you need a reversibly unambiguous proxy function. >Reduction/Quine
XII 74
Apparent Class/Quine: is given by open formula - E.g. a proxy function can be construed as an apparent class, if it is a function as an open formula with two free variables. - (> apparent quantification).

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Q XI
H. Lauener
Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982
Qualia Chalmers I 251
Qualia/Missing Qualia/ChalmersVsBlock: (Block 1978)(1) Thought experiments, in which system properties that reflect a human consciousness system in an economy or in the Chinese population are realized as a whole, have at most intuitive power. They are intended to show that such a system, in which an individual e.g. should stand for a neuron, as a whole system cannot develop a consciousness. ChalmersVsBlock: just as intuitively, we argue, when we say that it is hardly credible that a piece of gray mass produces consciousness and yet it does!
We would not see any experiences in an economy as a whole, but we do not do that in the brain either!
>Analogies, >Thought experiments, >Levels/order, >Levels of description, >Comparisons, >Comparability.
I 252
Likewise, we can explain the functioning of the whole system in the case of the population as well as the brain, even without conscious experiences. >Functions, >Experience.
On the other hand, it would not in principle be ruled out that a corresponding organizational structure in a population as a whole would bring about conscious experience, but one would have to considerably increase the speed of the signal lines.
BlockVsVs: we know about neurons that can do the job, we do not know this of homunculi (that would be individuals in the population in the example).
I 253
Fading Qualia/VsChalmers: For example, suppose parts of the brain would be replaced by silicon chips (Pylyshyn 1980)(2), Savitt (1982)(3), Cuda (1985)(4), then it could be that Qualia faded or disappeared bit by bit.
I 254
ChalmersVsVs: If the individual chips get enough input information (and if they check somewhere) then it makes no difference and the qualia remain. Bit by bit, all neurons could be replaced by chips.
I 256
A being with weaker Qualia is systematically mistaken about everything it experiences. Things I perceive as different will be homogeneous for it. The being will nevertheless believe,...
I 257
...that it has these complex experiences that are actually missing him. It has lost contact with its experiences. This seems implausible. Fading Qualia: are nevertheless logically possible.
>Logical possibility, cf. >Metaphysical possibility, >Physical possibility, >Possibility.
I 261
ChalmersVsVs: it is reasonable to assume that no system can be misunderstood as to its experiences.
I 262
Invariance of the behavior/VsChalmers: could there be a system that is completely differently structured than me, but behaves the same as I do? Such a system would have to be conscious in the same way! >Invariance, >Behavior.
VsVs: On the other hand, Block's example of a huge display with all inputs and outputs is not surely conscious. (Block 1981)(5). So something must be wrong with the argument.
ChalmersVsVs: 1. My argument does not apply to behaviourally equivalent systems. A perfect actor does not have to be of the same opinion as the person represented.
2. A thought experiment with equivalent behavior cannot be introduced bit by bit as with replacing neurons with electronic chips.
I 263
A system like this would be rational in any case.
I 266f
Def Dancing Qualia/Chalmers: Assuming that 10%, 20%, 30% ... of the brain are replaced by silicon chips, and the resulting Qualia may change rapidly between systematically weak or unsystematic, we do not care. There must only be two points A and B so that...
I 267
1. no more than 10% of the brain has been exchanged between A and B, and 2. A and B have significantly different experiences.
Problem: There may be some unnoticed differences between different experiences. (> Sorites/Chalmers).
Switch: we assume that I have a backup system of my brain and can switch back and forth from time to time.
I 268
After switching, I'll be like the new system - we call it Bill. He may have a blue instead of my red experience. I could even go back and forth, that would be the dancing qualia. N.B.: when switching back and forth, I will not notice any difference!
I 269
A change or altered behavior would require a functional difference between the two systems, contrary to the stipulated (functional) isomorphism. Since this is not the case, I cannot acquire any new beliefs, such as, for example, "My qualia just jumped." If it were otherwise, we would have to accept a completely new, changed psychology and phenomenology. N.B.: it could even be that our Qualia are actually constantly dancing in front of our eyes!
I 270
The only place where you could draw a principal line would be the functional level! Solution/Chalmers: the only thing that prevents us from accepting the possibility of the dancing qualia in our own case is the following principle:
Principle: If someone's conscious experiences change significantly, one notices the change. ((s) Circular between "significant" and "noticeable"). If we neglect the principle, we have no longer any defense against skepticism.
>Skepticism.
I 271
VsChalmers: Objections refer to gaps in the argument about the perception history, speed, weak inversions,...
I 272
...unnoticed qualia, which for their part are interchanged, e.g. at the edge of the facial field,...
I 273
...multiple changes. ChalmersVsVs: none of these arguments is critical for my argument.
Absent Qualia/Chalmers: absent qualia are extremely implausible, dancing and interchanged Qualia are even extremely implausible.
Functionalism: But this does not confirm functionalism in its strongest form (the thesis according to which the functional organization is constitutive for consciousness), since such qualia are not logically excluded.
>Functionalism, >Functionalism/Chalmers.

1. N. Block, Troubles with functionalism. In: C. W. Savage (Ed) Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundatzion of Psychology. Minneapolis 1978. Reprinted in N. Block (Ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 1, Cambridge 1980.
2. Z. Pylyshyn, The "causal power" of machines. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 1980: pp. 442-44
3. S. Savitt, Searle's demon and the brain simulator reply. Behavioral and Brain Sciences5, 1982: pp. 342-43
4. T. Cuda, Against neural chauvinism. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 111-27.
5. N. Block Psychologism and behaviorism Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43 (1981).

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Reference Buridan Geach I 94
Reference/Geach: thesis: the reference of an expression in a sentence must always somehow to be specified independently of the truth value! For example, if a question is answered with "yes" or "no", the reference of the expressions in the question must be somehow specifiable, regardless of what the correct answer is. (s) Without first knowing whether "yes" or "no". Third.
Geach: a modified paralogism of Buridan: E.g.
In the question, "Is A a Donkey?" A should stand for you if the correct answer is "Yes" and for Brownie, the donkey on the village pasture, if the correct answer is "No".
Consequence: if the correct answer is "yes", then you are a donkey when "no", then Brownie is not a donkey!
So: either you are a donkey, or Brownie is not a donkey.
But Brownie is a donkey, so: you're a donkey!
Buridan/Geach: the reference of "A" must be fixed before the question is expressed! Regardless of whether the sentence containing "A" is true or false. Reference must be independent of the truth value.


Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Reference Goodman III 57ff
Denotation/Goodman: something that does not denote, can still refer by explication and expression. >Denotation, >Expression, >Explanation, >Terminology/Goodman.
Def denote/Goodman: to denote means, to make reference, but being denoted does not necessarily mean to refer to something. And yet, expressions like representation are also a mode of symbolization. And an image must stand for that, what it expresses, it must symbolize it, it must refer to it.
III 63 ff
In normal language: the reference of "man" to "Churchill" and "word" to "man" is clearly denotation. But: if, on the other hand, Churchill symbolizes "man", and "man" symbolizes "word" the reference is clearly exemplification. >Exemplification, >Symbols.
---
IV 63
Denotation/exemplification/Goodman: denotation and exemplification go in opposite directions. Possession (of properties) is not a kind of reference.
Not all chains formed from references direct the reference from one end to another.
Example: the name of the name of the rose is not the name of the rose.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Relation-Theory Bigelow I 55
Quantity/relational theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities are general relations between objects. They seem to be consequences of the intrinsic properties of objects. But one would not have to postulate an intrinsic relation "greater than", but only e.g. the size. >Quantity, >Sizes/Physics, >Relations, >Objects, >Intrinsic,
>Properties.
Greater than/relational property/problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: one might wonder if there really is an intrinsic property to be that and that big.
Cf. >Haecceitism.
Relational property/Bigelow/Pargetter: one might be tempted to assume that everything is based on relational properties, rather than vice versa. But we are not going to go into that here.
Intrinsic property/Bigelow/Pargetter: we think that in the end they can be defended against relational properties as a basis. Nevertheless, we certainly need relational properties, e.g. for the order of events. These do not just stand in time. So we definitely need relations.
Relations/Bigelow/Pargetter: we definitely need relations. Because events never stand for themselves.
>Events.
I 56
Also for expressions such as "twice the size" etc. Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities cannot be based on properties alone, but need relations. For example, having this or that mass is then the property of being in relation to other massive objects.
Participation/BigelowVsPlato: Plato has all things in a more or less strong relation to a single thing, the form. We, on the other hand, want relations between things among themselves.
>Methexis, >Plato.
BigelowVsPlato: we can then explain different kinds of differences between objects, namely that they have different relational properties that other things do not have. E.g. two pairs of things can differ in different ways.
I 57
Relational Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: can handle differences of differences well. Question: can it cope well with similarities? For example, explain what mass is at all?
Problem: we need a relation between a common property and many relations to it. There are many implications (entailments) which are not yet explained.
Property/Bigelow/Pargetter: 1. in order to construct an (intrinsic) property at all, we must therefore specify the many possible relations it can have to particalur.
Solution: one possibility: the sentence via the property of the 2nd level.
2. Problem: how can two things have more in common than two other things?
Ad 1. Example Mass
Common/Commonality/Bigelow/Pargetter: must then be a property of relations (of the many different relations that the individual objects have to "mass").
I 58
Solution: property of the 2nd level that is shared by all massive things. For example, "stand in mass relations". >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Similarity, >Identity.
Entailment/N.b.: this common (2nd level property) explains the many relations of the entailment between massive objects and the common property of solidity.
Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: our relational theory is still incomplete.
Problem: to explain to what extent some mass-relations are closer (more similar) than others.
Relations/common/Bigelow/Pargetter: also the relations have a common: a property of the 2nd level. Property 2.
Level/difference/differentiation/problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: does not explain how two things differ more than two other things.
>Levels/order, >Description levels.
It also does not explain how, for example, differences in masses relate to differences in volume.
For example, compare the pairs
"a, b"
"c, d"
"e, f"
between which there are differences in thicknesses with regard to e.g. length.
Then two of the couples will be more similar in important respects than two other pairs.
I 59
Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the relation of proportion. This is similar to Frege's approach to real numbers. Real numbers/Frege: as proportions between sizes (Bigelow/Pargetter corresponds to our quantities).
>Real numbers, >Quantity/Bigelow.
Bigelow/Pargetter: three fundamental components
(1) Individuals
(2) Relations between individuals (3) Relations of proportions between relations between individuals.
Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: divide the relations between individuals into equivalence classes.
>Proportions/Bigelow.
Mass/Volume/Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: N.b. all masses are proportional to each other and all volumes are proportional to each other, but masses and volumes are not proportional to each other.
Equivalence classes/Bigelow/Pargetter: arrange objects with the same D-ates into classes. So they explain how two things ((s) can be more similar in one respect, D-able) than in another.
>Determinates/Determinables, >Equivalence classes.
Level 1: Objects
Level 2: Properties of things Level 3: Proportions between such properties.
Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: are universals that can introduce finer differences between equivalence classes of properties of the 2nd level.
Different pairs of mass relations can be placed in the same proportion on level 3. E.g. (s) 2Kg/4kg is twice as heavy as 3Kg/6Kg.
N.b.: with this we have groupings that are transverse to the equivalence classes of the mass relations, volumetric relations, velocity relations, etc.
Equal/different/Bigelow/Pargetter: N.B:: that explains why two relations can be equal and different at the same time. E.g. Assuming that one of the two relations is a mass relation (and stands in relation to other mass relations) the other is not a mass relation (and is not in relation to mass relations) and yet...
I 60
...both have something in common: they are "double" once in terms of mass, once in terms of volume. This is explained on level 3. Figures/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows the usefulness of numbers in the treatment of quantities. (BigelowVsField).
>Hartry Field, >Numbers, >Mathematical Entities, >Ontology.
Real numbers/Frege: Lit: Quine (1941(1), 1966(2)) in "Whitehead and the Rise of Modern Logic")
Measure/Unit/Measuerment Unit/To Measure/Bigelow/Pargetter:"same mass as" would be a property of the 2nd level that a thing has to an arbitrary unit.
>Measurement, >Equality.
Form/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: his theory of forms was not wrong, but incomplete. Objects have relations to paradigms (here: units of measurement). This is the same relation as that of participation in Plato.
I 61
Level 3: the relations between some D-ates can be more complex than those between others. For mass, for example, we need real numbers, other terms are less clear. Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: are divided into different types, which leads to interval scales or ratio scales of measurement, for example.
>Scales.
Pain/Bigelow/Pargetter: we cannot compare the pain of different living beings.
Level 3: not only explains a rich network of properties of the 2nd level and relations between objects,...
I 62
...but also explain patterns of entailments between them. NominalismVsBigelow: will try to avoid our apparatus of relations of relations.
>Nominalism.
BigelowVsNominalism: we need relations and relations of relations in science.
Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim to have proven it here. But it is the only way to solve the problem of the same and the different (problem of the quantities with the 3 levels).
>Realism/Bigelow, >Problem of quantities.
Simplicity/BigelowVsNominalism: will never be as uniform as our realistic explanation. Nominalism would have to accept complex relational predicates as primitive.
>Simplicity.
Worse still, it will have to accept complex relations between them as primitive.

1. Quine, W.V.O. (1941). Whitehead and the rise of modern logic. In: The philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (ed. P.A. Schilpp). pp.125-63. La Salle, Ill. Open Court.
2. Quine, W.V.O. (1966). Selected logic papers. New York: Random House.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Representation (Presentation) Goodman I 43
Means of representation can awaken admiration or aversion, but they do not necessarily express! Presenting means for sure reference, to stand for, to symbolize.
>Reference, >Symbol, >Expression, >Terminology/Goodman.
In a presentation negation is not possible.
>Negation, >Sense.
---
IV 121
A blurry horse-representation is certainly not a representation of a blurred horse. The vagueness belongs to the representation or idea. >Idea.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Russell’s Paradox Geach I 83
Russell's Paradox/Geach: the predicate "containing itself as an element" and "not containing itself as an element" will never have the same meaning, even if one accepts such an object that both conditions correspond to at the same time.
I 225
Russell's Paradox/Solution/Quine: two predicates can have the same class as the extension, although they do not apply to the same objects: For example, the predicates
"__is a class that does not belong to itself" and "__ is a class belonging to a class,
but not to itself"
have the same class as their extension.
But there is a class - obviously this common extension itself - which only suffices for the first predicate, not the second.
So they do not stand for the same property!
Geach: simpler example "Booth shot Lincoln" and "Booth shot Booth": contain the common predicate "Booth shot___" - i.e. not that the last expression occurs twice in both sentences!
For both sentences contain no strokes, but the two sentences have the common property of being related to "Booth shot___" in the same way.
And this common property is the common predicate.
((s) Intension instead of extension).
>Intension, >Extension, >Predicate, >Properties.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Sequences Lyons I 78
Def sequential/Linguistics/Lyons: means a fixed order of words. This is not syntagmatic! Syntagmatically compatible words can be in variable order, e.g. Latin. General:
Logical form: Differentiation between syntagmatic/sequential (or non-sequential):
Suppose there are two groups of units, X and Y,

X = {a, b}, Y = {p, q}

Italic/spelling : a realizes a, etc.
X, Y: are variable quantities that stand for the realization of the units, Suppose these substantial units cannot occur simultaneously (they can be consonants or vowels), but are arranged sequentially among themselves. Then there are three relevant options
(I): linear order fixed: Example X must occur before Y. I.e. ab, aq, bp, bq are possible, but not pa, qa, pb and qb.
(II): "free": "free" in so far as XY and YX can occur, but XY = YX! ((s), i.e. the sequence is irrelevant. This is different than when it makes a difference, but both forms are allowed). (i.e. non-sequential, but syntagmatic).
(III): fixed or free in another sense: it does not matter, because XY is not equal to YX.
I 80
(= sequential-syntagmatic).

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977

Lyons I
John Lyons
Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Signs Quine V 160
Sign/Interpretation/Quine: must not simply be reinterpreted, otherwise each string can have any meaning - N.B.: but terms can very well be reinterpreted. ((s) not signs). >Interpretation, >Meaning.

VII (c) 53
Meaning/Sign/Quine: it is unsatisfactory to say that a significant sequence is simply a series of phonemes that are uttered by a speaker of a chosen population. We do not only want the expressed sequences, but also those that may yet be expressed.
IV 396
Sign/Locke: ...but for two reasons we also need signs, which in turn stand for ideas: for the exchange of our thoughts and for their recording. These are the words. Behind them stand the ideas, as it were, as guarantors of meaning. Without them, words would merely be sounds. Words: are representatives of ideas.
IV 397
QuineVsLocke: one should stick to what is true for everyone when openly observed. Language is also not something private, but something social.
IV 398
Language: is a social skill acquired through the observation of social use. The externalisation of empiricism leads to a behavioural approach to meaning. (Behaviorism).

V 165
Infinite/Name/Signs/Quine: Problem: which signs should we use when we need infinitely many as insertions for the number variables? One cannot say that every sign is a physical object, because then they run out soon. Wrong solution: to say that these signs are forms (as classes of inscriptions). Because these are again physical realizations of forms and there is not enough of them.
Form/Quine: (to denote infinitely many natural numbers) here also not in the sense of analytical geometry, so that a form would become a class of classes of pairs of real numbers, because it does not help to explain the numbers by means of number signs, which are themselves explained by means of real numbers.
>Infinity, >Numbers, >Denotation.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Signs Ricoeur I 24
Sign/Meaning /Expression/Naming/Ricoeur: [there is] a duality in the sign (...) a) structural duality of sensual sign and the meaning it carries
b) intentional duality of sign and thing or named object.
On the one hand, words which are phonetically different depending on the language have identical meanings, on the other hand, these meanings cause the sensual signs to stand for something they name; we say that words express meanings because of their sensual quality and that, thanks to their meaning, they name something.
I 25
Designation/designation/Ricoeur: the word "designate" includes these two pairs, that of the expression and that of the designation. It is not this dualism that the symbol is about. >Symbol/Ricoeur.

