Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 26 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assertions | Habermas | IV 102 Assertions/Statement/Habermas: for a sentence like "This ball is red" there is no meaning-preserving sentence in a non-assertoric mode. There is an asymmetry: the semantic content of any illocutionary or expressive part of a speech act can be expressed by a descriptive sentence - but not by sentences of another mode. >Content, >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act This asymmetry explains why we learn the linguistic expressions that are constitutive for illocutionary or expressive elements in such a way that we can use them simultaneously in the attitudes of the first and third person. >First Person, >Learning, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Certainty | Cavell | I (a) 62 Certainty/skepticism/pain/knowledge/Cavell: it is not about the ability to recognize something is weaker than the ability to know something. On the contrary, if I acknowledge my delay, for example, it follows that I know about it, but not vice versa. >Knowledge, >stronger/weaker. I (a) 63 For example, if another person may have pain without recognizing it, then it follows that he knows about his pain? From this comes the (imagined?) fact that he now has certainty about his pain. Consequence: either we accept the analysis made by the anti-skeptic about the various statements of the skeptic or we keep to the facts that they take into account and conclude that the analysis offered cannot be correct that it did not follow the argument. >Skepticism. Skepticism/Cavell: the direct attempt to defeat it makes us believe we have arguments where we really have none. We are fighting in a too strong embrace with the skeptic. Thus, the anti-skeptic assumes the most important condition in the argument of the skeptics: according to which the problem of knowledge about the foreign psychological is the problem of certainty. >Other Minds. I (a) 64 At the same time, he neglects the central insight of the skeptic, trying to prove their non-existence by himself (that certainty is not enough). This leads the anti-skeptic to fix on the perspective of the first person and to neglect the third person. But one could say: the recognition of pain in the first person is not a recognition of certainty, but the recognition of pain! Showing the object. >First Person, >Pain. I (a) 65 Certainty/knowledge/first person/third person/pain/cook: the idea that I cannot know about the feelings of the other because I cannot have them, treats the difference as one of the circumstances. >Emotion/Cavell, >Circumstances. E.g. as I am not able to see the crocuses of my neighbor. WittgensteinVs: the difference is not in the circumstances but in the language game. >Language game. I (a) 66 Why is "incapable of having the feelings of another" no circumstance? Probably because you cannot imagine how it could be otherwise. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Circumstances | Chalmers | I 21 Circumstances/Explanation/Chalmers: also the circumstances fall under two aspects: A) those of the first person (phenomenal, Qualia) B) those of the third person (psychological, behavior explaining). Cf. >Psychology/Chalmers, >First Person, >Phenomena, >Qualia, >Behavior, >Explanation, >Aspects. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Consciousness | McDowell | I 113 ff Confidence/Kant: "I think" that must be able to accompany all my ideas. Temporal continuity. But only formally, otherwise Cartesian. >I think/Kant, >cogito, >Cartesianism, >Dualism, cf. >Skepticism. I 113 ff Definition Person/Locke: "a thinking intelligent being in possession of reason and consideration, and able to consider itself as itself. Even in different places and times. >Person. I 126/27 Consciousness/Apperception/Criterion/KantVsLocke: his point (chapter on paralogism): the self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity. The subject does not need to make an effort to focus its attention on one and the same thing. >Experience/McDowell, >Awareness/Chalmers. I 127 Consciousness/McDowell: to avoid Cartesianism we should not speak of the "flow of consciousness" (stream of consciousness), but of a lasting perspective on something that is itself outside of consciousness. I 128 "I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). >Given, >Reality, >Stream of consciousness/Husserl. I 129f McDowellVsKant: it is unsatisfactory if consciousness is to be only the continuity of one aspect, one perspective without a body. The notion of continuity cannot be conceived without the notion of the living thing - as little as digestion. But that is not to say that physical presence is always connected with a self-consciousness. Consciousness/Kant: only creatures with conceptual skills have self-consciousness. McDowell pro. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Consciousness | Rosenthal | Chalmers I 230 Consciousness/Rosenthal: (Rosenthal 1996)(1): Thesis: For a state to be conscious, it must be the object of thought of a higher-level thought. These second level thoughts are usually not conscious, so we do not notice them. ChalmersVs: considerations from the position of the third person speak against it, and second level thoughts do not seem to appear relevant to a cognitive system. They would usually be redundant (for example, if they were needed for every detail in the field of vision). >Thinking, >Cognition, >Thoughts. Experiences/Rosenthal: experiences are states of which we have a consciousness. >Experiences. ChalmersVs: it is not certain that most of our experiences are the object of our thoughts. >Perception, >World/Thinking. 1. David M. Rosenthal (1996). "A theory of consciousness". In: Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press (1997). |
Rosenthal I David M. Rosenthal "Multiple drafts and the facts of matter" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Empiricism | Searle | I 89 SearleVsEmpricism: "empirical" is ambiguous: ontological (causal) or epistemologically (observable parallelism). >SearleVsEmpiricism. Behavior is irrelevant when it comes to the ontology of consciousness. We could have two systems (robots) with identical behavior, one of which has consciousness and the other does not. Empiricist philosophers will not be comfortable with these thought experiments. It will seem to you as if I am assuming the existence of empirical facts regarding the mental states of a system, but which cannot be proved by any empirical means. You believe that the behavior of another system is the only clue we have to attribute mental states to this system. >Robot, >Behavior, >Simulation, >Consciousness, >Zombies, >Mind, >Computer-model, >Turing test. There is a systematic ambiguity in the use of the word "empirical". (a) Ontological sense of "empirical." Then when one speaks of empirical facts, sometimes contingent facts in the world are meant. I 90 b) Epistemological sense of this word. Here one means a provable sense, namely from the perspective of the third person. Supposedly, all empirical facts are equally accessible to all competent observers. But we know that this is not true. There are any number of empirical facts which are not equally accessible to all competent observers. ((s) Otherwise one would have to define competence by access, which would be circular.) |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Equality | Singer | I IX Equality/Animal/Human/Equal rights/Ethics/P. Singer: thesis: my book Practical Ethics(1) fights the attitude that all members of the human species would have higher-ranked rights solely because of their belonging to this species. >Animals, >Rights. P. SingerVs: it would be unphilosophical to forbid any comparisons beyond a species. This is about injustice that we inflict on animals and the damage we do to our environment. I 16 Equality/ethics/P. Singer: what does it actually mean when we say that all people are equal? Problem: the more we investigate individual cases, the more the belief in the universal validity of the principle of equality disappears. Example: Intelligence/Jensen/Eysenk/P. Singer: (Debate in the 1970s between Arthur Jensen, psychologist UC Berkeley and Hans Jürgen Eysenk, psychology at the University of London): I 17 Question: to what extent do variances of intelligence depend on genetic differences? This dispute was again taken up by Herrstein/Murray 1994(2). >Intelligence, >A. Jensen, >H.J. Eysenck. Racism: the critics of these authors say their theses, if justified, would justify racial discrimination. Are they right? Similar problem: was Larry Summers a sexist when he - at that time president of the Harvard University - claimed biological factors in connection with difficulties to appoint more women to chairs in mathematics and sciences? Similar question: should disadvantaged groups receive special preferential treatment in access to jobs or to the university? P. Singer: Differences between genders and differences between giftedness exist in any case. Range property/John Rawls: (in Rawls, Theory of Justice)(3) if one belongs to a domain, one simply has the property to belong to this domain and all within the domain have this property alike. I 18 Equality/Rawls/P. Singer: Rawl's thesis: a moral attitude is the basis for equality. >Morals, >Ethics. VsRawls: 1. One might object that this is a gradual matter. 2. Small children are not capable of having a moral personality. Solution/Rawls: small children are potentially moral personalities. I 19 VsRawls: Rawls does not provide a solution for people with irreparable impairments.(3) I 20 Suffering/interest/Third person/P. Singer: Problem: we have to explain whether the pain of a certain person is less undesirable than that of another person. >Suffering, >Pain. I 20 Interest/P. Singer: Principle: When it comes to equality, we should weigh interests as interests and not as interests of persons, as mine or someone else's interests. If then X loses more by an action than Y wins, the action should not be executed. >Interest. I 21 Then the race plays no role anymore in the weighing of interests. This is the reason why the Nazis were wrong: their policy was based only on the interests of the Aryan race. >Racism, >Fascism. 1. Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 3rd ed. Cambridge University Press (2011). 2. Herrnstein, R. J., & Murray, C. The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life. New York, NJ: Free Press (1994). 3. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Original Edition. Belknap Press (1971). |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| First Person | Burge | Frank I 687 Authority/First Person/Self-Knowledge/Burge: (pro Descartes) we have "basic self-knowledge". e.g. "I think (with exactly this thought) that writing requires concentration. Problem: 1) Does individualism result from the acceptance of this Cartesian conception? 2. How is certainty about one's own mental states possible for externalism (anti-individualism)? >Externalism. Frank I 706 Self-Knowledge/Burge: the source of our strong epistemic claim is not that we know a lot of the objects or that we know the circumstances (enabling conditions) particularly well, but arises from the nature and function of self-evaluating judgments. For example, if we consider that there is no water at all, we consider our position unjustly from the perspective of a third person. >Incorrigibility. Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663 |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Geometry | Thiel | I 287 Geometry/Protogeometry/Inhetveen/Thiel: There is often talk of an "operative" model of geometry, whereby it must be borne in mind that the properties captured in this way can only be realized if they are idealized. >Accuracy. I 288 There is the attempt of a "protogeometry" "circle-free method of size comparison" (Inhetveen) In order to satisfy the requirement of freedom from circles, we have to do without any geometric "devices" when producing shapes on bodies. I 289 The simplest operation with two bodies K1 and K2 is to bring them into contact with each other. The relation of touching is symmetrical. Two bodies each have at least one possible point of contact. Then further bodies K3 and K4 can always be constructed, so that K3 touches K1 at the point where K2 used to do so. "Imitation" "Replace". Inhetveen has called this "weak transitivity" because the subject requires three antecedents instead of two. I 289 Def "Weaker"/Thiel: means less demanding in mathematics. I 289/290 We extend our determinations to touching two bodies not only at individual points, but at all points of a given surface piece. The body definitions then "fit" together in these pieces. These formulas are statements about bodies, but they are not sentences about bodies that we have in front of us in our body world. We thus make statements about the manufacturing goals we pursue. Inhetveen describes them as "aphaetic" criteria for the quality of a technical realization. They lie protogeometrically before the theory of geometric forms. I 290/291 Now there are the terms of "fitting" as well as the original and impression derived from them. Fitting: "protogeometrically congruent". For technical purposes, however, one would not only like to be able to shape bodies in such a way that they fit, but also to fit a third person. Or that each of them also fits on the other. Def Weak transitivity of fitting: each body must fit to a copy of itself (since it cannot be brought to itself in a situation of fitting). Def "impression stable": the definition says nothing about how a body is brought to fit with any copy, and in fact this can happen in different ways...+...I 291 I 293 Folding axes, rotational symmetry, mirror symmetry are derived protogeometrically. Terms: "flat", "technical straight line" (= edge), "complementary", "supplementary wedges", "tilting", "edge". (...) The procedures are considered, the transition from protogeometry to geometry takes place in two abstraction steps. We ignore the methods and consider the results in the geometry. I 299 No reference is made to tools at any point. By the way, there are devices that are more effective than compasses and rulers: two "right-angle hooks" can achieve not only all constructions that can be done with compasses and rulers, but also those that lead analytically described to third-degree and fourth-degree equations. The bisector can be constructed using a copy. I 300 Protogeometry defined, geometry proven. >Proof. If geometry is to be the theory of constructible forms, then we have to consider this independence (describable as "size invariance" (>measurements)) and do this with what is known as the Form principle: if two further places P', Q' are obtained by a construction starting from two further places P,Q, each figure obtained by a sequence K1...Kn from construction steps of P' zbd Q' is geometrically indistinguishable from the figure to which the same construction steps starting from P and Q lead. I 301 A whole series of important statements of classical geometry can only be proved by using this principle. For example, the perpendicularity of the fourth angle in the theorem of thalas cannot be determined purely protogeometrically, nor can the uniqueness of the parallels to a given straight line be determined by a point outside. >Measurement. Only Euclidean geometry knows forms in the explained sense, in such a way that figures are identical in form if they cannot be distinguished and no application of the same consequences of further construction steps makes them distinguishable. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| I, Ego, Self | Habermas | IV 159 I/Habermas: For categorization as a person, it is not enough that a person can say "I", but how they do it. The expression "I" not only has the deictic meaning of the reference to an object, it also indicates the pragmatic attitude or perspective from which the speaker expresses himself/herself. In the communicative role of the speaker, someone addresses at least one listener. >Person, >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. The interpersonal relationship linked to the perspective of the first, second and third person updates an underlying relationship of belonging to a social group. Only here do we come across the pronominal sense of the expression "I". >Communication/Habermas, >Intersubjectivity, >Communication/Habermas, >Intersubjectivity, >First Person. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Identity | Castaneda | Frank I 168 Identity/Castaneda: we are contingently identical with our thinking and experience contents (VsKripke, VsNagel). >Content, >Propositional content, >Experience, >Thinking, >Equivalence. I 168ff Equivalence: Equivalence is weaker than identity statements of the first and third person. - These are only equivalent, not identical. >First person, cf. >Incorrigibility, Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Individuation | Mead | Habermas IV 93 Individuation/MeadVsDurkheim/Mead/Habermas: Mead thesis: the process of socialization is also a process of individuation. Mead justifies this with the diversity of position-bound perspectives that speakers and listeners take up. As a principle of individuation, Mead does not cite the body, but a perspective structure that is set with the communicative roles of the first, second and third person. "Me" stands for the view that ego offers an alter in an interaction when this ego makes a speech act offer. This view gains ego from himself in that he himself takes over alters perspective in speech acts. Habermas IV 94 N.B.: the actor is forced by the mere structure of linguistic intersubjectivity to be himself also in norm-compliant behavior. In communicative action, however it is guided by norms, nobody can be relieved of initiative in a very fundamental sense, nobody can hand over the initiative: "The "I" provides the feeling of freedom, the initiative".(1) >I, Ego, Self. >Self-identification, >Perspective. 1. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, ed. Ch. W. Morris, Chicago 1934, German Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft, Frankfurt, 1969, S. 221. |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Interpretation | Weber | Habermas III 153 Interpretation/Action/Weber/Habermas: the interpreter of an action only needs to determine "how the action would have proceeded if all circumstances and intentions of the co-interested parties had been known and if the means had been chosen in a strictly procedural rational manner, based on what we consider to be valid experience.(1) >Contrafactual conditional/Weber. Habermas: the more clearly an action corresponds to the procedural rational course of events, the less further psychological considerations are needed to explain it. >Purpose rationality, >Observation, >Actions, >Rationality. Habermas III 154 An action can be interpreted as more or less instrumentally rational. By proposing a rational interpretation, the interpreter himself takes a standpoint on the claim with which procedural rational actions occur; he himself leaves the attitude of a third person in favour of the attitude of one involved, which examines and, if necessary, criticizes a problematic claim of validity. >Validity claims, >Critique. 1. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Köln 1964, S. 5. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Materialism | Churchland | Pauen I 100 Materialism, eliminative/VsChurchland/Pauen: claim to be able to justify the abandonment of the terminology of everyday psychology. This assumes, however, that the corresponding entities do not exist in fact. This is an ontological and not just a language-philosophical thesis. Churchland claims that there are no serious objections to the eliminative materialism. That is not the case, however. I 101 VsMaterialismus, eliminative/Pauen: 1. False claim to know that there are neural, but no mental states. Performative contradiction: if this is about knowledge, then it must be true. There must therefore be no opinions (i.e., mental states). On the other hand, however, the knowledge status implicitly implies that the representative of a claim itself, is of the opinion that the facts are true. Patricia Churchland/Pauen: admits this performative contradiction, but sees in it only a further proof for our entanglement in the everyday psychology. VsChurchland: that is a mere announcement that the contradiction will be solved somehow. I 102 Performative contradiction/Churchland/Pauen: For example, the vitalism also diagnoses this contradiction: the opponent asserts that there are no spirits of life. This opponent, however, is himself alive, so he must have spirits of life ... PauenVsChurchland: that is not the same: the contradiction does not run on the same level: The opponent of vitalism does not depend on vitalism, but has an alternative concept. In contrast, the defender of everyday psychology does not have to make such a presupposition: the assertion that knowledge implies an opinion (the controversial mental state), is after all no invention of everyday psychology, it is not an empirical thesis at all. 103 VsMaterialism, eliminative/Pauen: 2nd problem of intertheoretical reduction: everyday psychology is to be eliminated, especially because it cannot be reduced to neurobiology. Robert McCauley/Pauen: therefore the two theories must compete on the same level. E.g. Phlogiston/Chemistry. In contrast to that, everyday psychology and scientific psychology are located on completely different levels. (First/third person, micro/macro). I 104 3. For example, split brain patients/Pauen: empirical evidence shows that, in particular, feelings are language-independent and thus can also be identified pre-theorytically. Patients react, but have no more conscious access. The stimuli occur in the right, unconscious, language-incapable hemisphere. Nevertheless, patients can provide correct information. They can neither be based on the generalizations of everyday psychology nor on a knowledge of the perceived object. I 105 This can only be explained if one assumes that emotional states have an intrinsic quality that also allows theory-independent interpretation. Churchland/Pauen: The latter then excludes the phenomenal states from the elimination. The everyday experience should no longer be changed by elimination. VsChurchland: this, however, diverges from the usual everyday psychology, which also includes pain. He had previously included pain in the states which would be changed by the elimination of the terms. Moreover, he is inconsistent when he insists on the elimination of cognitive consciousness. