Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 51 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Animals Davidson V 130
Animal/Thinking/Beliefs/Davidson: Thinking is possible not without language, because it must be possible to think of the same thing and to discover error, belief about belief - different living beings need to share the same concept of truth. - (Baseline of triangulation). >Triangulation.
V 136
Thinking/Language/Animal/Davidson: The lack of language makes thought impossible in animals - SearleVsDavidson: we know that human children have consciousness long before they have language. >Animal language, >thinking without language.
V 139
Animal/Propositional Attitude/Thinking/Davidson: E.g. the dog believes his master is at home, but not that the bank manager is at home, even though they are the same person - Searle: according to this argument, there is no intentional state without a certain fact that coresponded to its propositional content - SearleVsDavidson: we do not need language to recognize an incorrect belief. >Gavagai.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Animals Dupré I 315
Animal/Speech/Thinking/Dupré: it is not quite correct to speak of "pets", it is rather a coevolution of humans and other species that live for a long time in a symbiotic relationship. "Domestication" and "socialization" is something quite different. >Animals, >Animal language, >Evolution.
I 316
Animal/Communication/Intention/Dupré: an important criterion for intended communication is the possibility of deception. >Communication, >Delusion.
I 318
Animal/Thinking/Language/Descartes/Dupré: even those who defend the cognitive abilities of the animals most, often accept the Cartesian assumption that it is in principle impossible to prove the thinking or even the consciousness of animals because this would be conceptually dependent on behavior. >Behavior, >Language, >Thinking without language, >Language and thinking, >Gestures,
>Understanding.
I 319
DupréVsDavidson: if Davidson were right, the question at stake would not only be whether or not one can teach monkeys, but whether to teach them to think. >Animals/Davidson, >Language/Davidson, >Thinking/Davidson.
I 320
Animal ethics/Dupré: animal ethics does not depend in any way on the success of the project, to teach animals to speak. >Ethics.
I 321
Language/Thinking/Dupré: there are many forms of non-verbal behavior that allow communication, and many non-verbal manifestations of thinking. Animal/Dupré: the research of the language with monkeys can tell us much about monkeys and ourselves, which we cannot learn in a different way.


John Dupré, 1991. "Conversation with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of language". In: Investigating Psychology, Science of Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (ed.) London, New York: Routledge

Dupré I
John Dupré
"Conversations with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of Language", in: Investigating Psychology. Sciences of the Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (Ed) London/New York 1991, pp. 95-116
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Animals Mayr I 309
Language/Animals/Mayr: There is no language among animals. Their communication systems consist in the exchange of signals. There are no syntax and grammar. >Animal language, >Thinking without language, >Language,
>Communication, >Signals, >Signal language, >Syntax, >Grammar.
I 311
Mind: conceptual confusion: false limitation to the mental activities of the human. >Mind, >Thinking.
Animal/Mind: it has been shown that there is no categorial difference between the mental activities of certain animals (elephants, dogs, whales, primates, parrots) and those of humans.
I 312
Consciousness/Animal: the same applies to the consciousness, a basic version of which is even to be found in invertebrates and possibly protozoa. Mind/Mayr: there was simply no sudden emergence of the mind.
>Consciousness, >Emergence.

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998

Animals Papineau I 254
Thinking/Knowledge/Animal/Papineau: Levels: Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau:
Level 0: "Monomats": Tue V
Level 1: "Opportunists": If B, do V
I 248
Level 2: "people in need": If B and T, do V Level 3: "Voter": If B1 and T1, do V1, IF T1 is the dominant need
A comparative mechanism is needed here.
Level 4: "Learners": AFTER experience has shown that B1, T1, and V1 result in a reward, then ... (like 3).
Level 0: 4 apply to simple creatures. Nowhere is general information of the form "all A's or B's" or generic, causal information "A's cause B's"
I 255
Or even conditionals about present circumstances, "If A occurs, B will also occur." >Generality/Papineau, >Animals, >Animal language, >Thinking without language, >World/thinking.

Papineau I
David Papineau
"The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Papineau II
David Papineau
The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Papineau III
D. Papineau
Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004

Attribution Peacocke Avramides I 92
Beliefs/Desires/Attributions/Radical Interpretation/Peacocke/Avramidis: Suppose we could attribute beliefs and desires before the knowledge of the language. In this case, simultaneous attribution of propositional attitudes would still be necessary.
>Propositional attitudes, >Thinking without language, >Desires,
>Beliefs.
But not particular propositional attitudes before language.
>Language, >Understanding, >Language use.
PeacockeVs "actual language relation": this supposedly needs no semantic vocabulary.
>Reference, cf. >Primitive reference, >Semantics.
Peacocke later: Gricean intentions cannot be used as evidence for radical interpretation, but that's not VsGrice.
>Intentions/Grice, >P. Grice.

Peacocke I 78f
Propositional Attitudes/Attribution/Peacocke: Problem: instead of one set of propositional attitudes another can also be attributed. Solution/Peacocke: Relation of Closeness/Narrowness.
E.g. someone who rearranges something on the table usually does not respond to the compass direction. - The concepts may then have different expressiveness.
Important point: if it is a rotating table, the space-relative concepts can change while the table-relative ones remain constant.
((s) The concepts do not change, but their truth values.)
More expressive: the space-relative concepts. - Problem: if they are used here, there may be an explanatory gap.
>narrow concepts.
I 83
We should not attribute any wider concepts if there more narrow ones are available. >Narrow/wide.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976


Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Beliefs Avramides I 122
Concept/Instantiation/Davidson: a concept can be instantiated. (Realize, E.g. swimming) without having the concept. Davidson: but not with convictions.
>Instantiation.
I 122f
Conviction/Belief/Davidson: Condition: Awareness of the distinction subjective/objective (because of the necessary ability to be surprised). >Subjectivity, >Objectivity.
I 123
Bennett/AvramidesVsDavidson: in animals there is also learning ability (= distinction subjective/objective) instead of language ability. >Animals.
DavidsonVsVs: this is about properties of concepts, not beings.
Davidson: per conceptual symmetry between the semantic and the psychological.
Therefore, there is no thinking without language.
>Thinking without language.
I125
Reductionism/Antireductionism/Avramides: both are not separated by the dispute over ontological asymmetry, both could accept ontological symmetry like asymmetry. - It is really about deep epistemic asymmetry. >Terminology/Avramides.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Brain/Brain State Mayr I 112
Brain/Mayr: the human brain acquired its still existing skills about 100,000 years ago. All the achievements we are looking back at today were made with a brain that was not developed for them by the selection!
Three brain regions:
1) For reflexes ("closed programs").
2) Information intake ("open programs"): languages, norms, behavior.
What was once learned is difficult to forget; "simple coinage".
3) Regions are not yet defined; "memory", "storage".
I 309
Brain/Evolution/Mayr: Australopithecus: 400-500 cm³ ((like a anthroid ape) Homo erectus 750-1250 significantly larger brains only in the last 150,000 years. Language/Animals/Mayr: There is no language among animals. Their communication systems consist in the exchange of signals. There are no syntax and grammar.
>Animals, >Animal language, >Signals, >Signal language,
>Grammar, >Syntax.
I 310
Language/brain: could the absence of language be a reason why the Neandertals did not exploit their brain better? Language: evolved from about 300,000 - 200,000 years ago in small groups of hunters and collectors due to a selection advantage. Good location for brain enlargement.
>Language, >Language evolution, >Thinking without language.
I 311
Brain: a factor that led to a halt in brain development was perhaps the enlargement of the group. In larger groups, the reproductive superiority of a better-equipped leader is lower, while those with smaller brains enjoy better protection, longer life and greater reproductive success.
Stagnation: social integration of people contributed enormously to the evolution of culture, but may have initiated a period of stagnation in the evolution of the genome.
>Evolution.
Mind: conceptual confusion: false limitation to the mental activities of humans.
>Mind, >Thinking, >Humans, >Intentionality, >Action.
Animal/Mind: it has been shown that there is no categorial difference between the mental activities of certain animals (elephants, dogs, whales, primates, parrots) and those of humans.
>Animals, >Animal language.
I 312
Consciousness/Animal: the same applies to the consciousness, a basic version of which is even to be found in invertebrates and possibly protozoa. >Consciousness.
Mind/Mayr: there was simply no sudden emergence of the mind.
>Emergence.

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998

Cognition Papineau I 273
Cognition/space/spatial orientation/content/animal/Papineau: Many birds and insects do not have egocentric maps of their environments. Nevertheless, this is not necessary purpose-means-thinking. It depends on how they use these maps! >Map example, >Animals/Papineau, >Thinking without language, >World/thinking, >Thinking.
For example, they might just simply draw a straight line from their respective position to the destination, which would not be purpose-means-thinking.
For example, it would be purpose-means-thinking if they were to use cognition to imagine a continuous path, which avoids all obstacles, from their initial position within the non-egocentric map, and then decide to take this path. This would be a combination of causal individual information.
>Purposes/Papineau.