Ricoeur I
Paul Ricoeur
De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud
German Edition:
Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999

Ricoeur II
Paul Ricoeur
Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976

Singular Terms Field I 147
Singular Term/Field: since an expression does not denote, it does not prevent it from being a real singular term. E.g. "The number 4"/Field: does not denote any object.
But even with real singular terms, the question is whether the corresponding theorem is true.
>Numbers/Frege, >Numbers/Field, >Mathematical entities.
The fact that a predicate has no extension does not prevent it from being a sortal: e.g. Homer e.g. "natural number".
>Sortals, >Predicates, >Denotation.
FregeVsField: no singular term can stand for a concept. - (Wright pro Frege).
---
I 148
Sortal/Crispin Wright: syntactically, you cannot create statements of identity that contain a sortal like "well-being" (taken from "the well-being of children"). >Identity, >Identity statements.
I 149
Singular: E.g. "2" in "2 + 3 = 5". Different:
"There are two apples in the room": no singular term, but part of a quantifier.
>Quantifiers.
Analyzed: numeric functor "the number of" plus singular term "three".
I 150
If "the direction of c1 = direction of c2" and "c1 and c2 are parallel" - are to be logically equivalent: then any expressions like "the direction of" cannot function semantically as a singular term. If syntactically and semantically singular term, then they are without ontological commitment to other entities than lines. ((s) No direction(s)).
>Definitions/Frege, >Nominalism/Field, >Platonism.
---
III 21
Singular term/Field: we reject a singular term like e.g. "87". Solution: quantifier E87: "there are exactly 87".
Quantifiers are not singular terms.
III 22
"87" does not appear as a name but as part of an operator. >Operator.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Singular Terms Tugendhat I 102
Singular Term/Tugendhat: we need it because we cannot imagine object, but we mean them. >Meaning (Intending).
VsRepresentation - instead: propositional content.
>Representation, >Propositional content.
I 338f
Singular Term/Tugendhat: difference to predicate: we cannot say analogously, the singular term 'a' stands for those object that if the predicate 'F' applies to it, the assertion 'Fa' becomes true. >Truthmakers.
I 338
Then the object "a" would be the indistinguishable of all other objects to which the predicate 'F' also applies. Singular terms form equivalence classes.
>Equivalence classes.
I 414
Singular Term/Tugendhat: can stand for 4 types of objects: 1. demonstrative expressions: "this mountain"
2. description with location
3. other clear relation E.g. "the murderer of Schmidt" (not perception but relative feature)
4. by a single characteristic: E.g. "the highest mountain".

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Socialism Friedman Brocker I 401
Socialism/Friedman: socialist planned economies stand for non-free societies because critics and opponents of the system do not have the resources to make their opinions known to a broad public, while, conversely, the publishers in capitalism also want to earn money from the sale of "revolutionary" literature. >Public sphere, >Democracy, >Society.

Peter Spahn, „Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Econ Fried I
Milton Friedman
The role of monetary policy 1968


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
States of Affairs Tugendhat I 141
State of Affairs/TugendhatVsHusserl/TugendhatVsObject Theory (= Thesis State of Affairs = object) not every sentence corresponds to state of affairs - false "theory of objects". >Attributes, >Abstract objects, >Abstractness.
I 161
State of Affairs- not composed like an object - State of Affairs: like attributes: "abstract objects".
I 164f
State of Affairs/fact/Husserl/Tugendhat: imperceptible - composition of state of affairs different than of objects - linguistically composed (thinking) - (VsObject theory; >object theory). Def "categorical Synthesis"/Husserl: task: of the real composition of an object of components is a special, not real composition which would be constitutive for the state of affairs to distinguish.
>Edmund Husserl, >Experience/Husserl.
I 167
TugendhatVsHusserl, Vs categorical synthesis: Heidelberg castle is castle and red - even "red" represents object. >Predicates, >Predication, >Properties.
I 176
TugendhatVsObject theory: it fails at the question, how the meaning of the whole sentence is given by the meanings of the phrases. There are no combinations of objects in the sentence. >Compositionality.
I 280ff
State of Affairs/fact/Tugendhat: state of affairs as that what the sentence says: this does not work, due to potential lie. Identification of the states of affairs requires understanding the usage rules. - The same sentence can stand for different situations, and vice versa (like Austin).
The states of affairs in deictic expressions: Classifications principle of incidents - the state of affairs also lacks the contention mode, which is part of the assertion of "p" - VsObject theory.
>Assertions, >Meaning.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Symbols Deacon I 79
Symbols/Deacon: Tradition: assumes that symbolic association is formed by learning the connection between a sound or string with something else in the world. DeaconVsTradition: this is what we mean by index or index-like or indexing association.
>Icon/Deacon.
I 80
Words can also be an index: e.g."Aha!","there" etc. >Indexicality.
Understanding: a sign that someone has understood a word is his ability to use that word in other sentences. However, if the word is only inserted somewhere, it would only be an index-like or iconic understanding.
>Understanding, >Language use.
Symbol: to use something as a symbol, you should be able to handle the referential functions (what does it refer to?).
>Reference, >Symbolic reference.
Def stimulus generalization: the transfer of associations from one stimulus to a similar one. Similarly, the transfer of learned patterns to a similar context. This is often confused with symbolic associations.
>Association, >Stimulus, >Stimulus meaning, >Language use,
>Generalization.
I 81
Learning/DeaconVsTradition: such transfers are not special forms of learning, but simply iconic projections. This happens by itself, because ambiguity is always involved. Psychological models often speak of rules for this transfer. >Learning, >Rules.
DeaconVs: since this is an iconic relation, there is no implicit list of criteria that is learned. ((s) Images are compared directly, not based on lists of criteria).
Icon/Deacon: Words or stimuli stand for a set of things that differ more or less from each other. People and animals learn this. This learning is not done by criteria for symbols, but by iconic overlapping. This provides the basis for an indexed reference.
I 83
Symbol/learning/Deacon: the difficulty of symbolic learning stems from the complex relation a symbol (e.g. a word) has to other symbols. Such complex relations do not exist between indices (simple signs with a physical connection to an object).
I 92
Symbols/Deacon: Problem: Symbols cannot be learned individually as they form a system among each other.
I 93
Before a single symbol-object association can be detected, the complete logical system of symbols must be learned. Problem: even with a few symbols there is a very large number of possible combinations, most of which are pointless. These must be sorted out, i.e. "forgotten".
I 99
Symbols/Deacon: Symbols are not an unstructured set of tokens representing objects, but they represent each other. Symbols do not refer directly to things in the world, but they do so indirectly by referring to other symbols ((s) because they are located in a syntactic and semantic system).
I 100
Limitation/Borders: Randomly uninterpreted strings of signs have no reference and therefore no limit in their set. Other symbols: their quantity is limited because of (practical, external) use and because of the use of the other symbols by which they are defined. Question: why are only some types of symbol systems implemented in human languages, but not others?
I 266
Symbols/Deacon: it is wrong to assume they are located somewhere in the brain. They are rather relations between tokens, not the tokens themselves. It is also not constituted by a special association, but by the set of associations that are partially represented in each instance of the symbol.
I 267
In the brain, the operations for organizing these combinatorial relations are located in the prefrontal cortex.
I 336
Symbols/language/brain/evolution/Deacon: Thesis: it is the use of symbols that made it necessary for our human brain to develop in such a way that special emphasis could be placed on actions in the prefrontal cortex. >Adaptation/Deacon.
I 339
Symbols/Evolution/Brain/DeaconVsPinker/DeaconVsChomsky: whatever we call "language instinct", symbol processing is so widely distributed in the brain that it cannot be subjected to natural selection. Thus language is cut off from what biological evolution can shape. >Thinking, >Cognition, >Information processing/psychology, cf. >Cognitive psychology.
I 339/340
Universal grammar/language evolution/solution/Deacon: Co-evolution of languages with regard to the circumstances and dispositions of the brain. This can be an explanation for a developing grammatical universality. >Universal grammar, >Symbolic communication, >Symbolic learning,
>Symbolic representation.

Dea I
T. W. Deacon
The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998

Dea II
Terrence W. Deacon
Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013

Symbols Wittgenstein Hintikka I 60f
Symbol/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: symbols are not what they appear to be: R looks like a noun, but is not a noun - what is symbolized is that R occurs between a and b. >Relations.
I 61
So R is not the indefinable symbol in aRb. (Aül 9) - Hintikka: but the indefinable symbols are for Wittgenstein nothing more than names and these stand for objects - but the name is not a linguistic symbol (the letter R) but a linguistic relation, namely, to occur next to a specific letter - But different than Frege's distinction saturated/unsaturated. >Definability, >Names. ---
II 65
Symbol/Wittgenstein - is complete in itself - it does not refer to something outside. Cf. >Incomplete symbols.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Systems Pareto Brocker I 99
System/Sociology/Pareto: The ((s) system concept introduced by Pareto, among others, combines (...) a groundbreaking method of knowledge for the social sciences of the time, that of functional understanding. This implies that social phenomena - such as norms, ideas, the economy or the system of government - not only stand for themselves and are therefore not only immanent but also to be understood as elements of the respective system. They take on specific tasks and services, such as the stabilisation of patterns of action or the solution of certain problems of social order formation. >Norms, >Ideas, >Economics, >Systems/Luhmann, >Systems/Parsons,
>Systems theory.
Pareto still had the corresponding theoretical language at his disposal, but according to today's understanding he already had a functionalist structural theory of society in mind.
Brocker I 100
For Pareto, the constitutive elements of the social system are: a) "logical" and "non-logical action",
b) "residuals",
c) "derivatives" and
d) "circulation of the elites".
>Emotion/Pareto, >Argumentation/Pareto.

Maurizio Bach, Vilfredo Pareto, Allgemeine Soziologie (1916) in: Manfred Brocker (Hg). Geschichte des Politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018.


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Truth Definition Tugendhat I 320
Applying/Tugendhat: because an assertion is not already true if the predicate is applied, but only if it is rightly applicable - then you can set up a truth-definition, in which "true" does not exist - but still circles between "true" and "apply"- only through the divided structure truth conditions are possible. >Satisfaction/Tarski, >Truth/Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski,
>Theory of truth/Tarski.
I 484
Truth/Truth-Definition/Truth Condition/Tugendhat: instead of metatheoretically "when the predicate is applicable" - verification rule - "apply" and "stand for" must not occur. >Verification.
I 486
Instead: the sentence "Fa" is true if the predicate is properly applicable in the situation identified by "a". Problem: we need a verification rule to explain the identification rule.
VsTradition: assumes that the object is already identified.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Universals Russell IV 44/45
Universals/Knowledge/Russell: all knowledge of truths requires an acquaintance with "things" which are significantly different from the sense data: universals. >Acquaintance, >Things/Russell, >Truth/Russell.
E.g. "blackness", "diversity", "brotherhood" - each sentence must contain at least one universal because the meaning of all verbs is general.
>Verbs.
IV 82
Universals/Russell: is everything that is not denoted by proper names: it is what nouns, adjectives, prepositions and verbs stand for. - Therefore, there must be a universal in each sentence. Most authors VsRussell.
IV 88
Russell: universals have to be objects because we can think of them repeatedly. >Universal realism.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Use Tugendhat I 209
Language use: So far the speech of the use is still quite indeterminate. Question: With reference to what is the use of linguistic expressions regulated, if they are no longer objects? Nearest answer: circumstances. >Circumstances, >Words.
I 225
Use/Tugendhat: >"stand for": one must find an expression which stands for an object. - So you explain the rules of use of the singular term. >Singular terms.
Problem: the rules of use for the singular term presuppose the predicates and vice versa.
>Rules, >Predicates.
I 226
Usage Rule/Tugendhat: If the circumstances are completely unsuitable for explanation, must we not also abandon the rule of use? This is a mistake: usage is about function, not about circumstances! >Use theory.
I 279
Usage: the usage theory of meaning always refers to propositions (propositions or states of affairs), not to material objects. ((s) Most authors Vs: the theory of use refers to words, not to propositions.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 43. "One can, for a large class of cases of the use of the word "meaning" - though not for all cases of its use - explain this word thus: "The meaning of a word is its use in language."").
>Meaning, >Sentence meaning, >Word meaning.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Variables Prior I 30
Number variables/Prior: variables are no names. E.g. if exactly 3 things φ and exactly 4 things ψ, then more things are φ than ψ. Then "3" is no name but an inseparable part of the verb operator "Exactly 3 things __". >Names, >Operators, >Predication, >Is, >Equality, >Equations, >Sets, >Set theory.
I 33
Bound variables/Quine: bound variables can only stand for names. So for things, not for sentences. >Bound variables, cf. >Names of sentences, >Quantification,
>Objects.
QuineVsFrege: names are not for sentences, only for things. - E.g. "For a φ, φx" is the only way to read this, that there is at least one thing, so that x "does" this thing.
>Sentences, >"Stand for", >Names/Frege, >Sentences/Frege.
Quine himself does not do that but he has "ε" for "is element of".
>Element relation, >Is, >Predication.
I 35
Bound variable/name/Prior: E.g. open sentence "x is red-haired": what is x? >Open sentences/propositional functions.
It depends on how we stand for" understanding:
a) x is for a name, such as "Peter" (Substitute)
b) or object Peter
PriorVsQuine: bound variables can also stand for sentences: "J. believes that p" (anything), then stands for a sentence.
ad I 93 (external):
Sentence variable/Wittgenstein: Tractatus: The term presupposes forms of all sentences in which it can occur - Tractatus 3.312: It is therefore represented by the general form of the sentences which it characterizes - Wittgenstein: namely in this form the expression will be constant and everything else can be variable - sentence variable: Aristotle's innovation "a" for a whole sentence.
I 148
Bound variables/Prior: bound variables represent logical proper names. "For an x:
1. x φ-s,
2. nothing else than x φ-s and 3. it is not the case that x ψ-s".
I 164f
Bound variable/PriorVs some American logicians: not any bound variable stands for a name.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Variables Quine V 129
Variables/Quine: Their archetype are the pronouns - in the relative clause the relative pronoun stands for the name of the object. ---
VI 37/38
Variable/Quine: allows us to manoeuvre every occurrence of "a" into a context of "a =" and to treat the resulting context as an unanalysable predicate "A" that absorbes the singular term - singular term: can be re-introduced later as a description. ---
VII (a) 13
Bound variable/Quine: instead of it, we can say that something is in the range of a pronoun. ---
VII (f) 107ff
Variables/Quine: "F": not bindable - Only apparent predicates, vacancies in the sentence chart - "p", "q", etc. stand for whole expressions, they are sometimes viewed as if they needed entities whose names are these expressions (these are called propositions) - "p" "q", etc. are never bound variables! - "p>q" not a sentence, but a scheme. ---
VII (f) 110
Not bindable variable/Quine: E.g. "p". If it were considered to be the name of some entity, it would have to be a bindable variable, which is not the case - e.g. "F" on a par with "p": if predicates are to be the names of some entity, they would have to be regarded as bindable variables, which they are not.
VII (f) 110
Variables/Numbers/Quine: in "x + 3 > 7" "x" should be regarded as a pseudo-number - "x + 3> 7" should be considered a pseudo-sentence or scheme. It cannot be quantified.
VII (f) 111
Variables/Quine: Greek letters: completely different status: they occur in a language about language: E.g. (3) (∃a)(φ v ψ)
is on a semantically higher level than "x + 3> 7".
(3) is a name of a sentence or expression - Greek letters are standing for sentences here - they are quantifiable - "φ": grammatically substantival, occupies the place of names of sentences. - "p": grammatically sentential (sentence form): has the place of complete sentences.
---
IX 194f
Universal variable/Systematic ambiguity/Quine: possibly at the expense of adding new and unreduced predicates "T0", "T1", "T2",... that are added to "ε", we can get rid of the special, indexed variables in favor of the universal variables x, y.... - in fact, "Tnx" can easily be expressed with help of "ε" and the logic: "∃z(x,y ε z)" ensures compliance of the type in x and y and vice versa ensures compliance of the type with x and y that xn, yn ε ϑ n + 1, that ∃z(x,y, ε z). - Thus disappears Russell’s grammatical constraint, that declared "xm ε y n" meaningless if m + 1 unequal n - "m ε y n" now becomes useful for all m and n - if m + 1 unequal n, so "xm ε y n" simply becomes wrong. ---
X 95
Variables/Quine: quantifiable variables should never be in predicate places, but always in name places.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Vocabulary Searle III 161
Def conceptual relativism/term relativity/Searle: representation systems such as vocabularies are human creations and thus arbitrary. Some philosophers believe that this is a problem for realism. >Conceptual relativism.
---
I 15
Vocabulary/Searle: in the conflict of dualism and monism both sides are caught in a serious error. The vocabulary and assumptions of both are wrong. >Dualism, >Monism, >Property dualism.
I 20
Spirit/intentionality/materialism//Dennett/Searle: the thesis of materialism: our vocabulary of the spiritual does not actually stand for something intrinsically spiritual. Dennett: it is merely a vocabulary suitable for predicting and explaining behaviour.
>Materialism.
I 43
Smart (1959)(1) had tried to find a "topic-neutral" vocabulary and to avoid the so-called nomological appendages.
I 443/44
SearleVsSmart: SearleVs"topic neutral": note that nobody has the impression that digestion must be described in a "topic neutral" vocabulary.
I 189
Example pain/unconscious: could there be "unconscious pain"? Searle: this is not a dispute with a factual content. There is simply a different vocabulary to describe the same fact. >Pain, >Fact.