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Materialism | McGinn | II 30 f Materialism/Mind: Thesis: There is not more to the mind than there is to the brain. "Brain is all the mind needs". The mind consists of flesh, it is flesh. >Mind, >Brain, >Consciousness. II 31f Once the nature (or God) had planted neurons in our brains, no further work was necessary to provide us with consciousness. And that is not because neural processes cause consciousness processes, but because neuronal processes are processes of consciousness. II 32 It is also not true that consciousness processes are only one aspect of neuronal processes, but the state of consciousness is no more or less than its neural correlate. E.g. pain is simply reduced to physical processes, both of which are not only correlated, but identical. Granted, pain looks different in the introspection, but: introspection is merely a source of errors. The true nature of pain can only be disclosed by observing the third person. The mind is the brain in disguise, the genie is the lamp, although it may look different. II 33 McGinnVsMaterialism: Intuitive Answer: if materialism is right, I am in spite of everything not a conscious being. Old joke: Materialism must simulate anesthesia ((s) because the physical processes remain the same). According to materialism we would all be zombies who pretend to have a consciousness. From this follows an argument VsMaterialism: E.g. assuming I knew all there is to know in neurological terms about your brain. Would I know all about your mind then? (Could I predict your future?) McGinn: No. How can both be declared identical then: MaterialismVsMcGinn: Facts are one thing and knowledge about facts is another. Maybe I know all about your brain, but my knowledge is based on certain ideas (concepts). Materialism insists on that all mental facts are brain facts, that we cannot translate notions of mental facts into notions at the level of brain facts. ((s) A translation would have to perform a level change). E.g. All facts about water are facts about "H2O", although the words "water" and "H2O" do not mean the same thing. They are not synonyms. McGinnVsMaterialism: the problem with this objection is that there is no way to distinguish between mental and physical concepts without requiring a distinction at the level of facts. What distinguishes the idea of pain from the idea firing C-fibers is precisely the fact that in the focus of both concepts there are quite different properties, and thus we cannot say that both properties are identical. The materialist is forced to introduce the notion that one and the same fact can have two different manifestations. This concept of manifestations, however, is based in turn on that there are facts relating to manifestations which cannot be explained with brain facts. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Fodor | McGinn I 111 McGinn: domestication the theory of meaning of the third person: these theories shy away from consciousness and its contents while they settle the intended meaning in objective facts which concern the speaking subject. After that, causal, teleological or nomological relations to the environment are constitutive for the intended meaning (Dretske, Millikan, Fodor). >Meaning, >Language behavior, >Speaker meaning; cf. >Idiolect. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Norms | Davidson | Rorty VI 189 Norms/standards/Davidson: (according to Brandom): it is not required that practices that are not contained in an alternative practice (be it fictional), are checked against a norm. - The pursuit of truth cannot lead beyond our own practices (Sellars ditto). I 66 DavidsonVsQuine: His attempt is oriented to the first person, and thus Cartesian. Neither do I think we could do without at least some tacitly adopted norms. Davidson pro Quine: his courageous approach to epistemology presented in the third person. >Epistemology, >Community, >Society. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Ontology | Searle | I 33 In epistemological terms, it is laudable to say that the whole of reality is objective, neurobiologically it is simply wrong. >Constructivism. I 40 Ontology/Searle: wrong question: what kinds of things are there in the world? Correct: what must be the case that our empiricism is true? >Empiricism/Searle, >Existence/Searle. I 78f Reducibility is in any case a strange requirement of ontology, because in the past it was considered a classical proof of the non-existence of an entity if one traced it back to something else. >Reduction, >Reductionism. I 118 The ontology of observation, in contrast to its epistemology, is precisely the ontology of subjectivity. I 182 The ontology of unconscious states of mind consists solely in the existence of purely neurophysiological phenomena. I 183 This seems to be a contradiction: the ontology of unconscious intentionality consists entirely of objective, neurophysiological third person phenomena, and yet these states have an aspect shape! This contradiction dissolves when we consider the following: The concept of an unconscious intentional state is the concept of a state that is a possible conscious thought. The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective features of the brain that are capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts. >Object of thought, >Object of belief, >Intensional object. II 68 Representation: there is no ontology tied to representation. >Representation. V 163 Ontology: main question: are there criteria for ontological prerequisites? >Criteria. V 164 Existence/Quine: to accept something as an entity means to consider it as the value of a variable. Existence/SearleVsQuine: this criterion (value of a variable for existence) is confusing and meaningless. Alternative criterion: a theory presupposes and only the entities that it says exist. (This does not have to be done explicitly.) V 165 Ontology/Searle: one notation is as good as another, ontological conclusions should not be derived from it. It is also possible that there is no translation procedure to determine which statement is the simpler or better one. SearleVsQuine: according to Quine's criterion, two statements that actually include the same prerequisites would include different prerequisites! (This argument was put forward by William AlstonVsQuine). >Ontology/Quine. Stalnaker I 181 Ontology/language/metaphysics/Searle: one may not draw ontological conclusions from linguistic theories. >Identification principle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Privileged Access | Davidson | I (c) 42 Quine: privileged access - DavidsonVs. Frank I 630 First person authority/Davidson: indubitable - yet we explore everything in the third person perspective. Twin Earth/Putnam: third-person perspective: it is not sure if contents of the first person are recorded. Solution/Fodor: narrow content: internal condition with no relationship to the outside world - wide contents: relations with the outside world. - DavidsonVsFodor. Cf. >wide/narrow content. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Procedural Rationality | Weber | Habermas III 152 Procedural Rationality/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber subjectively refers to a purpose-oriented action, "which is exclusively oriented towards (subjectively) as appropriately presented means for (subjectively) unambiguously conceived purposes." (1) Habermas III 154 An action can be interpreted as more or less procedural rational. By proposing a rational interpretation, the interpreter himself takes a standpoint on the claim with which procedural rational actions occur; he himself leaves the attitude of a third person in favour of the attitude of one involved, which examines and, if necessary, criticizes a problematic claim of validity. >Validity claims, >Interpretation, >Observation. Habermas III 245 Weber calls actions that satisfy the conditions of the rationality of means and choice 'procedural rational' and actions that satisfy the conditions of normative rationality are called 'value-rational'. Both aspects can vary independently of each other. Progress in the dimension of procedural rationality can be made at the expense of value-rational actions. (2) >Value rationality. 1.M Weber, Methodologische Schriften, Frankfurt/M. 1968, p. 170. 2.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, (Ed.) J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 22. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Propositions | Perry | Frank I 396 Meaning/idea/PerryVsFrege: We must separate sharply meaning and thoughts. >Thoughts, >Thoughts/Frege, >Sense. The thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content. >Thought content, cf. >Thought objects. The meaning corresponds to the role of words. >Conceptual role, >Words, >Word meaning. The same role creates another de re proposition in any context. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Context, >de re. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 --- I 409f Proposition/PerryVsTradition: what is missing, is not a conceptual component, but an indexical. >Indexicality, >Index words. New theory: a kind of proposition is individuated by an object and a part of the old proposition. VsTradition: limiting the substitutability in quotations with propositional attitudes is not explained. >Opacity, >Substitutability. Tradition: E.g. Dean/Franks neighbor (identical, one and the same person): no variable but term. Problem: "He" does not provide a concept but a variable. Cf. >He/He himself. Solution/Perry: "open proposition": with objects and a conceptual component: "de re". - Then the "dean himself" is included and not only the term "Dean". >de re. Then a substitution by "Frank's neighbor" is valid and a quantification meaningful. >Quantification. Vs: de re does not solve the problem of mess in the supermarket (sugar trail) - (because of "I"). >Sugar trail example. --- I 455f Proposition/extra sense//Perry: parabola E.g. early humans who can only eat carrots lying in front of them, are equipped with the ability to believe propositions (to collect and pick up carrots). - Nothing happens, because the propositions do not say to humans that they even appear in it. Solution/Castaneda: additional localization in space and time. >Extra-Sense/Castaneda. Vs: the king of France does not know that he is the King of France and whether the carrot is not in front of the editor of Soul. VsExtra-sense: an extra-sense does not help the thinker embedding himself into a network of mental states. People understand sentences but do not form beliefs. >Understanding, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. List of extra senses for everyone: too long. Extra-sense "i" for everyone: validity by decree: solves the carrots problem but maims the language. Rule: "I" stands for the user ": makes people to speak of themselves in the "third person": ""I" is doing this". Problem: for truth of such sentences one needs reference (reference), meaning ("user") is not enough. >Reference, >Sense. The same meaning cannot perform different references. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Qualia | Searle | I 284 Qualia/Searle: qualia is what you cannot have without feeling anything. No qualia are: beliefs and other intentional states. You can have these without a certain feeling connected to them. I 34 The supposed problem is now: how can functionalism explain qualia? It cannot do it because it is tailored to a completely different subject area: it is about attributions from the point of view of the third person. >Functionalism. I 68 Qualia/reduction/reductionism/Searle: You cannot trace back intentional content (or pain, or qualia) to something else, because if you could, these things would be something else, but they are nothing else. >Reductionism. FodorVs: "in order for an intentional reference to be real, it must in reality be something else". Chalmers I 258 Disappearing Qualia/fading qualia/Searle: (Searle (1992)(1)): e.g. suppose that in your own brain, more and more silicon chips are being installed and you notice how your qualia is dwindling and you want to write "I'm becoming blind!" But you hear yourself say "I see a red object in front of me". Chalmers: the system might believe that something is wrong about itself. But only if the physical changes cause a magical interaction. I 259 Chalmers: it is much more likely that the qualia will not disappear when replacing neurons with silicone chips. 