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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absolutism | Kekes | Gaus I 133 Absolutism/Kekes/Gaus: Absolutists believe that the diversity of values is apparent, not real. They concede that there are many values, but they think that there is a universal and objective standard that can be appealed to in evaluating their respective importance. This standard may be a highest value, the summum bonum; other values can be ranked on the basis of their contribution to its realization. The highest value may be happiness, duty, God's will, a life of virtue, and so forth. Absolutism often has a rationalistic basis. For the most frequently offered reason in favour of the universality and objectivity of the standard that absolutists regard as the highest is that it reflects the moral order of reality. VsAbsolutism: It is a considerable embarrassment to absolutists that the candidates for universal and objective standards are also diverse, and thus face the same problems as the values whose diversity is supposed to be diminished by them. AbsolutismVsVs: Absolutists acknowledge this, and explain it in terms of human shortcomings that prevent people from recognizing the one and true standard. >Conservatism/Kekes, >Values/Conservatism. Kekes, John 2004. „Conservtive Theories“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Liberalism | Locke | Höffe I 254 Liberalism/LockeVsAbsolutism/Locke/Höffe: In Locke's political liberalism, the uncompromising veto against absolutism is even more important than averting danger, because a state authority that stands above all laws contradicts its origins in treaty theory. Non-transferability: Because the law of nature does not grant absolute power to anyone, it cannot be transferred to the state, because what one does not possess cannot be ceded. Transfer: According to the two dangers threatening the state of nature, two rights are transferred to the public authorities in the state-founding social contract: the right to interpret the moral natural law and the right to punish crimes committed against the natural law. >Absolutism. Non-transferable: (...) the three basic goods life, freedom and property [are] not transferred. Because otherwise one would fall into a self-slavery forbidden by natural law. Höffe I 255 the state authority may only promote the common good, which consists above all in securing the three (...) basic goods [life, freedom and property]. >Social contract, >Freedom, >Liberty, >Society, >Community. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Montesquieu | Höffe | Höffe I 260 Montesquieu/Höffe: Two generations after Locke's treatises on government, a French Enlightenment philosopher and brilliant exponent of morality produced the basic work of a new kind of political thought: the spirit of the law (De l'Esprit des lois, 1748). Sociology: The interest of state theory in the justification of political rule and with it the figure of legitimation of the social contract loses their significance in favour of political sociology and comparative legal anthropology (Ethnology of Law). MontesquieuVsAbsolutism: Montesquieu certainly does not deny his own political views, his preference for a liberal order and his rejection of any despotic absolutism. >Absolutism. MontesquieuVsEurocentrism: Against a European hubris, a Eurocentrism, [Montesquieu] portrays the members of a non-European culture, the Persians, as tolerant and cosmopolitan, capable, where necessary, of criticising themselves and others. While they particularly appreciate Europe's freer position of women, they criticize European customs, the many civil wars, including the Inquisition and the Papacy(1). 1. Montesquieu, Persian Letters 1721, anonymous. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| State (Polity) | Locke | Mause I 36 State/Locke: For Locke, the purpose of the state is the protection of property. This theoretically presupposes that Locke, unlike Hobbes, already has property rights in their natural state and the latter is not per se a state of war, so that the state established by contract is preferable to the state of nature and legitimate only if the property in it is better protected than before; and this also means in particular that it must be protected from interference by the state itself under all circumstances. Höffe I 248 State/Liberalism/Locke/Höffe: Like Hobbes, Locke establishes the state from the consent of free people, from a social contract. However, he attaches importance to more than just securing peace. He also attaches importance to the separation of powers and, above all, to the three basic goods mentioned above: "life, liberty and property". In the sense of a concretising expansion, health also appears occasionally. LockeVsHobbes/LockeVsAbsolutism: Without the additional tasks of securing peace, explains Locke against Hobbes' absolutism, one would "consider people so foolish that they try to prevent what martens or Höffe I 249 foxes could do, but are happy, indeed consider it safe to be devoured by lions" (§ 93)(1). Governance/Locke: Because of its superior rank, Locke's basic goods ("life, liberty and property") could be considered basic and human rights. It is true that in the natural state everyone is entitled to them, but they are not secured there. Locke emphasizes again and again that the necessary violence for the state community that is necessary for this is ceded to a strong majority, but not to distributive and collective ones. Consequently, it is not excluded what contradicts the idea of a veritable basic and human right: that the majority of a minority restricts the rights and, as in Locke's letter of tolerance, refuses tolerance to Catholics and atheists. See >Tolerataion/Locke. Höffe I 251 Pre-contractual state: Among the obligations that prevail in Locke's pre-contractual natural state is the right, in the absence of a public authority, to punish the violation of the relevant divine and natural commandments itself. Locke sees the only way out of leaving the natural state in the establishment of a political or civil society(2). It consists in a "political body", i.e. a state-like community that receives its legitimation by the free consent of its members, rational beings, i.e. by a social contract. >Natural State/Locke, >Social Contract/Locke. 