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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Experience | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 342 Private experiences/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: from Wittgenstein does not follow that there are no private experiences - HintikkaVsAnscombe - Wittgenstein: the essence of private experience is that everyone has his own - but that he does not know whether the other has the same - > Beetle-example: see "privileged access".) II 82 Experience/Wittgenstein: is not differentiated by predicates from what is not experience - it is a logical term - not a term such as "chair" or "table". II 101 Experience/causality/cause/border/Wittgenstein: one can get to all causal laws by experience - that is why we cannot find out what the cause is for the experience - if one provide a scientific explanation, one in turn describes an experience - therefore, no sentence can deal with the cause of >sense data. II 261 Experience/rule/Wittgenstein: both is easily confused: experience: that this is blue because - matches the pattern. - In contrast rule: the statement that both match, is a rule that I set up. --- IV 87 Experience/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: (according to 5552) shows the "how", not the "what" - 5634 no part of our experience is also a priori. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| I, Ego, Self | Chisholm | I 23 I/Chisholm: Being oneself is not a property. - from this follows: false: "x has necessarily the property to be identical with x" - instead: "for every x applies necessarily ..." - there is no property "to be identical with x". >Ontology, >Properties. I 41 I/Anscombe: the thing from whose action this idea of an action is an idea, etc. ChisholmVsAnscombe: explains I by demonstrativum. I 43 I/CastanedaVsChisholm: pro propositions of the first person as concrete things with finite existence - never possible to express or capture foreign I-propositions. >Propositions, >Intensions. I 46f I/Self/Chisholm: it is not certain that each person can comprehend their own individual nature - emphatic reflexive:/Chisholm: "he himself" - the non-emphatic are a special case of the emphatic - E.g. it does not matter whether the engine controls the enginge, or the engine controls itself - in this case no non-emphatic reflexives are possible - but difference: whether the doctor treats the doctor or the doctor treats himself - difference whether psychological or nonpsychological predicates are applicable. - If at all psychological ones are possible, then not understanding the "he-himself" expression as a special case of the ordinary expression de re, but vice versa. >He himself, >Self. I 73 I/Russell/Chisholm: the biography to which this belongs - now: the time of this - here: the place of this - now/Chisholm: does not pick out an identifiable property, which should that be? - to express that the present is the only existing time, one needs "now" or a synonym - time: conjunction of events or facts. I 74 I/ChisholmVsAnscombe: tries to explain their use of "I" by their use of "this" ("I am this thing") - Vs: but with this she cannot explain my use of "I". ChisholmVsAnscombe: we need no demonstrativa (like Brentano: no identifying properties). I 78 "We are F"/Chisholm: not always conjunction "I am F and you are F". I 184 I/property/Chisholm: even if I do not have an individual nature, some of my properties are essential to me: perhaps my being-a-person. >Person. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Self- Consciousness | Anscombe | Frank I 81 I/body/Anscombe: only in particular I sentences it applies that their description coincides with the description of events: e.g. "I jump", "I stand", etc. coming from this: Self-consciousness/Anscombe: self-consciousness can be determined externally! For example, Henry James: a novel character ("the poor Baldy") has lost his self-consciousness, but not his consciousness in a fall from the coach. Constitutively for James and Anscombe then for an externally observable or writable... Frank I 82 ...self-consciousness, the concept of an immediate, concept of actions without a subject, etc., which can be referred to as subjectless but to acting and suffering "things". Reason: this should avoid two things: 1. as a speaker of "I" to claim a body, 2. to identify a thing that is different from the body, but which then has to be related to the body. >Body, >Self-identification. SchaedeVsAnscombe: it remains unclear what this is about. What is a "subjectless act"? Frank I 92 Self-consiousness/Anscombe: self-consciousness can be explained as "awareness that this and that belongs to oneself". Caution: "he himself" is very different from "from oneself". >Reference, >Self-reference. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anscombe, E. | Armstrong Vs Anscombe, E. | Armstrong III 95 Causality/VsAnscombe: here it looks as if Anscombe’s position is weakened: if a’s F become b’s G are caused, don’t we have a law F>G? Armstrong: (pro Anscombe) that actually does not follow. We only have such a law if the first event causes the second by virtue of the universals F and G. Although it is natural to expect that universals are as operational as this, I do not see how it can be proven. I for my part would think worse of the universe if they were non-operational. Nevertheless Anscombe can rightly say that it is logically possible that the causation is a mere isolated case causation. She is also right with AnscombeVsDavidson. (ArmstrongVsDavidson). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Anscombe, E. | Brandom Vs Anscombe, E. | Brandom I 962 Anscombe, "I" is not at all a referring expression! No pronoun, because that is a completely heterogeneous category, you could say "it s the word that it is" just as well. I 769 BrandomVsAnscombe: this is overkill. "I" acts like a name. She recognizes herself. (Anscombe). The problem is easy to specify, as it is needed. Brandom: the specificity of "I" is that it can be used not only to assign a definition. Perry: 1. special type of non observation based knowledge ("introspection") 2 Important cases are immune to misidentification. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Anscombe, E. | Evans Vs Anscombe, E. | Frank I 510 Identity/Temporal/Anscombe: it is impossible for the subject to identify different things by the many "I" identifications, which it makes over time. An "unnoticed substitution" cannot possibly take place. Anscombe: Problem: this "logical guarantee" arouses her suspicions. EvansVsAnscombe: this "logical guarantee" only came about because of the way she describes the situation: namely, by the description that one and the same subject has thoughts at different times. (Description). Evans: it is simply a tautology that self-identification undoubtedly is identifications of the same self. I 512 I/Self-consciousness/Evans: Even under memory loss a subject can still think of itself! It may wonder why it does not receive information in the ordinary way. It would only be wrong to conclude from this that self-consciousness could be explained without reference to the different ways that the subjects have to gain knowledge about themselves. If a subject is supposed to think self-consciously about itself, then it must be essentially disposed to allow such a thinking to be determined by information that can be available to it in any of the relevant ways. EvansVsAnscombe: however, it does not necessarily have to dispose of actually accessible information in order to know that there is only one object to which it is so dispositionally referred. Fra I 513 Anscombe: an anesthetized person, according to her, has no reason to use a demonstrative expression that refers to himself, because he is given no object for this. I 563 Problem/Anscombe/(s): "The murderer of Laius intends to refer to the murderer of Laius" satisfies the same form. I.e. the special thing about "I" (first person pronoun) is not captured! (Oedipus would not agree with this attribution, or rather it would not be self-attribution of him. EvansVsAnscombe: this is not right, it is easily possible to attribute the intention of self-attribution to a subject, in the sense of intention to fulfill the single-digit term of expression "x refers to x" is identical with the intention to fulfill the single-digit term "x refers to me". Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Anscombe, E. | Prior Vs Anscombe, E. | Prior I 127 PriorVsReid/VsAnscombe/VsFindlay: it is not easy to hold the following two sentences together: (1) That which X thinks of Y, plans with him, adores about him, always includes a Y just like an X. - (2) There are cases in which X thinks of Y (adores, etc.) and there is no Y at all. - At least it is difficult to reject the following three considerations in this context that merely seem to make them consistent: - a) Thinking of an unreal object is another way of thinking than thinking of a real object. - b) our thinking would not put us in relation to the object, but only to an "idea" of it. - c) there would be strong and weak kinds of reality. (> Subsistence). I 128 Thinking/Anscombe/Prior: could "thinking" not be replaced by any other (at least intentional) verb? - Object/Tradition/Anscombe: something cannot just be an object without being the object of something. I.e. "relational property" of being an object. I 129 Thinking/Prior: one might think that thinking of Y or Z are just different types (modifications) of the same activity. Not as if being father of Y and being father of X were "different ways of being father", but rather like thinking quickly and slowly. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Anscombe, E. | Wittgenstein Vs Anscombe, E. | Hintikka I 163 ff Hintikka: The problem of color incompatibility is solvable. Color/color terms/color terms/logic/AnscombeVsWittgenstein: argues what is not accepted by WittgensteinVsAnscombe that, provided red and green are objects, we know which is their logical type. --- I 164 Color words/color terms/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: incompatible does not mean contradictory: (red/green). E.g. "This patch is red" and "This patch is green" are incompatible, but this incompatibility is not logical, in the sense that it is indicated by the notation (but: see below: 4). Also it does not reduce to a truth-functional contradiction. (Contradiction is for Wittgenstein a precisely defined term in the theory of truth functions (4:46)). "It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The statement that a point in the visual field has two different colors at the same time, is a contradiction. Hintikka: but here it is not about the status of colors, but about the status of the color attribution. There is no reason to suppose that Wittgenstein has ever believed color attributions such as "This is red" would have subject predicate form. Wittgenstein: from the use of these forms (meant here are grammatical sentences) we cannot draw, at most vague, conclusions. --- I 165 Sentence/form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: E.g. "This lecture is boring", "The weather is nice" are only seemingly sentences of the same form. They have nothing to do with each other. HintikkaVsAnscombe: their argument loses its strength with that: this is about someone who makes very different conditions. Hintikka: if you make other conditions, the situation is obviously quite different: Example: Assume that the general concept of color in the language not to be reproduced by a class of color predicates but by a function c which maps points of the visual space in a color space. The logical incompatibility would then be mirrored by the fact that the colors red and green are represented by different names. Then, the two sentences are logically incompatible! Due to their logical form a function cannot take two different values for the same argument. Wittgenstein claims even emphatically that attributions of different qualities of perception are essentially clear, that is, can be represented by real functions. --- I 165/166 Color/color words/neccessity/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the question of whether the colors incompatibility means a breach against Wittgenstein's notion that purely logical necessities are the only necessities, is now moved into a new light. It depends on what we think is the logical form of color terms. (Or the correct notation). Is a) every single color represented by a predicate, we get necessities that are not of a logical type. b) points in a color space: then the incompatibility of various colors cause no illogical necessities. (Wittgenstein is this alternative (but certainly strange to Anscombe). He constantly deals with the concept of the color space. However, this concept fails to satisfy if one interprets specific color words as undefined predicates --- I 341 ff Pain/private experiences/Cartesianism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the most surprising thesis of this chapter is probably the thesis of Wittgenstein's metaphysical Cartesianism, so the assertion that there are really private internal event-like experiences like pain and other such sensations according to Wittgenstein. It is undisputed that the language must be based on a public language game, one is divided what must follow for the private feelings. Implies the neccessity of a public framework that these experiences themselves are now objects, events, or anything not private? That this follows, is represented by many philosophers. e.g. --- Hintikka I 342 Anscombe: "If a word stands for a private object, it must have a private ostensive definition." Since private ostensive definitions are impossible there can probably be no personal item acording to this view. HintikkaVsAnscombe: but this implication does not apply. Of course we cannot say that sensations and the like are private in our language according to Wittgenstein. But that is not what this is about, this is just one of the consequences of inexpressibility of semantics. Actual question: are the philosophers right who claim that there are no private events according to Wittgenstein? No. PU § 272 provides a counter-example: "The essence of the private experience is actually not that each has its own example, but that no one knows whether the other also has this or something else. So it would be possible, although not verifiable, that one part of humanity has a sensation of red and the other a different one." |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Anscombe, E. | Chisholm Vs Anscombe, E. | I 40 I/Self/Identity/Proposition/Other philosophers: four recent attempts: 1) Anscombe: "I am this thing here" is a real proposition, but not a proposition of identity. It means: This thing here is the thing, the person of whose action this idea of an action is an idea, of whose movements this notion of movement is a notion, etc. I 42 ChisholmVsAnscombe: She tries to explain her use of "I" by the demonstrative "this". It is clear that she cannot explain my use of "I" with this. Therefore, she has no theory for indirect I 73 I/Anscombe: "I am this one" is a real proposition, but not a proposition of identity. Instead, it means: this thing here is the thing of whose action this idea of an action is an idea. ChisholmVsAnscombe: she tries to explain her use of "I" through the use of "this", I 74 but it is clear that she cannot explain my use of "I" with it. Peacocke I 150 Guaranteed reference/Peacocke: this idea can be found in connection with demonstrative thoughts. It now appears that neither the field of the identificationally basic nor that of the constitutive identificationally basic types exactly matches the class of guaranteed referring types. Def