Papineau I
David Papineau
"The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Papineau II
David Papineau
The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Papineau III
D. Papineau
Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004

Concepts Dennett II 13
Criteria/Recognition/Dennett: E.g. An animal is confused. Question: "what is the conceptual content of it being confused?"
II 57
Concepts/thinking//animal/Dennett: can dogs think? Problem: a thought must consist of certain terms.
II 58
Question of the description, resp. the formulation: Example A bowl with meat, a bucket with food, "the tasty stuff that tastes like this and like that"... Translation/Ascription: could we e.g. in English, express exactly the thought that the dog thinks?
II 59
If not, then dogs can either not think at all, or their thoughts cannot be expressed at all, and so they lie outside our horizon. >Thinking without language, >Language and Thought, >Animal language.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Consciousness Adorno Grenz I 213
Consciousness/Heidegger/AdornoVsHeidegger/Grenz: Heidegger, according to Adorno, tries to access a level of consciousness that was not even one in which the language (...) had not yet acquired imagery. >Language, >Language and thought, >Thinking without language,
>World/thinking, >Reality, >M. Heidegger, >Being/Heidegger.

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974


A X
Friedemann Grenz
Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984
Consciousness Dennett Rorty VI 161
Consciousness/Dennett: it is an illusion to believe that consciousness is the exception to the rule that everything can be explained by its relations to other things. It is no exception.
Dennett I 534
Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way that we cannot even imagine today.
Dennett II 23ff
Language/Animal/Consciousness/Dennett: since there is no limit to consciousness (with or without speech), since it has gradually emerged, the question which animals have consciousness is undecidable - "a matter of style" - consciousness is not the same as thinking! Dennett: no thought works without language but consciousness does work without thinking. >Thinking without language.
Rosenthal I 430
Consciousness/Dennett: not even for the first person it is always clear what conscious is and what it is not - e.g. becoming aware of the inventory of a room - E.g. wallpaper pattern: Completion by judgment, is not sensory!
Metzinger I 475
Consciousness/Dennett: consciousness is like a simulation of the world. It relates to the brain as flight simulations relate to the processes in the computer.
Metzinger I 555
Consciousness/Dennett: 1) cultural construction - 2) you cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness - BlockVsDennett: Incorrect fusion of p-consciousness and a-consciousness. (phenonmenal consciousness and access-consciousness). >Consciousness/Block.
Chalmers I 113
Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmer: Dennett (1978c)(1) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,
I 114
control unit and module for "public relations": for the implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.
Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991)(2) without a central "headquarter".
ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.
Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a(3), p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3)
Cognitive Models/Chalmers: there are also models by Churchland, (1995)(4), Johnson-Laird (1988)(5), Shallice (1972(6), 1988a(7), 1988b(8)). ChalmersVs: my criticism VsDennett from above applies to all.
Chalmers I 229
Consciousness/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett 1993b)(9) Consciousness is what stands out in the brain processes. ("Cerebral celebrity"). Such content is conscious that fix resources themselves and monopolize them. (P. 929). Chalmers: that is close to my approach, only that I speak of potential standing out, it must only be possible that a content can play this role.


1. Dennett, D. Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. In: D. Dennett, Brainsorms, Cabridge 1978.
2. Dennett, D. Consciousness explained. Little, Brown and Co., Boston 1991
3. Dennett, D. Back from the drawing board. In: B. Dahlbom (Ed) Dennett and His Critics, Oxford 1993.
4. Churchland, P. M. The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. Cambridge 1995.
5. Johnson-Laird, P. A computational analysis of consciousness. Cognition and Brain Theory 6, 1983: pp. 499-508
6. Shallice, T., Dual funtions of consciousness. Psychological Review 79, 1972: pp. 383-93; Information-precessing models of consciousness: Possibilities and problems. In: A. Marcel and E. Bisach (Eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford 1988.
7. Shallice, T. Information-precessing models of consciousness: Possibilities and problems. In: A. Marcel and E. Bisach (Eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford 1988.
8. Shallice, T. From Neuropsychology toMental structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9. Dennett, D. The message is: there is no medium. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:919-31

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Rosenthal I
David M. Rosenthal
"Multiple drafts and the facts of matter"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Contract Theory Singer I 63
Justification/Ethics/contract/P. Singer: a justification of ethics on the basis of closed contracts brings problems: not only animals but also disadvantaged people are excluded then. The same applies to small children. >Justification.
Interest: a precondition for entering into contracts is self-interest. Another problem arises from this: if we have no compensation to expect, why should we commit ourselves to leaving behind a better environment for future generations, or to do something that will make their lives better?
>Interest.
Ethics/P. Singer: This shows that our current ethics go beyond these considerations of reciprocity.
>Reciprocity.
Contract theory/P. Singer: therefore, some people argue that we should add to the moral community all those who have the possibility of a reciprocal agreement, or will have one day...
I 64
...regardless of when they'll ever have it. >Contracts.
P. SingerVsContract: What are the reasons we have at all for limiting morality to those who are, in principle at least, in a position to conclude contracts?
>Morals, >Ethics.
We should rather study which beings should be included in morality on the basis of universalization or generalization.
>Generalization, >Norms, >Society, >Claims of validity.
Darwin undermined the notion that humans and animals are completely different.
>Darwinism.
Animals/Bentham/P. Singer: Bentham pointed out that the fact that animals do not speak any language is no reason to ignore their suffering.
>Animal language, >Thinking without language, >Thinking, >Suffering, >Pain, >Utilitarianism/Bentham.
I 65
Animal/P. Singer: In the tradition, animals have been described as living beings who live only in the moment and therefore cannot be aware of themselves. As a result, they have been exempted from considerations relating to something that could be against their interests. >Self-consciousness.
Utilitarianism: if one wanted to look at the living beings as inherently higher-valued, one would move away from the utilitarianism ((s) represented here).
>Utilitarianism, >Preferential utilitarianism.
I 66
Self-confidence/self-awareness/ethics/P. Singer: If it is not about the question of life or non-life, the question of whether the interests of non-self-conscious living beings are of minor importance is a little different. In this case, however, it is not clear why we should bring the question of self-consciousness into play at all. >Awareness.
Human/Animal/P. Singer: If we were to discuss such questions at all, we would come close to the question of whether mentally handicapped people should not be counted as animals, what we do not want.
>Humans, >Animals.

SingerP I
Peter Singer
Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011

SingerP II
P. Singer
The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015

Drives/Instincts Papineau I 250, 254
Drive/Content/Papineau: Level 0: Monomats: tue V
Level 1 Opportunists If A, tue V
Level 3: Voters: if a and B, tue V1 or V2, depending on what is more desired. Due to this complexity, it is uncertain what the exact content is that drives represent
a) specific results
b) different effects? Papineau pro b.
>Complexity, >Parts, >Whole, >Behavior, >Animals.
I 276
Purpose-Means-Thinking/Non-Egocentric/Animal/Dickinson's Rats/Papineau: which animals have non-egocentric awareness of causal relations? Apes, primates: only very limited - new experiments by Dickinson seem to show that rats have non-egocentric purpose-means-thinking.
>Egocentrism, >Thinking, >Thinking without language.
I 279
Practical syllogism is unequal to purpose-means thinking. >Practical syllogism, >Purposes/Papineau.
I 281
PapineauVsDickinson: (ad Heyes & Dickinson 1990(1)): the rats are still causally egocentric. Only causal information: from their own behaviour.
1. C. Heyes & A. Dickinson (1990). "The Intentionality of Animal Action". In: Mind and Language 1990, p. 87-104.

Papineau I
David Papineau
"The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Papineau II
David Papineau
The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Papineau III
D. Papineau
Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004

Experience Maturana I 216
Experience / Maturana: all dimensions in the range of experiences exist in the language, i.e. as coordination of actions between observers. >Observation/Maturana, >Language, >Language and thought, >Thinking without language, >Thinking/Maturana.
I 228
Experience / Maturana: primarily compared to explanation - all experience comes from nowhere - e.g. a car that passed us - Understanding: always happens in practice. >Understanding.
I 311
Life practice and experience just happen. Explanations are superfluous.
>Explanation/Maturana.
I 352
Experience/Maturana: is content-free. In our experience, we encounter not things, not objects nor nature. We live in the experience of life practice as something that we produce ourselves at any moment. Cf. >language/Maturana, >Content.