1. J. Locke, Second treatise of Government, 1689/90 2. Ibid. Chap. VII |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Values | Conservatism | Gaus I 133 Values/Conservatism/Kekes/Gaus: Conservatives are committed to political arrangements that foster good lives, so they must have a view about what lives are good, about what obligations, virtues, and satisfactions are worth valuing. They must have a view, that is, about the values that make lives good. Values, however, appear to be diverse. There are countless obligations, virtues, and satisfactions, countless ways of combining them and evaluating their respective importance, and so there seem to be countless ways in which lives can be good. Conservatives, therefore, must have a view about the diversity of values because it has a fundamental influence on the reasons that can be offered for or against particular political arrangements. Problems: The problem is that there are three widely held but mutually exclusive views: absolutism, relativism, and pluralism. Absolutism: Absolutists believe that the diversity of values is apparent, not real. They concede that there are many values, but they think that there is a universal and objective standard that can be appealed to in evaluating their respective importance. >Absolutism/Kekes. Gaus I 134 Relativism: RelativismVsAbsolutism: Relativists regard the diversity of values as real: there are many values and there are many ways of combining and ranking them. (...) all values, therefore, are context-dependent. >Values/Relativism. Pluralism: Pluralists are in partial agreement and disagreement with both absolutists and relativists. According to pluralists, there is a universal and objective standard, but it is applicable only to some values. The standard is universal and objective enough to apply to some values that must be recognized by all political arrangements that foster good lives, but it is not sufficiently universal and objective to apply to all the many diverse values that may contribute to good lives. The standard, in other words, is a minimal one. (For accounts of pluralism in general, see Kekes, 1993(1); Rescher, 1993(2).) 1. Kekes, John (1993) The Morality of Pluralism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2. Rescher, Nicholas (1993) Pluralism. Oscorf: Clarendon. Kekes, John 2004. „Conservtive Theories“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Absolutism | Stalnaker Vs Absolutism | I 124 absolute/Possible Worlds/poss.w./Stalnaker: but that is not the sense in which we usually speak of properties and relations as absolute! Nobody would argue Vsabsolute simultaneity for the reason that simultaneity is contingent that simultaneous events could have taken place one after another. Suppose we are Vsabsolute identity in Salmons sense. Question: can we still understand the intraworldly or the poss.w.-relative identity relation as "to be the same thing" independent from the description of things? Stalnaker: there is no reason why we could not do so. Def identity/relative to poss.w./Stalnaker: identity is always the binary relation whose extension in every possible world w is the set of pairs so that d is in the domain of w. Nonexistence/predication/predication utterances/Stalnaker: problem: if the object does not exist. Thesis: I prefer a modal semantics that requires that the extension of a predicate is a subset of (things-) domains of their poss.w.. Then x=x is wrong if the value that is attributed to x does not exist (or has no counterparts). Versus: If you drop this condition (which is unusual) you allow that non-existent objects have properties and stand in relations. I 214 "Pessimistic view"/Jackson: e.g. a pessimist Vsabsolute quiescent point: Someone says, there is no absolute quiescent point, everything what we can represent by language are facts about relative position. Suppose we want to refute this: one could specify a coordinate system and a unit. E.g. take the mass centers of the earth, sun and mars, form a plane and in addition the moment of Newton's birth. Then we have an x-y plane then we introduce the units meter and second and define for each axis positive and negative directions. Then we have the means to specify absolute position as quadruples of real numbers, at least if we assume that there are absolute positions that you can specify. With that we ignore that our reference points (sun, mars could be vague). Vs: Jackson's skeptics could argue that this is not really allowed to say how things are absolute but only how they relate to the sun, earth and moon at the time of Newton's birth. VsVs/Stalnaker: but it would not be clear on what basis he replies that. I 215 We did therefore not escape the problem that all our words, even all of our representational resources come from the actual world - there is no point outside where we could look for it. Important argument: but that does not imply that the contents of whose expression we use our words, are inevitably dependent from many of the facts that our words have these contents. I 226 Relationalism/relationism/space/Leibniz/Stalnaker: Thesis: pro conceptual independence of space and time. Stalnaker: I think he is coherent. Thesis: there is no absolute localisation (Position, no absolute quiescent point). That means that the assignment of number triples to space points is arbitrary. RelationismVsAbsolutism/Stalnaker: the point of issue is whether the identification of spatial points is conventionally in time. Relationism: there is no absolute movement. Only change in time of the relative positions of things. Movement/Relationism/Stalnaker: Assertions about movements are totally useful here! But they are always understood in terms of a frame (frame of reference). Analogy/Stalnaker: suppose someone tried to refute relationism with an argument analogous to that of Shoemaker, meaning the one of the gradual change. Interpersonal spectrum: analogous to his denial is the denial of the meaningfulness of the thesis that the universe could also be shifted one meter to the left. Such a poss.w. would only be a conventional new description. I 227 Relationism: but even he has to admit - it is then said - that the chair could be first placed alone one meter to the left, and then gradually all other objects. This is certainly not impossible. And it would turn nonsense, one would say that at the last change the initial state would at a stroke again exist. ((s) In order to meet the thesis that nothing has changed on the whole). Stalnaker: I hope no one takes this argument seriously VsRelationism. Relationism/Stalnaker: has no reason to abandon his view that the overall effect of the series of changes leaves the things as they were. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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