1. J. R. Searle: The rediscovery of the mind, Cambridge 1992. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Reasons | Habermas | III 169 Reasons/Habermas: Reasons are of such a substance that they cannot be described in the attitude of a third person, i. e. without either an agreeing, rejecting or abstinent reaction. The interpreter would not have understood what a "reason" is if he did not reconstruct it with his claim to justification (...). The description of reasons requires eo ipso an evaluation even if the person giving the description is unable to judge its validity at the moment. One can only understand reasons to the extent that one can ... III 170 ... understand why they are sound or not. The interpreter cannot interpret reasons without commenting on them. >Interpretation, >Other minds, >Behavior, >Understanding, >Description, >First person, >Attribution, >Foreign attribution, cf. >Attribution/Chisholm. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Self-Knowledge | Burge | Frank I 687 Authority/First Person/Self-Knowledge/Burge: (per Descartes) We have "basic self-knowledge". E.g. "I think (with this very thought) that writing requires concentration. Problem: 1. does individualism follow from accepting this Cartesian conception? 2. how is certainty about one's own mental states possible for externalism (anti-individualism)? Frank I 706 Self-knowledge/Burge: the source of our strong epistemic claim is not that we know a lot about the objects or that we know the circumstances (enabling conditions) particularly well, but arises from the nature and function of self-evaluative judgments. E.g. When we consider that there is no water at all, we are unjustifiably viewing our position from a third person perspective. >Perspective, >Description levels, >Incorrigibility. Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663 |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Skepticism | McGinn | I 152 Skepticism/McGinn: 1. The general problem of skepticism: the reasons for our knowledge claims remain miserably behind the content of this claim. Problem of lacking. The input is not sufficient to justify the output. 2. Specific knowledge problems: are ahead of the skepticism: how do we get to the "a priori" knowledge? >Knowledge, >a priori/McGinn. I 174f Skepticism: a) skepticism of the first person: limits to my knowledge coincide with the limits of my phenomenal experience. b) skepticism of the third person: biological limit. How can we as a few pounds of meat, permeated by nerves, make an image of the outside world? McGinnVsSkepticism: Takes advantage of the idea, there would be a metaphysical gap between subject and knowledge object. a) For position of the first-person between the states of consciousness and the conditions in the outside world b) For the position of the third person: the gap is seen as a part of the objective world which would face another part of the world, while both parts have their own characteristics. I 176 We need to prove that despite these gaps knowledge is possible, and that the gaps of knowledge are not as detrimental as it seems. I 177 Knowledge/Transcendental Naturalism/TN: claims that the gaps are ultimately gaps in our understanding ability. Its origin is of epistemological, not of ontological kind. >Terminology/McGinn. I 196 The skeptic misinterprets our principled disability on the level of meta-theory as a case of irrationality on the basis level. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Type /Token Identity | Pauen | Pauen I 107 Type identity/Pauen: Feigl, Place, Smart: empirically determined, as between H20 and each water, clouds, ice. Not necessary because empirical. (KripkeVs). Feigl: "dual access". Token identity: >Anomalous monism, functionalism. >Functionalism. - >Anomalous monism, >Supervenience/Davidson. Aspect dualism (actual monism); >Monism. All authors agree: Thesis: each mental process is identical with a neural process. - Therefore it must be possible in principle to investigate conditions of the first person from the perspective of the third person. >Identity theory, >First Person, >Mental states, >Brain states. I 116 Type-identity/VsType identity/Pauen: 1. It has been previously empirically impossible to determine exactly describable types of neuronal processes - 2 even in stable psychophysical correlations would an identification not make sense - why should the uniform activity of unconscious neurons be identical with consciousness? >Consciousness. I 118 Token-identity/Pauen: weaker version of the identity theory: it is sufficient that every mental state has some physical realization - it is no longer required, that there is a certain type of neural states, which is identical with the type of pain. Subspecies: "Anomalous monism". >functionalism, >Anomalous monism, >Token physicalism. I 158 Type-identity/Pauen: today attractive again - ontological thrift - they must not insist that we mean functional relationships "in reality" when we speak of mental processes - therefore the mental state also has causality. >Type-/Token-identity, >Causality. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Avramides, A. | Reductionism Vs Avramides, A. | Avra I 90 Radical Interpretation/RI/Avramides: is quite obviously indeed a gradual approach? Avramides: I do not want to deny that, but that we need assumptions about beliefs and meanings simultaneously in early stages. ReductionismVsAvramides: this is the point where my opponent may step in and see an opportunity for an epistemic asymmetry: what is implausible, is not a gradual approach, but the concomitant thesis that radical interpreter needs a complete evidence basis for beliefs and intentions of the unacquainted speaker before he finds out anything about his language. AvramidesVsVs: this implausible thesis notwithstanding, the gradual approach of radical interpretation is as follows: the interpreter forms hypotheses on simple beliefs... (>see Bennett 1985) and all these hypotheses remain revisable until the end. In later stages, we then simultaneously deal with beliefs and meaning. I 158 ReductionismVsAvramides: Subjective Mind/AvramidesVsReductionism: is incompatible with the fact that the mind is only contingently connected with behavior. I 159 A subject can never be separated from its very own experience. VsAvramides: Important Argument: such a subjective concept can be constructed, without significant reference to the behavior! VsAvramides: neither is it necessary to make any significant reference to the third person perspective! I.e. reductionism (reductive Gricean) does not automatically lead to the objective mind. I.e. that a subjective concept of mind is therefore compatible with the fact that mind is only contingently connected with behavior. AvramidesVs: I admit that I cannot prove that this objection is incorrect, but is important to me that my approach allows to combine the first person and third person perspectives. I 160 Without connection to behavior there is no proper understanding of the first person perspective. And this leads to an objective Cartesian (or incomplete) picture. (55 +). |
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| Ayer, A. J. | Davidson Vs Ayer, A. J. | Frank I 639 Asymmetry/Authority/Perspective first person/third person/Ayer: (The Concept of a Person): similar to Ryle: self-attributions may be erroneous. Authority/Ayer: self-atrributions similar to those of eyewitnesses, compared with second-hand reports. DavidsonVsAyer: unsatisfactory: 1) this does not tell us why the first person should rather be in the position of an eyewitness 2) the comparison does not show what the first person authority actually is. Self-attribution/Davidson: often has no clues! (Like Wittgenstein). At best, the eyewitness has induction available, he can also be unreliable. But a person never loses its right I 640 to be right in terms of their own attitudes. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Cartesianism | Physicalism Vs Cartesianism | Avramides I 135 PhysicalismVsCartesianism: turns it around: instead of the first person perspektve we have only the third person perspective. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Churchland, P. | Pauen Vs Churchland, P. | Pauen I 99 Churchland/Pauen: commits sciences to a very strong notion of nature as a kind of "thing in itself", ultimate authority in the decision about theories. I 100 VsChurchland/Pauen: claim to be able to justify the renunciation of the terminology of folk psychology. However, this presupposes that the relevant entities do indeed not exist. So this is an ontological and not only a language philosophical thesis. All the while, Churchland assumes that there are no serious objections to eliminative materialism. That's not the case, though. I 101 VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 1) false claim of knowing that there are neural, but not mental states. Performative contradiction: if this is about knowledge, then it must be true for its part. I.e. there may be no opinions (i.e. mental states). On the other hand, however, the knowledge status implies that the representative of an assertion himself is of the opinion that the facts are true. Patricia Churchland/Pauen: concedes this performative contradiction, but sees it as only another piece of evidence of our involvement in folk psychology. VsChurchland: this is a mere announcement that the contradiction would eventually be dissolved. I 102 Performative Contradiction/Churchland/Pauen: E.g. vitalism also diagnoses this contradiction: the opponent claims that there are no animal spirits. But this opponent himself is alive, so he must have animal spirits... PauenVsChurchland: this is not the same: the contradiction does not run on the same level: The opponent of vitalism does not make himself dependent on vitalism, but has an alternative design. In contrast, the defender of folk psychology does not need to make such a requirement: the assertion that knowledge implies opinion (the controversial mental state) is not an invention of folk psychology after all, it is not an empirical thesis at all. I 103 VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 2nd problem of inter-theoretical reduction: folk psychology is to be eliminated mainly because it cannot be reduced to the neurobiology. Robert McCauley/Pauen: the two theories would have to compete on the same level for that. E.g. phlogiston/chemistry. In contrast, folk psychology and scientific psychology are located on completely different levels. (First/Third Person, Micro/Macro). I 104 3) E.g. Split Brain Patients/Pauen: Empirical evidence shows that feelings in particular are language-independent, and thus can also be identified pretheoretically. Patients respond, but have no conscious access anymore. The stimuli reach the right, unconscious hemisphere that is incapable of speech. Nevertheless, the patients can give correct information. In doing so, they can rely neither on the generalizations of folk psychology nor on a knowledge of the perceived