Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adaption | Ecological Theories | Norgaard I 331 Adaption/Climate Change/Climate Justice/Ecological Theories: The logic of adaptation as a matter of justice is, at one level, quite straightforward: if a person or community has been put at risk from anthropogenic climate change, and that risk can be reduced or eliminated by some kind of proactive investment supported by those who have caused the risk, there is a moral obligation to make that investment. (…) the obligations implied by ‘adaptation’ could be justified by an ‘ability to help’ principle, even in the absence of causal responsibility for the imposition of risk (Jamieson 1998(1); Caney 2009(2)). VsAdaption: (…) because the populations most at risk from anthropogenic climate change are by and large the same populations most at risk from ‘normal’ climatic variability and extreme weather events, it is conceptually very difficult if not impossible to separate investments that address only the ‘additional’ risk from anthropogenic change. (…) where it is possible to separate those who are most vulnerable to anthropogenic climate change, offering them protection through pro‐active adaptation implies directing assistance not to those who are most vulnerable to climate‐mediated harm, but to those whose vulnerability is increased by anthropogenic warming. Adaption/Development: It is widely recognized that ‘adaptation’ looks very similar to ‘development’. Indeed, it is one of the ironies that the logic of effective adaptation implies integrating adaptation funding and activities with existing development planning, policies, and projects (so‐ called ‘mainstreaming—e.g. Huq et al. 2004(3); Yamin 2005(4)), while the desire of developing countries Norgaard I 332 to increase the level of transfers and their control over it has led to demands for adaptation assistance to be separated from and demonstrably ‘additional’ to existing development aid, and under the control of new, UNFCCC‐directed institutions. >Climate justice, >Environmental ethics. 1. Jamieson, D. 1998. Global responsibilities: Ethics, public health and global environmental change. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 5: 99–120. 2. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Huq, S. et al. 2004. Mainstreaming adaptation to climate change in Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Climate Policy 4(1): 25–43. 4. Yamin, F. 2005. The European Union and future climate policy: Is mainstreaming adaptation a distraction or part of the solution? Climate Policy 5: 349–61. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Adaption | Gould | I 198 Adaptation/Preadaption/Gould: Definition preadaption: preadaption is derived from the thesis that other functions have been fulfilled in the initial stages, e.g. half a jaw could support the gills. Half a wing may have been used to catch prey, or to control body temperature. Gould: the concept of preadaptation is indispensable, but it is not appropriate to demonstrate continuity in all cases. I 199 For example, in two genera of Biodae (giant snakes) on Mauritius there is a divided maxillary bone (with elastic connection), which is not found in any other vertebrate on earth. Here, a discontinuous transition is preferable because a jaw cannot be half broken. Examples: I 195 For example, fish with jaws are related to their ancestors without jaws. Macroevolution (the larger structural transitions) is nothing but an expanded microevolution (e. g. the change of flies in closed containers). I 196 For example, if black moths replace whites within a century, reptiles can become birds by gently summing up countless changes over a few million years. II 51 Adaptation/Gould: we do not have to choose between limitation and beauty of adaptation, because only both together provides the necessary tension to regulate evolution. Selection/Gould: GouldVs: Gould is directed against the assumption of a consistent selection, or the assumption that there is an effect of selection on each level at the same time, or the theory that every detail that can be found in an organism results from the selection. Behavior/adaptation: each individual behavior may be a wonderful adaptation, but it must be shaped within a prevailing limitation, e. g. breeding behaviour of the gannet. II 52 Behavior/animal/Gould: the sources of organic forms and behaviours are diverse and contain at least three primary categories: a) instantaneous adaptation (the behaviour of the offspring), b) the potential non-adaptive consequences of basic structural designs that act as restrictions on adaptation, and c) adaptations of ancestors now used by the descendants in other ways. II 153 Adaptation/GouldVsAdaptionism/Gould: for example, special characteristics of some abnormal human children cannot be described as adaptation. We do not inhabit a perfect world in which natural selection ruthlessly checks all organic structures and then shapes them for optimal utility. In many cases, evolution reflects more inherited patterns than current environmental demands. II 152 We tend (incorrectly) to view each structure as if it were created for a particular purpose. IV 27 Adaptation/adjustment/Gould: we should not conclude that Darwin's assumed adaptability to a local environment has unrestricted power to generate theoretically optimal designs for all situations. The natural selection can only use existing material. This is the classic dilemma of evolutionary theory. Question: how do the intermediate steps arise? Structuralists (like Geoffroy Saint Hilaire, 1772-1844): thesis: first, the form changes and then finds a function. Functionalists (like Lamarck): thesis: organisms must first adopt a different way of life before the forms develop. DarwinVsStructuralism: the environment does not pass on its requirements for adaptation directly to the organism. Rather indirectly through more survivor's descendants of those who were lucky enough to vary towards a better adaptation to their local environment. IV 28 Lamarck: in fact, it was he who had found the right answer (like Darwin): he merely proposed a false mechanism for transferring information between the environment and the organism. His functionalist solution contains an elegant simplification that is accepted today by almost all evolutionary researchers. It is neither the shape of the body nor the form of its opponents that gives rise to the habits of the animals, but on the contrary, it is the habits and living conditions that have formed the shape of the body over time".