Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Classes | Frege | Simons I 102f Class/FregeVsSchröder: a) "Logical" classes: logical classes are value ranges. I 103 b) "Concrete" classes: a calculus of collective classes is just one calculus of a part and whole. VsFrege: >Russell’s paradox - is more vulnerable than Schröder’s "manifolds". >Calculus, >Parts/Wholes, >Value progression. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Concepts | Frege | II 29 Def Concept: a concept is a function whose value is always a truth value. Concept: a concept is not an object in itself, while the concept scope (value progression, i.e. with an inserted value for the variable) is an object. >Object, >Truth value, >Function. II 66 f Concept: a concept is predicative, unsaturated and not an object. The inclusion of an object in a concept is an irreversible relation. E.g. "The morning star is nothing but Venus" but not "Venus is nothing but the morning star." II 66 f An equation is reversible, a predication is irreversible (intension, false: "Venus is nothing but the morning star.") >Intension, >Identity. II 66 The "meaning" of a name is never a concept (predicate) but always only a subject. A concept is not an object. The "meaning" (reference): is an object. E.g. the concept horse is not a concept (but just an object). Similarly: E.g. "This rose is red" and we say: "The grammatical predicate" "is red" is part of the subject "this rose". Here, the words "The grammatical predicate" "is red" are not a grammatical predicate but a subject. This is difficult to grasp, the city of Berlin being a city and the volcano Vesuvius being a volcano. II 71 > Def Concept: Meaning of a predicate. ((s) QuineVs: >Predicates/Quine, >Properties/Quine, >Meaning/Quine). II 74 Number/Numbers/Concept/Object/Frege: Figures are statements about a concept. E.g. "There is at least one root of 4" is not about a specific number 2 but about a concept: the root of 4. On the contrary: e.g. "The concept root of 4 is fulfilled": the first 5 words form the name of an object. Something is being said about an object. Fulfillment/Frege/(s): fulfillment is not a property of a concept, but of an object. The fulfilled object is the concept. >Satisfaction. II 80 Object/Relation/Frege: Problem: with the words. "The relation of being included in an object": we mean no relation but an object - ((s) the words are the name of the relation, the relation is an object). I 82 Concept/Frege: E.g. "All whales are mammals" is about concepts - not a single animal can be shown. It is better than to speak of an "indefinite object" > number: not the objects but the concepts are the carriers of the number. IV 110 Concept/Frege: whether a term is contradictory must be shown through research. Tugendhat I 195f Concept/Frege: "logical basic relationship": is the inclusion of an object in a concept", whether it is properly applied: is not a logical, but empirical question. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Formal Language | Mates | I 63 Artificial language/formal/counterpart/Mates: the statement forms of the natural language comply with formulas of the artificial, namely as a counterpart, not as abbreviations. >Propositional forms, >Propositional functions, >Natural language, >Equivalence. If symbols are not assigned to meaning, then "uninterpreted calculus". >Interpretation, >Sense, >Symbols. I 74 artificial language L/Mates: E.g. statement j: always true in relation to an interpretation I - values of "j": statements of the language L - values of I: interpretations of L. Cf. >Value progression/Frege, >Ideal language, >Universal language. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Lambda-Abstraction | Stechow | 48 Lambda notation: [λx: f. g]. - E.g. if g is a sentence: - the function f, such that for any x that satisfies f : f (x) = 1 if g is true, 0 if g is false. 161 Lambda abstraction: returns the value sequence of a function. Lambda-bound variables: have no reference. - The variable in the lambda operator is neither bound nor free. >Lambda calculus, >Variables, >Bound variable, >Free variable, >Reference, >Operators, >Functions, >Value progression. |
A. von Stechow I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006) |
| Meaning | Tugendhat | I 21 Meaning/Tugendhat ultimately not based on objects (not any more than on circumstances) but on truth conditions - later verification conditions. >Truth conditions, >Verification conditions, >Verification, >Circumstances/Tugendhat. I 263 Sentence: Meaning/Tugendhat by specifying its truth conditions - and explains this by demonstrating the way of verification. >Sentence meaning. I 282 Meaning/Tugendhat: the meaning of the sentence p is not the fact that p : that fails with sentences that contain deictic expressions. - Different situations have different truth conditions. >Situations, cf. >Situation semantics. I 283 Meaning/Tugendhat: of a sentence: function. Arguments: use-situations of the sentence. Values: the assertions (truth conditions). >Functions, >Use, >Use theory (only for words, not for sentences). I 432 Meaning/Tugendhat: function whose arguments are the speech situations and their values are the objects . "The meaning maps the speech situations on the items". Vs: that is metalinguistically - it requires understanding of " I " , "here", etc. first to understand - (because demontratives are not names). Substitutability is the meaning of demonstratives. >Understanding, cf. >Speaker meaning, >Substitution, >Demonstratives. II 231 Meaning/Frege/Tugendhat: should not be translate as "reference". Only where Frege conceives sentences as a proper name. >Reference, >Fregean meaning, >Fregean sense, >Sense. Frege distinguishes between reference of names and truth values of sentences. >Truth values, >Sentences. II 240 Otherwise error/Frege: ... that you can mingle meaning and concept on the one hand and meaning and subject matter on the other hand. - Correct: "What two concept words ( predicates ) mean is the same iff the corresponding extents (value progression) coincide. >Value progression, >Term scope. II 247 Tugendhat: (meaning/reference): nevertheless there is a primacy of truth over the objects. >Truth/Tugendhat, >Truth. II 242 Meaning/Tugendhat: sentences are meaningful in that they can be true/false. - predicates by apply to some (and not others) objects. >True-of, >Satisfaction. Names: denote something. Predicates can be attributed to a thing. >Names, >Predication. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Russell’s Paradox | Frege | Thiel I 335 Logic/Frege/Thiel: Frege's concept of logic, on which he wanted to trace back the entire non-geometric mathematics, was a more broadly formulated one than that of today. For Frege, the formation of sets is a logical process, so that the transition from the statement that exactly the same objects fall under two terms A and B to the statement of equality of the conceptual scopes of A and B, is a law of logic for Frege. >Term scope. I 335/336 Today's view: conceptual scopes are nothing more than sets, therefore the law does not belong to logic, but to set theory. In traditional logic, the doctrine of conceptual extents was part of logic. Today it is part of set theory, while the doctrine of "conceptual content" remains in logic. This is quite weird. Russell's Antinomy/5th Basic Law/Frege: blamed the fifth of his "Basic Laws" (i. e. axioms) for inconsistency, according to which two concepts have the same extent if and only if each object falling under one of them also falls under the others. And, more generally, two functions have the same >"value progression" (artificial word coined by him), if and only if they result in exactly the same value for each argument. In his first analysis of the accident, Frege concluded that only the replacement of the arguments in the function terms by names for the equivalent conceptual scopes or value progressions themselves led to the contradiction. He changed his Basic Law V accordingly by demanding the diversity of all arguments that can be used from these special conceptual scopes or value progressions through an antecedent preceding the expression. He did not experience any more that this attempt ("Frege's way out") turned out to be unsuitable. Thiel I 337 Russell and Whitehead felt compelled to bury the logistical program again with their ramified type theory. The existence of an infinite domain of individuals had to be postulated by a separate axiom (since it could not be proven in the system itself), and an equally ad hoc introduced and otherwise unjustifiable "reduction axis" enabled type-independent general statements, e.g. about real numbers. When the second edition of Principia Mathematica appeared, it was obvious that the regression of mathematics to logic had failed. Thus, Russell's antinomy marks the unfortunate end of logicism. >Reducibility axiom, >Type theory. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Term Scope | Frege | II 28 Term scope/Frege: if two concepts have the same scope, two functions have accordingly the same value range. >Value progression. I 100/101 Def Number/amount/Frege: the set which belongs to the concept F is the scope of the concept "numerically equal to the concept F". I 100 Scope/term scope/Frege: if the straight line a is parallel to the straight line b, then the scope of the concept "straight line parallel to straight line a" is equal to the scope of the concept "straight line parallel to straight line b", and vice versa. This is equality of the term scope. IV 96 Subject/predicate/concept/term scope/Frege: e.g. "All A are B". False: that A was "subject" and B was "predicate". Correct: the predicate "is part of the class". "Some"/FregeVsSchröder: "some" is not a subject. IV 98/99 "Some" does not always designate the same part of a class. This leads to contradictions, "some" is considered the subject. >Subject, >Predicate, >Identity, >Copula, >Sentence, >Someone. IV 99 Universal quantification/Frege: universal quantification is a class below a class. Existential quantification: is an individual below a class. IV 100 "Are" and "is" have no content, i.e. they are copula and not an identity. IV 95 Class/Frege: class is a term scope, not a concept. >Concept, >Object, IV 108 Term scope/scope/Frege: does not have its existence in the individuals, but in the concept itself, i.e. in what is said about an object. IV 112 Scope/concept/term scope/Frege: the scope does not consist of the objects that fall under the concept like a forest consists of trees, but it only has a grip in the concept itself. ((s) Thus, research may reveal that nothing falls under the concept). |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Values | Russell | I 71 Values/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell: when we speak of "values of φ z^", they are assigned to the φ and not to the z^. >Valuation, >Propositional function, >Functions/Russell, >Truth value, >Value range, >Value progression, >Predication. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Schröder, E. | Frege Vs Schröder, E. | I 116 Sign/FregeVsSchröder: with him you sometimes do not know if he thinks that the number is a sign and what its meaning is then, or whether seven is its meaning. From the fact that you can establish various signs, so that the same (sign) never returns, it does not follow that these signs also mean different things. Simons I 102 Class/FregeVsSchröder: we have to distinguish: a) "logical" sets: = value progressions and I 103 b) "concrete" sets: a calculus of collective classes is only a calculus of part and whole. SimonsVsFrege: ironically, this turned out to be much more vulnerable as Schroeder’s "manifolds". Lesniewski: knew Frege’s criticism. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Tradition | Carnap Vs Tradition | II 205 CarnapVsTradition: uses neither object nor syntactical sentences in general. To be scientifically useful, the sentences used should be expressed as syntactic sentences in a substantive speech. Carnap: the content of speech does not have to be eliminated. One must only be aware that it is used to avoid endless pseudo discussions. VI 58 Content/Scope/CarnapVsTradition: they had no criterion for distinguishing between scope and content. Russell: (building on Frege) Joins scope and content logic. Content/Scope/Frege: the first for millennia: sharply outlined: concept: function whose values are truth values. Value progression: (Russell: statement function, extension) |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
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