object. I 105 This can only be explained if one assumes that emotional states have an intrinsic quality that also allows theory-independent interpretation. Churchland/Pauen: consequently excludes phenomenal states from the elimination. Everyday experience should now no longer be changed by elimination. VsChurchland: this now differs from the common folk psychology, however, which also includes pain. Before, he himself had still counted pain among the states which have been changed by the elimination of the concepts. He is also inconsistent when he adheres to the eliminability of cognitive awareness. I 188 Explanation Gap/Pauen: already recognized by Leibniz in principle. Then Dubois Reymond, Nagel, Joseph Levine. Explanation Gap/Levine/Pauen: between scientific and folk psychological theories. Chalmers: "Hard Problem of Consiousness": I 189 forces us to perform huge interventions in previously accepted views and methods. Identity theory: refers to ontology. Explanatory gap argument epistemically refers to our knowledge. Context: if we accept the identity theory, we must expect that our respective knowledge can be related to each other. I 191 Churchland: it would now be a fallacy to try and infer from our present ignorance the insolubility of the problem. ("Argument from Ignorance") VsChurchland: in the case of the explanation gap that does not need to be plausible! The representatives do not rely on their own ignorance and do not refer to the failure of previous research. They assume a fundamental difference between entities such as e.g. water and heat on the one hand and mental processes on the other. Therefore, our methods must fail. I 192 Causal properties play a significant role with these differences. Then, according the representatives of the explanatory gap argument, it must be possible to characterize our natural phenomena designated by everyday concepts characterized by such causal properties: Levine: then there is a two-stage process: I 193 1) quasi a-priori process: the concept is brought "into shape" for the reduction through the determination of the causal role. 2) empirical work to discover what the underlying mechanisms are. I 194 This method fails now when it comes to the explanation of mental and especially phenomenal states. They cannot be translated into causal roles in principle! Unlike in our colloquial speech of physical processes, we obviously do not mean these effects, when we talk about mental states. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Dennett, D. | Nagel Vs Dennett, D. | Rorty VI 144 Explanation/Dennett/Rorty: it is sufficient to explain why there seems to be something phenomenological, i.e. why it seems to be true "that there is a difference between thinking... that something seems to be pink, and the fact that something really appears to be pink. (!) VsDennett: his critics believe that his book is merely good for explaining away consciousness. Belief/Existence/Dennett/Rorty: should reply that it is a good thing to explain something away, i.e. to declare that we do not have to make room for this something in our image, but only for the belief in that something. NagelVsDennett/Rorty: Procrustes-like adaptation to objectivity. Instead, we should seek an objectivity which connects the position of the first person with that of the third person. First Person/Nagel/Searle/Rorty: (inter alia): knowledge of intrinsic, non-relational properties of mental events. RortyVsNagel/VsSearle: if they accept the maxim: "if all the relational properties are explained (all causes and effects), then the thing itself is explained", they will realize that they lose out here. I 145/146 Nagel: (according to Rorty) therefore he must insist that non-relational properties are impossible reduce to relational ones. Consciousness/Nagel/Rorty: that a human has consciousness is not merely a belief, but a conclusion from evidence. I.e. there is a gap (according to Rorty) between the evidence and the conclusion from the evidence, the gap between the totality of the relations between the consciousness and the rest of the world, and the intrinsic nature of consciousness on the other ahnd. VI 147 NagelVsDennett/Rorty: his "hetero-phenomenology" is not sufficient. Nagel Thesis: the sources of philosophy are pre-linguistic, their problems are not dependent on culture. VI 149 Hetero-Phenomenalism/DennettVsNagel: he should accept the "hetero-phenomenalism" as a neutral description. RortyVsDennett, RortyVsNagel: both missed! Hetero-phenomenalism claims to speak that which Nagel thinks unspeakable. Nagel is right here in accusing him of a petitio principii, because this anticipates the decision about all the interesting questions. DennettVsNagel: perhaps we are only now unable to describe certain things and later we will be! NagelVsDennett: something "else, describable" does not interest me! The indescribable should not be replaced with something describable. VI 150 That would be like trying to ask Kant to recognize the thing as such after the reception of Hegel. VI 151/152 Def Hetero-Phenomenology/Rorty: claims for himself to tell the other what "he actually spoke about". VsQualia, VsUnrecognizable Nature, VsKnowledge that cannot be influenced by way of speaking, (reductionism). (RortyVsDennett: he falsely believes he is neutral). |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Dennett, D. | Searle Vs Dennett, D. | Dennett I 558 Intentionality/SearleVsDennett: cannot be reached by the composition of equipment or the construction of ever-improving algorithms. DennettVsSearle: this is the belief in sky hook: the Spirit shall not be created, it is not designed, but only (unexplained) source of design. SearleVsDennett: the view that one can look for "floating grounds" for a selection process for the mind, is a caricature of Darwinian thinking. Searle I 179 We can understand the concept of an unconscious mental state only so that it was about a real content of consciousness. Def "compound principle": the idea that all unconscious intentional states in principle consciousness are accessible. 1. SearleVsDennett: there is a difference between intrinsic intentionality and as if intentionality. If one wanted to give up this difference, one would have to accept the fact that everything is about something mental, because relative to any purpose can be anything and everything treated as if it were something intellectual. E.g. Running water could be described as if it had intentionality: it is trying to get down, by visiting clever way the line of least resistance, it processes information, the calculated size of rocks, etc .. (> laws of nature). But if water is something mental, then everything is something mental. 2. Unconscious intentional states are intrinsic. I 180 3. intrinsic intentional states, conscious or unconscious, always have an aspect shape. Someone may want a glass of drinking water without wanting to drink a glass of H2O. There is an indefinite number of true descriptions of the evening star or a glass of water, but if someone wants a glass of water, this will only happen under certain aspects and not others. I 181 4. The aspects feature can not be exhaustively or fully characterized alone with the help of third person predicates. There is always an inference gap gape between the epistemological reasons that we can gain from the behavior that the aspect is present, and the ontology of the aspect itself. A person may well create a behavior of the water searching on the day, but each such conduct will also be a search of H2O. There is no way exclude the second. I 182 E.g. assumed we would have a brain o Skop to look into the skull of a person, and see that she wants water, but no H2O, then still a conclusion would play a part! We then would still have a law-like link that puts us in a position to conclude from our observations of the neural architecture that in this case the desire for water, but not the desire for H2O is realized. The neurophysiological facts are always causally sufficient for any amount of mental facts. 5. But the ontology of unconscious mental states is solely in the existence of purely neurophysiological phenomena. E.g. we imagine someone fast asleep and dreamless. Now it is so that he believes that the capital of Colorado is Denver. Now, the only facts that may exist while he is completely unconscious are neurophysiological facts. I 183 That seems to be a contradiction: the ontology of unconscious intentionality consists entirely of objective, neurophysiological third person phenomena, yet these states have an aspect shape. This contradiction is resolved when we consider the following: 6. The concept of an unconscious intentional state is the concept of a state which is a possible conscious thought. 7. The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective characteristics of the brain that are capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts. I 184 The existence of causal features is compatible therewith that their causal powers may be blocked in each case due to confounding factors. An unconscious intentional state may be such that it could simply not be brought to consciousness by the person concerned. However, it must be a thing of the kind that, in principle, can be brought to consciousness. Mentalism: the naive mentalism leads to a kind of dispositional analysis of unconscious mental phenomena. The idea of a dispositional theory of mind has been introduced precisely for the purpose of getting rid of the appeal to the consciousness. (> Dispositions/Ryle). III 156 Rule/VsSearle: one might say, "is it not simply so, "as if" we followed the rules?" As if/intentionality/Searle: "As if-Intentionality" explains nothing if there is no real intentionality. She has no causal power. SearleVsDennett: it is as empty as the "intentional attitude". |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Identity Theory | Pauen Vs Identity Theory | Pauen I 109 Identity Theory/Pauen: simple explanation of the origin of consciousness: simply as neuronal processes. E.g. Buddenbrooks is not just a novel, but also Mann's first work. VsIdentity Theory/Pauen: this makes it counterintuitive how neuronal processes are supposed to explain the origin of the work. I 110 Multiple RealizabilityVsIdentity Theory/Pauen: the identity theory cannot explain how different neural patterns can bring about the same state of consciousness. Explanation GapVsIdentity Theory/Pauen: ("Explanatory Gap Argument"): (Joseph Levine): in view of the multiple realization the two levels (mental, neuronal) gape but too far apart. In addition, experience is considered with regard to the mental state. Identity/Wittgenstein/Pauen: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say it of one thing is meaningless. I 113 Identity/Pauen: identity assertions which go beyond the trivial, are always hypotheses. I 77 Def Identity Theory/Pauen: first and third person are equal ranking, precursor: Spinoza, parallelism. Def Type Identity Theory: all mental states of a certain mental type are at the same time states of a particular neuronal type and vice versa. Highlight: 50s, then decline. VsTyp Identity: cannot explain multiple realizability. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Kant | McDowell Vs Kant | I 69 Experience/Kant/McDowell: is for Kant, as I see it, not behind a border that surrounds the sphere of the conceptual. McDowellVsKant: (I 67-69+) the talk of transcendental conditions renders the responsibility of our actions problematic. Although empirically speaking there may be justifications, transcendentally speaking we can only claim excuses! Kant/McDowell: we should not look for psychological phenomenalism in Kant. Strawson dito. McDowellVsKant: his philosophy leads to the disregard of the independence of reality. I 69 Idealism: Kant's followers claimed that one must give up the supernatural to arrive at a consistent idealism. McDowellVsBorder of the conceptual: thesis: Hegel expresses exactly that what I want: "I'm thinking I am free because I am not in an Other. I 109/110 Second Nature/(s): internalized background of norms that have been taken from nature. Second Nature/McDowell: they cannot hover freely above the opportunities that belong to the normal human body. > Education/McDowell. I 111 Rationality/Kant: acting freely in its own sphere. ((S) This is the origin of most problems covered here). McDowell: Thesis: we must reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject and object). McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature. I 122 Reality/Kant: attributes spirit of independence to the empirical world. I 123 McDowellVsKant: thinks that the interests of religion and morality can be protected by recognizing the supernatural. Nature/Kant: equal to the realm of natural laws. He does not know the concept of second nature, although well aware of the concept of education. But not as a background. I 126 Spontaneity/KantVsDavidson: it must structure the operations of our sensuality as such. McDowellVsKant: however, for him there remains only the resort to a transcendental realm. I 127 "I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). McDowellVsKant: it is not satisfactory, if the self-consciousness is only the continuity of a face. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Karttunen, L. | Stalnaker Vs Karttunen, L. | II 56 Def factive verbs/Lauri Karttunen/Stalnaker: e.g. to know, to regret, to discover, to see. non-factive verbs: e.g. to assert, to believe, to intend, faktive verbs: if V is a factive verb then x' presupposes V-en that P (and I would say also includes (entails)) that P. factive verbs/Karttunen: a) Def fully factive: here it is not only the assertion or denial of the proposition x V-t that P requires the presupposition but also the assumption (supposition) of this proposition in an antecedent or the assertion that the proposition could be true. E.g. to regret, to forget, to resent. b) Def semi-factive/Karttunen: here it is only the assertion or the denial of the proposition that requires the presupposition. E.g. Sam regrets that he voted for Nixon. If Sam regrets that he voted for Nixon he is an idiot. (fully factive). E.g. to regret something: here is strongly presupposed E.g. semi-factive: to discover, to recognize: here the presupposition is not as strong. Def strong presupposition/Karttunen/Stalnaker: if P is made necessary II 57 By MQ and M~Q then Q strongly presupposes P. Def weak presupposition/Karttunen/Stalnaker: corresponds to the normal presupposition. Strong/weak presupposition/factive/semi-factive/StalnakerVsKarttunen: I deny the theoretical approach and the clarity of the examples. E.g. When Harry discovers that his wife is making out, he will be upset. If Harry had discovered that his wife making out, he would have been upset If Harry would understand.... Explanation/StalnakerVsKarttunen: surely here is always a presupposition in play. But difference: a) if the speaker strictly assumes something ((s) explicitly) then he does not presuppose it. b) if something is questionable for the speaker he cannot assume that he already knows it. E.g. Karttunen: Did you regret - understand - note that you did not tell the truth? II 58 Pragmatic presupposition/Stalnaker: here the restrictions on the presuppositions can be changed without the truth conditions (tr.cond.) changing so we can see differences between statements of the first and second person or between such of a third person and postulate questions without different semantic types of propositions. That means despite the differences we can say that the statements have the same semantic content. StalnakerVsSemantic approach: here we cannot say that. II 59 Compound propositions/complex sentence/presupposition/Stalnaker: how do the presuppositions behave that require a conditional to the presuppositions that are demanded by the parts of the conditional? Conjunction/conditional/presupposition/Karttunen: thesis: S be a proposition of the form A and B or of the form if A then B. a) Conjunction: S presupposes that C iff either A presupposes that C or B presupposes that C and A includes (entails) not semantically that C. That means the presuppositions of a conjunction are those that are required by one of the conjuncts minus any other presupposition that are semantically included by the other conjunct (entailment). ((s) Entailment: is truth-functional (truth-conditional)). b) Conditional: the presuppositions of the conditional are those that are either demanded by the antecedent or the consequent minus those that are required by the consequent while semantically being included by the antecedent (entails). E.g. "Harry is married and Harry's wife is a great cook". Conjunction: here the reversal of the order is not acceptable. Moreover, the second conjunct can also stand alone. Conjunction/Karttunen/Stalnaker: when we interpret his analysis semantically (truth-functional) then we have to say that this conjunction is not truth-functional because the truth values (tr.v.) depend on the entailment between the conjunction. This implicates that this "and" is not symmetrical. A and B may be wrong, while B and A is no truth value. StalnakerVsKarttunen: that would implicate more complicated rules. II 60 Solution/Stalnaker: pragmatically interpreted we need neither ad hoc semantics nor pragmatic rules Explanation: after a proposition was asserted the speaker can reasonably assume it for the rest of the conversation. That means after A has been pronounced it became part of the background before B was pronounced. Even if A was not initially presupposed, one can assert A and B, because at that time, when you come to B, the context has changed and thus A was presupposed. Conditional/pragmatic presupposition/Stalnaker: here we must distinguish explicit assumption (supposition) of presuppositions. If-proposition: is explicit. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Anscombe Vs Kripke, S. A. | Frank I 84 I/Descartes: not a kind of body. I could assume that I don’t have a body. I/Augustine: "the mind knows of itself, that it is thinking." "It knows its own substance." Kripke/Anscombe: K. tried to rehabilitate Descartes’ argument for his dualism. AnscombeVsKripke: he neglects his first person character by making it an argument for the non-identity of Descartes with his own body. I 85 According to this, Descartes would have had to doubt the existence of Descartes as a human being, and in any case the existence of this figure in the world of his time, of this Frenchman, christened René... Descartes/AnscombeVsKripke: "I am not Descartes" was for him like "I’m not a body!" Forcing the argument into the third person perspective by replacing "I" with "Descartes" means to neglect this. Descartes never thought, "Descartes is not Descartes" (which according to Anscombe is ascribed to him by Kripke). I 85/86 AnscombeVsKripke: this discussion is not about the usual reflexive pronoun, but about a strange reflexive which must be explained from the standpoint of the "I". Grammarians call it the "indirect reflexive". (In Greek it is a separate form.) E.g. "When John Smith spoke of James Robinson, he spoke of his brother, but he did not know that." So it is conceivable that someone does not know that the object of which he speaks is himself. Now, if "I" is compatible with ignorance, the reflexive pronoun cannot be used as usual. Now one may ask: was the person of which Smith intended to speak not Smith? Was the person not himself?. Answer: not in the relevant sense! Unless the reflexive pronoun is itself a sufficient proof of reference. And the usual reflexive pronoun cannot do that. I 96 I/Self/Logic/Anscombe: here, the "manner of givenness" is unimportant. Fra I 97 The logician understands that "I" in my mouth is just another name for "E.A.". His rule: if x makes assertions with "I" as the subject, then they are true iff the predicates of x are true. AnscombeVsLogic/AnscombeVsKripke: for this reason he makes the transition from "I" to "Descartes". But this is too superficial: If one is a speaker who says "I", then it is impossible to find out what it is that says "I". E.g. one does not look to see from which apparatus the noise comes. Thus, we have to compel our logician to assume a "guaranteed" reference of "I". Fra I 98 Problem: with a guaranteed reference there is no longer any difference between "I" and "A". |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Materialism | Papineau Vs Materialism | David Papineau Literature II 309 Def Antipathetic Fallacy/Papineau: from the fact that we do not have the experiences we erroneously conclude that we could not refer to them either. Confusion of mention and use: we slide from a) to b) a) Third person thoughts do not use conscious experiences b) Third person thoughts do not mention conscious experiences. However, there is no reason why a third person could not relate (mention) thoughts to the experiences of others, but without using them. (Mention = Reference) II 310 Antipathetic False Conclusion/Papineau: What should he explain? He should explain why so many people have such strong intuitions according to which conscious states are not physical. (VsMaterialism, VsPhysicalism, Papineau pro.). II 312 PapineauVsAntipathetic Fallacy/Papineau: error that the experience is something additional to the brain state. (Category error, e.g. as if the university was something additional to the sum of its parts). Papineau: there is nothing to explain. I am not denying consciousness, but that there are additional inner lights. (McGinn uses this metaphor.) |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Nonfactualism | Searle Vs Nonfactualism | I 137 Nofactualism/facts/Searle: which fact in the world corresponds to your true statement: "I am now in pain"? I 138 There appear to be at least two types of such facts. 