Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adorno | Habermas | IV 490 Adorno/Horkheimer/Rationalization/Modernism/Habermas: Horkheimer and Adorno had disclosed the theory of class consciousness. They address the problem of linking the phenomena of the rationalization of life orders and the institutionalization of purpose-rational action (see Purpose Rationality/Weber) with the reification of consciousness (see Reification/Lukács) with the criticism of instrumental reason. This is a vision of an administered, totally reified world in which purpose rationality and rule merge. The theory has the advantage of focusing on the systemically induced deformation of communicatively structured life contexts. HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsHorkheimer: the weakness of its theory lies in the fact that it attributes the erosion of the lifeworld to the magic of a purpose rationality demonized to instrumental reason. Thus the criticism of instrumental reason falls into the same error as Weber's theory, and it also loses the fruits of its approach, which is nevertheless directed towards systemic effects. (See Instrumental Reason/Habermas). IV 558 Adorno/Horkheimer/Marcuse/Society Theory/Method/Habermas: Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse stick to Freudian drive theory and reckon with the dynamics of an inner nature that reacts to social pressure but remains resistant to the power of socialisation at its core. (1) (AdornoVsFromm, HorkeimerVsFromm: See I/Fromm.) 1. This position has not changed later: vgl. TH.W. Adorno, Soziologie und Psychologie, in: Festschrift Horkheimer, Frankfurt 1955; H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, Boston, 1955, der, Verhalten der Psychoanalyse, in: ders, Kultur und Gesellschaft 2, Frankfurt 1965, S. 85ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Art | Adorno | Grenz I 49 Art/Adorno: "Art is infinitely difficult, too, in the fact that it must transcend its concept [...] but that it adapts itself to the reification in which it is similar to realities, against which it protests ... (Ästhetische Theorie, p. 159). Art/Sense/Adorno: The abandonment of art to the category of meaning drives it into the arms of positivism (it is still a synonym for assimilated consciousness). (Ästhetische Theorie(1), p. 231). >Abstract Art, >Sense. Grenz I 104 Art/HabermasVsAdorno: Adorno's theory of the autonomy of art, which he sees represented in hermetic art, is a 'defensive' theory.(2) Grenz I 108 Abstract/art/Adorno/Grenz: the abstractness of the reference of the works of art to the psychological nominalism, existing before them, on which Adorno insists, are the consequences of the theorem of the ahistorical-ness of the ideological superstructure. >History/Adorno. Grenz I 186 Art/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno separates between the social content of the works of art and their monolithically-viewd suchness. >Truth/Adorno, >Truth content/Adorno. AdornoVs aesthetics of experience: Adorno adheres to the objectification character of the works of art. I 187 Either a work of art is communicative, but then it is at the same time, 'crude propaganda', or it is true as a critique of the communication system. But then it is socially ineffective. >Communication media. I 188 Art/Adorno: art is a practice as "formation of consciousness" (Ästhetische Theorie(1), p. 361). >Consciousness. 1. Th. W. Adorno. Ästhetische Theorie. In: Gesammelte Schriften 7, Rolf Tiedemann (Hg.), Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. 1970. 2. J. Habermas. Bewusstmachende oder rettende Kritik: Die Aktualität Walter Benjamins. (1972). In: Jürgen Habermas: Politik, Kunst und Religion. Essays über zeitgenössische Philosophen. Reclam, Stuttgart 1978 (aktuelle Neuauflage 2006) S. 48–95) |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Art | Kant | Gadamer I 52 Art/Beauty/Kant/Gadamer: Judging according to an ideal of beauty is (...), as Kant says, not merely a judgment of taste. Gadamer I 53 (...) to be pleasing as a work of art, something must be more than just tasteful and pleasing at the same time. Note: GadamerVsAdorno/GadamerVsJauß: Unfortunately, the Kantian analysis of taste judgement is still being misused for art theory, even by T. W. Adorno's Aesthetic Theory( (Schriften Band 7, S. 22ff.) or by H. R. Jauss (Ästhetische Erfahrung und literarische Hermeneutik. Frankfurt 1982, S. 29f.). When just now actual beauty seemed to exclude any fixation by concepts of purpose (>Beauty/Kant), then here, conversely, even a beautiful house, a beautiful tree, a beautiful garden, etc. is said to have no ideal, "because these purposes are not sufficiently defined and fixed by their concept, consequently the usefulness is almost as free as with vague beauty". Only of the human form, precisely because it alone is capable of a beauty fixed by a concept of purpose, is there an ideal of beauty! This doctrine, established by Winckelmann and Lessing(1), gains a kind of key position in Kant's foundation of aesthetics. For it is precisely this thesis that shows how little a formal aesthetic of taste (arabesque aesthetics) corresponds to the Kantian idea. >Beauty/Kant. Gadamer I 55 Kant/Gadamer: It is precisely with this classicist distinction between the normal idea and the ideal of beauty that Kant destroys the basis from which the aesthetic of perfection finds its incomparably unique beauty in the perfect meaningfulness of all being. Only now can "art" become an autonomous phenomenon. Its task is no longer the representation of the ideals of nature - but the self-encounter of man in nature and the human-historical world. Kant's proof that the beautiful is pleasing without concept does not prevent us from being fully interested only in the beautiful that appeals to us in a meaningful way. It is precisely the recognition of the concept-lessness ["Begrifflosigkeit"] of taste that leads beyond the aesthetics of mere taste.