1. J.J.Smart Sensations and Brain Processes. In: Philosophical Review. Band 68, 1959

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


The author or concept searched is found in the following 31 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Aristotle Frege Vs Aristotle Berka I 92
Syllogisms/FregeVsAristotle: his different types of inferences (when deriving one judgment from several) can all be represented by a single one: common form: if M is true, and N is true, A applies as well. Because it is possible to manage with a single type of inference, it is a commandment of clarity, to do just that. In addition: it would otherwise be no reason to remain with the Aristotelian ones, but you could add new ones into the indefinite.(1)
1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964

Stepanians I 9
Frege/Stepanians: his main question was: What are numbers? Thesis: they are something purely logical and therefore all propositions of arithmetic must be logically provable. I 10 FregeVsAristotle/Stepanians: not all propositions can be reduced to the form "S is P". Grammar/Frege: Mixes the logical and the psychological. I 11 Language/Philosophy of Language/Frege: ... the task of philosophy is to break the rule of the word over the human mind. Hence my Begriffsschrift. I 53 Quantifier/Quantifiers/Aristotle/Stepanians: even Aristotle had quantifiers: "all", "some", "none". Problem/Logic//VsAristotle: his system reached its limits as soon as the quantifiers occurred not only in the subject, but also in the predicate. E.g. "All the boys love all the girls." Solution/Frege: Begriffsschrift: expression of generality where it does not matter how many quantifiers occur in the subject or in the predicate. I 54 Generality/Frege: E.g. "2x2 = 4": where is the subject where the predicate? Solution/Frege: Letters/Frege: there are two types of characters in arithmetic: letters, each of which either represents a) an number left indeterminate or b) a function left indeterminate. Generality/Frege: is made possible by this indeterminacy! We can use the letters to express generality: E.g. (a+b)c = ac + bc. Ad a) includes characters such as +, - , 0, 1, 2... each of which has a particular meaning. Law/Generality/Frege/Stepanians: if we replace in a real equation as E.g. 3 + 2 = 2 + 3 the special numbers with letters, we get a law. Conversely, by inserting the same numbers for the same letters we can discover an infinite number of truths.
I 55
Generality/Frege/Stepanians: Important argument: generality no longer refers either to the subject or to the predicate. E.g. "The number 11 is smaller than the number 13": Subject "The number 11",
Predicate "is smaller than the number 13" ((s) VsStepanians: "Number 13" is not the predicate!) Both
may be replaced with characters.
Generalization/Frege/Stepanians: is an operation on the total content of the sentence.
Letters/Variables/Spelling/Frege/Stepanians: where Frege used a, b, c, etc., we use today x, y, z....
Variables/Arithmetic/Logic/Stepanians: while in arithmetic the variables stand for numbers, this limitation to one domain in logic must be abolished. I 56
Domain/Universal Proposition/Conditions/Frege/Stepanians: Frege does not define a scope: E.g. "x is confused" should only apply to the realm of philosophers. Instead: condition: if something is a philosopher, it is confused. I 57 Important argument: this applies for everything, without exception, even for Sam’s goldfish: if x is a philosopher, x is confused. ((s)> counterfactual conditional). Generalization/Generality/FregeVsAristotle: the generalization applies to the whole sentence, not for either the subject or the predicate. Problem: how can the generalized be subjected to other operations E.g. specify exceptions, that not everything is confused? Wrong solution: "not x is confused". At best, "x is not confused", but that boils down to the fact that nothing is confused.
I 58
Solution/Frege: external negation (operator that is applied to the whole sentence) ~(X) is confused. Boy/Girl/Aristotle/Frege/Stepanians: Solution/Frege: Whatever X and Y may be, if x is a boy and y is a girl, then x loves y.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

Step I
Markus Stepanians
Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001
Belnap, Nuel Kripke Vs Belnap, Nuel III 341
Substitutional quantification/SQ/Belnap/Dunn: Here an ontology of terms is not even necessary because the quantifiers of metalanguage (m.l.) could also be constructed by substitution! KripkeVsBelnap: This is a case of purely mechanical acquisition of Quine’s criteria for Ontological Commitment/OC: "referential quantifiers carry a OC with it and nothing else." Substitutional ml/Kripke: There are two possible interpretations: It is assumed that substitution quantification have (structurally descriptive) names for the expressions of the object language (o.l.) as substitutes ((s) The names have have the term for which they stand for, not the part). (see below, III 365). Then: a) the interpretation of m.l. is as such that these terms denote those of the o.l. or b) they do not denote.
ad a): If they denote, Wallace is right that the difference between substitutional quantification with names of expressions and referential quantification which work through expressions, is negligible. Both quantifiers carry the same amount of ontological commitment. ad b): then the m.l. has indeed no ontological commitment for expressions of the o.l.
But what is the justification then to call M a metalanguage of L? How should a theory which is formulated in M say anything about the semantics of L? Then T(x) is also no predicate anymore, filled with the true sentences of L and only them, but rather a form of M, without any interpretation.
KripkeVsBelnap: it is only possible to argue this mechanically if one has lost his or her philosophical goals.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984
Benacerraf, P. Wright Vs Benacerraf, P. Field I 23
Mathematics/Uncertainty/Arbitrariness/Crispin Wright (1983): Benacerraf's paper does not create a particular problem for mathematics: Benacerraf: "nothing in our use of numerical singular terms is sufficient to specify which, if any, sets they are.
WrightVsBenacerraf: this also applies for the singular terms representing sets themselves! And according to Quine also for the singular terms that stand for rabbits!
FieldVsWright: this goes past Benacerraf's argument. It is aimed more against an anti-platonist argument: that we should be skeptical about numbers, because if we assume that they do not exist, then it seems to be impossible to explain how we refer to them or have beliefs about them.
According to Benacerraf's argument our practice is sufficient to ensure that the entities to which we apply the word "number" form a sequence of distinct objects, under the relation that we call "<". (less than-relation). But that's all. But perhaps our use not does not even determine that.

             Perhaps they only form a sequence that satisfies our best axiomatic theory of the first stage of w sequences. I.e. everything that is determined by use, would be a non-standard model of such a theory. And that would also apply to sets.

             Wright (s): Thesis our standard use is not sufficient for the determination of the mathematical entities. (FieldVsWright).

             I 24
             VsWright: but the assertion that this also applied to rabbits is more controversial. A bad argument against this would be a causal theory of knowledge (through perception)

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Black, Max Dummett Vs Black, Max III (a) 7
Truth Value/Tr.val./BlackVsFrege: if two seentences are materially equivalent, they have the same truth value. Problem: according to Frege certain sentences would have a meaning that they would not have according to normal conception:
E.g. "If oysters are inedible, then the wrong thing".
DummettVsBlack: if sentences stand for truth value, but there are also expressions (not sentences) for Truth Value, then this is a grammatical problem, not a logical one.
Truth Value/Grammar/Dummett: we can easily transform it from a noun into an adjective: "make true".

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Brentano, Fr. Field Vs Brentano, Fr. Field II 30
Materialism/Mental Objects/Properties/Field: Materialism must also deny irreducible mental properties (E.g. beliefs, desires). 1) Problem: the experience properties, E.g. the property of feeling pain.
2) Problem: Intentionality: how can materialism explain it.
Mental Properties/Field: seem to be relational: between a person and something.
Materialism: must show that they are not irreducibly mental.
Can materialism VsBrentano show that beliefs and desires can be explained adequately?
Field: It can!.
II 259
Reference/Uncertainty/FieldVsBrentano: if reference is indeterminate, we can only accept a naturalistic answer, not a Brentanoian one of an irreducible mental connection. Naturalism/Field: but must admit that reference is indeterminate, (because he cannot assume any mental facts here).
Solution/Field: Naturalism, however, can assume naturalistic facts that partially define the reference. E.g. Facts about our use that show that a word does not stand for something else.
Problem: with that it is never ensured that the found reference is the only one. (This is already due ton the normal uncertainty, not the radical one).
Def Partial Reference/Field/(s): the same as "vague reference". That is, a word refers to an object, but perhaps also on others. (see above).

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Chisholm, R.M. Simons Vs Chisholm, R.M. Chisholm II 166
SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsBrentano: thesis: Chisholm inherited a mereological essentialism by Brentano with which I do not agree. But I will use these ideas to give a slightly different interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Wittgenstein himself was not so clear with respect to facts as it seems. Self-Criticism: self-criticism is a mess of facts and complexes.
There are worlds between the later Wittgenstein and Brentano, but there are contacts between Brentano and the Tractatus.
---
Simons I 1
Extensional Mereology/Simons: extensional mereology is a classical theory. Spelling: CEM.
Individuals Calculus/Leonard/Goodman: (40s): another name for the CEM is an individual calculus. This is intended to express that the objects of the part-whole relation belong to the lowest logical type (so they are all individuals, both a whole and a part are individuals).
VsCEM: 1. The CEM claims the existence of sums as individuals for whose existence we have no evidence beyond the theory.
Vs: 2. The whole theory is not applicable to most things in our lives.
Vs: 3. The logic of the CEM has not the resources to deal with temporal and modal terms: e.g. temporal part, substantial part, etc.
Simons: these are all external critiques but there is an internal critique: that comes from the extensional mereology.
Extensional Mereology: thesis: objects with the same parts are identical (analogous to set theory).
Problem:
1. Flux: e.g. people have different parts at different times.
I 2
2. Modality/extensional mereology: problem: e.g. a man could have other parts than he actually has and still be the same person. (s) The extensionality would then demand together with the Leibniz identity that all parts are essential. This leads to mereological essentialism.
Chisholm/mereological essentialism/Simons: Chisholm represents the mereological essentialism. Thesis: no object can have different parts than it actually has.
Vs: it is a problem to explain why normal objects are not modally rigid (all parts are essential).
Solution/Chisholm: thesis: (appearing) things (appearances) ((s) everyday things) are logical structures made of objects for which the mereological essentialism applies.
Flux/mereology/Simons: problem/(s): according to the CEM changing objects may not be regarded as identical with themselves.
1.
Solution/Chisholm: thesis: the actual objects are mereologically constant and the appearances again logical constructions of unchanging objects. SimonsVsChisholm: the price is too high.
2.
Common solution: the common solution is to replace the normal things (continuants) through processes that themselves have temporal parts.
SimonsVs: hence, the extensionality cannot be maintained. Such four-dimensional objects fail on the modal argument.
CEM/event/Simons: in the case of events the extensional mereology is applicable. It is also applicable in classes and masses.
Classes/masses/Simons: these are non-singular objects for which the extensionality applies.
Part/Simons: a part is ambiguous, depending on whether used in connection with individuals, classes or masses.
Extensionality/mereology/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, we are dealing with continuants.
I 3
Continuants/Simons: continuants may be in flux. Extensionality/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore several different objects can be at the same time in the same place.
I 175
Temporal Part/continuants/mereology/SimonsVsAll/SimonsVsChisholm: thesis: continuants can also have temporal parts! That means that they are not mereologically constant but mereologically variable. Continuants/Simons: thesis: continuants do not have to exist continuously. This provides us with a surprising solution to the problem of the Ship of Theseus.
I 187
SimonsVsChisholm: if Chisholm is right, most everyday things, including our organism, are only logical constructions.
I 188
Strict Connection/separateness/SimonsVsChisholm: the criterion for strict connection is unfortunately so that it implies that if x and y are strictly connected, but not in contact, they can be separated by the fact that a third object passes between them what per se is not a change, also not in their direct relations to each other. Problem: when this passing is only very short, the question is whether the separated sum of the two which was extinguished by the third object is the same that exists again when the third object has disappeared. If it is the same, we have a discontinued existing sum.
Chisholm: Chisholm himself asks this question with the following example: a castle of toy bricks will be demolished and built again with the same bricks.
I 189
Chisholm: thesis: it is a reason to be dissatisfied with the normal ontology, because it just allows such examples. SimonsVsChisholm: but Chisholm's own concepts just allowed us the previous example.
Topology/Simons: yet there is no doubt that it is useful to add topological concepts such as touching or to be inside of something to the mereology.
I 192
Def succession/Chisholm:
1.
x is a direct a-successor of y to t ' = Def (i) t does not start before t’
(ii) x is an a to t and y is a y to t’
(iii) there is a z so that z is part of x to t and a part of y to t’ and in every moment between t’ and t including, z is itself an a.
Simons: while there will be in general several such parts. We always choose the largest.
w: is the common part in it, e.g. in altering a table.
SimonsVsChisholm: problem: w is not always a table.
ChisholmVsVs: claims that w is indeed a table: if we cut away a small part of the table, what remains is still a table.
Problem: but if the thing that remains is a table because it was already previously there then it was a table that was a real part of a table!
I 193
SimonsVsChisholm: the argument is not valid! E.g.: Shakespeare, Henry IV, Act IV Scene V: Prince Hal considers: if the king dies, we will still have a king, (namely myself, the heir). But if that person is a king, then, because he had previously been there, then he was a king who was the eldest son of a king. ((s) This is a contradiction because then there would have been two kings simultaneously.)
Simons: this point is not new and was already highlighted by Wiggins and Quine (not VsChisholm).
I 194
Change/transformation/part/succession/SimonsVsChisholm: it seems, however, that they are not compatible with the simple case where a at the same time wins and loses parts. E.g. then a+b should be an A-predecessor of a+c and a+c an A-successor of a+b. But that is not allowed by the definition, unless we know that a is an A all the time, so that it connects a+b and a+c in a chain. But this will not usually be the case.
And if it is not the case, a will never ever be an A!
SimonsVsChisholm: so Chisholm's definitions only work if he assumes a wrong principle!
Succession/entia successiva/SimonsVsChisholm: problem: that each of the things that shall "stand in" (for a constant ens per se to explain the transformation) should themselves be an a in the original sense (e.g. table, cat, etc.) is counterintuitive.
Solution/Simons: the "is" is here an "is" of predication and not of constitution (>Wiggins 1980, 30ff).
Mereological Constancy/Simons: thesis: most things, of which we predict things like e.g. "is a man" or "is a table" are mereologically constant. The rest is easy loose speech and a play with identity.
E.g. if we say that the man in front of us lost a lot of hair in the last year we use "man" very loosely.
Chisholm: we should say, strictly speaking, that the man of today (stands for) who today stands for the same successive man has less hair than the man who stood for him last year.
SimonsVsChisholm/WigginsVsChisholm: with that he is dangerously close to the four-dimensionalism. And especially because of the following thesis:
I 195
To stand in for/stand for/entia successiva/Chisholm: thesis: "to stand in for" is not a relation of an aggregate to its parts. Sortal Concept/Simons: the question is whether sortal concepts that are subject to the conditions that determine what should count at one time or over time as a thing or several things of one kind are applicable rather to mereologically constant objects (Chisholm) or variable objects (Simons, Wiggins).
SimonsVsChisholm: Chisholm's thesis has the consequence that most people mostly use their most used terms wrongly, if this is not always the case at all.
I 208
Person/body/interrupted existence/identity/mereology/Chisholm/Simons: our theory is not so different in the end from Chisholm's, except that we do not accept matter-constancy as "strictly and philosophically" and oppose it to a everyday use of constancy. SimonsVsChisholm: advantage: we can show how the actual use of "ship" is related to hidden tendencies to use it in the sense of "matter-constant ship".
Ship of Theseus/SimonsVsChisholm: we are not obligated to mereological essentialism.
A matter-constant ship is ultimately a ship! That means that it is ready for use!
Interrupted Existence/substrate/Simons: there must be a substrate that allows the identification across the gap.
I 274
SimonsVsChisholm: according to Chisholm's principle, there is no real object, which is a table, because it can constantly change its microstructure ((s) win or lose atoms). Chisholm/Simons: but by this not the slightest contradiction for Chisholm is demonstrated.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Chomsky, N. Searle Vs Chomsky, N. SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique.
Dennett I 555
Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value.   There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries).

Searle I 273
SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism.
By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased.

IV 9
SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate.
IV 204
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms).
IV 205
This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files.

VIII 411
Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of the theory of syntax/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965(1)) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning.
VIII 412
For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar)
2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative)
3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),.
Also structuralism has phrase structure rules.
VIII 414
It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules.
VIII 420
Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man.
VIII 421
If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication.
The essence of language is its structure.
E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure.
Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else!
Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him".
ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology.
VIII 422
Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition.
Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!).
VIII 426
Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words!
Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not.
Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes!
VIII 429
Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma:
a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion >mention/>use).
b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate!
SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker.
The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination.
VIII 432
The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular.
E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition!
b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion.
VIII 433
ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings?
Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc.
Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones.
VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages.
SearleVs: the same dilemma:
a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or
b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements.
VIII 434
SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list.
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional.
Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act.
VIII 436
Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role.
VIII 437
Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act.


1. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge 1965

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Connectionism Pinker Vs Connectionism I 146
Def Connectionism/Pinker: Variant of the computer theory of the mind: the main form of information processing are statistical calculations with multiple levels. Vs: despite the promising name "neuronal" they are not particularly realistic models of the brain. For example, a "synapse" (i.e. the weighting of a link!) can switch between stimulating and inhibiting properties. And information can flow both ways at an "axon" (connection).
VsConnectoplasm/VsConnectionism: has major difficulties with 5 tasks of everyday thinking:
I 147
1) No individuality: if networks work with the same representations, they are indistinguishable from each other! Only generalities (classes, vegetables) can be represented, but not a specific horse. It is not a solution to let the node for horses become twice as be active, because this state does not differ from the twice as large the belief that the properties of a horse are present or the properties are present in double scope.
 It would be a mistake to regard the individual as a very, very specific subclass.
I 151
VsConnectionism/VsAssociationism: 2) Problem: Def Compositionality/Pinker: the possibility that a representation is made up of parts, while their meaning results from the meanings of the parts and the way they are combined.
 E.g. Compositionality is the key feature of all the human languages.
I 153
Language: E.g. distinction baby saw chicken/chicken saw baby shows that this is not a collection of separate units. Neural Networks/Compositionality/Language: Problem: compositionality is surprisingly hard to cope with for the connectoplasm. When active/passive are distinguished, then at the price that you no longer know who does something to whom.
I 154/155
We have the units: Baby eats and snail is eaten. If we wanted to distinguish between poodle and baby, we do not know whether the poodle saw that the baby ate the snail, or vice versa. The unit that the baby eats does not say anything about what it eats, and the (separate) unit for snail is eaten does not say by whom.  The problem cannot be solved by weighting again.
Solution: the mind needs a representation of the statement itself. Our model therefore needs an extra layer of units.
 This structure is very similar to normal, language-like Mentalese.
The components of the logic, predicate, argument, and statement must adjust themselves again. In addition, quantification to eliminate
I 156
E.g. "every 45 seconds someone suffers an accident, poor fellow."  "Someone"/Quantification/Pinker/(s): x can be stand for "someone". (Everyday language translation).
PinkerVsConnectoplasm: Problem: Interference, "disastrous forgetting": if the weighting for addition is changed, for example is newly introduced for the addition of 2, then it may be that the addition of 1 is forgotten. ("crosstalk").
I 165
PinkerVsConnectoplasm: the connectoplasm is so underprivileged that you often have to build networks with the worst combination: with too many innate structures in conjunction with too much input from the environment. This is how knowledge becomes useless if the question itself changes only a little.