Maturana I
Umberto Maturana
Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000

Generality Papineau I 255
Generality/Animal/Thinking/Papineau: no simple organism explicitly represents general facts. E.g. it is one thing to represent the location of a particular pond, that water is in ponds is quite another matter. This corresponds to the question: which animals can have beliefs? >Animals, >Thinking, >World/thinking, >Thinking without language, >Spatial localization, >Representation.
I 256
Purpose-means-thinking/Papineau: I have not defined this concept in terms of beliefs but of design: as the use of general representations. I avoid the concept belief. >Beliefs, >Content.
Representation/Papineau: why should an animal have no general representations?
I 257
After all, it has this disposition right now, because its behavior in the past has led to this result. >Generalization.
Disposition/Representation/Papineau: should the disposition itself not be regarded as the incarnation of the general information "Drinking supplies water"?
>Disposition, >Information.
I do not want to dispute such content attribution. The disposition represents information about the general "connection of reaction with result" (B&T, V>R).
Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: if it requires explicit representations, it no longer follows that simple creatures can be considered ZM thinkers.
I 258
Explicit representation requires physical tangibility. Vs: all behavioral dispositions must have some kind of physical embodiment.
>Behavior, >Embodiment.
I 259
Explicit/implicit: if an organism has implicitly different pieces of general information in different dispositions ("water is in ponds"), it still has no system to combine them. >Complexity, >Parts, >Whole, >Sense.

Papineau I
David Papineau
"The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Papineau II
David Papineau
The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Papineau III
D. Papineau
Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004

Grice Avramides I 26
Grice/Avramidis: Grice view should be understood as a conceptual analysis, not as reductionism. - Not as physicalism. - Grice wants a reconciliation with Frege and Davidson. >Philosophy of mind, >Gottlob Frege, >Donald Davidson, >Paul Grice.
I 42f
Grice/Avramides: Thesis: the problem of sentence meaning (meaning of the whole utterance) takes precedence over the meaning of partial statements. >Sentence meaning, >Word meaning, >Clauses, >Compositionality, >Frege-Principle, >Subsententials.
Statement/Grice: is understood broadly, also signals etc.
Important argument: thus, the analysis ranges in a situation meaning before the timeless meaning (the standard meaning).
>Situation, >Situation/Psychology, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention.
Only so can he equate"x means something" with "S means something (in a situation) with x".
1st Version; ... A response from the listener is induced ...
2nd Version: ... in addition: the listener must recognize the intention of the speaker.
I 44
3rd Version: in addition: the recognition of the speaker's intention must act as a reason for the belief of the listener. Vs: there are still many counterexamples.
I 45
GriceVsGrice: counter-E.g. it is a difference whether I spontaneously frown in a situation or in order to express my displeasure to a person. Important argument: exactly the same information is transmitted, no matter if the speaker has the intention to communicate or not. Then there is no reason to distinguish between natural and non-natural meaning.
>Natural meaning/non-natural meaning.
The difference has to do with what the frowning person can expect the listener to believe - but without intention no meaning - non-natural meaning (without intention) never sufficient for response.
I 46
E.g. thumbscrews mean nothing.
I 67
Grice/Avramides: so far, the analysis is not sufficient for timeless (linguistic meaning. - Only for speaker-meaning. Meaning/Grice: meaning is to be found both outside language and within.
I 68
Timeless meaning/Grice: disjunction of findings and about what people want to achieve with x. - This is also an effect etc. but not a practice. It is not sufficient (because it may have a second meaning), and not necessary (it may have alternatives). - But it is a "procedure in the repertoire".
>Practise, >Language behavior, >Language community, >Convention.
I 111
Reductionist Gricean/Loar: This position risks to accept thinking without language. >Thinking without language.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Intentionality Proust I 233
Animal/Mind/Intentionality/Premack/Woodruff/Proust: Premack/Woodruff's famous studies of "Theory of the Mind" in animals, "beliefs and desires", etc. Theory of the Mind, >Premack, >Woodruff, >Beliefs, >Thinking, >Thinking without language, >Desires.
Proust: if one speaks of a theory of the mind, one should distinguish it from a social one not from a psychological competence in the strict sense by which social animals try to influence each other.
Premack: an animal can deliberately act on what another is doing (social) or thinks (then also psychologically).
>Intentions.
"Spoilsport version": the explanation of behavior: not intention but only established correlation is intended to explain the behavior of an animal.
I 234
Then the psychological side can be dispensed with. Speechless animals simply establish a correlation. Cf. >Animals, >Animal language, >Thinking/animal.
DennettVs: intentional attitude for explanation.
>Correlation, >Animals/Dennett, >Intentional stance.
I 234
Intentionality/Dennett: Levels: 1. Desires and beliefs can be attributed.
2. Beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires
3. Beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires of the second level, etc.
>Levels/order, >Description levels.
I 235
ProustVsDennett: opens the door for the human to apply his psychological concepts to apparently concept-less processes: cars, dogs, cats. It is slightly different with primates.
>Concepts, >Language and thinking, >Thinking without language.

Proust I
Joelle Proust
"L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Language Bubner K.Glüer Davidson zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

I 122
Bubner: "Language is not an instrumental system of signs whose objective reference is still up for discussion, ... Language has no other function, than to make the world accessible." ---
Bubner I 200
Subjectivity/Bubner: after replacing the practice of connecting ethics and politics, the practical concretion is substituted by the cultivation of the individual. That is, that I am not in agreement with everything what concerns the good, but rather disunited with all.
This dissolves the "koinonia", in which Aristotle founds house and polis.
Language/Ancient/Modern/Bubner: Thesis: therefore, the language now has a completely different task to fulfill. It is no longer a medium for the clarification of objectives, it takes the place of practice itself, and the nature of politics is methodified for social discussion.
As long as dialogues are inserted into a practical context, they are in a serving relationship to action, the problems of which they process.
If the context disappears, because talking to one another is directly equated with co-operation, then the relationship becomes incomprehensible in which language and politics stand together. (Regardless of whether one adheres to Aristotelian or modern subjective primacy).
Whether the polis or the individual appears to be privileged, consequences of a practical concept must be deduced from the chosen concept of politics.
This is no longer the case when speech and action coincide.
Conflicts occur contingently. Politics cannot be definitively committed to that, but must establish a basic form of collective action in order to solve conflicts according to rules.
Cf. >Communication theory, >Communicative action, >Polis, >Collective action.
I 213
Language/Bubner: Clarity about language is created in the medium of language. Thinking/Bubner: there is no language-independent thinking form.
Cf. >Thinking without language.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

Language Dennett I 269
Evolution/molecules/origin of life/Monod/Dennett: "Language" of DNA and its "readers" have gone through a common evolution. Neither works alone. ((s) See T. Deacon on >language and >brain.)
I 474
Culture/Language/Dennett: For culture we need language, but language must first develop for its own reasons (because of the impossibility of foreseeing evolution). >Culture.
I 516
Animal/Language: is it true, do dolphins and chimpanzees have some kind of language? So you can also call music and politics a kind of language. >Animal language.
I 517
Language/Intelligence/Dennett: To what extent does language contribute to intelligence? Which forms of thinking require language?
I 528
Language/Darwin: "Prerequisite for the development of long thoughts": Decisive for planning and persevering with long projects.
II 23/24
Consciousness/Language/Dennett: There is a view that certain beings may have consciousness, but for lack of language cannot communicate it to us. DennettVs: Why do I think this is problematic? For example, the computer can calculate even if no printer is connected.
Our ideal way to get to know the spirit of others is language. It does not reach as far as you, but that is only a limitation of our knowledge, not a limitation of your mind. >Theory of mind.
II 185
Think/Human/Dennett: Also we humans do not think many things, brush our teeth, tie our shoes, etc. We even answer questions without thinking. We call fleeting processes that last longer and gain more and more influence thoughts.
Some of the (previously existing) mental content gains more influence through language.
II 190
Language/thinking/Dennett: Thesis: There is no thinking without language. Cf. >Psychological theories on Language and Thought.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Language Heidegger Figal I 123
Language/HeideggerVsHerder: There is no general language. >Language/Foucault, Language/Davidson.
---
Cardorff II 29
Language/Translation/Heidegger/Cardorff: Heidegger is deliberately vague.
Cardorff II 65
Language/Thinking/Heidegger/Cardorff: "Thinking accomplishes the relation of being to the essence of the human. It does not do and effect this reference. Thinking merely offers him what is given to himself by being, to being. In thinking, being is expressed. Language is the house of being." Language/Heidegger: In its essence neither expression nor an activity of human. The language speaks.
>Thinking, >Thinking/Heidegger, >World/Thinking, >Thinking without language, >Language use, >Sein/Heidegger, >Language evolution.