(2) >Art/Hegel, >Interest/Art/Kant, >Artwork/Kant, >Nature/Kant. Gadamer I 58 Def Art/Kant/Gadamer: Kant's definition of art as the "beautiful idea of a thing" takes this into account, insofar as even the ugly is beautiful in the representation by art. GadamerVsKant: Nevertheless, the true essence of art comes out badly in its contrast to the beauty of nature. If the concept of a thing were only represented beautifully, then this would again only be a matter of a "school-suitable" representation and would only fulfil the indispensable condition of all beauty. KantVsVs: Art, especially according to Kant, is more than a "beautiful representation of a thing"; it is a representation of aesthetic ideas, i.e. of something that is beyond all concept. The concept of genius wants to formulate this insight of Kant. >Genius/Kant. 1. Lessing, Entwürfe zum Laokoon Nr. 20 b; in Lessings Sämtl. Schriften ed. Lach- mann, 1886ff., Bd. 14, S. 415. 2. Kant explicitly says that "the judgement according to an ideal of beauty is not a is merely the judgement of taste".(K. d. U. S. 61). Vgl. dazu meinen Aufsatz Gadamer, Die Stellung der Poesie im Hegel'schen System der Künste( Hegel-Studien 21, (1986). |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Critical Theory | Arendt | Brocker I 363 Critical Theory/ArendtVsAdorno/ArendtVsMarcuse/ ArendtVsHorkheimer/Arendt: Arendt takes a critical perspective on modern mass society. However, she rejects the basic assumption of the Critical Theory that modern society has led to de-individualization on a large scale (cf. Horkheimer/Adorno 1944 (1); Marcuse 1967 (2)). In her view, the opposite is the case: it is only the democratic mass society that creates individualism in a constitutive way. >Individuals, >Individualism, >Democracy, >Society. 1. Horkheimer, Max/Adorno, Theodor W., Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente, Amsterdam 1944. 2. Marcuse, Herbert, Der eindimensionale Mensch. Studien zur Ideologie der fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaft, Neuwied/Berlin 1967. Antonia Grunenberg, „Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Arendt I H. Arendt Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics. Civil Disobedience. On Violence. Thoughts on Politics and Revolution Boston 1972 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Horkheimer | Habermas | IV 490 Adorno/Horkheimer/Rationalization/Modernism/Habermas: Horkheimer and Adorno had disclosed the theory of class consciousness. They address the problem of linking the phenomena of the rationalization of life orders and the institutionalization of purpose-rational action (see Purpose Rationality/Weber) with the reification of consciousness (see Reification/Lukács) with the criticism of instrumental reason. This is a vision of an administered, totally reified world in which purpose rationality and rule merge. The theory has the advantage of focusing on the systemically induced deformation of communicatively structured life contexts. HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsHorkheimer: the weakness of its theory lies in the fact that it attributes the erosion of the lifeworld to the magic of a purpose rationality demonized to instrumental reason. Thus the criticism of instrumental reason falls into the same error as Weber's theory, and it also loses the fruits of its approach, which is nevertheless directed towards systemic effects. (See Instrumental Reason/Habermas). IV 558 Adorno/Horkheimer/Marcuse/Society Theory/Method/Habermas: Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse stick to Freudian drive theory and reckon with the dynamics of an inner nature that reacts to social pressure but remains resistant to the power of socialisation at its core. (1) (AdornoVsFromm, HorkeimerVsFromm: See I/Fromm.) 1. This position has not changed later: vgl. TH.W. Adorno, Soziologie und Psychologie, in: Festschrift Horkheimer, Frankfurt 1955; H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, Boston, 1955, der, Verhalten der Psychoanalyse, in: ders, Kultur und Gesellschaft 2, Frankfurt 1965, S. 85ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Humans | Wiener | II 94 Human/Wiener, Norbert: Thesis: the human is a message himself. The older notions of individuality were somehow linked to the concept of identity, whether it was the material substance of the animal or the mental substance of the human soul. Nowadays, we have to admit that individuality is related to the continuity of the scheme and consequently shares with it the essence of communication. Scheme/Wiener, >Communication, >Message, >Person. WienerVsAdorno. II 99 Identity/Individual/Wiener: the physical identity of an individual is not based on the identity of the substance from which it is made. The metabolism causes a much stronger metabolism than was thought possible for a long time. Cf. >Identity/Henrich. |