Pi I
St. Pinker
How the Mind Works, New York 1997
German Edition:
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998
Field, H. Leeds Vs Field, H. Field II 304
Indeterminacy/Set Theory/ST/Leeds/Field: e.g. somebody considers the term "set" to be undetermined, so he could say instead: The term can be made "as large as possible". (Leeds 1997,24) (s) "everything that is included in the term"). As such the term can have a wider or narrower definition. Cardinality of the continuum/Indeterminacy/Field: This indeterminacy should at least contain the term set membership.
LeedsVsField: It is not coherent to accept set theory and to qualify its terms as indetermined at the same time. And it is not coherent to then apply classical logic in set theory.
Field: It could also look like this: the philosophical comments should be separated from mathematics. But we do not need to separate theory from practice, e.g. if the belief in indeterminacy is expressed in whether the degree of the mathematician's belief in the continuum hypothesis and his "doubt degree" adds up to 1 ((s) So that there is no space left for a third possibility).
Problem: A mathematician for whom it adds up to 1 could ask himself "Is the continuum hypothesis correct?" and would look for mathematical proof. A second mathematician, however, whose degree of certainty adds up to 0 ((s) since he believes in neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation) will find it erroneous to look for proof. Each possibility deserves to be analyzed.
The idea behind indeterminacy however is that only little needs to be defined beyond the accepted axioms. ((s) no facts.)
Continuum Hypothesis/Field: Practical considerations may prefer a concept over one another in a particular context and a different one in another context.
Solution/Field: This is not a problem as long as those contexts are hold separate. But is has been shown that its usefulness is independent from the truth.
II 305
Williamsons/Riddle/Indeterminacy/Leeds/Field: (LeedsVsField): (e.g. it must be determined whether Joe is rich or not): Solution/Leeds: i) we exclude the terms in question, e.g. rich (in this example) from the markup language which we accept as "first class"
and
ii) the primary (disquotional) use of "referred" or "is true of" is only used for this markup language.
Indeterminacy/Leeds: Is because there is no uniform best way to apply the disquotional scheme in order to translate into the markup language.
Field: This is genius: To reduce all indeterminacy on the indeterminacy of the translation.
FieldVsLeeds: I doubt that a meaning can be found.
Problem: To differentiate between undetermined termini and those which are only different regarding the extension of the markup language. Especially if we have a number of translations which all have different extensions in our markup language.
Solution/Disquotationalism: It would integrate the foreign terms in its own language. We would then be allowed to cite.(Quine, 1953 b, 135. see above chap. IV II 129-30).
Problem: If we integrate "/" and "", the solution which we obtained above may disappear.
FieldVsLeeds: I fear that our objective - to exclude the indeterminacy in our own language- will not be reached.It even seems to be impossible for our scientific terms!
e.g. the root –1/√-1/Brandom/Field: The indeterminacy is still there; We can simply use the "first class" markup language to say that -1 has two roots without introducing a name like "i" which shall stand for "one of the two".
FieldVsLeeds: We can accept set theory without accepting its language as "first class". ((s) But the objective was to eliminate terms of set theory from the first class markup language and to limit "true of" and "refer" to the markup language.)
Field: We are even able to do this if we accept Platonism (FieldVsPlatonism) :
II 306
e.g. we take a fundamental theory T which has no vocabulary of set theory and only says that there is an infinite number of non-physical eternally existing objects and postulates the consistency of fundamental set theory. Consistency is then the basic term which is regulated by its own axioms and not defined by terms of set theory. (Field 1991). We then translate the language of set theory in T by accepting "set" as true of certain or all non-physical eternally existing objects and interpret "element of" in such a way that the normal axioms remain true.
Then there are different ways to do this and they render different sentences true regarding the cardinality of the continuum. Then the continuum hypothesis has no particular truth value. (C.H. without truth value).
Problem: If we apply mathematical applications to non-mathemtical fields, we do not only need consistency in mathematics but in other fields as well. And we should then assume that the corresponding theories outside mathematics can have a Platonic reformulation.
1. This would be possible if they are substituted by a nominal (!) theory.
2. The Platonic theorie could be substituted by the demand that all nominal consequences of T-plus-set theory are true.
FieldVs: The latter looks like a cheap trick, but the selected set theory does not need to be the one deciding the cardinality of the continuum.
The selected set theory for a physical or psychological theory need not to be compatible with the set theory of another domain. This shows that the truth of the metalanguage is not accepted in a parent frame of reference. It's all about instrumental usefulness.
FieldVsLeeds: We cannot exclude indeterminacy - which surpasses vagueness- in our own language even if we concede its solution. But we do not even need to do this; I believe my solution is better.

I 378
Truth/T-Theory/T-concept/Leeds: We now need to differentiate between a) Truth Theory (T-Theory) ((s) in the object language) and
b) theories on the definition of truth ((s) metalinguistic) .
Field: (1972): Thesis: We need a SI theory of truth and reference (that a Standard Interpretation is always available), and this truth is also obtainable.
(LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/VsSI//LeedsVsField).
Field/Leeds: His argument is based on an analogy between truth and (chemical)valence. (..+....)
Field: Thesis: If it would have looked as if the analogy cannot be reduced, it would have been a reason to abandon the theory of valences, despite the theory's usefulness!
Truth/Field: Thesis: (analogous to valence ): Despite all we know about the extension of the term, the term also needs a physicalistic acceptable form of reduction!
Leeds: What Field would call a physicalistic acceptable reduction is what we would call the SI theory of truth: There always is a Standard Interpretation for "true" in a language.
Field/Leeds: Field suggests that it is possible to discover the above-mentioned in the end.
LeedsVsField: Let us take a closer look at the analogy: Question: Would a mere list of elements and numbers (instead of valences) not be acceptable?
I 379
This would not be a reduction since the chemists have formulated the law of valences. Physikalism/Natural law/Leeds: Does not demand that all terms can be easily or naturally explained but that the fundamental laws are formulated in a simple way.
Reduction/Leeds: Only because the word "valence" appears in a strict law there are strict limitations imposed on the reduction.
Truth/Tarski/LeedsVsTarski: Tarski's Definitions of T and R do not tell us all the story behind reference and truth in English.
Reference/Truth/Leeds: These relations have a naturalness and importance that cannot be captured in a mere list.
Field/Reduction/Leeds: If we want a reduction à la Field, we must find an analogy to the law of valences in the case of truth, i.e. we need to find a law or a regularity of truth in English.
Analogy/Field: (and numerous others) See in the utility of the truth definition an analogy to the law.
LeedsVsField: However, the utility can be fully explained without a SI theory. It is not astonishing that we have use for a predicate P with the characteristic that"’__’ is P" and "__"are always interchangeable. ((s)>Redundancy theory).
And this is because we often would like to express every sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g. when all elements have the form in common.) ((s) "All sentences of the form "a = a" are true"), > Generalization.
Generalization/T-Predicate/Leeds: Logical form: (x)(x e z > P(x)).
Semantic ascent/Descent/Leeds: On the other hand truth is then a convenient term, same as infinite conjunction and disjunction.
I 386
Important argument: In theory then, the term of truth would not be necessary! I believe it is possible that a language with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions can be learned. Namely, if conjunctions and disjunctions if they are treated as such in inferences. They could be finally be noted.
I 380
Truth/Leeds: It is useful for what Quine calls "disquotation" but it is still not a theory of truth (T-Theory). Use/Explanation/T-Theory/Leeds: In order to explain the usefulness of the T-term, we do not need to say anything about the relations between language and the world. Reference is then not important.
Solution/Leeds: We have here no T-Theory but a theory of the term of truth, e.g. a theory why the term is seen as useful in every language. This statement appears to be based solely on the formal characteristics of our language. And that is quite independent of any relations of "figure" or reference to the world.

Reference/Truth/Truth term/Leeds: it shows how little the usefulness of the truth term is dependent on a efficient reference relation!
The usefulness of a truth term is independent of English "depicts the world".
I 381
We can verify it: Suppose we have a large fragment of our language, for which we accept instrumentalism, namely that some words do not refer. This is true for sociology, psychology, ethics, etc. Then we will find semantic ascent useful if we are speaking about psychology for example. E.g. "Some of Freud's theories are true, others false" (instead of using "superego"!) Standard Interpretation/Leeds: And this should shake our belief that T is natural or a standard.
Tarski/Leeds: This in turn should not be an obstacle for us to define "T" à la Tarski. And then it is reasonable to assume that "x is true in English iff T (x)" is analytic.
LeedsVsSI: We have then two possibilities to manage without a SI:
a) we can express facts about truth in English referring to the T-definition (if the word "true" is used) or
b) referring to the disquotional role of the T-term. And this, if the explanandum comprises the word "true" in quotation marks (in obliqua, (s) mentioned).

Acquaintance/Russell/M. Williams: Meant a direct mental understanding, not a causal relation!
This is an elder form of the correspondence theory.
I 491
He was referring to RussellVsSkepticism: A foundation of knowledge and meaning FieldVsRussell/M. WilliamsVsRussell: das ist genau das Antackern des Begriffsschemas von außen an die Welt.
Field/M. Williams: His project, in comparison, is more metaphysical than epistemic. He wants a comprehensive physicalistic overview. He needs to show how semantic characteristics fit in a physical world.
If Field were right, we would have a reason to follow a strong correspondence theory, but without dubious epistemic projects which are normally linked to it.
LeedsVsField/M. Williams: But his argument is not successful. It does not give an answer to the question VsDeflationism. Suppose truth cannot be explained in a physicalitic way, then it contradicts the demand that there is an unmistakable causal order.
Solution: Truth cannot explain (see above) because we would again deal with epistemology (theory of knowledge).(>justification, acceptability).

Leeds I
Stephen Leeds
"Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Frege, G. Kripke Vs Frege, G. Cresswell II 151
Pierre-E.g../Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1979) Cresswell: if de re interpreted, is the belief about London. Description Theory/Cresswell: For this, the example is not a problem ((s) Londres and London are different for Pierre because of different descriptions).
((s) causal theory/(s): the case is a problem for them because they have to assume that the meaning of the name is the carrier and must therefore be the same carrier and therefore contradictory predicates are attributed.)
Description Theory/Cresswell: Here the description is relative to Pierre, but it is not his private matter!
Def "Extreme Fregeanism"/KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsRussell/Cresswell: (he attributes this disposition to these two): Thesis: that name in general belong to idiolects.
Problem: Then the Pierre-E.g. is not about Pierre but about the speaker, who is reporting this case, and his idiolect.
Cresswell: Unfortunately it is not so simple: e.g. an ancient Greek could have been arrived from the ancient to us. He is initially going to use "Φωσφόρος" instead of "Phosphorus". His disposition towards it will as different from ours, as the Pierre-example demonstrates the different dispositions of "London" and "Londres".
Ambiguity/Cresswell: is caused here because a name can stand for numerous descriptions. The latter allow in most cases that "London" can be translated as "Londres". The only case in which it does not work is the example of Pierre.

Stalnaker I 172
Name/reference/meaning/sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: Thesis: Names are directly addressing the referent without the mediation of an intermediary meaning
Frege/Dummett/Searle: Thesis: The meaning of the name must be adopted in-between the name and his referent.
a) otherwise the object cannot be identified or we cannot explain how it is identified,
b) (DummettVsKripke)since we cannot learn the language.
I 174
Reference/meaning/Searle/Stalnaker: When a statement does not possess a descriptive content, it cannot be linked to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: .. the object must be singled out somehow. Stalnaker: in both cases, it comes to skills, use, habits, practices or mental states.
Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both seem to be of the opinion that a satisfactory fundamental semantics (see above that as a fact an expression has its semantic value)cannot be given.
StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: Both, however, do not state this since they do not separate those two issues.
a) what is the semantics, e.g. for names
b) what circumstances lead to those semantics.
Stalnaker: if we separate them, we can no longer rule out the possibility that each language could be a language spoken by us. Then the community could very well speak a Mill’s language.
Frege’s language/Meaning/Reference/Denotation/Stalnaker: We would need them if these questions were not separate, e.g. if we needed to explain those at the same time.
a) why a name has these referents and
b) what the speaker communicates with his statement (which information, content).
Meaning/ KripkeVsFrege: Kripke (1972) (S.A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, 2nd edition, pp. 253-355; Addenda pp. 763-769, Dordrecht, 1972) The latter should be criticized for using "meaning" in two different ways.
a) as meaning
b) as the way how the reference is determined.
By identifying the two, he assumes that both are created by specific descriptions.that both are given by specific markings.
I 192
Causal chain/Historic chain/Semantics/Metasemantics/Presemantics/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan 1989a, 574 ("pre-semantics")
Question: Are causal chains a part of semantics or a part of metasemantics?
Semantics: states, which semantic values hold the expressions of a language.
Metasemantics: what circumstances determine the semantic values.
Presemantics/Kaplan: concerns those who believe that a name signifies something laying at the other end of a historical chain.
Semantics/Kaplan: gives us rather the meaning than explaining how to find it.
Similar to Kripke:
Reference/Meaning/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke distinguishes between what the reference fixes (the causal chain) and it signifies.
KripkeVsFrege: he has mixed up those two things.
Name/Kaplan/Stalnaker: he asks whether names are like index words.
I/Kaplan/Stalnaker: Is a rigid designator: The truth conditions (WB) of what is said (propositional content) depend on the actual referent. Contrary to:
Meaning/I/Stalnaker: One indicates the significance by stating how the referent is determined in the context. That would belong to a theory of e.g. the English language.
E.g. "I refer to the speaker" . Who knows this will be taken for someone who knwos the significance of"I", even if
Important Argument: he does not know who was the speaker at a particular occasion.((s) Difference between significance/reference > "whoever was the speaker")
Def Character/Kaplan: = significance. Function of possible contexts of use for referents.

Tugendhat I 440
KripkeVsFrege: Primacy of descriptions not anymore(TugendhatVs). Kripke/Tugendhat: Actually, he is not particularly interested in the definition of the proper name but in the rigid designator.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Frege, G. Quine Vs Frege, G. Quine I 425
VsFrege: tendency to object orientation. Tendency to align sentences to names and then take the objects to name them.
I 209
Identity/Aristotle/Quine. Aristotle, on the contrary, had things right: "Whatever is predicated by one should always be predicated by the other" QuineVsFrege: Frege also wrong in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung".
QuineVsKorzybski: repeated doubling: Korzybski "1 = 1" must be wrong, because the left and right side of the equation spatially different! (Confusion of character and object)
"a = b": To say a = b is not the same, because the first letter of the alphabet cannot be the second: confusion between the sign and the object.
Equation/Quine: most mathematicians would like to consider equations as if they correlated numbers that are somehow the same, but different. Whitehead once defended this view: 2 + 3 and 3 + 2 are not identical, the different sequence leads to different thought processes (QuineVs).
I 264
according to Russell "Propositional Attitudes": believes, says, strives to, that, argues, is surprised, feares, wishes, etc. ...
I 265
Propositional attitudes create opaque contexts into which quantification is not allowed. (>) It is not permissible to replace a singular term by an equally descriptive term, without stretching the truth value here. Nor a general term by an equally comprehensive one. Also cross-references out of opaque contexts are prohibited.
I 266
Frege: in a structure with a propositional attitude a sentence or term may not denote truth values, a class nor an individual, but it works as "name of a thought" or name of a property or as an "individual term". QuineVsFrege: I will not take any of these steps. I do not forbid the disruption of substitutability, but only see it as an indication of a non-designating function.

II 201
Frege emphasized the "unsaturated" nature of the predicates and functions: they must be supplemented with arguments. (Objections to premature objectification of classes or properties). QuineVsFrege: Frege did not realize that general terms can schematized without reifying classes or properties. At that time, the distinction between schematic letters and quantifiable variables was still unclear.
II 202
"So that" is ontologically harmless. Despite the sad story of the confusion of the general terms and class names, I propose to take the notation of the harmless relative clause from set theory and to write:
"{x:Fx} and "ε" for the harmless copula "is a" (containment).
(i.e.​​the inversion of "so that").
Then we simply deny that we are using it to refer to classes!
We slim down properties, they become classes due to the well-known advantages of extensionality.
The quantification over classes began with a confusion of the general with the singular.
II 203
It was later realized that not every general term could be allocated its own class, because of the paradoxes. The relative clauses (written as term abstracts "{x: Fx}") or so-that sentences could continue to act in the property of general terms without restrictions, but some of them could not be allowed to exercise a dual function as a class name, while others could. What is crucial is which set theory is to be used. When specifying a quantified expression a variable may not be replaced by an abstraction such as: "x} Fx". Such a move would require a premise of the form (1), and that would be a higher form of logic, namely set theory:
(1) (Ey)(y = {x:Fx})
This premise tells us that there is such a class. And at this point, mathematics goes beyond logic!
III 98
Term/Terminology/Quine: "Terms", here as a general absolute terms, in part III single-digit predicates.
III 99
Terms are never sentences. Term: is new in part II, because only here we are beginning to disassemble sentences.

Applying: Terms apply.
Centaur/Unicorn/Quine: "Centaur" applies to any centaur and to nothing else, i.e. it applies to nothing, since there are no centaurs.
III 100
Applying/Quine: Problem: "evil" does not apply to the quality of malice, nor to the class of evil people, but only to each individual evil person.
Term/Extension/Quine: Terms have extensions, but a term is not the denotation of its extension.
QuineVsFrege: one sentence is not the denotation of its truth value. ((s) Frege: "means" - not "denotes").
Quine: advantage. then we do not need to assume any abstract classes.

VII (f) 108
Variables/Quine: "F", etc.: not bindable! They are only pseudo-predicates, vacancies in the sentence diagram. "p", "q", etc.: represent whole statements, they are sometimes regarded as if they needed entities whose names these statements are.
Proposition: these entities are sometimes called propositions. These are rather hypothetical abstract entities.
VII (f) 109
Frege: alternatively: his statements always denote one or the other of exactly two entities: "the true one" or "the false one". The truth values. (Frege: statements: name of truth values) Quine pro Frege: better suited to distinguish the indistinguishable. (see above: maxim, truth values indistinguishable in the propositional calculus (see above VII (d) 71).
Propositions/Quine: if they are necessary, they should rather be viewed as names for statements.
Everyday Language/Quine: it is best if we return to everyday language:
Names are one kind of expression and statements are another!
QuineVsFrege: sentences (statements) must not be regarded as names and
"p", "q" is not as variables that assume entities as values that are entities denoted by statements.
Reason: "p", "q", etc. are not bound variables! Ex "[(p>q). ~p]> ~p" is not a sentence, but a scheme.
"p", "q", etc.: no variables in the sense that they could be replaced by values! (VII (f) 111)
VII (f) 115
Name/QuineVsFrege: there is no reason to treat statements as names of truth values, or even as names.
IX 216
Induction/Fregean Numbers: these are, other than those of Zermelo and of von Neumann, immune against the trouble with the induction (at least in the TT), and we have to work with them anyway in NF. New Foundations/NF: But NF is essentially abolishing the TT!
Problem: the abolition of TT invites some unstratified formulas. Thus, the trouble with induction can occur again.
NFVsFrege: is, on the other hand, freed from the trouble with the finite nature which the Fregean arithmetic touched in the TT. There, a UA was needed to ensure the uniqueness of the subtraction.
Subtraction/NF: here there is no problem of ambiguity, because NF has infinite classes - especially θ - without ad-hoc demands.