(1) Gould: this is considered correct today. >Lamarckism. 1. Lamarck, J.B. (1809/1984). Zoological Philosophy. Chicago: University Press. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adaptionism | Dennett Vs Adaptionism | I 382 DennettVsAdaptionism / mimicry: there is a temptation to say, when the forest floor looked different, the butterfly had a different color. But that is not justified. It does not have to be true too! (Dennett otherwise pro) The Adaptionist would ask: why do all the doors in this village have the hinges on the left? Answer: there is no reason for it, it s just a historical accident. (Dennett pro). Theory /Dennett: adaptionism and mentalism are not theories in the traditional sense! They are attitudes and strategies to organize data to explain relationships and nature to ask questions. Münch III 375ff DennettVsAdaptionism: is in danger to construe the entire building out of nothing, like mentalism does. III 376 Pangloss/Dennett: you can use this position to open up the completeness of a list of conditions. DobzhanskyVsAdaptionism: 1956 (in the spirit of Gould and Lewontin): The usefulness of a feature cannot be taken for granted. CainVsDobzhansky: 1964. Also, the uselessness cannot be taken for granted. III 379 Explanation/DennettVsPutnam: an explanation on a micro-physical level is not inconsistent with an explanation on rational grounds. Adaptionism/Dennett: the more complex the condition, the less likely appears the rational reason. But the truth of a non-adaptionist story does not require the falsehood of all adaptationist stories. We should accept Pangloss’ assumption. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Adaptionism | Gould Vs Adaptionism | Dennett I 334 GouldVsAdaptionism: is a form of laziness: because history offers such a pretty explanation, you do not bother to look for alternatives. "Exactly-as-stories": such a good story simply cannot be wrong. In addition we have the Pangloss-Principle. Dennett I 342 GouldVsAdaptionism: there are no standards for when an adaptionist explanation of the good is too much. Dennett I 358 GouldVsAdaptionism: assumes that all paths in the aptitude landscape lead to the summit. Gould: but that does not have to be the case, maybe there are barriers. DennettVsGould: that is fair enough, but then you have to consider how to find such (secret) barriers.(>Theory). Dennett I 367 GouldVsAdaptionism: instead: " |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Adaptionism | Verschiedene Vs Adaptionism | Dennett I 348 Vsadaptionism: Master in subsequent justification. (Evolution can in principle not look ahead). Münch III 376 DobzhanskyVsadaptionism: 1956 (in the spirit of Gould and Lewontin): The usefulness of a feature can not be taken for granted. CainVsDobzhansky: 1964: also the futility can not be taken for granted. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Dennett, D. | Gould Vs Dennett, D. | Dennett I 342 Adaptionism / Dennett: one can not explain the concept of homology without relying on adaptionism. GouldVsAdaptionism: there are no standards for when a adaptionist declaration is too much of a good. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Mentalesese | Dennett Vs Mentalesese | II 177 Mentalese/Dennett: most of what has been written about the possibility of a "thought language" presupposes that we think in a written thought language (thought language, Mentalese). (DennettVsMentalese). Münch III 375 DennettVsAdaptionism: is, like mentalism, at risk of building the entire building from the ground up. Theory/Dennett: Adaptionismus and mentalism are no theories in the traditional sense! They are attitudes and strategies to organize data to explain relationships and to ask nature questions. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Vollmer, G. | Verschiedene Vs Vollmer, G. | Putnam I 196 Causality/Charles FriedVsVollmer: can easily be considered a physical relationship! For example, "act, smash, move" are causal verbs. (impulse transmission). Fried: Once you have made this mistake, it is easy to believe that functional properties would simply be higher-level physical states. (Putnam self-criticism: I believed this myself earlier) And then to think, reference (and pretty much anything at all) could be a functional property and thus physical. Vollmer I 275 VsEvolutionary Epistemology/EE: Adaptation is reciprocal. It is precisely the selection advantage of the human to be able to radically reshape his environment (in relation to his needs). Thus the constructive moment is excluded in the evolutionary epistemology. VollmerVsVs: the evolutionary epistemology has been developed by biologists who are well aware of the interaction of adaptation. However, the dynamic of the process does not affect the applicability of the concept of adaptation at all. (DennettvsAdaption, GouldVsAdaption). I 290 DretskeVsEvolutionary Epistemology: has very little to offer. (1971, 585) PutnamVsEvolutionary Epistemology: may not be scientifically wrong, but does