WienerN I Norbert Wiener Cybernetics, Second Edition: or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine Cambridge, MA 1965 WienerN II N. Wiener The Human Use of Human Beings (Cybernetics and Society), Boston 1952 German Edition: Mensch und Menschmaschine Frankfurt/M. 1952 |
| I, Ego, Self | Fromm | Habermas IV 558 I/Fromm/FrommVsHorkheimer/FrommVsAdorno/Habermas: in contrast to Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, Erich Fromm takes up suggestions from ego-psychology and transfers the process of ego development into the medium of social interactions that penetrate and structure the natural substrate of instictive movements(1). >Personality Psychology, >About Personality psychology, >H. Marcuse, >Th.W. Adorno, >M. Horkheimer. 1.E. Fromm, Escape from Freedom, NY 1942, deutsch Frankfurt 1971. |
Fromm I Erich Fromm Escape from Freedom New York 1942 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Instrumental Reason | Habermas | IV 490 Instrumental Reason/Habermas: the term suggests that the rationality of recognizing and acting subjects systematically expands into a higher-order purpose rationality. >Rationality, >Procedural rationality. Thus the rationality of self-regulated systems, whose imperatives override the consciousness of their integrated members, appears in the form of a totalized purpose rationality. HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsHorkheimer: thus, the two authors confuse system and action rationality. Therefore, they cannot sufficiently differentiate between the rationalization of action orientation IV 491 in the context of a (...) lifeworld on the one hand and the expansion of the control capacities of (...) social systems on the other. >System rationality, >Lifeworld. Autonomy/Spontanity: Therefore, they can only locate spontaneity, which is not yet captured by the reifying power of system rationalization, in irrational forces - in the charismatic force of leaders or the mimetic of art and love. >Spontaneity, >Art, >Mimesis. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Mass Culture | Adorno | Habermas IV 558 Mass Culture/AdornoVsBenjamin/BenjaminVsAdorno/Habermas: on the question of the ideological character of mass culture, a front is formed between Adorno on the one hand and Benjamin on the other. While Adorno (with Löwenthal and Marcuse) irreconcilably contrasts the experience of authentic art with cultural consumption, Benjamin persistently sets his hopes on the profane illuminations that are supposed to emanate from a mass art stripped of its aura. >W. Benjamin, >Experience, >Experience/Adorno, >Art/Adorno, >History/Adorno, >Culture. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Mass Culture | Arendt | Brocker I 363 Mass Culture/ArendtVsAdorno/ArendtVsMarcuse/Arendt: Arendt takes a critical perspective on modern mass society. However, she rejects the basic assumption of the Critical Theory that modern society has led to de-individualization on a large scale (cf. Horkheimer/Adorno 1944(1); Marcuse 1967(2)). In her view, the opposite is the case: it is only the democratic mass society that creates individualism in a constitutive way. Question: 1. What are the material and spiritual conditions underlying the phenomenon that modern mass society is a community of isolated job-holders whose carriers have lost their relationship to their common world - the human conditionality? 2. What is or what is the standard for social coexistence? See Society/Arendt. 1. Horkheimer, Max/Adorno, Theodor W., Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente, Amsterdam 1944. 2. Marcuse, Herbert, Der eindimensionale Mensch. Studien zur Ideologie der fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaft, Neuwied/Berlin 1967. Antonia Grunenberg, „Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Arendt I H. Arendt Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics. Civil Disobedience. On Violence. Thoughts on Politics and Revolution Boston 1972 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Mass Culture | Benjamin | Habermas IV 558 Mass Culture/AdornoVsBenjamin/ BenjaminVsAdorno/Habermas: on the question of the ideological character of mass culture, a front is formed between Adorno on the one hand and Benjamin on the other. >Mass culture/Adorno. While Adorno (with Löwenthal and Marcuse) irreconcilably contrasts the experience of authentic art with cultural consumption, Benjamin persistently sets his hopes on the profane illuminations that are supposed to emanate from a mass art stripped of its aura. >Art/Adorno, >Aura. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Materialism | Adorno | Grenz I 116 Materialism/Adorno/Grenz: Thesis: Materialism would be secularized theology. BlochVsAdorno/Grenz: Bloch has attacked this very sharply.