Ad 173 Note 18:
Sentences/QuineVsFrege/Lauener: do not denote! Therefore, they can form no names (by quotation marks).
XI 55
QuineVsFrege/Existence Generalisation/Modal/Necessary/Lauener: Solution/FregeVsQuine: this is a fallacy, because in odd contexts a displacement between meaning and sense takes place. Here names do not refer to their object, but to their normal sense. The substitution principle remains valid, if we use a synonymous phrase for ")".
QuineVsFrege: 1) We do not know when names are synonymous. (Synonymy).
2) in formulas like e.g. "(9>7) and N(9>7)" "9" is both within and outside the modal operaotor. So that by existential generalization
(Ex)((9>7) and N(9>7))
comes out and that's incomprehensible. Because the variable x cannot stand for the same thing in the matrix both times.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Frege, G. Tugendhat Vs Frege, G. II 237
Replaceability/Frege: he was of the opinion that the principle of replaceability could prove that the truth values of the sentences correspond to the objects of the names. TugendhatVsFrege: with this principle it can only be proved that conversely, the objects of the names correspond to the truth values of the propositions.
II 238
Sentence/Proprietary Name/Tugendhat: names and sentences have something in common: the ability to have a meaning.
II 243
Def indirect meaning/Frege: name of a sentence. Complex Sentences/Frege/Tugendhat: Truth functions of their subordinate clauses! Where this is not the case, partial sentences appear as names (indirect meaning, quotation).
TugendhatVsFrege: the thought that the meaning of a sentence (in a technical sense) is only the truth value is mistaken. When a clause is nominalized, it expresses, according to Frege, only a part of a "thought".
II 244
Tugendhat: the truth-value potential of such a proposition (which cannot stand for itself) cannot consist in a truth value. (Because the replacement cannot be performed). Meaning/Frege/Tugendhat: this shows once again that Frege's concept of meaning is functional: the meaning of an expression differs depending on whether he expresses his independent thought or only part of it.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Frege, G. Hintikka Vs Frege, G. Cresswell I 148
Compositionality/Cresswell: It has long been known that it fails on the surface structure. (Cresswell 1973 p 77). HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: H. says that it is simply wrong. In saying that, he ignores the deep structure. And indeed you can regard the difference of the two readings of (39) (Everybody loves somebody) in the context of the game theory as changing the order in the choice of individuals. Then you could say that the only linguistic object is the surface structure.
CresswellVsHintikka: but when it comes to that, his observations are not new. Compositionality/Cresswell: fails if we say that the two readings depend on the order in which we first process "and" then "or", or vice versa.
Nevertheless, the Frege principle (= compositionality) is in turn applicable to (44) or (45). It is treated like this in Montague. (see below Annex IV: Game-theoretical semantics).
I 149
HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: fails even with higher order quantification. CresswellVsHintikka: this is a mistake: firstly, no compositionality is effective in the 1st order translation of sentences like (29).
But authors who use higher-order entities (Montague and Cresswell) do not see themselves as deniers of the Frege principle. Hintikka seems to acknowledge that. (1982 p 231).
I 161.
"is"/Frege/Russell: ambiguous in everyday language. HintikkaVsFrege/KulasVsFrege: (1983): not true!
Cresswell: ditto, just that "normal semantics" is not obliged to Frege-Russell anyway.

Hintikka II 45
(A) Knowledge/Knowledge Objects/Frege/Hintikka: His concern was what objects we have to assume in order to understand the logical behavior of the language, when it comes to knowledge.
Solution/Frege/Hintikka: (see below: Frege’s knowledge objects are the Fregean senses, reified, >intensional objects).
Hintikka: For me, it is primarily about the individuals of which we speak in epistemic contexts; only secondarily, I wonder if we may call them "knowledge objects".
Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: we can oppose the possible worlds semantics to his approach. (Hintikka pro possible worlds semantics).
II 46
Idea: application of knowledge leads to the elimination of possible worlds (alternatives). Possible World/Hintikka: the term is misleading, because too global.
Def Scenario/Hintikka: everything that is compatible with the knowledge of a knower. We can also call them knowledge worlds.
Set of All Possible Worlds/Hintikka: we can call it illegitimate. (FN 5).
Knowledge Object/Hintikka: can be objects, people, artifacts, etc.
Reference/Frege/Hintikka: Frege presumes a completely referential language. I.e. all our expressions stand for some kind of entities. They can be taken as Fregean knowledge objects.
Identity/Substitutability/SI/Terminology/Frege/Hintikka: SI is the thesis of the substitutability of identity ((s) only applies with limitation in intensional (opaque) contexts).
II 47
E.g. (1) ... Ramses knew that the morning star = the morning star From this it cannot be concluded that Ramses knew that the morning star = the evening star (although MS = ES).
II 48
Context/Frege/Hintikka: Frege distinguish two types of context: Direct Context/Frege/Hintikka: extensional, transparent
Indirect Context/Frege/Hintikka: intensional, opaque. E.g. contexts with "believes" (belief contexts). ((s) Terminology: "ext", "opaque", etc. not from Frege).
Frege/Hintikka: according to his own image:
(4) expression >sense >reference.
((s) I.e. according to Frege the intension determines the extension.)
Intensional Contexts/Frege/Hintikka: here, the picture is modified:
(5) Expression (>) sense (> reference)
Def Systematic Ambiguity/Frege/Hintikka: all our expressions are systematically ambiguous, i.e. they refer to different things, depending on whether they are direct (transparent, extensional) contexts or indirect ones (intensional, opaque).
Fregean Sense/Hintikka: Fregean senses in Frege are separate entities in order to be able to work at all as references in intensional contexts.
E.g. in order to be able to restore the inference in the example above (morning star/evening start) we do not need the
identity of morning star and evening star, but the.
identity of the Fregean sense of "morning star" and "evening star".
II 49
Important argument: but Frege himself does not reinterpret the identity in the expression morning star = evening star in this way. He cannot express this fact, because there identity occurs in an extensional context and later in an intensional context. Identity/Frege/Hintikka: therefore we cannot say that Frege reinterprets our normal concept of identity.
Problem: It is not even clear whether Frege can express the identity of the senses with an explicit sentence. For in his own formal language (in "Begriffsschrift"(1) and "Grundgesetze"(2)) there is no sentence that could do this. He says that himself in: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung": we can only refer to the meanings of our expressions by prefixing the prefix "the meaning of". But he never uses this himself.
(B)
Knowledge Objects/Possible World Approach/HintikkaVsFrege:
Idea: knowledge leads us to create an intentional context that forces us to consider certain possibilities. These we call possible worlds.
new: we do not consider new entities (intensional entities) in addition to the references, but we look at the same references in different possible worlds.
Morning Star/Evening Star/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: Solution: "morning star" and "evening star" now single out the same object, namely the planet in the real world.
II 50
(C) Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: there is no systematic ambiguity here, i.e. the expressions mean the same thing intensionally as extensionally.
E.g. Knowing what John knows means knowing those possible worlds which are compatible with his belief, and knowing which are not.
II 51
Extra premise: for that it must be sure that an expression singles out the same individual in different possible worlds. Context: what the relevant possible worlds are depends on the context.
E.g. Ramses: here, the case is clear,
On the other hand:
E.g. Herzl knew Loris is a great poet
Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal.
II 53
Meaning Function/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: the difference in my approach to that of Frege is that I consider problems locally, while Frege considers them globally. Fregean Sense/(= way of givenness) Hintikka: must be considered as defined for all possible worlds.
On the other hand:
Hintikka: if Fregean sense is construed as meaning function, it must be regarded as only defined for the relevant alternatives in my approach.
Frege: precisely uses the concept of identity of senses implicitly. And as meaning function, identity is only given if the mathematical function works for all relevant arguments.
Totality/Hintikka: this concept of totality of all logically possible worlds is now highly doubtful.
Solution/Hintikka: it is precisely the possible worlds semantics that helps dispense with the totality of all possible worlds. ((s) And to consider only the relevant alternatives defined by the context).
Fregean Sense/Hintikka: was virtually constructed as an object (attitude object propositional object, thought object, belief object). This is because they were assumed as entities in the real world (actual world), however abstract.
II 54
Meaning Function/M. F./HintikkaVsFrege/Hintikka: unlike Fregean senses, meaning functions are neither here nor elsewhere. Problem/Hintikka: Frege was tempted to reify his "senses".
Knowledge Object/Thought Object/Frege/Hintikka: Frege, unlike E.g. Quine, has never considered the problem.
Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: entitles us to move from a sentence S(b) with a singular term "b" to the existential statement (Ex) S(x).
This fails in intensional (epistemic) contexts.
Transition from "any" to "some".
E.g. epistemic context:
(10) (premise) George IV knew that (w = w)
(11) (tentative conclusion) (Ex) George IV knew that (w = x)
II 55
Problem: the transition from (10) to (11) fails, because (11) has the strength of (12) (12) George IV knew who w is.
EG/Fail/Solution/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumed that in intensional (opaque) contexts we are dealing with ideas of references.
HintikkaVsFrege: Problem: then (11) would follow from (10) in any case ((s) and that’s just what is not desired). Because you’d have to assume that there is definitely some kind of sense under which George IV imagines an individual w.
Problem: "w" singles out different individuals in different possible worlds.
II 56
Possible Worlds Semantics/Solution/Hintikka: E.g. Suppose. (13) George knows that S(w)
to
(14) (Ex) George knows that S(x)
where S(w) does not contain expressions that create opaque contexts.
Then we need an additional condition.
(15) (Ex) in all relevant possible worlds (w = x).
This is, however, not a well-formed expression in our notation. We have to say what the relevant possible worlds are.
Def Relevant Possible Worlds/Hintikka: are all those that are compatible with the knowledge of George.
Thus, (15) is equivalent to
(16) (Ex) George knows that (w = x).
This is the additional premise. I.e. George knows who w is. (Knowing that, knowing who, knowing what).
Knowing What/Logical Form/Hintikka/(s): corresponds to "knows that (x = y)" ((s) >single class, single quantity).
E.g. knowing that "so and so has done it" does not help to know who it was, unless you know who so and so is. ((s) i.e. however, that you know y!)
 Solution/Hintikka/(s): the set of possible worlds compatible with the knowledge)
II 57
Meaning Function/M. F./Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: in order to be a solution here, the meaning function (see above) needs to be a constant function, i.e. it must single out the same individuals in all possible worlds. Frege/Identity/Opaque Context/Hintikka: Frege had to deal with the failure of the SI (substitutability in case of identity) ((s) i.e. the individuals might have a different name), not with the failure of the Existential Generalization (EG). ((s) I.e. the individuals might not exist).
Hintikka: therefore, we need several additional premises.
Possible Worlds Semantics:
SI: here, for substitutability in case of identity, we only need on the assumption that the references of two different concepts in any possible world can be compared.
Existential Generalization: here we have to compare the reference of one and the same concept in all possible worlds.
Frege/Hintikka: now it seems that Frege could still be defended yet in a different way: namely, that we now quantify on world-lines (as entities). ((s) that would accomodate Frege’s Platonism).
II 58
World Lines/Hintikka: are therefore somehow "real"! So are they not somehow like the "Fregean senses"?. HintikkaVs: it is not about a contrast between world bound individuals and world lines as individuals.
World Lines/Hintikka: but we should not say that the world lines are something that is "neither here nor there". Using world lines does not mean reifying them.
Solution/Hintikka: we need world-lines, because without them it would not even make sense to ask at all, whether a resident of a possible world is the same one as that of another possible world. ((s) cross world identity).
II 59
World Line/Hintikka: we use it instead of Frege’s "way of givenness". HintikkaVsFrege: his error was to reify the "ways of givenness" as "sense". They are not something that exists in the actual world.
Quantification/Hintikka: therefore, in this context we need not ask "about what we quantify".
II 109
Frege Principle/FP/Compositionality/Hintikka: if we proceed from the outside inwards, we can allow a violation of Frege’s principle. (I.e. the semantic roles of the constituents in the interior are context dependent).
II 110
HintikkaVsFrege/HintikkaVsCompositionality: Thesis: meaning entities should not be created step by step from simpler ones in tandem with syntactic rules. They should instead be understood, at least in some cases, as rules of semantic analysis.

1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964
2. Gottlob Frege [1893–1903]: Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Jena: Hermann Pohle

Wittgenstein I 71
Def Existence/Wittgenstein: predicate of higher order and is articulated only by the existence quantifier. (Frege ditto).
I 72
Hintikka: many philosophers believe that this was only a technical implementation of the earlier idea that existence is not a predicate. HintikkaVsFrege: the inexpressibility of individual existence in Frege is one of the weakest points, however. You can even get by without the Fregean condition on a purely logical level.
HintikkaVsFrege: contradiction in Frege: violates the principle of expressing existence solely through the quantifier, because the thesis of inexpressibility means that through any authorized individual constant existential assumptions are introduced in the logical language.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Frege, G. Waismann Vs Frege, G. Waismann I 77
Frege: Definition of the number in two steps a) when two sets are equal.
b) Definition of the term "number": it is equal if each element of one set corresponds to one element of the other set. Unique relation.
Under
Def "Number of a Set"/Frege: he understands the set of all sets equal to it. Example: the number 5 is the totality of all classes of five in the world.
VsFrege: how shall we determine that two sets are equal? Apparently by showing such a relation.
For example, if you have to distribute spoons on cups, then the relation did not exist before.
As long as the spoons were not on the cups, the sets were not equal. However, this does not correspond to the sense in which the word equal is used. So it is about whether you can put the spoons on the cups.
But what does "can" mean?
I 78
That the same number of copies are available. Not the assignment determines the equivalence, but vice versa. The proposed definition gives a necessary, but not sufficient condition for equal numbers and defines the expression "equal number" too narrowly.
Class: List ("school class") logical or term (mammals) empirical. With two lists it is neither emopirical nor logical to say that they can be assigned to each other. Example
1. Are there as many people in this room as in the next room? An experiment provides the answer.
2. Are 3x4 cups equal to 12 spoons? You can answer this by drawing lines, which is not an experiment, but a process in a calculus.
According to Frege, two sets are not equal if the relation is not established. You have defined something, but not the term "equal numbered". You can extend the definition by saying that they can be assigned. But again this is not correct. For if the two sets are given by their properties, it always makes sense to assert their "being-assignment", (but this has a different meaning, depending on the criterion by which one recognizes the possibility of assignment: that the two are equal, or that it should make sense to speak of an assignment!
In fact, we use the word "equal" according to different criteria: of which Frege emphasizes only one and makes it a paradigm. Example
1. If there are 3 cups and 3 spoons on the table, you can see at a glance how they can be assigned.
I 79
2. If the number cannot be overlooked, but it is arranged in a clear form, e.g. square or diamond, the equal numbers are obvious again. 3. The case is different, if we notice something of two pentagons, that they have the same number of diagonals. Here we no longer understand the grouping directly, it is rather a theorem of geometry.
4. Equal numbers with unambiguous assignability
5. The normal criterion of equality of numbers is counting (which must not be understood as the representation of two sets by a relation).
WaismannVsFrege: Frege's definition does not reflect this different and flexible use.
I 80
This leads to strange consequences: According to Frege, two sets must necessarily be equal or not for logical reasons.
For example, suppose the starlit sky: Someone says: "I don't know how many I've seen, but it must have been a certain number". How do I distinguish this statement from "I have seen many stars"? (It is about the number of stars seen, not the number of stars present). If I could go back to the situation, I could recount it. But that is not possible.
There is no way to determine the number, and thus the number loses its meaning.
For example, you could also see things differently: you can still count a small number of stars, about 5. Here we have a new series of numbers: 1,2,3,4,5, many.
This is a series that some primitive peoples really use. It is not at all incomplete, and we are not in possession of a more complete one, but only a more complicated one, beside which the primitive one rightly exists.
You can also add and multiply in this row and do so with full rigor.
Assuming that the things of the world would float like drops to us, then this series of numbers would be quite appropriate.
For example, suppose we should count things that disappear again during counting or others emerge. Such experiences would steer our concept formation in completely different ways. Perhaps words such as "much", "little", etc. would take the place of our number words.
I 80/81
VsFrege: his definition misses all that. According to it, two sets are logically necessary and equal in number, without knowledge, or they are not. In the same way, Einstein had argued that two events are simultaneous, independent of observation. But this is not the case, but the sense of a statement is exhausted in the way of its verification (also Dummett)
Waismann: So you have to pay attention to the procedure for establishing equality in numbers, and that's much more complicated than Frege said.
Frege: second part of the definition of numbers:
Def Number/Frege: is a class of classes. ((s) Elsewhere: so not by Frege! FregeVs!).
Example: the term "apple lying on the table comes to the number 3". Or: the class of apples lying on the table is an element of class 3.
This has the great advantage of evidence: namely that the number is not expressed by things, but by the term.
WaismannVsFrege: But does this do justice to the actual use of the number words?
Example: in the command "3 apples!" the number word certainly has no other meaning, but after Frege this command can no longer be interpreted according to the same scheme. It does not mean that the class of apples to be fetched is an element of class 3.
Because this is a statement, and our language does not know it.
WaismannVsFrege: its definition ties the concept of numbers unnecessarily to the subject predicate form of our sentences.
In fact, it results the meaning of the word "3" from the way it is used (Wittgenstein).
RussellVsFrege: E.g. assuming there were exactly 9 individuals in the world. Then we could define the cardinal numbers from 0 to 9, but the 10, defined as 9+1, would be the zero class.
Consequently, the 10 and all subsequent natural numbers will be identical, all = 0.
To avoid this, an additional axiom would have to be introduced, the
Def "infinity axiom"/Russell: means that there is a type to which infinitely many individuals belong.
This is a statement about the world, and the structure of all arithmetic depends essentially on the truth of this axiom.
Everyone will now be eager to know if the infinity axiom is true. We must reply: we do not know.
It is constructed in a way that it eludes any examination. But then we must admit that its acceptance has no meaning.
I 82
Nor does it help that one takes the "axiom of infinity" as a condition of mathematics, because in this way one does not win mathematics as it actually exists: The set of fractions is dense everywhere, but not:
The set of fractions is dense everywhere if the infinity axiom applies.
That would be an artificial reinterpretation, only conceived to uphold the doctrine that numbers are made up of real classes in the world
(VsFrege: but only conditionally, because Frege does not speak of classes in the world).
Waismann I 85
The error of logic was that it believed it had firmly underpinned arithmetic. Frege: "The foundation stones, fixed in an eternal ground, are floodable by our thinking, but not movable." WaismannVsFrege: only the expression "justify" the arithmetic gives us a wrong picture,
I 86
as if its building were built on basic truths, while she is a calculus that proceeds only from certain determinations, free-floating, like the solar system that rests on nothing. We can only describe arithmetic, i.e. give its rules, not justify them.
Waismann I 163
The individual numerical terms form a family. There are family similarities. Question: are they invented or discovered? We reject the notion that the rules follow from the meaning of the signs. Let us look at Frege's arguments. (WaismannVsFrege)
II 164
1. Arithmetic can be seen as a game with signs, but then the real meaning of the whole is lost. If I set up calculation rules, did I then communicate the "sense" of the "="? Or just a mechanical instruction to use the sign? But probably the latter. But then the most important thing of arithmetic is lost, the meaning that is expressed in the signs. (VsHilbert)
Waismann: Assuming this is the case, why do we not describe the mental process right away?
But I will answer with an explanation of the signs and not with a description of my mental state, if one asks me what 1+1 = 2 means.
If one says, I know what the sign of equality means, e.g. in addition, square equations, etc. then one has given several answers.
The justified core of Frege's critique: if one considers only the formulaic side of arithmetic and disregards the application, one gets a mere game. But what is missing here is not the process of understanding, but interpretation!
I 165
For example, if I teach a child not only the formulas but also the translations into the word-language, does it only make mechanical use? Certainly not. 2. Argument: So it is the application that distinguishes arithmetic from a mere game. Frege: "Without a content of thought an application will not be possible either. WaismannVsFrege: Suppose you found a game that looks exactly like arithmetic, but is for pleasure only. Would it not express a thought anymore?
Why cannot one make use of a chess position? Because it does not express thoughts.
WaismannVsFrege: Let us say you find a game that looks exactly like arithmetic, but is just for fun. Would it notexpress a thought anymore?
Chess: it is premature to say that a chess position does not express thoughts. Waismann brings. For example figures stand for troops. But that could just mean that the pieces first have to be turned into signs of something.
I 166
Only if one has proved that there is one and only one object of the property, one is entitled to occupy it with the proper name "zero". It is impossible to create zero. A >sign must designate something, otherwise it is only printer's ink.
WaismannVsFrege: we do not want to deny or admit the latter. But what is the point of this assertion? It is clear that numbers are not the same as signs we write on paper. They only become what they are through use. But Frege rather means: that the numbers are already there somehow before, that the discovery of the imaginary numbers is similar to that of a distant continent.
I 167
Meaning/Frege: in order not to be ink blotches, the characters must have a meaning. And this exists independently of the characters. WaismannVsFrege: the meaning is the use, and what we command.

