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The author or concept searched is found in the following 48 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absoluteness | Hegel | Bubner I 182 Absolute Mind/Hegel: the eternal and self-contained idea operates as an absolute mind, creates and enjoys. (According to Aristotle, who distinguishes the self-thought as the highest activity of reason.) >Absolute Spirit. I 183 Absolute/HegelVsAristoteles: for him, the Absolute fits in with the categories of a self-uniting unity that seamlessly fits into systematic philosophies. He goes beyond this, in that he does not reserve the theory of goodness to a sub-domain of metaphysics. Thus, the doctrine of God means philosophizing in an encyclopaedically comprehensive dimension. There is no longer a supreme object. >Aristotle. HegelVsAristotle: Furthermore: parting with the teleology of nature. >Teleology, >Nature/Aristotle, >Nature. Instead: subjectivity principle. Heartbeat of the whole. The energeia, which permeates all things, is attributed to thought activities. I 184 Absoluteness/Hegel/Bubner: Absoluteness of the idea presents itself as the method of logic, and fulfills the condition of self-reference with this typically modern trick. >Self-reference, >Idea, >Logic/Hegel. Adorno XII 115 Absoluteness/Consciousness/Hegel/Adorno: by adopting an absolute identity of being and mind, Hegel tried to save the ontological proof of God. This assumption is actually the content of his philosophy. >Absolute spirit, >Proof of God. KantVsHegel: denies such an identity between what is and our consciousness. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| al-Farabi | Höffe | Höffe I 122 Al-Farabi/Höffe: Al-FarabiVsAl-Kindi: al-Fārābī (around 870-950), strongly opposes al-Kindī. Höffe I 123 Aristotle/al-Farabi: It is not clear in which form Plato's Politeia was present to al-Fārābī ; only individual sections of Aristotle's politics were known to him. >Aristotle, >Politics/Aristotle. Religion/Philosophy/Islam: Al-Fārābī does not criticize Islam, because like al-Kindī he is convinced that philosophy and religion represent the same truth. Philosophy with its concepts and arguments has to serve the religion operating with pictures and parables. >Philosophy, >Religion. Politics/al-Farabi: here especially the writing Mabādi' ārā ahl al-madīna al-fādila [is authoritative]: The principles of the views Höffe I 124 of the inhabitants of an excellent state (942/43), in short: The Excellent State or the Model State. (Madīna may literally mean "city", but in this case the text is about a community, a state). >Politics, >State (Polity). al-FarabiVsAristotle: From a philosophical-historical point of view, [the scripture] consists of a commitment to Plato and New Platonism. In contrast to Aristotle, the excellent state has its place in a metaphysically founded overall structure of being. >Plato, >Being. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Causes | Gould | II 78 Causes/Aristotle/Gould: according to Aristotle, every incident has four distinct types of causes: e.g. House: What is the cause of my house? 1. Material Cause: it makes a difference which material is used. 2. Inducing Cause: the actual work must be carried out. 3. Formal Cause: the formal cause are the pre-defined blueprints. 4. Final Causes, Purpose Cause/GouldVsAristotle: these are no longer accepted today. Today we confine ourselves to the "causative cause" of Aristotle and do not regard the composition of the table, for example, as irrelevant, but it is no longer called the cause. Aristotle believes that it "thunders, for example, because there must be a hissing and raving while the fire is being extinguished, and also to threaten the souls in Tarutarus".(1) >Causality, >Explanation, >Causal explanation. III 239 Cause/effect/evolution: cause and effect are not always unambiguously determinable with regard to evolution. For example, brain: no one can say that our brain has been enlarged by natural selection for a certain purpose! Complexity/human/evolution: complexity, as for example in the human, is a passive consequence of evolutionary principles whose main result is something completely different. It is an effect, but not an effect of causes that are used for their purpose. 1. Aristotle, Anal.Post II 94b, 1. 28 |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Community | Aristotle | Höffe I 64 Community/Aristoteles/Höffe: Aristotle, for example, rejects session fees, although they allow all citizens to participate in the People's Assembly. Aristotle's basic thesis of a political anthropology is that man is by nature a political being (physei politikon zôon). Towards the beginning of politics it appears in connection with three other assertions: The polis is the perfect community, it is natural, furthermore by nature earlier than the house and the individuals. >Politics/Aristotle. HobbesVsAristotle: Hobbes argues that communities are not only gatherings but also alliances, so they are not created by nature but by art (Leviathan, introduction). Other authors VsAristotle: According to another, legitimatory objection Aristotle commits the naturalistic fallacy, because from statements about man as he is, he derives how he should live. Historical objection VsAristoteles: After the historical objection finally man could not be a political living being already because the corresponding communities had arisen late in the history of mankind. AristotleVsVs/Höffe: The historical objection assumes a static concept of nature. >Nature/Aristotle. Höffe I 65 According to his pattern for Physis, the biological processes, Aristotle understands nature dynamically as a development in which three aspects are important: the beginning and motor, the goal already latently present in the beginning and motor, and the sequence, the development process. "Biological fallacy" VsAristotle/Höffe: Aristotle does not succumb to a further, "biological fallacy", according to which political communities develop "by themselves", without a conscious own contribution of man. For he speaks of someone who brought the polis into being and, like Hobbes later, qualifies him as the "author of greatest goods". |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Community | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 152 Community/Thomas/Höffe: Since no human can live for him- or herself alone in accordance with his or her purpose, it was given to him or her by nature to "live sociably with many"(1). This living together - here Thomas Aquinas shows himself to be a republican. - There should be a Höffe I 153 a "Society of free men." >Society. Governance: According to another partial argument, the gap between the personal and the common good, there is a need for an authority that guides people. Only for this reason, because the welfare of the individual can run counter to the welfare of the community, does a rule become necessary. For it is only with its help that the multiplicity of individuals becomes the unity of a community. Monarchy: The factual follow-up question of whether one or more persons should rule, i.e. the question of the best constitution, is answered by Thomas Aquinas, although in the aforementioned sense a Republican, in favour of sole rule, namely the monarchy. >State (Polity). However, he does impose one condition on it: it must be exercised fairly, which in Thomas Aquinas' case, as is customary with Aristotle, Stoa and Cicero, means serving the common good. >Aristotle, >Cicero, >Stoicism as an author, >About stoicism. Righteous rule: Righteous is a rule that serves not the ruler but the community. Thomas Aquinas' sees its core in inner peace, which is not only suggested by the historical situation when the Sicilian Empire of Frederick II. fell apart and an interregnum ("intermediate rule") prevailed in the Roman-German Empire after the end of the Staufer dynasty. Community: Surprisingly, the definition of the commonwealth as a legal order, which is important in the Iex tract of the sum of theology, plays no role in the writing On the Rule of Princes. ThomasVsAristotle: [Thomas Aquinas' goes beyond Aristotle here]: Following his model of communities, the kingdoms of the time - not the Greek city republics as Aristotle did - he does not only follow the house and the village (qua clan) with civitas, the citizenship and city community. Cf. >Polis. In addition, he introduces the provincia or regnum, a community that spans several cities and landscapes. Only this greater unity makes it possible - according to medieval experience - to guarantee all the necessities of life almost autonomously. 1. Thomas De regno ad regem Cypri I, 1 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Constitution | Spinoza | Höffe I 235 Constitution/Spinoza/Höffe: Spinoza(1) starts with the foundations of law and state, shows that it is neither possible nor necessary to transfer everything to the highest authorities, and draws some political doctrines from the state constitution and history of the Hebrews. He declares that the law in spiritual matters, including the decision on external religious worship, is the exclusive prerogative of the highest authorities, and ends with the argumentation goal of the entire treatise: that in a free state not everyone is allowed to act as one wants, but that one is allowed to think what one wants and say what one thinks. >Natural Justice/Spinoza, >State/Spinoza, >Freedom/Spinoza. Chapter 16(1), which is fundamental for the philosophy of law and state, breaks with the traditional Aristotelian Stoic-Thomist theory of natural law, which extends into the Spanish late scholasticism. >Natural justice, >Aristotle, >Stoa, >Thomas Aquinas. Natural Law/SpinozaVsThomas Aquinas/SpinozaVsAristotle: Spinoza retains the traditional expression of natural law, but gives it a fundamentally new, exclusively naturalistic meaning. According to its principle of self-preservation, natural law does not contain any moral or otherwise normative claim. >Validity claims. SpinozaVsMachiavelli: On the contrary, every human being, not just the prince as in Machiavelli's case, may do what morality tends to forbid, he may act with force or cunning. >N. Machiavelli. Defined without any sense of duty, pre-state law consists in nothing other than its own natural power (potentia). With this, a subjective right - the legitimate claim of a person - coincides with one’s ability to enforce one’s right. >Law, >Rights, >Freedom, >Society. SpinozaVsRationalism: Spinoza, a rationalist who is methodologically uncompromising in ethics, surprisingly rejects any recourse to ratio here. Thus, Höffe I 236 within his metaphysics he gives priority to content-related naturalism over methodical rationalism. >Rationalism. The state treaty necessary for overcoming the state of nature is only valid under considerations of usefulness. >Contract Theory/Spinoza. 1. B. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus 2. Ibid., Chap. 16 |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Customs/Morality | Hegel | Brocker I 791 Sittlichkeit/HegelVsHobbes/Hegel/Honneth: (Honneth refers here to Hegel's early Jena writings.(1) Hegel develops a concept of morality that has a principally progressive thrust and therefore also points "beyond the institutional horizon" of Hegel's own present.(2) The social struggle of individuals for recognition is characterized by a distinctive dynamic; for Hegel, it proves to be an event that is open to the future and can never be finally concluded. With the motif of recognition, Hegel inscribes a principal tension in his understanding of social life, which integrates the social conflicts between individuals and groups into the historical horizon of a moral process of progress that is open to the future. >Recognition/Honneth, >Identity/Honneth. 1. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Jenaer Schriften 1808-1807 Frankfurt, 1986. 2. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) S.11 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I 334 Morality/Hegel/Höffe: The basic lines(1) reach their climax, the synthesis as reconciliation of abstract law and subjective morality, morality, in a will that is free both externally, qua law, and internally, qua morality. This includes social forms and institutions in which a free >self-consciousness can recognize and acknowledge itself. Because they realize a far higher degree of rationality, they have an "infinitely more solid authority and power than the being of nature" (§ 146). Polis: To his thought of morality Hegel sees correspondences in the ancient Polis, namely in its theorist Aristotle. According to him, the guiding goal of human practice, eudaimonia, happiness, is the same for the individual citizen and for the polis. Similarly, Hegel, the great Neoaristotelian of modern times, conceives the highest level of freedom, morality, as the unity of the moral concepts of individuals with the moral concepts of the "moral powers," with law, custom and religion and their concrete communities and states. HegelVsAristotle/Höffe: Over this common ground one may not overlook however the fundamental difference: With Hegel, the Aristotelian doctrine of the personal household community (oikos) is replaced by the theory of the anonymous bourgeois Höffe I 335 society, with which the newer national economy or economics is integrated into the theory of law and state. >Second Nature/Hegel. Normative elements are clearly included in the description of the process. a) Hegel begins with the "immediate by-oneself", the family shaped by love. According to a further triune section this is divided into marriage, in which an initially only external unity is transformed, by free consent, into a spiritual unity of a self-conscious love. b) According to the antithesis, marriage requires a "lasting and secure possession, a property" (§ 170), for the acquisition of which, according to Hegel, the man is primarily responsible. c) According to the synthesis, the children who guarantee the progress of humanity have the right to be nourished and educated from the common family property. Alienation: With the coming of age of the children, the possibility of new families of their own arises, in which the transition to the next step, the antithesis within morality, becomes apparent. Their essence is alienation from the family, including history and religion. It is the economic and working society, known as the "civil society", which on the one hand is necessary for the development of freedom, but on the other hand does not get rid of its problem of poverty and wealth. Welfare state: The welfare state as a corrective does not come into view here. In order for bourgeois society to "function", it needs a legal system that Hegel calls the state of necessity and understanding. 1. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Dialectic | Plato | Bubner I 34 Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: more than a method, the dialectician proceeds with methodical correctness, because he leads his local life by being awake, not by dreaming. I 37 DialecticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the action-oriented speaker is entangled in the deception of the words. (VsSophists). >Sophists/Plato. I 38 Sophism/AristotleVsPlato: makes use of the same reasons to argue for the incompleteness of the dialectic, precisely because it has to do with intersubjective practise of speech. Def "Topoi"/Aristotle: pre-scientific community. The topics makes the illuminating and success-promising of speeches substantial. >Dialectics/Aristotle. Dialectics/Kant: the negative reputation adheres to the dialectic up until Kant. However, the adherence to Kant is recognized as necessary. I 39 Dialectic/HegelVsKant: his fear of contradictions reveals the limitations of his understanding of science. The dialectic must be thought through until the end. Kant had stopped at the negative result. >Kant, >Dialectic/Hegel. HegelVsAristotle: "speculative mind of language": the insight into the linguistic and logical rootedness of speculation is to assure again the rank of strict method, which Aristotle had just denied because of its connection with the language. I 111 Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: A) knowledge theory: the non-seclusion of true knowledge and reflection leads to a whole ensemble of rules and structures. B) dialectic in Plato is also the logical relationship between assertion and inference. C) way of determining terms. (Up and down process) The late Plato develops approaches of a propositional logic. >Knowledge/Plato, cf. >Propositional logic. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Enlightenment | Ancient Philosophy | Taureck I 35 Enlightenment/Taureck: Question. Can we compare the modern features of Sophists with the Enlightenment? E.g. Nomos/Sophists: "Laws of the Gods" are no longer enough to explain the social binding forces. Enlightenment/Taureck: 18th century; Main representatives are d'Alembert, Diderot, Rousseau and Voltaire. They were not strongly interested in the Sophists. >d'Alembert, >Rousseau, >Voltaire. Encyclopédie 1765. I 36 Enlightenment/Taureck: today one can see 5 characteristics of the Enlightenment: 1. Nature-legal justification of political and legal norms. Non-factual traditional norms, but natural determinations of people who demand freedom, equality and fraternity. (Rousseau, however, is against the abolition of social institutions, which means only the replacement of corruption by brigandage (gangsterism)). At that time the absolute monarchy was the most common form of government almost everywhere in Europe. I 37 Sophists/Taureck: sophists were in a situation where they were looking for foundations for the practice of a "direct" democracy that was lived in Athens and other cities without being bound to universal value judgments, because these did not exist. The physis could obviously be understood (according to Plato's Callicles) as a legal title for an empowerment of the strong against the community. Enlightenment/Taureck: 2. Characteristic: Definition Deism: deism is a natural religion, which includes rationality and tolerance of religions: God as the creator of nature, reason enables human beings to fulfill the moral prescriptions of the creator. >Deism. I 39 Enlightenment/Taureck: 3. Characteristic: Replacement of metaphysics by epistemology. Definition Metaphysics/Encyclopedie: "Science about the reasons of things". Because all painters, musicians, surveyors, poets need reasons, everyone has their own metaphysics. This leads to an empty and "contemptuous" science. I 39 Metaphysics/Sophists/Taureck: the sophists did not yet know the concept which was later developed by Plato and Aristotle. In any case, they were more oriented towards epistemology. Enlightenment/Taureck: 4. Characteristic: Reorientation of the natural sciences. I 40 Newton, GalileoVsAristotle: Movement is no longer to be understood as a goal-directed phenomenon, but by causality. >Natural science. Mechanics/Physics/Sophists/Taureck: the sophists did not yet know the teleology of Aristotle. >Epistemology. Enlightenment/Taureck: 5. Characteristic: Aesthetic theory, according to which beauty is to be judged independent of social standards. >Aesthetics. |
Taureck I B. H.F. Taureck Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995 |
| Experience | Aristotle | Gadamer I 356 Experience/Aristotle/Gadamer: Aristotle describes (...) in the appendix of his second analytics(1) (and quite similarly in the first chapter of metaphysics) how many individual perceptions, by keeping the manifoldness of the individuals, finally result in experience, the one unity of experience. What is this unity? >Induction/Aristotle, >Unity/Aristotle. GadamerVsAristoteles: The relationship between experiencing, keeping and the resulting unity of experience remains conspicuously unclear. Obviously Aristotle builts here upon a train of thought that in his time already Gadamer I 357 had a certain classical imprint. We can prove it in its oldest testimony for Anaxagoras, of whom Plutarch has handed down to us that the distinction of the human over animals was determined by Empeiria, Mneme, Sophia and Techne.(2) We find a similar connection with the emphasis on "mnemes" in the Prometheus of Aeschylus(3) and although we miss the corresponding emphasis on "mnemes" in the Platonic Protagoras myth, Plato(4) as well as Aristotle show that this is already a firm theory. The remaining of important perceptions (moné) is apparently the connecting motive through which the knowledge of the general is able to rise from the experience of the individual. Science/Method: Aristotle has a very nice picture for the logic of [the] process [of induction]. He compares the many observations one makes with a fleeing army. (...) if, in this general flight, an observation is confirmed throug re- Gadamer I 358 peated experience, then it stops. Thus at this point, as it were, a first standstill in the general flight sets in. If others now join it, the whole army of the fugitives comes to a halt at the end and again obeys the unit of the command. GadamerVsAristotle: If one now, like Aristotle, thinks the essence of experience only in terms of "science" (which is not science, but "knowledge"), then one simplifies the process in which it comes into being. The picture describes just this process, but it describes it under simplifying conditions that do not apply in this way. As if the typical of experience were self-evident without contradiction! Aristotle here always already presupposes the common, which in the flight of observations comes to a halt and develops as a general; the generality of the concept is for him an ontological prius. What Aristotle is interested in experience is merely its contribution to the formation of concepts. If experience is thus considered in terms of its result, then the Gadamer I 359 actual process of experience is skipped. >Experience/Gadamer. 1. An. Post. B 19 (99ff.) 2. Plut. de fort. 3 p. 98 F = Diels, Vors. Anaxag. B 21 b. 3. Aisch. Prom. 461. 4. Phaid. 96. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Explanation | Davidson | Glüer II 99 ff Explaining means re-describing. Thesis: explanations of action can be interpreted as singular causal statements. That is, in contrast to the "logical-connection-thesis" as statements about two distinct events. Caution: It is true that explanations of action do not allow an independent description of the cause, but it is precisely the description of the cause for which this is true, not the cause itself. >Causes, >Reasons, >Reason/Cause, >Motives, >Description/Davidson. Glüer II 112f Explanation of Action/DavidsonVsAristotle: the practical syllogism cannot deal with divergent causal chains (mountaineer-example), and also not with a mere intention (omission, intermittent event), and weakness of will. >Weakness of will. Glüer II 114 Intention/Davidson: Form: Judgment: "x is executable." Weak will/Acrasia/Davidson: irrational judgment - solution: separate action and intention. Glüer II 115 "All things-considered"-judgement: is only possible for omniscient beings. Glüer II 138 Explanation of action/mental/physical/DavidsonVsReductionism: intentionalistic vocabulary is in principle irreducible. There are no strict laws for the prediction of actions. - >Anomalous monism. Horwich I 456 Truth/Explanation/Davidson/Rorty: is not an explanation for something - ((s) A phenomenon is not explained by the fact that a proposition that asserts it is true). - also the existence of truth needs no explanation. Wrong: e.g. "he did not find the house because his beliefs about its location were wrong". Correct: (without truth): "He believed that it was located ---". Explanation: details of what was true or false, not the truth itself - If truth itself was an explanation, it would have to be a cause for something. Explanation: not "he did the right thing", but the circumstances. "Truth" as explanation would be like tertia (e.g. "intended interpretation", "conceptual scheme"). It is an idle wheel. - Putnam ditto. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Flux | Bigelow | I 71 Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: cooperates very well with the Cartesian law of inertia. Thereafter, the same speed is not a change. Defintion law of inertia/Descartes/Bigelow/Pargetter: an object moves at a constant velocity when no forces act on it. Change/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we assume that any change needs a cause, the Flux doctrine revises the Aristotelian view of the movement. (FluxVsAristotle). >Change/Aristotle. Change/Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: the Flux-Doctrine states that a change of location is an extrinsic change for a body, because the intrinsic property of speed does not have to change for this. Flux/explanation: for most changes flux is the better explanation. I 72 Change/Bigelow/Pargetter: for a few changes, Ockham's explanation ((s) is not a vector for instantaneous velocity) better: for example twilight, for example, cooling, for example, moral improvement, simply much that people contemplated about in the Middle Ages. Impulse/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: has a body according to the Ockhamists because it had that and that position at the time. Problem: this requires that, e.g. a meteor has a "memory". Acceleration/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: the problem becomes more difficult when e.g. the meteor has still an acceleration, because this still needs additional assumptions. Then the movement of the meteor depends on the distances of points in space. Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: that the movement depends on the prehistory, cannot simply be lead ad absurdum. Only the flux doctrine is more elegant. Impulse/Shock/Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: The meteor has the impulse according to the flux doctrine due to its instantaneous properties. Prehistory/Bigelow/Pargetter: can play an epistemic role to explain why the body has its instantaneous speed. Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: the causal cause, however, is the instantaneous velocity and not the prehistory. >Cause, >Causality. VsOckhamism/VsOckham/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: For example, the perfectly homogeneous, rotating disk. I 73 Motion/Bigelow/Pargetter: the movement of this disk does not lead to any change in the distribution of qualities. Nevertheless, it differs from an inactive disk. The two are distinguished by their causal forces. Explanation: change the material parts. Time sections of the rotating disk provide circles, the ones of the stationary disk do not. Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: the concept of identity that is used here is controversial. It does not rely on the possibility of qualitative distinction or tracking back in time cannot rely on tracking an identifiable piece of matter. This leads to haecceitas Haecceitism/Bigelow/Pargetter: is based on the assumption that identity cannot always be based on the same qualities. For example a perfectly rotating homogeneous disk. Haecceitas: This-ness. Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not resist against non-qualitative identity. We accept that the rotating disk has a pattern of changing identities. >Haecceitism, >Identity. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is not the whole story: Causal forces: e.g. the rotating disk: are not provided by the non-qualitative identities. Solution/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: the individual parts of the homogeneous disk have an instantaneous speed. I 74 These lead to the fact that the time sections describe circles. Universals/Physics/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is the reason why we say that instantaneous speed - a vector with magnitude and direction - is a universal that body at a time can possess. It is an intrinsic property. >Universals, >Intrinsic. Property/Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: but we have to explain what kind of property this is that has a size and direction. Size/Direction/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to the flux doctrine, the size and direction of a vector are more difficult to explain. We cannot explain the necessary instantaneous velocity by the pattern of the earlier positions. >Vectors. Solution/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: we need a theory of relations between properties. Size/direction/vector/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: can simply say that both are given by the previous history of the earlier positions. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Future | Quine | VI 127f Future/QuineVsAristotle: E.g. "tomorrow’s sea battle": tomorrow’s sea battle does not exist. Therefore there are no statements about it. Not even the statement that "it is not true now"... -assumes 1) omniscient God - 2) determinism - is incompatible with our freedom of action. Freedom/Quine: we do what we decide to do - whether decisions are determined is not the issue - Sentence of the Excluded Middle: is definitely valid but is at most, incomplete - ambiguous propositions are not true, but the corresponding propositions - Completion: does not lie in the future, though - ((s) ...but lies in information - truth value: can be left open, but not the meaning of the sentence.) >Excluded Middle/Quine. VI 129 Pro three-valued logic: truth value, and not whether the sentence makes sense, would depend on the existence of the unicorn - as it should be - Vs: Problem: there are too many truth-function combinations. >Truth Values/Quine. XIII 73 Future/Quine: XIII 74 Question: are sentences about the future neither true nor false (without truth value) until the matter is decided? Aristotle: pro. This is still supported today by some theologians. Future/Theology: if a sentence about the future is already true today, God must know it, but then determinism also follows from it. But that is a different kind of determinism than the one discussed under "freedom of will". Problem: then people can no longer act freely and free action is a prerequisite for praise and blame, sin and grace. Quine: I hope the reader is not convinced by my presentation of the argument. Prediction/future/statement/solution/Quine: Thesis: statements about the future are true or false when made, however capricious or unfounded they may be. Advantage: only if we accept this, we can treat time and space on one level. Namely, time as the 4th dimension. Ethics/Morality/Time/Future/Quine: also for the moral discussion we get advantages from it: Example Dilemma: a) Environmental protection benefits people as well as the unborn, b) Birth control benefits the environment. But with this we deny the rights of the unborn. Four-Dimensionalism/future/past/resolution/Quine: Thesis: future and past objects and people are just as real as present ones. XIII 75 Timeless: timelessly spoken, unborn babies are just as real and their interests are to be respected in the same way. Birth control: people who are never born because of it are a fiction. Such people do not exist, not even timelessly! Ethics/Morality/Future/Non-Existence/Quine: in this way nobody's right is violated by birth control. Four-Dimensionalism/Possibilia/Quine: four-dimensionalism creates a place in the sun for all future actualities, however unpredictable, but it is no consolation or help for mere possibilities. Actual/Possibilia/Quine: the rights of the non-updated are contingent on their actualization. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Happiness | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 146 Happiness/Thomas/Höffe: Thomas AquinasVsAristotle: While (...) the ethics of his philosophical model remains free of metaphysics and theology, Thomas Aquinas takes up Aristotle's doctrine of the divine mover from Book Lambda (XII) of metaphysics and explains that the complete fulfillment of happiness is only possible in the hereafter. >Ethics/Thomas, >Ethics/Aristotle, >Metaphysics, >Theology. ThomasVsAugustine: In contrast to Augustine's divine state, the happiness of this world is considered realizable and Höffe I 147 desirable, even if it is still surpassed in the "happiness-providing" view of God (visio beatifica dei). >God/Thomas. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Humans | Anthropology | Höffe I 152 Humans/Citizen/Anthropology/Höffe: Aristotle's definition of the human as a political being by nature is developed [in Thomas Aquinas](1) into the concept of the animal sociale et politicum, the social and political being. (...) >Aristotle, >Humans/Aristotle. [Thomas Aquinas'] view is that the human, both a deficient and a rational being, must take care of his or her own life with his or her own hands and work. >Thomas Aquinas. Thomas AquinasVsAristotle/Höffe: With this anthropological argument Thomas Aquinas tacitly makes a revolutionary reassessment of work: he frees it from a double stigma. It neither appears as an activity merely for servants/slaves nor as a punishment for original sin, but is rather assigned to the nature of humans. >Labour. 1. Thomas De regno ad regem Cypri |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Humans | Höffe | Höffe I 152 Humans/Citizen/Anthropology/Höffe: Aristotle's definition of the human as a political being by nature is developed [in Thomas Aquinas](1) into the concept of the animal sociale et politicum, the social and political being. (...) [Thomas Aquinas'] view is that the human, both a deficient and a rational being, must take care of his or her own life with his or her own hands and work. Thomas AquinasVsAristotle/Höffe: With this anthropological argument Thomas Aquinas tacitly makes a revolutionary reassessment of work: he frees it from a double stigma. It neither appears as an activity merely for servants/slaves nor as a punishment for original sin, but is rather assigned to the nature of humans. >Labour, >Work, >Jobs. 1. Thomas De regno ad regem Cypri |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Individuals | Mayr | I 205 Formation of Individuals/Biology/Mayr: Def Parthenogenesis: Asexuality: in some organisms, individuals develop themselves from the eggs, fertilization is not necessary. E.g. Aphids, plankton crustaceans: here sexual and asexual generations alternate. I 206 Sexuality: increases diversity and thus defense against diseases. I 207 Pangenesis theory: (old) theory, according to which each body cell contributes hereditary material. From Aristotle to the 19th century. PreformationVsEpigenesis (already in Aristotle, then to the nineteenth century). I 208 VsAristotle: Aristotle believed falsely, only female organisms could possess eggs. >Aristotle. I 209 Egg: the actual mammal was discovered only by Karl Ernst von Baer in 1828(1). It was recognized that the ovary is the counterpart to the testis. DNA: discovered by Johann Friedrich Miescher (19th century). I 211 Definition Preformation: Eggs produce individuals of the same species. Therefore it was concluded that egg or sperm is already a miniature of the future organism. Logical consequence: in this organism all future offspring must again be contained in a miniature edition (nesting). Numerous contemporary pictures did show such small miniature humans (homunculi) in the spermatozoon. I 212 Epigenesis: thought that the development came from an entirely unformed mass. "Vis essentialis." Each species has its own peculiar "essential force". This was completely opposed to the uniform forces described by the physicists, e.g. gravitation. Definition Epigenesis: Development during the life history of the individual, in contrast to ontogeny and phylogeny. Nevertheless, the epigenesis prevails in the controversy. Solution only in the 20th century: difference between Definition genotype (genetic constitution of the individual) and Definition phenotype (totality of perceptible characteristics). Cell: how does it come that the nerve cell develops so completely differently as a cell of the digestive tract? I 214 Cell division: Wilhelm Roux (1883)(2) concludes the complex internal differentiation of the cell: Solution: particles must be placed on a thread, and this is divided! Confirmed later. Cell: passes through a differentiation process, only a small part of the genes in the nucleus is active. Cell development: in taxa with regulatory development (e.g. vertebrate animals) there are no fixed early cell lines, but extensive cell migration. Induction (influence of already existing tissues on the development of other tissues) largely determines the specification of the cells. Cell migration: pigment and nerve cells make extensive migrations through the organism. Often they follow clear chemical stimuli. 1. E. v. Baer (1828). Entwickelungsgeschichte der Thiere: Beobachtung und Reflexion. Königsberg: Bornträger. 2. W. Roux (1883). Über die Bedeutung der Kerntheilungsfiguren. Leipzig: Engelmann. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Induction | Aristotle | Gadamer I 356 Induction/Aristotle/Gadamer: Aristotle describes (...) in the appendix of his second analytics(1) (and quite similarly in the first chapter of metaphysics) how many individual perceptions, by keeping the manifoldness of the many individuals, finally result in experience, the one unity of experience. What is this unity? Apparently it is the unity of a general. But the generality of experience is not yet the generality of science. Rather, it occupies a remarkably indeterminate middle position in Aristotle's work between the many individual perceptions and the true generality of the concept. It is from the generality of the concept that science and technology take their starting point. But what is the generality of experience, and how does it merge into the new generality of the Logos? >Generality/Aristotle. If experience shows us that a certain remedy has a certain effect, it means that something common has been seen out of a wealth of observations, and it is clear that only from such an assured observation the actual medical question, that of science, becomes possible: the question of the Logos. >Logos/Aristotle. Science knows why, for what reason, this remedy has a healing effect. Experience: Experience is not science itself, but it is a necessary condition for it. It must already be secured, i.e. the individual observations must regularly show the same. Only then, when the generality of experience has already been reached, can the question about the reason and thus the question that leads to science begin. GadamerVsAristotle: The relationship between experiencing, keeping and the resulting unity of experience remains conspicuously unclear. Obviously Aristotle build here upon a train of thought that in his time already Gadamer I 357 had a certain classical imprint. We can prove it in its oldest testimony for Anaxagoras, of whom Plutarch has handed down to us that the distinction of the human over animals was determined by Empeiria, Mneme, Sophia and Techne(2). We find a similar connection with the emphasis of the "mnemes" in the Prometheus of Aeschylus(3), and although we miss the corresponding emphasis of the "mnemes" in the Platonic Protagoras myth, Plato(4) as well as Aristotle show that this is already a fixed theory. The remaining of important perceptions (moné) is apparently the connecting motive through which the knowledge of the general is able to rise from the experience of the individual. >Unity/Aristotle, >Science/Aristotle. 1. An. Post. B 19 (99ff.) 2. Plut. de fort. 3 p. 98 F = Diels, Vors. Anaxag. B 21 b. 3. Aisch. Prom. 461. 4. Phaid. 96. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Life | Agamben | Brocker I 821 Life/Agamben: Agamben's concept of "naked life" begins with the ancient Greek distinction between "zoe" and "bios": zoe/Aristotle: a life qualified for politics bios/Aristotle: a naturally unqualified life, which is thus excluded from politics. Naked Life/Agamben: this term is caught between Foucault's concept of "biopolitics" (Foucault, Der Wille zum Wissen, 1977) and Hannah Arendt's concept of homo laborans (H. Arendt, Vita Aktiva oder vom tätigen Leben, 1960). Biological life is thus increasingly moving into the centre of the political stage. (1) See State/Agamben. The form that "naked life" takes in politics is that of the "homo sacer" ((s) of the "holy man"). Brocker I 827 Life/AgambenVsAristotle: contrary to the classic Aristotelian separation of "zōḗ" and "bíos", which also returns in a neo-aristotelian way in Arendt's distinction between the social and political spheres, for Agamben naked life has always and exclusively been understandable as political life. See Biopolitics/Agamben. Agamben: Thesis: Every life, even if it is completely unqualified, naked and exposed, forms the original starting point of every policy, also and especially of democratic politics under the sign of human rights. 1.Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita, Torino 1995. Dt.: Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben, Frankfurt/M. 2002, p. 13. Maria Muhle, „Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Agamben I Giorgio Agamben Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben Frankfurt 2002 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Logos | Aristotle | Bubner I 190 Logos/Aristotle: it surpasses the elementary natural conditionality. In contrast to Hobbes and Rousseau, there is no contract conclusion, which leads out of nature (natural right). Logos: to be understood in Aristotle as language and not as reason, which emerges from the comparison with animals. >Language/Aristotle, >Animal/Aristotle. Language reveals the good and the just in mutual exchange. The good as leading design of action is indeed controversial, so that it must be debated. >The Good/Aristotle. The Logos is such a means to discover, but not a set goal and not content in itself. It is only thanks to the insinuation of common interests that the dialogue is set in motion. Without polis no function of the logos and no logos, no politics. >Politics/Aristotle. The growing complexity is self-sustaining without forming a political community of action. HegelVsAristotle recognizes this. >HegelVsAristotle. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Mathematics | Bigelow | I VII Mathematics/BigelowVsField: can be understood realistically when viewed as a study of universals, properties and relations, of patterns and structures of things that can be in different places at the same time. >Universals, >Properties, >Relations, >Structures. I 346 Mathematics/Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: Pro Realism of Mathematics. ((s) The thesis that numbers exist as objects. And thus also sets, and all possible mathematical objects or entities. (FieldVs.) We agree with the antirealists that there are human creations: For example, words, ideas, diagrams, images, terms, theories, texts, academic departments, etc. >Antirealism. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: of mathematics: is well compatible with modal realism. >Modal realism, >Modalities. Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: no one believes that everything in science is real. There must be (useful) fictions. Therefore, one can in principle be a realist in relation to everyday things and at the same time a mathematical antirealist. For example, Field: Field/Bigelow/Pargetter: is at the same time a realist regarding space-time, particles and fields. Vgl. >Hartry Field, >Relationism, >Substantivalism. I 347 Realism/Antirealism/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: nevertheless, there is something wrong with this marriage: mathematics is not a small element of science but a very large one. It is also not easy to isolate. Example: Galileo/Bigelow/Pargetter: did not know about instantaneous speed yet. For him, speed was simply a course divided by time. A falling object then had an average speed, although Galileo was not aware of this either. Therefore, he made the following mistake: if two bodies are dropped together and one of them continues to fly, they both have exactly the same speed until the first one stops. Galileo: but had to assume that this body was slower, because the other body needed less than twice as much for the eventual double distance. I 348 Rate of fall/Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore the average velocity cannot be proportional to the distance. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: if anything is evidence for realism, it is this: an object that falls twice as far does not have twice the average velocity. If you find out, you are a realist in terms of how long it takes for an object to reach a given distance. This makes us realists in terms of velocity, time and distance. ((s) The problem arose from the fact that Galileo was forced to adhere to the definitions he had set up himself, otherwise he would have had to change his theory.). Average/VsRealism/Bigelow/Pargetter: one could argue that average is only an abstraction. VsVs: we do not need the average here at all: it is simply true that the object falls faster in the second section, and that simply means that the average velocity cannot be the same. Velocity/Galileo/Bigelow/Pargetter: he respects that it is physically real. And caused by forces and proportional to these forces, so velocity was causally effective for him. Velocity/today/Bigelow/Pargetter: we think today that it is the instantaneous speed which is causally effective, never the average velocity. I 349 Realism/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: the equations we use to describe the relations between different falling objects are human inventions, but not the relations themselves. Rate of fall/fall law/Galileo/Bigelow/Pargetter: the distance is proportional to the square of the time traveled. How is this abstract law based on concrete physical facts? Galileo: in the first unit of time the body falls a certain distance, in the second unit not double, but triple of this distance, in the third five units, and so on. Predecessor/Bigelow/Pargetter: this had already been anticipated in the Middle Ages. >Numbers. I 350 Middle Ages/Thesis: an increment has been added to each section. One, three, five, seven... Now the sum of the first n odd numbers is n². Then it seems to be based on nothing but rules for the use of symbols that (1 + 3 +... + (2n - 1) = n². But this is a mistake: Numbers/Number/Bigelow/Pargetter: may be abstract, but they are present in an important sense in the physical objects: in a collection of objects that have this number, they are the common thing. For example, a collection of objects which has the number n². I 350 You can just see that the pattern has to go on like this. I 351 And so it is in Galileo's case. Realism/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: the differences to physical bodies should not blind us for the similarities. If objects instantiate the same numbers, the same proportions will exist between them. >Instantiation. Instantiation/Bigelow/Pargetter/(s): For example, a collection of 3 objects instantiates the number three. I 352 Equation/Bigelow/Pargetter: (e.g. Galileo's fall rate, which was wrong) is a description of real relations between real objects. Platonism/Bigelow/Pargetter: this view can roughly be called Platonist. Bigelow/Pargetter: pro Platonism, but without the usual Platonic doctrines: we do not assume forms or ideals taken from an earlier existence that we cannot see in our world, and so on. >Platonism. Realism/Universal Realism/Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: our realism is closer to Aristotle: the universals are here in our world, not in an otherworldly. >Realism, >Aristotle. BigelowVsAristotle: we disapprove of his preference for quantitative versus quantitative characteristics of objects. I 377 Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: (...) I 378 Patterns unfold patterns. The structures of mathematics show up not only in the hardware of physics, but also in the "mathware", through properties and relations in different areas of mathematics. For example, not only objects, but also numbers can be counted. Proportions, for example, stand in proportions to each other. This is the reflexivity within mathematics. Cf. >Hartry Field. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Metaphors | Aristotle | Ricoeur II 47 Metaphor/Aristotle/Ricoeur: (...) we read in Aristotle's Poetics that a metaphor is "the application to a thing of a name that belongs to something else, the transference taking place from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, or proportionally.“(1) His Rhetoric takes this definition for granted, simply adding a marginal note concerning the use of comparative images, which are characterized as a special form of the proportional metaphor in which the comparison is explicitly marked by a comparative term such as "is like". Comparison, in other words, is an expanded form of Ricoeur I 48 metaphor. Cicero and Quintilian later inverted this model and said that a metaphor is simply an abridged comparison. >Metaphor/Ricoeur. RicoeurVsAristotle: [We will need a] revision (...) [that] shifts the problem of metaphor from the semantics of the word to the semantics of the sentence. 1. Aristotle, Poetics, XXI, 4. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Money | Aristotle | Mause I 28 Money/Aristoteles: Aristotle's view of the money value is surprisingly modern: It is not attributed to the material or intrinsic value of money, but to the mere agreement of the money users, i.e. the general acceptance of a certain medium as a means of exchange. >Exchange, >Trade. Höffe I 56 Money/Aristotle/Höffe: While for Plato money was suspect, no more than a necessary evil, Aristotle, in the context of ordering justice, presents the first theory of money ever written in Europe. He describes its nature and function with astonishing clarity: Exchange: By making highly different goods and services comparable, money enables a society based on the division of labour to carry out the various exchange processes Marx: "The genius of Aristotle", Marx still acknowledges, "shines precisely in the fact that he discovers a relationship of equality in the value expression of goods. MarxVsAristotle: Only the historical barrier of the society in which he lived prevents him from finding out what "in truth" this relationship of equality consists of".(1) Use value/Aristoteles: Höffe: The fact that Aristotle, unlike Marx, did not orientate himself on human work, but on the use and need value, can also be understood as an (perhaps even more modern) alternative. >Value theory, >K. Marx. 1 K. Marx, Das Kapital, Book I, Chapter 1.3 |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Motion | Bigelow | I 63 Movement/change/Bigelow/Pargetter: was always a problem, e.g. movement as a change of location: seems to imply a contradiction. >Change, >Contradictions. For example, the change of a disk from round to square: seems to imply that it is both round and square. Contradiction. Solution/Ockham/MA/Bigelow/Pargetter: different points of time. (Doctrine of changing forms, forma fluens). Problem: what is the difference between a) an alternating form, and b) the change of forms? ((s) one or more). Change: is once the subject itself, once it is the form. >Forms. I 64 NewtonVsOckham: the counterposition was that a moving body has not only a position at a time, but also a speed. Flux/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: Theory of "fluxus" was Newton's expression for the differential calculus. Motion/Newton: attributed instantaneous velocities to moving objects: a vector. >I. Newton. Vector/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: also the Ockhamists attributed vectors, but in a weaker sense: as a sequence of positions. But this is then an abstraction and does not correspond to any intrinsic property of movement. Movement/Newton/Bigelow/Pargetter: is according to him a full-fledged property of an object of the 1st level, according to the Ockhamists a property of 2nd level. And this is independent according to Newton from history and "destiny", but not according to the Ockhamists. >William of Ockham. I 65 Spheres/Aristotle/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to Aristotle, there was nothing beyond the spheres (of the stars), not even empty space, which according to Aristotle was a contradiction in itself. >Aristotle. Motion/Aristotle/Bigelow/Pargetter: the universe as a whole cannot have any velocity. Then God cannot have given him one. VsAristotle: to the Church this seemed to be a limitation of God's omnipotence. >Vectors. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Natural Justice | Hobbes | Bubner I 193 Natural Justice/Hobbes/Bubner: HobbesVsAristotle: modern natural justice. "Natural state" is a fiction in which the legal foundations of the founding of the state are anchored, while the actual conclusion of treaty overcomes that state through an artificial justice institute. The natural law of the wise pursuit of the interests of each individual, as well as the impossibility, in principle, of collective enforcement of the interests of the individual increased to the death threat, belong to the characteristics of the natural state. >Natural state, >Fiction. Both characteristics together result in a dilemma which the collective leaves behind by the task of the rights of all individuals in the conclusion of contract. Nature acts here as a prerequisite and stimulant of a step beyond nature with regard to securing a lasting order. Leviathan the contractually legitimate sovereign guarantees the order. He deserves the title of the natural only because of his inevitability. Actually, he is a machine that imitates the divine creation. >Governance, >Society. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Natural Justice | Spinoza | Höffe I 235 Natural Law/SpinozaVsThomas Aquinas/SpinozaVsAristotle: Spinoza retains the traditional expression of natural law, but gives it a fundamentally new, exclusively naturalistic meaning. According to its principle of self-preservation, natural law does not contain any moral or otherwise normative claim. >Natural justice/Aristotle. SpinozaVsMachiavelli: On the contrary, every human being, not just the prince as in Machiavelli's case, may do what morality tends to forbid, he may act with force or cunning. >N.Machiavelli. Defined without any sense of duty, pre-state law consists in nothing other than its own natural power (potentia). With this a subjective right - the legitimate claim of a person - coincides with his ability to enforce his right.(1) >Freedom, >State, >Society, >Individuals, >Community, >Law, >Rights. 1. B. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus. |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Natural Laws | Bigelow | I 113 Natural Laws/Counterfactual Conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: are often formulated in terms of "ideal systems". To do this, they need the counterfactual conditionals. I 114 Similarly, thought experiments need counterfactual conditionals. I 214 Law/Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: For example,"What goes up must fall". Lucrez: what consists mainly of soil or water has to move downwards. "Down" was a marked direction. Atomism: Representative: Lucrez: Little astronomical knowledge yet. Aristotle/Ptolemaios: believed that everything that consists mainly of earth or water moves to the center of the cosmos, and since it moves to the center of the earth, it must be the center of the cosmos. I 215 Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: in one respect Aristotle is closer to the truth, in other respects it is Lucrez. He was right that the center of the earth is not marked. Natural Laws/Physics/Biology/Bigelow/Pargetter: a one-sided diet with examples from physics does not necessarily lead to a correct view of the natural laws. Instead, here are some examples from biology: Generalization/Biology: For example, a living being has father and mother of the same species as it itself. (Today we know that this has some exceptions). I 216 It was a surprise to discover that this also applies to some plants. I 217 Generalization: most of them have an exception. For example, without exception: perhaps the generalization "All mammals have a mother". Exceptions/counter-examples/Bigelow/Pargetter: one should not overestimate the threat posed by exceptions to laws. Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: we are looking for two things: a) something that is more than regularity, on the other hand b) less than a regularity without exception. It may be that we have discovered with a law an important property of the cases that are sufficient for it, even if not all cases satisfy it. Modal/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: the commonalities that satisfy the law are modal. Law/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not always need a law, for example to know that our cat is pregnant. >Generality, >Generalization. I 220 Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are improved: e.g. Aristotle - Copernicus - Newton. Copernicus: still thought that the material of the moon does not fall towards the earth, but towards the moon center. Therefore the moon is round. Newton/(s): first explained the circular motion of the moon. Aristotle: thesis: everything (earthly and watery) falls to a center and this is coincidentally the center of the earth. N.B.: thus he fulfils the quasi-copernican theory! I 221 VsAristotle: his theory was nevertheless wrong. But not because any movement would have been different, but because the reasoning was wrong: it is about gravity, Aristotle considered the center of the earth to be the center of the cosmos. Error: was not that Aristotle thought that no object would fall in a different direction, but because he thought that no object could fall in a different direction. (Necessity). I 221 Law/Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are generalizations (description of regularities) plus attribution of necessity. (Dretske 1977(1), Tooley 1977(2), Armstrong 1978(3), 1983(4)) >Possibilia, >Counterfactual conditional. Bigelow/Pargetter: if they are wrong, they must be strictly wrong or empty. (Cartwright 1983(5), Hacking 1983(6)). I 222 Definition Laws/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: are truths about Possibilia. Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: Actualia cannot be fully understood without understanding Possibilia. ((s) Here understanding is associated with objects, not sentences.) >Understanding. Possible Worlds/Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: we understand the actual world only by locating it in the logical space of possible worlds. >Possible worlds, >Possible worlds/Bigelow, >Actual world. Natural Law/Laws of nature/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: cannot be adequately described in a non-modal language. Because a natural law is not just a regularity. >Regularities, >Regularity theory, >Modalities, >Theory language. Logical form: i.e. a natural law cannot be merely defined as (x)(Fx > Gx). Logical form: of a natural law will often be a universal generalization (UG). >Universal generalization. But it can also be another generalization or other form of sentence. >Universal generalization. >Generality, >Generalization We assume, however, that natural laws (UG) will be involved and therefore have the following form: I 223 natN (x)(Fx > Gx). Natural necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: entails that natural laws involve counterfactual conditionals. Because they are about what would happen, not just what already happens. And even if things were different in certain respects. I.e. in addition to regularity (x)(Fx > Gx) it will be true that every F would be a G ((s) Logic of 2nd level!) Logical form/(s) counterfactual conditional instead of quantification of 2nd level: (x) Fx would be > would be Gx) we take this together as a truthmaker of the proposition natN (x)(Fx > Gx) (see above). >Truthmakers. Natural Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: this is the view of natural laws that we defend. LewisVsBigelow: (Lewis, 1979)(7) the theory is circular. >Natural laws/Lewis. I 226 Non-modal Theory/Natural Laws/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: (instead of relative necessity:) most non-modal theories of natural law are derived from Hume. Then we can accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity, without falling into a circle. >Necessity, >Necessity/Bigelow, >Necessity/Hume. N.B.: then we can simply accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on independent access to laws! Explanation: so it makes sense to use laws to explain nomic necessity rather than vice versa. And this is much less obscure than modal arguments. >Modalities. I 227 BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Humean theories are not able to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power. >Explanations, >Causal explanation. 1. Dretske, F.I. (1977). Laws of nature. Philosophy of Science 44, pp. 248-68 2. Tooley, M. (1977). The nature of laws. Canadian Journal of Philosphy 7, pp. 667-98. 3. Armstrong, D.M. (1978). Universals and scientific realism. Cambridge University Press. 4. Armstrong, D.M. (1983). What is a law of nature? Cambridge University Press. 5. Cartwright, N. (1983). How the laws of physics lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 6. Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and intervening: Introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science. Cambridge University Press. 7. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Nature | McDowell | I, 123 et seq Nature/Kant/McDowell: nature is equal to the realm of natural laws in Kant. He does not know the concept of the second nature, although he is well aware of the concept of >education. But not as a background. >Second nature, >Nature/Kant, >Natural laws/Kant. --- I 118 Second Nature/McDowell: Thesis: there are rules of nature, whether you are receptive to them or not. This is the result of proper education. "Naturalism of the Second Nature", "Naturalized Platonism". >Platonism. Nature/Natural Law/McDowellVsNaturalism: Vs "blunt naturalism": The space of nature is not equal to the space of natural laws. The forces are partially part of the second nature. >Theory of force/McDowell. Nature/McDowell: encompasses everything that belongs to the most fundamental understanding of things, that is, neither meaning nor values. (VsAristotle). Disenchantment of nature is progress. But: what has been disenchanted does not have to be identified with nature. --- Rorty VI 212 McDowell/Rorty: Nature may not only exercise causal but also rational control over human research. Definition Second Nature/McDowell: "People acquire a second nature, among other things, by developing conceptual abilities whose interrelationships belong to the logical space of reasons." (E.g., initiation, entry into a moral community, "education"). That one's eyes are opened gives one the ability to be rationally controlled by the world. And thus to be able to make judgments that are responsible to the world. In addition, this gives a rational freedom. McDowellVsBrandom/McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson/Rorty: all this becomes incomprehensible when we use Sellar's, Davidson's, or Brandom's terms. >Sellars, >Davidson, >Brandom. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Necessity | Wiggins | II 285 Necessity/QuineVsAristotle/QuineVsEssentialism: the essence not independent of our specification of the objects. >Essentialism, >Essence, >Necessity/Quine. II 292 Wiggins: An Operator "it is necessary that ..." creates opaque contexts: E.g. to be taken for Jekyll is not the same as to be taken for Hyde, although Jekyll = Hyde. >Opacity, >Beliefs, >Speaker intention. Also rigid designators in contexts with "it is possible that .." are not interchangeable (and probably not even in "necessary..."). >Operators, >Rigidity. II 301 Necessary/Wiggins: analog to inner/outer negation: Tradition: to blurr the difference after the first method: E.g. "necessarily Socrates is a human" and "Socrates is necessarily a human". Wiggins pro second method -> Definition satisfaction for sentences with "necessary": Wiggins pro existence as necessary feature -> Existence generalization. II 303 Necessary/de dicto/Wiggins: simply wrong: E.g. necessarily (x)(x = Cicero)> (x is a human). de dicto: is it true? If so, we get the wrong thing: necessarily (Ez)(x)(x = z > (x is a human). |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Nietzsche | MacIntyre | Brocker I 660 Nietzsche/Moral/Ethics/MacIntyreVsEnlightenment/MacIntyre: in Nietzsche, MacIntyre recognizes the "moral philosopher of the present". (1) He had diagnosed the failure to rationalise moral and had drawn the consequences from this state of affairs. He unmasked moral as an underlying will to power. He is the "outermost opponent of the Aristotelian tradition" (2). NietzscheVsAristotle. >F. Nietzsche, cf. >Aristotle. 1. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame, Ind. 1981. Dt: Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend. Zur moralischen Krise der Gegenwart. Erweiterte Neuausgabe, Frankfurt/M. 2006 (zuerst 1987), p. 155 2. Ibid. p. 345 Jürgen Goldstein, „Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Ontology | Aristotle | Bubner I 118 Ontology/Aristotle: knows the real reasons of reality, from which the sciences apodictically infer. BubnerVsAristotle: the competence of the reasons of evidence remains indeterminate, placeless, and thus does not adequately cover the need to determine the empirical domain of apodeixis. >Proof/Aristotle, >Knowledge/Aristotle, >Science/Aristotle; cf. >Ultimate justification, >Justification, >Existence, >Foundation. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Order | Bigelow | I 42 Order/Universals/Antisymmetry/Bigelow/Pargetter: the antisymmetry can then establish an order (hierarchy) between infinitely many different universals. Order/Hierarchy: 1. individuals: Definition individual/Bigelow/Pargetter: what is not instantiated by anything. 2. rule: the rest is obtained by the following rule: If t1, t2,.... tn are types, then also (t1, t2... tn) is a type... >Individuals, >Type/Token, >Universals. ((s) that is, summaries of types are also types). Def type/Bigelow/Pargetter: is then a set of universals, which can consist of one to infinitely many. Domain/Bigelow/Pargetter: the union of all types, each type is a subset of the domain. There may also be empty subsets. >Domains, >Sets. I 362 Real Numbers/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory of proportions as a theory of real numbers was developed by Dedekind and others at the end of the 19th century. >Real numbers. Order/Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: for this theory we need to extend the natural order created by relatios. >Proportions. Geometry: shows proportions that cannot be displayed in whole numbers. >Geometry. Proportion/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: we call proportions ratios that cannot be expressed in whole numbers. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: pleads for the assumption that there are objects with the proportions of the golden section rather than claiming there is no golden section. >Realism. Real numbers/Bigelow/Pargetter: Assuming that there is no golden section, would there be no real numbers? I 363 Is the existence of real numbers contingent on the existence of quantities? >Quantity, >Quantities/Physics. Aristotle/Bigelow/Pargetter: demands that every quantity must be instantiated to exist. >Instantiation, >Ontology, >Existence. VsAristotle: this seems to make mathematical facts dependent on empirical facts. >Mathematical entities, >Empiricism. Platonism/Bigelow/Pargetter: all quantities exist for him, regardless of whether they are instantiated or not. This guarantees pure mathematics. >Platonism, >Mathematics. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Ousia | Aristotle | Adorno XII 54 Being/Ousia/Aristotle/Adorno: Aristotle helps himself a little bit by saying that it is ousia the present and the here in the sense of the genesis, but according to the purely mental ontological rank the ousia is the first in the sense of the idea. >Idea/Aristotle, >Ontology/Aristole. AdornoVsAristotle: this is a somewhat violent separation of genesis and validity. It returns in Max Scheler's strange theory of ideas. (See Ideas/Scheler). |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Polis | Hegel | Höffe I 334 Polis/Hegel/Höffe: In accordance with his thought of morality(1) Hegel sees correspondences in the ancient Polis, namely in its theorist Aristotle. According to him, the guiding goal of human practice, eudaimonia, happiness, is the same for the individual citizen and for the polis. >Aristotle, >Polis. Similarly, Hegel, the great Neoaristotelian of modern times, conceives the highest level of freedom, morality, as the unity of the moral concepts of individuals with the moral concepts of the "moral powers," with law, custom and religion and their concrete communities and states. >Community, >State/Hegel. HegelVsAristotle/Höffe: Over this common ground one may not overlook however the fundamental difference: With Hegel, the Aristotelian doctrine of the personal household community (oikos) is replaced by the theory of the anonymous bourgeois Höffe I 335 society, with which the newer national economy or economics is integrated into the theory of law and state. >Second Nature/Hegel, >Oikos. 1. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Practical Syllogism | Aristotle | Wright I 36 Practical Syllogism/Aristoteles/Wright, G. H.: The idea goes back to Aristotle. (Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, 1147a 25-30). Wright: the conclusions to a correct interpretation is not easy to find. Aristotle himself deals with the subject very unsystematically and his examples are often confusing. One possibility of reconstruction is: the starting point or supremacy of syllogism mentions a desired object or an objective of action; the subordinate relates a certain action to this object as a means to an end, and the conclusio is ultimately the use of this means to achieve that purpose. Just as in a theoretical conclusion the assertion of the premises necessarily leads to the concluding statement of the conclusion, so in a practical conclusion from the affirmation of the premises follows the corresponding action. >Premise, >Practical inference. Anscombe: the practical conclusion is not a form of proof, but a form of justification which is of a different kind than evidence syllogism. >Syllogism. WrightVsAristotle: however, the peculiarities of practical syllogism and its relationship to theoretical justifications are complex and remain unclear. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Progress | Hobbes | Adorno XIII 251 Progress/HobbesVsLocke/HobbesVsAristotle/Hobbes/Adorno: unlike Aristotle and Locke, Hobbes did not make the progress dependent on any positive, original qualities of the human's nature, but of the necessity and the contradiction directly justified by the incompatibility of competing individual interests... --- XIII 252 ...of individuals by a bourgeois primacy principle. >Freedom/Kant. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Reason | Minsky | Münch III 125 Everyday reason/everyday problems/MinskyVsAristotle: rather logical approaches do not work. Syllogisms cannot deal with everyday complexity when solving problems. >Problem solving, cf. >Syllogisms, >Artificial intelligence, Axioms: "One does not go undressed out of the house", etc. >Human Level AI. Since logicians are not concerned with systems that can be extended later, they must design axioms that allow only permitted conclusions. >Axioms, >Axiom systems, >Logic. This is different with intelligence. Marvin Minsky, “A framework for representing knowledge” in: John Haugeland (Ed) Mind, design, Montgomery 1981, pp. 95-128 |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Science | Aristotle | Gadamer I 357 Science/Aristotle/Gadamer: Aristotle has a very nice picture for the logic of [the] process [of induction]. He compares the many observations one makes with a fleeing army. (...) if, in this general flight, one observation is confirmed through re- Gadamer I 358 peated experience, then it stops. >Experience/Aristotle, >Knowledge/Aristotle. Thus at this point, as it were, a first standstill in the general flight sets in. If others now join the flight, the whole army of the fugitives comes to a halt at the end and again obeys the unit of the command. The uniform mastery of the whole symbolizes here what science is. The picture is intended to show how science, i.e. general truth, can come about in the first place, which must not depend on the randomness of the observations, but should be valid in real generality. Bubner I 120 Epagogé/Aristotle/Bubner: Epagogé emerges from the rhetorical practice of providing examples. Introduction. Not strict induction in today's sense of the relation of universal quantification and individual cases. >Induction, >Deduction. In Aristotle: no comparable subsumption relation. Previous Knowledge/Aristotle: where does it come from? We are always already familiar with the concrete individual from the sensory experience. But the universal? >Prior knolwdge/Today's discussion. Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and Epagogé. Science/Aristotle: Principles as a basis cannot be the object of science. Form of Thought. They derive from induction, but can only be comprised intuitively. I 123 BaconVsAristotle: "Novum Organon" (! 620): Tired of scholastic formula. Turning to empiricism and sense of reality. "Once people have become dependent on the verdict of others (senators without voting rights), they no longer increase science, they limit themselves to praising certain writers ..." Bacon: pro induction from concrete sensuousness, vs infertile dialectics of Aristotle consisting of syllogisms. Science/Antiquity/Bubner: does have the peculiar features of childish discovery. Fertile in disputes, poor in works. Was stuck for centuries. Arts/Antiquity/Bubner: in contrast to science, they were strikingly lively. I 147 Science/Aristotle/Bubner: every individual science is dealing with reality, but none with reality in itself, but only with the chosen aspect. "They cut out a part of the being and look at it with regard to what is to come to it." Even the sum of the individual sciences will never overcome the limitation that lies in specialization. The question of the reality behind it cannot be asked in the surroundings of the present knowledge. >Ontology/Aristotle. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Science | Heidegger | Gadamer I 263 Science/Objectivity/Heidegger/Gadamer: Dilthey's endeavour to make the humanities understandable from life and to take life experience as a starting point had (...) never reached a real balance with the Cartesian concept of science to which he adhered. >W. Dilthey. Heidegger, on the other hand, was able to begin quite differently, when (...) Husserl had already made the decline to life a virtually universal working topic and thus left behind the restriction to the question of the methods of the humanities. His analysis of the world of life and the anonymous endowment of meaning that forms the basis of all experience gave the question of objectivity in the humanities a completely new background. >E. Husserl. Objectivity/Husserl: [Husserl's analysis] made the concept of objectivity in science appear as a special case. >Objectivism/Husserl. Science is anything but a fact to be assumed. The constitution of the scientific world is rather a task in its own right, the task of enlightening the idealization of science. But this task is not the first. In the retreat to the "performing life" (>Life/Husserl) the opposition of nature and spirit proves to be not ultimately valid. Both the humanities and the natural sciences can be derived from the achievements of the intentionality of universal life, that is, from an absolute historicity. This is the understanding in which the self-contemplation of philosophy alone is sufficient. >Understanding/Heidegger, >Life/Heidegger. Temporality of Understanding/Heidegger/Gadamer: (...) the mode of knowledge of the natural sciences [becomes] visible as a variation of understanding, "which got lost in the legitimate task of grasping the existing in its intrinsic Gadamer I 264 incomprehensibility."(1) Understanding/HeideggerVsDilthey/HeideggerVsHusserl: Understanding (...) is the original form of Dasein, the "being-in-the-world" (...). >Hermeneutics/Heidegger. Gadamer I 459 Science/Heidegger/Gadamer: It seems to me that Heidegger (...) in "Being and Time" has gained the point of view from which both the difference and the connecting element between Greek and modern science can be thought. When he presented the concept of "Vorhandenheit" (engl. presence-at-hand) as a deficient mode of being and recognized it as the background of classical metaphysics and its continued effect in the concept of subjectivity of modern times, he had followed an ontologically correct connection between the Greek Theoria and modern science. >Metaphysics, >Subjectivity. In the horizon of his temporal interpretation of being, classical metaphysics as a whole is an ontology of the existing, and modern science, without suspecting it, is its heir. In the Greek Theoria itself, however, there was certainly something else. Theoria grasps not so much what exists as the thing itself, which still has the dignity of the "thing". That the experience of the thing has as little to do with the mere ascertainability of the pure existence as with the experience of the so-called I 460 experiential science, was precisely emphasized by the later Heidegger himself(2). Gadamer: So, like the dignity of the thing, we will also have to keep the objectivity of language free from the prejudice against the ontology of the existing and in one with it from the concept of objectivity. >Language, >Language/Heidegger. 1. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit p. 153. 2. Cf. on "das Ding" lectures and essays, pp. 164f. Here the summary of the "Theoria" with the "Science of the Existing" which "Being and Time" had undertaken, is dissolved under the question of the later Heidegger (see also ibid. p. 51 f.). (Cf. also my afterword to M. Heidegger's Kunstwerk-Aufsatz, Stuttgart 1960 (Reclam), pp. 102-125,now in "Heideggers Wege. Studien zum Spätwerk", Tübingen 1983, p. 81-92; Vol. 3 of the Ges. Werke). Rorty II 65 Science/Heidegger/Derrida: hard sciences are henchmen of technical progress, no views on the undisguised reality. Kierkegaard/NietzscheVsPlato, NietzscheVsAristotle: the pursuit of objective truth, not the most rewarding and most human activity. --- Figal I 107f Science/Heidegger: "it provides a picture" for acting. There is still "bias" in the orientation to the picture. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Figal I Günter Figal Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016 |