1. M. Heidegger. Über den Humanismus. Frankfurt/M. 1943, S. 51. M. Heidegger. Über den Humanismus. Frankfurt/M. 1943, p. 5

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993


Figal I
Günter Figal
Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016

Hei II
Peter Cardorff
Martin Heidegger Frankfurt/M. 1991
Language Nagel I 57
NagelVsprimacy of language: leads to the devaluation of reason, decay product of analytic philosophy. >Linguistic turn, >Analytic philosophy.
Rejection of Frege. Thinking is often not linguistical. The most common forms of thinking do not depend on any single language.
>Thinking without language.
I 57
If language reveals principles of thought, this is not because logic is grammar, but because grammar follows a logic. >Logic, >Grammar, >Thinking, >Thoughts.
I 61
That "and" has become the word for the conjunction by contingent circumstances has no concequences for the status of the true statement that p is implied by p and q. What a set of sentences means depends on conventions. What follows from a set of premises does not depend on them (formal).
Rorty VI 144 ff
NagelVsDennett/Rorty: his "hetero-phenomenology" is not sufficient. >Heterophenomenology.
Nagel thesis: the sources of philosophy are preverbal, their problems are not dependent on culture.
Rorty VI 144 ff
NagelVsWittgenstein: (according to Rorty): the limits of language are not the limits of thinking! "The content of some thoughts goes beyond any form that they may take in human consciousness." (Per distinction scheme/content). >Scheme/content.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Language Papineau I 284
Purpose-means-thinking/language/animal/Papineau: (also as "Spandrille", side effect): Thesis: supposedly purpose-means-thinking emerged in a piggyback manner with language in the evolution. >Evolution, >Purposes, >Animals, >Animal language, >Thinking, >World/Thinking.
PapineauVs: there is a danger of circularity: the primary biological purpose of language could be to increase the supply of information, but this would not help if the purpose-means-thinking had not already been developed.
>Circular reasoning.
Papineau: language could also have developed first as an instrument for passing on information. E.g. "A tiger approaches".
>Information.
I 285
Problem/Papineau: to explain the last step: what is the additional biological pressure that led to the language with which general information are reported? >Selection.
A) If for the purpose of facilitating the purpose-means-thinking, then the purpose-means-thinking is not a side effect. It might have been language-dependent.
B) If, on the other hand, language developed the ability to represent and process general information on an independent basis, there are further problems:
1. Why should language be selected for reporting and processing at all?
2. Fundamental: If language is independent of the purpose-means-thinking, then we need a story about how this independent ability is subsequently expanded as a side effect for the purpose-means-thinking.
Cf. >Epiphenomenalism.
The point is that the purpose-means-thinking must exercise a behavioral control.
>Behavior, >Control mechanism, >Behavioral control, cf. >Self-regulation.
I 286
The ability for general information processing must be able to add something to the set of dispositions: E.g.: "From now on only fish instead of meat", E.g. "At the next mailbox I will post the letter". Without this, the purpose-means-thinking makes no difference for our actions.
>Information processing, cf. >Problem solving.
I 286
Language/Purpose-Means-Thinking/Evolution/Papineau: Problem: how could a new way to change our behavior arise without a fundamental biological change? As a side effect? This is a pointless assumption. It must have brought the ability to develop new dispositions. >Evolution, >Dispositions.
It is hard to imagine how this should have happened without biological selection.
I 287
But this is not yet an argument for a wholly separate mechanism for the purpose-means-thinking in the human brain. Weaker: there could be some biological mechanism for the purpose-means-thinking, e.g. that the language has developed independently of the processing and reporting. Thereafter, further steps allow their outputs to influence the behavior.
Cf. >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker.
I 290
Language/Evolution/Generality/Papineau: previously I distinguished the language for special facts from one for general facts. >Generality/Papineau, >Generalization.
Perhaps the former has developed for communication, and the latter for the purpose-means-thinking.
>Communication.
Or language for general facts has evolved under the co-evolutionary pressure of purpose-means-thinking and communication.
Presentation/figurative/Papineau: how could the results of the figurative representation gain the power to influence the already existing structures of the control of the action?
>Imagination, >Thinking without language.
I 291
Perhaps from imitation of complex action sequences of others. >Imitation.

Papineau I
David Papineau
"The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Papineau II
David Papineau
The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Papineau III
D. Papineau
Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004

Language Proust I 230
Animals/Davidson: since animals have no language, they also have no concepts. >Concepts, >Language, >Animals, >Animal language, >Language and thinking, >Thinking without language.
ProustVsDavidson: Davidson uses a Cartesian strategy.
>Cartesianism.
I 231
Triangulation: triangulation seems impossible in animals, because the absence of a shared symbolic language does not allow access to intersubjectivity. >Triangulation.
Concepts/Davidson: concepts are normative because each has its particular application conditions. With this, Davidson takes up Descartes' basic idea.
1. If an organism has the concept of X, it is predisposed to decide whether something is X or not.
2. The term can then be applied to new cases.
3. Concepts form an inferential structure (a theory).
>Predication, >True-of.
I 232
Concept/Animal/ProustVsDavidson: it is not an overstated assumption that certain animals can form concepts that make important aspects of their environment understandable to them. Possibly social animals (dogs, primates, etc.) have theories for the organization of social relations.
These theories contain concepts for dominant animals, offspring, enemies, allies, as well as the inferential and associative links between these categories for sharing food, protection, partnering, etc.
Cf. >Theory of Mind.

Proust I
Joelle Proust
"L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Language Wright I 280
Language is not a mere clothing of thought. We have no contact to the wordless thought that P. Thoughts have to be mediated symbolically. >Thinking and language, >Thinking without language, >Thinking, >Thoughts, >World/thinking, >Symbols, >Communication, >Language use, >Language community, >Understanding.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Language Acquisition Tomasello Gärdenfors I 6
Language acquisition/Tomasello/Gärdenfors: (Tomasello 2001)(1) Thesis: the child's attention is often focused on a single object. >Awareness.

1. Tomasello, M. (2001). Perceiving intentions and learning words in thesecond year of life. In M. Bowerman & S. Levinson (Eds.),Language Acquisition and Conceptual Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Upton I 75
Language acquisition/Tomasello/Upton: Tomasello (2006)(1) describes a similar approach in his usage-based theory, which argues that the essence of language is its symbolic dimension, not its grammatical construction. Language is learned as a specific tool for conversation and communication. Concrete words are learned initially, with no grammatical rules at all. All the child has is a collection of useful concrete speech units, which form the basic building blocks of language. Gradually, the ability to construct longer and more complex utterances emerges. Initially, children do not possess the fully abstract categories and schemas of adult grammar. Children construct these abstractions only gradually and in piecemeal fashion. >Stages of development.
General cognitive process/Tomasello:
intention-reading (e.g. joint attention), by which they attempt to understand the communicative significance of an utterance;
pattern-finding (categorisation, schema formation), by which they are able to create the more abstract dimensions of linguistic competence.
Upton: This implies that language development follows on from the development of our thinking processes.
>Language and thought, >Thinking without language, >Thinking, >Language.

1. Tomasello, M. (2006) Acquiring linguistic constructions, in Kuhn, D and Siegler, R (eds) Handbook of Child Psychology, Vol. 2: Cognition, perception, and language (6th edn). New York: Wiley.

Tomasello I
Michael Tomasello
Die Ursprünge der menschlichen Kommunikation Frankfurt/M. 2011


Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Upton I
Penney Upton
Developmental Psychology 2011
Learning Papineau I 252
Novelty/Learning/Drive/Animal/Papineau: e.g. a drive to register "unusual": the animal must be able to identify something unusual. It would not be good if this instinct would be satisfied every time it performed its function! For in the case of unusual things one should become even more watchful! >Drives, >Experience, >Thinking, >Animals, cf. >Animal language, >Thinking without language.
Conclusion: there is no reason to exclude drives which are reinforced by their own fulfillment. But if this is the case, no learning mechanism will be able to use the disappearance of the drive as the source of the reinforcement, especially since this disappearance is not a good substitute for the fulfillment of its function.
Rather, the learning mechanism must function with the aid of a different sign so that a behavior is an effective means for the fulfillment of a drive.
>Behavior, >Drives.
It is not sure if this is actually inherited.
>Inheritance, >Heritability.

Papineau I
David Papineau
"The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Papineau II
David Papineau
The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Papineau III
D. Papineau
Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004

Mathematics Neumann Weizenbaum I 203
Mathematics/Neumann, J. von: (J. von Neumann 1958)(1): when we talk about mathematics, then perhaps we are discussing a secondary language based on the primary language that is actually used by the central nervous system. Thus, the external forms of our mathematics are not absolutely relevant when it comes to judging which mathematical or logical language is actually used by the central nervous system. >Theory language, >Language of theought, >Mathematical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >World/thinking, >Thinking without language, >Central nervous system.

1. J. von Neumann, The Computer and the Brain, New Haven, 1958, S. 82.

NeumJ I
J. v. Neumann
The Computer and the Brain New Haven 2012


Weizenbaum I
Joseph Weizenbaum
Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976
German Edition:
Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978
Meaning Change Gärdenfors I 72
Meaning change/language/language development/historical/Gärdenfors: historical language development is difficult to explain: changes of meaning often occur fast and cannot be predicted. Still, we are trying to establish laws for meaning change, according to which some changes are more probable than others. If my thesis is true that pragmatics is to be put evolutionary before the semantics, certain cognitive functions have been defined before the formation of the language and are a condition for this. Language is then used to represent foreign beliefs and future goals. (See Gärdenfors 2003, 2004c; Gärdenfors et al. 2012).(1)(2)(3)

Thinking without language/DennettVsGärdenfors: in contrast, some authors argue that thinking is not possible without language: (Dennett, 1991).(4)
Terms/Dennett: Thesis: many terms can only be formed when language is already present to some extent, such as B inflation, month, heritage.
Terms/Gärdenfors: this is certainly true, but it does not deny that most of our terms have been developed by observation and action before they found their linguistic expression.