(1) >Theology, >History/Adorno. Grenz I 127 Dialectical Materialism/Alfred Schmidt/Grenz: "Like all materialisms, the dialectically one recognizes that the laws and movements of external nature exist independently and outside any consciousness. This in-itself, beomes however, [and thus the dialectic modifies the general materialism] only relevant insofar as it becomes a for-us, that is, insofar as nature is involved in human-social purposes."(2) >Dialectic, >Laws of nature, >Relevance. 1. E. Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung III p. 1602ff. 2. A. Schmidt Der Begriff der Natur, p. 151. --- Adorno XIII 171 Materialism/Adorno: materialism has a certain trait of the polemic, which differs fundamentally from the affirmative trait of all idealistic philosophies. XIII 174 It is the attitude which opposes naturalness to every manifestation of the mind and ultimately leads to represent the necessity of living as that which decides at all. XIII 175 He does not only recourse to the subject through the recognition and through reality constituted through recognition, but he refers directly to reality itself from the protest against the illusionary moment in the mind. XIII 219 Materialism/Adorno: in his monistic as well as in his Marxist-dialectical form, he placed the concept of development in the center, for obvious anti-theological reasons. If neither a creatio ex nihilo nor an eternally self-identical and unchanging being is accepted, the concept of development receives a strong accent. This is surprisingly also found in > Epicurus. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Myth | Gadamer | I 278 Myth/GadamerVsRomanticism/Gadamer: In truth, the precondition is the mysterious dark, in which lies a mythical collective consciousness that precedes all thinking, just as dogmatic-abstract as that of a state of perfection of completed enlightenment or that of absolute knowledge. Cf. >Enlightenment/Romanticism, >Myth/Romanticism. Primordial wisdom is only the counter-image of the "primordial dumb". All mythical consciousness has always been knowledge, and by knowing about divine powers, it goes beyond a mere trembling before power (if one should take such for the primordial stage) I 279 but also beyond a collective life banished to magical rituals (as we find it for example in the early Orient). It knows about itself, and in this knowledge it is no longer simply beside itself(1). This is connected with the fact that the contrast between genuine mythical thinking and pseudo-mythical poetic thinking is also a romantic illusion based on a prejudice of the Enlightenment: namely that poetic action, because it is a creation of the free imagination, no longer has any part in the religious obligation of the myth. 1) Horkheimer and Adorno seem to me to be quite right with their analysis of the "Dialectic of Enlightenment" (even if I can see a lack of historical reflection, if not a confusion of Homer with Johann Heinrich Voss in the application of sociological terms as in Odysseus, as already criticized by Goethe). (GadamerVsHorkheimer, GadamerVsAdorno.) |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Philosophy | Habermas | Rorty III 142 HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsFoucault: their polemic against the Enlightenment turns the back on the social hopes of liberal societies. >Enlightenment, >Progress, >Liberalism, >HabermasVsAdorno, >HabermasVsFoucault. Rorty III 143 Habermas shares with the Marxists the assumption that the true meaning of a philosophical opinion exists in its political implications. >Marxism/Habermas, >RortyVsHabermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Rationalization | Habermas | III 22 Rationalization/Sociology/Habermas: Understanding rational action orientations becomes the point of reference for understanding all action orientations. For sociology, this means the following relationship between meta-theoretical and methodological level: a) At the metatheoretical level, it chooses basic concepts that are tailored to the increase in rationality of modern life. b) At the methodological level, the understanding of rational action orientations becomes a reference point for the understanding of all action orientations (>Theory of Meaningful Understanding). This is about internal relationships between meaning and validity. >Sociology, >Levels/order, >Levels of Description, >Theory, >Method. III 209 Rationalization/HabermasVsMarx/VsAdorno/VsHorkheimer/VsWeber/Habermas: the concept of rationality of these authors is too narrow to grasp the comprehensive social rationality they have in mind. >Rationality/Habermas, >Rationality/Adorno, >Rationality/Weber, >HabermasVsAdorno, >HabermasVsMarx, >HabermasVsWeber. The term would have to be used at the same level as the productive forces, the subsystems of functional rational action, the totalitarian bearers of instrumental reason. >Productive Forces/Habermas. That is not happening. The concept of action of these authors is not complex enough for this. >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas. In addition, basic concepts of action and system theory must not be confused: LuhmannVsMarx, LuhmannVsWeber, LuhmannVsAdorno: the rationalization of action orientations and lifeworld structures is not the same as the increase in complexity of action systems.