| Sensus communis | Vico | Gadamer I 25 Sensus communis/Vico/Gadamer: [Vicos](1) Reference to the sensus communis refers (...) except the rhetorical (>Humanities/Vico) yet another moment from the ancient tradition. It is the contrast between the scholar and the sage on which he relies, a contrast that found its first form in the Cynical image of Socrates, its factual basis in the conceptual opposition of sophia and phronesis that Aristotle first elaborated, which in Peripatos was developed into a critique of the theoretical ideal of life(2) and in the Hellenistic age helped to shape the image of the wise man, especially after the Greek educational ideal had merged with the self-confidence of Rome's political elite. Also the Roman jurisprudence of the late period, for example, rises, as is well known, on the background of a legal art and practice that is more in touch with the practical ideal of Phronesis than with the theoretical ideal of Sophia(3). >Reason/Knowledge/Vico. Gadamer I 26 Sensus communis/Vico/Gadamer: Science/Rhetorics/Vico: Vico's reference to the sensus communis certainly shows a special colouring within this humanistic tradition. There is also in the field of science the querelle des anciens et des modernes. It is no longer the contrast to "school" but the special contrast to modern science that Vico means. Vico does not dispute the merits of modern critical science, but rather shows its limitations. The wisdom of the ancients, their care of the prudentia and eloquentia cannot be dispensed with even now, in view of this new science and its mathematical methodology. Even now, what is important for education is something else: the formation of the sensus communis, which nourishes itself not from what is true but from what is probable. >Sensus communis/Thomas, >Phronesis/Aristoteles. Gadamer I 28 VicoVsAristotle/VicoVsThomas: Vico makes use (...) of the ancient Roman concept of the sensus communis, as known in particular to the Roman classics, who, in contrast to Greek education, clung to the value and meaning of their own traditions of state and social life. It is thus a critical tone, a tone directed against the theoretical speculation of the philosophers, which can already be heard in the Roman concept of the sensus communis and which the Vico brings to the fore from its changed front position against modern science (the critica). Gadamer I 29 But Vico was not alone in his appeal to the sensus communis. He has an important parallel in Shaftesbury, whose influence on the 18th century was enormous. >Sense communis/Shaftesbury. 1. .J. B. Vico, De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, mit Übertragung v. W. F. Otto. 1947. 2. W. Jaeger, Über Ursprung und Kreislauf des philosophischen Lebensideals, Sit- zungsberichte der Preuß. Akademie d. Wiss., Berlin 1928. 3. F. Wieacker, Vom römischen Recht, 1945. |
Vico I Giambattista Vico Prinzipien einer neuen Wissenschaft über die gemeinsame Natur der Völker Hamburg 2009 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Sentences | Geach | I 204 Sentence/name/abbreviation/substitute/proxy/Geach: e.g. if "P" and "Q" are abbreviations of sentences and "A" and "B", the respective names of these sentences, then we could have a convention, by which "A > B" is the name (abbreviation) of the sentence "P > Q". >Name of a sentence, >Level/Order, >Names, >Descriptions. Autonymous/Carnap: the symbol ">" in "A > B", is used as a sign of itself, autonymous. - (Geach per) >Logical constants, >Logical connectives, >Sign, >Symbol. I 258 Conjunction/Sentence/Frege: "P u Q" is a phrase that is different from "p" and "q" individually. Mill: ditto: otherwise "a group of horses" would be the same as "a kind of horse" - but not: E.g. "Jim is convinced and his wife is unfaithful". Solution: "the fact that ..." is always to be split into a pair of statements. >Facts. I 291 Sentence/GeachVsAristotle: it is a mistake to analyze complex sentences as a combination of atomic sentences. >Atomic sentence, >Complex, cf. >Compositionality. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Slavery | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 148 Slavery/Thomas Aquinas/Höffe: In the course of the lex (law) tract(2) Thomas Aquinas justifies the servitudo, Höffe 149 the slavery or servitude. Thomas Aquinas pro Aristotle: Again he refers back to Aristotle, here the concept of "slaves by nature"(1), whose intellectual deficit, making a master necessary, is due to original sin(2). HöffeVsAristotle/HöffeVsThomas Aquinas: But this reasoning is not convincing. For all human beings are subject to original sin, which is why they all have to be regarded as servants/slaves, whereby the difference decisive for slavery, masters there, slaves here, becomes invalid. The fact that such an outstanding thinker as Thomas overlooks this consequence shows how much he remains attached to a view prevailing at that time. In the decisive respect for the Christian theologian, however, the slaves or servants are not disadvantaged; they too are called to eternal salvation. >Christianity, >Theology, >Ethics, >Justification. 1. Aristoteles, Politika 15. 2. Thomas Summa lIa Ilae, qu. 105 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| State (Polity) | al-Farabi | Höffe I 127 State/al-Farabi/Höffe: in addition to the perfect state, the author recognizes two further, i.e. a total of three forms of state as legitimate. Al-FarabiVsAristotle: (...) two forms represented since Aristotle and taken up by Cicero do not exist, neither the state of free and equal citizens nor the mixed constitution. >Aristotle, >Cicero. According to al-Fārābī there may be no form except 1. the monarchy of the par excellence best ruler nor the 2. the monarchy of a second best ruler, finally 3. an aristocracy, in which the rule is divided among several persons whose abilities complement each other. What they have in common is that one does not inherit the rule, since it is not the son but the most capable who should rule. Religion/al-Farabi: The religions (...) have the task of bringing the same truth [of philosophy] to ordinary people, the non-philosophers, in parables and symbols. For them, each political community (umma) has its own tradition, which results in a remarkable tolerance: Because of the diversity of their cultural context, each community expresses its beliefs in different parables and symbols, and therefore different religions. According to this, there can be excellent nations and excellent cities, which, despite different religions, claim the same happiness and pursue exactly the same goals(1). Höffe I 128 Deviations from the Excellent State; sources of error: a) Ignorant community: (...) [here] both the ruler and the subjects lack the knowledge of the true good, the veritable happiness. b) Irritant community: (...) [here] the rulers possess the knowledge, but do not share it with their subjects. c) Immoral or sinful communities: Here both sides, ruler and subjects, have access to knowledge, but because of low motives they neglect the good or even strive for the bad. All three misshapings lead man away from salvation and draw him to ruin. Höffe I 130 Legitimate power constellations: (1) A person fulfills all the conditions that make the best form of government, a monarchy, the philosopher-prophet rule, possible. (2) No single person, but several persons, because their specialized skills complement each other, fulfil the conditions together, which leads to a kind of aristocracy. (3) a "monarchy according to the law" or (4) an "aristocracy according to the law"(2) (...) 1. al-Farabi, On the perfect state, chap 17, § 2. 2. al-Farabi, Aphorisms of the statesman, I 54 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| State (Polity) | Marsilius of Padua | Höffe I 177 State/Marsilius/Höffe: VsTwo-Kingdom-Doctrine: In a clarity and sharpness that was unknown before, (...) Marsilius not only rejects the Pope's multiple abuse of power, but far more fundamentally all his worldly claims to power and the doctrine of the two kingdoms that underlies them. Two-Kingdom-Doctrine: More than eight centuries [before Marsilius' Defensor pacis, 1324] Pope Gelasius I distinguished in his doctrine of two powers the spiritual from the worldly authority and claimed for himself as pope the primacy that no ruler conscious of himself and his office can recognize. Consequently, neither in political theory nor in political practice a coexistence free of competition and conflicts can be expected, at least a coexistence that is free of conflicts. Marsilius: The corresponding conflict especially between Ludwig of Bavaria and Pope Gregory VII will dominate Marsilius' life and thinking. Although Marsilius is no clergyman, nor does he defend papal claims, but rather rejects them to a large extent, (...) Höffe: (...) and although he deliberately renounces theological arguments in the justification of a political community, he is wise enough, to allude Höffe I 178 in the title of his writing to a name of honour, to Christ, to the Prince of Peace (princeps pacis). Community/MarsiliusVsAristotle: according to Aristotle, the community [is] ultimately [concerned with] the good life, whereas according to Marsilius, here in the Augustinian tradition, which is already indicated by the title [defensor pacis, defender of peace], it is peace that counts. >Governance/Marsilius. Höffe I 180 Form of State/Marsilius/ Höffe: Only in a monarchy can law be effectively enforced - for Marsilius, again with Aristotle, the rule of laws is more important than that of persons - and peace can be maintained. Similar to al-Farabi and Thomas Aquinas, Marsilius, however, advocates an elective monarchy without succession(1). For it allows to determine the best regent in each case, namely one who is distinguished by prudence and moral virtues, especially justice(2). Cf. >Governance/al-Farabi, >Governance/Thomas Aquinas, >State/al-Farabi. 1. Marsilius. Defensor pacis, Chap. 9 and 15—16 2. Ibid. Chap. 14, § 10 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Syllogisms | Mill | Prior I 121 Syllogism/MillVsAristotle: E.g. A dragon breathes fire, a dragon is a serpent, Summary: some or all snakes breathe fire - which is valid according to Aristotle. RussellVsAristotle: this is simply invalid because the premises are false: a dragon does not exist. Russell: either the premises mean: "Dragon is a word that means a thing breathing fire"- or "The idea (idea) of a dragon is the idea of a thing, breathing fire" . >Premises, >Conclusions, >Consequence relation, >Inferences, >Logic, >Truth, >Truth maintenance, >Ideas. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Teleology | Epicurus | Adorno XIII Teleology/Purpose/EpicurusVsAristotle/Epicurus/Democritus/Adorno: Epicurus is even stronger opposing the placement of purposes into the natural things than Democritus. However, every relationship to gods, who had exercised its spooky nature in things, should be eliminated by criticising the thought of purpose. >Purposes/Aristotle, >Purposes/Ancient philosophy, >Democritus, >Teleology. |
|
| Truth | Geach | I 15 Truth/GeachVsAristotle: Aristotle confused two pairs of concepts: a) sentences: true/false b) predication: "true-of" Tarski: "true-of" is basic. >Satisfaction. I 76 Truth/Tarski: satisfaction ("true-of"): cannot be applied to components, but only to whole sentences. Even complex sentences correspond to a propositional function. >Propositional functions. Semantic truth definition: relevant relation: predicate to the thing of which it is predicated to be true: it is about a sentence but not a fact. >Truth definition, >Sentence/Geach, >Facts/Geach. I 258 Truth/Oxford school: only for few allegations. GeachVs: then "p v q" would not be truth-functional! >Truth functions. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Verification | Hempel | I 99 Verification/Natural Laws/Hempel: a general statement is checked by examining their singular consequences. Problem: each general statement specifies an infinite class of singular statements. Therefore, there is never a final verification. Conversely, no general law is derived formally from a finite set of singular statements. --- Bubner I 125 Confirmation/Hempel/Science Theory/Bubner: The relationship of logical inclusion of sentences avoids a crucial problem of induction. Both hypothetically valid laws or general statements as well as individual statements from observation are subject of logical consideration as sentences. Formal rules of derivation: Rehabilitation of deduction. With P. Oppenheim: D N Model: the deductive nomological explanation is a scientific explanation as a logical operation with sentences, i.e. the subsumption of sentences under sentences. The explanandum is subsumed under explanation reasons (explanas). The explanas disintegrates into antecedents conditions (C1, C2,... Ck) which describe an event and general law statements (L1, L2,... Lr) I 127 Deduction schema/Hempel: C1, C2,... Ck L1, L2,... Lr E (Description of the phenomenon) The laws are therefore subject to the premises. (Only significant innovation VsAristotle). GoodmanVsHempel: we need law-like statements instead of laws. Induction: the "new mystery of induction" does not concern the confirmation but the original creation of hypotheses. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aristotle | Berkeley Vs Aristotle | I 230 General/BerkeleyVsAristotle/BerkeleyVsPlato/BerkeleyVsLocke: the idea of a triangle as an abstract notion may neither be acute nor perpendicular nor obtuse (>SellarsVsLocke: disjunction, Berkeley: rejection). Berkeley: but then it is not a triangle, so there are no abstract notions. I 231 VsBerkeley: how is science at all possible? Solution/Berkeley: referential character of the signs. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Aristotle | Black Vs Aristotle | III 99 Humaneness/humanity/Morals/Ethics/Black: what is a behavior that is adequate for dealing with other human beings?. III 100 Adequacy/Black: is mostly understood in terms of a particular function, such as doctor, judge, etc. We are concerned here but human beings as such, the human "qua human." Human/Aristotle: Thesis: has its own function qua human. BlackVsAristotle: his only argument for this is that craftsmen also have a function. And it would be strange if the human had none. But in the absence of religious belief, it is not plausible that humans would be teleological entities with a particular purpose. III 101 In particular, no such entities like an organ such as the heart. Otherwise we would have to consider humans as parts of a supra-individual being. Humanity/Black: without religious implications: what is the correct behavior of a human towards other humans? E.g. representatives of several religions in a lifeboat: what obligations do they have towards one another, even if they are not related or of the same nationality?. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Aristotle | Bubner Vs Aristotle | I 118 Ontology/Aristotle: knows the real reasons of reality from which the sciences infer apodictically. BubnerVsAristotle: the competence of arguments remains undetermined, placeless, and therefore does not satisfactorily cover the need to determine the empirical scope of apodeixis. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Aristotle | Derrida Vs Aristotle | II 327 Habermas I 221 DerridaVsAristotle: no longer priority of logic over rhetoric, but vice versa. However, he does not put his projects in the history of philosophy: otherwise, he would have had to relativize the significance of his own project based on the tradition from Dante to Vico, via Hamann, Humboldt, Dilthey to Gadamer. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Aristotle | Descartes Vs Aristotle | Esfeld I 209 DescartesVsAristotle: 1) VsTeleology, 2) VsEssentialism. No hierarchical order of forms that culminates in God. >Essentialism, >Teleology. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Aristotle | Fraassen Vs Aristotle | I 130 Asymmetry/Explanation: is solved by our other result: contextual relevance. The interest of the questioner will play a role. I 131 Aristotle: (FN 35) ("Posterior Analytics" I, 13): develops a typology of 4 explanation factors, the "four causes". Fraassen: then there may be two (relative to the background information) equivalent propositions A and B that describe the factors of various types. Then it is possible that A, but not B, contains the relevant factor or vice versa. Lantern E.g./Aristotle: (PA II, 11) shows that he already knew the problem. E.g. a father asks his son: "Why is this yard light on?" Then there are two possible answers: a) because the circuit was closed by my turning the switch and..." Background: the house is being re-electrified. b) because I’m still expecting a visit." Other background. FraassenVsAristotle: his division into four is certainly oversimplified. Asymmetry/Explanation/(s): consists in that the event actually provides all the information, but the explanation requires only a certain piece of information. I 132 Asymmetry/Fraassen: Solution: it must at least sometimes be possible to reverse it by a change of context. Thus, the salient factors become clear. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Aristotle | Frege Vs Aristotle | Berka I 92 Syllogisms/FregeVsAristotle: his different types of inferences (when deriving one judgment from several) can all be represented by a single one: common form: if M is true, and N is true, A applies as well. Because it is possible to manage with a single type of inference, it is a commandment of clarity, to do just that. In addition: it would otherwise be no reason to remain with the Aristotelian ones, but you could add new ones into the indefinite.(1) 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 Stepanians I 9 Frege/Stepanians: his main question was: What are numbers? Thesis: they are something purely logical and therefore all propositions of arithmetic must be logically provable. I 10 FregeVsAristotle/Stepanians: not all propositions can be reduced to the form "S is P". Grammar/Frege: Mixes the logical and the psychological. I 11 Language/Philosophy of Language/Frege: ... the task of philosophy is to break the rule of the word over the human mind. Hence my Begriffsschrift. I 53 Quantifier/Quantifiers/Aristotle/Stepanians: even Aristotle had quantifiers: "all", "some", "none". Problem/Logic//VsAristotle: his system reached its limits as soon as the quantifiers occurred not only in the subject, but also in the predicate. E.g. "All the boys love all the girls." Solution/Frege: Begriffsschrift: expression of generality where it does not matter how many quantifiers occur in the subject or in the predicate. I 54 Generality/Frege: E.g. "2x2 = 4": where is the subject where the predicate? Solution/Frege: Letters/Frege: there are two types of characters in arithmetic: letters, each of which either represents a) an number left indeterminate or b) a function left indeterminate. Generality/Frege: is made possible by this indeterminacy! We can use the letters to express generality: E.g. (a+b)c = ac + bc. Ad a) includes characters such as +, - , 0, 1, 2... each of which has a particular meaning. Law/Generality/Frege/Stepanians: if we replace in a real equation as E.g. 3 + 2 = 2 + 3 the special numbers with letters, we get a law. Conversely, by inserting the same numbers for the same letters we can discover an infinite number of truths. I 55 Generality/Frege/Stepanians: Important argument: generality no longer refers either to the subject or to the predicate. E.g. "The number 11 is smaller than the number 13": Subject "The number 11", Predicate "is smaller than the number 13" ((s) VsStepanians: "Number 13" is not the predicate!) Both may be replaced with characters. Generalization/Frege/Stepanians: is an operation on the total content of the sentence. Letters/Variables/Spelling/Frege/Stepanians: where Frege used a, b, c, etc., we use today x, y, z.... Variables/Arithmetic/Logic/Stepanians: while in arithmetic the variables stand for numbers, this limitation to one domain in logic must be abolished. I 56 Domain/Universal Proposition/Conditions/Frege/Stepanians: Frege does not define a scope: E.g. "x is confused" should only apply to the realm of philosophers. Instead: condition: if something is a philosopher, it is confused. I 57 Important argument: this applies for everything, without exception, even for Sam’s goldfish: if x is a philosopher, x is confused. ((s)> counterfactual conditional). Generalization/Generality/FregeVsAristotle: the generalization applies to the whole sentence, not for either the subject or the predicate. Problem: how can the generalized be subjected to other operations E.g. specify exceptions, that not everything is confused? Wrong solution: "not x is confused". At best, "x is not confused", but that boils down to the fact that nothing is confused. I 58 Solution/Frege: external negation (operator that is applied to the whole sentence) ~(X) is confused. Boy/Girl/Aristotle/Frege/Stepanians: Solution/Frege: Whatever X and Y may be, if x is a boy and y is a girl, then x loves y. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Step I Markus Stepanians Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Aristotle | Lewis Vs Aristotle | IV 42 Essence/essentialism/LewisVsAristotle: essences of things are only secured to the extent that they are counterpart relations. And the counterpart relations are not very secure! >Counterparts/Lewis, >Counterpart Relation/Lewis, >Counterpart Theory/Lewis. This is due to the weaknesses of the similarity relation. Similarity/Lewis: problems: 1. Which aspects should count? 2. Which weights are assigned to the individual aspects? 3. What should be the minimum similarity that will be counted? 4. To what extent are candidates eliminated from the competition for the strongest similarity? Vagueness: concerns the counterpart relation and thus the essence and modality of the general. Conclusion: it is difficult to say anything wrong about essences at all. IV 43 a) extreme position: a suitable context may provide an anti-essentialist counterpart relation - one in which everything is counterpart to everything, and nothing has an essence worth mentioning. Or: Hazen: we could thus divide things into species and assume a counterpart relation according to which everything is counterpart to everything of its kind. Then the essence would simply be identical with the species. LewisVs: that would violate postulate P5: no thing may have a counterpart within its world. b) other extreme: hyper-essentialistic counterpart relation: nothing has a counterpart except itself. Then, according to P2, nothing has extra-worldly counterparts and nothing has accidental characteristics! |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Aristotle | Locke Vs Aristotle | II 182 Essence/Properties/LockeVsAristotle: the qualities of natural things or "substances" cannot be derived conceptually from their essence, as the Aristotelian scholastic tradition thought it possible. II 195 Knowledge/Rationalism/Aristotle/Descartes/Leibniz: assumption of innate knowledge, substantial forms and "entities" as defined and applied to knowledge. Empiricism/LockeVsAristotle: the objectivity of what is to be known and the unity of the consciousness content occurring in a general idea must be justified by the means of knowing itself. II 198 Genus/Species/LockeVsAristotle: purely artificial product is erroneously regarded as order of laws of nature. However, we can hardly escape the view that they are images of something that really exists. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Aristotle | Luhmann Vs Aristotle | AU Kass 10 LuhmannVsAristotle: he does something, whatever happens to me: to use space and time at the same time together. One imagines that the simultaneous is also spatially together. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Aristotle | Nozick Vs Aristotle | II 145 Relation/Law/Incident/Language/Interpretation/Nozick: Wittgenstein needed people to teach the language with its instances. Nozick: but it cannot be people who teach a natural law with its instances. Causal laws also apply for people, inter alia, and were valid before people existed. The consent of people to something depends on causality and cannot determine causality itself. (FN 22). Law/Nozick: therefore seems to have no own ontological status, because it cannot reach for incidents itself. Nevertheless, if a natural law only determines a pattern, it is merely descriptive. Without ontological status it cannot support counterfactual conditionals beyond actual events and how could laws then be used to explain something? Explanation/Nozick: how does a higher level pattern explain a lower level one? Is every explanation implicitly only a repetition? Explanation/Law/NozickVsAristotle: explanatory laws need not be necessary truths, but do they need to be anything at all? If events proceed according to laws, what is the connection between the event and the law? It can of course not be causal. ((s) recourse). But even any logical connection must be interpreted in turn. Can a lawlike statement interpret itself? I.e. can a law give instructions for the interpretation? Problem: these instructions would have to be interpreted again II 146 If the interpretation was to be fixed, the law would have to include something analogous to reflexive self-reference. This itself is mysterious. Hence, we must not treat laws as related to statements. Gödel: there is no formal system in which all the truths of number theory can be proved. Nozick: that is bad luck for a picture of all the facts from which the statements of fact can be completely derived. Determinism/Nozick: should therefore not rely on derivability from causal laws! (FN 23). NozickVsDeterminism: claims: if the initial state was repeated, the later states would also repeat themselves. Problem: in a re-collapsing universe other laws could apply for another big bang. I.e. the subjunctivist conditional, (subjunction = counterfactual conditional, unlike implication (metalinguistical)) on which determinism is based would be wrong. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Aristotle | Putnam Vs Aristotle | VSA V 104 Similarity/PutnamVsAristotle: if, as it seems, the similarity theory has failed, can we not simply postulate an abstract isomorphism that ensures allocation of sensations and concepts? Abstract isomorphism: allows to make all theories compatible. There are too many relationships; to single out the appropriate ones we would already need to have a reference access to the mind-independent things. To recognize a privileged reference we would need to have access to the "noumenal" world. Every physical event can be described in two different ways: --- V 105 E.g. Remote Effect/Close-up Effect: The different physical theories are metaphysically incompatible. Mathematically, however, they translate into each other! If nothing more is needed than an abstract correspondence, then incompatible theories may be true! --- V 200 PutnamVsAristotle: if we think differently from Aristotle today, we do it in that we are more pluralistic than he was. Aristotle: seems to have believed that ideally there was a basic constitution everyone should have. Today we think that even be in an ideal world there would be different basic constitutions. The belief in a pluralist ideal is not the same as the belief that every ideal is as good as any other. --- V 201 If something like moral wrongness did not exist, then it would not be wrong if the government were to prescribe moral choices. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Aristotle | Quine Vs Aristotle | EMD II 285 Necessity/QuineVsAristotle: cannot be considered independently of the way the objects are specified. Newen I 71 Synonymy/Two Dogmas/Quine: Problem: the concept is based on interchangeability salva veritate. Vs: Ex bachelor/unmarried man: "... has n letters". Here, interchangeability is not given salva veritate, although the words are synonymous. Variant: it must be possible to to exchange them in simple sentences without quotation marks. Vs: Example beings with a heart/beings with kidneys are koextensive. Variant: in simple modal contexts without quotation marks. Solution: for Ex heart/kidney, because it was not necessary but contingent that living beings with heart only developed if they also had kidneys. Newen I 72 QuineVs: QuineVsEssentialism/QuineVsAristotle. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Aristotle | Rorty Vs Aristotle | IV 117 Comprehensibility/Rorty: It is difficult to explain what it means to say that tables and chairs are incomprehensible, but God is not (or vice versa!). The logical positivism with its formal speech is in saome way a solution. Comprehensibility/Rorty: Problem from Parmenides to Ayer: we are constantly trying to define "conditions of intelligibility of a statement ..." although this statement itself does not meet the conditions specified. Comprehensibility/Aristotle/RortyVsAristotle: does not solve the problem at all, if he demands that the intellect become identical with the object, that renders the term "matter" incomprehensible. Comprehensibility/Noumenon/thing in itself/Kant/RortyVsKant/Rorty: in Kant, the concept of noumenon becomes incomprehensible, when he says an expression is meaningful if it stands for a mental content which forms a synthesis of sensual perceptions through a concept. ((s) through the synthesis of the sensible to the mental). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Aristotle | Sellars Vs Aristotle | Rorty VI 181 SellarsVsAristotle/Rorty: misleading description of the relation between objects and knowledge. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Aristotle | Verschiedene Vs Aristotle | Stegmüller IV 282/283 SidgwickVsAristotle: through him one gets to know "only the environment" of virtues: a general normative criterion of demarcation is missing. Solution/Mackie: content filling. Possibilities: 1. Orientation to behavioural conventions of the respective time. 2. To orientate oneself towards what one considers to be the right thing to do. 3. Orientation to Hume: reason can never be the motive for or against an action! Passions and preferences are logically independent of conclusions. Nevertheless, Hume also sees that there are practically tactically reasonable preferences. Mackie: even complete lack of passion does not allow a clear view of things. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Aristotle | Bigelow Vs Aristotle | I 220 Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are improved: E.g. Aristotle - Copernicus - Newton. Copernicus: still thought that the material of the moon does not fall towards the Earth, but towards the center of the Moon. Therefore, the moon is round. Aristotle: Thesis: everything (earthy and hydrous) falls to a center and this happens to be the center of the earth. Important argument: with that he also fulfils the quasi-Copernican theory! I 221 BigelowVsAristotle: his theory was still wrong. But not because any movement should have been different, but because the reasoning was wrong: it is about gravity, Aristotle considered the center of the Earth to be the center of the cosmos. Error: was not that Aristotle said that no object would fall in a different direction, but because he thought that no object could fall in a different direction. (Necessity). I 352 BigelowVsAristotle: we disapprove of his preference for quantitative over quantitative properties of objects. I 362 Real numbers/Bigelow/Pargetter: Suppose the golden ratio did not exist, would there be no real numbers? I 363 Is the existence of real numbers contingent with the existence of quantities? Aristotle/Bigelow/Pargetter: Demands that every quantity must be instantiated in order to exist. VsAristotle: that seems to make mathematical facts dependent on empirical facts. Platonism/Bigelow/Pargetter: for him all quantities exist regardless of whether or not they are instantiated. This guarantees pure mathematics. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Aristotle | Bacon Vs Aristotle | Bubner I 123 BaconVsAristotle: "Novum Organon" (!620): Weariness of scholastic formalism. Turning to empiricism and realism. "Once people have become dependent on the judgment of another, (senators without vote) they no longer enhance science, they confine themselves to praising certain writers ..." Bacon: per induction from concrete sensually given things, Vs futile dialectics of Aristotle consisting of syllogisms. John D. Barrow Die Natur der Natur, Hamburg 1996 I 509 Francis BaconVsAristoteles: gave up on deductive logical reason. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Aristotle | Hempel. Vs Aristotle | Bubner I 127 Deduction Scheme/HempelVsAristotle/Hempel: C1,C2,...Ck L1,L2,....Lr E (description of the phenomenon) The laws therefore fall under the premises. (The only significant innovation VsAristotle). GoodmanVsHempel: lawlike statements instead of laws! Induction: the "new puzzle of induction" does not affect the confirmation, but the original formation of hypotheses. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Aristotle | Simons Vs Aristotle | I 241 Primordial Matter/SimonsVsAristotle: the primordial matter fell from grace because of Aristotle who brought together the following two concepts: a) the substrate of change (change) and b) the carrier of properties. VsAristotle: it was an unhappy (perhaps metaphorical) formulation of "withdrawing" all attributes (shape) of the things to obtain them pure, that means as formless matter which only potentially cannot exist for real. Simons: but we do not have to bring a) and b) together. Primordial Matter/Simons: the primordial matter may well have its own special characteristics. Pro Aristotle: if we follow the chain downwards we already recognize that more and more characteristics are lost and that the micro-objects become simpler. Diversity/tradition/Simons: diversity was explained by the combination options of simpler building blocks. That would come to an end with a basic building block. Then you could explain all the qualities by relations between the constituents. This can already be found in the Tractatus. Foundation Stones/Tractatus/Simons: (2.0231-2): foundation stones are colorless. Simons: but the foundation stones have quite characteristics, even the objects of the Tractatus are not bare particulars, but their properties are modal (if they are to be essential and internally (internal) or if they are accidentally real (Tractatus 2.0233). I 291 Sum/mereology/Simons: there are even sums across the categories (mixed-categorical sums): e.g. a body and the events that happen to it ((s) its life story!). SimonsVsFour Dimensionalism: a sum is also more evidently understood than this four-dimensional block. Universal Realism/Simons: universal realism could construct individual things with properties as a sum of concrete carriers and abstract characteristics. Simons: these examples are at least not arbitrary. Whole/Wholeness/Simons: the whole appears to be equally arbitrary definition dependent (SimonsVsWholeness, Vs German Philosophy Between The World Wars). I 292 Whole/Aristotle/Simons: the whole seems to require inner relations towards a sum. Inner Relations/whole/Aristotle: e.g.: continuity, firmness, uniformity, qualitative equality, to be of the same type, to be made of the same matter. This includes species and genera. SimonsVsAristotle: the list is merely impressionistic and does not mention the most important relation: causation. Husserl/Simons: Husserl discusses the most Aristotelian problems, without mentioning his name. Def "pregnant whole"/Husserl: the "pregnant whole" is an object whose parts are connected by relation foundation (>Foundation/Husserl, Foundation/Simons). Foundation/Husserl/terminology/Simons: a foundation can be roughly described as ontological dependence (oD). Substance/tradition/Simons: the substance is (sort of) ontologically independent. Ontological Dependence/oD/Simons: to have a substantial part is ontological dependent. I 318 Independence/ontology/Simons: where independence is seen as positive (dependent objects are then those of a 2nd class) - as such many times in philosophy (rather theology) - is about the existence of God. Substance/Aristotle: the substance is a very weak form of independence. Def primary: primary ist, what can be without other things while other things cannot exist without it. SimonsVsAristotle: that is not accurate enough. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Aristotle | Minsky Vs Aristotle | Münch III 125 Common Sense/Everyday Problems/MinskyVsAristotle: more logical approaches do not work. Syllogisms do not cope with the everyday complexity of problem solving. Axioms: "You do not leave the house undressed" etc. Since logicians do not have to do with systems that can be extended later, they have to design axioms that only allow permitted conclusions. Intelligence is different. Marvin Minsky, “A framework for representing knowledge” in: John Haugeland (Ed) Mind, design, Montgomery 1981, pp. 95-128 |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Aristotle | Galilei Vs Aristotle | Genz I 18 Fallversuche/Gedankenexperiment/GalileiVsAristotle: wenn ein leichter Körper langsamer fällt als ein schwerer, dann müssten zwei unterschiedliche Körper, aneinandergebunden zusammen langsamer fallen, da der leichtere den schnelleren Fall des schwereren bremst. Andererseits müssten beide zusammen aber schneller fallen, da der schwerere den langsameren leichteren beschleunigt. Drittens müssten sie noch schneller fallen, da die Summe einen noch schwereren Gegenstand ergibt. Genz: modern gesprochen: das Äquivalenzprinzip, die Gleichheit von schwerer und träger Masse ist hier noch gar nicht impliziert. (Es war Galilei noch nicht bekannt). Es hätte mit diesem GE auch nicht bewiesen werden können! Genz I 29 GenzVsGalilei: das Argument Galileis ist nicht schlüssig: was, wenn schwere und träge Masse nicht additiv wären? Sein Argument ist ziemlich aristotelisch! Es ist zwar physikalisch richtig, aber mit Lücken. Aus der Verallgemeinerung einer Annahme folgt, dass neu gewonnene Ergebnisse gleichzeitig größer und kleiner sein müssten. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Disposition Theory | Kripke Vs Disposition Theory | Esfeld I 102 Disposition/Rule/Rule-following/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Esfeld: KripkeVsDispositions: Kripke (1982) (S.A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge, 1982): Do not help, because they are also limited. They are also unable to solve the Problem of Normativity: Why would the act that one is predisposed to do the same one should do if intending to follow the rule? No distinction possible between correct/incorrect. Kripke: He takes it on further than Quine who concentrated on behavior (Quine in Word and Object, explicitly based on Wittgenstein). I 103 Meaning/Contents: If one assumes that they were platonic objects, the problem is only deferred: How can a person capture these senses? What does it matter that a finite sequence of mental acts grasps the true meaning? (E.g. addition). Katz: Proposes that such platonic objects (Fregean Sense) themselves are finite. VsKatz: Every finite sequence can express more than one particular sense. What is the difference between both the conception of addition and quaddition? Form/KripkeVsAristotle: same problem: If you wanted to assume like A. that natural properties are inherent in all physical objects, the question is how to recognize the right ones! I 104 Grue/Natural Property: N.P. is e.g. "green" contrary to grue. Problem: Every finite number of examples instantiates more than just one natural characteristic. E.g. a table can be brown, and can also have four legs. We may not figure out which aspects a person refers to. Kripke: Asserts that Wittgenstein himself advocates the skeptical position I 105 and proposes a skeptical solution, in analogy to Hume’s solution regarding the Problem of Causation. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Newen Vs Quine, W.V.O. | New I 129 Concept/Holism/Quine/NewenVsQuine/Newen: not all concepts are linked to all others. E.g. color concepts are independent of the concept of the electron. NS I 68 Meaning/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: Quine is a meaning skeptic. His raw material for a reconstruction of a theory of meaning are the empirical sciences. Two Dogmas/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: is Quine's largest "Wrecking Ball". NS I 69 Two Dogmas/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: 1. Dogma: distinction analytic/synthetic 2. Dogma: reductionism: any meaningful synthetic sentence is equivalent to a sentence whose terms all refer to the sensory experience. Meaning/Two Dogmas/Quine: the concept of meaning is not well defined. Analyticity/Analytical/Two Dogmas/Quine: 1) Experimental Definition: "... true because of the meanings of the words in it, regardless of empirical facts. Vs: Problem: the transition from e.g. "every unmarried man is unmarried" to "every bachelor is unmarried". Analytical: its definition thus depends on the concept of meaning. Meaning/Quine: Problem: reference objects cannot always serve: e.g. creatures with heart/kidneys. Same Extension. But only because of the (random) evolution), not because of the meaning of words. It cannot always be true solely on the basis of the meaning of words, because the words are different ((s) and "heart" and "kidneys" just are not synonymous.) NS I 70 Today: VsQuine/Newen/Schrenk: recent developments have advanced: although meaning is not the same as the reference object, the reference object may be part of the meaning. (see below >natural kinds). Synonymy/Quine: is closely linked to the concept of meaning. If you wished that the meaning was an abstract object, then the class of all synonymous terms/sentences can serve as this abstraction. It follows a new definition: Analyticity/Analytical/Two Dogmas/Quine: 2) Experimental Definition: a statement is analytically true if it is true because of synonymy relations and regardless of facts. Point: "meaning" does not occur here anymore. New: the class of the synonymous sentences of w.g. "every bachelor is unmarried" contains the sentence "all unmarried men..." NS I 71 Dictionary/Two Dogmas/Lexicon/Quine: the dictionary already presumes the concept of synonymy. Dictionaries are empirical hypotheses about the use. Synonymy/Two Dogmas/Quine: Problem: the concept is based on interchangeability salva veritate. Vs: example Bachelor/unmarried man: "... has n letters". Here, interchangeability salva veritate is not given, although the words are synonymous. Variant: it must be possible to exchange them in simple sentences without quotation marks. Vs: e.g. heart/kidneys Variant: in simple modal contexts without quotation marks... Solution: for example heart/kidneys, because it was not necessary but contingent that living creatures with hearts have only evolved if they also had kidneys. NS I 72 QuineVs: QuineVsEssentialism/QuineVsAristotle. Essentialism/VsQuine/Newen/Schrenk: in modern metaphysics and philosophy of science essentialism is experiencing a comeback. (Lit 4-4). NS I 74 Analyticity/Synonymy/Meaning/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: these expressions are not well defined. Solution/Quine: stimulus meaning: consists of positive and negative stimulus meaning: also contains irrelevant stimuli, i.e. the total package of stimuli on one occasion that lead a particular speaker to accept or decline. It is only a pale imitation of the original concept of meaning. This is part of Quine's meaning nihilism. NS I 75 Stimulus Synonymy: only for defined speaker. The same stimulus meaning. Stimulus Analyticity: only for defined speaker. Agreement with each stimulus. Differs from the original analyticity concept. NS I 76 Indeterminacy/Gavagai/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: 1) inscrutability of reference: E.g. unseparated rabbit parts comply with the same observation situations 2) indeterminacy of translation: E.g. unseparated rabbit part: can a) "be the same" b) "belong to the same thing" (both in the foreign language! This goes beyond the inscrutability of reference 3) underdetermination (of a theory) by the data: (corresponds to translation indeterminacy): there may be rival theories that match the same number of observations. VsQuine: some argue that it never comes to radical translations, because many aspects of language are evolutionarily enscribed in the brain and cannot vary so widely (literature: 4-2). I.e. only the third uncertainty remains. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
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