1. at the moment certain unpleasant conscious sensations and 2. certain underlying neurophysiological processes. Suppose we want to say, the pain was in fact "nothing but" the pattern of neuronal firing. Then we left out the essential characteristics of the pain. And simply because First Person features are something different than Third Person characteristics. Know how/SearleVsNonfactualism: someone who had complete knowledge of the neurophysiology knew still not what pain is if he did not know what it is like to feel pain. >Facts/Searle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Nozick, R. | Peacocke Vs Nozick, R. | I 133 Way of Givenness/Object/Peacocke: I have separated the theory of the way of givenness of an object from the theory about the nature of objects. This is in contrast to the approach of Robert Nozick: Philosophical Explanations, 1981, p 87th I 133/134 I/NozickVsPeacocke: Thesis: the I is designed and synthesized around the act of reflexive self-reference. This is the only way to explain why we when reflexively referring to ourselves, know that it is we ourselves who we refer to. Declaration/Peacocke: Nozick refers here to the fact that an epistemic fact can only be explained by appealing to a certain approach to nature of this object, and not to the way of givenness how we perceive the object. Or how the subject is reflected upon. Object/Intension/Explanation/Peacocke: Question: It is for every person a) a conditional that they know or is it b) a conditional which is only a consequence of its knowledge? The first case would be: a) I know: when I say "I", then the utterance of "I" refers to me b) When I say "I", then: I know that the utterance of "I" refers to me Peacocke: ad b): is not a real date that requires an explanation. It is not always true! E.g. I am in the same room with my twin brother and for one of us the vocal cords do not work without both of us knowing for whom... ad a): this seems to be based on two different beliefs: I 135 1) the originator of the statement u of 'I' = myself 2) Every utterance of "I" refers to its originator. Nozick/Problem: E.g. Oedipus: he knows: The originator of the utterance u of "the murderer of Laius" = I and he also knows: Every utterance of "the murderer of Laius" refers to the murderer of Laius. but he does not believe in the identity of "the murderer..." = I. So he is not in the position to judge: The originator of the utterance u of "the murderer of Laius" refers to me. I/PeacockVsNozick: so we have the contrast between first person and third person cases without having a theory of the "synthesized self" (Nozick), if we can explain the availability and the content of the premises in the first-person case without this theory. Nozick: what is it like for me to know that it was I who produced a particular statement? Peacocke: but that involves two different interpretations: 1) What is it like to know that and not only to believe it? This is no more problematic than the question whether it was I who blew out the candle. 2) What is the content of the thought: "I have made this statement"? I 136 This is again about evidence*: that "the person with such and such states" made the statement. Nozick: it is not sufficient that I know a token of the utterance "I made this statement" and speak German! Peacocke: it can be compared with the time problem: The time of the utterance of u "now" = now Every utterance of "now" refers to the time of the utterance PeacockeVsNozick: it does not seem that we need a theory of time, as "synthesized around acts of reference" in any (every?) language. Nozick's theory cannot explain what it claims to be explaining: because a his subject matter concerns that which can be known, while his theory is not a theory of ways of givenness. We cannot simply think of any object without thinking about it a certain way. Nozick's synthesized selves are simply construed as objects, though. Peacocke: can we reformulate Nozick's theory as approach to ways of givenness? Is "the originator of this statement" to be thought somehow in a first person way? (reflexive self-reference). 1) What is this act like in a complex way of givenness. It cannot be perceptual. Because that could be an informative (!) self-identification ((s) empirically, after confusion with the twin brother, and then not necessarily). Instead: Action-based: "the act, which was brought about by the attempt to speak". That is not informative indeed. But that brings Nozick's theory close to our theory of the constitutive role. I 137 Because such attempts are among the conscious states of the subject. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Physicalism | Avramides Vs Physicalism | Avramides I 111 AvramidesVsPhysicalism/AvramidsVsCartesianism: both make the same mistake. In reality no perspective (God viewpoint or science of the future) can ever fathom the mental life of an individual without observing his behavior. (Davidson ditto). I 135 AvramidesVsPhysicalism: by emphasizing the difficulties of an intangible empire, he loses sight of an important insight by Descartes: The subject has a unique relation to its interior. PhysicalismVsCartesianism: turns it around: instead of first-person perspektve we have only the third person perspective. I 137 Objective mind/Asymmetry/Concept/AvramidesVsLoar/AvramidesVsPhysicalism: thesis: if one understands the mind as objective, conceptual questions can no longer be separated from superficial epistemic questions or maintain a separation between our access to what the states of mind are in themselves and the normal evidence (behavior) that affect them. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Davidson Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I (c) 41 Quine connects meaning and content with the firing of sensory nerves (compromise proposal) This makes his epistemology naturalistic. - DavidsonVsQuine: Quine should drop this (keep naturalism) but what remains of empiricism after deducting the first two dogmas. - DavidsonVsQuine: names: "Third Dogma" (> Quine, Theories and Things, Answer) dualism of scheme and content. Davidson: Scheme: Language including the ontology and world theory contained in it; I 42 - Content: the morphological firing of the neurons. Argument: something like the concept of uninterpreted content is necessary to make the concept relativism comprehensible. In Quine neurological replacement for sensory data as the basis for concept relativism. Davidson: Quine separation of scheme and content, however, becomes clear at one point: (Word and Object). Quine: "... by subtracting these indications from the worldview of people, we get the difference of what he contributes to this worldview. This difference highlights the extent of the conceptual sovereignty of the human, the area where he can revise his theories without changing anything in the data." (Word and Object, beginning) I 43 - Referring to QuineVsStroud: "everything could be different": we would not notice... -DavidsonVsQuine: Is that even right? According to the proximal theory, it could be assumed: one sees a rabbit, someone else sees a warthog and both say: Gavagai! (Something similar could occur with blind, deaf, bats or even with low-level astigmatism. The brains in the tank may be wrong even to the extent that Stroud feared. But everyone has a theory that preserves the structure of their sensations. I (c) 55 So it is easy to understand Cresswell when he says CreswellVsQuine: he has an empire of reified experiences or phenomena which confronts an inscrutable reality. QuineVsCresswell> Quine III) - I (c) 64 DavidsonVsQuine: he should openly advocate the distal theory and recognize the active role of the interpreter. The speaker must then refer to the causes in the world that both speak and which are obvious for both sides. I (d) 66 DavidsonVsQuine: His attempt is based on the first person, and thus Cartesian. Nor do I think we could do without some at least tacitly agreed standards. ProQuine: his courageous access to epistemology presented in the third person. I (e) 93 Quine: ontology only physical objects and classes - action not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action: event and reference object. Explicating this ontology is a matter of semantics. Which entities must we assume in order to understand a natural language? McDowell I 165 McDowell: World/Thinking/Davidson: (according to McDowell): general enemy to the question of how we come into contact with the empirical world. There is no mystery at all. No interaction of spontaneity and receptivity. (DavidsonVsQuine) Scheme/Content/Davidson: (Third Dogma): Scheme: Language in Quine - Content: "empirical meaning" in Quine. (I 165) Conceptual sovereignty/Quine: can go as far as giving rise to incommensurable worldviews. DavidsonVsQuine: experience cannot form a basis of knowledge beyond our opinions. It would otherwise have to be simultaneously inside and outside the space of reason. Fodor/Lepore IV 225 Note 13.> IV 72 Radical Inerpretation/RI/Quine: his version is a first step to show that the concept of linguistic meaning is not scientifically useful and that there is a "large range" in which the application can be varied without empirical limitation. (W + O, p. 26> conceptual sovereignty). DavidsonVsQuine: in contrast to this: RI is a basis for denying that it would make sense to claim that individuals or cultures had different conceptual schemes. |
Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Ryle, G. | Davidson Vs Ryle, G. | Frank I 639 Asymmetry/Authority/First-person perspective/Third person/Davidson: pro Ryle: every attempt at explaining the asymmetry by knowing something in a certain way must lead to skepticism. DavidsonVsRyle: instead of explaining the asymmetry, he simply denies it. But since it obviously exists, one should not draw the conclusion that there is no first-person authority from the lack of a particular way of knowing something. >First person/Davidson. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 |
Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Skepticism | McGinn Vs Skepticism | I174 Skepticism: a) first person perspective: limits to my knowledge coincide with the limits of my phenomenal experience. b) third person perspective: biological limit. How can we as a few pounds of meat permeated by nerve get an image of the outside world? I 176 McGinnVsSkepticism: uses the idea that there is a metaphysical gap between the subject and the object of knowledge. a) for the first-person stance: between the states of consciousness and the conditions in the outside world. b) for the third person: the gap is to be perceived as if a part of the objective world opposed another part of the world, while both parts each have their own characteristics. We need to prove that despite these gaps knowledge is possible, and that the gaps are not as detrimental to knowledge as it seems. I 191 McGinnVsSkepticism: its brittle core consists of two problematic ideas: 1. The idea of a possible content of attentive consciousness. 2. concept of the rationality of our inferences. I 193 If the premises are not enough logically, we are worried about the underdetermination through evidence. Often we intuitively deem a certain conclusion correct. This intuitive accuracy is an example of a classical philosophical riddle: there is an inexplicable transition from one kind of things to another type without clear principles being available to justify this stretch. Then we talk about innovation and creativity. I 196 McGinnVsSkepticism: the skeptic misinterprets our principle inability at the level of meta-theory as a case of irrationality on the basic level. I 196 McGinnVsSkepticism: a 3rd point is the viability of our cognitive practices. Does the way how we arrive at our beliefs entail a clue that this were deeply irrational? If it were, the problem would be far more drastic than the mere absence of justifications. I 199 transcendental naturalismVsSkepticism: the falsity of the skeptical position can only be seen from outside our system of concepts. It has to be explained psychologically, only that this explanation is beyond our capabilities. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Tradition | Ryle Vs Tradition | Lanz I 275 Ryle: psychological statements are hypothetical statements. They are also verifiable from the perspective of the third person. It is not about causes, but about criteria and standards for skills and achievements. I 276 They denote behavioral dispositions and non-internal events that would be the causes of behavior. Intelligence/Tradition: intelligent action: rule or method knowledge, so to know a set of positions. That is, intelligent action would be action with an intelligent cause. (RyleVs). Intelligence/Ryle: there are many examples of intelligent action without consideration: E.g. quick-witted replies, spontaneously correct deciding (fast chess) practically clever behavior in games, in sports and others. I 277 RyleVsTradition: Regress: if intelligent action was the application of intelligence, then this application would again be an action for which intelligence would be necessary, ad infinitum. Definition Intelligence/Ryle: action with a certain level, with a certain quality. The actor possesses corresponding ability and uses them. Ryle I 373 Memory/Presentation/RyleVs trace theory: their followers should try to imagine the case in which someone has a melody stuck in his head. Is this a reactivated trace of auditory sensation, or a series of reactivated traces of a series of auditory sensations? Ryle I 66 Mental state/mind/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: even if there were the mythical inner states and activities assumed by some, one could not draw any likelihoods of their occurrence among others. --- I 84 VsVolition/VsActs of will/act of will/Ryle: both voluntary and involuntary acts of will are absurd. If my act of will is voluntary in the sense of theory, another act of will must have preceded it, ad infinitum (regress) It has been proposed for the avoidance that the act of will can be neither described as voluntary nor as involuntary. "Act of will" is a term that cannot accept predicates such as "virtuous", "vicious", "good" or "wicked," which may embarrass those moralists who use the acts of will as the emergency anchor of their systems. I 85 In short: the theory of acts of will is a causal hypothesis, and the question of voluntariness is a question of the cause. I 86 RyleVsTradition: some well-known and truly occurring events are often confused with acts of will: people are often in doubt what to do. The final choice is sometimes referred to as an act of will. But equality is untenable, for most voluntary actions do not come from a state of indifference! Weakness of will/akrasia/Ryle: it is also known that someone can decide, but the action is not carried out becacuse of weakness of will. Or he does not carry it out because of new circumstances. RyleVsTradition: Problem: According to the theory of acts of will, it would be impossible for them to sometimes not lead to results. Otherwise all new executed operations would have to be postulated which explains that voluntary actions are sometimes actually carried out. If a choice was called voluntary, it must have been preceeded by another choice, ad infinitum. Ryle I 87 If the action is not carried out, according to the theory (tradition) there is also no act of will. Ryle I 182 Introspection/Attention/RyleVsTradition: In the case of an inspection, one would have to ask again whether it is attentive or inattentive. (Regress) Vs: That also pretends that there is a difference in having an irritation of the throat and the statement that one has it. Not only is attention far from being a kind of inspection or listening, but inspecting and listening are themselves specific ways of exercising attention. Whether metaphorically or literally, a viewer can always be attentive or inattentive. To do something with attention is not to link an activity with a bit of theorizing, exploring, inspecting, or knowing. Otherwise, any action done with attention would involve an infinite number of activities. VsIntellectualist tradition: as if the exercise of theory is the essential function of mind and contemplation the essence of this activity. Ryle I 215 Consciousness/Tradition/Ryle: According to the traditional theory, soul processes are not aware in the sense that we can report about them later, but that the opening up of their own incident is a feature of these incidents and cannot come after them. I 216 Tradition/Ryle: these alleged revelations would be expressed in the present and not in the past, if they were dressed in words at all. At the same time as I discover that my watch stands still, I also discover that I discover it. RyleVsTradition: this is a myth! 1. We usually know what we are doing. No "phosphorescence" theory is necessary. 2. That we know it does not imply that we are constantly thinking about it. 3. It does not imply that when we know something about ourselves, we encounter some ghostly phenomena. RyleVsTradition: The basic objection against the traditional theory which claims that the mind must know what it does because mental events are consciously or metaphorically "self-luminous" is that there are no such events. I 217 There are no events that take place in a world of any other kind. Consequently, there is also no need for such methods to make the acquaintance of inhabitants of such a world. RyleVsTradition/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: No one would ever want to say that he had gained some knowledge "out of his consciousness". It is a grammatical and logical abuse of the word "knowing" that the consciousness of my mental states is that I know them. It is nonsense to say that someone knows this thunderstorm, this colored surface or this act of concluding. This is just the wrong accusative for the verb "to know". The metaphor of light does not help here. Ryle I 388 Intellect/mind/use of symbols/Ryle: in practice, we do not regard every expression as an intellectual, but only the one understood as work. Border problems do not pose a problem for us. Some problem solving is intellectual, searching for the thimble is not, bridge is in the middle. Thinking/mind/intellect/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: for us, this is important: it means that both theories are wrong, the old with the special, occult organ, and the newer ones, which speak of particular intellectual processes such as judgments, conceptual perception, assumption, thinking through, etc. They pretend to have identification signs for things they cannot always identify in reality. Ryle I 391 Theory/Theories/Ryle: Nothing would be gained with the assertion that Einstein, Thucydides, Newton, and Columbus were concerned with the same activity. Sherlock Holmes's theories have not been constructed by the same means as those of Karl Marx. Both agreed, however, that they wrote theories in didactic prose. Theory/Tradition: To have a theory means to have learned one and not to forget it. To be at the place of destination. It does not mean doing something yourself. Theory/RyleVsTradition: Having a pen is to be able to write with it. Having a theory or a plan means being ready to communicate or apply it when the opportunity arises. Difference: the intelligent listener then acquires a theory, if he is wise, has understood it, he does not have to accept it at all. But we do not set up a theory primarily to be able to put it into words. Columbus did not go on journeys to increase the material for geographic studies. Definition having a theory/Ryle: is the ability to solve additional tasks. To be a Newton follower would not only mean saying what Newton had said, but also to do the same and say what he had said. --- Flor I 263 Can, to be able to/RyleVsTradition: "Legend": that an action can only be carried out intelligently if it is based on or accompanies a theoretical, intellectual performance. (Dualistic). Division in private, theoretical part of the activity and a practical, public. Can, to be able to: (know-how): cannot be determined by theoretical insight! (Knowing that this or that applies). Theoretical insight is itself a form of practice and cannot itself be intelligent or not intelligent! It is not plausible that any action, in which intelligence or its deficiency can be demonstrated, should include the consideration of theoretical statements, norms, or rules. There are also many actions for which there are no formulated rules or criteria for intelligent executio Flor I 264 Regress/Ryle: according to the dualistic notion, an intelligent action presupposes that there has been a theoretical consideration of statements, norms, or rules by which the activity is then carried out. This consideration, however, is itself an action that can be more or less intelligent. This leads to regress. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Various Authors | Stalnaker Vs Various Authors | II 48 Presupposition/Stalnaker: 1. as semantic relation (StalnakerVs) between sentences or propositions. Here we have to distinguish between presupposition and assertion in concepts of content or truth conditions ((s) truth-conditional semantics). Def presupposition/semantic/logical form/Stalnaker: a proposition that P presupposes that Q iff Q must be true so that P has a truth value (tr.v.) at all. That means presuppositions are made necessary by the truth and falsity of the proposition. If any presupposition is wrong the assertion has no tr.v.. StalnakerVsSemantic presupposition: although suitable for theoretical explanations, but requires complicated ad hoc hypotheses about the semantics of individual words and constructions. II 49 Def pragmatic presupposition/Stalnaker: (provisional version): a proposition A is a pragmatic presupposition of a speaker in a given context precisely in the case that the speaker assumes or believes that P, accepts or believes that the listeners assumes or believes that P and accepts or believes that the listener realizes that he makes these assumptions or has these convictions. II 50 So it are the speakers, not the sentences that make the presuppositions ((s) unlike the semantic approach). logical form: there are three possible definitions of pragmatic presupposition: a) proposition x presupposes that Q exactly in the event that the use of x appropriate (normal, acceptable) is only in contexts where Q is presupposed by the speaker. b) a statement that P (in a particular context) presupposes that Q just in case that one can reasonably conclude that the speaker presupposes Q from the fact that he made the statement. c) ... when it is necessary to assume that the speaker presupposes that Q to properly understand or interpret the statement. Important argument: we do not need an intermediate step of an assumed relation that should exist between propositions (StalnakerVsSemantic approach). II 58 Pragmatic presupposition/Stalnaker: here the restrictions on the presuppositions can change without the truth conditions changing so we can see differences between statements of the first and second person or between such a third person and ask questions without postulating different semantic types of propositions. That means despite the differences we can say that the statements have the same semantic content. StalnakerVsSemantic approach: here we cannot say that. II 69 Similarity metrics/similarity/next poss.w./most similar world/Stalnaker: it will always be true that something is more similar to itself than to anything else. Therefore, the selection function must be one which picks out the real world, whenever possible. (poss.w. = possible world). StalnakerVsSemantic approach: nothing can further be said here about what are the relevant aspects of similarity. Solution/Stalnaker: pragmatic approach: here we can explain how the context determines the truth conditions at least for indicative conditionals. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Reference |
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| Hetero-Phenomen. | Dennett, D. | Perler / Wild I 408 Hetero phenomenology / h.ph. / DennettVsBrentano / VsHusserl: from the perspective of the third person instead of the first. RadnerVsDennett: you can also operate h.ph. from the first person perspective. |
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