Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quotation Marks | Tugendhat | II 109 Quotation marks/TugendhatVsHeidegger: In Heidegger the quotation marks are misleadingly omitted: E.g. "What you actually mean when you use the expression "being"". Tugendhat: Then it is ambiguous whether the sense of the word or of being is meant. - This is a shift typical for Heidegger. >Quotation, >Levels, >Sense, >Reference, >Description levels. Now when Heidegger asks for the sense of being, he asks for the sense2 of a sense1 of the word. - He asks for the sense2 (which is in any case not the sense of a word) of something we mean when we speak of the being of a being - and what this something is is left open. >Being/Heidegger, >Being, >Martin Heidegger, >Words, >Word meaning, >Meaning. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Words | Heidegger | Cardorff II 68 Words/Heidegger/Cardorff: Heidegger's etymological derivations are controversial. >TugendhatVsHeidegger. E.g. Originally, "place" means "the tip of the spear". .. "The place gathered together into the highest and the utmost, the gathering decomposes and permeates everything, the place, the gathering, brings in to itself. Cf. >Word meaning, >Concepts, >Words, >Meaning, >Meaning change, >Theory change. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Hei II Peter Cardorff Martin Heidegger Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Heidegger, M. | Tugendhat Vs Heidegger, M. | Habermas I 182 TugendhatVsHeidegger: by making the word of truth to a basic concept, he just avoids the problem of truth. Tugendhat I 88 TugendhatVsHeidegger: Being: ambiguous in all languages. Heidegger was completely naive not to investigate this beforehand. Def veritative being: e.g. "It is the case that", "It is so, as you say, Socrates..." I 90 Disclosure: all disclosure that is articulated in statements is in this respect a disclosure of (veritative) being. I 91 Heidegger/Tugendhat: did not give an account of it. It seemed natural to him to say with the figurative tradition that all to be is a to be of being, although this does not fit at all to the veritative being ("If something is the case, it is also true"), let alone to the expanded concept. (TugendhatVsHeidegger). I 92 Disclosure/Heidegger: original development is not at all related to objects. By "objectivity" in being and time he meant "existence", not only that which singular terms stand for, but the entire ontological perspective that results from the orientation towards a statement. Pre-linguistically. I 104 TugendhatVsHeidegger: this contradicts the central importance that Heidegger attached to language ("Language is the house of being"). Heidegger fell back to the level of the most primitive theories of language by emphasizing the meaning of the word for the resoluteness of being. II 65 Being/Heidegger: the content of that universal proposition of existence as enabling all "is"-saying is quasi the epitome of being. TugendhatVsHeidegger: this sense remains unclear. Ambiguity: "being and nothingness" in its formulations has finally changed into "being and non-being". Through this ambiguity he also failed to make clear the difference between his position and the traditional ontology. II 109 Quotation Marks/Heidegger: its use of quotation marks is not uniform. Being/Plato: "...what you mean when you use the expression "being"..." TugendhatVsHeidegger: he omits the quotation marks! Falsification! One can now argue about whether he means the meaning of the word or the meaning of being. TugendhatVsHeidegger: typical: he makes inconspicuous shifts from harmless starting positions with considerable consequences. II 110 Sense of the Being/Heidegger/Tugendhat: no other way out than to speak of two different kinds of meaning: Sense1 and Sense2. When Heidegger now asks for the sense of being, he asks for the sense2 of a sense1 of the word. He asks for the sense2 (which in any case is not the sense of a word) of something that we mean when we speak of the being of an existing being. And what this something is, is left open. TugendhatVsHeidegger: he was even content to leave the words unclear that should be the most important to him and to us. II 111 Def Sense/Heidegger: "The result of the design, from which something becomes understandable as something." Only existence has meaning if it is disclosed. Def World/Heidegger: The "Whereupon" of Understanding Def "Worumwillen" (what for) of the Being/Heidegger: its own being that is designed in one way or another. TugendhatVsHeidegger: Question: to what extent is anything we can refer to meaningless? Heidegger had used another meaning of "sense" here, something like the purpose of words. Thus one can speak of the meaning of the human, but not of the meaning of being. Sense of Sense/Heidegger: nothing behind being, but in existence. TugendhatVsHeidegger: suggests that the same being can once be opened up and once not. II 112 Tugendhat: isn't something that we can refer to always accessible? Sense of Sense/Heidegger: Time. Like what was understood by "being" since the Greeks: "attendence", "present", "presence". TugendhatVsHeidegger: Presence is not only made accessible by being seen in the horizon of time, it is from the beginning in this horizon. This could only be overlooked by someone who is completely immersed in "presence". And that is exactly what Heidegger accused ancient philosophy of of! II 113 But there are simple words (like "present", "time") that we understand only in connection with other words. II 115 Understanding/Heidegger: all human understanding is primarily an understanding of being. It goes beyond language. TugendhatVsHeidegger: he has not seen the following tension: on the one hand his being should be of being, on the other hand he is oriented towards the "is" and connects this with the thesis that all understanding is understanding of being. II 116 For example "It is so that it rains" here one can say that the "is" refers to the state of affairs, and that is also a being. But that is not possible with unicorns. Tugendhat: Why should one deform oneself so? Example (from Heidegger): "The sky is blue". Question: To which being does the "is" refer to the sky, or to what is meant by "blue", or to both? So it makes sense to omit the orientation towards the existing and to speak only of being. II 121 TugendhatVsHeidegger: his will to clearly think through what he had seen once was weak. Heidegger has seen quite a few new things, two themes seem worth preserving. II 123 Mood/Heidegger: the primary way in which we are related to the world "as a whole". Being has no intentional content (!), it is directionless. ("fear", "withdrawal") focus on the "being in the whole". TugenhatVsHeidegger: here a substantiated "nothing" appears again, so to speak: an (impossible) negative proposition of existence: "There is nothing I can hold on to". II 124 Being/later Heidegger: the "one who differs from all that exists", "absolutely other to all that exists". This could not have been formulated in such a way in "Being and Time" yet. "Being" is now the "world". It no longer stands for "is" but for "there is". TugendhatVsHeidegger: I see no clue for the vibrating thesis that all understanding can be understood from this being. Everything but clear. II 129 Greek concept of being/TugendhatVsHeidegger: Heidegger uses a sleight of hand: one must ask whether he was actually aware of the swindle. "Ousia" belongs to the tribe of "einai". Ousia = "being" pre-philosophically: "property", "house", "yard". Heidegger translates it as "estate" and projects back. In being and time he claims: "pareinai" = "being by" and could be translated as "estate", but the equation of ousia with parousia is simply wrong! II 130 Time/Heidegger: the temporality of existence is more original than Heidegger's so-called "vulgar" time. (With a ratio of "sooner" and "later"). Future/Heidegger: one must see the self-behaviour to one's own being as a reference to the future. II 131 Play on words: "Future" (German: "Zu-kunft") as that which is already fixed for being, in contrast to the indefinite future. TugendhatVsHeidegger: but this vulgar time must still be assumed. Of course, in every waking moment of my life I refer to the time ahead. II 131 Time as meaning of being/time/future/Heidegger: he tried to construct a peculiar "movement" of existence, unlike the rest of being. This had to fail. II 132 TugendhatVsHeidegger: the transfer of a structure, which is essentially conscious or present, to something else - even being - makes no sense! II 132 Turn/Heidegger: can be understood as an attempt to project the "movement", which lies in the temporality of existence, into being itself or to settle it now on both sides. Here the terms "world" and the supposedly original concept of truth of "unconcealment" or "discovery" play a role. II 133 Existence has its motion only from the motion of being, from the time thus understood as meaning of being. Oblivion of Being: HeideggerVsMetaphysics: which supposedly has forgotten the actual being and sees only the being of the existing. II 134 TugendhatVsHeidegger: the new "movement of being" (understood from the movement of existence) is the crux of the "turn". Tugendhat: this fails: the reference to existence is a phenomenon sui generis. It is an extension of Husserl's intentionality (from Heidegger's point of view) both in the direction of the world and in the direction of temporality. TugendhatVsHeidegger: but we have no possibility to consider a somewhat mirror image correspondence on the part of being. All words stand for the very process that takes place in the "vulgar" time! Heidegger: wants existence to be temporal and yet not processual. That is contradictory. An emergence that is not an emergence in the "vulgar" time does not exist. Heidegger's reaction to these contradictions was a quasi-religious attitude whose practical counterpart was "serenity". |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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