Waismann I
F. Waismann
Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996

Waismann II
F. Waismann
Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976
Heidegger, M. Tugendhat Vs Heidegger, M. Habermas I 182
TugendhatVsHeidegger: by making the word of truth to a basic concept, he just avoids the problem of truth.
Tugendhat I 88
TugendhatVsHeidegger: Being: ambiguous in all languages. Heidegger was completely naive not to investigate this beforehand. Def veritative being: e.g. "It is the case that", "It is so, as you say, Socrates..."
I 90
Disclosure: all disclosure that is articulated in statements is in this respect a disclosure of (veritative) being.
I 91
Heidegger/Tugendhat: did not give an account of it. It seemed natural to him to say with the figurative tradition that all to be is a to be of being, although this does not fit at all to the veritative being ("If something is the case, it is also true"), let alone to the expanded concept. (TugendhatVsHeidegger).
I 92
Disclosure/Heidegger: original development is not at all related to objects. By "objectivity" in being and time he meant "existence", not only that which singular terms stand for, but the entire ontological perspective that results from the orientation towards a statement. Pre-linguistically.
I 104
TugendhatVsHeidegger: this contradicts the central importance that Heidegger attached to language ("Language is the house of being"). Heidegger fell back to the level of the most primitive theories of language by emphasizing the meaning of the word for the resoluteness of being.
II 65
Being/Heidegger: the content of that universal proposition of existence as enabling all "is"-saying is quasi the epitome of being. TugendhatVsHeidegger: this sense remains unclear. Ambiguity: "being and nothingness" in its formulations has finally changed into "being and non-being".
Through this ambiguity he also failed to make clear the difference between his position and the traditional ontology.
II 109
Quotation Marks/Heidegger: its use of quotation marks is not uniform. Being/Plato: "...what you mean when you use the expression "being"..."
TugendhatVsHeidegger: he omits the quotation marks! Falsification! One can now argue about whether he means the meaning of the word or the meaning of being.
TugendhatVsHeidegger: typical: he makes inconspicuous shifts from harmless starting positions with considerable consequences.
II 110
Sense of the Being/Heidegger/Tugendhat: no other way out than to speak of two different kinds of meaning: Sense1 and Sense2. When Heidegger now asks for the sense of being, he asks for the sense2 of a sense1 of the word. He asks for the sense2 (which in any case is not the sense of a word) of something that we mean when we speak of the being of an existing being. And what this something is, is left open. TugendhatVsHeidegger: he was even content to leave the words unclear that should be the most important to him and to us.
II 111
Def Sense/Heidegger: "The result of the design, from which something becomes understandable as something." Only existence has meaning if it is disclosed. Def World/Heidegger: The "Whereupon" of Understanding
Def "Worumwillen" (what for) of the Being/Heidegger: its own being that is designed in one way or another.
TugendhatVsHeidegger: Question: to what extent is anything we can refer to meaningless? Heidegger had used another meaning of "sense" here, something like the purpose of words. Thus one can speak of the meaning of the human, but not of the meaning of being.
Sense of Sense/Heidegger: nothing behind being, but in existence.
TugendhatVsHeidegger: suggests that the same being can once be opened up and once not.
II 112
Tugendhat: isn't something that we can refer to always accessible? Sense of Sense/Heidegger: Time. Like what was understood by "being" since the Greeks: "attendence", "present", "presence".
TugendhatVsHeidegger: Presence is not only made accessible by being seen in the horizon of time, it is from the beginning in this horizon. This could only be overlooked by someone who is completely immersed in "presence". And that is exactly what Heidegger accused ancient philosophy of of!
II 113
But there are simple words (like "present", "time") that we understand only in connection with other words.
II 115
Understanding/Heidegger: all human understanding is primarily an understanding of being. It goes beyond language. TugendhatVsHeidegger: he has not seen the following tension: on the one hand his being should be of being, on the other hand he is oriented towards the "is" and connects this with the thesis that all understanding is understanding of being.
II 116
For example "It is so that it rains" here one can say that the "is" refers to the state of affairs, and that is also a being. But that is not possible with unicorns. Tugendhat: Why should one deform oneself so?
Example (from Heidegger): "The sky is blue". Question: To which being does the "is" refer to the sky, or to what is meant by "blue", or to both?
So it makes sense to omit the orientation towards the existing and to speak only of being.
II 121
TugendhatVsHeidegger: his will to clearly think through what he had seen once was weak. Heidegger has seen quite a few new things, two themes seem worth preserving.
II 123
Mood/Heidegger: the primary way in which we are related to the world "as a whole". Being has no intentional content (!), it is directionless. ("fear", "withdrawal") focus on the "being in the whole". TugenhatVsHeidegger: here a substantiated "nothing" appears again, so to speak: an (impossible) negative proposition of existence: "There is nothing I can hold on to".
II 124
Being/later Heidegger: the "one who differs from all that exists", "absolutely other to all that exists". This could not have been formulated in such a way in "Being and Time" yet. "Being" is now the "world". It no longer stands for "is" but for "there is".
TugendhatVsHeidegger: I see no clue for the vibrating thesis that all understanding can be understood from this being. Everything but clear.
II 129
Greek concept of being/TugendhatVsHeidegger: Heidegger uses a sleight of hand: one must ask whether he was actually aware of the swindle. "Ousia" belongs to the tribe of "einai". Ousia = "being" pre-philosophically: "property", "house", "yard". Heidegger translates it as "estate" and projects back. In being and time he claims: "pareinai" = "being by" and could be translated as "estate", but the equation of ousia with parousia is simply wrong!
II 130
Time/Heidegger: the temporality of existence is more original than Heidegger's so-called "vulgar" time. (With a ratio of "sooner" and "later"). Future/Heidegger: one must see the self-behaviour to one's own being as a reference to the future.
II 131
Play on words: "Future" (German: "Zu-kunft") as that which is already fixed for being, in contrast to the indefinite future. TugendhatVsHeidegger: but this vulgar time must still be assumed. Of course, in every waking moment of my life I refer to the time ahead.
II 131
Time as meaning of being/time/future/Heidegger: he tried to construct a peculiar "movement" of existence, unlike the rest of being. This had to fail.
II 132
TugendhatVsHeidegger: the transfer of a structure, which is essentially conscious or present, to something else - even being - makes no sense!
II 132
Turn/Heidegger: can be understood as an attempt to project the "movement", which lies in the temporality of existence, into being itself or to settle it now on both sides. Here the terms "world" and the supposedly original concept of truth of "unconcealment" or "discovery" play a role.
II 133
Existence has its motion only from the motion of being, from the time thus understood as meaning of being. Oblivion of Being: HeideggerVsMetaphysics: which supposedly has forgotten the actual being and sees only the being of the existing.
II 134
TugendhatVsHeidegger: the new "movement of being" (understood from the movement of existence) is the crux of the "turn". Tugendhat: this fails: the reference to existence is a phenomenon sui generis. It is an extension of Husserl's intentionality (from Heidegger's point of view) both in the direction of the world and in the direction of temporality.
TugendhatVsHeidegger: but we have no possibility to consider a somewhat mirror image correspondence on the part of being. All words stand for the very process that takes place in the "vulgar" time!
Heidegger: wants existence to be temporal and yet not processual. That is contradictory. An emergence that is not an emergence in the "vulgar" time does not exist.
Heidegger's reaction to these contradictions was a quasi-religious attitude whose practical counterpart was "serenity".

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Husserl, E. Tugendhat Vs Husserl, E. Habermas I 204
TugendhatVsHusserl: the attempt to make subjective expressions independent of situations is hopeless. Singular terms are examples of genuinely pragmatic meanings like performative expressions.
Tugendhat I 141
TugendhatVsHusserl: fails to answer the question of how predicates are understood because of his object-theoretical approach. (Object Theory: Thesis: The sentence would correspond to a fact).
Tugendhat I 171
TugendhatVsHusserl: the composition must not be understood as real. The only criterion is that the redness in the lock is exactly when the lock is red.
I 172
Predicate/TugendhatVsHusserl: we need a whole new explanation for a predicate that cannot be an explanation of the way that the predicate stands for something. We must completely dispense with the object-theoretical explanatory model. Categorical Act/Husserl/Tugendhat: for their part are not directly demonstrable.
I 173
We can only recognize you by the fact that an expression has a certain semantic form. Relation Statements/Relation/TugendhatVsHusserl: one might think that Husserl's theory could be maintained at least with relation statements, i.e. with multi-digit predictive sentences.
One could put it this way: in the state of affairs, the relation of the real being together is ideally composed with the hammer on the one hand and the pair of objects style and head on the other hand.
This then corresponds exactly to the composition of the attribute with the one real object in the single-digit predictive sentence.
Vs: on the other hand, the same objection applies: when asked for a criterion for presenting this ideal composition, one can only answer that it exists between the real composition and the objects, if the original sentence is true.
Tugendhat I 291
Conjunction/Husserl: "Conjunctive connection of names or statements". (Subject Theoretical). Statements stand for objects (facts). "And": "Together of objects". But no quantity.
I 292
TugendhatVsHusserl: the problem is that we see this as spatial proximity. But we can imagine Peter and Paul as spatially separated and still make a statement that concerns them both.
I 361
Synthesis/Object/Husserl: Syntheses of ways of givenness: he does not mean objects at all, but especially spatial objects. Synthesis of shadows, colors, perspectives. TugendhatVsHusserl: these are not at all ways of givenness of objects as such, but of their predicative determinations!
I 362
Husserl: Object: "The pure X, in abstraction from all predicates". Tugendhat: this is too little.
II 9
TugendhatVsHusserl: lost years of his life with the confrontation, which is ultimately obsolete by analytical philosophy.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Kripke, S. A. Donnellan Vs Kripke, S. A. I 27
Names/DonnellanVsRussell: logical proper names ("this") are no meaningful construction: according to the natural conception, it is precisely proper names that stand for an object without describing it. DonnellanVsKripke: for him it looks as if the name would somehow stand directly for the language-independent given object, I 27 Donnellan: but the name is only a means, which could also be replaced by another one. (>Donnellan I 205)
I 27
Causal Chain/Donnellan: must be historically correct. In the case of negative existential propositions it breaks off or is blocked. Names/BurgeVsKripke/BurgeVsDonnellan: not singular terms, but predicates (like Russell). E.g. "There is a time t for the speaker S a reference action x to an object y, so that: y is a Socrates and y is bald". The part sentence "y is a Socrates" thus has a truth condition itself. Reference is not eliminated. Dual reference: To the reference action and to naming.

Donnellan I
Keith S. Donnellan
"Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Lesniewski, St. Prior Vs Lesniewski, St. I 43
Abstracts/Prior: Ontological Commitment/Quine: quantification of non-nominal variables nominalises them and thus forces us to believe in the corresponding abstract objects.
Here is a more technical argument which seems to point into Quine's direction at first:
Properties/Abstraction Operator/Lambda Notation/Church/Prior: logicians who believe in the real existence of properties sometimes introduce names for them.
Abstraction Operator: should form names from corresponding predicates. Or from open sentences.
Lambda: λ followed by a variable, followed by the open sentence in question.
E.g. if φx is read as "x is red",
I 44
then the property of redness is: λxφx. E.g. if Aφxψx: "x is red or x is green" (A: Here adjunction)
"Property of being red or green": λx∀φxψx.
To say that such a property characterizes an object, we just put the name of the property in front of the name of the object.
Lambda Calculus/Prior: usually has a rule that says that an object y has the property of φ-ness iff. y φt. I.e. we can equate:
(λy∀φxψx)y = ∀φyψy. ((s) y/x: because "for y applies: something (x) is...")
One might think that someone who does not believe in the real existence of properties does not need such a notation.
But perhaps we do need it if we want to be free for all types of quantification.
E.g. all-quantification of higher order:
a) C∏φCφy∑φyCAψyXy∑xAψxXx,
i.e. If (1) for all φ, if y φt, then φt is something
then (2) if y is either ψt or Xt, then
something results in either ψ or X.
That's alright.
Problem: if we want to formulate the more general principle of which a) is a special case: first:
b) C∏φΘφΘ()
Where we want to insert in the brackets that which symbolizes the alternation of a pair of verbs "ψ" and "X".
AψX does not work, because A must not be followed by two verbs, but only by two sentences.
We could introduce a new symbol A', which allows:
(A’ φψ)x = Aψxψx
this turns the whole thing into:
c) C∏φΘφΘA’ψX
From this we obtain by instantiation: of Θ
d) C∏φCφy∑xφxCA’ψXy∑xA’ψXx.
And this, Lesniewski's definition of "A", results in a).
This is also Lesniewski's solution to the problem.
I 45
PriorVsLesniewski: nevertheless, this is somewhat ad hoc. Lambda Notation: gives us a procedure that can be generalized:
For c) gives us
e) C∏φΘφΘ(λzAψzXz)
which can be instatiated to:
f) C∏φCφy∑xφx(λzAψzXz)y∑x(λzAψzXz)y.
From this, λ-conversion takes us back to a).
Point: λ-conversion does not take us back from e) to a), because in e) the λ-abstraction is not bound to an individual variable.
So of some contexts, "abstractions" cannot be eliminated.

I 161
Principia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Prior: Theorem 24.52: the universe is not empty The universal class is not empty, the all-class is not empty.
Russell himself found this problematic.
LesniewskiVsRussell: (Introduction to Principia Mathematica): violation of logical purity: that the universal class is believed to be not empty.
Ontology/Model Theory/LesniewskiVsRussell: for him, ontology is compatible with an empty universe.
PriorVsLesniewski: his explanation for this is mysterious:
Lesniewski: types at the lowest level stand for name (as in Russell).
But for him not only for singular names, but equally for general names and empty names!
Existence/LesniewskiVsRussell: is then something that can be significantly predicted with an ontological "name" as the subject. E.g. "a exists" is then always a well-formed expression (Russell: pointless!), albeit not always true.
Epsilon/LesniewskiVsRussell: does not only connect types of different levels for him, but also the same level! (Same logical types) E.g. "a ε a" is well-formed in Lesniewski, but not in Russell.
I 162
Set Theory/Classes/Lesniewski/Prior: what are we to make of it? I suggest that we conceive this ontology generally as Russell's set theory that simply has no variables for the lowest logical types. Names: so-called "names" of ontology are then not individual names like in Russell, but class names.
This solves the first of our two problems: while it is pointless to split individual names, it is not so with class names.
So we split them into those that are applied to exactly one individual, to several, or to none at all.
Ontology/Lesniewski/Russell/Prior: the fact that there should be no empty class still requires an explanation.
Names/Lesniewski/Prior: Lesniewski's names may therefore be logically complex! I.e. we can, for example, use to form their logical sum or their logical product!
And we can construct a name that is logically empty.
E.g. the composite name "a and not-a".
Variables/Russell: for him, on the other hand, individual variables are logically structureless.
Set Theory/Lesniewski/Prior: the development of Russell's set theory but without variables at the lowest level (individuals) causes problems, because these are not simply dispensable for Russell. On the contrary; for Russell, classes are constructed of individuals.
Thus he has, as it were, a primary (for individuals, functors) and a secondary language (for higher-order functors, etc.)
Basic sentences are something like "x ε a".
I 163
Def Logical Product/Russell: e.g. of the αs and βs: the class of xs is such that x is an α, and x is a β.

1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Mill, J. St. Frege Vs Mill, J. St. I 33
Numbers/Mill: initially, like Leibniz, wants to base everything on definitions. Numbers/FregeVsMill: he spoils everything, because he considers every science as empirical. This is not possible in the case of numbers.
 What in the world is to be thought of the physical fact that corresponds to the number 777 864?
 Too bad that Mill cannot show the physical facts which would correspond to 0 and 1.
I 34
Calculate/Mill: does not follow from the definitions, but from the observed fact. FregeVsMill: where could Leibniz have relied upon a fact in the above definition?
Mill overlooks, like Leibniz, the gap caused by the elimination of the brackets.
Laws: in them, E.g. the peculiarity of the number 1000 000 = 999 999 + 1 is lost.
Equation/Addition/Calculating/Numbers/Mill: asserts: the equation 1 = 1 could be wrong, because one pound piece does not always have exactly the weight of the other.
I 37
Calculating/Numbers/Addition/FregeVsMill: the sentence 1 = 1 does not want to say that at all! Mill understands the sign "+" in a way that is should express the relationship of the parts of a physical object or a heap to the whole, but that is not the sense of the plus sign.  Mill always confuses applications with the purely arithmetical proposition itself. Addition does not correspond to a physical relationship.
I 52
Number/Mill: "the name of a number designates a property which belongs to the aggregate of things that we call by that name." This property is the characteristic manner in which the assembly is composed and divisible. " FregeVsMill: there is more than one "characteristic way". (>Intension).
I 55
FregeVsMill: there is no physical difference between "a pair of boots" and "two boots".
Kripke I 36
FregeVsMill/RussellVsMill: Error: in reality, a proper name, which is used properly, is only an abbreviated or disguised description.
Read III 158
Names: if there was no criterion for recognition, names could not stand for an object. (FregeVsMill): this is wrong about Mill’s connotation-less explanation of names. (Russell openly admitted that there was a difficulty in identifying real names).
Stepanians I 34
Pure View/Kant/Frege/Stepanians: (like Kant): geometrical knowledge is based on pure view and is already synthetic "in us", a priori. FregeVsMill: geometrical knowledge is no sensation, because point, line, etc. are not actually perceived by the senses.