Guaranteed reference/Peacocke: E.g. whenever someone suspects themselves to be thinking a thought with a certain way of givenness, then there is indeed such a way of givenness and it refers. In this sense, some identificationally basic cases have no guaranteed reference. E.g. unrealized hallucination. Guaranteed reference is not sufficient for identificational basality (independence from identification): guaranteed reference: E.g. "my paternal grandfather" has a guaranteed reference for a normal human. E.g. a way of givenness of form "the oldest now living person and otherwise I." In both cases, reference is even guaranteed a priori! But from inference, not from identification. But these examples are not identification ally basic, nor is it sufficient for identification independence that a way of givenness type m is guaranteed to apply to an object, so that the subject then believes that it is a way of givenness type m! Not sufficient: as ability to recognize also passes the test ((s) but is dependent on identification). E.g. If someone hallucinates that Dummett is standing in front of them, this is still a thought about Dummett. Which object the thought picks out does not depend on the object meeting a certain description. Rather, it depends on certain complex relations with the thinker. Demonstrative thoughts/Peacocke: not all of these relations are independent from identification, and that needs to be explained by the theory of dG. Identificationally basic/Peacocke: does not imply that any substantial identity was definitely true in the case of an i.g. way of givenness. I 151 It is only about a way of knowledge that is not based on other beliefs. I/Guaranteed reference/Anscombe: (The First Person, p.57): "I" is an expression X which has a guaranteed reference in the following sense: not only that there is such a thing X, but also that what I suppose to be X actually is X."... the person of whose movements these movement ideas are ideas..." Self-identification/PeacockeVsAnscombe: you can identify someone else falsely with these conditions! E.g. Anscombe would allow the bishop to see a woman disguised as a bishop in the mirror, and falsely sees her as himself. (ChisholmVsAnscombe: she shows how she identifies herself, but not how I identify myself). |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Peacocke Vs Chisholm, R.M. | I 119 Constitutive Role: E.g. of "the person who and has such and such experiences and thoughts": here there are two possible misunderstandings: 1) E.g. in Chisholm: PeacockeVsChisholm: confusion of general and particular. Anscombe: "I am this thing here": i.e. the person of whose action this idea of an action is an idea, etc." ChisholmVsAnscombe: that explains their use of the first person, but not my use! Peacocke: a distinction general/particular is implicit in our constitutive role. Particular: The particular constitutive role is specified by the conscious states of a person at a given time. General: the general constitutive role can be viewed as the function of thinking people and times on the associated individual constitutive roles. PeacockeVsChisholm: E.g. so there is a general recipe for the various particular constitutive roles of [self] (notation) for the two thinkers Anscombe and Chisholm. This defines the general constitutive role. And the same also goes for two thoughts by Chisholm at two different times. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 |
| Various Authors | Prior Vs Various Authors | I 123 Intentionality/Findlay: relational property with only one side. ((s) Vs: absurd.) Of course, "thinking about T" is a property of the thinker. I 124 Touchstone for Intentionality: is the "built-in reference to what is not part of it and what does not need to exist anywhere". There is absolutely no intrinsic difference between thinking and speaking about what does and what does not exist. (>Anscombe pro: >Objects of Thougt/Anscombe). That would only be a Pickwickian distinction (>difference without a difference). FindlayVsRussell: VsTheory of Descriptions. PriorVsFindlay: that's not fair, because he just offered the solution. I 127 PriorVsReid/VsAnscombe/VsFindlay: it is not easy to hold the following two sentences together: (1) What X thinks of Y, plans to do with him, appreciates about him, always involves Y as much as X. (2) There are cases in which X thinks of Y (appreciates, etc.), and there is no Y at all. At least it's difficult in this case to dismiss the following three considerations that merely seem to make them consistent: a) Thinking about an unreal object is a different kind of thinking than that about a real object. b) our thinking would not put us in relation to an object, but only to an "idea" of it. c) there would be strong and weak types of reality. (>Subsistence). I 128 Thinking/Anscombe/Prior: could "think" not be replaced with any other (at least intentional) verb? Object/Tradition/Anscombe: something cannot just be an object without being object of something. I.e. "relational property" of being an object. Simons I 119 Identity/Simons: is transitive. Prior: this is questionable (the only one). (PriorVsTransitivity of identity). |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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