Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Abstraction Prior I 64
"extensional abstraction" / Prior: says that it is not about real entities but only surrogates - e.g. identity of "nothing φ-es" with "everything that φ-es is not identical with itself."
I 133
PriorVsAbstraction: it is not certain whether the vernacular requires a.: E.g. Cook Wilson: instead of "Jones is musically talented": what is predicted, is musicality - PriorVs: "-ty" or "-ness" is always just a trick. (> Vsuniversals; >universals.)

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Conceptualism Armstrong Place I 25
Def Conceptualism/Place: (PlatoVs, Aristotle pro, Place pro). Everything belongs to one of these 4 categories: 1) concrete particular 2) property of a particular 3) situation 4) property of a situation (II 31 also property of a property e.g. syntactic relations within a sentence are relations between words - Def words: consist in certain formal properties either of an event (of vocal expression) or particular: (characters) II 26 Conceptualism: i.e. there are no abstractions such as numbers, sets or laws of nature (as states in the world, only as formulas that describe something - Universals/Conceptualism: exist in two respects: 1) in the sense in which its instances exist (they really occur) 2) in the sense that living organisms are predisposed to classify particulars, and that the classifications are represented in the semantic conventions of natural language - i.e. as abstractions due to similarities between particulars.
Placew II 49
ConceptualismVsAbstractions/Place: VsNominalization of "fragility" in subject position - VsPossible Worlds - II 56 but does not deny universals.
Place III 110
Conceptualism/Similarity/Place: (pro like Martin): there must be a sense in which two things are similar, so that they can be "of the same kind" - in this sense they cannot be "inexactly" similar U/Species/Conceptualism/Place: U not in addition to the similarities between their instantiations - solution: "species", "U": viewed from the perspective of the object: which properties do the particulars need to have - "concept", "intention": affect the disposition of the mind for classification

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004
Semantics Black II 166
"General Semantics" / nominalism / Alfred Korzybski / Black: educational movement U.S. after World War 1 - VsLogic - distortions call on diseases - "cow" should be replaced by "Bessie" - Vsgeneral terms - VsAbstraction

Black I
Max Black
"Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979

Black II
M. Black
The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978
German Edition:
Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973

Black III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Black IV
Max Black
"The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994


The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Abstraction Berkeley Vs Abstraction Ber I 233
BerkeleyVsAbstraction: if one erroneously assumes mental objects were physical or if one refines real things to general abstract terms or splits simple things with metaphysical craftsmanship into diverse parts. Where will this lead? But when I ask a simple person regarding the free will, they agree immediately. And I agree with them because of what I find inside me.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Abstraction Prior Vs Abstraction I 132
Thinking/Grammar/Prior: Othello thinks of Desdemona that she ...becomes ...thinks that... Difference: whether the gap for the verb is filled, but not that for the name.
Nominalization: ("old game"): instead of "Desdemona is faithful": "It is true of Desdemona that she is faithful." (Introduction of "that").
That-Sentences: pronouns are almost always through abstracta (quasi-names). (>Cook Wilson):
Subject/Predicate/Wilson: E.g. "Jones's musical": here it is not predicated "is musical", or "that he is musical," but "musicality".
I 133
PriorVsWilson: but the difference is not very large. Moreover, the true relation is that between "Jones" and "he". Better. Attribution of musicality. The introduction of abstractions such as "ness", etc. is always a trick.

Verb/Prior: is like a sentence: its job is to make names of sentences.
A verb is a sentence with one or more gaps.
Verbs can be composed in the same way as sentences. Every composition of a sentence is ipso facto a composition of the verbs it contains.
I 134
PriorVsAbstraction: it is not certain whether the formal presentation of ordinary language sentences requires abstraction.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003