1. Gärdenfors, P. (2003). How Homo became Sapiens: On the evolution of thinking. Oxford.
2. Gärdenfors, P. (2004c). Cooperation and the evolution of symbolic communication. In K. Oller & U. Griebel (Eds.) The evolution of communication systems (pp. 237-256).
3. Gärdenfors et al. (2012). Gärdenfors, P. Brinck, L. & Osvath, M. (2012) Coevolution of cooperation, cognition and communication. In F. Stjernfelt, T. Deacon & T. Schilhab (Eds.) New perspectives of the symbolic species (pp. 193-222) Berlin.
4. Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Mind Mayr I 311
Mind: conceptual confusion: false limitation to the mental activities of humans. >Animals, >Animal language, >Thinking without language, >Language.
Animal/mind: it has been shown that there is no categorial difference between the mental activities of certain animals (elephants, dogs, whales, primates, parrots) and those of humans.
I 312
Consciousness/animal: the same applies to the consciousness, which is to be found even in the case of invertebrates and possibly protozoa. >Consciousness.
Mind/Mayr: there was simply no sudden emergence of the mind.
>Evolution, >Emergence, >Thinking, >Brain, >Brain states.

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998

Perception Mayr I 113
Perception/Mayr: Thesis: for the perception and understanding of the world no highly specialized brain structure is necessary. Evolution does not seem to lead to highly specialized structures, but to general improvement. >Life, >World/thinking, >Knowledge, >Behavior, >Animals, >Thinking without language, >Animal language, >Experiences,
>Appearances, >Distinctions, >Understanding.

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998

Propositions Plantinga Cresswell II 168
Def Propositions/Plantinga: propositions are no linguistic entities for Plantinga. Cf. >Thought content, >Thought objects, >Belief objects, >Mental states, >Thinking, >Thinking without language, >World/thinking, cf. >Intensions, >Propositional attitudes.

Plant I
A. Plantinga
The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) Revised ed. Edition 1979


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Psychology Churchland Lanz I 302
Everyday psychology/Churchland: (pro everyday psychology/Sellars - ChurchlandVsDennett): Link to Sellars: Everyday psychology has the status of a useful empirical theory. You have to check if A) the everyday psychological predicates actually designate natural species
B) whether the lingua mentis theory of functionalism, which is closely linked to everyday psychology, is plausible. The Churchlands deny a) and b).
Instead, Patricia S. Churchland: "Neurophilosophy":
Ad a): it is remarkable that due to everyday psychology we have not the faintest idea what underlies the psychological phenomena with which we are familiar.
>Language of thought, >Mentalese, >Folk psychology.
Lanz I 303
Ad b): VsMentalese, VsLingua Mentis theory: from the perspective of evolution, language is a latecomer. There were intelligent creatures before language came into the world and there are intelligent creatures who are not able to speak. Thus, due to the evolutionary continuity between humans and their ancestors, a large number of non-language analog cognitive processes must also be assumed in humans. >Language/Deacon, >Thinking without language.

Peter Lanz, Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie in: Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Reductionism Avramides I 96
Reductionism/Grice/Avramides: the real bone of contention between reductive and anti-reductive Griceans is the profound epistemic asymmetry - (that thoughts could be known without language). For symmetry/asymmetry: >Terminology/Avramides.
Both, reductionism and anti-reductionism are agains superficial epistemic aymmetry:
Def Superficial Epistemic Asymmetry/Radical Interpetation/Avramides: Thesis: that we can solve the problem of Radical interpretation by understanding the foreign language through firstly learning the beliefs and intentions ((s) without language, because the psychological concepts are more fundamental).
>Avramides on Grice, >Thinking without language.
I 96
DavidsonVsReductionism: of the semantic on the mental. - Without knowledge of the language beliefs cannot be verified. The method of radical interpetation (RI) fails: you cannot first establish foreign beliefs and intentions.
>Radical interpretation.
I 112
Reductionism/Avramides: must accept thinking without language. Antireductionism: must deny just that.
I 127f
Mind/AvramidesVsReductionism: Thesis: the image of the reductionism of the objective mind is wrong. - It goes back to its distinction between superficial and deep epistemic asymmetry.
I 130
Avramides Thesis: deep epistemic symmetry does not include ontological symmetry (despite Davidson). Mind/Avramides:The right (subjective) image of the mind requires the semantic and the psychological to be understood on the same level. >Meaning theory.
I 128
Summary/Antireductionism/Avramides: is the right about how we can understand propositional attitudes - Reductionism: is right about what propositional attitudes are.
I 166
AvramidesVsReductionism: overlooks the fact that we have to characterize behavior semantically at some point. Normal evidence is the only means to maintain the thesis that semantic and psychological concepts are on the same level.
I 168
The dispute over reductionism is about epistemic, not ontological questions. >Epistemic/ontologic.
I 166
Grice: Thesis: the psychological is an essential part of the semantic. Reductionism/Avramides: the reductionism denies that!
Thinking without language: if we attribute it, the semantic and the psychological may not be very interdependent.
Solution/AvramidesVsReductionism: behavior is observable even with speechless creatures. - This forms part of our concept of the psychological.
>Animals, cf. >Animal language.
I 167
Manifestation/Avramides: it would be wrong to say that it must be more complex if the attributed thoughts are more complex. More complex is rather a linguistic behavior.
>Compositionality, >Complexity.
The reductive Gricean accepts deep epistemic asymmetry - the antireductionist denies it.
>Terminology/Avramides.
VsReductionism: with that he has nothing more to do with interpretation and understanding.

Graeser I 128
AvramidesVsReductionism/Graeser: reductionism disregards the intimate connection between the psychological and the semantic and ultimately does nothing to contribute to the clarification of the mind and the thoughts.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Representation Proust I 225
Mental representation/Dretske/Proust: 1. Covariance between internal condition and external situation ("Indication").
2. The internal indicator has the function of displaying the external situation. Then it represents it.
3. Representations can be true or false.
I 227
Representation/Proust: the everyday understanding commits a petitio principii when it refers to a particular representation, which is to be based only on a difference between inside and outside or on spatial concepts. >Space/Proust, >Inside/Outside.
Spatial concepts can only provide a solution when it comes to explaining the use of spatial relations to distinguish terms.
>Concepts/Proust, >Concepts.
I 229
Representation/Animal/Proust: we see that probably many animals have mental representations.
I 230
These are also objective. Question: are these animals that are obviously capable of a kind of proto belief, also capable of real beliefs, or do they only have non-conceptual perception abilities?
>Proto-thought, >Thinking without language, >Animals, >Animal language.

Proust I
Joelle Proust
"L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Semantics Wright I 280
Semantic descent/Wright: Instead of talking about words, talking about facts, objects, substantial truth. Boghossian promised to avoid this descent. >Semantic ascent.
I 280
Thought/sentence/object language/meta language/Wright: the question whether the sentence "My lawn is green" is true, depends on its meaning, the status of the idea that my lawn is green, does not depend on it. Cf- >Belief state.
In the semantic descent from sentence to thought we left the meaning behind us.
>Sentences, >Thoughts, >Proposition, >Meaning.
WrightVs: that does not do more than sticking your head in the sand.
How could the assertion that P could escape the fate of its metalinguistic counterpart if the fate of the latter is sealed only by the participation of the content?
>Content.
Language is not a mere clothing of the thought. We have no wordless contact with the thought that P! Thoughts must be conveyed symbolically.
>Thinking, >Content, >Language, >Language and thinking, cf. >Thinking without language.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Thinking Avramides I 104
Thinking/Language/Avramides: thesis: beings without language can have thoughts. >Thinking without language, >Language and thought, >World/Thinking, >Thoughts.
I 113
Thinking without Language/Avramides: then language is a mere vehicle for communication. >Communication.
Schiffer: the Gricean concepts allow for that, but contingently there are no such beings.
>Communication/Schiffer.
I 115
Thinking without Language/Reductionism/Avramides: there is only a problem for reductionism if the assertion is conceptually related to the semantic and psychological concepts - (and is not simply empirical). >Reductionism.
Davidson: psychological concepts cannot be instantiated without semantic ones - SchifferVsDavidson: ditto, but they can be grasped without them!
Avramides: then the mere intuition that there can be no thinking without language is not sufficient for an antireductionism.
Antireductionism: must assert that the assertion of the reductionist a deep epistemic dependence is unfounded.
>Terminology/Arvramides.
I 142f
DummettVsIdealism/DummettVsLocke: Locke proposes a wrong code concept of language for ideas. Significance is not explained by thoughts. - Where the thoughts, in turn, are without reference to language - this does not explain how thoughts themselves come to significance. - Then mother tongue would be like a foreign language.
>Code, >John Locke, >Meaning, cf. >Language of thought.
Solution/Dummett: grasp = use: E.g. thw word "square" sorts out square things. -Then no representations are needed to connect sentences with thoughts.
>Representation.
It is about understanding instead of association.
>Association, >Understanding.
AvramidesVsDummett: but this approach allows no thinking without language.
I 15
Thinking/Dummett: thinking can only be investigated through language (not through behavior). AvramidesVsDummett: also through behavior. >Behavior.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Thinking Black II 94
Thinking/Black: not to be covered with "various linguistic clothes". - If a thought is supposed to be "too profound for words", we have to ignore it - VsClothing Model: would lead to regarding all speaking as the encoding process and hearing as decoding.
II 97
Wrong: "Think before you speak" - Vs Cl.I.Lewis: meaning very well comes into existence through communication (otherwise we ge a "Clothing Model"). >Communication. However Black Thesis: thinking without language is possible - E.g. imagining chess positions. Cf. >Psychological theories on language and thought, >Chess.
II 98
The speech current does not need to be accompanied by a parallel stream of mental events - the spoken language needs no mental correlate to be meaningful. >Speaking/Ricoeur.
II 100
It is hardly possible to distinguish between thoughts and linguistic representation.
II 119
But: Language/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 4.002: Language disguises the thought - in a way that one cannot infer the shape of the clad thought from the outer shape of the dress. (BlackVsWittgenstein).

