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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Subjective Probability | Schurz | I 99 Def Objective probability/Schurz: the probability of an event type (e.g. Fx) is the relative frequency of its occurrence or the limit value of its relative frequency in the long run. Notation p(-) resp. p(Fx) Def Subjective probability /Schurz: the probability of a certain event or fact (e.g. Fa) is the rational degree of belief in the occurrence of an event by a given subject or all subjects of a rationality type, Notation: w(-) or w(Fa). >Probability/Schurz. I 111 Subjective probability: Pointe: Example coin toss: deviates from the objective probability! If more often number comes, one must assume that the coin is asymmetrical! This assumption is not expressible in the objective probability at all. I 115 Probability theory/Schurz: problems: (b) subjective probability: justification problems. On what grounds should rational degrees of belief satisfy Kolmogorov axioms? What role should degrees of belief play in the goal of finding real truths? Solution/Ramsey/de Finetti: Bet. Bet/Betting Quotient/Ramsey/Schurz: thesis fair betting quotients of a person satisfy Kolmogorov Axioms A1 - A3 exactly if they are coherent, i.e. that there is no system where total loss is possible. VsRamsey/Schurz: A bet is not yet a rational behavior in the sense of a search for truth! They are not truth-seeking, because the definition of the fair betting ratio refers only to the subjective degrees of belief, not to objective probability. The real frequency of success is not touched at all. Ex Suppose a subjectivist enthusiastically accepts a bet, of 1 : 1, that he will roll a six. He is fair if he is also willing to accept the opposite bet, 1 : 1 that he will not roll a six. Problem: he remains coherent and fair even if he has lost his entire fortune. He will only be surprised that no one will accept the counter bets he assumes to be fair. He cannot explain it as long as he is not allowed to consider the objective frequencies. This shows that the axioms A1 - A3 are at best a minimal condition. But this is too weak to exclude irrational behavior. I 115 Principal Principle/PP/Statistics/Schurz: the subjective probabilities, if the objective probabilities are known, must be consistent with them. Lewis: (1980)(1): singular PP: subjectivist. Here "objective" singular propensities are simply postulated. >Propensities. SchurzVsPropensity/SchurzVsPopper: it remains unclear what property a singular propensity should correspond to in the first place. Solution/de Finetti: one can also accept the objective notion of probability at the same time. Conditionalization/Statistics/Schurz: on an arbitrary experience datum E(b1...bn) over other individuals b1,..bn is important to derive two further versions of PP: 1. PP for random samples, which is needed for the subjective justification of the statistical likelihood intuition. 2. the conditional PP, for the principle of the closest reference class and subject to the inductive statistical specialization inference. >Probability theory. 1. Lewis, D. (1980). "A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance". In: Jeffrey, R.C. (ed.)(1980), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Vol 2, Berkeley: University of California Press. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Antireductionism | Lewis Vs Antireductionism | Schwarz I 216 Possible Worlds/poss.w./meaning/conditional theory/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. objects can only be a possible world if there is a corresponding object for each mode a world could be. This is why possible worlds cannot be sets of common sentences since there is not enough of them. ((s) >Language has not enough sentences to express all the possibilities.) >Ersatz Worlds as sets of sentences. Possible World/LewisVsAnti-Reductionism/Schwarz: interestingly, he is also using the same argument against anti-reductionist theories for which possible worlds are basic metaphysical facts. The name "possible world in which donkeys are able to talk" can only be given to an object if it somehow represents talking donkeys. Schwarz I 217 Possible World/representation/Lewis/Schwarz: for Lewis, possible worlds are nothing else than 1:1 models. How can this work for irreducible abstract entities? This is why it remains open whether proposed candidates actually could be possible worlds (1986e, 184)(1). Problem: some basic entities do not fulfill those conditions (if reduction failed). Not even in Laws of Nature (LoN) and objective probabilities. Objective probability is characterized by the Principal Principle and therefore implies subjective probability. But why should I assume that an event is going to happen only because I learn that an irreducible element, which is logically independent from the event happening, possesses the value 0.9 (1994a,239)(2)?. This is why something should not be called "chance". Reference/Lewis: reference therefore represents a sort of theory of definite description of the reference. Thesis: terms such as "possible world", "meaning", "pain", "objective probability" are associated with roles which describe what they refer to. How those roles are defined is explained by Lewis in "How to define theoretical terms" (1970c)(3). >Theoretical Terms. 1. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 2. D. Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 3. D. Lewis [1970c]: “How to Define Theoretical Terms”. Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Bayesianism | Fraassen Vs Bayesianism | I 22 Bayes/Bayesians/Fraassen: typical for them is that they assume an "initial probability" (here: in a)). More traditional approaches only assume b). But that also requires H and H’ to provide certain probability. Important argument: if H’ is merely the negation of H, this is usually not the case! E.g. H says that the probability of E is ¾. Then the negation non-H says that it is a number other than ¾. But normally, it will not even contain this, because H will include other things as well. Solution/Bayesians: solve this problem of the "unattainability of probability" by assuming that everyone has a subjective probability (degree of belief) for any proposition they can formulate. In that case, all probabilities for E, H and H’ are attainable. The price for this is that they subjectivize all probabilities. FraassenVsBayes: they do not subjectivize all probabilities! I do not believe that the realism of subjective probability wants to be dependent on the existence of unobservable entities. I 36 Bayes/Putnam: Rationality requires that if two hypotheses have the same verifiable consequences, we should not accept the one that is a priori less plausible. But how do we obtain the a priori order? We obtain it ourselves, either as individuals or as a community: Plausibility/Accept/Theory/Hypotheses/Bayes: is neither an empirical judgment nor the assertion of a theorem of deductive logic, but a methodological cause. According to that, Rutherford and Vaihinger or Putnam and Duhem differ with respect to the a-priori implausibility. (of electrons or demons). FraassenVsBayes: This is supposed to be the position of any rational human? How disappointing! But that will not do. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Field, H. | Schiffer Vs Field, H. | I 105 SchifferVsField: wrong is his suggestion: physical relations as an explanation for the reference relation would also cover relations to things of which they are not true. (E.g. >"Arthritis"/"shmarthritis", E.g. >Addition/Quaddition. - FieldVsPhysicalism). Conclusion: no functional relation, which operates without disquotation scheme will be appropriate for the "true-of" relation. ((s) Anyway not the relation, but the theory works, if at all with the disquotation scheme.). I 109 Def Conceptual Role/c.r./Field: (Field 1977): the subjective conditional probability-function of an agent Two mental representations S1 and S2 have the same cr for one person, iff. their (the person’s) subjective conditional prblty-function is so that s for any mental representation, given the subjective probability of s1 s is the same as that of s2 where s. SchifferVsField: This is of little use, because not two people have the same conditional probability function. But Field is anyway pessimistic with respect to a precise concept of intersubjective sameness of mental content that goes beyond sameness of referential significance. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Grice, P.H. | Jackson Vs Grice, P.H. | Lewis V 153 Implicature/Conversational Implicature/Grice/Lewis: E.g. "This time you are right" Implicature: "Otherwise you are usually wrong." Conventional Implicature/Jackson: E.g. "She votes liberal, but she's not an idiot" - "Most liberals are idiots". Conditional/Grice/Lewis: if P(A>C) is high mainly because P(A) is low (E.g. falso quodlibet), then what sense does it make to say "If A, then B"? Why should you not say the stronger one: that it is almost as likely non-A?. JacksonVsGrice/JacksonVsLewis: we often assert things that are much weaker than we could actually assert, and for good reason. Hereby I suppose this that your belief system is similar to mine, but not identical. E.g. Assuming you know something that strikes me as highly unlikely today, but I still want to say something useful. So I say something weaker, so that you can definitely take my word. Def Robust/Jackson/Lewis: A is robust relative to B (in terms of one's subjective probability at a time), iff. the probability of A and probability of A conditional to B are close to each other and are both high. V 154 so that if one learns that B, they still consider A probable. Jackson: the weaker thing can then be more robust with respect to something that you think is more unlikely, but that you do not want to ignore. If it is now useless, the to say weaker thing, how useless is it then to say the weaker thing and the stronger thing together! And yet we do it! E.g. Lewis: "Bruce sleeps in the clothes chest, or elsewhere on the ground floor". Jackson: Explanation: it makes sense to assert the stronger thing, and just as much sense to assert the more robust thing. If they differ, we assert both. Robustness/Indicative Conditional/IC/Lewis: an IC is a truth functional conditional, that conventionally implies robustness (convention implicature) with respect to the antecedent. Therefore, the probabilities P(A>C) and P(A>C) must both be high. That is the reason why the BH of the IC comes with the corresponding conditional probability. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Lewis, D. | Jackson Vs Lewis, D. | V 152 Indicative Conditional/IC/JacksonVsLewis: better theory (Lewis pro): both theories have the following in common: 1) The IC has the truth conditions of the truth-functional conditional A>C. 2) nevertheless, assertibility goes with the conditional subjective probability 3) there is a discrepancy between truth and assertibility-preserving inferences involving indicative conditionals. V 152/153 4) our intuition about valid inference with conditionals may be applied to the conditionals, but are also meager evidence of validity. 5) The discrepancy between the assertibility of P(C I A) and the probability of the truth of P(A > C) is due to one or the other Gricean implicature. 6) The right approach to do this implicature must depart from the premise that the conditional has the truth conditions of the (truth-functional) A ⊃ C . V 154 Lewis Thesis: "Assert the stronger" theory for conditional probability. Jackson Thesis: "Implicature of robustness": theory for conditional probability. Pro: JacksonVsLewis: E.g. "Fred will not study and even if he does, he will fail." If (according to Lewis) the conditional is only assertible if the antecedent cannot be denied, how can it be that yet both are asserted together? Explanation: the antecedent is added because of the robustness. Even if you believe that I am mistaken in thinking that Fred does not study, you can still believe like me that he will fail. Lewis pro. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 |
| Ramsey, F. P. | Schurz Vs Ramsey, F. P. | I 114 Probability Theory/Schurz: Problems: b) subjective probability: justification problems. For what reasons should rational degrees of belief fulfill the Kolmogorov axioms? What role should degrees of belief play for the goal of finding real truths? Solution/Ramsey/de Finetti: Bet. Bet/Bet Odds/Ramsey/Schurz: Thesis: fair odds of a person fulfill the Kolmogorov axioms A1 - A3 exactly when they are coherent, i.e. there is no system where a total loss is possible. VsRamsey/Vs Bet/Schurz: a bet is not a rational behaviour in the sense of a search for truth! They are not truth-oriented, because the definition of the fair odds only refers to the subjective degrees of belief, not to objective probability. The real frequency of success is not touched at all. For example, suppose a subjectivist enthusiastically accepts a bet of 1 : 1 that he rolls a six. He is fair if he is willing to accept the opposite bet, 1:1 that he does not roll a six. Problem: he remains coherent and fair even if he has lost all his fortune. He will only be surprised that no one will accept the counter bets he has accepted as fair. He cannot explain it as long as he is not allowed to consider the objective frequencies. This shows that the axioms A1 - A3 are at best a minimum condition. But this is too weak to exclude irrational behaviour. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Conditional | Adams, R. | Lewis V 133 Indicative Conditional/Probability/Adams (1965): Thesis: Here, assertibility rather seems to be linked with the conditional (contingent) subjective probability of the consequent when the antecedent is given. Lewis: Adams convinced me: Thesis: The indicative conditional A -> C is closely associated with the subjective probability P (C I A). But why? Why not rather the absolute probability P(A ->C)? Explanation: ultimately, assertibility is indeed linked to absolute probability, indicative conditionals are no exception to this. But precisely the same way also P (C I A) is possible, because the meaning of "->" is to guarantee that P(A -> C) and P(C I A) are always the equal (if the latter is defined). Short: Probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities. |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Conceptual Role | Field, Hartry | Fod / Lep IV 180 conceptual role / Field / Fodor / Lepore: In a much-publicized paper Hartry Field has equated the conceptual role with subjective probability. (Logic,Meaning and conceptual role) |
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| Assertibility | Grice, P.H. | Lewis V 142 Assertibility / probability / Grice / Lewis: luckily there is a more conservative theory: Grice (1967) makes an elegant statement of some qualitative rules that govern the assertibility of an indicative conditional: (exactly as we want it: the ass. goes with the subjective probability): Grice thesis incidative conditionals do have truth values. The incidative conditional A> C is in fact the truth value of the truth-functional conditional A > C (horseshoe). |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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