(1) >LuhmannVsWeber. III 457 Communicative action/rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only when we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday actions and the formation of subsystems for procedural rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas III 459 Rationalization/Habermas: the paradox of rationalization, of which Weber spoke, can be understood abstractly in such a way that the rationalization of the world allows a kind of system integration ((s) of subsystems with non-linguistic communication media such as money and power) that competes with the integration principle of ((s) linguistic) understanding and under certain conditions has a disintegrating effect on the world of life. >Lifeworld. IV 451 Rationalization/Modernism/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Weber could not classify the problems of legitimacy that a positivistically undermined legal rule raises within the pattern of rationalization of modern societies, because he himself remained imprisoned by legal-positivist views. >Legitimicy/Habermas. Solution/Habermas: Thesis: (p) The emergence (...) of modern societies requires the institutional embodiment of moral and legal concepts of a post-traditional nature, but (q) capitalist modernization follows a pattern according to which cognitive-instrumental rationality penetrates beyond the realms of economy and state into other, communicatively structured areas of life and takes precedence there at the expense of moral-practical and aesthetic-practical rationality. (r) This causes disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld. IV 452 Problem: a progressively rationalised lifeworld is simultaneously decoupled and made dependent on increasingly complex, formally organised areas of action such as economics and state administration. This takes sociopathological forms of internal colonization. To the extent that critical imbalances can only be avoided at the cost of disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld (i.e. of "subjectively" experienced crises or pathologies threatening identity). IV 486 Paradoxically, rationalization releases both at the same time - the systemically induced reification and the utopian perspective from which capitalist modernization has always inherited the stigma that it dissolves traditional forms of life without saving their communicative substance. >Reification 1.N. Luhmann, Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität, Tübingen 1968. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adorno, Th.W. | Rorty Vs Adorno, Th.W. | V 80 Rorty sAdorno: hardly contributes anything new to the familiar pre-Freudian opinion that if people had more education, more leisure and more money, we would have to deal less with slave-drivers. V 110 Democracy/Rationality/Adorno/Rorty: Prognosis: the self-destruction of rationality will lead to failure of the liberal democracies. V 111 RortyVsAdorno: this collapse would not be convincing proof for the assertion that human communities can only survive if there is agreement on the last things in them. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Foucault, M. | Rorty Vs Foucault, M. | Rorty III 142 HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsFoucault: their polemics against enlightenment turns the back on social hopes of liberal societies. III 143 Habermas shares with the Marxists belief that the true meaning of a philosophical opinion consists in its political implications. V 8 Foundation/Final Justification/RortyVsHabermas: I distrust the remaining fundamentalism, striving for "universality". Habermas celebrates democracy, but he does not justify it. If HabermasVsFoucault alleges relativism and challenges him to disclose its "normative standards". >Ultimate Justification. Rorty: here I stand on the side of Foucault, who shrugs and says nothing. RortyVsFoucault: distrust him when he projects his desire for private Nietzschean autonomy in the public sphere. In this mood he rejects the democratic institutions. V 20 Cultures/Rorty: have no axiomatic structures. That they have institutionalized norms, actually means the same as Foucault's thesis that knowledge and power can never be separated. If at a certain time at a certain place you do not believe in certain things, you'll probably have to pay for it. V 21 RortyVsFoucault: but these standards are not "rules of language" or "criteria of rationality". They have the look of officials and policemen. Whoever disagrees, commits the Def Cartesian fallacy/Rorty: he sees axioms where nothing but shared habits reign. |
R. Rorty I Rorty Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt/M 1997 II Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt 2000 III Rorty Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität, Frankfurt,1992 IV Rorty Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart (Reclam)1993 V Rorty Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998 VI Rorty Wahrheit und Fortschritt, Frankfurt 2000 |
