Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vitalism | Dennett Vs Vitalism | Metz II 691 VsArtificial Consciousness/VsRobots/Dennett: Traditional ArgumentsVsArtificial Intelligence: 1) Robots are purely physical objects, while something immaterial is required for consciousness. DennettVs: That is Cartesian dualism. II 692 2) Robots are not organic, consciousness can only exist in organic brains. (Vitalism) DennettVsVitalism: Is deservedly dead, since the biochemistry showed that the properties in all organic compounds can be mechanistically reduced and therefore are also reproducible at any scale in another physical medium. 3) Robots are artifacts and only something natural, born may have consciousness. (Chauvinism of origin). DennettVsChauvinism of Origin/Forgery/Dennett: II 694 E.g. A fake cheap wine can also be a good wine if experts consider it good. E.g. A fake Cézanne is also a good picture, if "experts" consider it good. Dennett: but these distinctions represent a dangerous nonsense if they refer to alleged "intrinsic properties". (That means that the molecules would still needed the consecrations of a befitting birth; that would be racism). (By the way, the robot COG passes through a childhood period of learning). Forgery/Dennett: Whether a fake is produced artificially atom by atom, (but in the same molecule compounds) may have legal consequences with respect to a clone that does not deserve the same punishment. II 695 Dennett: E.g. The movie "Schindler’s List" could in principle be produced artificially through computer animation, because it only consists of two-dimensional gray tones on the screen. II 696 4) Robots will always be too simple to have consciousness. Dennett: this is the only acceptable argument, even if we try to refute it. The human body consists of trillions of individual parts. But wherever one looks, one discovers functional similarities at higher levels that allow us to replace hellishly complex modules with relatively simple ones. II 697 There is no reason to believe that any part of the brain could not be substituted. Robots/Dennett: Robot enthusiasts who believe it is easy to construct a conscious robot reveal an infantile understanding of the real world with the intricacies of consciousness. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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