Black I
Max Black
"Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979

Black II
M. Black
The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978
German Edition:
Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973

Black III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Black IV
Max Black
"The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Thinking Dennett II 58
Thinking/Animal/Dennett: Can dogs think? Problem: An idea must be composed of certain concepts. Question of the description or formulation: E.g. bowl with meat, bucket with feed, "the delicious stuff that tastes so and so" ...
Translation: Could we, for example, just express the exact thought the dog thinks in English? If not, dogs can either not think at all or their thoughts cannot be expressed, and thus lie beyond our horizon.
II 157
Thinking/Speech/Dennett: All in all, these considerations suggest that our way of thinking had to wait for speech to develop. Speech, in turn, had to wait for keeping of secrets to develop, and that in turn required the development of a certain complexity of the environment. Cf. >Speaking.
II 202
DennettVsRyle: Notorious are Ryle's assertions that thinking could only take place in the public world and would not need to occur in a personal place.
II 190
Speech/Thinking/Dennett: No thinking without speech - (Thinking is not the same as consciousness. E.g. A dog has no concept of cat as an animal). >Thinking without language.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Thinking Dupré Perler I 318
Animal/Thinking/Language/Descartes/Dupré: Even those who defend the cognitive abilities of the animals the most often accept the Cartesian assumption that it is in principle impossible to prove the thinking or even the consciousness of animals because this would be conceptually dependent on behavior. >Animals, >Animal language, >Communication, >Consciousness, >R. Descartes.
Perler I 319
DupréVsDavidson: if Davidson were right, the question at stake would not only be whether or not one can teach monkeys to speak, but whether one can teach them to think. >Animals/Davidson, >Language/Davidson, >Thinking/Davidson.
Perler I 321
Language/Thinking/Dupré: there are many forms of non-verbal behavior that allow communication, and many non-verbal manifestations of thinking. >Thinking and language, >Thinking without language.


John Dupré, 1991. "Conversation with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of language". In: Investigating Psychology, Science of Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (ed.) London, New York: Routledge

Dupré I
John Dupré
"Conversations with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of Language", in: Investigating Psychology. Sciences of the Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (Ed) London/New York 1991, pp. 95-116
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Perler I
Dominik Perler
Markus Wild
Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005
Thinking Gärdenfors I 72
Thinking without language/DennettVsGärdenfors: in contrast, some authors argue that thinking is not possible without language: (Dennett, 1991)(1). Concepts/Dennett: Thesis: many concepts can only be formed when language is already present, such as B inflation, month, heritage.
Concepts/Gärdenfors: this is certainly true, but it does not deny that most of our concepts have been developed by observation and action before they found their linguistic expression. GärdenforsVsDennett.
---
I 259
Deduction/Shirky/Gärdenfors: (Shirky, 2003)(2): deductive reason is over-estimated by people who work on artificial intelligence and especially on the Semantic Web. GärdenforsVsDescartes: this over-estimation comes from Arthur Conan Doyle whose Sherlock Holmes stories have done more harm to the idea of how the human mind works than anything since Descartes.


1. Dennett (1991): Dennett, D. Consciousness explained. Boston, MA.
2. Shirky, C. (2003). The Semantic Web, syllogism, and worldview. http://www.shirky.com/writings/semantic_syllogism.html

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Thinking Lewis II 228
It may well be that our thinking has recourse to language, and that he who makes an assumption, accepted a corresponding sentence in the language. But it does not follow that making an assumption should be analyzed as the acceptance of sentences. It is at least possible that man - like certain animals - believes some things without reason to accept certain propositions.
Circular: there is no one here, if it is at least possible to determine assumptions without recourse to certain phrases. >Animal language, >thinking without language.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Thinking Maturana I 54
Def thinking / Maturana: the neurophysiological process, which consists in that the system interacts with some of its own internal states as if these were independent variables. >Systems/Maturana, >Operation/Maturana.
Operation mode of the nervous system, which reflects functionally the internal anatomical projection to itself - necessary regardless of language. (Experiments with brain damage).
>Language, >Thinking and language, >Thinking without language,
>Nervous system.

Maturana I
Umberto Maturana
Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000

Thinking Nagel I 63
Thought/Nagel: one cannot escape it - that is different than making marks on paper.
I 65
Therefore "add two" cannot be considered a naturalistic event. - It cannot be considered separately from its contents. - Thinking is something else than making signs on paper. A naturalistic analysis of intentionality is not possible. (NagelVsSearle). >Intentionality/Searle, >Intentionality, >Naturalism.
Nagel: The fallacy lies in the idea that one could escape the thought "add two" and comprehend it as naturalistically describable event.
I 93 ff
Thinking: thinking takes precedence over its description, because its description necessarily presupposes thinking. >Description/Nagel.
I 101
Nagel: our thinking always inevitably leads to a view point where "I" is no longer relevant. >I, Ego, Self.
One cannot consider any thought type to be merely personal, unless one assumes a non-personal view point.
Rorty VI 147
Language/thinking/Nagel: NagelVsWittgenstein/Rorty: the limits of language are not the limits of thought. >Thinking without language.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Thinking Peacocke Dum I 112
"Philosophy of thoughts"/Evans/Peacocke: Evans thesis: the language has no longer the basic position, - It deals with the problem of what it means to have a thought, and with the structure of thought and its components. What does it mean that a thought is about a subject of one kind or another? What does it mean to grasp a concept? What makes a term a component of a thought? >Thoughts, >Thought objects, >Belief objects.
I 115
DummettVsEvans: dangerous to reverse the priority of language over the idea (risk of psychologism, when thoughts are subjective and incommunicable). >Psychologism, >Analytic philosophy/Dummett, >Language and thinking,
>Thinking without language, cf. >Animal language, >Animals.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Thinking Prior I 16f
Thinking/Prior: must not have the form of sentences. >Thinking, >Language and thought, >Thinking without language.
Even if we think in sentence form, we do not think sentences. - E.g. we fear dogs, no sentences.
>Sentences, >Objects, >Levels/order, >Description levels.
Fear that p does not lead to fear a sentence which means p. - "I have my broken leg" does not mean:" I have broken what is usually called "my leg" in English". - My relation to the sentence is parasitic to the relation to the leg.
I 136
Thinking/general/Prior: one can certainly think of something general: E.g. that there are cases of infidelity. >Generality, >Generalization.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Thinking Ryle Dennett II 201
DennettVsRyle: Ryle's assertions are notorious, thinking could only take place in the public world and should not take place at a personal place. Cf. >Thinking/Dennett.
---
ad Ryle I 29
Language/thinking/Ryle/(s): monologue requires dialogue. >Dialogue.
Ryle I 317
Thinking/Ryle: we learn how to derive something from already established facts, e.g. in reality we like to play chess, cycle, or learn to recognize goalposts, namely by practice, perhaps supported by some instruction. >Ability.
I 386
Thinking/Ryle: thinking is no self-talk. It is not a symbolic operation (at least not consciously). >Self-talk, >Consciousness, >Unconscious.
Ryle: Dealing with symbols must not be an application. Also thoughtless speech makes sense.
>Symbols, cf. >Thinking without language, cf. >Speaking/Ricoeur.
I 390
Thinking/Ryle: thinking is a) work
b) a disposition to opinions, results of work - there is nothing hidden.
>Disposition/Ryle, >Knowledge, >Recognition.