| Various Authors | Goodman Vs Various Authors | I 81 GoodmanVsIntrinsic/Extrinsic: this does apparently not work: because in every classification of properties in extrins./intrins. each image or each object has both internal and external poperties. II Preamble Putnam IX GoodmanVsFormalism for the Sake of Formalism. GoodmanVsIdea of an ontological basement independent from our theorizing II 10 It is not true that science could do without unreal conditional clauses. The tendency to dismiss the problems of unr. conditional clauses as a pseudo-problem or unsolvable is understandable considering the great difficulties (GoodmanVs.) If you drop all problems of disposition, possibility, scientific law, confirmation, etc., then you are in fact giving up the philosophy of science. II 67 The argument that one should better dispense with the definition of an expression if it was not usually defined by scientists or laymen, is similar to the argument that philosophy need not be systematic, because the reality described by it is not systematic (VsAdorno). You might as well say that philosophy should not be in German, because the reality is not written in German. II 70 (s) SalmonVsGoodman: Objects do not need to appear at all times, but places must be there at all times! ((s) GoodmanVs: Description dependence for him does not only refer to objects, but to the whole of reality. (VsKant)) Kant: space and time are not reality, but the condition for the possibility to experience reality. III 67 Presentation/Empathy/GoodmanVsEmpathy Theory: Gestures do not need to have features in common with music. III 81 Metaphor: the general question: What does a metaphor say and what makes it true? GoodmanVsMetaphor as abridged comparison: sometimes we say a metaphor is elliptically designed and the metaphorical truth was simply understood as the literal truth of the extended statement. But the comparison cannot just result in the image of the person being similar in one respect or another. In this way, everything is similar to everything. III 224 GoodmanVs"Special Aesthetic Emotion" - GoodmanVs Theory that it does not depend on the pleasure that one has, but on a certain "objectified pleasure": Goodman: Then the pleasure would be something that the object must have, and indeed rather without causing it; ultimately it would therefore probably have to feel this pleasure itself. III 228 GoodmanVsDichotomy between the Cognitive and the Emotional. It blocks the insight that emotions work cognitively in the aesthetic experience. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Various Authors | Luhmann Vs Various Authors | Habermas I 436 VsParsons: simply reproduces the classical model through systems. (Social system = action system). Luhmann instead: human as part of the environment of society. This changes the premises of all questions. Methodical anti-humanism. Habermas I 440 LuhmannVsHumanism: "Cardinal Error". A fusion of social and material dimensions. Reese-Schäfer II 28 LuhmannVsDualism: of observer and object. Universality/Vs: the total view, the universality had to be given up and was replaced by "critique", with which the subject's point of view on universality is rounded up again". Foundation/Luhmann: there is no last stop. (Like Quine, Sellars, Rorty). Reese-Schäfer II 42 VsMarx: rejects the speech of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly aspire to the same good. Contradiction/Luhmann: arises only from the self-reference of sense. Not as in Marx. Contradictions/Legal System: does not serve for the avoidance, but for the regulation of conflicts. Reese-Schäfer II 78 Freedom of Value: (Max Weber): the renunciation of valuations is, so to speak, the blind spot of a second level observation. Reese-Schäfer II 89 Vs Right Politics: here there is no theory at all that would be able to read other theories. There is only apercus or certain literary guiding ideas. Reese-Schäfer II 90/91 VsGehlen: we do not have to subordinate ourselves to the institutions. Reese-Schäfer II 102 VsAction Theory: a very vague concept of individuals that can only be defined by pointing at people. Thus language habits are presented as language knowledge: because language requires us to employ subjects. LL. Language. Reese-Schäfer II 103 Reason/VsAdorno: one should not resign oneself (dialectic of the Enlightenment) but ask whether it does not get better without reason! Reese-Schäfer II 112 Overstimulation/LuhmannVsTradition: cannot take place at all. For already the neurophysiological apparatus drastically shields the consciousness. The operative medium sense does the rest. Reese-Schäfer II 138 Human/Gehlen: tried to determine the human from its difference to the animal. (LuhmannVs). AU Cass. 3 VsParsons: Terminology limited by structural functionalism: one could not ask about the function of structures, or examine terms such as inventory or inventory prerequisite, variable or the whole methodological area. Limitation by the fact that a certain object was assumed as given. There were no criteria for the existence of the object - instead the theory must be able to contain all deviance and dysfunction. (not possible with Parsons) - Question: in which time period and which bandwidths is a system identifiable? (e.g. Revolution: is society still the same society afterwards?) Inventory criteria Biology: Definition by death. The living reproduces itself by its own means. Self-reference (important in modern system theory) is not possible within the framework of the Parsons' model. Therefore we need interdisciplinary solutions. VsAction Theory: the concept of action is not suitable because an actor is assumed! But it also exists without an observer! In principle, an action can be presented as a solitary thing without social resonance! - Paradox/Luhmann: the procedure of the dissolution of the paradox is logically objectionable, but is constantly applied by the logicians themselves: they use a change of levels. The only question that must not be asked is: what is the unity of the difference of planes? (AU Cass. 4) VsEquilibrium Theories: questionable today; 1. from the point of view of natural science: it is precisely the imbalances which are stable, equilibrium is rather metaphor. (AU Cass. 6) Tradition: "Transmission of patterns from generation to generation". Stored value patterns that are offered again and again and adopted by the offspring. However, these patterns are still the same. VsTradition: Question: Where does identity come from in the first place? How could one talk about selfhood without an external observer? That will not be much different either with the assumptions of a reciprocal relationship with learning. Luhmann: instead: (Autopoiesis): Socialization is always self-socialization. AU Cass 6 Information/Luhmann: the term must now be adapted to it! In the 70s one spoke of "genetic information", treated structures as informative, the genetic code contained information. Luhmann: this is wrong, because genes only contain structures and no events! The semantic side of the term remained unexplained for a long time, i.e. the question of what information can choose from. Reese-Schäfer II 76 LuhmannVsMarx/Reese-Schäfer: rejects the talk of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly strive for the same good. AU Cass 11 Emergence/Reductionism/System Theory/Luhmann: this does not even pose the actual question: what actually distinguishes an emergent system? What is the characteristic for the distinction from the basal state? What is the criterion that enables emergence? Will Martens: (Issue 4, Kölner Zeitschrift f. Sozialforschung): Autopoiesis of social systems. It deals with the question following the concept of autopoiesis and communication. Communication/Luhmann: Tripartite structure: Information, Communication, Understanding (not action sequences). (Comes from linguistics, but also antiquity!). Martens: this tripartite division is the psychological foundation of communication. Communication must first be negotiated in the individual head, I must see what I assume to be unknown and what I want to choose, and my body must also be in good shape. Marten's thesis: sociality only comes about in the synthesis of these three components. Social things arise when information, communication and understanding are created as a unit with repercussions on the participating mental systems, which must behave accordingly. The unity is only the synthesis itself, while the elements still have to be described psychologically or biologically etc. Without this foundation it does not work. LuhmannVsMartens: I hope you fall for it! At first that sounds very plausible. But now comes the question: What is communicated in the text by Martens? Certainly not the blood circulation! There is also no blood in the text! The editors would already fight this off, there is also no state of consciousness in the text! So I cannot imagine what the author was thinking! I can well imagine that he was supplied with blood and sat in front of the computer. And that he wanted to take part in the discussion. Luhmann: these are all constructions which are suggested in communication, but which are not actually present in communication. (>Interpenetration). Communication/LuhmannVsMartens: Question: what is actually claimed in the text, and does it not actually refute it itself? Paradox: the text that tells of blood and thoughts claims to bring blood and thoughts, but it only brings letters and what a skilled reader can make of the text. That is communication. That is all I can actually see! Communication/Luhmann: if you think realistically and operatively, you cannot see more in the text. We have to put the words together from the letters ourselves. When psychic systems respond to communication, they change their internal states accordingly. Communication/Luhmann: if one has received this message (from Martens), one can say: everything is actually correct, one could describe a communication completely on the basis of physical or psychological facts. Nothing would be missing, with the exception of autopoiesis itself. Question: we have to explain how communication maintains itself without incorporating psychological and physical operations! Luhmann: this reproduction of communication through communication goes only through total exclusion from physical, psychological, etc. operations. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
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