not answer a single philosophical question! (1982a,6) I 292 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: some of its representatives already see a "knowledge-gathering process" in the entire biological evolution. Or one speaks of a molecule "recognizing" another molecule. I 293 VollmerVsVs: no critic defines "knowledge", only Löw: this includes subjectivity (which he does not define either). Information/Löw: Information always exists only for one subject. Vollmer pro, but perhaps too dogmatic. I 298 Truth/Success/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: when the correctness of experience is inferred from evolutionary success: 1. facts are confused with norms (quid juris, quid facti) 2. the problem of knowledge is reduced to its genetic context and thus 3. the question of the validity of a statement ist trivialized. This is a genetic fallacy. VollmerVsVs: it is true that factual and normative questions are considered inseparable here, but it does not mean that they are confused! The evolutionary epistemology does not conclude from survival the correctness of a world view! Rather vice versa: in general, a better understanding of the external world structures points to a survival advantage. Under competition then mostly the better world view prevails. I 300 Validity/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: The evolutionary epistemology does not solve the validity problem. Validity is central to knowledge, but not possible without reflection. Validity/Vollmer: what validity is, is seen very differently. Lotze: Validity Puntel: Discursive redeemability Gethmann: Ability to consent Generally necessary: a valid statement must be syntactically correct, logically consistent, semantically flawless, intersubjectively understandable, discursive, intersubjectively verifiable, compatible with accepted statements, etc. Sufficient: here one must distinguish between conditional (hypothetical) and unconditional (categorical) validity. Conditional validity: has a statement if another statement must be assumed as valid to prove its validity, otherwise unconditional validity. Vollmer: the claim of unconditional validity has never been honoured. (> Final statement). We must content ourselves with conditions for relative validity. I 309 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: if epistemology is empirical, it becomes circular. I 310 Evolutionary Epistemology/EE/Vollmer: it is not the task of epistemology to provide absolute justifications for knowledge and truth claims. One can, however, ask under which conditions certain factual knowledge would be possible, and to these questions it can also give reasonable answers. Epistemology/Vollmer: Tasks: Explication of concepts and knowledge Investigation of our cognitive abilities, comparison of different cognitive systems. Differentiation of subjective and objective structures, descriptive and normative statements, factual and conventional elements. Illumination of the conditions for cognition. Demonstration of cognitive boundaries. I 315 Causality/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: after the evolutionary epistemology, causality plays a threefold role: 1. order form of nature 2. thinking category 3. this category of thinking is the result of selection. Therefore, causality generates causality via causality. a) Through the multiple meaning of "causality" the principle of methodical order is violated. (Gerhardt, 1983,67 69,75). b) If causality is a category of thought, it cannot at the same time be a product of experience. For this it would have to be inductive or abstract like any experience. Thus, such event sequences must first of all have been recognized as causal. (Lütterfelds, 1982, 113,6). I 316 VollmerVsVs: the ambiguity is admissible, but easy to eliminate. Solution: instead, one can say that causality as a real category generates causality as a form of thinking via a causally effective selection. This is then not a life-worldly experience. I 318 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: says nothing new at all! Already Spencer was refuted. Haeckel already uses the term "biological epistemology". The thesis of the mind as an organ function is reminiscent of Kant's interpretation by Helmholtz and F.A. Lange: "The a priori as a physical psychic "organization". Vollmer I 313 Reason/BaumgartnerVsVollmer: cannot come out of himself. It is absolute in this sense and cannot be deceived. Reason/ZimmerliVsVollmer: the eye can see itself through apparatuses. But seeing can never see it, because it always does seeing. "Mental uncertainty relation". Explanation/HayekVsVollmer: no system can explain itself. I 314 Back-Reference/Hövelmann: in principle the ability to speak cannot be cheated on. VollmerVsVs: these authors do not explain "reason" etc. at all. Exception: I 323 Def Explanation/Hayek: requires classification. A system that is to classify objects according to n properties must be able to create and distinguish at least 2 exp n different classes. Therefore, the classifying system must be much more complex. However, no system can surpass itself in complexity and therefore cannot explain itself. I 314 Back-Reference/Vollmer: of course self-knowledge and self-declaration cannot impart secure or complete knowledge. But many "good circles" are quite consistent and informative. Example: "Good circles": |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vs Adaptionism. | Gould, St. J. | Dennett I 370 Gould: The vault of St. Mark’s Basilica and the" Pangloss "principle: VsAdaptionism thesis: Adjustment is pervasive. Def "gusset" / Gould: all those biological characteristics which are not adjustments. |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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