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969


Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Thinking Searle IV 251f
Language/Searle: thoughts, desires, feelings are not communicable without language.(1). >Thinking without language, >Language and thought, >Intentionality/Searle, >Representation/Searle.
1. Husted "Searle" in: Hügli/Lübke (Ed.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993 p. 251f

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Thinking Strawson McGinn I 210
Space/Thinking/Strawson: Thinking without spatial awareness is not possible for us. The thought of multiple instantiations of the same property presupposes a notion of space. >Exemplification, >Space/Strawson, >Imagination, >Properties/Strawson, >Identification/Strawson.

Strawson IV 131
Language/thinking/Strawson: at a certain point we can not say what we can not think - but thinking is not just talk - we need to understand our sentences. >Understanding, >Speaking, >Language and thought, >Thinking without language.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Thinking Tomasello Gärdenfors I 72
Thinking without language/Tomasello/Gärdenfors: thesis: Thinking is more original than language: For example, to assume that language is a cause of human thinking is like the thesis that money is the cause of economics. (Tomasello 1999(1), p. 94). >Thinking without language, >World/thinking, >Language and thought, >Language, >Developmental stages.
Gärdenfors: But even before the money came up, people were trading.
I 73
The language was also later added to communication and made it more efficient, just as money made trade more efficient. >Communication, >Communication media.

1. Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Tomasello I
Michael Tomasello
Die Ursprünge der menschlichen Kommunikation Frankfurt/M. 2011


Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014
Thoughts Malcolm I 127
Thought/thinking/animal/language//DavidsonVsMalcolm: his concept of "thought" only covers the higher level of thinking - I cover all propositional positions with that - Malcolm: E.g. the dog believes de re of the cat that she climbed the oak but not de dicto. >Animal language, >Thinking, >de re, >de dicto.
Malcom: Thesis: belief de dicto, but not de re requires language - a) thinking (belief): the dog is aware that p - b) have thoughts: the creature is aware that it is aware that p - DavidsonVsMalcolm: even to think one must have a concept of a thought - so language is required.
>Language and thinking, >Thinking without language.

Malcolm I
Norman Malcolm
"Thoughtless Brutes" in: The Nature of Mind, D. M. Rosenthal (Ed), Oxford 1991, pp. 445-461
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Malcolm II
N. Malcom
Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein (Harper Essays in Philosophy) 1971

Thoughts Wright I 280
Semantic relegation/Wright: Instead of talking about words, talking about facts, objects, substantial truth. Boghossian promised to avoid this descent. Cf. >Semantic ascent.
Thought/sentence/object language/meta language/Wright: the question whether the sentence "My lawn is green" is true, depends on its meaning, but not on the status of the thought that my lawn is green.
Cf. >Belief state.
 In the semantic descent of sentence to thought - we left the meaning behind us.
>Sentences, >Propositions, >Meaning.
WrightVs: this does not do more than sticking your head in the sand.
How could the assertion that P escapes the fate of its metalinguistic counterpart if the fate of the latter is sealed only by the cooperation of the content?
>Content.
Language is not a mere clothing of thought. We have no wordless contact with the thought that P. Thoughts must be mediated symbolically.
>Thinking, >Content, >Language, >Language and thinking, cf. >Thinking without language.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008


The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Avramides, A. Grice Vs Avramides, A. Avramides I 164
GriceeansVsAvramides:
The analysis in question was that propositional attitudes are relations to sentences in the theory language. This allows seeing semantics and psychology as interdependent and simultaneously attribute thoughts to speechless beings. GriceansVsAvramides: would look at the matter the other way around: the apparent entailment of ontological asymmetry to conceptual asymmetry should be taken as evidence that this type of analysis of propositional attitudes is fundamentally wrong. Because if you can attribute thinking without language (Thw/oL) in a sensible way, then it would seem as if our psychological concepts are independent of semantic ones.
Avramides: No side has more than prima facie evidence.
Anti-reductionism: can claim conceptual symmetry without being limited to ontological symmetry. And it can accept thinking without language.

Grice I
H. Paul Grice
"Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993

Grice II
H. Paul Grice
"Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle

Grice III
H. Paul Grice
"Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Grice IV
H. Paul Grice
"Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Davidson, D. Schiffer Vs Davidson, D. Avramides I 115
Davidson: our psychological concepts can not be instantiated without the semantic, because we simply cannot capture the semantic without the psychological. SchifferVsDavidson: ditto: they cannot be instantiated, but they can still be captured independently!
Thinking without language/Reduction/Avramides: if all that is true, then the mere intuition, that thinking without language cannot exist, cannot be sufficient for a antireductionism.

Schiffer I 125
paratactic analysis/Davidson/Schiffer: problem: quantification into that-propositions. The theory must be refined for this, because otherwise it cannot represent the following: E.g. Galileo said of a particular person that he makes great lasagna.
Ambiguity:
E.g. Galileo said that his mother makes great lasagna.
Problem: to say de re. (We do not elaborate this further here).
Foreign language/paratactic analysis/SchifferVsDavidson: the following does not work: (1’) Galilei a dit que la terre bouge. Galileo a dit que!.
false solution: to understand "that" as orthographic part of the semantically primitive verb "to say that": vs: then there is no term in (1) that brings the reference to the statement.
I 126
A. First problem paratactic analysis/say/belief/propositional attitude/SchifferVsDavidson: his analysis can only be applied to "say" and not be extended to belief.
(3) Galileo believed that the earth moves
First, there are similarities:
1. The logical form of representation may initially be the same.
Galileo believed this. The earth moves.
2. "This" is also in this case demonstrative
3. "Believe" is a two-figure relation.
Problem: it cannot be a relation to the actual statement. And then it can also not be a correct two-figure relation.
B(x,u)
With an actual statement. E.g.
Galileo said something
If this is true, then
(Eu) S(Galileo,u)
I 127
But this does not work with Galileo believed something
(Eu) B(Galileo, u)
LoarVsDavidson/LoarVsparatactic analysis/belief: it might have been another than this particular statement that gives belief its contents. Therefore it cannot be a relatum in this relation.

Schiffer I 131
3. Belief/Schiffer: unfortunately you cannot just say that belief is a relation to a statement type: you have to say to what kind of type! Vs(4): the statement "the earth moves" has many types.
possible solution:
The earth moves
Galileo believed a statement type to which the statement belongs, if it has the same content as my last statement.
SchifferVs: this does also not yet work, because "content" is here an artificial term, because we do not know yet what in (3) (Galileo believed that the earth moves) is referenced as a relatum when we do not yet have the content determined properties.
Pointe: this is about the old (bad!) objection VsDavidson that he relies on an unexplained concept of content equality. Because he does not rely on such concept!
Content/SchifferVsDavidson: problem: the role of "content" in Davidson's theory cannot be trivialized as desired by us when we revise his theory as we want it. Because here the "this" can still reference to an actual statement, but not to a primary occurrence, but as secondary within the singular term "the type statement, which has the same content as this".
Problem: we will not know the reference if we do not know which term of content is intended here.
B. Second problem
paratactic analysis/SayLoarVsDavidson/SchifferVsDavidson: (Loar verbally): his analysis of "say" is in conflict with a certain correct principle:
I 132
Def primary occurence/singular term/Loar/Schiffer: a singular term occurs primarily iff it is properly contained in the occurence of another singular term. E.g. primary: "George's car" in "George's car is blue" – E.g. secondary: here : „George“.
singular term/content proposition/principle/Loar:
(P) If the occurence of a singular term t in [speaker S said that ..t... ] is primary and references to x, then this proposition is only true if S referenced to x.
E.g. assumed I say:
Ralph said that she was driving the car. Where I reference to a particular car and a certain woman. Then my statement is only true if Ralph referenced to the same things.
Alternative:
Ralph said that she was driving George's car.
Here Ralph somehow had to reference to George's car but not to George!
SchifferVsDavidson: now there is a problem for Davidson:
(5) Laplace said that Galileo said that the earth moves.
From Davidson's theory follows that the second occurrence of "that" is the primary. As a consequence
SchifferVsDavidson:
1. principle (P)
2. if Davidson's theory is correct, then the second occurrence of "that" in (5) is a primary, with the speakers "the earth moves."
I 133
3. problem: but (5) may be correct, even if Laplace is not referring to this statement at all! 4. Ergo Davidson's theory is not correct.
C. Third problem
paratactic analysis/belief/propositional attitude/SchifferVsDavidson: (this is the really urgent problem): Davidson's presentation of
(a) Sam PA, that flounders snore ("PA": any propositional attitude)
as
(b) Sam PA that. flounders snore
cannot be correct because
(1) we cannot know the made assertion and its truth by (a) without knowing the content of the propositional attitude of Sam
(2) but you can know the made statement by (b) without knowing the content of the propositional attitude.
Schiffer: (1) seems correct.
Problem: if Davidson acknowledges (2) he is forced to say that either it is possible to know the truth, without even knowing what Sam said. Or that the knowledge ((s) of the truth value) brings no knowledge of the content with it.
I 134
Schiffer: Ad (2): is certainly correct as well! E.g. Pierre: La neige est blanche
Donald: Tarski said this.
Schiffer: according to Davidson you may know what Donald claimed without knowing the content of Pierres statement! And so without knowing the content of Tarski's statement! (…+…).

