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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Association | Deacon | I 96 Associations/Deacon: a) Index-like level/character-like: (correlation stimulus/response, noise/object, signal/object): here there are competing sets of overlapping associative relations. These are translated into mutually reinforcing semantic categories at the higher, symbolic level. b) Symbolic level: here there are relations between the symbols which do not exist at the level of the index-like relations: e.g. categories of meaning, syntactic differences, etc. At this level the stimuli do not compete with each other as they do at the character-like level. >Symbols/Deacon. This explains why, for example, animals that have reached the symbolic level learn faster. The novel associations between characters (not only between a character and an object) lead to a network with two predominant types of association: a) one opposite many b) many opposite one. >Symbolic Reference/Deacon; >Symbolic Learning/Deacon; >Icon/Deacon; >Learning/Deacon. I 97 Memory/Deacon: each character-like association (stimulus/response) is now supported at the symbolic level by a large number of other character-like associations, because they are all encoded in memory in various ways. >Memory. Together, they are much more protected against erasure because the external relations to objects are now relatively less important. Associative learning/Deacon: this explains why we are learning relatively easy a large amount of words. Brain: stores and finds character-like and symbolically associated information in the same way. This is shown by experiments with electrical stimuli, which were set at the same time as the occurrence of words. I 98 Animal: Experiments with monkeys (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1978(1);1980(2) and Savage-Rumbaugh 1986(3)) showed that new vocabulary was learned more quickly if the animals were able to have symbolic associations. We can call that the symbolic threshold. >Animals, >Animal language. I 266 Associations/language/Deacon: the recursive embedding of partial sentences creates in an economic way a hierarchy of associations. I 267 In the brain, the operations for organizing these combinatorial relations are located in the prefrontal cortex. >Brain/Deacon. I 277 Language/Brain: In humans, the cerebellum is probably much more involved in the analysis of sounds. This can be very important for the formation of word associations. The cerebellum is very fast in the formation of predictions. Linking to the cerebellum is, for example, beneficial for fast conjugations that are used in the formation of sentences. >Language/Deacon. 1. Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1978). Symbolization, language and chimpanzees: A theoretcal reevaluation based on initial language acquisition processes in four young Pan troglodytes. Brain and Language 6, 265. 2. Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1980). Reference: The linguistic essential. Science 210. 922-925. 3. Savage-Rumbaugh (1986). Ape Language: From Conditioned Response to Symbol. New York: Columbia University Press. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Behaviorism | Searle | I 57 LewisVsBehaviorism: behaviorismus consideres non-causal relationships. I 77 Beliefs and desires/Searle: beliefs and desires do not need to be postulated, they will be experienced consciously and not be in question. >Belief, >Wishes. I 48 ff Methodological behaviorism: psychology: encompases stimulus/response. >Stimulus/Reaction. Logical Behaviorism (Ryle, Hempel): only encompasses behavior. >Behavior/Ryle, >Behavior, >Hempel. SearleVsBehaviorism: the disposition is unclear. Circles: belief is only explainable by wishes and vice versa. Super SpartansVsBehaviorism. >SearleVsBehaviorism. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Innateness | Davidson | I 10 Stimulus/Response/Learning/Davidson: Thesis: if some selection mechanisms were not innate nothing could be learned. I (a) 14 If someone has thoughts about the reactions of his teacher, there must be another, second sentient living being whose innate similarity reactions are sufficiently similar to his own to provide an answer to the question of what stimulus this someone is actually responding to. >Similarity, >Stimuli. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Learning | Deacon | I 48 Learning/Deacon: Learning always takes place in a special context, involving certain senses and motor actions. It is more than strengthening associations in memory. >Associations, >Memory, >Context. Learning requires that we find out what is relevant and how the relevant variables are related. It requires filtering and organizing what we have already learned. >Knowledge, >Prior knowledge. I 50 Language acquisition: what prevents other species from learning a language? Is symbolic reference counter-intuitive? Does it require animals to see things in a radically different way than they are capable of seeing? Animals don not know what it is all about, even when confronted with simple forms of language. >Symbolic reference, >Language acquisition, >Reference, >Animals, >Animal language. I 83 Learning/Language Acquisition/Symbolic Learning/Deacon: Learning symbols is different from learning signs. While signs are about the projection of previously learned connections between object and sign into the future, this projection into the future is much more difficult in the case of symbols. >Signs/Deacon, >Symbols/Deacon. Symbolic learning: Symbols form a complex system among themselves, which in turn must be recognized, understood and learned. A special feature is that words with a similar meaning are not used together, but alternatively. At the same time, words with very different meanings tend to appear together. >Word meaning, >Language, >Language use. Language acquisition: further problem: Sentences are seldom repeated exactly. The occurrence of a certain combination often happens only once. Index-based learning/stimulus/response: Index-based learning (from the common appearance of object and sign) is therefore extremely unsuitable in the case of symbol systems (languages). >Indexikality. I 98 Learning/Deacon: it is helpful when the number of word types increases to create a richer network of relations between symbols. This makes it easier to learn new vocabulary. Slots/Deacon: Thesis: New logical groups of words open new slots that can be filled. ((s) Slots/(s): are understood here as positions in sentences that can be filled with certain types of words.). Vocabulary: newly appearing slots must be quickly filled with new vocabulary. >Vocabulary. I 99 Animal experiments: (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1978(1);1980(2) and Savage-Rumbaugh 1986(3)) showed that no new correlations (sign/object) had to be learned if the classification in semantic categories was available. I 338 Learning/adaptation/evolution/brain/Deacon: a disposition for learning specific things can be the consequence of a genetic assimilation, if constant conditions are given as well as an invariance of neuronal circuits beyond individuals. How can specific learning disposition be represented in the brain? The ability to learn is not a general function that is independent of the type of learner. It is completely different for learning signs that stand isolated for one thing than, for example, for learning symbols that are in turn founded in systems. Learning dispositions/Deacon: are both: result and cause of Baldwin's evolution (Baldwin effect). >Evolution/Deacon. 1. Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1978). Symbolization, language and chimpanzees: A theoretcal reevaluation based on initial language acquisition processes in four young Pan troglodytes. Brain and Language 6, 265. 2. Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1980). Reference: The linguistic essential. Science 210. 922-925. 3. Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. (1986). Animal intelligence. Ape language: From conditioned response to symbol. Columbia University Press. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Stimuli | Pinker | I 196 Stimulus/response/Pinker: reflexes in humans need much longer than, say, in insects. That is, that any thought processes take place. >Thinking, >Spirit, >Mind, >Memory, >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Problem solving, >General Problem Solver, >Cognition, >Information processing, >Symbol processing. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Stimuli | Quine | I 66/67 Stimulus: here it is about stimuli, not rabbits! - (See also problems in relation to >forgery). - Verification by society. >Gavagai. I 67 Stimulus meaning: preliminary isolation of individual sentences for verification. VsCarnap: Advantage: distinction between the cases of unicorn and goblin is possible without preliminary decision on admissibility. >Stimulus meaning. I 81 Stimulus meaning: objective reality that the linguist needs. - Translation, not identity but approaching stimulus meaning. >Translation. I 120f Consistent sentences: stimulus meaning is more sparse - accordingly: stimulus synonymy less plumable. >VsAnalyticity. I 126 Stimulus synonymy improved by socialization (agreement) - same goes for stimulus analyticity: But now: 2 + 2 = 4 on the same level as "There are black dogs" (>acceptability). I 379 Stimuli are not intensional. I 402 Existence: does not arise from the dichotomy individual thing-universal - it does not matter whether it exists. Equator, North Pole. Linking with stimuli is a weak argument for primacy of physical objects, but makes terms accessible for all positions. --- II 57 QuineVsSensory qualities - people speak and do not think about their stimuli. - It is about stimulus and response. --- V 48f Stimulus/Response/Quine: this (polar) contradiction is mitigated by the notion of perception similarity. V 49 Truth similarity: includes auditory similarity of words. Truth similarity: analysis ignores the different origins - stimulus reaction analysis does not. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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