Thiel I 16
FregeVsMill: drastic counter-examples: doubtfulness in the case of 0 and 1, but also for very large numbers. Who should ever have observed the fact for the definition of the number 777 865? Mill could have defended himself. That his position seems to be more suitable for the justification of our number and perception of form than for the justification of arithmetic.

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Re III
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Step I
Markus Stepanians
Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001

T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Mill, J. St. Tugendhat Vs Mill, J. St. I 349
Mill regards names as elementary. Distinguishes general and individual names. Individual names: "denotative".
Only descriptions are also connotative. They refer to the object by means of the attribute.
Proper names: not connotative, they are "attached to the object itself."
TugendhatVsMill: Problem: it would have to be like in the fairy tale of Alibaba where the house is marked with a chalk mark to be able to recognize it. Mill sees this objection himself.
His solution: we do not mark the object, but our image of the object.
I 350
Presentation/Tradition/Tugendhat: irredeemable metaphor of traditional philosophy. Also for modern tradition. Problem: the fact that the image is supposed to be something like an internal image more problems than it solves.
It is no coincidence, however, that philosophy came up with this concept, initially there was no alternative but to look towards something sensual for orientation if you did not want to use a language itself for orientation.
I 352
Mill/Tugendhat: however, we can reformulate his theory such that it is not about an imagination, but about "standing for": namely for an imagined object. However, his theory implies that our relation to the objects is not a linguistic one. Object/Frege: Object: is not anything imaginable as a simple fact, but something to which showing itself in manifold ways of givenness belongs essentially.
I 353
Image/Sign/Tugendhat: do signs not need to be conceivable at least? Tugendhat: yes: sign types are conceivable, i.e. in a non-metaphorical sense.
I 354
TugendhatVsTradition/TugendhatVsMill: 1) The metaphor of a non-sensual, somehow intellectual image makes no sense.
2) Excessive tendency to think the object as a counterpart.
I 355
However, it is not controversial between tradition and analytic philosophy that singular terms "stand for objects". (> Proxy/Tugendhat).
I 356
3) images are not understood by tradition as intersubjective. (Humpty-Dumpty Theory).

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Millikan, R. Searle Vs Millikan, R. III 27
Function/Ruth Millikan (SearleVs): new concept of "actual function" based on "reproduction" and causation. Recursive definition: So that an object A has a function F as its "proper function", it is necessary (and also adequately) that meets either one of the following conditions:
1. A emerged as a "reproduction" (copy or copy of a copy) of an earlier object that has actually performed partly due to the possession of reproduced characteristics, F in the past, and A exists (causal historical) due to this direction.
2. A has emerged as the product of any previous means that under the circumstances of this direction of F had a real function and that under these circumstances is usually the reason that F is performed by means of the production of objects such as A. (derived "actual functions").
Function/SearleVsMillikan: so one can introduce any new technical expression. However, such definitions do not take any certain essential characteristics of the ordinary concept of function into consideration.
1. For Millikan the definition of the function depends on a specific causal historical theory.
II 28
Even if all previous, also Darwinian turn out to be wrong, my heart would continue to pump blood. 2. Furthermore, there are also stark counter-examples: E.g. according to Wright and Millikan we would have to say that it is the function of colds to spread cold germs.
SearleVs: but colds do not have any function at all!
3. The normative component of functions remains unexplained. (Although Millikan's theory takes into account that some features in reality may not be exercised.) Normative: Millikan does not explain why we are talking about better and worse functioning hearts, heart failure, etc..
Old dilemma: either we talk about crude, blind, causal relations, or we believe that there really is something functional to functions, although Millikan omits the observer relative properties.
III 29
Observer relative/Searle: functions, the fact that there are police officers and professors. (Intensional). Immanent: the fact that there are people at all. Blind, causal relations.
Function: a) Use Function: screwdriver, drive shaft.
b) Non-use functions: independent of practical intentions of the people: the function of the heart to pump blood.
III 33
Use functions: within: special class: representative function, represent something, stand for something else: e.g. baseball icons. >Icons, >symbols, >function.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Nominalism Field Vs Nominalism I 67
FieldVsNominalism: I do think that ME like numbers, functions, sets etc. are dispensable, but I do not claim the dispensability of any entity that some self-proclaimed nominalist rejects E.g. spacetime regions.
I 68
Because we have causal knowledge of of Sp.t.r., in the case of ME, we must postulate mysterious connections to a Platonic realm beyond time and space. E.g. A knowledge about an absolute infinity of objects in that realm. Sp.t. does not bring epistemic problems with it, even if we do not stand in a causal relation with each tiger.
I 69
FieldVsPlatonism: its entities are in principle inaccessible. Reference/Relation/Knowledge/Field: Problem: a) How do words stand for things? b) more fundamental: how do beliefs stand for things? Problem: in the broad sense: ME do not only stand in no causal, but also in no physical relation with us. Sp.t.: no problem: we can point to many of them! And refer to them with index words ("here", "now", etc.).

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Propositions Field Vs Propositions II 52
FieldVsPropositions: if we do not quantify on them, we cannot express the following: E.g. (8) There are many things that she thinks of him, and not all are flattering. Or
(9) No one can perceive an object without believing anything about it. Solution/Field: believe* ((s) see above: believe a sentence, i.e. it simultaneously understand it). Terminology/Field: From now on we will simply write "believe", even if we understand it in the sense of believing*.
Belief/Sentence/Field: belief should not be thought of as strictly based on an English sentence. We also say of beings who do not speak English that they believe that snow is white.
II 53
Def believe-that/Field: a person believes that p (where "p" abbreviates an English sentence S) when he believes a sentence in his internal representation system whose translation into English is S. Translation/Field: the concept we use here in the context of representations is a pretty sloppy one. We may only assume approximate synonymy. There are complicated pragmatic considerations here.
Propositions/Field: better be avoided. (see below: And thus also possible worlds).
II 54
If propositions are understood as sets of possible worlds, a truth theoretic semantics is also needed, but that already contains all the interesting semantics. Semantics/Field: this is about one that attributes properties to predicates rather than attributing quantities. (see above II 41) I.e. instead of saying that someone is related to a set of possible worlds in which Russell was bald, it is better to say: he is related to a sentence that consists of a name that stands for Russell, and a predicate stands for baldness. Properties/Propositions/Putnam/Field: (Put 1969): shows that there is indeed an ontological benefit when quantifying on properties instead of propositions:
a) it is needed in science, b) properties are just something completely different than meanings (propositions). E.G. two predicates like "x has a temperature of 210°" and "x has an average molecular energy..." can stand for the same property, although they have different meanings.
II 163
Proposition/Behavior Explanation/FieldVsPropositions: we need sentences here, not assumed internal entities like propositions (or sets of possible worlds). We want to attribute a sentence to the actor, which we understand ourselves. Vs: but only because the explanation does not indicate which of the possible propositions (sets of possible worlds) is the right one. VsVs: this may be, but it is because our standard for knowing which proposition it is about consists in delivering a sentence that we understand and that expresses the proposition.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Quine, W.V.O. Russell Vs Quine, W.V.O. Prior I 39
Ramified type theory/rTT/Prior: first edition Principia Mathematica(1): here it does not say yet that quantification on non-nouns (non nominal) is illegitimate, or that they are only apparently not nominal. (Not on names?) But only that you have to treat them carefully.
I 40
The ramified type theory was incorporated in the first edition. (The "simple type theory" is, on the other hand, little more than a certain sensitivity to the syntax.)
Predicate: makes a sentence out of a noun. E.g. "φ" is a verb that forms the phrase "φx".
But it will not form a sentence when a verb is added to another verb. "φφ".
Branch: comes into play when expressions form a sentence from a single name. Here we must distinguish whether quantified expressions of the same kind occur.
E.g. "__ has all the characteristics of a great commander."
logical form: "For all φ if (for all x, if x is a great commander, then φx) then φ__".
ΠφΠxCψxφx" (C: conditional, ψ: commander, Π: for all applies).
Easier example: "__ has the one or the other property"
logical form: "For a φ, φ __"
"Σφφ". (Σ: there is a)
Order/Type: here one can say, although the predicate is of the same type, it is of a different order.
Because this "φ" has an internal quantification of "φ's".
Ramified type theory: not only different types, but also various "orders" should be represented by different symbols.
That is, if we, for example, have introduced "F" for a predicative function on individuals" (i.e. as a one-digit predicate), we must not insert non-predicative functions for "f" in theorems.
E.g. "If there are no facts about a particular individual ..."
"If for all φ, not φx, then there is not this fact about x: that there are no facts about x that is, if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it cannot be true. I.e. if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it is wrong, that there is this fact.
Symbolically:
1. CΠφNφxNψx.
I 41
"If for all φ not φ, then not ψx" (whereby "ψ" can stand for any predicate). Therefore, by inserting "∏φφ" for "ψ": 2. CΠφNφxNΠφNφx
Therefore, by inserting and reductio ad absurdum: CCpNpNp (what implies its own falsehood, is wrong)
3. CΠφNφx.
The step of 1 to 2 is an impermissible substitution according to the ramified type theory.
Sentence/ramified type theory/Prior: the same restriction must be made for phrases (i.e. "zero-digit predicates", propositions).
Thus, the well-known old argument is prevented:
E.g. if everything is wrong, then one of the wrong things would be this: that everything is wrong. Therefore, it may not be the case that everything is wrong.
logical form:
1. CΠpNpNq
by inserting: 2. CΠpNpNPpNp
and so by CCpNpNp (reductio ad absurdum?)
3. NΠpNp,
Ramified type theory: that is now blocked by the consideration that "ΠpNp" is no proposition of the "same order" as the "p" which exists in itself.
And thus not of the same order as the "q" which follows from it by instantiation, so it cannot be used for "q" to go from 1 to 2.
RussellVsQuine/Prior: here propositions and predicates of "higher order" are not entirely excluded, as with Quine. They are merely treated as of another "order".
VsBranched type theory: there were problems with some basic mathematical forms that could not be formed anymore, and thus Russell and Whitehead introduce the reducibility axiom.
By contrast, a simplified type theory was proposed in the 20s again.
Type Theory/Ramsey: was one of the early advocates of a simplification.
Wittgenstein/Tractatus/Ramsey: Thesis: universal quantification and existential quantification are both long conjunctions or disjunctions of individual sentences (singular statements).
E.g. "For some p, p": Either grass is green or the sky is pink, or 2 + 2 = 4, etc.". (> Wessel: CNF, ANF, conjunctive and adjunctive normal form)
Propositions/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: no matter of what "order" are always truth functions of indiviual sentences.
Ramified Type TheoryVsRamsey/VsWittgenstein: such conjunctions and disjunctions would not only be infinitely long, but the ones of higher order would also need to contain themselves.
E.g. "For some p.p" it must be written as a disjunction of which "for some p, p" is a part itself, which in turn would have to contain a part, ... etc.
RamseyVsVs: the different levels that occur here, are only differences of character: not only between "for some p,p" and "for some φ, φ" but also between
"p and p" and "p, or p", and even the simple "p" are only different characters.
Therefore, the expressed proposition must not contain itself.


1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Resnik, M. Lewis Vs Resnik, M. Schwarz I 82
Plural quantifier/Quantification/Lewis/Schwarz: is common in everyday language. Predicate logic: here it has to be replaced by singular constructions: Example "the numbers" may then stand for the class of all numbers, example "are few" expresses a property(!) of this class.
Plural/Michael Resnik: (1988)(1) is the correct interpretation of everyday language plurals.
LewisVsResnik: (Inwagen dito): on the one hand "the classes" is unproblematic, but on the other hand there is not the class of all classes, so you can't translate it that way.
Question: in the above one-to-one correspondence, isn't it hidden and quantified via classes?


1. Michael D. Resnik [1988]: “Second-Order Logic Still Wild”. Journal of Philosophy, 85:
75–87

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Russell, B. Quine Vs Russell, B. Chisholm II 75
Predicates/Denote/Russell: denoting expressions: proper names stand for individual things and general expressions for universals. (Probleme d. Phil. p. 82f). In every sentence, at least one word refers to a universal. QuineVsRussell: confusion!
II 108
Theory of Descriptions/VsRussell/Brandl: thus the whole theory is suspected of neglecting the fact that material objects can never be part of propositions. QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use.
Quine II 97
Pricipia mathematica, 1903: Here, Russell's ontology is rampant: every word refers to something. If a word is a proper name, then its object is a thing, otherwise it is a concept. He limits the term "existence" to things, but has a liberal conception of things which even includes times and points in empty space! Then there are, beyond the existent things, other entities: "numbers, the gods of Homer, relationships, fantasies, and four-dimensional space". The word "concept", used by Russell in this manner, has the connotation of "merely a concept". Caution: Gods and fantasies are as real as numbers for Russell!
QuineVsRussell: this is an intolerably indiscriminate ontology. Example: Take impossible numbers, e.g. prime numbers that are divisible by 6. It must be wrong in a certain sense that they exist, and that is in a sense in which it is right that there are prime numbers! Do fantasies exist in this sense?

II 101
Russell has a preference for the term "propositional function" against "class concept". In P.M. both expressions appear. Here: Def "Propositional Function": especially based on forms of notation, e.g. open sentences, while concepts are decidedly independent of notation. However, according to Meinong Russell's confidence is in concepts was diminished, and he prefers the more nominalistic sound of the expression "propositional function" which is now carries twice the load (later than Principia Mathematica.)
Use/Mention/Quine: if we now tried to deal with the difference between use and mention as carelessly as Russell has managed to do sixty years ago, we can see how he might have felt that his theory of propositional functions was notation based, while a theory of types of real classes would be ontological.
Quine: we who pay attention to use and mention can specify when Russell's so-called propositional functions as terms (more specific than properties and relations) must be construed as concepts, and when they may be construed as a mere open sentences or predicates: a) when he quantifies about them, he (unknowingly) reifies them as concepts.
For this reason, nothing more be presumed for his elimination of classes than I have stated above: a derivation of the classes from properties or concepts by means of a context definition that is formulated such that it provides the missing extensionality.
QuineVsRussell: thinks wrongly that his theory has eliminated classes more thoroughly from the world than in terms of a reduction to properties.
II 102
RussellVsFrege: "~ the entire distinction between meaning and designating is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where are we to find the designating complex which supposedly designates C?" QuineVsRussell: Russell's position sometimes seems to stem from a confusion of the expression with its meaning, sometimes from the confusion of the expression with its mention.
II 103/104
In other papers Russel used meaning usually in the sense of "referencing" (would correspond to Frege): "Napoleon" particular individual, "human" whole class of such individual things that have proper names.
Russell rarely seems to look for an existing entity under any heading that would be such that we could call it the meaning that goes beyond the existing referent.
Russell tends to let this entity melt into the expression itself, a tendency he has in general when it comes to existing entities.
QuineVsRussell: for my taste, Russell is too wasteful with existing entities. Precisely because he does not differentiate enough, he lets insignificance and missed reference commingle.
Theory of Descriptions: He cannot get rid of the "King of France" without first inventing the description theory: being meaningful would mean: have a meaning and the meaning is the reference. I.e. "King of France" without meaning, and "The King of France is bald" only had a meaning, because it is the short form of a sentence that does not contain the expression "King of France".
Quine: actually unnecessary, but enlightening.
Russell tends commingle existing entities and expressions. Also on the occasion of his remarks on
Propositions: (P.M.): propositions are always expressions, but then he speaks in a manner that does not match this attitude of the "unity of the propositions" (p.50) and of the impossibility of infinite propositions (p.145)
II 105
Russell: The proposition is nothing more than a symbol, even later, instead: Apparently, propositions are nothing..." the assumption that there are a huge number of false propositions running around in the real, natural world is outrageous." Quine: this revocation is astounding. What is now being offered to us instead of existence is nothingness. Basically Russell has ceased to speak of existence.
What had once been regarded as existing is now accommodated in one of three ways
a) equated with the expression,
b) utterly rejected
c) elevated to the status of proper existence.

II 107
Russell/later: "All there is in the world I call a fact." QuineVsRussell: Russell's preference for an ontology of facts depends on his confusion of meaning with reference. Otherwise he would probably have finished the facts off quickly.
What the reader of "Philosophy of logical atomism" notices would have deterred Russell himself, namely how much the analysis of facts is based on the analysis of language.
Russell does not recognize the facts as fundamental in any case. Atomic facts are as atomic as facts can be.
Atomic Facts/Quine: but they are composite objects! Russell's atoms are not atomic facts, but sense data!

II 183 ff
Russell: Pure mathematics is the class of all sentences of the form "p implies q" where p and q are sentences with one or more variables, and in both sets the same. "We never know what is being discussed, nor if what we say is true."
II 184
This misinterpretation of mathematics was a response to non-Euclidean geometry. Numbers: how about elementary arithmetic? Pure numbers, etc. should be regarded as uninterpreted. Then the application to apples is an accumulation.
Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I find this attitude completely wrong. The words "five" and "twelve" are nowhere uninterpreted, they are as much essential components of our interpreted language as apples. >Numbers. They denote two intangible objects, numbers that are the sizes of quantities of apples and the like. The "plus" in addition is also interpreted from start to finish, but it has nothing to do with the accumulation of things. Five plus twelve is: how many apples there are in two separate piles. However, without pouring them together. The numbers "five" and "twelve" differ from apples in that they do not denote a body, that has nothing to do with misinterpretation. The same could be said of "nation" or "species". The ordinary interpreted scientific speech is determined to abstract objects as it is determined to apples and bodies. All these things appear in our world system as values ​​of variables.
II 185
It even has nothing to do with purity (e.g. of the set theory). Purity is something other than uninterpretedness.
XII 60
Expression/Numbers/Knowledge/Explication/Explanation/Quine: our knowledge of expressions is alone in their laws of interlinking. Therefore, every structure that fulfills these laws can be an explication.
XII 61
Knowledge of numbers: consists alone in the laws of arithmetic. Then any lawful construction is an explication of the numbers. RussellVs: (early): Thesis: arithmetic laws are not sufficient for understanding numbers. We also need to know applications (use) or their embedding in the talk about other things.
Number/Russell: is the key concept here: "there are n such and suches".
Number/Definition/QuineVsRussell: we can define "there are n such and suches" without ever deciding what numbers are beyond their fulfillment of arithmetic addition.
Application/Use/QuineVsRussell: wherever there is structure, the applications set in. E.g. expressions and Gödel numbers: even the mention of an inscription was no definitive proof that we are talking about expressions and not about Gödel numbers. We can always say that our ostension was shifted.