Schiffer I 135
SchifferVsDavidson: problem: according to Davidson you would have to know a content determining property φ which, however, no one knows!
I 136
(9) Sam said the type of statements that are φ like this. Flounders snore.
Conclusion/SchifferVsDavidson: to escape the objections, he would have to find the token φ and put it in to individuate the statements.
But such a token would have to be known to all the normal people!
Even if there were this token it does not go into the propositional knowledge.
I 137
If there ever was an extensional theory of meaning for a language out there that finds explicitly something whose knowledge for interpretation of statements is sufficient, then no one knows what it is that determines this theory.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Dummett, M. Avramides Vs Dummett, M. Avra I 8
AvramidesVsDummett/AvramidesVsDavidson: the approach of the "theory makers" is too pessimistic, their pessimism is premature and unwarranted.
I 10
AvramidesVsDummett: his reasons are not convincing, the fact remains that he merely expresses a preference. The "knowing of a language" is therefore more complex than just knowing of meanings. Meaning/Dummett: What are the linguistic or non-linguistic means which we can use to determine the meaning of an expression without determining it explicitly? Or perhaps one should not ask at all how we express something in a situation, but rather how we should analyze sentences that include the concept of meaning.
AvramidesVsDummett: this might apply to other terms as well.
Analysis/Avramides: is a harmless means, if we meet Wisdoms demand. (And clearly capture the subject matter).
I 12
AvramidesVsDummett: he does not say why we should proceed like this in the case of the concept of knowledge (providing a theory that explains all knowledge of the actors (the users of the term)).
Avra I 143
Dummett/Avramides: shows three things: 1) Locke’s idealistic theory is not irreparable. It can be completed.
I 144
2) Dummett moves from the question "What associates a concept or idea with a word or phrase?" to the question: "What does it mean to understand a concept or idea?" AvramidesVsDummett: he could just as easily have started with both questions at the same time; if both are not answered, the ideational theory of meaning only wastes time.
3. AvramidesVsDummett: he has not developed his view of how we grasp a concept or an idea in a way that it also permits the attribution of thoughts to speechless beings. (Thw/oL).
I would therefore like to propose an extension.
Thinking without Language/Thw/oL/AvramidesVsDummett: if we allow Thw/oL (> See Dummett: W.James Lectures No. 8, pp. 48), how do we understand this kind of (speechless) thoughts? We could say, we attribute them through the behavior.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Grice, P.H. Loar Vs Grice, P.H. I 1
Language/everyday language/concept/theory/explanation/pragmatic/Loar: all pragmatic concepts are ultimately based on belief.
Loar: Thesis: my approach (chapter 9) is reductionist:
1. Semantic characteristics are based on beliefs and desires. (Similar to Grice).
LoarVsGrice: my approach is not only communication theoretical:
LoarVsAll: the theories of beliefs can serve as a basis for the semantic theory of "language of thought" (most authors: the other way around!)
2. My explanation of belief and desires is not based on
I 2
Propositions or semantic concepts. Meaning/Loar: propositional attitudes can therefore serve non-circularly as a basis for meaning.
Belief/Conviction/Wish/Desire/Loar: Thesis: can be explained without assuming everyday semantics.
Thinking/Language/Loar: but this should not assume thinking without language, i.e. language as a mere vehicle of communication:
Belief/Loar: Thesis: is not a linguistic state.
Content/Loar: even if belief were a linguistic state, its content could be analyzed independently of its linguistic aspects.
Solution/Loar: explanation through behaviour and perception.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

Loar II
Brian Loar
"Two Theories of Meaning"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Loar, B. Avramides Vs Loar, B. Avramidis I 29
Meaning theory/M.Th./Pragmatics/Semantics/Loar/Avramidis: (Loar 1976 p.150f) (close to Lewis, VsMcDowell, VsWiggins, pro Grice) Thesis Semantics and pragmatics should not be separated. Acccording to Loar Grice is not only on the side of pragmatics. Semantics cannot be used without psychological terms. Grice: for Loar, Grice is working on the first level (see above). Loar: the line between semantics and pragmatics is difficult to draw. Def Pragmatics/Loar: must be negatively determined: all facts about language use in a community that are not semantic facts. AvramidesVsLoar: this definition of pragmatics is not the standard definition, this comes from Morris: (Foundations of the Theory of Signs) Def Syntax/Morris: the study of the relation of the characters to each other Def Semantics/Morris: the study of the relation of signs to things denominated by them Def Pragmatics/Morris: the study of the relationship between the signs and their interpreters. Thus, for Morris, any investigation involving the speaker would fall into the field of pragmatics. Also Grice’ work. I 30 On the other hand: the model of Wiggins/McDowell (sense/power theory) makes it necessary for the two of them to choose Morris’ definition of pragmatics and Loar’s. That may be why Loar rejects their model and tends to Lewis. Loar: seems to consider the distinction between the possible and actual languages ​​within the semantics possible. Then pragmatism is something that hovers above it. AvramidesVs: one can see Lewis’ model also differently: Thesis The distinction of actual/possible languages is ​​parallel to the distinction semantics/pragmatics by Morris. (And does not bring many new aspects either) AvramiesVsLoar: misinterpretation: he seems to believe that if we accept a layer model of the theory of meaning, we have to keep the levels isolated. Then he fears that Grice would solely be attributed to pragmatics. (Loar 1927, p.149). McDowell/Avramides: according to his interpretation it would not be like that. Here we have an overall picture that includes semantics and pragmatics. Layer Model/M.Th./Avramides: allows a reconciliation of Grice’ approach with the formal M.Th. by Frege/Davidson. I 31 Problem: the reconciliation must be acceptable to both sides. Anyway, according to Loar the distinction pragmatics/semantics is anything but merely terminological: M.Th./Philosophy of mind/Loar: M.Th. is part of the theory of mind, and not vice versa. Loar/Avramides: that means that Loar can only understand the fundamental nature of semantic concepts by reference to psychological terms. (> camp). Therefore he takes a reductive position. Grice: is part of semantics according to Loar. And semantics must be reduced to psychology. I 78 Reduction/Avramides: the question is whether we may use psychological concepts in the analysans that do not rely on just the semantic terms that we first wanted to analyze. Reductive Interpretation/Grice/Avramides: the reductive one has yet another claim: if successful, it should show that our notion of meaning is secondary to our psychological concepts in the overall scheme (overall scheme). I 79 AvramidesVsSchiffer/AvramidesVsLoar: a reduction of the semantic on the psychological does not work because of the second form of circularity. I 110 Cartesianism/Loar: he sees his rejection above all in the rejection of what he called "non-naturalism". AvramidesVsLoar: but those who have the intuition that belief and intentions are primarily linguistic states could reject more than just non-naturalism. I 111
Loar: the view that belief, desires and their content could be explained without assumptions about the natural language, runs the risk of drawing a picture of thinking without language. (Loar 1981 p.2) AvramidesVsLoar: Thinking is not impossible without language. ++ I 137

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Reductionism Avramides Vs Reductionism Avra I 112
Avramides Reductionism: Reductionism/Avramides: can deny to be committed to attributing thinking without language to a being. Antireductionism/Avramides: might be uncomfortable with the implausible thesis (attribtuted to him) of having to deny thinking without language. Solution/Avramides: ontological asymmetry Vs ontological symmetry: Ontological asymmetry/Avramides: one could argue that my deep epistemic asymmetry (EA) contained ontological implications. If there is to be a deep EA, there would have to be an ontological one. This conditional could be interpreted as follows: Antireductionism: discards the antecedent and thus must reject the consequent. Therefore it is set to ontological symmetry. Reductionism: can assume ontological asymmetry. And with that he seems to be committed to epistemic asymmetry. AvramidesVs: that only seems like that! Because the controversy between ReductionismVsAntireductionism runs above that of ontological SymmetryVsAsymmetry. Reductionism/Avramides: must accept thinking without language. Antireductionism: must deny just that. AvramidesVs: but the flaws in these arguments are obvious. Antireductionism/Avramides: (formal errors aside) how can he accept thinking without language? What exactly is the relationship between epistemic and ontological asymmetry? We will now examine that.
I 112
Reductionism/Avramides: must accept thinking without language - Antireductionism: must deny it.
I 168
Reductionism/Grice/Epistemic/Ontological/Avramides: the controversy over reductionism or antireductionism is not about ontological but epistemological questions. The reductive follwer of Grice accepts deep epistemic asymmetry, Antireductionist: denies it. AvramidesVsReductionism: so he has nothing to do with interpretation and understanding anymore.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989