VII (e) 80
Principia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Whitehead/Quine: shows that the whole of mathematics can be translated into logic. Only three concepts need to be clarified: Mathematics, translation and logic.
VII (e) 81
QuineVsRussell: the concept of the propositional function is unclear and obscures the entire PM.
VII (e) 93
QuineVsRussell: PM must be complemented by the axiom of infinity if certain mathematical principles are to be derived.
VII (e) 93/94
Axiom of infinity: ensures the existence of a class with infinitely many elements. Quine: New Foundations instead makes do with the universal class: θ or x^ (x = x).


1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

VII (f) 122
Propositional Functions/QuineVsRussell: ambiguous: a) open sentences
b) properties.
Russell no classes theory uses propositional functions as properties as value-bound variables.

IX 15
QuineVsRussell: inexact terminology. "Propositional function", he used this expression both when referring to attributes (real properties) and when referring to statements or predicates. In truth, he only reduced the theory of classes to an unreduced theory of attributes.
IX 93
Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I differ in one point: for me, rational numbers are themselves real numbers, not so for Russell and Whitehead. Russell: rational numbers are pairwise disjoint for them like those of Peano. (See Chapter 17), while their real numbers are nested. ((s) pairwise disjoint, contrast: nested)
Natural Numbers/Quine: for me as for most authors: no rational integers.
Rational Numbers/Russell: accordingly, no rational real numbers. They are only "imitated" by the rational real numbers.
Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: for me, however, the rational numbers are real numbers. This is because I have constructed the real numbers according to Russell's version b) without using the name and the designation of rational numbers.
Therefore, I was able to retain name and designation for the rational real numbers

IX 181
Type Theory/TT/QuineVsRussell: in the present form our theory is too weak to prove some sentences of classical mathematics. E.g. proof that every limited class of real numbers has a least upper boundary (LUB).
IX 182
Suppose the real numbers were developed in Russell's theory similar to Section VI, however, attributes were now to take the place of classes and the alocation to attributes replaces the element relation to classes. LUB: (Capters 18, 19) of a limited class of real numbers: the class Uz or {x:Ey(x ε y ε z)}.
Attribute: in parallel, we might thus expect that the LUB of a limited attribute φ of real numbers in Russell's system is equal to the
Attribute Eψ(φψ u ψ^x).
Problem: under Russell's order doctrine is this LUB ψ is of a higher order than that of the real numbers ψ which fall under the attribute φ whose LUB is sought.
Boundary/LUB/QuineVsRussell: You need LUB for the entire classic technique of calculus, which is based on continuity. However, LUB have no value for these purposes if they are not available as values ​​of the same variables whose value range already includes those numbers whose upper boundary is wanted.
An upper boundary (i.e. LUB) of higher order cannot be the value of such variables, and thus misses its purpose.
Solution/Russell: Axiom of Reducibility:
Def Axiom of Reducibility/RA/Russell/Quine: every propositional function has the same extension as a certain predicative one. I.e.
Ey∀x(ψ!x φx), Eψ∀x∀y[ψ!(x,y) φ(x,y)], etc.
IX 184
VsConstruktivism/Construction/QuineVsRussell: we have seen Russell's constructivist approach to the real numbers fail (LUB, see above). He gave up on constructivism and took refuge in the RA.
IX 184/185
The way he gave it up had something perverse to it: Axiom of Reducibility/QuineVsRussell: the RA implies that all the distinctions that gave rise to its creation are superfluous! (... + ...)

IX 185
Propositional Function/PF/Attribute/Predicate/TT/QuineVsRussell: overlooked the following difference and its analogs: a) "propositional functions": as attributes (or intentional relations) and
b) proposition functions: as expressions, i.e. predicates (and open statements: e.g. "x is mortal") Accordingly:
a) attributes
b) open statements
As expressions they differ visibly in the order if the order is to be assessed on the basis of the indices of bound variables within the expression. For Russell everything is "AF".
Since Russell failed to distinguish between formula and object (word/object, mention/use), he did not remember the trick of allowing that an expression of higher order refers straight to an attribute or a relation of lower order.

X 95
Context Definition/Properties/Stage 2 Logic/Quine: if you prefer properties as sets, you can introduce quantification over properties, and then introduce quantification over sets through a schematic context definition. Russell: has taken this path.
Quine: but the definition has to ensure that the principle of extensionality applies to sets, but not to properties. That is precisely the difference.
Russell/QuineVsRussell: why did he want properties?
X 96
He did not notice at which point the unproblematic talk of predicates capsized to speaking about properties. ((s) object language/meta language/mention/use). Propositional Function/PF: Russell took it over from Frege.
QuineVsRussell: he sometimes used PF to refer to predicates, sometimes to properties.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Russell, B. Hintikka Vs Russell, B. II 165
On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for genuine constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of substitutivity of identity (SI) in intensional contexts.
Informative Identity/Frege: the fact that identity can even sometimes be informative is connected to this.
EG/Existential Generalization/Russell: it, too, may fail in in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms).
HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather circumvents the problems of denoting terms.
E.g. The bald king of France/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France.
HintikkaVsRussell: But there are also other problems. (see below for ambiguity of cross world identificaiton).
Description/Russell/Hintikka:
Def Primary Description: the substitutivity of identity applies to them (SI)
Def secondary description: for them, substitutivity of identity (SI) fails.
II 166
Existential Generalization/Russell: two readings: (1) George IV did not know whether Scott was the author of Waverley.
Description/Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: "the author of Waverley": (ix)A(x)
primarily: the description has the following power:
(2) (Ex)[A(x) & (y) A(y) > y = x) & ~ George IV knew that (Scott = x)].
((s) notation: quantifier here always normal existential quantifier, mirrored E).
I.e. the quantifier has the maximum range in the primary identification.
The second reading is more likely, however: Secondary:
(3) ~George IV knew that (Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x & (Scott = x)].
((s) narrow range):
Range/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is also a third option for the range of a quantifier ((s) >"medium range"/Kripke).
(4) ~(Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x ) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)].
II 166
Existential Generalization/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not see that there was a reason for the failure of the existential generalization, which is not caused by the non-existence of the object. E.g.
(5) George IV knew that the author of Waverley is the author of Waverley.
a) trivial interpretation:
I 167
(6) George IV knew that (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x)) everyday language translation: he knew that one and only one person wrote Waverley.
I 166
b) non-trivial interpretation: (7) (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x))).
((s) no quantifier after "knew that
everyday language translation: George knew of the only person who actually wrote Waverley, that they did.
Because knowledge implies truth, (7) is equivalent to
(8) (Ex) George IV knew that (Ez)(A(z) & (y)(A(y) > y = z) & x = z).
this is equivalent to.
(9) (Ex) George IV knew that (the author of Waverley = x)
Here, the description has secondary (narrow) range.
Everyday language translation: George knew who the author of Waverley is.
I 167
Knowledge/Who/What/Where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze structures of the form knows + W-sentence. General: (10) a knows, who (Ex x) is so that A(x)
becomes
(11) (Ex) a knows that A(x).
Hintikka: this is only possible if we modify Russell’s approach:
Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be attributed to non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed by Russell’s Theory of Descriptions (ThoD).
Problem: for every person, there are a lot of people whose names they know and of whose existence they know, but of who they do not know who they are.
II 168
E.g. Charles Dodgson was for Queen Victoria someone of whom she had heard, but whom she did not know. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10), the following applies.
(12) ~(Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x)
But that’s trivially false, even according to Russell.
Because the following is certainly true:
(13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson)
Existential Generalization/EG: then yields
(14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x)
So exactly the negation of (12) contradiction.
II 168
Descriptions/Hintikka: are not involved here. Therefore, Russell’s description theory cannot help here, either. E.g. we can also assume that Victoria knew of the existence of Dodgson.
Empty Terms/Empty Names: are therefore not the problem, either.
Ontology/Hintikka: so our problem gets an ontological aspect.
Existential Generalization/EG/Being/Quine/Ontology/Hintikka: the question of whether existential generalization may be applied on a singular term "b", E.g. in a context "F(b)", is the same as whether b may be value of a bound variable.
Existential Generalization/Hintikka: does not fail here because of non-existence.
II 169
We are dealing with the following problems here: Manifestation used by
a) no SI Frege, Russell
b) no EG
(i) due to non-existence Russell
(ii) because of ambiguity Hintikka
Ambiguity/Solution/Hintikka: possible worlds semantics.
E.g. (12) - (14) the problem is not that Dodgson did not exist in the actual world or not in one of Victoria’s worlds of knowledge, but that the name Dodgson singles out different individuals in different possible worlds.
Hence (14) does not follow from (13).
II 170
Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Clarity/Russell/Hintikka: Which way would have been open to Russell?. Knowing-Who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself very often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge, who did something with the existence of another individual, which is known to have done... + ...
II 173
Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: Important argument: an ingenious feature of Russell’s theory of denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers that denote! Theory of Denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") includes the reduction of descriptions to objects of acquaintance.
II 174
Hintikka: this relation is amazing, it also seems to be circular to allow only objects of acquaintance. Solution: We need to see what successfully denoting expressions (phrases) actually denote: they precisely denote objects of acquaintance.
Ambiguity/Clarity/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization.
Existential Generalization/Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: his own example shows that only objects of acquaintance are allowed: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is in fact a primary incident i.e. his example (2).
"Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "if" instead of "did not know". (secondary?).
Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed like this: that George wanted to know of the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott.
II 175
That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (in the distance) and had asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell select an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not usually deal with beings of flesh and blood whose identity is known to us, instead of only with objects of perception?.
Knowing Who/Knowing What/Perception Object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely with perception objects it seems as if the kind of clarity that we need for a knowing-who, is not just given.
Identifcation/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in my approach Dodgson is a bona fide individual iff. he is one and the same individual in all worlds of knowledge of Victoria. I.e. identifiable iff.
(15) (E.g.) in all relevant possible worlds it is true that (Dodgson = x).
Problem: What are the relevant possible worlds?.
II 178
Quantifier/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell systematically confuses two types of quantifiers. (a) of acquaintance, b) of description). Problem: Russell has not realized that the difference cannot be defined solely in terms of the actual world!.
Solution/Hintikka: we need a relativization to sets of possible worlds that change with the different propositional attitudes.
II 179
RussellVsHintikka: he would not have accepted my representation of his position like this. HintikkaVsRussell: but the reason for this merely lies in a further error of Russell’s: I have not attributed to him what he believed, but what he should have believed.
Quantification/Russell/Hintikka: he should have reduced to objects of acquaintance. Russell believed, however, it was sufficient to eliminate expressions that seemingly denote objects that are not such of acquaintance.
Important argument: in that his quantifiers do not enter any ontological commitment. Only denoting expressions do that.
Variable/Russell/Hintikka: are only notational patterns in Russell.
Ontological Commitment/Quine/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell did not recognize the ontological commitment that ​​1st order languages bring with them.
Being/Ontology/Quine: "Being means being value of a bound variable".
HintikkaVsRussell: he has realized that.
II 180
Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate merely seemingly denoting descriptions one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go over individuals that are identified by way of description. ((s) Object of the >Description). Otherwise, the real Bismarck would not be a permissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain species.
Problem: then these quantifiers may not be constituents of propositions, because their value ranges do not only consist of objects of acquaintance. Therefore, Russell’s mistake was twofold.
Quantifier/Variable/Russell/Hintikka, 1905, he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions.
Def Pseudo Variable/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable.
Acquaintance/Russell: values of the variable ​​should only be objects of acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell).
Quantifiers/HintikkaVsRussell: now we can see why Russell did not differentiate between different quantifiers (acquaintance/description): For him quantifiers were only notational patterns, and for them the range of possible interpretations need not be determined, therefore it makes no difference if the rage changes!.
Quantification/Russell: for him, it was implicitly objectional (referential), and in any event not substitutional.

Peacocke I 190
Possible Worlds/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: R. is unable to explain the cases in which we quantify in belief contexts (!) where (according to Hintikka) the quantifier over "publicly descriptively identified" particulars is sufficient. Hintikka: compares with a "roman à clef".
Peacocke: it is not clear that (whether) this could not be explained by Russell as cases of general ideas, so that the person with such and such characteristics is so and so.
Universals/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: we are familiar with universals and they are constituents of our thoughts.
HintikkaVsRussell: this is a desperate remedy to save the principle of acquaintance.
PeacockeVsRussell: his arguments are also very weak.
Russell: E.g. we cannot understand the transitivity of "before" if we are not acquainted with "before", and even less what it means that one thing is before another. While the judgment depends on a consciousness of a complex, whose analysis we do not understand if we do not understand the terms used.
I 191
PeacockeVsRussell: what kind of relationship should exist between subject and universal?. Solution: the reformulated PB: Here we can see to which conditions a term is subject, similar to the principle of sensitivity in relational givenness.
I 192
HintikkaVsRussell: ("On denoting what?", 1981, p.167 ff): the elimination of objects with which the subject is not familiar from the singular term position is not sufficient for the irreducibility of acquaintance that Russell had in mind. Quantification/Hintikka: the quantifiers will still reach over objects with which the subject is not familiar.
But such quantifiers cannot be constituents of propositions, if that is to be compatible with the PB. Because they would certainly occur through their value range Occur and these do not consist of particulars with which one is familiar.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Various Authors Lyons, J. Vs Various Authors Lyons I 169 / I 134
Grammar/Semantics/Congruence/Lyons: we called the expressions used for the characteristics e.g. "proper name" or "appellative" grammatically.
I 170
We have not yet abandoned the principle that such expressions, when they stand for word classes, are terms for distributional categories. N.B.: that leads us to semantics!
Classification: due to characteristics such as "animated" etc. this often contradicts the meaning of the words (see Chapter 7 below).
VsContent-Related Grammar/Lyons: this is the reason why most authors have withdrawn from "content-related grammar".
In a language description, the lexicon must contain both grammatical and semantic information for each word.
Lyon's thesis: there is often congruence between semantic and grammatical classification. There one can infer the grammatical information partly from the word meaning.

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977

Lyons I
John Lyons
Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995
Various Authors Lesniewski Vs Various Authors Simons I 102
LesniewskiVsClasses/LesniewskiVsSet Theory/MereologyVsSet Theory: can be eliminated by reformulation. Instead of "a is an element of the class of bs": simply "a is a b", ontologically: "a ε b". If the term e.g. "the class of teaspoons" is not so eliminable, then it can only stand for a simple sum. But as a sum it can be described differently, especially as the sum of all objects, which consists only of teaspoons and non-detached teaspoon parts.
(> Gavagai).
N.B.: because it consists exclusively of teaspoons and their parts, (it is a fusion of the teaspoons) it contains itself as an element.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Wittgenstein Goodman Vs Wittgenstein Wittgenstein I 295
Image/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: second meaning of image: "not similar, but that it is an image of something consists in the intention". (Lecture 26).
I 296
Large typescript: here, the comparison with genre paintings is used to understand the nature of sentences to which the verification concept cannot be applied: (E.g. novels). Such sentences correspond to historic paintings or portraits: isomorphic structure like the possible fact that would make it true. (GoodmanVsWittgenstein, E.g. Constable) ((s)> Cresswell).
I 297
The image conception does not only apply after the reference objects are allocated, but also regardless of the manner in which the objects are determined for a sentence, even if these simple components do not stand for specific entities. Early: the relationships between name and object do not require any action on the side of the speakers and can therefore be understood once and for all without further ado.
late: this Wittgenstein overthrows this early conception once he introduces language games.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Wright, Cr. Field Vs Wright, Cr. I 23
Mathematics/Indeterminacytainty/Arbitrariness/Crispin Wright: (1983): Benacerraf’s paper creates indeterminacy not a particular problem for mathematics: Benacerraf: "nothing in our use of numerical singular terms is sufficient to specify which, if any, quantities they are.
WrightVsBenacerraf: this is also valid for the singular terms that represent the quantities themselves! And according to Quine also for singular terms that stand for rabbits!
FieldVsWright: this goes past Benacerraf’s argument. It is aimed more against an anti-platonist argument: that we should be skeptical of numbers, because if we assume that they do not exist, then it seems to be impossible to explain how we refer to them or have beliefs about them.
According to Benacerraf’s argument our practice is sufficient to ensure that the entities to which we apply the word "number" form a  sequence of distinct objects under the relation that we call "‹" (less-than relation). But that’s all. But perhaps our use does not even determine this. Perhaps they only form a sequence that fulfills our best axiomatic first level theory of ω-sequences. I.e. everything that is determined by the use would be a non-standard model of such a theory. And that would then also apply for quantities. Wright/(s): Thesis: Our standard use is not sufficient for determining the mathematical entities. (FieldVsWright). I 24 VsWright: but that this would apply for rabbits is more controversial. A bad argument against it would be a causal theory of knowledge (through perception).

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
ens sukzessivum Chisholm, R. Simons I 195
stand for / entia sukzessiva / Chisholm: Thesis: to stand for somtething is no relation of a unit to its parts.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Relation Theory Horwich, P. Field II 71
Intentionality/Belief/Brentano/Horwich/FieldVsHorwich: (Horwich (1998)) shows how the problem can be missed even further: Thesis: According to him "means" and "believes" stand for real relations between persons and propositions. Horwich: but there is no reason to assume that a physicalistic approach receives this relational status:
Def False conclusion of constitution/Horwich/Field: the (false) assumption that what constitutes relational facts must itself be relational.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Names Kripke, S.A. I 70
I will defend the thesis that names are always rigid designation expressions.
II 23
Name / causal theory / Kripke (1972): "Naming and Necessity".   Thesis: name stand for an object, but have no meaning. (Mill ditto).
Behavior Locke, J. Avramides I 139
Behavior / thinking / language / Locke: behavior is linked only contingently with thoughts - AvramidesVs: Problem: what should then behavior have to do with spirit - (Vs "objective mind") - when words stand for ideas, the behavior is irrelevant. - physicalism: takes behavior to be as unimportant as idealism.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989